China - Hegelianism between Nationalism and Marxism (1920-1945)

Kai Froeb2026

This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume I, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.

Chinese Hegel reception in the interwar period stands under the sign of radical upheaval: the fall of the imperial dynasty (1911), the May Fourth Movement (1919), the civil war between Nationalists and Communists (from 1927), the Japanese invasion (1937). In this constellation, Hegel is received in three ways: as philosopher of historical development (against Confucian cyclical thinking), as mediator between Chinese and Western tradition, as foundation of Marxism (via Soviet textbooks). These three lines remain partly separate, partly overlapping.

The Channels of Mediation: Japan, the USA, Germany

Chinese reception runs through three channels, each conveying a different image of Hegel:

1. Japan: Many Chinese intellectuals study in Tokyo (nearer, cheaper, culturally more related than Europe). They encounter Hegel through Japanese mediation – as philosopher of modernization, of the nation-state, of historical development. This reception is often nationalistically colored: Japan as model for Chinese modernization. After the Japanese invasion (1937), this line becomes problematic.[1]

2. USA: From the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals study at Columbia (New York), Harvard, Berkeley. They encounter Hegel through pragmatism (Dewey) and idealism (Royce). This mediation emphasizes Hegel’s philosophy of education, his philosophy of history, less his Logic. American reception is anti-authoritarian – against Confucian hierarchies, for individualism, democracy.[2]

3. Germany: A smaller group studies directly in Germany (Heidelberg, Berlin, Munich). They encounter Hegel in the original, studying the Logic, the Phenomenology. This reception is the most systematic, but the least widespread (language barrier, cost, distance).[3]

These three channels produce different images of Hegel that are not always compatible. The task of Chinese philosophers is to combine these into an independent synthesis – which succeeds only partially.

Liang Qichao - Philosophy of History against the Cycle

Liang Qichao (梁启超, 1873-1929) is one of China’s most influential reformers. He propagates constitutional monarchy (against revolution), the appropriation of Western science (against blind traditionalism), the renewal of Confucianism (against its rigidification). His encounter with Hegel is indirect – through Japanese texts, secondary literature, conversations with scholars.[4]

Liang’s central thesis: the Chinese conception of history is cyclical – the rise and fall of dynasties, the eternal recurrence of the same, no genuine development. This conception legitimizes fatalism: what is to happen will happen regardless. Hegel offers an alternative: history has direction – it develops toward higher consciousness, toward greater freedom. This development is not automatic but requires human action. But it is possible.[5]

Liang translates Hegel’s basic ideas into Chinese concepts: “consciousness of freedom” becomes “awakening of the people” (minzu juexing, 民族觉醒), “world spirit” becomes “national strength” (guomin liliang, 国民力量), “dialectic” becomes “mutual interpenetration of contradictions” (maodun xiangru, 矛盾相入). These translations are creative but not always precise – they adapt Hegel to Chinese thought traditions while also transforming him.[6]

The problem: Liang’s Hegel reception remains superficial. He does not know Hegel’s Logic, does not study the Phenomenology, reads the Philosophy of Right only fragmentarily. What he adopts is a general idea – history as progress. This idea is inspiring but philosophically undeveloped. Liang remains a publicist, does not become a systematic philosopher.

The systematic significance: Liang shows that Hegel’s philosophy of history is attractive to non-European cultures wanting to understand their own history. Confucian cyclical theory offered no explanation for China’s decline in the nineteenth century (Opium Wars, colonialism, modernization backwardness). Hegel offered a framework: China was a great civilization but is historically superseded, must renew itself. This diagnosis is problematic (Eurocentric), but it gave orientation – not fatalism, but a call to action.[7]

Feng Youlan - Synthesis of Hegel and Neo-Confucianism

Feng Youlan (冯友兰, 1895-1990) is the most systematic Chinese philosopher of his generation. He studies in Beijing, then at Columbia (USA) under John Dewey, writes his dissertation on comparative philosophy (1923), becomes professor in Beijing (Tsinghua University). His main work “History of Chinese Philosophy” (中国哲学史, Zhongguo zhexue shi, 1934) is the first comprehensive presentation of Chinese philosophy using Western categories – and becomes the standard work.[8]

Feng’s thesis: Chinese philosophy has its own logic, which is not identical with Western logic but also not irrational. This logic shows itself especially in Neo-Confucianism (Song Dynasty, 11th-13th centuries), which develops a metaphysics structurally similar to Hegel’s idealism. The basic concepts:

