Transition

Hegel (recurring, core methodological concept)

Transition is one of the fundamental forms of movement in Hegel's logic. It designates the process by which a category or determination necessarily passes over into another, because it reaches its inner limit. Transition is not externally added but arises from the immanent development of the matter itself. In the logic of being, transition is the characteristic form of movement: one determination vanishes and is replaced by another (e.g., being — nothing — becoming). In contrast to the shining [*Scheinen*] of the logic of essence (where determinations mutually constitute one another) and to the development of the logic of the concept (where the concept explicates itself), transition is marked by the disappearance of its starting point. Transition here is not a temporal sequence but a logical necessity: what a category is in itself shows itself by its passing over into its other.

Origin

The concept of transition was made systematically fruitful for philosophy by Hegel, although it goes back to the Greek "μετάβασις" (metabasis). In Aristotle, "metabasis eis allo genos" designates the fallacious transition from one genus into another. Hegel radicalizes this: transition is not an error but the truth of the matter. Against Kant's separation of categories (which remain static), Hegel shows that categories necessarily pass over into one another. In Fichte and Schelling, transition is still carried out as an external construction by the philosopher; in Hegel, it becomes the immanent self-movement of thought. Transition is an expression of becoming — not a being that becomes, but becoming itself as the truth of being and nothing.

In Hegel

Enc. §88 (in Hegel: *Übergehen* [passing-over], *Werden* [becoming]); on method §§238 ff.

Im buch

Chap. 1.3