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THE
HEGELIAN SYSTEM.

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THE
SECRET OF HEGEL:

BEING

THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM

IN

ORIGIN, PRINCIPLE, FORM, AND MATTER.

BY

JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING.

‘Μάστιγ, ἢ ἱετῆρα κακῶν —

— Οἷτοι γὰρ κλητοὶ γε βροτῶν ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.’

‘The Hidden Secret of the Universe is powerless to resist the might of thought; it must unclothe itself before it, revealing to sight and bringing to enjoyment its riches and its depths.’

HEGEL.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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1865.

ERRATA.

- Vol. I.—Pages 25, 27, headline, *for Feud read Jena.*
" 125, first note, *for Preliminary Notice read Preface.*
" 176, first word, *for sumes read resumes.*
" 198, first word, line 16, *for thought read what.*

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PRELIMINARY NOTICE.

THIS is the last fruit, though first published, of a long and earnest labour devoted, in the main, to two men only—Kant and Hegel, and more closely, in the main also, to the three principal works (The *Kritiken*) of the one, and the two principal works (The *Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia*) of the other. This study has been the writer's chief—not just to say sole—occupation during a greater number of years, and for a greater number of hours in each day of these years, than it is perhaps prudent to avow at present. The reader, then, has a good right to expect something mature from so long, unintermitted, and concentrated an endeavour: it is to be feared, however, that the irregularity of the very first look of the thing will lead him to believe, on the contrary, that he is only deceived. The truth is, that, after a considerable amount of time and trouble had been employed on an exposition of Kant and a general introduction to the whole subject of German Philosophy, it was suddenly perceived that, perhaps, the most peculiar and important elements to which the study had led, were those that concerned Hegel, while, at the same time, the reflection arose that it was to Hegel the Public probably looked with the greatest amount of expectant interest, if also of baffled irritation. This indicates the considerations which led to the hope

that the importance of the matter might, in such a case, obtain excuse for a certain extemporaneousness that lay in the form—that, in short, the matter of years might compensate the manner of months.

What I am most in pain about is the Translations that relate to the more technical parts of the System. Perhaps, in that regard, when speaking of certain translations of another German as reading so that they seemed to have been executed in the dark, I have only extended a rod for my own pain. The Comments and Interpretations will, perhaps, extract the admission, however, that, be these *translations* as dark as they may, something of light cannot be denied to the *translator*. It will be seen in the end that the Logic of Hegel is as technical as the Principia of Newton, and that a translation, while necessarily no less technical, could not be much—or indeed at all—less difficult, than the original. It is hoped, then, that the translations in this reference, will prove at last much more satisfactory than they can possibly appear at first, though they will always manifest probably something of that crippled gait which we find, for example, in the commoner translations of the Classics. It may be added here, that the sad waste of capitals, into which the German has betrayed, was seen too late for anything but the sincere apology which is here tendered : lector benevolus condonabit.

I do not think it worth while to make any observations here on the different sections or parts contained in these two volumes ; I remark only that if the reader—who probably, nevertheless, will take his own way—would read this book in the order and manner its own composer would prescribe, he will begin with the part

marked 'II., A Translation from the Complete Logic of the whole First Section, *Quality*,' and force himself to dwell there the very longest that he can. Only so will he realise at the vividest the incredulity with which one first meets the strangeness and unintelligibleness of Hegel. Again, in reading the chapters of the 'Struggle to Hegel,' which he will take next, he ought to retain this translation still in his hands. The various portions of this *struggle* will, in fact, be fully intelligible only to him who endeavours, repeatedly, to advance as far as 'Limit,' either in the translation or in Hegel's own Logic. Finally, after such preliminaries, the translation II., or the correspondent original, should, in company with the commentary and interpretation III., be rigorously, radically, completely studied, and then the rest taken as it stands.

It would certainly have been very desirable to have been able to present more of the *Particular* of Hegel; but for that, as the competent reader will see for himself in the end, space failed. Imperfect as these volumes are, however, I have no hesitation in stating it as my conviction that in them Hegel is once for all open, and what we may call his 'Secret' for the first time disclosed. That Secret may be indicated at shortest thus: As Aristotle—with considerable assistance from Plato—made *explicit* the *abstract* Universal that was *implicit* in Socrates, so Hegel—with less considerable assistance from Fichte and Schelling—made *explicit* the *concrete* Universal that was *implicit* in Kant.

In conclusion, to preclude at once an entire sphere of objections, I remark that Kant and Hegel are the

very reverse of the so-called 'German Party' with which in England they are, perhaps, very generally confounded. It is the express mission of Kant and Hegel, in effect, to replace the *negative* of that party, by an *affirmative*: or Kant and Hegel—all but wholly directly both, and one of them quite wholly directly—have no object but to restore Faith—Faith in God—Faith in the Immortality of the Soul and the Freedom of the Will—nay, Faith in Christianity as the Revealed Religion—and that, too, in perfect harmony with the Right of Private Judgment, and the Rights, or Lights, or Might of Intelligence in general.

PREFACE.

IN intruding on the Public with a work on Hegel, the first duty that seems to offer, is, to come to an understanding with it as regards the prepossessions which commonly obtain, it is to be feared, not only as against the particular writer named, but as against the whole body of what is called *German Philosophy*. It will be readily admitted, to be sure, by all from whom the admission is of any value, that just in proportion to the relative knowledge of the individual is his perception as well of the relative ignorance of the community. But this—general ignorance, to wit—were no dispensation from the duty indicated: for just in such circumstances is it that there *are* prepossessions, that there are—in the strict sense of the word—*prejudices*; and prejudices constitute, here as everywhere, that preliminary obstacle of natural error which requires removal before any settlement of rational truth can possibly be effected. We cannot pretend, however, to reach all the prejudices concerned; for, thought in this connexion being still so incomplete, as usual, the variety of opinion passes into the indefinite; night reigns—a night peopled by our own fancies—and distinct enumeration becomes impossible.

Nevertheless, restricting ourselves to what is either actually or virtually prominent—in the one case by

public rumour, and in the other by private validity—perhaps we shall accomplish a sufficiently exhaustive discussion by considering the whole question of objections as reduced to the two main assertions, that German Philosophy is, firstly, *obsolete* and, secondly, *bad*. The latter category, indeed, is so comprehensive, that there is little reason to fear but that we shall be able to include under it (with its fellow) all of any consequence that has been anywhere said on the subject.—Of these two assertions in their order, then.

Of the First, certain proceedings of Schelling constitute the angle; but to understand these proceedings, and the influence they exerted, a word is first of all necessary in regard to what, at the date in question, was universally held to be the historical progress of German Philosophy. The sum of general opinion here, in fact, we may state at once to have been this: Kant was supplanted by Fichte, Fichte by Schelling, and Schelling by Hegel. Any dissension, indeed, as to the sequent signification of this series was, as is natural, only to be found among the terms or members of it themselves. Kant, for example, publicly declined the affiliation which Fichte claimed from him. But then this was still settled by the remark of Reinhold, that, though Kant's belief could no longer be doubted, it yet by no means followed that Fichte was wrong. As for Fichte and Schelling, they had had their differences certainly, the master and the pupil, for the latter had gone to school to other masters, and had insisted on the addition to the original common property of a considerable amount of materials from without: nevertheless, it may be taken for granted that they themselves,

though not without reluctance on the part of one of them perhaps, acquiesced in the universal understanding of their mutual relations. Hegel again, who had at first fought for Schelling, who had produced the bulk of that *Critical Journal* which had on the face of it no origin and no object but polemically to stand by Schelling—who, in particular, had written there that article which demonstrated the advance of Schelling over all his predecessors, and the consequent truth of the *Identitätssystem*—who, in a word, had publicly adopted this system and openly declared himself an adherent of Schelling,—Hegel, it is true, had afterwards *declared off*, or, as the Germans have it, *said himself loose* from Schelling. But here, too, it was not necessary to take Hegel at his own word; for who does not know what every such mere declaration, such mere saying, is worth? Every man, in view of the special *nick* which he himself seems to have effected in the end, would fain see eliminated before it all the nicks of his predecessors, but not the less on that account is this former but the product of those latter. On the whole, then, despite some little natural interior dissension, it was certain that Fichte was the outcome of Kant—more certain, perhaps, that Schelling was the outcome of Fichte, and even quite in the superlative degree certain that Hegel was the outcome of Schelling.

Such we may assume to have been the universal belief at the death of Hegel in 1831. But now it was the fortune of Schelling to survive Hegel, and for a period of no less than twenty-three years, during part of which it became his cue to overbid Hegel, and pass him in his turn. During what we may call the *reign*

of Hegel, which may be taken to have commenced, though at first feebly, with the appearance of the *Phaenomenologie* in 1807, Schelling had preserved an almost unbroken and very remarkable silence. (Could he have been trying to understand Hegel?) No sooner was Hegel dead, however, than Schelling let hints escape him—this was as early as 1832—of the speedy appearance on his part of yet another Philosophy, and, this time, of transcendent and unimagined import. No publication followed these hints, nevertheless, till 1834, when, in reference to a certain translation of Cousin, he gave vent to ‘a very sharp and depreciatory estimate of the Hegelian Philosophy,’ and on grounds that were equally hostile to his own, from which that of Hegel was supposed to have sprung. Lastly, at Berlin in 1841, he publicly declared his previous Philosophy—and, of course, the Philosophy of Hegel seemed no less involved—to have been a poem, ‘a mere poem,’ and he now offered in its place his ‘Philosophy of Revelation.’ Now, with these facts before it, at the same time that all Germany united to reject this last Philosophy as certainly for its part a poem whatever its predecessor might have been, how could the general public be expected to feel? Worn out with the two generations of fever that had followed the *Kritik* of Kant, would not the natural impulse be to take the remaining philosopher of the series at his word, and believe with him that the whole matter had been in truth a poem, a futile striving of mere imagination in the empty air of an unreal and false abstraction? This same public, moreover, found itself on trial compelled to forego the hope of judging Hegel for itself, and,

while the very difficulty that produced this result would seem to it to throw an anterior probability on the judgment of Schelling, it had every reason to feel convinced that he, of all men, was the one who, in a super-eminent degree, was the best qualified to judge for it. He, by universal acknowledgment, had thoroughly understood and thoroughly summed both Kant and Fichte; by an acknowledgment equally universal, it was his system that had given origin to the system of Hegel: moreover, he had lived longer than Hegel, and had enjoyed, counting from the *Critical Journal*, the ample advantage of more than fifty years of the study of the works of Hegel. If any man, then, possessed the necessary ability, the necessary acquirements, the necessary presuppositions every way, to enable him to understand Hegel, that man was Schelling, and there could, therefore, be no hesitation whatever in accepting the judgment of Schelling as what, in reference to the Philosophy of Hegel, was to be universally considered the absolutely definitive conclusion, the absolutely definitive sentence. If Schelling were inadequate to understand Hegel, what other German could hope success?—and, the door being shut on Germany, was it possible to expect an ‘open sesame’ from the lips of any foreigner? Rosenkranz remarks, as if twittingly, of the *Times*, that ‘it ridiculed the attention which we devoted to the conflict of Schelling with the School of Hegel and opined that we were abstruse enthusiasts, for the whole difference between Hegel and Schelling came at last to this, that the first was very obscure, and the second obscurer still.’ But surely, in the circumstances described, the *Times*, though for the rest obviously strange to the

region, was not only entitled to say as much as this, but, more still, that the whole thing had been but an intellectual fever, and was now at an end, self-stultified by the admission of its own dream. In fact, as has been said, the declaration of Schelling amounted to a sentence. And so the general public took it—we may say—not only in Germany, but throughout Europe. Thenceforth, accordingly, stronger natures turned themselves to more hopeful issues, and German Philosophy was universally abandoned, unless, as it were, for the accidental studies of a few exceptional spirits. Since then, indeed, and especially since the failure of political hopes in 1848, Germany on the whole has, by a complete reaction, devoted to the crass concretes of empirical science the same ardour which she previously exhibited in the abstract atmosphere of the pure Idea.

This will probably be allowed to suffice as regards the case of the Affirmative in reference to the first assertion that German Philosophy is *obsolete*. What may be said for the Negative, will be considered later. Meanwhile, we shall proceed to state the case of the Affirmative of the second assertion that German Philosophy is *bad*.

The proof of this assertion, current opinion usually rests, firstly, on the indirect evidence of the reputed friends of German Philosophy, and, secondly, on the direct findings of its intelligent foes.

Are not the friends of the German Philosophers, we are asked, for example, just all those people who occupy themselves nowadays with Feuerbach and with Strauss; and do not they belong, almost all of them, to an inferior Atheistico-Materialistic set, or, at

all events, to those remnants of the *Aufklärung*, of Eighteenth Century Illumination, which still exist among us? Then, are not Essayists and Reviewers, with Bishop Colenso, generally spoken of as 'the German Party;' while, as for Strauss and Renan, are they not, by universal assertion and express name, *the* pupils of Hegel; and is not the one aim of the whole of these writers to establish a negative as regards the special inspiration of the Christian Scriptures, and shake Faith? There was Mr. Buckle, too, who, as is very clearly to be seen, though, to be sure, his mind was not very well made up, and he vacillated curiously between the Deism with an Immortality (say) of Hume and the Atheism without an Immortality of Comte—there was Mr. Buckle, who still knew nothing and would know nothing but the *Illumination*, and did not he round his vacant but tumid periods with allusions to the German Philosophers as 'advanced thinkers' of the most exemplary type? By their fruits you shall know them, and shall we not judge of Kant and Hegel by these their self-proclaimed friends, which are the fruits they produced? Nor so judging, and in view of the very superfluous extension—in an age like the present—of scepticism and misery (which is the sole vocation of such friends), shall we hesitate to declare the whole movement *bad*?

But, besides this indirect evidence of the reputed friends, there is the direct testimony of the intelligent foes of the Philosophy and Philosophers in question: we possess writers of the highest ability in themselves, and of the most consummate accomplishment as to all learning requisite—Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge,

De Quincey, for example—who have instituted each of them his own special inquest into the matter, and who all agree in assuring us of the Atheistic, Pantheistic, and, for the rest, self-contradictory, and indeed nugatory, nature of the entire industry, from Kant, who began it, to Hegel and Schelling, who finished it. Surely, then, a clear case here, if anywhere, has been made out against the whole body of German Philosophy, which really, besides, directly refutes itself, even in the eyes of the simplest, by its own uncouth, outré, bizarre, and unintelligible jargon. Beyond a doubt the thing is bad, radically bad, and deservedly at an end. ‘Advanced Thinkers’ come themselves to see, more and more clearly daily, the nullity of its Idealism, as well as its obstructiveness generally to the legitimate progress of all *sensible* speculation, and Mr. Lockhart (if we mistake not) had perfect reason, if not in the words, at least in the thoughts, when he exclaimed to a would-be translator of German Philosophy, ‘What! would you introduce that d——d nonsense into this country?’

It would seem, then, that the affirmative possesses an exceedingly strong case as regards both assertions, and that the negative has imposed on it a very awkward dilemma in each. Either grant German Philosophy *obsolete*, or prefer yourself to Schelling: this is the dilemma on one side, and on the other it cries: Either grant German Philosophy *bad*, or justify Scepticism.

Now, to take the latter alternative of the first dilemma would be ridiculous. To take that of the second, again, would be to advance in the teeth of our own deepest convictions.

Scepticism has done its work, and it were an

anachronism on our part, should we, like Mr. Buckle, pat Scepticism on the back and urge it still further forward. Scepticism is the necessary servant of *Illuminations*,—and Illuminations are themselves very necessary things; but Scepticism and Illuminations are no longer to be continued when Scepticism and Illuminations have accomplished their mission, fulfilled their function. It is all very well, when the new light breaks in on us, to take delight in it, and to doubt every nook and corner of our old darkness. It is very exhilarating then, too, though it breed but wind and conceit, to crow over our neighbours, and to be eager to convince them of the excellence of our position and of the wretchedness of theirs. But when, in Schelling's phrase, Aufklärung has passed into Ausklärung—when the Light-up has become a Light-out, the Clearing-up a Clearing-out—when we are *cleared*, that is, of every article of our stowage, of our Inhalt, of our Substance—things are very different. As we shiver *then* for hunger and cold in a crank bark that will not sail, all the clearing and clearness, all the light and lightness in the world, will not recompense or console us. The Vanity of being better informed, of being superior to the prejudices of the vulgar, even of being superior to the 'superstition' of the vulgar, will no longer support us. We too have souls to be saved. We too would believe in God. We too have an interest in the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. We too would wish to share the assurance of the humble pious Christian who takes all thankfully, carrying it in perfect trust of the future to *the other side*.

To maintain the negative, then, as regards the two

assertions at issue, will demand on our part some care. Would we maintain, as regards the first, that German Philosophy is not *obsolete*, we must so present what we maintain as not in any way offensively to derogate from the dignity and authority of the intellect and position of Schelling. On the other hand, would we maintain, as regards the second, that German Philosophy is not *bad*, this too must be so managed that Scepticism, or, more accurately, the continuance of Scepticism, shall not be justified—rather so that German Philosophy shall appear not bad just for this reason, that it demonstrates a necessary end to Scepticism—and this, too, without being untrue to the *Aufklärung*, without being untrue to the one principle of the *Aufklärung*, its single outcome—the Right of Private Judgment.

With reference to the first assertion, then, that German Philosophy is *obsolete*, we hold the negative, and we rest our position simply on the present historical truth, that the sentence of Schelling, however infallible its apparent authority, has not, in point of fact, been accepted. The several considerations which go to prove this follow here together.

Many other Germans, for example, of good ability, of great accomplishment, and thoroughly versed in Schelling himself, have, despite the ban of the latter, continued to study Hegel, and have even claimed for him a superior significance, not only as regards Schelling or Fichte, but even as regards Kant. As concerns other countries, the same state of the case has been attested by the translations which have appeared. Translations are public matters, and call for no express enumeration; and as regards the German writers to

whom we allude, perhaps general statement will suffice also. We shall appeal only, by way of instance, to one friend and to one foe. The former is Schwegler, whose premature death has been universally deplored, and whom we have to thank, as well for a most exhaustive and laborious investigation of the Metaphysic of Aristotle, as for what it is, perhaps, not rash to name the most perfect Epitome of General Philosophy at present in existence. This latter work is easily accessible, and the summaries it contains are of such a nature generally, and as respects Schelling and Hegel in particular, —though drawbacks are not wanting,—as to relieve us of the fear that its authority in the case of either will be readily impugned. The foe whom we would adduce here is Haym, who applies to Schelling's estimate of Hegel such epithets as 'spiteful' and 'envious,' and asserts it to contain 'rancour,' 'misintelligence,' and 'a good deal of distortion.'* The same evidence, both of friend and foe, is illustrated and made good by the present state, not only in Germany, but everywhere in Europe, of the study of the four writers who represent the Philosophy in question. As regards Schelling himself, for example, that study may be almost named null, and his writings are probably never read now unless for purposes of an historic and business nature. Reading, indeed, seems unnecessary in the case of what was life-long inconsistency, stained too by the malice, and infected by the ineptitude, of the end. Of Fichte, much of the philosophical framework has fallen to the ground, and what works of his are still current, at the same time that they are in their nature

* Vide Haym : *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 23.

exoteric, interest rather by their *literary* merits and the intrinsic nobleness of the man. But the hopes that were founded on Kant and Hegel have not yet withered down, and the works of both are still fondled in the hands with however longing a sigh over the strange spell of difficulty that clasps them from the sight. With reference to the former, Germany, at this very moment, loudly declares that with him is a beginning again to be made, and openly confesses that she has been too fast—that aspiration and enthusiasm have outstripped intelligence. As for Hegel, the case is thus put by an accomplished English Metaphysician: * ‘Who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen—not any foreigner—seldom even himself. With peaks here and there more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe. . . . Hegel is impenetrable, almost throughout, as a mountain of adamant.’ This is the truth, and it would have been well had other writers but manifested an equal courage of honest avowal. But it is with very mixed feelings that one watches the *allures* of those who decorate their pages with long passages from the Delian German of this modern Heraclitus, as if these passages were *pertinent* to their pages and *intelligible* to themselves—this at the very moment that they declare the utter impossibility of extracting any meaning from what they quote—unless by a process of distillation! Hegelian iron, Hegelianly tempered into Hegelian steel—the absolute

* Professor Ferrier, whose recent death we are now mourning.

adamant—this is to be distilled ! Bah, take heart, hang out, sew on your *panni purpurei* all the same !

The verdict of Schelling, then, seems practically set aside by the mere progress of time ; and there appears to lie no wish nearer to the hearts of all honest students nowadays, than that Hegel (and with him Kant is usually united) should be made permeable. And justification of this wish, on the part of students who are confessedly only on the outside, is to be found in this—that, even from this position, the works of both these writers, however impenetrable in the main, afford intimations of the richest promise on all the deeper interests of man. The Kritik of Pure Reason and the Kritik of Judgment remain still vast blocks of immovable opacity ; and even the Kritik of Practical Reason has not yet been represented with any approach to entirety in England : nevertheless, from this last work there have shone, even on British breasts, some of those rays which filled the soul of Richter with divine joy—with divine tranquillity as regards the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. Hegel is more impervious than Kant ; yet still, despite the exasperation, the positive offence which attends the reading of such exoteric works of his as have been attempted to be conveyed to the Public in French or English, we see cropping occasionally to the surface in these, a meaningfulness of speech, a facility of manipulating, and of reducing into ready proportion, a vast number of interests which to the bulk of readers are as yet only in a state of instinctive chaos, and, just on every subject that is approached, a general overmastering grasp of thought to which no other writer

exhibits a parallel. In short, we may say that, as regards these great Germans, the general Public carries in its heart a strange secret conviction, and that it seems even to its own self to wait on them with a dumb but fixed expectation of infinite and essential result. On this head, then, the conclusion forced upon us seems to be, that German Philosophy is indeed not understood, but not, on that account, by any means *obsolete*.

We come now to the *negative* of the second assertion, that German Philosophy is *bad*, and have to consider, first of all, what, on the opposite side, has been said for the *affirmative*, and under the two heads of the indirect evidence of reputed friends, and the direct testimony of intelligent foes. Under the first head, the plea began by alluding to a certain small Atheistico-Materialistic Party; but to this it is sufficient reply to point out that the adherents of a Strauss and a Feuerbach must be widely discriminated from those of a Kant and a Hegel. Further, what the plea states next, that Strauss and Renan are named *par excellence* the pupils of Hegel, is, as mere ascription, of small moment before the fact that their supposed master would have found the industry of both, in view of what he had done himself, not only superfluous, but obstructive, contradictory, and even, in a certain point of view, contemptible. Much the same thing can be said as regards the English writers who seem to follow a similar bent: whatever may be the inner motives of these writers (Essayists and Reviewers, &c.), their activity belongs to that sphere of *Rationalism* against which Hegel directly opposed himself. Still to spread the *negative*—a *negative* the spreading of which has

long reached ultimate tenuity—and in those days when it is not the *negative* but the *affirmative* we need—this would have seemed to a Hegel of all things the most unnecessary, of all things the most absurd.

