Charles Taylor - The Canadian Bridge (1961-1975)
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
The Mediator between Continents
Charles Taylor (b. 1931) is Canadian, studies in Montreal and Oxford, receives his doctorate in 1961 on Hegel under Isaiah Berlin (of all people, the critic of Hegel!). His dissertation is later expanded into the book “Hegel” (1975)—the most extensive Hegel commentary in English up to that point.[1]
But what matters for our period is: Taylor already begins in the 1960s to receive Hegel productively—as a bridge between analytic and continental philosophy.
The biographical constellation: Taylor studies not only under Berlin at Oxford but also under Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Paris. He is familiar with the phenomenological tradition (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), but also with analytic philosophy (Ryle, Austin, Berlin). His philosophy connects both traditions—and Hegel is the hinge.[2]
Hegel against Atomism and Utilitarianism
Taylor’s early works (1960s) criticize atomism—the idea that society consists of isolated individuals pursuing their interests. This idea dominates Anglo-American political philosophy (liberalism, utilitarianism, rational choice theory). Taylor shows: atomism is incoherent—it cannot explain how social bonds, moral obligations, collective identities arise.[3]
The alternative: expressivism—the idea that human beings realize themselves by unfolding their capacities. This is not egoistic (as utilitarianism is), because self-realization is social—I can only realize myself in relation to others, in communities, in institutions.
The Hegel connection: this is Hegel’s Sittlichkeit against Moralität. Moralität thinks abstractly (everyone has rights, independent of context). Sittlichkeit thinks concretely (I am a daughter, a citizen, a colleague—these roles constitute me). Self-realization is not individualistic but socially embedded.
Critique of naturalism: Taylor argues against the reduction of morality to biology, psychology, economics. Moral judgments are not “merely subjective” or “evolutionarily conditioned.” They have a status of their own—they are articulations of what it means to be a human being. This is not metaphysics but hermeneutics—the explication of meanings already operative in our practices.[4]
Recognition as a Key Concept
Already in the 1960s, Taylor develops the concept of recognition—which later (in the 1990s) becomes the center of his political philosophy. The basic idea: identity is not self-made but recognition-dependent. I become who I am through being recognized by others—as a daughter, as a citizen, as a philosopher.
This is Hegel’s master-slave dialectic—transformed into a theory of modern identity. Recognition is not struggle (as in Hegel’s Phenomenology) but mutual affirmation. Modern societies must create structures in which all members are recognized—not only as legal subjects (formal equality), but as individuals with particular capacities, cultural affiliations, life projects.[5]
Outlook: Taylor will develop these ideas further in the 1980s and 1990s—in “Sources of the Self” (1989) and “The Politics of Recognition” (1994). But already in the 1960s it is clear: for Taylor, Hegel is not a historical relic but a living resource for contemporary problems.
Charles Taylor: Hegel (1975). ↩︎
On the biographical constellation see Ruth Abbey: Charles Taylor (2000), chapter 1. ↩︎
Charles Taylor: “Atomism” (1979), reprinted in: id.: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1985). ↩︎
Charles Taylor: “The Diversity of Goods” (1982), reprinted in: id.: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (1985). ↩︎
Charles Taylor: “The Politics of Recognition” (1992), expanded from earlier work. ↩︎