Entanglement with National Socialism - A Painful Balance Sheet

Kai Froeb2026

This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume I, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.

German Hegel research of the interwar period faced a crucial test when the National Socialists seized power in 1933. How did the Hegelians relate to the new regime? The answer is shameful: most could “live” with National Socialism - some actively welcomed it, others remained silent, few resisted.[1]

The Majority: Adaptation and Silence

Academic Hegelians - professors, private lecturers, secondary school teachers - for the most part adapted. They did not lose their professorships, continued to publish, continued to lecture. Some carefully reformulated their positions, avoided controversies, swam with the spirit of the times. Others remained silent about the regime’s crimes and concentrated on “unpolitical” subjects - the logic of being, metaphysics, the history of philosophy.[2]

This attitude was understandable - and nevertheless culpable. The philosophers had a responsibility they did not fulfill. Hegel’s philosophy of freedom, of recognition, of rational statehood - all of this should have been mobilized against National Socialism. But most remained silent.

The silence of the majority enabled the regime to establish itself. Opposition would have meant risk - but philosophers who wrote about freedom and reason should have taken on these risks. Their silence was a betrayal of their own discipline.[3] There were exceptions such as Theodor Litt in Leipzig, but they remained a minority.

The Propagandists: Active Support

Some Hegelians went further than silence - they actively supported the regime. They interpreted Hegel nationalistically, in völkisch terms, authoritarian terms. They constructed a continuity from Hegel to Hitler - historically absurd, but politically effective.

Theodor Haering (1884-1964) was a prominent example. The author of the monumental Hegel biography Hegel - sein Wollen und sein Werk (1929/1938) was more than a mere fellow traveler. He was a leading member of the National Socialist Lecturers League (NS-Dozentenbund), joined the NSDAP on May 1, 1937 (membership number 5,896,006), and understood “philosophy as spiritual racial science” (the title of a 1939 lecture). In a text from 1935 he wrote: “Alongside the racial principle stands the Führer principle.” Haering participated in the Nazi project “War Effort of the Humanities” and adhered to anti-democratic convictions even after the war. In 1948 he was classified as a “fellow traveler” (Mitläufer) - a euphemism - and lost his civil rights for three years, but was rehabilitated and reinstated in 1951 under the so-called “131 Law” (a West German law reinstating former civil servants, including many former Nazis).[4]

Hermann Glockner (1896-1979), who edited the monumental “Jubiläumsausgabe” of Hegel’s works (1927-1940), was far more than an opportunistic conformist. The reason for his appointment to Gießen in 1933 by the already-established National Socialist regime was his work on the “struggle against Semitic influence in German philosophy of recent decades,” which - according to the official justification - stood “on the firm ground of the National Socialist worldview.”[5]

From 1933 to 1937, Glockner was dean of the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Gießen - during the period of “purges” and the expulsion of Jewish colleagues. He advanced the thesis “that Hitler’s significance for politics would be the same as Hegel’s for philosophy.”[6] Glockner’s philosophy was classified by the Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS in an “SD dossier on philosophy professors” as “politically unobjectionable” and “determined by the principles of National Socialism.”[7]

In 1934 Glockner joined the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (Nazi welfare organization), and from 1934 he was editor of the Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie. In 1942 he joined the National Socialist German Lecturers League. His application for NSDAP membership was rejected - presumably due to the admission freeze then in effect, not for political reasons.

The irony: Glockner’s Jubiläumsausgabe remained the standard edition of Hegel into the 1970s. The scholarly quality of his editorial work is undisputed - but it was embedded in active ideological collaboration, not mere adaptation.

After the war, Glockner was appointed in 1951 to the Technical University of Braunschweig - his denazification process apparently classified him as a “fellow traveler,” which, given his tenure as dean and his ideological positioning, represents a considerable trivialization. In 1971 he received the Golden Mayoral Medal of his hometown Fürth, and in 1980 a street was named after him.[8]

This instrumentalization was possible because Hegel is ambiguous. His philosophy of the state emphasizes the authority of the state - but it equally emphasizes the constitutional limits of that authority. His philosophy of history speaks of the “World Spirit” - but this World Spirit is not a Germanic folk spirit. The National Socialist reading was a deliberate misreading - but it could latch onto certain passages of text.

The tragedy: precisely the nuance of Hegel’s position made it vulnerable to abuse. Simple positions - “all state power is evil” or “every state is divine” - cannot be so easily reinterpreted. Hegel’s mediating position - “the state is ethical insofar as it is rational” - offered points of connection for various interpretations.

The Exceptions: Resistance and Integrity

a) Theodor Litt - Pedagogical Resistance and Premature Emeritus Status

Theodor Litt (1880-1962), professor of philosophy and pedagogy in Leipzig, belonged to that small number who did not bend to National Socialism. His position was not spectacular resistance like that of the Kreisau Circle, but a consistent refusal to conform.

Confrontation as rector: Already as rector of the University of Leipzig (1931-1932), Litt came into conflict with the National Socialist Student League. His inaugural address of October 31, 1931 broke with the academic tradition of giving insight into one’s own research. Instead, Litt appealed to the university’s responsibility to preserve its independence - a barely veiled warning against the looming forced conformity (Gleichschaltung, the Nazi process of bringing institutions into line with the regime).[9]

The pedagogical prohibition of overwhelming: Litt’s philosophical position made him incompatible with the Nazi regime. His work Führen oder Wachsenlassen (1927, “Leading or Letting Grow”) had formulated the “pedagogical prohibition of overwhelming” (Überwältigungsverbot): education must not become indoctrination but must enable the self-formation of the individual. This position was a direct rejection of totalitarian concepts of education.[10]

The consequences: In 1937 Litt was banned from lecturing and prematurely retired. The justification was clear: his rejection of “irrational, organological, and romantic ideologies,” together with his insistence on respecting the developing human being, made him intolerable to the regime. Nevertheless, Litt continued to publish - his writings were veiled but recognizable critiques of Nazi ideology.[11]

The systematic significance: Litt’s case shows that Hegel’s dialectical anthropology - correctly understood - immunized against totalitarian appropriation. His thesis of the reciprocal constitution of individual and community excluded both extremes: atomistic individualism and collectivist dissolution. National Socialism was philosophically untenable for Litt because it replaced mediation with violence.

Note: Litt’s philosophical influence unfolded less during the interwar period than in the Federal Republic after 1945. Through his student Wolfgang Klafki, he shaped democratic educational theory and - transmitted through the “pedagogical prohibition of overwhelming” - the Beutelsbach Consensus of 1976 (a foundational principle of German civic education requiring balanced, non-indoctrinating instruction). His philosophy and its postwar influence are treated in detail in Volume II.1, Chapter 4.4.

b) Adam von Trott zu Solz - Resistance from Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom

Adam von Trott zu Solz (1909-1944) went further than passive refusal - he became an active resistance fighter. Jurist, diplomat, member of the Kreisau Circle - and reader of Hegel. His 1931 doctoral dissertation dealt with “Hegel’s philosophy of the state and international law.”[12]

The philosophical justification: Trott grounded his resistance in Hegel’s philosophy of freedom and mutual recognition. For him, National Socialism was the negation of everything Hegel had understood by “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). A regime that annihilated millions could not be “rational.” A state that denied universal recognition was no true state.[13]

The tragic end: After the failed assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, Trott was arrested, sentenced to death, and executed. His final letters testify to the philosophical conviction that resistance against barbarism was a moral duty - an attitude that grew out of his reading of Hegel.[14]

c) The Lesson from the Exceptions

These exceptions show: Hegel could also be read otherwise. The philosophy of reason was not necessarily affirmative. It could be critical, resistant - if one took it seriously. Litt and Trott took it seriously.

The question remains: why were there so few? The answer lies in a reception of Hegel that had neglected the critical dimension. The German Hegelians had read Hegel as a philosopher of the state - as legitimator of the existing order. They had overlooked that Hegel was at the same time a critic of any order that was merely positive, not rational.

The Lessons for the Postwar Period

The entanglement of German Hegel research with National Socialism had long-term consequences. After 1945, Hegel stood under suspicion - not only in the Anglo-American world (where Popper formulated the indictment), but in Germany itself. Many young philosophers turned away - from Hegel, from German idealism, from systematic philosophy altogether.[15]

The task of the postwar generation was therefore twofold: first, the philological reconstruction of the “true” Hegel - beyond the nationalist distortions. Second, the systematic reckoning with the question of how Hegel’s philosophy could be instrumentalized - and how it can be immunized against such instrumentalization.[16]

This task remains unfinished to this day. The question of how systematic philosophy can be connected to totalitarian politics remains urgent. Is Hegel’s systematic thinking structurally vulnerable? Or was the National Socialist reading a complete misunderstanding? The answer is nuanced: Hegel’s position is not totalitarian - but it contains elements that, when improperly isolated, can be interpreted in a totalitarian sense.[17]

The lesson: philosophy is never “unpolitical.” Even the most abstract logic has political implications. The responsibility of those who philosophize consists in reflecting on these implications - and defending against their abuse. Most German Hegelians did not fulfill this responsibility between 1933 and 1945. That is the painful balance sheet.[18]

  1. On the general entanglement of German philosophers with National Socialism, see fundamentally Christian Tilitzki: Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich, 2 vols., Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002. An overview of individual persons is provided by Ernst Klee: Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945?, Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2003. ↩︎

  2. The strategy of retreating into “unpolitical” subjects was widespread but illusory. Even the seemingly most abstract logic had political implications that could not escape instrumentalization. See Herbert Marcuse: “The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State” (1934), in: Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, pp. 3-42. ↩︎

  3. The problem of academic silence was intensely discussed after 1945. Karl Jaspers criticized the “moral guilt” of the silent in Die Schuldfrage (1946, “The Question of German Guilt”). Even if not all were legally guilty, they bore a share of responsibility for what happened. See Karl Jaspers: Die Schuldfrage, Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1946; new edition Munich: Piper, 1979. ↩︎

  4. Ernst Klee: Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich, Weltbild Verlag, 5th ed. 2008, p. 187 (on Haering). ↩︎

  5. Ernst Klee: Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich, op. cit., p. 187. ↩︎

  6. FürthWiki: “Hermann Glockner,” op. cit. ↩︎

  7. Leaman, Georg/Simon, Gerd: “Deutsche Philosophen aus der Sicht des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichsführers SS,” in: Jahrbuch für Soziologie-Geschichte 1992, pp. 261-292. ↩︎

  8. FürthWiki: “Hermann Glockner,” https://www.fuerthwiki.de/wiki/index.php/Hermann_Glockner (accessed January 2026). ↩︎

  9. The rectoral address is documented in the University Archive of Leipzig. On Litt’s stance under National Socialism, see: Christian Tilitzki, Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich, 2 vols., Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 687-694. ↩︎

  10. Theodor Litt, Führen oder Wachsenlassen. Eine Erörterung des pädagogischen Grundproblems, Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner 1927. The work went through 13 editions by 1967, demonstrating its lasting significance. ↩︎

  11. On Litt’s publications 1937-1945, see: Peter Müller, “Litt, Theodor,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 14 (1985), pp. 700-702. Der deutsche Geist und das Christentum (1938) in particular can be read as veiled critique. ↩︎

  12. The dissertation was published as: Adam von Trott zu Solz, Hegels Staatsphilosophie und das internationale Recht, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1932. ↩︎

  13. On the philosophical dimension, see: Giles MacDonogh, A Good German: Adam von Trott zu Solz, London: Quartet Books, 1989; German edition: Ein guter Deutscher, Munich: dtv, 1991. ↩︎

  14. Documented in: Clarita von Trott zu Solz (ed.), Adam von Trott zu Solz. Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften und Briefen, Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1994. ↩︎

  15. Karl Popper formulated the most influential postwar critique of Hegel in The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols., London: Routledge, 1945. Volume 2 bears the subtitle “The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath.” Popper’s critique is largely a caricature, but it articulated a widespread unease with systematic philosophy after the experiences of totalitarianism. See the critical engagement with Popper in Walter Kaufmann: “The Hegel Myth and Its Method,” op. cit. ↩︎

  16. This dual task was taken up by various approaches: systematic Hegel research (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dieter Henrich, Michael Theunissen) worked on the philological reconstruction. Critical theory of the Frankfurt School (Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas) reflected on the dialectic of enlightenment and barbarism. Both strands often remained unconnected - a productive integration is still lacking. ↩︎

  17. This question is still controversially discussed today. Conservative critics (such as Joachim Ritter and his students) emphasize the modernity of Hegel’s position and his defense of the rule of law. Left-wing critics (such as Adorno) point to affirmative tendencies. The position advocated here is that Hegel’s system is not structurally totalitarian, but contains elements (above all the philosophy of the state and philosophy of history) that can be abused when read in isolation. The solution does not lie in abandoning systematic thinking, but in strengthening its self-critical moments. ↩︎

  18. The responsibility of philosophy in political crises is an enduring question. Hannah Arendt addressed the “failure of the educated” in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). The philosophers who wrote about reason, freedom, and ethical life mostly failed when it came to defending these principles in practice. This experience continues to shape the discussion of the relationship between theory and practice to this day. See Hannah Arendt: Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, New York: Viking Press, 1963; German trans. Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein Bericht von der Banalität des Bösen, Munich: Piper, 1964. ↩︎