Systematic Assessment: What Remains of Western European Euro-Marxism?
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
The Western European Marxist receptions of Hegel – in France, Italy, and West Germany – were more diverse and productive than Moscow’s orthodoxy. They argued within the context of free societies, even though they oriented themselves politically toward the communist parties. This tension – free thought in the service of an unfree movement – shaped their philosophy.
What remains productive?
1. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony: the insight that domination is not only coercion but consent – through culture, education, ideology. This remains central today for the analysis of media, populism, cultural struggle. Gramsci shows: Hegel is not merely a philosopher of the state, but a theorist of civil society. Ethical life is the field where domination and resistance are mediated.
2. Sève’s humanism: the insight that Marxism needs a theory of personality – how do human beings develop? Without this, Marxism remains abstract. Sève asked the right question, even if his answers remained bound to PCF orthodoxy.
3. The historical-political defense of Hegel: D’Hondt’s and Losurdo’s demonstration that liberal Hegel-criticism (Popper, Russell) often reveals more about the critics than about Hegel. The question of the political conditions under which philosophy arises remains relevant. The line D’Hondt -> Losurdo -> Vieweg shows: this perspective outlives Marxism as a movement.
4. Holz’s history of dialectics: the most comprehensive materialist account of the dialectical tradition – a reference work useful even to non-Marxists.
5. Holzkamp’s Critical Psychology: the question of the subject within social relations – how does the capacity for action develop? This connects Hegel, Marx, and empirical psychology. Hegel’s concept of Bildung (formation) can be made empirically fruitful.
What remains problematic?
1. Althusser’s anti-humanism: the idea that there is no subject, only structures – this is philosophically questionable (how then does practice arise?) and politically dangerous (it legitimizes authority: “the structure demands it!”). Althusser’s “epistemological break” between the young and the mature Marx was influential, but misses the continuity that connects both with Hegel.
2. Della Volpe’s and Colletti’s empiricism: the reduction of Marx to empirical research and the return to Kant – this misses the dialectical method. One needs both: empirical research and conceptual mediation. Colletti’s later conversion to liberalism shows the instability of this position.
3. Political attachment to the parties: many Western European Marxists defended Soviet positions for too long – or kept silent about the crimes. This discredited their philosophical work. The PCF and PCI were intellectually productive but politically blind to the reality of “actually existing socialism.”
4. The failure of theoretical integration: the question Althusser posed – how does scientific analysis relate to philosophical speculation? – was never satisfactorily answered. Structuralism eliminated the subject; humanism underestimated the structures. A genuine synthesis never materialized.
The lesson for a contemporary reception of Hegel
Western European Euro-Marxism shows: one can go beyond Marx with Hegel – or correct Marx with Hegel. But it also shows the limits of a philosophy that binds itself to political movements.
The most productive insights – Gramsci’s hegemony, Sève’s theory of personality, D’Hondt’s historical contextualization – are not bound to Marxism as a movement. They can be integrated into a broader critical theory.
The most problematic tendencies – Althusser’s subjectlessness, political loyalty against better knowledge – show what happens when philosophy becomes party work.