  • Li (理, principle, structure): the universal, form, law
  • Qi (气, energy, matter): the particular, stuff, actualization
  • Taiji (太极, Great Ultimate): the unity of both, the absolute

These concepts correspond roughly to Hegel’s triad: concept (li), reality (qi), idea (taiji). Neo-Confucianism develops a dialectic: principle (li) is realized in matter (qi), matter (qi) follows principle (li). Both are not separate but moments of a unity.[9]

Feng attempts a synthesis: Hegel + Neo-Confucianism = new Chinese philosophy. This should be neither merely traditionalist (return to Confucius) nor merely Western (copy of European philosophy), but creative transformation – Chinese tradition, conceptually permeated with Hegelian categories.[10]

The problem: Feng’s synthesis remains controversial. Critics accuse him of Westernizing Chinese philosophy – pressing it into foreign categories instead of respecting its own character. Feng responds: philosophy is universal – the question of truth, of the good, of being arises everywhere. The answers may differ, but the questions are the same. Using Hegel is not Westernization, but the use of a conceptual tool to analyze one’s own tradition.[11]

The systematic significance: Feng shows the possibility of intercultural philosophy – not as mere comparison (“thus in Hegel, otherwise in Confucius”), but as mutual disclosure. Hegel helps to conceptually penetrate Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism helps to correct Hegel’s Eurocentrism (history does not end in Europe). Whether this synthesis succeeds is debatable. But the attempt is philosophically fruitful.[12]

He Lin - Translation and Neo-Confucian Hegelianism

He Lin (贺麟, 1902-1992) studied in Germany (Heidelberg, Berlin), received his doctorate on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1927), returned to China, became professor. His central achievement: translating Hegel’s “Lesser Logic” (Encyclopedia, first part) into Chinese (1936) – the first direct translation of Hegel from German.[13]

He Lin’s philosophical project: Neo-Confucian Hegelianism. He argues: Neo-Confucianism (Song Dynasty) had already developed a dialectic – the doctrine of li and qi, of principle and matter. But this dialectic remained unelaborated, intuitive, unsystematic. Hegel offers the method to make it explicit.[14]

He Lin’s central thesis: the Confucian concept ren (仁, humaneness, humanity) corresponds to Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Ren is not merely individual virtue but an objective order – it is realized in family, society, state. Ren is not naturally given but culturally acquired – through education, ritual, self-cultivation. This structure is Hegelian: the subject becomes objective (ethical life) through mediation (education).[15]

The difference from Hegel: ren is family-centered, not state-centered. Confucian ethics begins with the five relationships (wulun, 五伦): father-son, ruler-subject, husband-wife, elder-younger brother, friend-friend. The family is the center, the state is an extension of the family. In Hegel, the state is higher than the family – it is the realization of freedom, not merely an extension of kinship bonds.[16]

He Lin defends the Confucian position: the family is not merely a biological unit, but an ethical substance. Filial piety (xiao, 孝) is not mere obedience, but recognition – the child recognizes itself in the parents, the parents recognize themselves in the child. This mutual recognition is the origin of all ethical life. Hegel skips over this – he begins directly with the state, thereby losing the ethical substance.[17]

The problem: He Lin’s synthesis remains ambivalent. Is it progressive appropriation (Chinese tradition, conceptually permeated) or conservative legitimation (Confucian hierarchies, Hegelian-dressed)? He Lin tends toward conservatism – he defends the patriarchal family, gender hierarchy, political authority. After 1949 he is criticized as a “bourgeois philosopher,” forced to practice self-criticism, marginalized.[18]

The systematic significance: He Lin shows the limits of intercultural syntheses. Hegel’s ethical life and Confucian ren are not simply identical. The differences (state vs. family, reason vs. ritual, individuality vs. relation) are substantial. A synthesis is possible, but only if these differences are reflected upon, not merely papered over. He Lin partly papers them over – he asserts compatibility where there is tension. This makes his philosophy harmonizing but not critical.[19]

After 1949 - Marxist Canonization and Rigidification

After the Communist takeover (1949), Hegel becomes state philosophy – but through a Soviet lens. Textbooks of Diamat (dialectical materialism) are translated, Hegel’s works are published (People’s Publishing House Beijing), Hegel study becomes obligatory. But it is a canonized Hegel – fixed, dogmatic, instrumentalized.[20]

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) destroys this reception too. Hegel is denounced as “idealist,” his works removed from libraries, philosophy professors persecuted. Feng Youlan and He Lin must write “self-criticism,” their books are banned. The philosophical tradition is violently broken off.[21]

