John Rawls: *A Theory of Justice* (1971) — The New Paradigm Shift
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
The Project: Justice as Fairness
Rawls’ starting point was dissatisfaction with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism says: what is just is whatever maximizes the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But this has troubling consequences: the interests of a minority can be sacrificed if doing so increases the total sum of utility. Slavery could be justified if the slaveholders derive enough benefit from it.
Rawls’ alternative: justice is not utility maximization but fairness. A just society is one whose basic structure all citizens could accept as free and equal — regardless of their arbitrary position within that society.
The Veil of Ignorance
Rawls’ most famous thought experiment is the “veil of ignorance.” Imagine you did not know what position you would occupy in society — whether you would be rich or poor, talented or disabled, a man or a woman. What principles would you choose for society?
Rawls argues that behind the veil of ignorance, rational people would choose two principles. First: equal basic liberties for all (freedom of speech, the right to vote, the rule of law). Second: social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they benefit the least advantaged (the “difference principle”).
This is a procedural theory: justice is not defined by a substantive picture of the good life but by a fair procedure. Whatever results from this procedure is just — regardless of the substantive preferences of those involved.
The Implicit Critique of Hegel
Rawls rarely names Hegel, but the critique is implicit. Hegel had carried out the separation of morality [Moralität] and ethical life [Sittlichkeit]: abstract morality (Kant) must be realized in concrete ethical life (family, society, state). Rawls takes the opposite path: he abstracts from all concrete forms of life and asks after the principles that everyone could accept.
For Hegel this would be a regression behind an insight already achieved. The “veil of ignorance” is methodological solipsism — it treats human beings as isolated choosers, not as beings constituted through community. The principles thus derived are empty — they do not say how one should concretely live.
But Rawls would have replied: that is exactly the point. A liberal society permits different conceptions of the good life. It does not prescribe how people should live; it only guarantees the conditions under which they can shape their own lives. The abstraction is not a weakness but the strength of liberalism.