Mr. Buckle—who comes next—certainly praises Kant as, perhaps, the greatest thinker of his century; and, though he does not name Hegel, he seems to speak of the Philosophers of Germany in general as something very exalted. But, observe, there is always in all this the air of a man who is speaking by anticipation, and who only *counts* on verifying the same. Nor—beyond anticipation—can any broader basis of support be extended to those generous promises he so kindly advanced, of supplying us with definitive light at length on German Philosophy, and on the causes of the special accumulation of Thought and Knowledge—in *that great country*! It is, indeed, to be feared that those promises rested only on reliance in his own invincible intellect, and not on any knowledge as yet of the subject itself. He had a theory, had Mr. Buckle, or, rather, a theory had him—a theory, it is true, small rather, but still a theory that to him loomed huge as the universe, at the same time that it was the single drop of vitality in his whole soul.—Now, that such redoubted thinkers as Kant and Hegel, who, in especial, had been suspected or accused of Deism, Atheism, Pantheism, and all manner of *isms* dear to Enlightenment, but hateful to Prejudice—(or vice versâ)—that these should be found not to fit his theory—such doubt never for a moment crossed even the most casual dream of Buckle!

We hold, then, that Mr. Buckle spoke in undoubted anticipation, and in absence of any actual knowledge.

His book, at all events, would argue absolute destitution of any such knowledge, despite a certain amount of the usual tumid pretension ; and it was just when he found himself brought by his own programme face to face with the Germans, that, it appears, he felt induced to take that voyage of recreation, the melancholy result of which we still deplore. The dilemma is this : once arrived at the actual study of the Germans, either Mr. Buckle penetrated the Germans, or he did not. Now, on the one horn, if he did, he surely found, to his amazement, consternation, horror—a spirit, a thought the very reverse of his theory—the very reverse of that superiority to established prejudice and constituted superstition which his own unhesitating conviction had led him so innocently to expect. In other words, if Mr. Buckle did penetrate the Germans, he found that there was nothing left him but to burn every vestige of that shallow Enlightenment which, supported on such semi-information, on such weak personal vanity, amid such hollow *raisonnement*, and with such contradictory results, he had been tempted, so boyishly ardent, so vaingloriously pompous, to communicate—to a world in many of its members so ignorant, that it hailed a crude, conceited boy (of formal ability, quick conscientiousness, and the *pang* of Illumination—inherited probably from antecedents somewhere) as a ‘Vast Genius,’ and his work—a bundle of excerpts of mere Illumination, from a bundle of books of mere Illumination, disposed around a ready-made presupposition of mere Illumination—as a ‘Magnificent Contribution,’ fruit of ‘Vast Learning,’ and even ‘Philosophy.’*

* The theory entertained in explanation of Mr. Buckle here, has not

Such would have been the case if Mr. Buckle had penetrated the Germans: he would have been in haste to hide out of the way all traces of the blunder (and of the blundering manner of the blunder) which had pretentiously brought forward as new and great what had received its *coup de grâce* at the hands—and thereafter been duly ticketed and shelved as Aufklärung by the industry—of an entire generation of Germans, and at least not less than half a century previously.

On the other horn, if Mr. Buckle had not penetrated and could not penetrate the Germans—a supposition not incompatible with the formal ability of even Mr. Buckle—vexation the most intense would replace the boyish anticipations, the conceited promises, which had been with so much confidence announced. A certain amount of *matter* was here indispensable; mere hollow, swashbuckler peroration about superstition, fanaticism, and the like, would no longer serve: his own programme forced him to *show* some of the knowledge which had been here—as he had himself declared—so preeminently accumulated, as well as to demonstrate something of the peculiar means and influences which had brought about so remarkable a result. The Theme was Civilisation, and to him civilisation was knowledge,—the accumulation of knowledge, therefore, was

in regard his particular age when he wrote his work, but a youthful ideal, whose burthen was Aufklärung, which had been kindled in him probably from early communication with some—to him—hero or heroes of Aufklärung, and which was filled up by what quotations he was able to make from a miscellaneous and mere reading in the

direction of the Aufklärung. In a certain way, there is not much said here as against Mr. Buckle: while his talent and love of truth are both acknowledged, his *matter* is identified with the Aufklärung, and this last consideration is not likely to be taken ill by the friends of the Aufklärung.

necessarily to him the very first and fundamental condition, and of this condition Germany had been publicly proclaimed by himself the type and the exemplar. Mere generalities would no longer suffice, then—the type itself would require to be produced—the Germans must be penetrated!—But how if they could not be penetrated?

Thus, choosing for Mr. Buckle which horn we may, the dilemma is such as to truncate or reverse any influence of his praise on the German Philosophers. Mr Buckle's sanguine expectations, indeed, to find there but mirrors of the same small Enlightenment and Illumination which he himself worshipped, are to be applied, not in determination of Kant and Hegel, but of Mr. Buckle himself.*

On the general consideration at present before us, then, we are left with the conclusion that the German Philosophers are unaffected by the indirect evidence of their reputed friends.

On the other issue, as regards what weight is to be attached to the verdict of the supposed intelligent foes of the Germans, here were required a special analysis at least of the relative *acquirements* of each of these; and this would lead to an inquest and discussion of greater length than to adapt it for insertion here. This, then, *though on our part an actual accomplishment*, will be carried over to another work. We remark here only, that if Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, and others have averred this and that of the Germans, whatever they aver is something quite indifferent, for the ignorance of

* Our world-renowned 'Times' Mill, it is true,) to *think* for us! As may have, once on a time, surprised if Mr. Buckle could think for us others besides ourselves, by calling anything that was not already—the on Mr. Buckle (conjoined with Mr. Illumination to wit—a century old!

all such, in the field before us, is utter, and, considering the pretensions which accompany it, disgraceful.* As for Mr. Lockhart, it will be presently seen, perhaps, that he only made a mistake when he styled German Philosophy 'd——d nonsense,' and that it is to that 'nonsense' we have probably to attribute some very important results.

As regards the *unfriendly* 'advanced thinkers' who denounce the Idealism and Jargon of German Philosophy, this is as it should be : for German Philosophy, while it considers the general movement concerned as the one evil of the present, cannot but feel amused with the simple ways of this odd thing which calls itself an 'advanced thinker' nowadays. 'There was a time,' says Hegel, 'when a man who did not believe in Ghosts or the Devil was named a Philosopher !' But an 'advanced thinker,' to these distinctions negative of the unseen, adds—what is positive of the seen—an enlightened pride in his father the monkey ! He may enjoy, perhaps, a well-informed satisfaction in contemplating *mere material phenomena that vary to conditions* as the all of this universe—or he may even experience an elevation into the moral sublime when he points to his future in the rock in the form of those bones and other remains of a *Pithecus Intelligens*, which, in all probability (he reflects), no subsequent intelligence will ever handle—but monkey is the pass-word ! Sink your pedigree as man, and adopt for family-tree a procession of the skeletons of monkeys — then superior enlightenment radiates from your very person, and your

* The pretensions of Coleridge Those of others, though less simple, are equally demonstrable.
have been already made notorious.

place is fixed—a place of honour in the acclamant brotherhood that names itself ‘advanced!’ So it is in England at present; this is the acknowledged pinnacle of English thought and English science now. Just point in these days to the picture of some huge baboon, and—suddenly—before such Enlightenment—superstition is disarmed, priests confess their imposture, and the Church sinks—beneath the Hippocampus of a Gorilla!

And this is but one example of the present general truth, that Spiritualism seems dying out in England, and that more and more numerous voices daily cry hail to the new God, Matter—matter, too, independent of any law—(even law-loving Mr. Buckle left behind!)—matter pliant only to the moulding influence of *contingent* conditions! This, surely, may be legitimately named the beginning of the end!

In Germany, indeed, despite a general apathy as under stun of expectations shocked, matters are not yet quite so bad; and that they are not yet quite so bad may, perhaps, be attributed to some glimmering influence, or to some glimmering hope of its Philosophy yet. Germany is certainly not without Materialism at present; but still that extreme doctrine cannot be said to be so widely spread there as in either France or England. This we may ascribe to the ‘d——d nonsense’ perhorrescoed by Mr. Lockhart.

Be this as it may, we shall take leave to ascribe to this ‘nonsense’ another difference between England and Germany which, let it be ascribed to what it may, will as a fact be denied by none. This difference or this fact is, that this country is at this present moment far outstripped by Germany in regard to

everything that holds of the intellect—with the sole exception, perhaps, of Poetry and Fiction. Even as regards these, Germany has it still in her power to say a strong word for herself; but, these apart, in what department of Literature are we not now surpassed by the Germans? * From whom have we received that 'more penetrative spirit' of Criticism and Biography that obtains at present? Who sets us an example of completed research, of thorough accuracy, of absolutely impartial representation? Who reads the Classics for us, and corrects and makes them plain to us—plain in the minutest allusion to the concrete life from which they sprang? Who gathers information for us, and refers us to the sources of the same, on every subject in which it may occur to us to take an interest? But Literature is not the strong point here: what of Science?—and no one will dispute the value of that—is there any department of science in which at this moment the Germans are not far in advance of the rest of Europe? Consider Chemistry alone—or Physiology alone! In this last, there is Virchow, for example—in comparison with him, it is to be feared that we, but too many of us, the medical men of the rest of Europe, in our semi-information, semi-education, in our innocent Latin and Greek, in our barbarously learned nomenclature—in those crude, chaotic clouds of vapour and verbiage generally on which our conceit looks fondly as on wonders of intellect,—seem like charlatans!

Now, all this activity which gives to Germany the

* Of course, the question is only last, we certainly have still some of present literature, and alone of *great men* whom we place second literature, not of men. As for these to no German.

intellectual lead in Europe is subsequent to her Philosophies, and is, in all probability, just to be attributed to her Philosophies.—It is quite possible, at the same time, that the scientific men of Germany are no students of what is called *the Philosophy* of their country—nay, it appears to the present writer a matter of certainty that that Philosophy is not yet essentially understood anywhere: it by no means follows, on that account, however, that this Philosophy is not the motive spring to that science. If the essential secret of Philosophy has not been won, still much of the mass has been invaded from without, has been broken up externally, and has fallen down and resolved itself into the general current. Its language, its distinctions have passed into the vernacular, and work there with their own life. Hence it is that Germany seems to possess at present, not only a language of its own, but, as it were, a system of *Thought-counters* of its own for which no other language can find equivalents. Let anyone take up the *Anzeige der Vorlesungen*, the notice of lectures at any German University, and he will find much matter of speculation presented to him; for everything will seem there to him *sui generis*, and quite dissimilar to anything of which he may have experience in Great Britain or in France. Haym* remarks, as regards this vast difference between the spirit of Germany and that of England, that to compare the books that issue from the press of the one country with those that issue from that

* 'Let us compare, to go no further, the scientific works of the English with those of our own country, and we shall very soon perceive that the type of English thought is essentially different from that of the German; that the scientific faculty of the countrymen of Bacon and Locke moves in quite other paths, and makes quite

of the other, one is tempted to suppose that the two nations move on wholly different courses.—Now, mere difference would be a matter of no moment; but what if the difference point to retrogression on one side, and progression on the other? It is very certain that we are behind the Germans now, and it is also certain that these latter continue to rush forward with a speed in every branch of science which threatens to leave us in the end completely in the lee.

Associating this difference of progress with that difference of the language used for the purposes of thought, it does seem not unreasonable to conclude that the former is but a corollary of the latter. In other words, it appears probable that that ‘d——d nonsense’ has been the means of introducing into the German mind such series of new and marvellously penetrant terms and distinctions as has carried it with ease into the solution of a variety of problems impossible to the English, despite the induction of Bacon, the good sense of Locke, and even Adam Smith’s politico-economical revelations.

We have mentioned Virchow, who seems almost to have initiated a new Era in Physiological Science.—Now, if anyone will take the trouble to examine the language of Virchow, he will find it instinct with the peculiar terms of the new philosophy. The very cell which is Virchow’s *First*, and beyond which there is in that sphere no other, is quite Hegelian, not only in that respect, but in its very construction.

other stadia; that its combinations with the countrymen of Kant and proceed by quite other notions, Hegel.’—Haym: Hegel und seine both principal and accessory, than Zeit, p. 300.
is the case, in the same respect,

Quality, being complete, turns itself to Quantity, from which drinking, it grows. So is it with the cell : it is as the completed Quality, that stands in need now of Quantity alone. No germ of life but is an example of this ; for to the invisible spore as Quality, matter is but as Quantity. But the cell itself, regarded as Quality alone, presents a striking resemblance to the completed Quality of Hegel. Seyn, Daseyn, and Fürsichseyn are, as is well known, the elements of the latter, and they seem to repeat themselves in the cell of Virchow. Seyn (Being) is the Universal—the one membrane ; Daseyn (So-being) is the Particular—the distinguishable involution of the membrane ; Fürsichseyn (Self-being or Self-ness) is the Singular—the apex, the Kernchen, the functioning and individual *one*. Something of fancy may have mingled here, but really the cell of Virchow seems but a reflexion from the triplicity and the Notion of Hegel. The analogy of the former is, at lowest, admirably illustrative of the latter. But it is not necessary to demand as much as this—the new distinctions introduced by the general language and spirit of thought suffice for the support of all that we would maintain here.

The denunciations of German Philosophy, then, emitted by ‘advanced thinkers,’ would seem powerless beside the superiority of German Science to that of the rest of Europe when collated with the terms and distinctions of the Philosophy which preceded it. These advanced thinkers, in fact, are the logical contradictory of German Philosophy, and, if they denounce it, it in turn—not denounces, but, lifting the drapery, simply *names* them.

It is, perhaps, now justifiable to conclude on the whole, then, that, as regards the negative of the assertions that German Philosophy is *obsolete* or *bad*, a case has been led of sufficient validity to set aside the opposing plea of the affirmative. It is not to be inferred, however, that the case is now closed, and all said that can be said in support of the Germans. We have spoken of the benefits which seem to have derived from the very terms; but these surely are not restricted to the mere words, and others, both greater in number and more important in kind, may be expected to flow from the thoughts which these words or terms only represent. It were desirable, then, to know these latter benefits, which, if they really exist, ought to prove infinitely more commendatory of the study we advocate than any interest which has yet been adduced. It is this consideration which shall form the theme, on the whole, of what we think it right yet prefatorily to add.

The misfortune is, however, that, as regards the benefits in question, they—as yet—only ‘may be expected:’ it cannot be said that, from German Philosophy, so far as the thoughts are concerned, any adequate harvest has yet been reaped. Nevertheless, this harvest is still potentially there, and, perhaps, it is not quite impossible to find a word or two that shall prefigure something of its general nature and extent. It is evident, however, that, if it is true, be it as it may with the terms, that the thoughts of German Philosophy are not yet adequately turned to account, but remain as yet almost, as it were, beyond the reach whether of friend or foe, there must exist some unusual difficulty

of intelligence in the case ; and it may be worth while to look to this first. For the duty of a Preface—though necessarily for the most part in a merely cursory manner—is no less to relieve difficulty than to meet objections, explain connexions, and induce a hearing. The difficulty we have at present before us, however, must be supposed to concern Hegel only ; what concerns Kant must be placed elsewhere. Nor, even as regards Hegel, is it to be considered possible to enumerate at present all the sources of his difficulty, and for this reason, that a certain knowledge of the matter involved must be presupposed before any adequate understanding can be expected in this reference. The great source of difficulty, for example, if our inmost conviction be correct, is that an exhaustive study of Kant has been universally neglected—a neglect, as Hegel himself—we may say—*chuckles*, ‘not unrevenged,’—and the key-note of this same Hegel has thus remained inaccessible. Now this plainly concerns a point for which a preface can offer no sufficient breadth. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, to one or two sources of difficulty which may contain auxiliary matter in themselves, and may prove, on the whole, not quite insusceptible of intelligible discussion at once.

What is called the *Jargon* of German Philosophy, for example, and has been denounced as *Barbarisch* by a multitude of Germans themselves (Haym among them), though, under the name of *terms* and *distinctions*, it has just been defended, may not unprofitably receive another word. Now, we may say at once, that if on one side this Jargon is to be admitted, it is to be denied on the other. The truth is, that if on one side it looks

like jargon and sounds like jargon, on the other it is not jargon, but a philosophical nomenclature and express system of terms. The scandal of philosophy hitherto has been its logomachies, its mere verbal disputes. Now, with terms that float loosely on the lips of the public, and vary daily, misunderstandings and disputes in consequence of a multiplicity of meanings were hardly to be avoided; but here it is that we have one of the most peculiar and admirable of the excellences of Hegel: his words are such and so that they *must* be understood as he understands them, and difference there can be none. In Hegel, thing and word arise together, and must be comprehended together. A true definition, as we know, is that which predicates both the *proximum genus* and the *differentia*: now the peculiarity of the Hegelian terms is just this—that their very birth is nothing but the reflexion of the *differentia* into the *proximum genus*—that at their very birth, then, they arise in a perfect definition. This is why we find no dictionary and so little explanation of terms in Hegel; for the book itself is that dictionary; and *how* each term comes, *that* is the explanation;—each comes forward, indeed, as it is wanted, and where it is wanted, and just so, in short, that it is no mere term, but the thought itself. It is useless to offer examples of this, for every paragraph of the Logic is an example in point. If the words, then, were an absolutely new coinage, this would be their justification, and the nickname of jargon would fall to the ground. But what we have here is no new coinage,—Hegel has carefully chosen for his terms those words which are the known and familiar names of the current *Vorstellungen*, of the current figurate

conceptions which correspond to his Begriffe, to his pure notions, and are as the metaphors and externalisations of these Begriffe, of these pure notions. They have thus no mere arbitrary and artificial sense, but a living and natural one, and their attachment through the Vorstellung to the Begriff, through the figurate conception to the pure notion, converts an instinctive and blind, into a conscious and perceptive use,—to the infinite improvement both of thought and speech even in their commonest daily applications. The reproach of jargon, then, concerns one of the greatest merits of Hegel—a merit which distinguishes him above all other philosophers, and which, while it extends to us a means of the most assured movement, secures himself from those misunderstandings which have hitherto sapped philosophy, and rendered it universally suspect.—Jargon is an objection, then, which will indeed remove itself, so soon as the objector shall have given himself the trouble to understand it.

Another difficulty turns on this word Vorstellung which we have just used. A Vorstellung is a sort of sensuous thought; it is a symbol, a metaphor, as it were, an externalisation of thought: or Vorstellung, as a whole, is what we commonly mean by Conception, Imagination, the Association of Ideas, &c. Hegel pointedly declares of this Association of Ideas, that it is not astrict to the three ordinary laws only which, since Hume, have been named Contiguity, Similitude, and Contrast, but that it floats on a prey to a thousand-fold contingency. Now, it is this Association of Ideas that constitutes thought to most of us,—a blind,

instinctive secution of a miscellaneous multitude of unverified individuals. These individuals are *Vorstellungen*, figurate conceptions—*Ideas*—crass, emblematic bodies of thoughts rather than thoughts themselves. Then, the process itself, as a whole, is also nameable *Vorstellung* in general. An example, perhaps, will illustrate this—an example which by anticipation may be used here, though it will be found elsewhere.—‘God might have thrown into space a single germ-cell from which all that we see now might have developed itself.’ We take these words from a periodical which presumes itself—and justly—to be in the van at present: the particular writer also to whom they are due, speaks with the tone of a man who knows—and justly—that he is at least not behind his fellows. What is involved in this writing, however, is not thought, but *Vorstellung*. In the quotation, indeed, there are mainly three *Vorstellungen*—God, Space, and a Germ-cell. Now, with these elements the writer of this particular sentence conceives himself to *think a beginning*. To take all back to God, Space, and a single Germ-cell, that is enough for him and his necessities of thought; that to him is to look at the thought *beginning*, sufficiently closely. But all these three elements are already complete and self-dependent.—God, one *Vorstellung*, finished, ready-made, complete by itself, takes up a Germ-cell, another *Vorstellung*, finished, ready-made, complete by itself, and drops it into Space, a third *Vorstellung*, finished, ready-made, complete by itself. This done—without transition, without explanation, the rest (by the way, another *Vorstellung*) follows. This, then, is not thought, but an idle mis-spending of the time

with empty pictures which, while they infect the mind of the reader only with other pictures equally empty, tend to infect that of the writer also with wind—the wind of vanity.—‘Yes; I looked into Spinoza some time ago, and it was a clear ether, but there was no God:’ this, the remark of a distinguished man in conversation, is another excellent example of *Vorstellung*, figurate conception, imagination—in lieu of thought. If one wants to think God, one has no business to set the eye a-roving through an infinite clear ether in hopes of—*seeing him at length*! ‘I have swept space with my telescope,’ says Lalande, ‘and found no God.’ To the expectation of this *illuminated* Astronomer, then, God was an optical object; and as he could find with his glass no such optical object—rather no optical object to correspond to his *Vorstellung*, which *Vorstellung* he had got he knew not where and never asked to know, which *Vorstellung*, in fact, it had never occurred to him in any way to question—God there was none! These, then, are examples of *Vorstellungen*, and not of thought; and we may say that the *Vorstellung* of the Materialist as to space constitutes a rebuke to the *Vorstellung* of the Spiritualist as to a clear ether in which it was a disappointment that no God was to be *seen*! God, as revealed to us by Scripture, and demonstrated by Philosophy, is a Spirit; and a Spirit is to be found and known by thought only, and neither by the sensuous eye of the body nor the imaginative eye of the mind.

Unfortunately, it can hardly be said that there is thought *proper* anywhere at present; and circumstances universally exist which have substituted figurate conception in its stead. In England, for example, the

literature with which the century began was a sort of poetical re-action against the Aufklärung, and the element of that literature is Vorstellung, Imagination merely. Acquired stores, experience, thought,—these were not, but, instead of these, emotions enough, images enough, cries enough! *Nature was beautiful, and Love was divine*: this was enough—with Genius!—to produce the loftiest works, pictures, poems, even alchemy! An empty belly, when it is active, is adequate to the production of—gripes: and when an empty head is similarly active, what can you expect but gripes to correspond—convulsions namely, contortions of conceit, attitudinising, eccentric gesticulations in a wind of our own raising? It were easy to name names and bring the criticism home; but it will be prudent at present to stop here. It is enough to say that the literature of England during the present century largely consists of those Genieschwünge, those fervours, those swings or springs or flights of genius, which were so suspicious and distasteful both to Kant and Hegel. Formal personal ability, *which is only that*, if it would produce, can only lash itself into efforts and energies that are idle—that have absolutely no *filling* whatever but one's own subjective vanity. Or formal personal ability which is only that, has nothing to develop from itself but reflexes of its own longing, self-inflicted convulsions; it has no thoughts—only Vorstellungen, figurate conceptions, emotional images,—mostly big, haughty enough ones, too. One result of all this, is what we may call the Photographic writing which alone obtains at present. For a long time back, writers have desired to write only to our eyes, not to our thoughts.