Only after Reform and Opening (1978, under Deng Xiaoping) does a new Hegel reception begin. The younger generation (Zhang Shiying, Yang Zuhua) studies Hegel systematically, translates further works (Phenomenology, Philosophy of Right), develops independent interpretations. This new reception is less ideological, closer to the texts, internationally networked. It benefits from the end of dogmatism.[22]

The systematic lesson: Chinese Hegel reception shows the ambivalence of the globalization of philosophy. On one hand: productive appropriation, creative syntheses, new perspectives (Feng, He Lin). On the other: instrumentalization, dogmatism, suppression (Maoism). Philosophy can become either – a critical tool or an ideological weapon. The decision lies not in the texts, but in the practice of their appropriation.[23]

  1. On Japanese mediation see: Joshua A. Fogel: Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934), Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1984, ch. 3: “Chinese Students in Japan.” ↩︎

  2. On American mediation see: Y.C. Wang: Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966, ch. 11: “The Columbia Connection.” ↩︎

  3. On German mediation see: Rudolf G. Wagner: “The Shenbao in Crisis: The International Environment and the Conflict between Guo Songtao and the Shenbao,” in: Late Imperial China 20 (1999), pp. 107-143. ↩︎

  4. On the biography see: Joseph R. Levenson: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China, Cambridge/MA: Harvard UP, 1953. ↩︎

  5. Liang Qichao: “On Progress” (Lun jinbu, 论进步, 1902), in: Liang Qichao Wenji (Collected Writings), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1989, Vol. 2, pp. 56-78. ↩︎

  6. On the problem of translation see: Lydia H. Liu: Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity - China, 1900-1937, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995, ch. 2. ↩︎

  7. On the significance for Chinese intellectuals see: Hao Chang: Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890-1911, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. ↩︎

  8. Feng Youlan: A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols., Princeton: Princeton UP, 1952-1953 (English translation of the 1934 Chinese edition). ↩︎

  9. Feng: History, Vol. 2, pp. 534-571 (presentation of Neo-Confucianism with Hegel parallels). ↩︎

  10. Feng Youlan: Xin Lixue (New Rationalism, 新理学, 1939), Shanghai: Commercial Press. A systematic attempt at a Hegel-Confucianism synthesis. ↩︎

  11. On criticism of Feng see: Wing-tsit Chan: “Review of Feng Youlan’s History,” in: Journal of Asian Studies 13 (1954), pp. 548-551. Chan criticizes the “Westernization” of Chinese philosophy. ↩︎

  12. On the systematic significance see: Chung-ying Cheng: “Chinese Philosophy and Contemporary Human Communication Theory,” in: Philosophy East and West 51 (2001), pp. 1-43. ↩︎

  13. He Lin: translation of Hegel: 小逻辑 (Lesser Logic, Xiao luoji), Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936. First direct translation from German. ↩︎

  14. He Lin: 文化与人生 (Culture and Life, Wenhua yu rensheng), Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937. Systematic presentation of his neo-Confucian Hegelianism. ↩︎

  15. He Lin: “仁学原理” (Principles of Ren Theory), in: He Lin Wenji (Collected Writings), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1993, pp. 112-145. ↩︎

  16. On the difference between Hegel and Confucianism see: Tu Wei-ming: Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, Albany: SUNY Press, 1985, ch. 3: “The Confucian Concept of Selfhood.” ↩︎

  17. He Lin: “论儒家伦理与黑格尔哲学” (On Confucian Ethics and Hegelian Philosophy), in: He Lin Wenji, pp. 234-267. ↩︎

  18. On the biography see: Li Zehou / Liu Gangji (eds.): 中国现代思想史论 (History of Modern Chinese Thought), Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe, 1987, pp. 456-478. ↩︎

  19. On the critical assessment see: Joseph Chan: “Does Confucian Ethics Support Autocracy?,” in: The Review of Politics 73 (2011), pp. 99-125. ↩︎

  20. On Soviet mediation see: Nick Knight: Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923-1945, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. ↩︎

  21. On the Cultural Revolution see: Richard Curt Kraus: Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism, New York: Columbia UP, 1981, ch. 5: “The Attack on Intellectuals.” ↩︎

  22. On the new reception see: Zhang Shiying: 黑格尔辞典 (Hegel Dictionary), Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1990. Comprehensive reference work of the new generation. ↩︎

  23. On the ambivalence see: Bill Brugger / David Kelly: Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Era, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. ↩︎