Systematic Assessment 1945-1968 - The Hidden Continuity

This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.

The Double Movement

The Anglo-American reception of Hegel from 1945 to 1968 shows a double movement:

On the surface: radical rejection (Russell, Ayer, Popper). Hegel is considered a metaphysician, an obscurantist, a proto-totalitarian. Analytic philosophy defines itself through the negation of Hegel.

Underneath: productive transformation (Collingwood, Oakeshott, Dewey, Sellars, Findlay, Taylor). Central Hegelian insights are taken up—historicity, contextuality, conceptual mediation, social constitution—but naturalized, pragmatized, de-metaphysicized.

The rejection is loud, the appropriation quiet. But the quiet appropriation is more effective—it prepares the Hegel renaissance of the 1980s and 1990s.

What Remains, What Goes?

What the analytic critique destroys:

  • The philosophy of history as teleology (the idea that history necessarily leads to progress)
  • Absolute metaphysics (the idea that philosophy can know the Absolute)
  • System-closure (the idea that there is an “absolute knowing” from which everything can be understood)

What the pragmatist/hermeneutic appropriation preserves:

  • Mediation instead of immediacy (Sellars: no myth of the given)
  • Historicity instead of ahistoricity (Collingwood: history as re-enactment)
  • Social constitution instead of atomism (Taylor: expressivism)
  • Conceptuality instead of empiricism (Findlay: categories as structures)

The systematic point: one can think in Hegelian terms without being a Hegelian. One can adopt his method (mediation, reflection, social constitution) without accepting his metaphysics (absolute spirit, world history as theodicy).

The Three Traditions

By 1968, three traditions have emerged that transform Hegel differently:

  1. Pragmatism (Dewey, Hook): Hegel naturalized—thinking as problem-solving, institutions as practice, truth as validation.

  2. Hermeneutics (Collingwood, Oakeshott, Taylor): Hegel contextualized—understanding as re-enactment, ethical life as tradition, identity as socially constituted.

  3. Analytic reconstruction (Sellars, Findlay): Hegel formalized—categories as conceptual structures, mediation as logical necessity, system as the architecture of thought.

These three traditions will converge in the 1980s and 1990s—in the Pittsburgh School (Brandom, McDowell), which integrates all three strands: pragmatist (thinking as practice), hermeneutic (socially constituted), analytic (conceptual structures). But that is a story for Volume III.

Outlook: What Is Still Missing?

By 1968, still missing are:

  • A systematic reconstruction of the Logic (this comes only with Pippin, Houlgate in the 1980s)
  • A political philosophy on Hegelian foundations (this comes with Taylor, Honneth in the 1990s)
  • A naturalistic metaphysics (this comes with Brandom, McDowell in the 2000s)

But the foundations have been laid. Anglo-American philosophy has not overcome Hegel—it has transformed him. The question is no longer: Hegel or analysis? But rather: which form of Hegel-reception does justice to the complexity of modern rationality?