Purpose and Means
Hegelian concept
Hegel's word for ethical life (§ 151; cf. § 4): forms of life that are not naturally given, as biological life is, but have grown historically — and in which subjects find themselves again because they see their own determinations realized within them.
Not meant
habit in the sense of mere accustoming. What is meant is habit in the sense of § 410, which frees attention and is therein a condition of freedom — so developed in [[hegel-subjektiver-geist:14]]. Second nature is no less binding than the first, but is grounded differently: it can be changed, and it must be answered for.
Developed in
Part V
Cross-references
Hegels doppelbestimmung
The object has, in relation to the purpose, the character "of being powerless and of serving it"; immediately thereafter: "But the means also has a side according to which it still has independence in relation to the purpose" (TWA 6, 450). Both belong together.
Die folge, die hegel selbst zieht
Were external purposiveness left to itself, the product "would again be only a means, and so on to infinity" (TWA 6, 451). It never arrives at the purpose.
Entwickelt in
Part V
In der logik
Enc. Vol. 1 §§ 204–212 and Science of Logic, TWA 6, 446–461. There stands the twofold determination of the means and the statement that the external teleological series makes its product once again a means "and so on to infinity" (TWA 6, 451). Cf. [[kleine-logik:15]].
Nicht gemeint
habit in the sense of mere accustoming. What is meant is habit in the sense of § 410, which frees attention and is therein a condition of freedom — so developed in [[hegel-subjektiver-geist:14]]. Second nature is no less binding than the first, but is grounded differently: it can be changed, and it must be answered for.