The Biographical Background - Scholasticism, Dialogics, Breakthrough
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
The Scholastic Foundation
Heinrichs’ philosophical development begins with an intensive six-year course of study in Thomistic philosophy at the Jesuit Philosophical College in Pullach near Munich (in the 1960s). This scholastic training is not a mere biographical footnote but is systematically decisive: Heinrichs discovers in Thomas Aquinas an ontology of reflection that precedes modern philosophy from Descartes to Husserl—and surpasses it on decisive points.
The key concepts: Thomas distinguishes between “intentio directa” (the objective content of consciousness) and “intentio indirecta” (non-objective self-knowledge). Human consciousness is not simply “consciousness of something” but is always already, at the same time, “consciousness of consciousness.” This “reditio completa in seipsum”—the complete return to oneself—distinguishes the human being from the animal, which achieves only “reditio incompleta.”[1]
The great paradox of modernity: Descartes discovered self-consciousness as the starting point of philosophy (“cogito ergo sum”), but forgot the ontological key to this epistemological key, which had already been available in Thomas. Descartes understood self-consciousness merely epistemologically—as the ego’s subsequent reflection upon itself. This gives rise to all the problems later analyzed by Dieter Henrich: circularity problems, infinite regresses, the impossibility of explaining self-consciousness without already presupposing it.
Thomas already had the solution: self-consciousness is not subsequent reflection but the ontological basic structure of consciousness itself. It is “conscientia concomitans”—an accompanying, immediate co-knowledge of oneself in the very act of consciousness. Modern philosophy still circles today around problems that arose from this Cartesian misorientation.
From Tillich to Dialogical Hermeneutics of Meaning
The path from scholastic ontology of reflection to modern logic of reflection led through a decisive intermediate stage: the engagement with Paul Tillich (1886-1965). In his first scholarly article (1970), Heinrichs develops “The Idea of a Universal Hermeneutics of Meaning”—and in doing so encounters a fundamental limitation.
Tillich had distinguished two “elements of meaning”: act and content. This distinction captures the basic structure of consciousness—every act of consciousness is simultaneously an act (activity) and related to a content (substance). But Heinrichs recognized: this duality ultimately reproduces the traditional subject-object dualism at a higher level. Act stands for the subjective side, content for the objective.
The dialogical rupture: under the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach and Martin Buber, Heinrichs recognizes that the subject-object dualism must be broken open in two respects. First: there is not only the I (subject) and the It (object), but also the Thou—the other, who is itself a subject but initially appears to me as an object. This “objective subject” is neither pure subject nor pure object but something qualitatively third. Second: there are not only the direct relations between I, Thou, and It, but also the medium of their mediation—the “dialogical between” (Buber), which Heinrichs will later call the “medium of meaning.”[2]
The duality becomes a fourfoldness: It (the pole of the objective world), I (the pole of interiority), Thou (the pole of intersubjectivity), Medium (the pole of mediation and integration). These four elements of meaning are already present in Heinrichs’ thinking throughout his dissertation period—but the systematic breakthrough does not come until 1975, in Paris.
The Paris Breakthrough (1975)
In Paris, Heinrichs engages with French personalism and dialogical philosophy. He wants to understand how genuine interpersonal encounter is to be described. Traditional epistemology fails here: it can only describe the relation of a knowing subject to a known object. But the other person is precisely not merely an object, but is itself a subject.
Analyzing concrete situations of encounter, Heinrichs comes upon a fascinating phenomenon: every encounter with another person necessarily passes through four qualitatively distinct stages. This staging is not arbitrary or culturally conditioned but follows an inner logic grounded in the reflexive nature of consciousness itself.
The four stages of reflection:
First stage: At first I treat the other like an object. I perceive his outward appearance, estimate his age, register his clothing. This “objective attitude” is not superficial or contemptuous of persons—it is unavoidable. Without the ability to objectify people and things at first, I could not act in the world at all.
Second stage: But the other proves to be more than an object. He moves independently, perhaps looks at me, reacts to my presence. I must correct my original attitude: this person is himself an acting, thinking being. He is not only an object but also a subject—an “objective subject,” as the logician Gotthard Günther put it.
Third stage: When we enter into conversation, something qualitatively new happens. Not only do I know that the other thinks and feels—I also know that he knows that I know this. This “double reciprocity” constitutes genuine communication. Both reflect on each other, and both know of this mutual reflection.
Fourth stage: Finally, communication itself becomes the topic. We come to an understanding about the rules of the conversation, about shared presuppositions, about the medium of communication. This gives rise to a new level—the level of institutions, norms, cultural codes.
Why exactly four stages? The first stage is unavoidable: everything else is at first treated as an object. The second arises necessarily once this other proves to be itself acting. The third is a qualitative leap to double reciprocity. The fourth is the system-forming conclusion: communication itself becomes the topic. Further reflection would not lead to new qualities but only to iterations of the same structure.[3]
The significance of the discovery: these four stages structure not only interpersonal encounters. They are the basic structure of all human acts of meaning-making. If this is the necessary structure of interpersonal reflection, then it must also be the basic structure of consciousness as such—for our consciousness is never isolated self-relatedness but is always already self-relation-in-relation-to-the-other.
Johannes Heinrichs develops this interpretation of Thomas in his licentiate thesis “Intentio als Sinn bei Thomas von Aquin” (Intentio as Meaning in Thomas Aquinas, 1967) and in later works. The systematic importance of scholastic ontology of reflection for his entire body of work can hardly be overestimated. ↩︎
The engagement with Tillich is documented in Heinrichs’ first scholarly article: “Der Ort der Metaphysik im System der Wissenschaften bei Paul Tillich. Die Idee einer universalen Sinnhermeneutik,” in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 92 (1970). ↩︎
The systematic presentation of the four stages of reflection can be found in: Johannes Heinrichs, Reflexion als soziales System. Zu einer Reflexions-Systemtheorie der Gesellschaft, Bonn 1976. A more accessibly written new edition appeared in 2005 under the title “Logik des Sozialen. Woraus Gesellschaft entsteht” (Steno Verlag, Varna), which explains the basic ideas more clearly but omits some references to Hegel in the process. ↩︎