The Later Wittgenstein and the Rule-Following Problem
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
From Logic to Practice
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953) had already played a role in The Late Wittgenstein as a Systematic Response to the Failure of the Vienna Circle. But their full impact unfolded only in the 1970s and 1980s — especially through Kripke’s interpretation, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982).[1]
The rule-following problem: How can I be sure that I am following a rule correctly? When I compute “plus” (2+2=4), how do I know that I am not actually following a different rule (“quus”), one that works like “plus” for small numbers but yields different results for large ones?
Kripke’s interpretation: there is no fact that determines which rule I am following. Rules are not stored in my head like data in a computer. Rule-following is a social practice — I follow the rule the way my community follows it. Meaning is public, not private.
The Hegelian turn: This is Hegel’s critique of the “abstract I” — the notion that meaning, rules, and thought are anchored in the isolated individual. For Hegel, consciousness arises only through recognition by others; language is objective spirit, not private representation. Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein makes the same point in analytic terms: meaning is socially constituted.[2]
The Pittsburgh School will develop this insight systematically: Brandom understands concepts as “social practices of giving and asking for reasons” — a pragmatist reformulation of Hegel’s objective spirit.