History now is as a picture-gallery, or as a puppet-show ; men with particular legs and particular noses, street-processions, battle-scenes—these—images—all *images* !—mow and mop and grin on us from every canvass now. We are never asked to think—only to look—as into a peep-show, where, on the right, we see *that*, and on the left *this* ! This, however, must culminate and pass, if, indeed, it has not already culminated in the extraordinary attempt we saw some time ago to enable us to be present—through mere reading—at the Niagara Falls. Now, this it is which constitutes an immense source of difficulty in the study of Hegel. Lord Macaulay remarks on ‘the slovenly way in which most people are content to think ;’ and we would extend the remark to the slovenly way in which nowadays most people are content to read. Everything, indeed, has been done by our recent writers to relieve us even of that duty, and a book has become but a succession of optical presentments followed easily by the eye. Reading is thus, now, a sort of sensuous entertainment : it costs only a mechanical effort, and no greater than that of smoking or of chewing. The consequence of this reading is, that the habit of *Vorstellungen*, and without effort of our own, has become so inveterate, that not only are we unable to move in *Begriffe*, in pure notions, but we are shut out from all *Begriffe* by impervious clouds of ready-made *Vorstellungen*. Thus it is that writers like Kant and Hegel are sealed books to us, or books that have to be shut by the most of us—after five minutes—in very weariness of the flesh—in very oppression of the eyes.

We must bear in mind, on the other hand, that Vor-

stellungen are always the beginning, and constitute the express conditions, of thought. We are not to remain by them, nevertheless, as what is ultimate. When Kant says that the Greeks were the first to think *in abstracto*, and that there are nations, even nowadays, who still think *in concreto*, he has the same theme before him, though from another side. The concrete *Vorstellung* is the preliminary condition, but it must be purified into the abstract *Begriff*; else we never attain to mastery over ourselves, but float about a helpless prey to our own pictures. (We shall see a side again where our abstractions are to be re-dipped in the concrete, in order to be restored to truth; but the contradiction is only apparent.)

So much, indeed, is *Vorstellung* the condition of the *Begriff*, that we should attribute Hegel's success in the latter to his immense power in the former. No man had ever clearer, firmer *Vorstellungen* than he; but he had the mastery over them—he made them at will tenaciously remain before him, or equally tenaciously draw themselves the one after the other. *Vorstellung*, in fact, is for the most part the key to mental power; and if you know a man's *Vorstellungen*, you know himself. If, on one side, then, the habit of *Vorstellungen*, and previous formation of *Vorstellungen* without attempt to reduce them to *Begriffe*, constitute the greatest obstacle to the understanding of Hegel, power of *Vorstellung* is, on the other side, absolutely necessary to this understanding itself. So it is that, of all our later literary men, we are accustomed to think of Shelley and Keats as those the best adapted by nature for the understanding of a Hegel. These young

men had a real power of *Vorstellung*; and their *Vorstellungen* were not mere crass, external pictures, but fine images analytic and expressive of original thought.

‘ By such dread words from Earth to Heaven

My still realm was never riven :

When its wound was closed, there stood

Darkness o’er the day like blood.’

‘ Driving sweet buds, like flocks, to feed in air.’

‘ Thou

For whose path the Atlantic’s level powers

Cleave themselves into chasms, while far below

The sea-blooms and the oozy woods which wear

The sapless foliage of the ocean, know

Thy voice, and suddenly grow grey with fear,

And tremble and despoil themselves : Oh hear !’

These are *Vorstellungen* from Shelley (whose every line, we may say, teems with such); and if they are *Vorstellungen*, they are also thoughts. Keats is, perhaps, subtler and not less rich, though more sensual and less ethereally pure, than Shelley; *Vorstellungen* in him are such as these : —

‘ She, like a moon in wane,

Faded before him, cowered, nor could restrain

Her fearful sobs, self-folding like a flower

That faints into itself at evening hour :

But the God fostering her chilled hand,

She felt the warmth, her eyelids opened bland,

And, like new flowers at morning song of bees,

Bloomed, and gave up her honey to the lees.’

How much these images are thoughts, how they are but analytic and expressive of thought, will escape no one.

Compare with these this : —

‘ And thou art long, and lank, and brown,

As is the ribbed sea-sand.’

This, too, is a *Vorstellung*; but, in comparison with the

preceding, it is external and thought-less, it is analytic of nothing, it is expressive of nothing; it is a bar to thought, and not a help. Yet there is so much in it of the mere picture, there is so much in it of that unexpectedness that makes one stare, that it has been cited a thousand times, and is familiar to everybody; while those of Keats and Shelley are probably known to those only who have been specially trained to judge. By as much, nevertheless, as the *Vorstellungen* of Keats and Shelley are superior to this *Vorstellung* of Wordsworth's, (Coleridge gives it to him,) inferences may be drawn as to an equal *original* superiority of *quality* on the part of both the former relatively to the latter. Neither will Coleridge stand this test any better than Wordsworth; and even the maturer products, however exquisite, of Tennyson (whose genius seems bodily to rise out of these his predecessors) display not *Vorstellungen* equally internal, plastic, creative, with those of Keats and Shelley.—Intensely vivid *Vorstellung*, this, we may say, almost constitutes Mr. Carlyle: in him, however, it is *reproductive* mainly; in him, too, it very frequently occurs in an element of *feeling*: and *feeling* is usually an element hot and one-sided, so that the *Vorstellung* *glares*, or is fierce, keen, Hebraic. The test applied here is not restricted to *writers*—it can be extended to men of *action*; and Alexander and Cæsar, Wellington, Napoleon, Cromwell, will readily respond to it. Cromwell here, however, is almost to be included as an exception; for he can hardly be said to have had any traffic with *Vorstellung* at all; or what of that faculty he shows is very confused, very incompetent, and almost to be named incapable. Cromwell, in fact, had direct

being in his categories, and his expression accordingly was direct action.* We have here, however, a seductive subject, and of endless reach; we will do well to return.

There is a distinction, then, between those who move in *Vorstellungen* wholly as such, and those who use them as living bodies with a soul of thought consciously within them; and the classes separated by this distinction will be differently placed as regards Hegel: while the former, in all probability, will never get near him, the latter, on the other hand, will possess the power to succeed; but success even to them, as habits now are, will demand immense effort, and will arrive when they have contrived to see, not with their *Vorstellungen*, but without them, or at least *through* them.

As regards the difficulty which we have just considered, the division between Hegel and his reader is

* This brief statement of Cromwell may be slight; but it is worth supporting, by suggesting that it may have more value to the reader when he shall have become familiar with the full force of the word *Categories*. Of these Hegel says, in a passage quoted by Rosenkranz from the *Naturphilosophie* (Hegel's *Werke*, vii. 18), 'That by which *Naturphilosophie* distinguishes itself from *Physics* is more particularly the species of *Metaphysic* which each employs; for metaphysic is nothing else than the complement of the universal thought-forms [*Categories*]; the diamond net, as it were, into which we bring and by which only we render intelligible any and every

concrete matter whatever. No formed consciousness but has its metaphysic, the instinctive thought, the absolute might in us, of which we become master only when we make it itself the object of our knowledge. Philosophy, in general, has, as philosophy, other categories than ordinary consciousness; all culture reduces itself to difference of categories. All revolutions, in the sciences, no less than in general history, originate only in this, that the spirit of man, for the understanding and comprehending of himself, for the possessing of himself, has now altered his categories, uniting himself in a truer, deeper, more inner and intimate relation with himself.'

so, that the former appears on the abstract, the latter on the concrete side; but we have now to refer to a difficulty where this position is reversed—where, Hegel being concrete, the reader cannot get at him, just for this, that he himself cannot help remaining obstinately abstract. *The abstractions of the understanding*, this is the word which is the cue to what we have in mind at present. It is impossible to enter here into any full exposition of how Hegel, in the end, regarded understanding, or of how his particular regards were in the first case introduced. It must suffice to say at once, that understanding was to Hegel as the god Horos, it was the principle and agent of the definite everywhere; but, as such, it necessarily separated and distinguished into isolated, self-dependent individuals. Now this which has been indicated is our (the readers') element; we live and move among wholly different, self-identical entities which—each of them as regards the other—are *abstractly* held. This, however, is not the element of Hegel; his element is *the one concrete*, where no entity is, so to speak, its own self, but quite as much its other—where if the one is to him, as it is to us (but without consciousness of the one), *the all*, the all *are* equally to him the one. Hegel's world is a concrete world, and he discovered the key of this concrete world in that he was enabled, through Kant, to perceive that the conditions of a concrete and of every concrete are two opposites: in other words, Hegel came to see that there exists no concrete which consists not of two antagonistic characters, where, at the same time, strangely, somehow, the one is not only through the other, but actually is this other. Now it is this

condition of Things which the abstractions of the Understanding interfere to shut out from us; and it is our life in these abstractions of the understanding which is the chief source of our inability to enter and take up the concrete element of Hegel. The Logic of Hegel is an exemplification of this Cosmical fact, from the very beginning even to the very end; but it will sufficiently illustrate what we have said, perhaps, to take the single example of *Quantity*.

To us, as regards Quantity, Continuity is one thing, and Discretion quite another: we see a *line* unbroken in the one case, and but so many different dots in the other. Not so Hegel, however: to him Continuity is not only impossible without Discretion, and Discretion is not only impossible without Continuity, but Discretion is Continuity, and Continuity is Discretion. *We* see them, abstractly, apart—the one independent of, different from, the other: *he* sees them, concretely, together—the one dependent on, identical with, the other. To Hegel it is obvious that continuity and discretion, not either singly, but both together, constitute Quantity—that, in short, these are the constitutive moments or elements of the single pure, abstract, yet in itself concrete, Notion, Quantity. If a *continuum* were not in itself discrete, it were no quantity; and nowhere in *rerum natura* can there be found any *continuum* that is not in itself discrete. Similarly, if a *discretum* were not in itself continuous, it were no quantity, and so on. In fact, to the single notion, quantity, these two sub-notions are always necessary: it is impossible to conceive, it is impossible that there should be, a How Much that were not as well continuous as discrete: it is

the discretion that makes the continuity, and it is the continuity of discretion that makes quantity ; or it is the continuity that makes the discretion, and it is the discretion of continuity that makes quantity. Quantity is a concrete of the two ; *they* are indivisibly, inseparably together *in it*. Now every Notion—truly such—is just such disjunctive conjunct or conjunctive disjunct. Hence is it that Dialectic arises : false in us as we cannot bring the opposing characters together, because of the abstractions of the understanding ; true in Hegel, because he has attained to the power—will ever any other man reach it equally?—of seeing these together, that is, in their truth, their concrete, actually existent truth.

For example, it is on the notion, Quantity as such, on the dissociation and antagonism of its two constituent moments, that all those supposed insoluble puzzles concerning the infinite divisibility of Time, Space, Matter, &c., depend ; and all disputes in this connexion are kept up by simply neglecting to see both sides, or to bring *both* of the necessary moments together. My friend tells me, for instance, that matter is not infinitely divisible, that that table—to take an actual case—can be passed over, can both factually and mathematically be proved to be passed over, and hence is not infinite, but finite. I, again, point out that division takes nothing away from what it divides ; that that table, consequently, (and every part of the table is similarly situated,) is divisible, and again divisible *usque ad infinitum*, or so long as there is a quantity left, and, as for that, that there must always be a quantity left—for, as said, *division takes nothing away*. Or I too can bring

my mathematics.—In this way, he persisting on his side, I persisting on my side, we never come together. But we effect this, or we readily come together, when we perceive that both sides are necessary to the single *One* (Quantity), or that each, in fact, is necessary to the other. In short, quantity as continuous is infinitely divisible; as discrete, it consists of parts which are as ultimate and further indivisible. These are the two points of view, under either of which quantity can be set; and, more than that, these two points of view are, each of them, equally essential to the single thing, quantity, and are the moments which together constitute the single thing (correctly notion), quantity. ‘The One,’ then, (moment, that is,) as Hegel sums up here, and we refer to the full discussion in its proper place for complete details, ‘is as one-sided as the other.’

This is not the place to point out the entire significance of the single fact that is suggested here, nor of how Hegel was led to it, and what he effected with it: this which we so suggest were a complete exposition of the one Secret and of the entire System of Hegel. Such exposition is the business of the general work which we here introduce; but it will be found brought in some sense to a point—though necessarily imperfectly, as the reader arrived there will readily understand—in the ‘last word’ at the end of the second volume. Our sole object here is to illustrate the difficulty we labour under relatively to Hegel from the abstractions of the understanding, and to render these themselves, to some preliminary extent, intelligible.

We may add, that the above is the true solution to those difficulties which have at different times been brought

forward as paradoxes of Zeno, or as antinomies of Kant. The case, as summed by Hegel, (see under Quantity,) will be found to be particularly disastrous not only to the German pretensions, but even to the Grecian pretensions—not only to the Hegelian pretensions, but even to the Aristotelian pretensions, of such men as Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, and De Quincey. The two last, indeed, with that ‘voice across the ages,’ between them, are even ludicrous.

It is to be feared that the view given here of the difficulties of Hegel will prove disappointing to many. As was natural to a public so prepared by *the passions*, the *interjections*, the *gesticulations* of those whom we regard as our recent men of genius, the general belief, in all probability, was, and still is, that Kant and Hegel are difficult because they ‘soar so high,’ because they have so very much of the ‘fervid’ in them, and especially because they are ‘mystic.’ To be disabused of these big figurate conceptions on which we rise so haughtily may prove a pain. Indeed, as by a sudden dash on the solid ground, it may be a rather rude shaking out of us of these same bignesses, to be brought to understand that the difficulties of Hegel are simply technical, and that his Logic is to be read only by such means as will enable us to read the Principia of Newton—industry, tenacity, perseverance! In England, ever since these same fervid men of genius, a vast number of people, when they are going to write, think it necessary, first of all, to put their mouths askew, and blow the bellows of their breasts up: only so, they hope, on the strong bias of their breath, to ‘soar’—to blow themselves and us, that is—‘into the Empyrean!’ But

Hegel, alas ! never puts his mouth askew, never thinks of *biassing* his breath, never lays himself out at all for the luxury of a *soar*. Here are no ardours, no enthusiasms, no aspirations ; here is an air so cool, so clear, that all such tropical luxuriances wither in it. Hegel, no more than Kant, will attempt anything by a *Genieschwung* : all in both is thought, and thought that rises, slowly, laboriously, only by unremitting step after step. Apart from thought *qua* thought, Kant and Hegel are both very plain fellows : Kant, a very plain little old man, whose only obstacle to us is, after all, just his endless garrulity, his iterating, and again iterating, and always iterating *Geschwätz* ; Hegel, a dry Scotsman who speaks *at*, rather than *to* us, and would seem to seek to enlighten by provoking us ! It is not at all rhetoric, eloquence, poetry, that we are to expect in them, then ; in fact, they are never in the air, but always on the ground, and this is their strength. Many people, doubtless, from what they hear of Hegel, his Idealism, his Absolute Idealism, &c., will not be prepared for this. They have been told by men who pretended to know, that Hegel, like some common conjuror, would prove the chair they sat on not a chair, &c. &c. This is a very vulgar conception, and must be abandoned, together with that other that would consider Hegel as impracticable, unreal, visionary, a dreamer of dreams, ‘a man with too many bees in his bonnet.’ Hegel is just the reverse of this ; he is wholly down on the solid floor of substantial fact, and will not allow himself to quit it—no, not for a moment’s indulgence to his subjective vanity—a moment’s recreation on a gust of genius. Hegel is a Suabian. There are *Suabian licks* as well as *Lockerby licks*.

Hegel is as a son of the border, home-spun, rustic-real, blunt: as in part already said, there are always the sagacious ways about him of some plain, honest, deep-seen, old Scotsman. Here, from the Aesthetic, is a little illustrative specimen of him, which the extracts of Franz and Hillert extend to us:—

‘Romances, in the modern sense of the word, follow those of Knight-errantry and those named Pastoral. In them we have Knight-errantry become again earnest and substantially real. The previous lawlessness and precariousness of outward existence has become transformed into the fixed and safe arrangements of civilised life; so that Police, Law, the Army, Government, now replace the chimerical duties which the Knight-errant set himself. Accordingly, the Knight-errantry of the modern Hero is correspondently changed. As an individual with his subjective ends of ambition, love, honour, or with his ideals of a world reformed, he stands in antagonism to this established order and *prosa* of actuality, which thwarts him on all hands. In this antagonism, his subjective desires and demands are worked up into tremendous intensity; for he finds before him a world spell-bound, a world alien to him, a world which he must fight, as it bears itself against him, and in its cold indifference yields not to his passions, but interposes, as an obstacle to them, the will of a father, of an aunt, societary arrangements, &c. It is especially our youths who are these new Knights-errant that have to fight their way through that actual career which realises itself in place of their ideals, and to whom it can only appear a misery that there are such things at all as Family, Conventional Rules, Laws, a State, Professions, &c., because

these substantial ties of human existence place their barriers cruelly in the way of the Ideals and infinite Rights of the heart. The thing to be done now, then, is for the hero to strike a breach into this arrangement of things—to alter the world, to reform it, or, in its despite, to carve out for himself a heaven on earth, to seek out for himself the maiden that is as a maiden should be—to find her, to woo her, and win her and carry her off in triumph, maugre all wicked relations and every other obstruction. These stampings and strugglings, nevertheless, are, in our modern world, nothing else than the apprenticeship, the schooling of the individual in actual existence, and receive thus their true meaning. For the end of such apprenticeship is, that the subject gets his oats sown and his horns rubbed off—accommodates himself, with all his wishes and opinions, to existent relations and their reasonableness; enters into the concatenation of the world, and earns for himself there his due position. One may have ever so recalcitrantly laid about him in the world, or been ever so much shoved and shouldered in it, in the end, for the most part, one finds one's maiden and some place or other for all that, marries, and becomes a slow-coach, a Philistine, just like the rest : the wife looks after the house ; children thicken ; the adored wife that was at first just *the one*, an angel, comes to look, on the whole, something like all the rest : one's business is attended with its toils and its troubles, wedlock with household cross ; and so there are the *reflective Cat-dumps**

* *Catdumps* (Reflective *Seediness*) translates Katzenjammer. The metaphor involved in the word probably refers to the penitent morning-misery of a cat that has been out all night.

of all the rest over again.'—If the reader will but take the trouble to read this *Scoticè*, the illustration will be complete.

It is a mistake, then, to conceive Hegel as other than the most practical of men, with no object that is not itself of the most practical nature. To the right of private judgment he remains unhesitatingly true, and every interest that comes before him must, to be accepted, demonstrate its relevancy to empirical fact. With all this, however, his function here is that of a Philosopher; and his Philosophy, while the hardest to penetrate, is at once the deepest and the widest that has been yet offered to mortals. If the deepest and the widest, it is probably at this moment also the most required.

It has been said already that our own day is one—a pretty late one, it is to be hoped—in that general movement which has been named *Aufklärung*, Illumination, the principle of which we declared to be the Right of Private Judgment. Now Kant, who participated deeply in the spirit of this movement, and who with his whole heart accepted this principle, became, nevertheless, the *closer* of the one and the *guide* of the other—by this, that he saw the necessity of a *positive* complement to the peculiar *negative* industry to which, up to his day, both movement and principle had alone seemed adequate. The subtle suggestions of Hume seemed to have loosened every joint of the Existent, and there seemed no conclusion but universal Scepticism. Against this the conscientious purity of Kant revolted, and he set himself to seek out some other outlet. We may have seen in some other country the elaborate

structure of a baby dressed. The board-like stiffness in which it was carried, the manifest incapacity of the little thing to move a finger, the enormous amount and extraordinary nature of the various appliances—swathes, folders, belts, cloths, bandages, &c., points and trusses innumerable—all this may have struck us with astonishment, and we may have figured ourselves addressing the parents, and, by dint of *invincible reason*, persuading them to give up the board, then the folder, then the swathe, then the bandage, &c. ; but, in this *negative action of taking off*, we should have stopped somewhere ; even when insisting on free air and free movement, we should have found it necessary to leave to the infant what should keep it warm. Nay, the question of clothes as a whole were thus once for all generalised, and debate, once initiated, would cease never till *universal reason* were satisfied—till the infant were at length fairly *rationaly* dressed. As the function of the Aufklärung must stop somewhere, then, when it applies itself to the undressing of the wrong-dressed baby, so must the same function stop somewhere when it applies itself to the similar undressing of the similarly wrong-dressed (feudally-dressed) State. A naked State would just be as little likely to thrive as a naked infant : and how far—it is worth while considering—is a State removed from absolute nudity, when it is reduced to the self-will of the individual controlled only by the mechanical force of a Police ?

No partisan of the Illumination has ever gone further than that ; no partisan of the Illumination has ever said, Let the self-will of each be absolutely all : the control of a Police (Protection of Person and Property) has been

a universal postulate, insisted on by even the extremest left of the movement. Yet there are those who say this—there are those who say, Remove your meddlesome protection of the police ; by the aid of free competition we can parson and doctor ourselves, and by the aid of free competition, therefore, we can also police ourselves : remove, then, here also all your vicious system of checks, as all your no less vicious system of bounties and benefits ; let humanity be absolutely free—let there be nothing left but self-will, individual self-will *pur et simple* ! There are those who say this : they are our Criminals ! Like the cruel mother whose interest is not in its growth, but in its decease, our criminals would have the naked baby. But if self-will is to be proclaimed the principle, if self-will *is* the principle, our criminals are more consistent than our ‘advanced thinkers,’ who, while they assert this principle, and believe this principle, and think they observe this principle, open the door to the Police, and find themselves unable to shut it again, till it is driven to the wall before the *whole* of reason, before Reason herself who enters with the announcement that self-will is not the principle, and the direct reverse of the principle.

Now, Kant saw a great deal of this—Kant saw that the naked baby would not do ; that, if it were even necessary to strip off every rag of the old, still a new would have to be procured, or life would be impossible. So it was that, though unconsciously to himself, he was led to seek his *Principles*. These, Kant came to see, were the one want ; and surely, if they were the one want in his day, they are no less the want now. Self-will, individual commodity, this has been made *the principle*, and

accordingly we have turned to it, that we might *enjoy ourselves alone*, that we *might live to ourselves alone*, that the I might be wholly the I unmixed and unobstructed ; and, for result, the I in each of us is dying of inanition—even though we make (it is even *because* we make) the seclusion to self complete—even though we drive off from us our very children, and leave them to corrupt at Boarding-schools into the one common model that is *stock* there. We all live now, in fact, *divorced from Substance*, forlorn each of us, isolated to himself—an absolutely abstract unit in a universal, unsympathising, unparticipant *Atomism*. Hence the universal *rush* at present, as of maddened animals, to material possession ; and, this obtained, to material ostentation, with the hope of at least buying sympathy and bribing respect.—Sympathy ! Oh no ! it is the hate of envy. Respect ! say rather the sneer of malice that disparages and makes light. Till even in the midst of material possession and material ostentation, the heart within us has sunk into weary, weary, hopeless, hopeless ashes. And of this the *Aufklärung* is the cause. The *Aufklärung* has left us nothing but our animality, nothing but our relationship to the monkey ! It has emptied us of all essential humanity—of Philosophy, Morality, Religion. So it is that we are *divorced from Substance*. But the animality that is left in the midst of such immense material appliance becomes disease ; while the Spirit that has been emptied feels, knows that it has been only *robbed*, and, by very necessity of nature, is a craving, craving, ever-restless void.

