The Theory of Self-Consciousness: The Problem of the I
This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.
Henrich’s principal systematic contribution concerns the theory of self-consciousness. The question sounds simple: What does it mean to say “I”? What happens when a consciousness becomes conscious of itself?
The traditional answer — as Henrich saw it — was the reflection model: the I directs itself toward itself, like an eye seeing itself in a mirror. Consciousness becomes conscious of itself by taking itself as an object.
Henrich argued that this model leads into an infinite regress. If I recognize myself by making myself into an object, I must already know that this object is me. But how do I know that? Through a further reflection? Then I need prior knowledge again, and so on ad infinitum. The reflection model presupposes what it is supposed to explain.
Henrich’s thesis was therefore: self-consciousness is not the result of reflection, but its precondition. There is an original self-acquaintance that precedes all reflection. I am always already familiar with myself before I begin to think about myself. This familiarity is not knowledge of an object, but a different kind of acquaintance — pre-reflective, immediate, but not objectifying.