Outlook on Volume III—After the End of History?
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
1989 marks a caesura. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War—Francis Fukuyama proclaims the “end of history”: liberal democracy has won, there are no more ideological alternatives, Hegel was right (so Fukuyama).
But Fukuyama’s thesis is not new. Already in the 1940s Kojève said: history ended in 1806 (Jena) or in 1945 (the end of fascism). Already in Hegel himself it is suggested: history ends when freedom is realized. The only question is: is freedom realized?
The immediate refutations came quickly. Samuel Huntington (1993): not the end of history but the “clash of civilizations”—conflicts become cultural/religious, not ideological. Jacques Derrida (1993): Specters of Marx—Marx’s specters return, liberalism has not won. Slavoj Žižek: the subject is not reconciled, capitalism produces new antagonisms.
The 1990s showed: Fukuyama was wrong. Not the end of history, but a new confusion (Habermas). Not reconciliation, but new conflicts. Not one path, but many paths.
For philosophy this meant: new questions instead of old answers. After the metanarratives (Lyotard): how is orientation possible without foundation? After digitalization: the internet as a global village (McLuhan confirmed) or as surveillance capitalism (Zuboff)? After the Anthropocene: the climate crisis as a philosophical problem. After globalization: multiculturalism vs. nationalism. After postmodernism: metamodernism, new realism, critical ontology?
The question of Volume III will be: how does philosophy respond to these new challenges? And: does Hegel remain relevant in this? Our thesis (which remains to be proven): yes—not as a source of answers, but as a method. Dialectical thinking against oversimplification, polarization, dogmatism. Mediation against one-sidedness. Recognition against contempt. Self-reflection against blindness.
The transition to Volume III is the transition from “after Auschwitz” to “after the end of history”—both formulations are ironic, both are questions, not answers. The work continues.