These days, therefore, are no improvement on the days of Kant ; and what to him appeared necessary then,

is still more necessary now. Nay, as we see, the Illumination itself does not leave self-will absolutely independent, absolutely free. Even the Illumination demands for self-will clothing and control. At lowest it demands Police; for the most part, it adds to Police a School and a Post-office; and it sometimes thinks, though reluctantly, hesitatingly, that there is necessary also a Church. It sees not that it has thus opened the whole question, and cannot any longer, by *its* will, close it. When Enlightenment admits at all the *necessity of control*, the *what* and *how far* of this *control* can be argued out from this *necessity*—and self-will is abandoned. For it is Reason that finds the necessity, it is Reason that prescribes the control; and Reason is not an affair of one or two Civic Regulations, but the absolute round of its own perfect and entire System. In one word, the principle must not be Subjective Will, but Objective Will; not your will or my will or his will, and yet your will and my will and his will—Universal Will—Reason! Individual will is self-will or caprice; and that is precisely the one Evil, or the evil One—the Bad. And is it to be thought that Police alone will ever suffice for the correction of the single will into the universal will—for the extirpation of the Bad?

To this there are wanting—Principles. And with this want Kant began; nor had he any other object throughout his long life than the discovery of *Principles*—Principles for the whole substance of man—Principles Theoretical, Practical, and Aesthetic: and this Rubric, in that it is absolutely comprehensive, will include plainly Politics, Religion, &c., in their respective places. This is the sole object of the three great works of Kant,

which correspond to the three divisions just named. This, too, is the sole object of Hegel; for Hegel is but the continuator, and, perhaps, in a sort the completer, of the whole business inaugurated by Kant.

The central principle of Kant was *Freiheit*, Free-will; and when this word was articulated by the lips of Kant, the Illumination was virtually at an end. The single sound *Freiheit* was the death-sentence of the *Aufklärung*. The principle of the *Aufklärung*, the Right of Private Judgment, is a perfectly true one. But it is not true as used by the *Aufklärung*, or it is used only one-sidedly by the *Aufklärung*. Of the two words, Private Judgment, the *Aufklärung* accentuates and sees only the former. The *Aufklärung* asks only that the *Private* man, the individual, be satisfied. Its principle is Subjectivity, pure and simple. But its own words imply more than subjectivity—its own words imply objectivity as well; for the accent on Private ought not to have blinded it to the fact that there is question of *Judgment* as well. Now, I as a subject, you as a subject, he as a subject, there is so no guarantee of agreement: I may say, A, you B, and he C. But all this is changed the instant we have said *Judgment*. Judgment is not subjectively mine, or subjectively yours, or subjectively his: it is objectively mine, yours, his, &c.; it is a common possession; it is a thing in which we all meet and agree. At all events, it is not subjective, and so incapable of comparison,—but objective, capable of comparison, and consequently such that in its regard, in the end, we *shall* all agree. Now, Private Judgment with the accent on Private is self-will; but with the accent on Judg-

ment, it is Freiheit, Freedom Proper, Free-will, Objective Will, Universal Will. This is the Beginning : this is the first stone of the new world which is to be the sole work of at least several succeeding generations. —Formally subjective, I am empty ; exercising *my* will alone, I am mere formalism, I am only formally a man ; and what is formal merely is a pain and an obstacle to all the other units of the concrete—it is a pain and an obstacle to itself—it is a false abstraction in the concrete, and must, one way or other, be expunged. The subject, then, must not remain Formal—he must obtain Filling, the Filling of the Object. This subject is not my true Me ; my true Me is the Object—Reason—the Universal Thought, Will, Purpose of Man as Man. So it is that *Private* Judgment is not enough : what is enough is Judgment. *My* right is only to share it, only to be *there*, present to it, with my conviction, my subjective conviction. This is the *only* Right of the Subject. In exercising the Right of Private Judgment, then, there is more required than what attaches to the word Private ; there must be some guarantee of the Judgment as well. The Rights of the Object are above the Rights of the Subject ; or, to say it better, the Rights of the Object *are*—the true Rights of the Subject. That the Subject should not be empty, then—that he should be filled up and out to his true size, shape, strength, by having absorbed the Object,—this is a necessity ; only so can the Private Judgment be Judgment, and as such valid.—If, then, the Aufklärung said, Self-will shall work out the Universal Will by following Self-will, Kant and Hegel put an end to this by reversing the phrase, and by declaring, Self-will shall work out, shall realise Self-will

by following the Universal Will. The two positions are diametrically opposed : the Aufklärung, with whatever belongs to it, is virtually superseded. The Aufklärung is not superseded, however, in the sense of being destroyed ; it is superseded only in that, as it were, it has been absorbed, used as food, and assimilated into a higher form. The Right of Private Judgment, the Rights of Intelligence—these, the interests of the Aufklärung, are not by any means lost, or pushed out of the way : they are only carried forward into their *truth*. Nay, *Liberté—Egalité—Fraternité* themselves are not yet lost ; they, too, will be carried forward into their truth : to that, however, they must be saved from certain merely empty, formal subjectivities, blind remnants of the Aufklärung, furious sometimes from mistaken conscientiousness ; furious, it is to be feared, sometimes also from personal self-seeking.

But what is the Object?—what is Reason?—what is objective Judgment? So we may put the questions which the Aufklärung itself might put with sneers and jeers. Lord Macaulay, a true child of the Aufklärung, has already jeeringly asked, ‘ Who are wisest and best, and whose opinion is to decide that? ’—Perhaps an answer is not so hopeless as it appeared to this distinguished Aufgeklärter. Let us see——

It was not without meaning that we spoke of Reason as *entering* with the announcement that Self-will was not the principle, and we seek firstly to draw attention to this, that Reason does not enter thus only for the first time now ; there is at least another occasion in the world’s history when she so entered. The age into which Socrates was born was one of Aufklärung, even

as that of Kant and Hegel. Man had awoke then to the light of thought, and had turned to see by it the place he lived in, all the things that had fallen to his lot,—his whole inheritance of Tradition. Few things that are old can stand the test of day, and the sophists had it speedily all their own way in Greece. There seemed nothing fit any longer to be believed in, all was unfixed; truth there seemed none but the subjective experience of the moment; and the only wisdom, therefore, was to see that that experience should be one of enjoyment. Thus in Greece, too, man was emptied of his Substance and reduced to his senses, his animality, his relationship to the monkey—and, for that part, to the rat. Now it was, then, that Socrates appeared and demanded Principles, Objective Standards, that should be absolutely independent of the good-will and pleasure of any particular subject. Of this quest of Socrates, the industries of Plato and Aristotle were but Systematisations. It was to Thought as Thought that Socrates was led as likely to contain the Principles he wanted, and on that side which is now named Generalisation. Socrates, in fact, seems to have been the first man who expressly and consciously generalised, and for him, therefore, we must vindicate the title of the True Father of Practical Induction. A, he said, is valour, and B is valour, and C is valour; but what is valour universally? So the inquiry went forward also as regards other virtues, for the ground that Socrates occupied was mainly moral. Plato absolutely generalised the Socratic act, and sought the universal of everything, even that of a Table, till all such became hypostasised, presences to him, and the only true presences, the Ideas. Aristotle

substituted for this Hypostasis of the Ideas the theory of the abstract universal, and a collection of abstract generalised Sciences—Logic, and then Ethics, &c. Thus in Greece, too, Reason, in the person of Socrates, *entered* with the announcement that the principle is not self-will, but a universal.

But were such principles actually found in Greece? And, if so, why did Greece perish, and why have we been allowed to undergo another Aufklärung? It will be but a small matter that Socrates saw the want, if he did not supply it: and that he did not supply it, both the fate of Greece and we ourselves are here to prove! It must be admitted at once that Socrates and his followers cannot have truly succeeded, for in that case surely the course of history would have been far otherwise. The first corollary for us to draw, however, is—Look at the warning! Aufklärung, Illumination, Enlightenment, destroyed Greece; it lowered man from Spirit to Animal; and the Greek became, as now, the serf of every conqueror. In Rome we have the same warning, but—material appliances being there so infinitely greater, and the height from which the descent was made being there, perhaps, so much higher—in colours infinitely more glaring, forms infinitely more hideous, and with a breadth and depth of wallowing misery and sin that would revolt the most abandoned. It is characteristic, too, that for Socrates, Rome had only Cicero—(the vain, subjective, logosophic Cicero, who, however, as pre-eminently a master of words, will always be pre-eminent with scholarly men). In presence of such warnings, then, the necessity of a success in the quest of objective standards greater on our part

than that on the part of Socrates, becomes of even terrible import. Nevertheless, again, the unsuccess of the latter and his followers was by no means absolute. Such principles as are in question were set up by all of them. By way of single example, take the position, that it is better to suffer than to do injustice, where, as it were, the subject gains himself by yielding himself. We shall afterwards see, too, that Aristotle had at least reached *terms* of the concrete notion about as good as any that can be given yet. Nevertheless, it is to be said that, on the whole, the inquest in their hands proved unsuccessful: their principles remained a loose, miscellaneous, uncertiorated *many*; the concrete notion was probably blindly touched only; unity and system were never attained to; and, in the main, the ground occupied at last was but that of formal generalisation and the abstract universal.

But now at last have we succeeded better?—do we know Reason?—have we the Object? Or, in the phrase of Macaulay, can we tell who are wisest and best, and whose opinion is to decide that?—In the first place, we may say that the question of wisest and best is pertinent only to the position of Hero-worship; a position not occupied by us—a position which sets up only the untenable principle of subjectivity as subjectivity. A man is not wisest and best by chance only, or caprice of nature; we were but badly off, had we always only to wait for our guidance *so*—we were but badly off, were it left to each of us, as it were, to *taste* our wisest and best by *subjective feeling*. A man is wisest and best by that which is *in* him, his *Inhalt*, his *Filling*—his absorbed, assimilated, and incorporated

matter : it is the Filling, then, which is the main point ; and in view of that Filling, abstraction can be made altogether from the great man it fills. Lord Macaulay's questions, then, (and those of Hero-worship itself,) are seen, abstraction being made from the form, to be identical with our own—do we know Reason, have we the Object ?

Now, if it were question of an Algebra, a Geometry, an Astronomy, a Chemistry, &c., I suppose it would never occur to anyone to ask about the wisest and best, &c. ; I suppose, in these cases, it is a matter of little moment whether we say Euler, Bourdon, or Bonycastle ; Euclid, Legendre, or Hutton ; Berzelius, Liebig, or Reid, &c. : I suppose the main thing is to have the object (otherwise called the subject) itself, and that then there would be no interest in any wisest and best, or in opinion at all. In the matter of Will, Reason, Judgment, then, did we but know the Object, the Universal, and could we but assign it, in the same way as we know and assign the Object, the Universal, in the case of Algebra, Chemistry, &c., the problem, we presume, would, by universal acknowledgment, be pretty well solved. But just this is what Hegel asserts of the Kantian Philosophy. We hear much in these days of Metaphysic, Philosophy having crumbled down definitively into ruins—this, by an unworthy misapplication and perversion, on the authority of Kant himself—this, at the very moment that Hegel claims for himself the completion of the Kantian Philosophy into a Science, an exact Science, and its establishment for ever—this, from men more ignorant of what they speak about than any Mandarin in China !—Nay, if we are to be-

lieve Hegel—and no man alive is at this moment competent to gainsay him—the exploit is infinitely greater still, the science accomplished infinitely more perfect and complete than any Algebra, Astronomy, Chemistry, or other science we possess. This perfection and completion we may illustrate thus: Geometry is an exact science; it rests on demonstration, it is thoroughly objective, it is utterly independent of any subjective authority whatever. But Geometry is just a *side-by-side* of particulars; it is just a crate of miscellaneous goods; it properly begins not, ends not; it is no whole, and no whole product of a single principle. Now, let us conceive Geometry perfected into this—a perfectly-rounded whole of organically-articulated elements which out of a single principle arise and into a single principle retract,—let us conceive this, and we have before us an image of the Hegelian System. This science, too, is to be conceived as the Science of Science—the *Scientia* of *Scientia*; it is to be conceived to contain the ultimate principles of all things and of all thoughts—to be, in a word, the essential diamond of the universe. These pretensions have, of course, yet to be verified, and not by one man, or two or three men, but by a sufficient jury of men—extended, too, probably, over several generations. In this jury the present writer does not yet make one: his task as yet has been—for himself entrance, for the reader exposition: the power of judgment and the privilege of vote must come, if indeed ever, later. Nevertheless, the Concrete Notion, which is the secret of Hegel, will be found a principle of such rare virtue that it recommends itself almost irresistibly. The unity and

systematic wholeness, too, attract powerfully, and not less the inexpugnable position which seems, at length, extended to all the higher interests of man. And at last we can say this,—should the path be but a vista of the imagination and conduct us nowhere, it yields at every step the choicest aliment of humanity—such aliment as nourishes us strongly into our true stature.

To such claims of this new science of Philosophy—or, in better speech, of this new science of Logic—there lies a very close objection in Germany itself. ‘In all practical matters,’ the German is said to be ‘slow,’ and, indeed, ‘quite behind;’ and such quality and such position are held to comport but ill with the alleged pre-eminence of his philosophy.—In the first place, we may say in reply, that the fact is capable of dispute: the rising of 1848 and other democratic movements may be pointed to; and the German, with reference at least to his philosophy, may be declared much too fast, and much too rash. In the next place, what is meant by ‘practical matters,’ is Politics, and Politics such as the *Aufklärung* accepts; all those measures, namely, which, be they in themselves bad, or be they in themselves good, lead nowhere at present unless to that American *Constitution* of no *Institution* but an *incompetent Police*. His philosophy teaches the German to view these things in another light than that of the unverified *Aufklärung*: that is very certain. But the truth of the whole matter is just this—that German Politics cannot as yet be attributed to German Philosophy, for that philosophy cannot be said to be yet known in Germany. Even what political influence has overflowed from the writings of

Hegel or of Kant, or from the general terms and distinctions of philosophy, has not fallen on the masses, but on isolated students, who are by no means induced thereby to put shoulder to shoulder with the remnants of the Aufklärung. Any argument against German Philosophy from Politics, as Politics appear to an ordinary English eye, is to be held, therefore, as inapposite. Yet, probably, it is true that all true Germans are slow; that all true Germans, however small the number, wait—wait till we understand, till they understand *how* to advance: for *Reform*, the Reform of Illumination, is but as a detected trick of the trade which cannot any longer raise a hope. These Germans, then, wait for principles of *position*, and leave to others the completion of that single principle of *negation*—‘throw off every tie of feudalism’—which the Aufklärung still so cheerfully executes, in the simple faith that it is realising something *positive*—new Sciences, new Political Systems, and what not! Such *principles* these Germans hope, too, to find in their philosophy—were it but once open to them. Nor even were it found incomplete when open, would it then wholly disappoint, did it but still appear—as all the rest only are, Algebra, Astronomy, Chemistry, &c.—a science begun.

We have now said nearly all that we desired to say by way of Preface, with the view of meeting objections, explaining connexions, removing difficulties, and demonstrating something of the value of the proffered wares, as well as of our present need of them. We shall only add now a word of conclusion by naming a little nearer some of the *Principles* concerned.

To Kant the three interests that were vital, and which lay at the centre of every thought and movement in him, were the Existence of God, the Freedom of the Will, and the Immortality of the Soul. These three positions Kant conceived himself to have demonstrated, and in the only manner at once consistent with themselves and with the thinking faculties of man. It is precisely in these themes that Hegel follows Kant; these are his objects also: yet it is precisely here—especially in reference to God and Immortality—that the teaching of Hegel has been held, and by what is called his own school, to be inexplicit. Not the less, however, is it to be said that every step of his system is towards the Immortality of the Soul, that every step is towards the Freedom of the Will, that every step is towards God. Hegel, in truth, would restore to us all that Understanding, all that Reflexion, all that the Illumination has deprived us of, and that, too, in a higher and richer form, and not less in the light and element of the Illumination itself, and in perfect harmony with its principle and truth. Hegel, in fact, completes the compromise of Understanding by the complement of Reason. Philosophy is to him not Philosophy unless, or rather Philosophy is to him only Philosophy when, it stands up for the Substance of Humanity, for all those great religious interests to which alone we virtually live. Accordingly, it is not only the interests of what is called Natural Religion that he seeks to restore, but those of Christianity itself: there, too, he would complete the compromise of Understanding by the complement of Reason. Surely, then, these are great matters!

What we shall take leave to name the *Historic Pabulum*, this alone is the appointed food of every successive generation, this alone is the condition of the growth of Spirit; and this food neglected, we have a generation that but vacillates—vacillates, it may be, even into temporary retrogression. This last is the unfortunate position now. The *Historic Pabulum* passing from the vessel of Hume, was received into that of Kant, and thence finally into that of Hegel; but from the vessels of the two latter the generations have not yet eaten.—This is the whole.—Europe—Germany as Germany is itself no exception—has continued to nourish itself from the vessel of Hume, long after the *Historic Pabulum* had abandoned it for another and others. Hence all that we see. Hume is our Politics, Hume is our Trade, Hume is our Philosophy, Hume is our Religion,—it wants little but that Hume were even our Taste.

A broad subject is here indicated, and we cannot be expected at present to point out the retrogression or the *beside-the-point* of all philosophy else, as in the case of Reid, Stewart, &c. Neither can we be expected to dwell on the partial re-actions against the *Aufklärung* which we have witnessed in this country; as, firstly, the Prudential Re-action that was conditioned, in some cases, by Public considerations, and in others by only Private ones; secondly, the Re-action of Poetry and Nature, as in Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, &c.; and, thirdly, the Germanico-Literary Re-action, as in Carlyle and Emerson. The great point here is to see that all these re-actions have been partial and, so far as Thought *qua* Thought is concerned, incomplete, resting for their advancement, for the most part, on subjective conceit

(calling itself to itself genius, it may be), that has sought alimant, inspiration, or what was to it prophecy, in contingent crumbs. Hence it is that what we have *now*, is a retrograde re-action—a revulsion—and of the shallowest order, back to the Aufklärung again; a re-action the members of which call themselves ‘advanced thinkers,’ although at bottom they are but friends of the monkey, and would drain us to our Senses. In this Revulsion—in this perverted or inverted re-action, we must even reckon Essayists and Reviewers, Strauss, Renan, Colenso, Feuerbach, Buckle, and others. It is this *retrogressive* re-action, this revulsion to the Aufklärung, that demonstrates the insufficiency of the previous *progressive* re-actions against the Aufklärung, Prudential, Poetical, and Germanico-Literary. In short, the only true means of progress have not been brought into service. The *Historic Pabulum*, however greedily it has been devoured out of Hume, has been left untouched in the vessel of Hegel, who alone of all mankind has succeeded in eating it all up out of the vessel of Kant. This is the true nature of the case, and these generations, therefore, have no duty but to turn from their blunder—a blunder, it is to be admitted, at the same time, not quite voluntary, but necessitated by certain difficulties—and apply themselves to the in-haustion of the only food on which, it will be found, Humanity will thrive. It is towards this object that these very imperfect introductory works are now offered to the Public; and we venture to hope that the importance of the object will, in some measure, excuse the imperfection of the means.

THE SECRET OF HEGEL.

I.

PROLEGOMENA.—THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

ONE approaches Hegel for the first time—such is the voice of rumour and such the subjects he involves—as one might approach some enchanted palace of the Arabian stories. New powers—imagination is assured (were but the entrance gained)—await one there—secrets—as it were, the ring of Solomon and the pass-keys of the universe. But, very truly, if thus magical is the promise, no less magical is the difficulty ; and one wanders round the book—as Aboulfaouaris round the palace—*irrito*, without success, but not without a sufficiency of vexation. Book—palace—is absolutely inaccessible, for the *known* can show no bridge to it ; or if accessible, then it is absolutely impenetrable, for it begins *not*, it enters *not*, what seems the doorway receives but to reject, and every attempt at a window is baffled by a fall.

This is the *universal* experience ; and one is almost justified to add, that—whether in England, or in France,

or in Germany itself—this, the experience of the beginning, is—all but equally universally—the experience also of the *end*. And yet how one cloaks the hurt, how one *dat verba dolori*, how one extenuates defeat—nay rather, perhaps, how one rises in triumph over the *worthless*, which is, however, only the *sour*! ‘It is but scholasticism,’ one is happy enough to see at last; ‘or a play upon words;’ ‘at all events there is no advance in it on Plato,’ ‘or on Aristotle,’ ‘or on Plotinus,’ ‘or on Thomas Aquinas;’ ‘at least that Being and Nothing “is” the same, is but a *bêtise* of good, heavy, innocent Teutschland;’ ‘and then there cannot be a doubt but everyone must recoil at the reconciliation of contraries,’ ‘aye, and shudder at Pantheism!’ But not thus is it that Hegel will be *laid*, and not thus is it that—in the end—our own ignorance shall be hailed as knowledge.

But, if it be thus with those who admit defeat—with those, that is, who actually acknowledge their inability to *construe* (though for the most part, at the same time, with the consistency of an ostrich, they comically assume to *confute*), it must be confessed that one’s satisfaction is not perfect, either, with those who arrogate a victory and display the spoils. ‘A victory!’ one is apt to mutter, ‘yes, a victory of the outside—a victory, as it were, of the table of contents—a victory of these contents themselves, perhaps, but so that it looks like a licking of them all up *dry*—a victory then which has been, not chemically or vitally, but only mechanically effected; effected in such wise, indeed, that the displayed spoils (the book they write) consist but of a sort of logical *Petrefactenkunde*, but of a grammatical fluency of mere forms, which, however useful to a professor as a professor, affect others like the nomenclature of Selenography; whose *Mare Magnum* and *Lacus Niger* and

Montes Lucis (if these be the names) are names only—names, that is, of seas and lakes and mountains in the Moon, which can possess correspondent substance, consequently, for him only who reaches *it*—a consummation plainly that must be renounced by a Selenographer.'

It is in view of this difficulty of Hegel that the chapters bearing in their titles to refer to the struggle to Hegel have been, though with considerable hesitation, submitted to the reader. They consist, for the most part, of certain members of a series of notes which, as it were, fell by the way—exclamation is natural to pain—during the writer's own *struggle* to the *Logik* and the *Encyclopaedie*. Originating thus, these notes (though sometimes written as if referring to a reader) brought with them no thought of publication so far as they themselves were concerned; many of them, indeed, were destroyed before any such thought occurred; and as the rest remained, they remain still, for to change them now would be to anachronise and stultify them. Imperfections, then, of all sorts are what is to be looked for in them; but still the hope is entertained that they may assist, or that, should they fail to assist, they may succeed to encourage; for, representing various stages of success, or unsucess, in the study of Hegel, they may be allowably expected to have peculiar meaning for more than one student, who, finding his own difficulties reflected in what claims to have passed them, may feel himself stimulated afresh to a renewed attempt.

In the circumstances of the case too, I am sure the reader will not deem it unreasonable that he should be warned that the opinions expressed in these notes—both as interimistic and provisional in themselves, and as always referring to *another*, whether from the point of view of Hegel or from that of his commentator—

must not be regarded as deliberate products of either, but must be viewed only as a preparatory scaffolding to be afterwards removed.

I shall always recollect the first time I opened the *Encyclopædia* of Hegel. It was the re-edition, by Rosenkranz (Berlin, 1845) of Hegel's own third edition,* a compact, substantial, but not bulky volume,

* It may be not amiss to remark that, besides this edition, I have seen also Hegel's own first and second editions. That contained in the collected works of Hegel, published by his disciples since his death, I have not seen nor sought to see; deeming it better to restrict myself to Hegel as—if I may say so—authenticated by himself, than to trust myself to the equivocal, and, so to speak, contingent notes of students, of which notes, together with the text of Hegel, I understand this edition to consist.—The works which specially underlie the present writing are the *Logik*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1833; and the *Encyclopaëdie*, Rosenkranz' edition, Berlin, 1845, which repeats unaltered, as I understand it, Hegel's own last or third edition.

It may be worth while remarking that it is difficult to understand M. Véra on this matter of editions. In his *Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel*, pp. 21, 22, this author enumerates the five various editions of the *Encyclopædia* correctly enough; but still he seems to have an incorrect conception of the specific nature of each. He tells us, and still, as I believe, with perfect accuracy, that there are 'two *Encyclopædias*,' 'a big,' and 'a little.' The 'big' he describes—and here now the confusion commences—as

constituted by adding to the 'little' a certain 'commentary' of Hegel's own. 'This commentary,' he goes on to say, 'is not found in the first edition, which contains only the thesis and the summary demonstration. It was only in his second edition that Hegel believed it right to add it in order to render his thought less abstract and more accessible. It is this latter edition that I call the *big Encyclopædia*. Placed,' he continues, 'in the choice which we had to make between the "big" and the "little" *Encyclopædia*, we decided for the latter.' Yet he tell us in a note, 'it is the text of the edition given by Rosenkranz (Berlin, 1845) which we have followed.' That is, M. Véra follows what he calls the *big Encyclopædia*, when he believes himself to follow the *little*; for Rosenkranz' edition is a copy, not of Hegel's first, nor of Hegel's second (the 'big' of M. Véra), but of Hegel's third edition, and is thus bigger than the supposed big *Encyclopædia* itself.—Nor if M. Véra would take the trouble to look at Hegel's own first edition, would he find it altogether without commentary; neither is the *addition* of commentary, whatever enlargement may present itself in that and every respect, the distinctive feature of the editions which followed. They are

with clear and well-sized type, that seemed to offer a ready and satisfactory access to the *whole* of this extraordinary system. Surely, was the thought, there will be no difficulty in making one's way through that! What a promise the very contents seemed to offer, if floating strangely in such an air of novelty! First of all, three grand *Parts*: the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of Spirit! Evidently, something very comprehensive and exhaustive was about to be given us! For Logic, Nature, Spirit—which last of course could only refer to intelligence, or to thinking, willing, feeling self-consciousness in general—being all three explained to us, there manifestly could remain nothing else to ask after. Then the *Sub-parts*! As the *Parts* were three, so under each of the three the *Sub-parts* were also three. Under Logic: the doctrine of Being, the doctrine of Essence, the doctrine of the Notion. Under Nature: Mechanik, Physik, Organik. Under Spirit: Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, Absolute Spirit. Nor did *two* trichotomies suffice; there was a *third* into the *Majuscules* A, B, C, a *fourth* into the *Minuscules* a, b, c, a *fifth* into the *grammata* α , β , γ , and lastly the discussion in the body of the work was seen—a *sixth* trichotomy—to proceed by the *numbers* 1, 2, 3. The outer look at least was attractive; there was balance, there was symmetry, and the energy of a beginner could at lowest hope that it was in presence, not

successively larger, and decidedly larger, certainly; but Hegel's own smallest contains, in most cases, the first sketch of commentary, quite as much as of text, and his own largest is to be named the little Encyclopædia, when compared with that of the collected works, which,

swelled by additions from the *Hefte* of the students, is, as I understand it, the only big one. Possibly it is of this last edition that M. Véra thinks as Hegel's *second*; but if so, M. Véra's position were by no means altered for the better—Hegel having had nothing to do with it.

of artifice and formality, but of nature and reality. At all events, be it as it might with the form, the matter was unexceptionable, and promised knowledge of the most complete, interesting, and important nature. For under Logic, there were not only propositions, syllogisms, &c., to be discussed, but all the great questions of Ontology also, as Being, and Existence, and Noumenon, and Phænomenon, and Substance, and Cause and Effect, and Reciprocity, &c. &c. Then the treatment of Nature seemed an extremely full one; for Static, and Dynamic, and Mechanic, and Chemistry (Chemism rather), and Geology, and Botany, and Physiology, and much else, seemed all to have place in it. Lastly, at once how pregnant and how new the matter of the Philosophy of Spirit appeared! Psychology, Morals, Religion, Law, Politics, Society, Art, and Philosophy: these were the subjects discussed, but all in a new order, and under new categories, with strange and new associates at their sides. What was *Being-for-self*, for example, and what was *Phænomenology*, and the *World of Appearance*, and, above all, what was the *Absolute Idea*?

But let us cease to wonder—let us begin to read.

Well, we have read the *Fore-word* of Rosenkranz. We have found in it, certainly, a considerable sprinkling of—to us—new words; some of them, too, of endless syllable, Mongolic, merely stuck together on the agglutinative principle, such as *Sichinsichselbstreflectiren*, (which does not occur here, however), or *Ineinandergreifen*, (which does); but we have gone through with it—we seem to ourselves to have understood it—there is no hidden difficulty in it, so far as we can judge. Though we have heard in it, too, that there is a split in the school, and that Hegelianism is not in Germany what it was; we have been told as well that this Ency-

clopædia is a national treasure, the estimation of which will only grow with time; that other sciences are obliged to conform themselves to the notions it contains, and that it presents a pregnant concentration beside which the *Manuels de Philosophie* of the French and others are but shallow maundering, empty and antiquated. For our own part, moreover, we have felt ourselves, throughout the reading, in presence of what is evidently both a highly developed, and a wholly new, method of general thought. Altogether the *Fore-word* of Rosenkranz is a word of encouragement and hope.

We go further now—we enter upon Hegel himself. Alas! Hegel is not Rosenkranz, and the *Fore-word*—after a thousand efforts, with surprise, with incredulity, with astonishment, with vexation, with gall, with sweat—seems destined for ever to remain the *Hind-word* also.

Even if a ray of light seem suddenly to leap to you, most probably your position is not one whit the better of it; for the gleam of the beginning proves, for the most part, but a meteor of the marsh; a meteor with express appointment, it may be, even to mislead your vanity into the pitfall of the ridiculous. You shall have advanced, let us assume, for example, to the words: 'The Idea, however, demonstrates itself, as Thought directly identical with itself, and this at the same time as the power to set itself over against itself, in order to be for itself, and in this Other only to be by itself.' You shall have seen into these words, let us say, so far; and you shall have smirkingly pointed them out to friends, and smiled complacently over the hopeless blankness that fell upon their features; but in the smirk, and in the smile, and in the delusion that

underlies them, you shall have, like Dogberry, to be 'written down an ass' the while. These words but abstractly state the position of Idealism—do they? And so, hugging yourself as on a secret gained, you relax pleasedly into the cloudland of the *Vorstellung*, to see there, far off across the blue, the whole huge universe iridescently collapse into the crystal of the Idea. You will yet see reason to be ashamed of your cloudland, to be disappointed with your secret, how true soever, and to find in every case that you have not yet accomplished a single step in advance.

The Encyclopædia proves utterly refractory then. With resolute concentration we have set ourselves, again and again, to begin with the beginning, or, more desperately, with the end, perhaps with the middle—now with this section, now with that—in vain! Deliberate effort, desultory *dip*—'tis all the same thing! We shut the book; we look around for explanation and assistance.

We are in Germany itself at the moment (say); and very naturally, in the first instance, we address ourselves to our own late teacher of the language. '*Other writers,*' he replies, '*may be this, may be that; but Hegel!—one has to stop! and think! and think!—Hegel! Ach Gott!*' Such a weary look of exhausted effort lengthens the jaw! and it is our last chance of a word with our late teacher; for henceforth he always unaccountably vanishes at the very first glimpse of our person, though caught a mile off!

But here is a friend of ours, an Englishman, of infinite ability, of infinite acquirement, conversant with many languages, but especially conversant with German, for he has held for years a German appointment, and rejoiced for years in a German wife. *He* will assist

us. With what a curious smile he looks up, and shakes his head, after having read the two or three first sentences of the first Preface to the Encyclopædia! This Preface is Hegelian iron certainly, and with the *tang* of Hegelian iron in every word of it; but, looking at it now, it is difficult to understand that it should ever have seemed hard. Nor do I suppose that it really was hard to the friend alluded to. Only the closely wrought concentration must have seemed exceedingly peculiar; and it must have been felt that in such words—common and current as they are—as *Inhalt*, *Vorstellung*, *Begriff*, and even *äusserliche Zweckmässigkeit*, *äusserliche Ordnung*, *Manier*, *Uebergänge*, *Vermittlung*, &c., there lay a meaning quite other than the ordinary one; *a meaning depending on some general system of thought, and intelligible consequently only to the initiated.*

We are driven back on books again then; and we have recourse to the Life of Hegel as written by Rosenkranz. This writer possesses at once a facile and a lucid pen, beneath which, too, there rise up ever and anon the most expressive images, the most picturesque metaphors. Image, metaphor, facility, lucidity, all seem ineffectual, however, the instant they come to be applied to what alone concerns us—the philosophy of Hegel. The perspicuity and transparency which gives light everywhere else, here suddenly—so far as we are concerned—vanishes; and there is an incontinent relapse, on our part, into the ancient gall. Let the reader look, for example, at these, the first two sentences of what appears in the work referred to as a formal statement of the system of Hegel!

‘Philosophy was to him the self-cognition of the process of the Absolute, which, as pure Ideality, is not affected by the vicissitude of the quantitative difference

of the Becoming which attaches to the Finite. The distinction of the Pure Idea, of Nature, and of the Spirit as personification of history, is eliminated in the total totality of the Absolute Spirit that is present in them.

The reader will do well to refer to the original, and to examine from time to time the succeeding page, or page and a half, in test of his own proficiency. Insight into Hegel will have begun, when the passage referred to has become sun-clear. Not more than begun, however, for the glance into the system involved here extends only to the 'totality,' and, compared with a knowledge which were truly knowledge, is altogether inadequate. In the case of Hegel, there is nothing more deceptive than what are called general views. It is extreme injustice to all interests concerned, to sum up his system in a paragraph; and still worse to fancy that it is understood, and *finished off*, and *done with* in the single word *Pantheism*. He who would know Hegel, must know what Hegel himself would call *das Einzelne*, and even *das Einzelne des Einzelnen*; that is, he must not content himself with some mere fraudulent or illusory general conception of the whole; but he must know 'the particular,' (strictly, 'the singular'), and 'the particular of the particular.' The System of Hegel is this: not a mere theory or intellectual view, or collection of theories or intellectual views, but *an Organon through which—as system of drill, instruction, discipline—passed, the individual soul finds itself on a new elevation, and with new powers*. A general view that shall shortly name and give shortly to understand—a single statement that shall explain—this were a demand not one whit more absurd as regards the Principia of Newton than as regards the Logic of Hegel.

Of the latter, as of the former, he only knows anything who has effected actual *permeation*. Fancy the smile into which the iron of Hegel broke when the never-doubting M. Cousin requested a succinct statement of The System! '*Monsieur,*' said he, '*ces choses ne se disent pas succinctement, surtout en Français!*'

The Life of Hegel by Rosenkranz, then, however interesting, however satisfactory otherwise, failed there—at least for us—where only we wished it to succeed. It extended no light for perception of the System. There it was, dark and impervious—as dark and impervious as the *Encyclopaedie* itself. The opening sentences of the relative statement and the succeeding passages already referred to were flung, in the wonder they excited, to more than one correspondent, and the 'total Totality' remained an occasion of endless smile.

From all this it was evident, then, that the System of Hegel was something eminently peculiar, and that, if it were to be understood at all, the only course that remained was to take it in its place as part and parcel of what is called *German Philosophy* in general; and, with that object, to institute, necessarily, a systematic study of the entire subject from the commencement. Now that commencement was Kant; in regard to whom, so far, at least, as Hume and the philosophy of Great Britain generally were concerned, we might assume ourselves to possess what preliminary preparation was specially required. With Kant, then, without carrying the regression further, and with reasonable hope of success, we might begin at once.

The *Kritik of Pure Reason* was accordingly taken up, and an assiduous study of the same duly set forward. The *Introduction* and the *Aesthetik* necessitated, indeed, the closest attention and the most earnest

thought in consequence of the newness of the matter and the imperfections of the form, but offered on the whole no serious impediment. It was otherwise, however, with the *Transcendental Analytik*, the burthen of which is the *Deduction of the Categories*, pronounced by Hegel what is *hardest* in Kant and, so far as I have evidence, mastered as yet by Hegel alone. Here there was pause; here the eyes wandered; here they looked up in quest of aid from without. The translations that offered themselves to hand were all of them to be regarded but as psychological curiosities; without exception, they seemed to have been executed as it were with the eyes shut, or as if in the dark; and consequently they fell on the eyes of the reader like a very 'blanket of the night,' against the overpowering weight of which no human lid could stir. Reinhold,* Schwegler,† not were procured, but fell in the way, scarcely with any profit. The former was one of those nervously clear, nervously distinct individuals who blind with excess of light and deafen with excess of accent; while the latter, excellent, admirable, afforded only a summary that was absolutely of no avail to the interest concerned, the Deduction of the Categories. The Frenchman, Saintes,‡ extended a thin varnish of the 'Literature of the Subject;' but, as regarded the main object of a full perception of what that really was that the Kritik of Pure Reason strove to, he was as far from throwing any satisfactory light on Kant, as Véra§—of whom one says at the end that,

* Reinhold: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens.

† Schwegler: Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss.

‡ Saintes: Vie et Philosophie de Kant.

§ Véra: Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel.

It must be understood that these censures come from one whose desire was thoroughly to see into the whole connection and details of the systems in question,

in every page, he has said *l'idée, l'idée, l'idée*, but what else one knows not—was from throwing any light on what one really wanted to know of Hegel. Three *Vorträge* of Kuno Fischer, besides that they came years too late, seemed so very light in their tissue that they did not persuade me, as they were meant, to feel any interest in, or make any demand for, the two volumes on Kant which were announced to follow. Haym (*Hegel und seine Zeit*) was a man of genius, but all his admirable writing, all his brilliantly-pointed expression failed to convince me that there was nothing in Hegel. The prefatory notice to the extracts of Frantz and Hillert, an insignificant pamphlet on Hegel's subjective Logic published by Chapman, Gruppe—'Gegenwart, &c., der Philosophie,' Fortlage—'die Lücken des Hegelschen Systems' (I suppose I need not mention Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*, or Lewes' so-called *Biographical History of Philosophy*, especially as they are spoken of elsewhere*)—these and the other works already named constitute what in my case is the Literature of the subject; and, though very readily allowing each his own peculiar merits—(Schwegler is indispensable)—it is not too much to say that a single satisfactory idea on the main thing wanted by a strug-

and that consequently another who should only aim at a '*general conception*' may feel very differently towards some of the works mentioned. Rosenkranz and Sibree, for example, speak alike highly of the work of Véra; and they are both authorities of weight. Rosenkranz, as is well known, is *the Hegelianer par excellence*. And I have no hesitation in characterising Mr. Sibree's translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* as by far the

best contribution to German philosophy that has yet appeared in England. The *Philosophy of History* is, however, perhaps, the very easiest and most exoteric of all the statements of Hegel; Mr. Sibree trips sometimes on very smooth ground; and when Philosophy Proper enters, the translator is to be found at work pretty much in the dark.

* In MSS. precedently belonging to those same labours.

gling student who would be thorough, is not to be got from the whole of them. He who after such reading supposes himself to possess an adequate conception of Kant and Hegel simply deludes himself. For my part, I have to declare that, so far as it has been given me to see, I have no evidence that any man has thoroughly understood Kant except Hegel, or that this latter himself remains aught else than a problem, whose solution has been arrogated, but never effected.

As regards the greater number of the writers already mentioned, one peculiarity is, that they all tell the same story; the repetition of which, indeed, each of them seems to regard as the word and countersign of his initiation. But, as happens elsewhere, the countersign here also degenerates into a snuffle—a snuffle about Plato this, Aristotle that, till Descartes, followed by Spinoza, Leibnitz, then after Locke, Hume, but Kant, then Fichte, next Schelling, last Hegel—a snuffle (the ‘Literature of the subject,’ God bless the mark!) so conventional, so stereotyped, that now its slightest echo sets the teeth on edge!

On the whole, the conclusion at this stage was, that, if one really desired to come to any knowledge of Kant and Hegel, or, for that part, of Fichte and Schelling either, it was with Kant and Hegel, with Fichte and Schelling, that one had alone to do. Accordingly, Tennemann, Chalybaeus, Michelet, though heard of, were not consulted. Neither were the Elucidations to Hegel by Rosenkranz enquired for; and the same author’s alleged Reformation of the Hegelian Logic, if ever adapted to be of use, came to hand when it was no longer wanted. The pertinent articles in the Conversations Lexicon were too short to be of much service as regards the ‘Philosophies’ themselves; but

useful light was obtained here and there on the technical meanings of German philosophical terms.

It was a consolation to learn from another such encyclopædic work, whose name I forget, that Hegel had been a shut book both to Goethe and Schiller, and that, as regards Jean Paul, it was in a manner an expression wrung from him, that Hegel was 'the subtlest of all Metaphysical heads, but a very vampire of the living man.' In a like reference, it was not unpleasing to know that the *Kritik of Pure Reason* had remained opaque to Goethe, and to perceive from the words conveying it, that the claim of the same great man to an understanding of the *Kritik of Judgment* was perhaps not less susceptible of a negative than of an affirmative. Such evidences of the difficulty, then, were a consolation to the suffering individual student, at the same time that everything seemed to confirm the truth of his conclusion, that, in this case, as in most others, the true policy was to pass by the subordinates and address oneself at once to the principals.

But again, if we may neglect what is named the 'Literature of the subject,' as but a parasitic consequent, serviceable only to 'well-informed' sufficiency that would perorate its stiffest in a drawing-room—a consequent, indeed, which is incidental to every movement—how far, it may be asked, are we justified in assuming this or any movement to lie in its principals alone, and—what is the same thing on another side—how far is it possible to separate the consideration of any such movement from the consideration of its literature? These questions probably enable us to open at best what we would proceed to say. The movement, of which there is question at present, is an intellectual movement of such a nature as is not rare in history.

The Germans commonly distinguish such movements by the word *Gährung*, which signifies *zymosis*, *fermentation*, ferment. Now, the dramatic zymosis of England, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, presents a considerable analogy to the philosophical zymosis of Germany at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century ; while neither of them, perhaps, can well be surpassed, as an example of the class, by any other which has occurred in history. In both, the same passionate enthusiasm, the same eager haste, the same burning rush, the same swift alternation of *io triumphe*, the same precipitation and superfetation of production. Man, strung to his utmost, vies his utmost ; and each new day brings forth its portent ; which portent, again, in its place and season, is as temporary centre and feeding fuel to the growing, glowing, and enflaming hubbub.

Germany, for its part, however, was luckily free, as indeed behoved Philosophy, from an element of sense which deformed and disgraced the English ferment. For such pure white flames as Kant and Fichte, the own substance of the spirit was oil enough ; the natural speed of their own life sufficed them ; they required not, like Marlow, the fierce combustible of wine, as it were to give them edge upon themselves, that so they might eat into themselves, and devour up their own sweetness in an instant's rush. Yet Fichte, absolutely without a fear — absolutely without a misgiving in the intensity of his sincerity, in the intensity of his honesty, in the intensity of his conviction, was as swift and precipitate as even Marlow. Of this, his every act, his every word is proof. He kindles to Kant, he writes his ' *Kritik of All Revelation* ' in four weeks, he

rushes to Königsberg, he extends to Kant this same 'Kritik' by way of introductory letter. He becomes professor at Jena; his lectures are as inflaming fire, and his works—Wissenschaftslehre, Rechtslehre, Sittenlehre—leap from him like consecutive lightnings. The Journal he edits is, for its plainness of speech, confiscated by the Government: he rises up, he rushes to the front, he defends, he appeals, he listens to no private *Hush, man! hold your tongue, we are going to look over it*; he will have 'lawful conviction' or 'signal satisfaction.' Submit to be threatened! it is *he* will threaten, he will *quit*—quit and take his people with him; he and they will found a university for themselves! So single, so entire in his conviction of his first philosophy, this is no impediment to equal single-ness, to equal entirety in his conviction of his second. Then, when the political horizon darkens over his country, he calls his compatriots to arms—calls to them through the very roulades of the French drums, calls to them in the very hearing of the French governor! Nor when, as if in answer to his call, the war arises, does the student slink into his study as if his work were done. No! the *word* is but exchanged for the *deed*; and in the doing of the deed, both he and his brave wife fall a sacrifice to their own nobleness! The eagle Fichte! whose flight was arrow-straight, whose speed the lightning's! Or take him in less serious and more amusing circumstances. The enthusiasm in the days of Marlow, the drunkenness of intellection could not be greater than this. Fichte visits Baggesen, whom as yet he has not seen; Baggesen has a child at the point of death, and cannot receive Fichte. They cannot part thus, however: Baggesen comes to Fichte in the stair; and there the two of them, Fichte

and Baggesen, find *Consciousness* a subject so interesting, that, in such position, in such circumstances, they remain discussing it *an hour and a half*, turning away from each other at last, we may suppose,—*to strike the stars—sublimi vertice!*

It must be admitted, indeed, that the excitement in Germany took on, in some respects, larger proportions than that in England. The numbers of the *affected*, for example, were much greater in the former country than in the latter. The former country, indeed, would probably count by hundreds as the other by tens. Schulze, Kraus, Maimon, Krug, Kiesewetter, Erhard, Eberhard, Heydenreich, Bouterweck, Bendavid, Fries, Reinhold, Bardili, Beck, Hülsen, Köppen, Suabedissen—these really are but a tithe of the names that turn up in the German fluctuation, and each of them is to be conceived as but a seething froth-point in the immeasurable yeast.

In these zymoses, then, whether in Germany or in England, we may say that those who took part in them were stirred to their very depths; that they stood up, as it were, convulsed; that they emulously agonised themselves mutually, to the production of results, in both countries, on the whole transcendent, almost superhuman. Now, however wide was the seething sea in England, we all know, in these days, that it has subsided round a single, matchless island, Shakspeare, the delight, the glory, the wonder of the world; *beside* which, it is, on the whole, only by a species of indulgent indifference on our parts that we allow certain virtuosi to point out the existence of some ancillary islets. But just as it is in England as regards the dramatic zymosis, it is, or will be, in Germany as regards the philosophic; *only*, the latter country, perhaps, will

distinguish its single island by a double name. We have arrived now at the point where an answer to the questions which we have left a short way behind us is easy, is self-evident. The seething thing, named English Drama, or German Philosophy, is one thing; and the practical outcome of the seething, another. Thus different, each, then, may be considered apart and by itself; and two diverse branches of human industry are seen to become hereby possible. He who shall make it his business to watch the gathering of the materials for the seething—the first bells or bubbles of the same—the further progress, all the consecutive phases as they appear in time—will be the Phaenomenologist or Historian of the Seething. By this historian, plainly, no detail is to be neglected, nor is any name to be omitted.

A very different task, however, is his who would take the other branch, and discuss only the settled outcome of the ferment: and this is the task in regard to German Philosophy which we here, and elsewhere, would desire to assume; a task which is, probably, insusceptible as yet of the form of art—which as yet cannot be effected, as it were, by a picture, by a statue, or even by a homogeneous essay, but which must content itself with what expansion it can receive from the rough and rude manner of one who breaks ground. For us then, with such object, the majority of the names tossed over in the turmoil will have no interest; for us, in short, the principals will suffice. And thus, by another road, we are brought to the same conclusion as before—to neglect, namely, the ‘Literature of the subject;’ and this, not only so far as it follows, but also so far as—so to speak—it accompanies the ferment. But again the terms *principals* and *outcome* are not necessarily coincident. In the ferment of the English Drama,

Marlow, Ben Jonson, and others may, even beside Shakspeare, be correctly enough named principals; yet it is the last alone whom we properly term outcome. As it is, then, in the English movement, so probably will it be in the German also; and in this light, perhaps, there awaits us a closer circumscription yet than that which we had already reached. In other words, there may be principals here, too, whom, in part or in whole, it is not necessary to regard as *outcome*.

The reader, indeed, may have already perceived a tendency on our part to talk somewhat exclusively of Kant and Hegel; and may already, perhaps, resent the slight thereby implied to Fichte and Schelling, as to men who have hitherto ranked on the same platform as equals themselves, and no less equals of the others also. No man, for instance, will subordinate Fichte to Schelling; yet, as there has been assigned to Kant the relative place of Socrates, and to Hegel that of Aristotle, so there has always been reserved for Schelling no less proud a place—the place of Plato. It may well be asked, then, why should Fichte and Schelling give way to Hegel? Is it possible to take up the works of either of the former without perpetually coming on *Anklänge*—on assonances to Hegel for which this latter is the debtor? Do not the sources of the special inspiration of Hegel crop out all through the ‘Ideen’ and the ‘Transcendentale Idealismus’—all through the ‘Wissenschaftslehre,’ and the ‘Rechtslehre,’ and the ‘Sittenlehre?’ Are not the considerations contained in these works the precise material on which Hegel turns? Whence else could there have been extended to him the ruts or the rails whereby his waggon was enabled to roll forward with filling to the inane? In what respect is the single quest of Schelling or of Fichte to be

distinguished from that of Hegel or of Kant? Is it not true that there is but one quest common to all the four of them? Is not, after all, this quest with each but, in one word, the *à priori*? Do not they all aim at an *à priori deduction of the all of things*—a deduction which shall extend to man the pillars of his universe, and the principles as well by which he may find support and guidance in all his ways and wishes? If, then, they are thus successive attempts at the same result, why should they not all of them be equally studied? To this we may answer, that, *so far as there is a succession*, there is no wish to deny the right of any of them to be studied. We seek a practical concentration only, and, in the interest of that concentration, we would eliminate everything that is extraneous, everything that is superfluous—but nothing more. Now, as regards Kant, there is no room for doubt; his place is fixed, not only by common consent, but by the very nature of the case. It was he who originated the whole movement, and without him not a step in it can be understood. As regards Hegel, not so much to common consent is it that he owes his place, as to the inexorable sentence of History; for there has been no step since his death which is not to be characterised as dissolution and demise. But if Hegel be the historical culmination and end, both Fichte and Schelling must submit to be historical only so far as they lead to him—only so far as they approve themselves in his regard as nexus of mediation to Kant. Now, at a glance, there is much in both of them that is extraneous, and incapable of being regarded as historically connective in any respect. Fichte, for example, had *two* philosophical epochs; and if both belong to biography, only one belongs to history. The epochs of Schelling were, I suppose, three times more numerous;

but, of them all, only the second and third are historical; those, namely, which, following the first, the initiatory identification with Fichte, sought to vindicate for Nature an independent place beside the Ego, and resumption for both into an indefinite Absolute. Nay, of the two epochs just named, it is even possible that we ought to strike off the latter; for there are not wanting good reasons to maintain that the work of this epoch—the resumption, namely, of both Nature and the Ego into the Absolute—belongs, not to Schelling, but to Hegel. Some of these reasons we shall see presently. Meantime, we shall assume the philosophical majority of Hegel to commence with the publication of the ‘*Phaenomenologie des Geistes*,’ in 1807. On this assumption, the historical works of Fichte are the ‘*Wissenschaftslehre*’ in its various forms, the ‘*Grundlage des Naturrechts*,’ and the ‘*System der Sittenlehre*,’ while the ‘*Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*,’ or his ‘*Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*,’ his ‘*System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*,’ and his ‘*Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*,’ shall represent the historical works of Schelling.

It is very probable, however, that even these conclusions will become to the student, as he advances, doubtful. With Fichte and with Schelling, his satisfaction will not always be unmixed; and reasons will begin to show themselves for believing Hegel—though largely their debtor, both for stimulation and suggestion—to have, after all, in the end, dispensed with both, and taken a fresh departure from Kant for himself. In such circumstances, he will incline to think still further concentration both justifiable and feasible. No doubt it is interesting, he will say, to see the consecutive forms which the theme of Kant assumes now in the

hands of Fichte, and now in the hands of Schelling. No doubt this is not only interesting, but also, for Hegel, extremely adjuvant. Still, if it is true that all culminates in Hegel, and that Hegel himself has made good his attachment to Kant, with practical elimination of all that is intermediate, then, evidently, for him whose object is the *outcome* only, Fichte and Schelling are no longer indispensably necessary. Then the dissatisfaction with these writers themselves!

As *writers*—this, at least, is the experience of the present student—Fichte and Schelling were incomparably the most accomplished of all the four, and offered by far the least impediment to the progress of a current intelligence. Schelling, however (his vindication of Nature as in opposition to Fichte, and such like, being neglected), seemed to have little to offer as stepping-stone to Hegel, besides what we may call, perhaps, his *Neutrum* of Reason—his generalised Universal of Reasons—which neutrum again coalesces in effect with the Absolute Neutrum, which resumes into itself both Nature and the Ego, both objectivity and subjectivity. And even as regards this, probably by far the most important element nameable Schellingian in Hegel, there were considerations which might just reverse the received relation of its origin.

The facts on which the considerations alluded to rest are these :—Hegel, when his time was come and his system—at least in its first form—lay complete in his desk, wrote to Schelling disclosing his intention to enter the career of Letters, or rather Philosophy, and asking his advice as to where to settle. He feared the literary revel and riot of Jena, he said : would not Bamberg, with opportunities to study Roman Catholicism, be a judicious preliminary residence? Hegel

wrote this letter in November 1800, and his arrival in Jena the following January was the result of the correspondence. Now Schelling, who had but just summed and completed himself—and had but just given himself to the world as summed and completed—in his ‘System des Transcendentalen Idealismus,’ is found, immediately after his first meetings with Hegel, and with signs of haste and precipitation about him, offering himself to the world again, new summed, new completed—this time, indeed, as he professed, finally summed, finally completed, in what was largely antagonistic of the immediately previous sum—his ‘Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie.’

These facts are few, but they probably cover a whole busy beehive of human interests both as regards Schelling and as regards Hegel. Haym, for example, a writer of brilliant genius, whom we have already mentioned, scarcely hesitates to insinuate that this haste of Schelling was probably not unconnected with the new-comer Hegel and the proverbial communicativeness of first meetings. If, then, Hegel, on these occasions communicated anything to Schelling, the burthen of such communication would be most probably the *Neutrum*; for, while it is the most prominent element in Hegel that can be called Schellingian, it is precisely in the last-named work of Schelling’s that it emerges for the first time fully formed and fully overt. In this way, this same *neutrum* may be viewed as the *honorarium* or hush-money paid by the Unknown to the Known for the privilege of standing on the latter’s shoulders and in the light of the latter’s fame. For possibly the application of Hegel to Schelling was not without its calculations. It broke a long silence, and it concerned correspondents very differently placed.

Hegel was by four years and five months the senior of Schelling: as yet, nevertheless, he had done nothing; he was but an obscure tutor, and his existence was to be wholly ignored. Schelling, on the contrary, though so much his junior, was already an old celebrity, a placed professor, an established author, a philosopher the rival of Fichte, the rival of Kant. To Hegel, unknown, obscure, of no account, nothing, but who would rank precisely among these highest of the high—who would, in fact, as the paper in his desk prophesied to him, be all—the immense advantages that would lie in Schelling's introduction, in Schelling's association of him with himself as philosophical teacher, as literary writer, could not be hid. Why, it would be the saving to him of whole years of labour, perhaps of a whole world of heart-breaks. There is, quite accordingly, a peculiar tone, a peculiar batedness of breath in the letter of Hegel: admiration of Schelling's career, almost amounting to awe, is hinted; he looks to Schelling with full confidence for a recognition of his disinterested labour (the paper in his desk), even though its sphere be lower; before trusting himself to the literary intoxication of Jena, he would like preliminarily to strengthen himself somewhere else, say at Bamberg, &c. &c. It is difficult to avoid distrusting all this, for we feel it is precisely Jena he wants to get at, and we know that he was not slow to come to Jena when Schelling bade him. *Then*, we seem to see, Bamberg had served its turn; *it* and its opportunities for the study of Catholicism might now go hang! what was wanted had been got.

In their first meetings at Jena, then, such being the relative positions of the two former fellow-students, Hegel, it may be supposed, would naturally desire to

conciliate Schelling—would naturally desire indirectly to show him that the advantages of a partnership would not, after all, be so very wholly on one side,—would naturally desire to make him feel that he (Schelling) had not done so ill in giving the stranger the benefit of his introduction and the prestige of his fame. Very probably, then, Hegel would not hesitate, in such circumstances, to show Schelling, if he could, that in his (Schelling's) own doctrines there lay an element which, if developed, would extend to the System the last touch of comprehensiveness, simplicity, and symmetry.

But this Neutrum will be found to be very fairly expressed, and more than once too, in the 'Transcendentale Idealismus!'

An 'absolut Identisches' in which the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' shall coalesce is talked of in various places. We may instance these:—At page 29, we hear of 'ein Absolutes, das *von sich selbst* die Ursache und die Wirkung—Subject und Object—ist;' at pages iv. and v. of Preface, an 'Allgemeinheit' is talked of, in which 'das Einzelne völlig verschwindet;' again, at page 29, the 'Selbstbewusstseyn' is identified with Nature, and both with the absolute identity of Subjective and Objective; lastly, pp. 4, 5, we have the following: 'Nature reaches the highest goal, to become wholly Object to its own self, only through the highest and last Reflexion, which is nothing else than Man, or, more generally, that which we name Reason, through which (Reflexion) Nature first returns completely into its own self, and whereby it becomes manifest that Nature is originally identical with that which is recognised in us as what is Intelligent and Conscious.'

This would seem to dispose definitively of any pretensions of Hegel. But again, it is a curious thing,

that, once a doctrine has become historically established, we are often startled by expressions in the works of previous writers which seem accurately to describe it; yet these previous writers shall have no more insight into the doctrine concerned than any Indian in his woods; and we ourselves should have found something quite else in the expressions, had we read them before the doctrine itself was become historically overt. Small individuals there are in the world, however, who ferret out such *ex post facto* coincidences, to gloat over them in the envy and malice of their own impotence, and to denounce—sententiously vehement, indignantly moral on the strength of their own acuteness and such mere nonsense—some veritable historical founder as but a cheat and a thief and a plagiarist! Now, this might have happened here, and Schelling, for all his expressions in the Transcendental Idealism, might have been quite blind to their real reach till he had had his eyes opened by the communications of Hegel; in which circumstances, too, it would be illnatured to blame him for showing haste to make good his own in the eyes of the public. It is certain that a Universal of Reason lies much more in the way of the notions of Hegel than in that of those of Schelling, who, in the duality of Reality here and Ideality there, seems to leap to a Neutrum which is a Neutrum, which is Zero rather than an Absolute, rather than Reason. Be all this as it may, we are compelled, as it comes to us, to attribute this tenet to Schelling. If Hegel paid it away, and with such motives as we have pictured, he deserved to lose it; and the Hegelian may still take to himself the consolation which lay open to his master—he may sardonically look on at the little use Schelling made of it—at the little use

Schelling could make of it, as it wanted to him that connection with Kant which enabled Hegel by giving body to the form to realise his System.

For the rest, the balanced magnet of an Absolute that was at once everywhere and nowhere—that was ideality, yet ideality was not reality, and that was again reality, yet reality was not ideality,—then the subordination of all to Art as highest outcome of the Absolute itself—the restlessness and inconstancy of his faith whether as regards others or himself,—his silence during the life of Hegel, his malicious breaking of silence after the death of Hegel, and the little intelligence he seemed to show of the very system he broke silence on,—all this dissatisfied with Schelling, and left an impression as of the too ebullient ardour that o'erleaps itself. Schelling has been said to resemble Coleridge, and not without reason so far as the latter's similarly ebullient youth is concerned. Doubtless, too, some will see in both a like versatility of opinion, and a like unsatisfactoriness of close: but, in these respects, any likeness that can be imputed is not more than skin-deep; and otherwise, surely, not many points of comparison can be offered. Coleridge, with all his logosophy, was no philosopher; and it is difficult to believe even that there is any single philosopher in the world whom he had either thoroughly studied or thoroughly understood. Schelling had both studied and originated Philosophy. Than Coleridge, he was infinitely profounder in acquisition, infinitely profounder in meditation of the same; he was infinitely clearer also, infinitely more vigorous, infinitely richer, and more elastic in the spontaneity of original suggestion and thought.*

* Coleridge's plagiarism from Schelling, and the maundering cun-

As for Fichte, having overcome the difficulty of his second proposition, which is that of *Entgegensetzung*, all seemed easy so far as study was concerned; and undoubtedly there lay in certain of his political findings—in his method of movement by *thesis*, *antithesis*, and *synthesis*, and in that his undeniable and most valuable contribution, the Unconditionedness of the notion of the Ego—elements to which Hegel owed much; but—notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the

ning, the ostrich-like devices by which he sought to efface his own footsteps, have been noticed elsewhere (still in MS.). It is in this reference that De Quincey, in that brilliant rant which suited the period, sets the mere ‘amusements’ of Coleridge’s ‘magical brain’ above what ‘any German that ever breathed,’ ‘Schelling,’ ‘Jean Paul,’ ‘could have emulated even in his dreams!’ This is exquisite! it is clear to an opium-eater that the business of the superior man is, ‘for mere amusement of his activities,’ ‘to spin from the loom of his own magical brain,’ ‘gorgeous theories,’ ‘supported by a pomp and luxury of images, &c.,’ and that he is at his strongest in his dreams. It is equally clear to a Hegel that such language is but the language of the *Vorstellung*, that it is absolutely alien to *thought*, and that in general it is just as worthless as any dream that was ever dreamed, though all the cavalcades of the universe had pranced, and all the bands of the universe had played through it. Coleridge superior to Schelling! Why, Schelling really effected something—the *Natur-Philosophie*, the *Transcendental-Philosophie*—something that *has*

historically functioned, and *still* historically functions. But what has Coleridge effected? Aught else than fragmentary poetry—*Cristabel*—the *Ancient Mariner*? Aught else than fragmentary criticism of poetry—chiefly Wordsworth’s? *Erudition*! Desultory dipping and pretentious maundering about the same with an idle parade of some resultant names? *Religion*! A transient hectic in some half-a-dozen students of theology? *Philosophy*! Where is it? Mr. John Stuart Mill, if I do not mistake, called Coleridge ‘one of those great seminal minds,’ and Mr. Buckle believed him, but on what grounds of universal philosophy, or of the philosophies of either Mr. Mill or Mr. Buckle, it is difficult to see. Surely his opinions, on what subject soever—Church, State, Understanding, Imagination, Reason, the Bible, Political Economy, the Middle Ages, Tradition—were not such as either Mr. Mill or Mr. Buckle could approve! It is certainly generous to praise one’s *direct* enemy; but one fears for the consistency of the principles. Rather, on the whole, as regards the entire business, one simply admires!

impetuous nobleness of the man, whose unhesitating headlong singleness, if to be viewed with Mr. Carlyle as a rock at all, must be viewed as a rock, not at rest, but in motion, irresistible from without, nor yet quite resistible from within,—the general aspect of the system is, on the whole, unsubstantial and unreal; the *in and in* of the development wearies and awakens doubt, and one finds one's self easily sympathising with the aged and somewhat chagrined Kant, when, in a letter to Tieftrunk, he characterises it as a 'sort of ghost,' a mere 'thought-form,' 'without stuff,' which is incapable of being 'clutched,' and which accordingly 'makes a wonderful impression on the reader.'

On the whole, then,—for us,—but very little material could be pointed to as separating Hegel from Kant; nay, this material itself could be derived quite as well at first hand from the original quarry, as at second hand from the trucks of the quarry-men; and generally, in all respects, it was Hegel who specially continued and developed into full and final form all the issues which Kant had ever properly begun. The true principals, then, were Kant and Hegel; and, they being won, all others might be cheerfully neglected. Neither as regards their *difficulty*, surely, was there any reason to dread eventual despair, were but the due labour instituted. What they understood, another might understand; and for no other purpose than to be understood, had these their works been written, had these their works been published.

Let us confine ourselves to Kant and Hegel, then; nay, let us confine ourselves in them to those works of theirs which are specially occupied with the express scientific statement of their respective systems. In a word, let us confine ourselves to three works of each: as

regards Kant, to the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' 'the Kritik of Practical Reason,' and the 'Kritik of Judgment;' as regards Hegel, to the 'Phaenomenologie des Geistes,' the 'Logik,' and the 'Encyclopaedie.' This, then, is what has been done—indeed, to the production of greater restriction still, from the above enumeration, the 'Phaenomenologie des Geistes' is, on the whole, to be eliminated.

The present work relates to Hegel alone; and the immediately succeeding chapters present a series of notes which, as products of an actual struggle to this author, may prove, perhaps, not unadapted to assist, or at least encourage, others in a like undertaking. As regards Kant, whose study was first accomplished, an analogous expository statement, for which all the materials are collected, and which indeed in part already exists in sketch, will probably follow.

The reader, meantime, is not to suppose that by confining ourselves to Kant and Hegel, we wish it to be inferred that we consider these writers beyond the reach of some of the same objections already stated as regards Fichte and Schelling. The restriction in question is not due to any such motive, but depends only on considerations of what really constitutes the thing called German Philosophy; in regard to which every restriction seemed necessarily a boon, if at once productive of simplification, and not incompatible with a sufficiently full statement of the essential truth of the subject. By such motives is it that we have been actuated: and be it further understood that our present business is not with objections, not with *judgment* of the systems at all, but only as yet—and if possible—with their *statement* and *exposition*.

CHAPTER II.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

A. 1.

THE criticism on *Ex nihilo nihil fit** is crucial. If it is admitted, we are at once and ever after Hegelians; if it is rejected, we can never become Hegelian. Is that axiom false, then, and is its contrary true? From nothing can something come? That sparrow passing the window was not, is, and will cease to be; but it neither comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing. All that belongs to *Daseyn* (translate it, for the nonce, existence) is a *Vermitteltes*—is a product, a result of means; it has real elements and real factors. Hegel's principle, then, which transcends *Daseyn*, which ascends to *Seyn* (Being) can relate only to a first act of creation. But of this we know nothing. In all our world such a principle is not to be found. It may be applied to a certain extent to *function* (the function of a watch, of a steam-engine, of a plant, of an animal), which we see, if not coming from nothing, at least passing into nothing: but then all functions are *vermittelt*, are products, and have factors. No: for Hegel, there is nothing but creation. Unless in a creative act, Hegel's process (something from nothing) is not true, as applied to any *Bestimmung* of *Daseyn*, to actual existence, or any appurtenance of the same: nowhere do

* See third paragraph of *Remark I. of Quality*, both as translated and commented.

we see nothing passing into something, or something into nothing ; we see only processes of combination out of something, and of resolution into something.

I was not, *I* am, *I* shall cease to be. True ; but if *I* am only functional manifestation, *I* have no privilege over the sparrow. It is here, however, that the other element, the *crux* of existence, steps in—the principle of Self-consciousness, which we cannot allow ourselves to degrade to a level with what we call material *Daseyn* ; we cannot believe it mere function of material elements. Here then, perhaps, we approach the essential position of Hegel, who subordinates the material to the spiritual, who begins with the spiritual and derives all thence. Hegel refuses to build up the world from without ; he begins from within. In this point of view, then, is there any countenance, any holding-ground for his principle ?——Hegel's idea is *there*, really there to a certain extent. *This* lily was not, and is ; *that* lily was, and is not : the bottom *thought* at least relates to Something and Nothing. If not *constitutive* of the process, they are *regulative* of it.*

* Constitutive and Regulative.—‘The distinction between speculative and regulative knowledge holds an important place in the philosophy of Kant.’ These words occur in Mansel's ‘Bampton Lectures,’ and it was amusing to observe the unanimity with which the critics of the day took the supererogatory leap, and repeated the blunder of their authority : they, too, were eloquent about *speculative* and *regulative*. It needs, however, but very slight acquaintance with the subject to know that Kant could not possibly perpetrate any such false distinction. What Kant means by Speculative, and

what by Regulative, may be found in scores of passages by opening his chief work almost at a venture ; but in no passage will Speculative be found opposed to Regulative. What Kant opposes to the latter word is, as is found in the text, Constitutive.

Without express reference to Kant for his definition of the meaning of these words, let the reader, to save time and space, understand by Constitutive, *material* elements of *composition*, elements that make part and parcel of the *matter*, elements that *constitute* objects ; while by Regulative, again, let him

What does Hegel intend by his Logic?—*Categories*, the lowest (or highest) general ideal forms, the meta-

understand *formal* elements of *disposition*, elements productive of unity of reference and arrangement in a multitude of particulars, elements that *regulate* or give *form* (rule, law) to objects. To know the *constitutive* elements of the material universe, we should look to Chemistry; to know the *regulative*, we should look to Natural Philosophy.

It is barely possible that the error which substitutes Speculative for Constitutive may be due to a slip of the pen. This excuse, however, can at best only serve the Lecturer; it is inadmissible as regards his critics. But, it must be said, so indissoluble is the association of constitutive with regulative; and so well known and discrepant is the meaning of speculative, that, to any one really familiar with Kant, the substitution of the last word for the first would have instantly grated on the ear its own detection. In truth, it seems to me that the burthen of Mr. Mansel's utterances in this whole reference, suggests in general the same superficial, desultory, fallacious acquaintance with the writings of Kant which underlies the heedless injustice and petulant effrontery of his master, Sir William Hamilton. It is positively melancholy to be obliged to witness the ignorance of this country in regard to all—the commonest and currentest—that bears on German Philosophy. That, for example, Bishop Colenso and the Essayists and Reviewers—mere products of that *Aufklärung* whose correction was the express mission directly of Hegel, and only a little

less directly of Kant—should be styled here the *German Party*! But ignorance is not the worst feature in the case. Simple ignorance might be excused. But how are we to excuse the *pretensions*—the calculated pretensions—united, too, with denunciations not the less morally sublime that they are wholly empty? Ever since, in the vanity of a weak ambition, the example was set by Sir William Hamilton, men of the highest position in England have thought it no inconsistency to claim to refute what at the same time they complained to be unintelligible. The distinguished disciple of Sir William Hamilton, for instance, from whose 'Bampton Lectures' we have just quoted, is not content to place himself in an equivocal position as regards Kant; but, with a similar consequence in reference to Hegel, he seeks to win a smile from us by citing a jocosse proposal to translate this author by—distillation! That is, Hegel is absolutely unintelligible, but, as a last chance, we—*distil* him! Mr. Mansel, like Coleridge, like Hamilton, and others, quotes liberally from Plotinus, Aquinas, &c.; and what he quotes being intelligible, the practice is intelligible: but why should he diversify his squares of Greek and his oblongs of Latin by 'coming us cranking in with huge half-moons' of the German of Kant 'and monstrous cantles' of the Egyptian of Hegel, seeing that the one is very plainly not understood, and the other is declared unintelligible? Square of Plotinus, cantle of Kant,

physical skeleton of the body of thought: we are exercised in pure thought—in the material as well as in the formal element of Logic. It is a reduction of the *matter* of thought to its ultimate elements. Can he believe in any possible cosmogonical power through the progressive self-concretion of the Idea? How does it connect itself with his general idea of the Absolute, his general expression of Idealism—Thought, the Idea, passing into objectivity and returning thence, enriched and reconciled, into its own subjectivity again? This is true of us; and from us is it, as it were, *impersonified* into the Absolute? Well, it is reasonable to present the primary and simple forms first, as the first stage of the Idea; but even in its first stage, it is triune and possesses analogues of the others.

There may be a cosmogony at the bottom, too. There is the step from Schelling's substance to an impersonal subject as Absolute, whose life is from *An sich* (In itself) to *Für sich* (By and for itself), through *Ausser sich* (Out of itself). Take this as Regulative—with reflexes of a Constitutive also—then Philosophy as demonstrating this process on the part of the All will present three parts or moments: 1. *An sich*; 2. *Ausser sich*; and, 3. *Für sich*. What will fall under the two

oblong of Aquinas, half-moon of Hegel! Why should obscure cantle and utterly dark half-moon be intruded on the brightness of square and oblong? Is it at all possible to account for this, unless on the hypothesis—the mechanical tessellation being so glaring—of a certain love of *external effect*? But is Mr. Mansel barely just to himself in placing quotations from the unreadable Hegel beside others from his Plato and his Aristotle? Or is

Philosophy but sporadic quotation? But perhaps we ought not to forget that Hegel is now understood by distillation! Henceforth we shall conquer the *Principia* and the *Mécanique Céleste*, not by mastering a technical dialect, but—by process of distillation!

Perhaps, the truth is this: since David Hume, thought *qua* thought has neither been represented nor understood in England.

latter heads is plain (Nature and Spirit, namely), but what are we to put under the first? Why, thought, as yet unformed, the rudimentary skeleton of the Idea *an sich*—that which is common to both of the other parts, but yet possesses nothing that is specially characteristic of these parts. But the primal forms of thought that interpenetrate both Nature and Spirit is Logic Proper—Logic not as confined to the mere formal rules of reasoning, but Logic that constitutes the very essence of thought. In all three, the principle of progress will be the same as the general principle: it will be thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

A. 2.

The *Idea* is thought: thought consists of ideas—to think is to follow ideas. Thought, then, as whole of ideas, is an element *sui generis*, and will possess its own organic order; ideas will follow an order native and inherent to them: but the general, the universal of all ideas may be called *the* idea. The idea, then, is self-identical thinking; self-identical because in its own nature the idea is two-sided—an objective side is, as it were, exposed and offered to a subjective side, and the result is the return, so to speak, of the idea from its *other*, which is its objective side, into itself, or subjective side, as satisfied, gratified, and contented knowledge. We are not required to think of existent nature in all this, but only of the nature of a general idea—of *the* idea in its own self. Besides being self-identical thinking, it is thus also seen to be, as defined by Hegel, the capability of opposing or exposing itself to itself, and that for the purpose of being in its own self and for its own self—just its own self, in fact.

In this process, the objective side can evidently be very properly called its state of otherness or hetercity ; and it is only when it arrives at this state of otherness or hetercity, and has identified it with itself, that it can be said to be by itself—that is, at home and reconciled with itself.

The notion of a general idea—idea as a general, as a universal—the idea is taken and looked at by the mind, and is seen to possess this immanent process or nature. But idea follows idea—or *the* idea is in constant process : to show the order and train of these, or the moments of this process, may be called the system of thought, that is, of Logic, then. Now, what is concerned here, is not the succession of ideas as they occur subjectively on what is called the association of ideas, but it is that succession which occurs in real thinking, in thought as thought—in objective thought, in the performance of the Idea's own immanent process and function.

Now, how then will the Idea, the speculative Idea, arise and develop itself in any subject ? The first question that will naturally suggest itself will relate to Being. The idea will be first asked, or will first ask itself, to exercise its function, to do its spiriting on the fact of existence, for the nearest and first character of the Idea is that *it is*. The idea, then, first of all, holds itself as a mirror to the general thought of existence—to Being in its abstract generality, to the mere essence of the word *is*. Now, it cannot do so without the opposite notion of nothing also arising. *It is* implies or involves *it is not*, or, at all events, *it was not* ; it cannot help saying to itself, the moment it looks at *it is*, *it was not*. *Not* and *is*, then, *is* and *not*, must arise together, and cannot help arising together. Neither can they

help flowing into the kindred notions, origin and de cease, or coming to be and ceasing to be. The instant we think of Being, Existence, just as Being, Existence, in general, without a single property or quality, the notions of *not*, of *coming to be*, and of *ceasing to be* (which are both included in *Becoming*), must follow and do follow. So is it with us when we think, so is it with our speculative ideas—that is, so is it with *the* speculative idea—the Idea then; and so was it also in History. The first philosophical systems must have revolved around these simple notions, and Hegel is quite in earnest when he maintains the coincidence of History and of Logic. *What* is this Seyn, this Being? *Whence* comes it? *Whither* goes it? What is change? What is the influence of number, quantity, proportion? *Why* is it? These are the simple questions that circle round Being, Origin, De cease, Becoming. What is it particularly to be—individually to be (Daseyn, Fürsichseyn)? These really are the questions of the Ionics, of the Eleatics, of Heraclitus, of Pythagoras, of Democritus, &c.

Now these notions are all capable of being included under the designation *Quality*, for they are all replies to *Qualis*? Mere existence as an Idea soon passes into that of special or actual existence, that really is and continues to be in the middle of that coming to be and ceasing to be. It is next also seen to be not only existent in the middle of this process, but individually existent, as it were personally existent. The whole progress of Hegel through Seyn, Nichts, Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen, Daseyn, Reality, Negation, Something, Other, Being-in-itself, Being-for-Other, Precise Nature, manifested Property, Limit, &c.; these may be viewed as adumbrations of stages of infantile conscious-

ness : Dim thought that there *is*, that there is *nothing*, that there comes to be, that there ceases to be, that there is a middle state that *is* in the coming to being and the going from being ; that this is marked-off being, defined being ; that there is a definite and an indefinite ; that there was negation, that there is reality ; that this reality thickens itself under reflexion and reference on reality and on negation, and from reality to negation, and from negation to reality, into a *something* that is what it is to be *in itself*, in which distinction disappears and it remains a familiar Unity.

When a blind man recovers sight, all is a *blur*, an indistinct formless blur that seems to touch him, that is not distinguished from himself, or that conceivably he could not have distinguished from himself, had he not learned from the other senses that there was another than himself. Now, a child is in the position of the blind man who recovers sight, without ever having learned a single item from any other sense, or in any other manner. Naturally, then that there *is*, &c., abstract Seyn, &c., will be the sequence of unrecorded consciousness. Distinctions of quality will certainly precede those of quantity—the differences of kind will be seen before the fact of the repetition of an individual.

This Logic, then, may be viewed as the way we came to think—the way in which thought grew, till there was a world for Reflexion, for Understanding to turn upon. Even this, then, is an *othering* of its own self to see its own self, and it is the mode in which it did *other* itself. It is quite apart from nature or from mind raised into spirit ; it is the unconscious product of thought ; and it follows its own laws, and deposits itself according to its own laws. Hegel, as it were, swoons himself back into infancy—trances himself through all

childhood, and awakes when the child awakes, that is, with reflexion, but retaining a consciousness of the process, which the child does not. It is a realisation of the wish that we could know the series of development in the mind of the child. His meaning of Reflexion, of Understanding, of Reason, comes out very plain now, for the process is a transcending of the Understanding, and a demonstration of the work of pure Reason. Then, again, it is common to us all—it is an impersonal subject.

To repeat—conceivably there is first a sense of being—or the vague, wide idea Being; there is no *I* in it: *I* is the product of reflexion; it is just a general *there is*; it is the vast vague infinite of Being; it has its circumference everywhere, and its centre nowhere. That is plain—that Being is at once such centre and circumference; for though it is vast, and everything and everywhere—and, at the same time indefinite, and vague and nowhere—still, as Being, as a vast that *is*, there is a principle of punctual stop in it—of fixture, of definiteness; it is indefinite and indeterminate, but, as *is*, it is also definite and determinate.

This is conceivably the first *sense* of Being. But evidently in what has been already said there is a *sense* of *Nothing* involved. It is the boundless blank, that *is*, and no more; it is the roofless, wall-less, bottomless gulf of all and of nothing: senses or ideas of Being and Nothing, like vast and infinite confronting vapours—the infinite vaporous warp and infinite vaporous woof, confronting, meeting, interpenetrating, wave and weave together, waft and waver apart, to wave and weave together again.

Then, as the only conceivably true existence—the only thing conceivably worth existence — is mind,

thought, intelligence, spirit,—this must have been the *first*, if not as man, then as God. And the *first* of the *first* was such process. The sense of the indistinguishable—the necessity, the *besoin* of the distinguishable! *No*, then, is the principle that creates distinction. There is no use to explain this; we can go back no further: it is the universe—it is what is. Understanding begins, so to speak, when Reason ceases.

The Logic, then, is the deposit and crystallisation *in* Reason previous to Reflexion. It is the structure that comes ready constructed to Understanding. The detection of its process is the analysis or resolution of what the Understanding looks upon as something simply and directly *there*—something ready to its hand, something simply and directly given, and which is as it is given. It is what each of us has done for himself during infancy and childhood, in darkness and unconsciousness; or it is the work of Reason before Reflexion. We see, then, that Understanding, which transcends so much, as in Astronomy, &c., must itself be transcended, and speculative Reason adopted instead. Carlyle's *unfathomableness* of the universe must be seen to rest on Understanding.

After all, too, there may be Jacob Böhmic cosmogonic ideas at bottom: no saying how far he allows these notions of Being and Nothing to take the form of forces, and build up the All. If there be no *Jenseits*—only a here and this—which supposition does not, in Hegel's way, infringe in the slightest the truth of Immortality—then his theory is as good as any. How otherwise are we to conceive a beginning? A beginning *is* what is begun, and is *not* what is begun. The beginning of all beginnings cannot differ. Being, too, is the basal thought and fact of all. Nothing,

the principle of distinction and difference, is equally basal. It is very difficult to conceive *objective* thought, however, and to conceive it gradually developing itself into this actual concrete *me*, with these five fingers, which now write on paper, with pen and ink, &c. Something seems always to lie in the actual present, the actual immediate, that says such a genesis from abstract thought is impossible. Yet, again a genesis of thought from mere matter—that is equally impossible; thought *must* be the *prius*: then how conceive a beginning and progress with reference to that *prius*? Our system of reconciliation (English Idealism) is a *Deus ex Machinâ*: I—the thinking principle—am *so made* that such a series presents itself! Which just amounts to—I am tired thinking it; I just give it up to *another*, and say *he* cuts the knot—believing my own saying with much innocence and simplicity, and resting quite content therein, as if I really had got rid of the whole difficulty and solved the whole matter. English Idealism, in its one series, is certainly a simpler theory than the ordinary one, that there are two series—that first *it* (the object) and that then *I* (the subject) are *so made*. Stone-masonry and wood-carpentry are thus spared the *Prius*. Yet, again, there is nothing spared the *Prius*; all has been thrust into it, out of the way, as into a drawer, which is then shut, *but it is all still in the drawer*. Whether *it* is *so made* and *I* am *so made*, or only *I* am *so made*, the *so* is in the *Prius*; whatever else be in the *Prius*, the *Prius* is responsible to that extent: the *so* is; and since the *so* is, the *Prius* must be *so*. We are still in presence, then, of the whole problem, which is simply the *So*. All this is plain to a Hegel, and all this he would meet by his absolute Idealism. Hegel has a particular dislike to

the Deus of modern enlightenment, which he names an empty abstraction. An abstract *Summum*—an abstract *Prius*—and nothing more, seems indeed to constitute what goes to make up the idea, when we examine it closely. But if Hegel ridicules the Deus of Deism, it must be allowed he is sincere in his devotion before God—who, as every man's own heart—as tradition, as Scripture tells us, is a Spirit. Nor does he believe that he contradicts either Reason or Scripture when he endeavours 'to know God.' Hegel is probably right in opening his eyes to a Deus ex Machinâ, and in desiring to draw close to God, the Spirit, in that he endeavours to deduce from this Universe, the Universal Subject of this Universe. Nevertheless, his principle has much more the look of a mere Regulative than of a Constitutive—and it is a Constitutive that we must have.

A. 3.

Plato discovers a boyish delight in the exercise of the new-found power of conscious generalisation extended to him by Socrates. Hegel seems to have learned a lesson in this art from Plato, for ταῦτόν and ὁ ἄλλος, or identity and otherness, which are the instruments or moments of the generalisation of the latter, seem to perform a like function in the dialectic of the former. The Socratic evolution of the idea—through elimination of the accidental from the concrete example—presents analogies (when transferred from mere ethical ideas to ideas in general) to both the Heraclitic and the Eleatic modes of thought. The accidental which is eliminated, is analogous to the fluent and changeable of Heraclitus; while the idea that remains is analogous to the permanent and abiding

One of the Eleatics. As if *what is* were an absolute Being, but also a relative—yet really existent—Non-being. In the relations of the Ideas, the principle of Identity is Eleatic, that of Difference is Heraclitic. The Ideas are the Universal and Necessary in the Particular and Contingent: the latter *is* only by reason of *them*; still the former come forward or *appear* only in *it*. How very analogous the categories, the dialectic, &c. &c. of Hegel to all this!

B.

One, single, empirical man cannot be taken, but he and what he embodies are universalised, as it were, into a universal subject. The Logic is the immanent process of the Reason of this subject. The logical values are, as it were, depositions from the great sea of Reason; and yet, by a turn, the great sea takes all up again into its own transparent simplicity and unity. We are admitted to the ultimate and elementary fibres of the All. *Being* and *Nothing* interweave to *Becoming*. *Coming to be* and *Ceasing to be* interweave to *So-to-be*, to *So-being*, or *Here-being*—to sublunary existentiality, to mortal state, which again is just *Quality*. *Reality* and *Negation* interweave to *Something* and *Other*. In *Something* and *Other*, the subtle delicacy of the thought-manipulation comes well to light, and displays the nature of the whole work, which is the construction of the Thing-in-itself from materials of thought only. So it is that the Understanding succeeds Reason, and turns on the work of Reason as on its material. Let us rapidly sketch the development in a single wave.

There is a tree, a horse, a man—there is a feeling,

there is a passion, there is a thought. All these phrases are, without doubt, universally intelligible. Now, in the whole six of them, *there is* presents itself as a common element; and it suffers no change in any, but is absolutely the same in all. There is a tree, &c.—there is a thought, &c.—however different a thought may be from a tree, or a feeling from a house, the phrase *there is* has precisely the same meaning when attached to tree or house that it has when attached to thought or feeling. Let us abstract, then, from these subjects, from these words, and repeat the phrase *there is*, *there is*, till the special element which these two words contribute begins to dawn on our consciousness. Let us repeat to ourselves *there is* with reference to matters not only outward, but inward; and let us repeat it, and again repeat it, till it acquires, so to speak, some body as a distinct thought. If we succeed well with the two words *there is*, we shall find no difficulty in making one other step in advance, and in realising to ourselves a conception of what is meant by the bare word *is*.

But the reader must understand that he is to do this. He is now to cease reading, and to occupy himself a good half-hour with the rumination of what he has just read. If he contents himself with simple perusal, he will find himself very soon stopped by insurmountable obstacles, and most probably very soon compelled to give it up in disgust. But if he will devote one half-hour in the manner we have indicated, the result will be a perfect conception of the meaning of *is*, that is, of Abstract or Pure Being, of Abstract or Pure Existentiality, of the Hegelian *Seyn*. And most appropriately is it named abstract; for it is the ultimate and absolute Abstract. It is that which may

be abstracted or extracted from every fact and form of existence, whether celestial or terrestrial, material or spiritual. Rather it is *the* residue when we abstract from all these. It is the absolutely terminal calx—the absolutely final residuum that continues and must continue for our thought when abstraction is made from the whole world. Let there be no stone, no plant, no sea, no earth, no sun, no star in all the firmament—let there be no mind, no thought, no idea, no space, no time, no God—let the universe disappear—we have not yet got rid of *is*: *is* will not, cannot disappear. Let us do our best to conceive the universe abolished—let us do our best to conceive what we call existence abolished—still we shall find that we cannot escape from the abstract shadow *is* which we have indicated. *Being* is absolutely necessary to thought; to thought, that is, it is absolutely necessary that there be Being. Ask yourself, What would there *be*, if there were just nothing at all, and if there never had been anything—neither a God, nor a world, nor an existence at all? Ask yourself this and listen! Then just look at the question itself, and observe how it contains its own dialectic and contradiction in *presupposing* the Being it is actually supposing not to be!

It may appear to the reader a very simple thought, this, and a very unnecessary one: still, if he will consider that it is the universal element—that there is nothing in the heaven above nor in the earth beneath where it is not present, and that it is as essential a constituent of thought as of matter, it will probably appear not unnatural that it should be begun with in a system of Universal Logic, of Universal Thought. Without it there is no thought, and without it there is no thing. Take

it even as a matter of conception, it is that which is absolutely first—that which, without us or within us, is absolutely over-against us, absolutely immediate, absolutely and directly present to us. The Eleatics had a perfect right to exclaim, ‘Being only is, and nothing is just nothing at all!’

Look at it again, now ; call up the shadow *is*—let us once more realise to ourselves all that we think when we say *there is* with any reference or with no reference—let us place before us the conception of abstract existence, of abstract Seyn, and we shall perceive that it is characterised by a total and complete absence of any possible predicate. It is the absolute void, the absolute inane. Like the mathematical point, it is position without magnitude ; and again, it is magnitude without position—it is everything in general, and nothing in particular : it is, in fact, nothing.

If this prove repugnant to the reader, let him ask himself, what then is it, if it is not nothing? or let him ask himself, what then is nothing? and the result of his deepest pondering will be that, after all, the shadow *nothing* is the shadow *is*—that abstract nothing and abstract being, or the abstract *not* and the abstract *is*, contain precisely the same thought, and that the one, quite as much as the other, is the absolute void, the absolute inane—that the one quite as much as the other is position without magnitude, and magnitude without position—that each involves and implies the other, and that both are all in general, and nothing in particular. It is absolutely indifferent, then, which we take first, as either only leads to the other. Nothing—the conception contained in the absolutely abstract Nothing, involves the position implied in abstract Being, and the latter is as absolutely predicateless as the former. The

shadow *is*, abstract existentiality, will, if the endeavour to think it be continued long enough, be seen in the end to be the absolute nothing, the absolute void. There is no object whatever suspended in it; nay, there is not even space to admit of either object or suspension. For the reader is required to realise the conception *there is* in reference not only to material things, but in reference also to immaterial things—ideas, thoughts, passions, &c., where already qualities of space are excluded. And then, again, *nothing* or *not* similarly perseveringly pondered and realised to thought, will be seen in the end to imply *is* or *Being*, and to possess an absolutely identical characterisation, or an absolutely identical want of characterisation, as *is* or *Being*.

The reader may possibly feel it absurd, unreasonable, even unnatural, to be asked to occupy himself with such thoughts; but we pray him not to be disheartened, but in simple and good faith to believe that the call is made on him for his best endeavours to cooperate with us, not without hopes of a solid and satisfactory result. That *Being* should be *Nothing*, and *Nothing* *Being*, is not absurd, if only that *Being* and that *Nothing* be thought which we have done our best to indicate. We are not fools, and we discern as perfectly as another the difference of house and no house, dinner and no dinner, a hundred dollars and no dollar; and when our remark that Philosophy does not occupy itself with such questions is described as ‘delicious,’ we know well that it is not our philosophic stolidity, but rather the *Unbefangenheit*, the uninitiated innocence and innocent uninitiatedness of our lively opponent, that is in truth delicious.

The reader must have the goodness to recollect that our *Nothing* is the abstract *Nothing*—the thoroughly

indeterminate, and not the, so to speak, concrete and determinate Nothing implied in that word when used as the contrary of some concrete and determinate Something. No dinner is nothing certainly, but then it is a qualified nothing: it is a nothing that refers to a special something, dinner; it contains in itself, so to speak, this reference, and so is distinguished from other analogous terms. We hope, then—and, however apparently unmeaning our language may be, we hope also that the reader will lend us his faith yet awhile longer—that it is now plain to everyone that, in *our* sense of the terms, Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same. They are both absolute blanks, and each is the same blank; still it must be understood that *our* sense is the true sense of *Pure* Being and *Pure* Nothing—the true sense of Being and Nothing taken strictly as such, taken in ultimate analysis. Again, it is still true that Being is not Nothing and Nothing is not Being. We feel that though each term formulises the absolute blank, and the absolutely same blank, there is somehow and somewhere a difference between them. They point to and designate the absolutely same thought, yet still a distinction is felt to exist between them. Being and Nothing are the same, then, and they are not the same. Each formulises and implies the same elements; but one formulises what the other only implies, which latter, in turn, formulises what the former only implies. Being formulises, so to speak, Being and implies Nothing; while Nothing implies Being but formulises Nothing. Being implies negation but accentuates position; while Nothing implies position but accentuates negation. But this is just another way of saying they are the same. The two conceptions, as pointing to absolutely the same thought, are still essentially the

same. Their difference, however, when the two are steadily looked at in thought, is seen to generate a species of movement in which they alternately mutually interchange their own identity. Being, looked at isolatedly, vanishes of its own accord, and disappears in its own opposite; while Nothing again, similarly looked at, refuses to remain Nothing, and transforms itself to Being. The thought Being leads irresistibly to the thought Nothing, and the thought Nothing leads as irresistibly to the thought Being: that is, they disappear mutually into each other.

The real truth of the whole thought, therefore, is represented by neither the one expression nor the other: this truth is seen to lie rather in the movement we have indicated, or the immediate passage of the one—no matter which we make the first—into the other. The truth of the thought, then, is that they mutually pass, or, rather, that they mutually have passed, the one into the other. But what is this process? If Being pass into Nothing, is not that the process that we name decease? and if Nothing pass into Being, is not that the process that we name birth, or origin, or coming to be? Are not both processes a coming to be—in the one case, Nothing coming to be Being, and in the other Being coming to be Nothing? Are they not both, then, but forms of *Becoming*, and does not the general process Becoming contain and express the whole truth of Being and of Nothing?

The abstract thoughts, then, that we name Pure Being and Pure Nothing are so mutually related that they are the same, and yet not the same; in other words, they are susceptible of distinction, but not of separation. Again, the abstract process of which birth, growth, decay, death, &c. are concrete examples, and

which we name pure or abstract Becoming, is so constituted that it presents itself as the truth of both Being and Nothing; it is seen to contain both as in their own nature inseparate and inseparable, and yet distinguishable, but only by a distinctivity which immediately resolves and suppresses itself. Their truth, in fact, is this mutual disappearance of the one into the other, this mutual interchange; and that is precisely the process that we name Becoming. The *truth* of the matter is that the one passes into the other—and not that they are—but this is Becoming.

There may, to the general reader, appear something unsatisfactory in all this. It is not what he has been accustomed to; he is not at home in it; he feels himself in doubt and embarrassment. He has been led, in a manner new and strange to him, from one thought to another; he is not sure that the process is a legitimate one; and he is in considerable apprehension as to the results. Still we beg a little further attention on his part, and we shall not hurry him. He may suspect us of having practised on him a mere *tour de force*; but as yet he has not gone very far, and we entreat him to retrace his steps and examine the road he has already beaten. Let him realise to himself again the thought *is*, pure being, and he will find himself impelled by the very nature of the thing, and not by any external influence of ours, to the thought *not*, *nought*, or *pure nothing*. Having then realised these thoughts, he will find again that they, in their own peculiar mutual influences, imply the process, and impel him involuntarily to the thought, of pure Becoming.

If we consider now the process or thought expressed by the term Becoming, we shall see that *in* it Being and Nothing are elements, or, rather—to borrow a word

from mechanical science—Moments. Becoming is the unity of both; neither is self-dependent, each is distinct, yet each disappears into the other, and Becoming is the result of the mutual eclipse of both. They are thus, then, moments of Becoming, and, though transformed and—so to speak—vanished, they are still there present, and still operative and active. Becoming has two forms according as we begin with Being and refer to Nothing, or begin with Nothing and refer to Being. It is evident, too, that Coming to be, and Ceasing to be, involve a middle ground of reality, that *is*: nay, Becoming itself, as based on the diversity of its moments, and yet as constituting their disappearance, involves a neutral point, a period as it were of rest, where *Becoming is become*. This neutral point, this period of rest, in the process of Becoming where Becoming is become, this middle point of reality between Coming to be and Ceasing to be, we name There-being or So-being, that is the being distinguishably *there*, or the being distinguishably *so*, what we might also call *state*.

The reader, probably, will not have much difficulty in realising to himself this further step which, not we, but the thing itself, the idea itself, has taken. Pure Being leads irresistibly to pure Nothing, and both together lead irresistibly to pure Becoming, the forms or moments of which are Coming to be and Ceasing to be: now, between these moments, or in the mutual interpenetration of these moments—that is to say, in Becoming itself—there is involved or implied an intermediate *punctum* that *is*, a middle point of unity, of repose—this point, this stable moment, or quasi-stable moment, in which Becoming is as it were Become, is There-being or So-being. Becoming indicates abso-

lutely a become, and that become—as such and in perfect generality—is mortal state, sublunarity, in every reference, but in no special.

So-being, then, as being no longer becoming but become, is eminently in the form of being; or, in other words, So-being emphatically *is*. The one-sidedness, however, does not in reality exclude the other element, the *not*, the *nothing*; Becoming lies behind it—it is but product of Becoming, and both elements must appear. The other element, indeed, the *not*, will manifest itself as the distinctive element. (We are now, let us remark, following Hegel almost literally, as the reader will see for himself by referring to the actual translation which he will find elsewhere.)

So-being, or There-being, is being, but it is now predicable being. It is not like pure being, wholly unlimited, wholly indeterminate; it is now, on the contrary, limited and determinate. But limitation is negation. So-being, in fact, is Being qualified by a Non-being; but both present themselves in a condition of intimate and perfect interpenetration and union. The resultant unity is, as it were, no compound, but a simple. Neither element preponderates over the other. As far as So-being is being, so far is it non-being, so far is it definite, determinate, limited. The defining element appears in absolute unity with the element of being, and neither is distinguished from the other. Again, the determining principle, viewed as what gives definiteness, as itself definiteness, as definiteness that *is*, is quality. Quality is the characteristic and distinctive principle of So-being. But as So-being is constituted, so is Quality. Quality, with special reference to the positive element of So-being, quality viewed as being, is Reality, while, on the other hand, with

reference to the negative element, viewed as determiningness, it is Negation.

We see, then, the presence of distinction, difference in So-being; we see in it two moments, one of reality and one of negation. Still it is easy to see also that these distinctions are null; in fact, that quality is inseparable from So-being, and that these moments are inseparable from quality; that is, that they subsist—or consist—there in absolute unity. Each, in fact, can be readily seen to imply and constitute the other; or each is reflexion from and to the other. But the resolution or suppression of distinction is a most important step here, for from it results the next determination, one of the most important of all. For this perception yet withdrawal of distinction involves a reflexion, a return from the limit or difference back to the reality. But this reflexion, this doubling back to and on itself—implying at the same time absorption or assimilation of the limit, the difference—is the special constitutive nature of So-being. But a further thought springs up to consciousness here. In saying all this, we are manifestly saying of So-being, that it is in itself or within itself (for reflexion from, with absorption of, the limit into the reality itself is nothing else)—that it is a somewhat that is, or just that it is *Something*.

Something, then, as Self-reference, as simple reference to self, is the first *negation of the negation*. Arriving at the negation, reflexion took place back on itself with resolution of the negation. Something, then, as negation of the negation is the restoration of simple reference to self, but just thus is it *mediation*, or *commutation of itself with itself*. This principle manifests itself, but quite abstractly, even in Becoming; and it will be found in the sequel a determination of the

greatest importance. But if reflexion back to and on itself in So-being gives birth to Something, a similar reflexion in regard to negation gives birth to the conception or determination of *otherness*, or *other* in general. So-being, then, appears again in these moments as Becoming, but of this Becoming the moments are no longer abstract Being and Nothing, but—themselves in the form of So-being—Something and Other.

Here the reader will do well once again to retrace his steps, and ascertain accurately the method which has determined results so important and striking. The results Something and Other are the most important we have yet obtained, and it is absolutely necessary to be decided as to the legitimacy or non-legitimacy of their acquisition.

We started then with Being, in which, as abstract, the decisive point is its indefiniteness, through which indefiniteness it passes into Nothing. Being and Nothing, in their mutual interchange of identity, led directly to Becoming, which, in its own nature, and in the opposition of its moments, manifested a quasi-permanent middle point of There-being or So-being. So-being, then, manifested itself as Being with a limit, with a restriction. The element being was its *proximate genus*, while the limit was its *differentia*. The *proximate genus* appears, then, as Reality, while the *differentia* appears as negation. Between being and limit, *proximate genus* and *differentia*, reality and negation, a process of reflexion, as between reciprocally reflex centres, takes place, rather has taken place. This reflexion, on the side of reality, elicits the conception of simple reference to self, which involves a being in or within self, of somewhat within itself or Something. On the side of negation, reflexion elicited

the conception of otherness, of another, of other in general. And it is these determinations of Something and Other which we have now to examine.

Something and Other readily show themselves as interchangeable. Each is *Something*, and each is relatively *Other*. True, the Other is constituted by this reference to Something, but it manifests itself as external to this Something. It may thus be isolated and considered by itself. But thus considered, it presents itself as the abstract other, the other as other, the other in itself, the other of itself, the other of the other. Physical nature is such other. It is the other of Spirit. Its nature, then, is a mere relativity, by which not an inherent quality, but a mere outer relation is expressed. Spirit, then, is the true Something, and Nature is what it is only as opposed to Spirit. The quality of Nature, then, isolated and viewed apart, is just that it is the other as other, that it is that which exists externally to its own self (in Space and Time, &c.).

C. 1.

That *there is*, is thought only *in itself*. Thought in itself—come to itself—come to be—constitutes *is*. Thought in its very commencement and absolute beginning—the very first reference of thought—the very first act of thought—could only be *is*—i. e. the feeling, sentiment, or sense of Being. This is the *Cogito-Sum* of Descartes, and this is the *Ich-Ich* of Fichte. In fact, the *Ich-Ich* of Fichte having passed through the alembic of Schelling and become a *neutrum*, an *impersonativum*, receives from Hegel the expression of *est*—*Seyn*—which single word conveys to him the whole burthen of the phrase, '*Seyn ist der Begriff nur an sich*,' or 'Being is the Notion only *in itself*.'

To Hegel, a commencement, a beginning, is not, as it is to us, a creature of time, an occurrence, a thing that took place; it is a mere thought—a thought that possesses in itself its own nature, and in the sphere of thoughts its own place. And just thus is it again for Hegel a creature of time, an event, an occurrence, a thing that took place. To Hegel, then, the idea of a commencement is unavoidable; but still it is only an idea so and so constituted and so and so placed in respect of others. To us it is more than an idea—it is an event, an actuality. To Hegel it is also, in one sense, more than an idea. To Hegel also it is an event, an actuality; but still to him it remains in its essence ideal—it remains an idea so placed and so constituted that we name it event, actuality, &c. To us, too, the notion of a beginning is an unavoidable and absolutely necessary presupposition; but this beginning we attribute to the act of an agent—God. In the system of Hegel, God, too, is present; and without God it were difficult to see what the system would be; but to Hegel, when used as a word that contains in it a dispensation from the necessity of a beginning, this word amounts only to a *Deus ex machina*; or the idea which it is supposed to imply, being but an ultimate abstraction, void, empty (in fact, idea-less), is slighted by him as the Gallic *Deus*, *le dieu français*, *le dieu-philosophe*, the *Deus* of the *Aufklärung*—for by such phrases we may at least allow ourselves to translate his thought. To Hegel the introduction of this *Deus* is only a postponement of the question, only a removal of the difficulty, and that by a single step; it is but the Indian elephant, which, if it supports the world, demands for its own feet the tortoise. To Hegel, in his way, too, God is a Subject, a Person, a Spirit; but as that he is the sphere

of spheres and circle of circles, in whose dialectic evolution the notion of a beginning is a constitutive point, element, or moment, but at the same time not participating in that material and sensuous nature which we attribute to the character of a beginning.

Still, when our object is a beginning in relation to Thought as Thought—to Thought perfectly universally, whether the reference of our view be to the thought of God, or to the thought of man, we must all of us admit that a beginning of thought is to thought a presupposition absolutely necessary. Such necessity exists for my thought, for your thought, for all thought—let us say, then, for thought in general. But the beginning of thought as thought could only be that it was. All that thought beginning could say for itself would be *is*, or, if you like, *am*; both words referring simply, so to speak, to the *felt* thought of existence in general. The absolutely first as regards Thought just is—Thought is, or rather the possibility of Thought, is, for as yet it is only undeveloped and unformed. We look at thought as it was necessarily constituted at the moment of its supposed birth, and entirely apart from involution in any material organ or set of organs—with that or these we have nothing to do, our whole business is with thought, and with thought as it in its own self unfolded and expanded itself. We have nothing to do with any physiological process—we watch only thought, the evolution of thought, the process of thought. Taking thought, then, supposititiously at its moment of birth, we can only say of it, *it is*. Nay, as already remarked, it could only say *is*, or *am*, of itself, or to itself; for thought is reflex, thought speaks to itself, thought is conscious, and the very first act of thought—though in blindness, dumbness, and, in a certain sense, in uncon-

sciousness—would, of necessity, be a sense of Being. Thought, then, begins with the single predicate *is* (or *am*), and its further progress or process will evidently consist of an evolution or multiplication of predicates; *thought will simply go on naming to itself what it finds itself to be;—and this is just the history of the world.* It is at this system of predication, then—at this evolution of predicates—that here, in Logic, we are invited to assist.

The meaning of the phrase, ‘Being is the Notion only *in itself*,’ will probably now be beginning to show itself. The Begriff, the Notion, has just come to be; Der Begriff *ist*, or Cogito-sum; for *Begriff* is *Cogito*, and *sum* is *is*. Thought now is, thought is in itself, it has come to itself so far; it refers to itself, to its being; it has come to be, it simply is—as yet, however, only *in itself*. There is, as yet, only blank self-identity.

It will not be too much to say further, here also, that as thought grows, the characteristics, the predicates that will add themselves, will all possess as well the form of Being—they will all *be*—we shall be able to say of each of them, *it is*. Further, we shall be able to say that they are distinguishable, that is that they are different, that is that they are other to other. The very process of the growth—the progression—will be from one to the other, a constant transition, that is, to other, others, or otherness. The reason common to all this is just that as yet the Notion is only *in itself*, the form as yet is only that of a Seyn, of a Peing, of an *Is*, of simple self-identity.

The process is predication merely—a substrate or subject is excluded, and there can be no form of proposition or judgment. It is a progression from predicate to predicate—because the progress of Reason

before consciousness—the Seyn—is rather a process of deposition and concretion, and implies neither subject nor proposition.

C. 2.

Shall I be able to conduct you through this vast Cyclopean edifice—this huge structure—this enormous pile—this vast mass—that resembles nothing which has ever yet appeared in France or England or the world? One of those vast palaces, it is, of Oriental dream, gigantic, endless,—court upon court, chamber on chamber, terrace on terrace,—built of materials from the east and the west and the north and the south,—marble and gold and jasper and amethyst and ruby,—old prophets asleep with signet rings,—guarded by monsters winged and unwinged, footed and footless,—there out in the void desert, separated from the world of man by endless days and nights, and eternally recurrent and repeating solitudes—lonely, mysterious, inexplicable,—a giant dreamland, but still barbaric, incoherent, barren! After all, the *omnium gatherum* of infinite laboriousness,—a Chinese puzzle, a mighty ball (in snow-ball fashion) of picked-up pieces of broken crystal—reflexions of Heraclitus, and Parmenides, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and Aristotle, and Plotinus, and Proclus, and Descartes, and Spinoza, and Kant, and Fichte, and Jacob Böhm, and a thousand others! No growth, but a thing of infinite meddle and make—a mass of infinite joinings, of endless seams and sutures, whose opposing edges no cunning of gum, or glue, or paste, or paint can ever hide from us!

Like Goethe, Hegel is a proof of the simple open susceptibility and ready impressibility of the Germans.

Contrary to general supposition, they are really inoriginate. Nothing in Germany *grows*. Everything is *made*: all is a *Gemachtes*. It is an endless recurrence to the beginning, and a perpetual refingering of the old, with hardly the addition of a single new original grain.

Hegel coolly accepts the new position—demands no proof, supplies no proof—only sets to work new-arranging and new-labelling. All is ideal, and all is substance, but all must have the schema of subject. Nature is but the *other* of Spirit, and the Logical Idea unites them both. This is parallel to the scheme of Spinoza, Extension, Thought, and Substance. The general schema is to be considered applicable also as particular, or as method. All are ideas; they must be classified, then—thrown into spheres, objective, subjective, and so on. The logical are the common categories—the secret machinery of the whole—the latent, internal, invisible skeleton.

Say a pool of water reflects the world above. Now, let there be no above, but let the pool still reflect as before. The pool, then, becomes in itself reflector and reflexion, subject and object—Man. Restore now again the *above* which we withdrew, the above that was reflected in the pool—the mighty blue gulf of the universe; and call that the reflexion of a mightier—to us invisible—pool, which is thus also reflector and reflexion, subject and object, but, as pool of all pools, God. This is an image of Hegel's world. He will have no *Jenseits*, no Yonder and Again; all shall be *Diesseits*, a perpetual Here and Now. God shall be no mystery; he will know God. He will apply the predicates and name the subject. The logical formulæ are the real predicates of God. God is that real and concrete—not

that unreal and abstract, not that nonentity and nowhere that is understood as *le dieu français*, the Dieu of the Philosophes, the Gallic God, the infidel God. Being and Non-being are the ultimate secrets of the universe, the ultimate and essential predicates of God.

He blinks no consequences; each individual as only finite, as only *Daseyn*, as only quasi-permanent moment must be resolved into the Werden, which alone is the *truth* of Being and Non-being. He will pack all into the form he has got—he will not see that anything sticks out of it—he will not allow himself to think that either he or we see that it *is* a packing.

Again, the system is like the three legs which are the symbol of the Isle of Man. Throw it as you will, it keeps its feet. Turn it, toss it, it is ever the same, and triune. There is a magical toy just like it—consisting of three plates or so—seize any one of them, and all clatters down into the same original form.

The Thing-in-itself is a mere abstraction, a surface of reflexion, a regulative. *Is*, taken immediately, that is, without reflexion, is a pure abstraction. It is a pure thought—a mere thought. Hegel sees thus an immense magical hollow universe construct itself around from a few very simple elementary principles in the centre.

He has completely wrested himself from mere mortal place—on the outside—groping into a concrete delusion. He sees himself like a planet circling round a centre; he sees that his own nature mirrors that centre; then he forcibly places himself in the centre, to take up, as it were, the position of God, the Maker, and sees himself—as mere man—as concrete delusion—circle round himself.

How small must all other men appear to him—such

as —— or as —— in their outer and utter delusion !
And the other pigmies that trip over his *Seyn* and his
Nichts ! What fearful laughter is in this man !

Does he not come out from the centre of that world,
that den, that secret chamber of his, begrimed with
powder, smelling of sulphur—like some conjuror,—
hard and haggard, his voice sepulchral and his accents
foreign, but his laugh the laugh of demons ? Contrast
this with the simple pious soul, on the green earth,
in the bright fresh air, patiently industrious, patiently
loving, piously penitent, piously hopeful, sure of a
new world and a new life—a better world and a better
life—united to his loved ones ; there for ever in the
realms of God, through the merits of his Lord and
Saviour Jesus Christ.

C. 3.

In Wesen Hegel has to exhibit the metaphysical
nature of Essence ; the peculiarity of which is assumed
by us to lie in this, that *it* alone constitutes the reality,
while the *manifestation* constitutes the unreality ;
nevertheless, at the same time, also, the manifestation
depends on the essence, and yet, no less, the essence
depends on the manifestation. This is a simple idea ;
but with this, and this only, Hegel contrives to wash
over page after page. Such a conception quite suits the
nature of the man ; his delight is endless in it. He looks
at it incessantly, finding ever some new figure, some
new phrase for the extraordinary inter-relations of
essence and manifestation. And never were such
words written—selcouth, uncouth, bizarre, baroque—
pertinent and valuable only to a Hegel. Style and ter-
minology how clumsy, inelegant, obscure ! Then the
figures, like ‘life in excrement,’ an endless sprawl—

an endless twist and twine—endless vermiculation, like an anthill.

We will not remain content with the manifestation, we must pierce through it to the centre verity, he says ; it is the background that contains the true, the immediate outside and surface is untrue. Then this knowledge is a reflexive knowledge—it does not take place by or in the essence—it begins in another, it has a preliminary path to travel—a path that transcends the directly next to us, or, rather, that enters into this. Thought must take hints from the immediate, and thus through interagency attain to essence. Then, &c. &c. &c. Strange, meaningless, stupid as all this may seem, it is still the same thing that is spoken of—the mutual relations that result from a thing considered at once as essence and manifestation. The manifestation exhibits itself as real and unreal, as separable from essence and inseparable, and the whole idea is the product of a process of reflexion between the two parts—between the sort of negative abstraction or interior that is viewed as what is eminently real and that corresponds to essence, and the affirmative manifestation or exterior, that is yet viewed as relatively negative and unreal. Essence, in short, is an idea resulting from reflexes between an outer manifestation and an inner centre or verity. Such is the whole Metaphysic of the matter, and to this we have page after page applied.*

C. 4.

Kant *ideally constructed* all as far as the Thing-in-itself, God, Immortality, &c. Fichte transmuted the

* This just shows, however, that distinctions—our common terms of we must verify our categories—our thought and speech.

Thing-in-itself into the *Anstoss*, the Appulse, and summed up the others under the Ego. Schelling got rid of Ego, *Anstoss*, &c. in his neutrum of the Absolute. Hegel only *mediated* what Kant had left *immediate*, up to the stand-point of Schelling; that is, he deduced by a process of evolution the Thing-in-itself, &c. The means he adopted consisted of his expedients of abstraction and reflexion. Through these he succeeds in showing the *mediate* nature of these *Bestimmungen*, values, previously looked on as *immediate*.

There is much that is suggestive in Kant, much that is sound and pregnant; but there is again even in him, mainly Britannic as he is, the German tendency to ride an idea to death—to be carried on one's hobby-horse, nothing doubting, far into the inane. The unreality of his categories, the inconceivableness of their application, the unsatisfactoriness of his conclusions on Time and Space, the insufficiency of his schema of Time in regard to Causality (bunglingly borrowed, though it be, and in a crumb-like fashion, by Sir W. Hamilton)—all this, and much more, must be held as evident. Then Fichte develops a most pregnant conception in that of the pure Ego, but he stops there; or, rather, everyone instinctively refuses to follow him farther on his hobby-horse of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and wonders at the simple, futile laboriousness of the noble, honest man. Schelling and his neutrum must content themselves with their temporary or contemporary influence. He was ever, as it were, a susceptible, ardent stripling—a creature of books and the air of chambers: his transcendence of the Ego only misled Hegel, and his neutrum is untenable. If ever man dropped into the grave an 'exasperated stripling'

of fourscore, it was Schelling. He longed to be great ; but neither Fichte, nor Spinoza, nor Jacob Böhm, nor Plotinus, nor Hegel could supply him with a bridge to what he coveted. Hegel has a brassier and tougher determination to be original at all costs than Schelling. He attacks all, and he reconciles all. He is as resolute a Cheap-John, as cunning and unscrupulous and unhesitating a hawker, as ever held up wares in market. