Wolfgang Harich (1923-1995): Reform from Within — The Performative Contradiction

Kai Froeb2026

This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.

The Systematic Question: Can One Criticize a System That Forbids Criticism?

Wolfgang Harich embodied a tragic contradiction:

Claim: A system can be reformed from within if one brings the right arguments. Socialism plus democracy is possible. Hegel plus Marx can ground a democratic socialism.

Reality: The system permits no criticism. Whoever wants to reform is treated as an enemy. The Party does not want arguments—it wants obedience.

The question: Is there a performative contradiction in the reform attempt itself? If a system forbids self-criticism—is the attempt to reform it self-critically not doomed to fail from the outset?

Harich’s Position from Within

The Brilliant Young Professor (1949-1953)

Wolfgang Harich was a prodigy of GDR philosophy. In 1949, at 26, he received a professorship at Humboldt University Berlin. This was unusual—but Harich was brilliant. He had studied under Eduard Spranger (one of the last “bourgeois” philosophers), knew the history of German philosophy inside out, and was a gifted speaker.[1]

In 1951/52 Harich delivered his famous Hegel lectures at Humboldt University. Hundreds of students crowded into the halls. Harich used as his vademecum (as he later said) Georg Lukács’s The Young Hegel (Zurich 1948)—a book not permitted to appear in the GDR because it presented Hegel too positively.[2]

Harich taught: Hegel is no reactionary (contra Gropp), but “the intellectual forerunner of the democratic-revolutionary opposition, first of Heine and then also of the young Marx.”[3] This was heretical—but still permitted, because the Party still tolerated debate among philosophers.

In 1952 Harich intervened against an attack on Lukács (Klaus Schrickel had criticized Lukács’s “Existentialism or Marxism?” in Einheit). Harich wrote a Hegel memorandum and attacked Ernst Hoffmann and Kurt Hager—Politburo members![4] He demanded that at Humboldt University there was an “intellectual backlog among the professoriate” in the history of philosophy.[5]

This was not humility—it was intellectual hubris. Harich believed truth was on his side. And philosophically he was right. But politically this was naive: the Party tolerated no know-it-alls.

Editor-in-Chief of the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1953-1956)

In 1953 Harich became editor-in-chief of the newly founded Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Together with Arthur Baumgarten, Ernst Bloch, and Karl Schröter he developed a concept: an all-German forum for Marxist intellectuals. The journal was to open up, “through the highest possible standard,” the philosophically interested intelligentsia to Marxist thought.[6]

This was a political project: the GDR was to score points in the competition of systems through intellectual superiority. Not through coercion, but through persuasion. Not through propaganda, but through philosophy.

The journal published work of international caliber: Lukács on Schelling, Auguste Cornu on Marx and Hegel, Werner Krauss on “Karl Marx in the Vormärz.”[7] These were not propaganda texts, but differentiated analyses.

When Rugard Otto Gropp published his attack on Hegel in 1954, the editors opened the article “for discussion”—against Kurt Hager’s recommendation. This was an affront: the philosophers presumed to debate the Party line.

Harich wrote to Lukács (May 1954): “Well, I’m going to strike back hard.”[8] Gropp, Walter Besenbruch, Wolfgang Heise, and Alfred Kosing were meant to take the blows. Harich was in combat mode—philosophically against the Stalinist line.

The Reform Attempt (1956)

After Khrushchev’s secret speech (February 1956) Harich hoped: now is the time for reforms! De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union must also arrive in the GDR. In November 1956 he developed a “Platform for a Special German Path to Socialism”—a reform program.[9]

The program contained:

  • Democratization: more freedom, less repression, free elections (within the socialist framework)
  • Economic reform: more efficiency, less bureaucracy
  • Cultural openness: less censorship, more discussion

But: no change of system. Harich explicitly committed to “democratic centralism” (the Party leads) and to the socialist structure of property. This was about reform, not revolution.

Harich sent the program to members of the Politburo and the Central Committee. He thought: if I bring good arguments, they will be convinced. This was intellectually brilliant—but politically fatal.

Arrest and Trial (1956/57)

On November 29, 1956, five days after the second Soviet invasion of Budapest, Harich was arrested. The charge: “forming a counterrevolutionary group.”[10]

In March 1957 the trial followed: ten years’ imprisonment. Co-defendants: Walter Janka (head of the Aufbau publishing house, five years), Gustav Just, Erich Loest. In the courtroom sat Anna Seghers and Helene Weigel—prominent cultural figures who attended the show trial, but did not protest.[11]

The university revoked Harich’s doctoral degree (awarded in 1951). His edition of Rudolf Haym’s biography of Herder (published in 1954 with a substantial introduction) was censored: in the 1958 edition Harich’s introduction was removed entirely.[12]

Harich sat in Bautzen prison until 1964. After an amnesty he was released—but he remained marked. His academic career was over. He worked at the Akademie-Verlag (on the Feuerbach edition), later on ecology and “communism without growth” (1970s). But he remained an outsider.

The Estate Situation

Harich’s papers, after his death in 1995, were stored in Amsterdam (International Institute of Social History). Disputes over the inheritance delayed publication. Only from 2012 did an 11-volume edition appear (ed. Andreas Heyer, Tectum Verlag).[13]

The Hegel volume (At the Ideological Front: Hegel between Feuerbach and Marx, 800 pages) contains:

  • The Hegel lectures at Humboldt University (1951/52)
  • The article for the confiscated issue 5/1956 of the DZfPh: “On the Relationship of Marxism to Hegel’s Philosophy”
  • Essays on Feuerbach, Heine, Marx
  • Assessments of Lukács
  • Minutes of the meeting of the Philosophical Institute (April 1952)

This makes accessible, for the first time, what Harich achieved philosophically—and why he was so dangerous.

Assessment in Light of Our Interpretation of Hegel

What Is Right about This? (Preservation)
  1. Hegel plus Marx can ground democratic socialism

Harich’s thesis: Hegel is no reactionary but a theorist of emancipation. Marx builds on Hegel. Therefore one can use Hegel plus Marx for a democratic socialism.

This is correct. Our interpretation of Hegel (Volume 1, Chapter 1): Hegel shows that freedom is not arbitrariness but self-determination. A free being is not one that does what it wants, but one that gives itself laws—and comprehends these laws (rather than blindly following them).

This is a democratic idea: laws are legitimate when they are self-given (autonomy). A state is legitimate when it rests on mutual recognition (not on coercion).

Marx takes this over: socialism means that the producers organize themselves (rather than being governed by a party). “Association of free producers”—that is Hegelian: freedom through self-determination.[14]

Harich is thus right: one could ground a democratic socialism with Hegel plus Marx. But the GDR did not want that. That is the crux of the matter.

  1. Reform requires self-criticism

Harich recognized: a system that cannot criticize itself stagnates. The GDR needed to admit mistakes, discuss them, correct them.

This is Hegelian: self-criticism is the condition of development. A system that permits no contradictions cannot learn. It accumulates errors until collapse.

Our interpretation of Hegel (Volume 1, Chapter 1): the “resistance of experience” is central. When experiences contradict expectations, the system must correct itself. A system that suppresses contradictions (through censorship, propaganda, repression) cannot learn.

Harich was right: the GDR needed reform. But the Party feared self-criticism (because it endangered power).

What Inner Contradiction Emerges? (Negation)
  1. The performative contradiction of the reform attempt

Harich’s contradiction: he attempted to reform, from within, a system that treats criticism as an enemy.

Claim: reform is possible if one brings good arguments.

Action: Harich writes a reform program, sends it to the Politburo.

Result: ten years’ imprisonment.

The lesson: a system that forbids criticism cannot be reformed. For reform requires criticism. Whoever forbids criticism prevents reform.

This is a performative contradiction: the system claims to be dialectical (hence self-critical). But it acts anti-dialectically (suppresses criticism). Harich took the claim at its word—and was defeated by reality.

Hegelian point: a system that performatively violates its own principles is not rational. The GDR claimed to be Hegelian-dialectical—but it suppressed dialectics. That is self-contradiction—and such systems are unstable (as 1989 showed).

  1. Intellectual naivety versus political reality

Harich believed: arguments count. If I show that Hegel plus Marx can ground democratic socialism, the Party will be convinced.

But the Party was not interested in arguments, but in power. Harich’s reform program was a threat, not an enrichment. It called the legitimacy of the leadership into question.

Hegelian point: Hegel shows (in the Phenomenology, master/servant) that recognition is not a matter of arguments but of power relations. The master does not recognize the servant because he is persuaded, but because he is compelled (through the labor the servant performs).

The Party did not need Harich—it saw him as a danger. So it eliminated him. This was not rational (in the sense of being convincingly argued), but it was real (in the sense of preserving power).

Harich overlooked: in a system where power precedes truth, arguments count for nothing.

Where Would Our Interpretation of Hegel Go Further? (Elevation)
  1. Freedom is the condition of truth

Our interpretation of Hegel (Volume 1, Chapter 1; see also the text on truth): freedom is not a luxury one affords oneself when everything is working. Freedom is the condition of the possibility of truth.

Why? Because truth arises through self-correction. And self-correction requires:

  • The resistance of experience (experiences must be able to contradict)
  • Mutual recognition (different perspectives must be heard)
  • Self-reflexivity (the system must be able to criticize itself)

Without freedom: no criticism. Without criticism: no self-correction. Without self-correction: accumulation of errors → collapse.

The GDR proved negatively that Hegel is right: a system without freedom must fail. Not for moral reasons (although repression is morally reprehensible), but for systematic ones: it cannot learn.

  1. Mutual recognition is structural, not individual

Harich thought: if I personally persuade (Politburo members), the system will change.

But Hegel shows (in the Philosophy of Right) that structures count for more than individuals. A one-party state cannot be democratic—regardless of how “good” the party members are.

Why? Because the structure (the monopoly on power) prevents mutual recognition. There are no checks and balances, no opposition, no public sphere. Hence there are no mechanisms of self-correction.[15]

Harich should have recognized: the problem is not that the persons are bad (Ulbricht, Honecker). The problem is that the structure permits no self-correction.

Democratic socialism requires structural reform: a multi-party system (or functional equivalents), separation of powers, a public sphere, freedom of the press. Without these structures, “self-criticism” is mere rhetoric.

Systematic Significance

Wolfgang Harich shows: reform from within is impossible in a system that forbids criticism. This is not a moral judgment (Harich = hero, SED = villains), but a systematic one: a system without self-criticism cannot be reformed—only replaced.

The tragic irony: Harich was right on the substance. Hegel plus Marx could ground democratic socialism. But the GDR did not want a democratic socialism—it wanted power.

The lesson (in light of our interpretation of Hegel): a “dialectical state” that suppresses dialectics is a contradiction in itself. Such systems are unstable—they fail systematically, not by chance. The GDR of 1989 confirms Hegel’s teaching negatively: without freedom no truth, without self-criticism no learning, without learning no survival.

Harich’s lasting merit: he tried. He showed what would have been possible—if the powerful had allowed it. That they did not allow it says more about them than about him.

  1. Andreas Heyer, Wolfgang Harich. Dissident im doppelten Deutschland, Berlin: Dietz, 2017, pp. 45–78. ↩︎

  2. Wolfgang Harich, “Mein Weg zu Lukács,” in: Andreas Heyer (ed.), Wolfgang Harich. An der ideologischen Front. Hegel zwischen Feuerbach und Marx, Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2013, pp. 25–40. ↩︎

  3. Wolfgang Harich, “Die Lehre von Marx und die Bildung der Intelligenz,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2 (1954), issue 2, pp. 347–378. ↩︎

  4. Helle Panke (ed.), Wolfgang Harich und Georg Lukács. Wege zu einem neuen Marxismus, Berlin 2016, pp. 12–18. ↩︎

  5. “Protokoll der Sitzung des Philosophischen Instituts,” April 1952, quoted in: nd-aktuell, “Ich lasse auf Hegel nicht scheißen,” January 24, 2023. ↩︎

  6. Wolfgang Harich, letter to Georg Lukács, August 14, 1953, quoted in: Hedtke, “Skizze zur Geschichte der Hegel-Literatur in der DDR.” ↩︎

  7. Cf. the overview in: Hedtke, “Skizze zur Geschichte der Hegel-Literatur in der DDR.” ↩︎

  8. Quoted in: nd-aktuell, “Ich lasse auf Hegel nicht scheißen,” January 24, 2023. ↩︎

  9. Wolfgang Harich, “Plattform für einen besonderen deutschen Weg zum Sozialismus” (November 1956), documented in: German History in Documents and Images, “Der Philosophieprofessor Wolfgang Harich (Dezember 1956).” ↩︎

  10. German History in Documents and Images, “Der Philosophieprofessor Wolfgang Harich (Dezember 1956).” ↩︎

  11. Cf. Walter Janka, Schwierigkeiten mit der Wahrheit, Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1989. ↩︎

  12. Guntolf Herzberg, “Wolfgang Harich - eine philosophische Wiederentdeckung,” Helle Panke, issue 146, Berlin 2017. ↩︎

  13. Andreas Heyer (ed.), Wolfgang Harich. Gesamtausgabe, 11 vols., Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2012–2019. ↩︎

  14. Karl Marx, Capital I, MEW 23, pp. 92–93. ↩︎

  15. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, TWA 7, §257–271 (the state). ↩︎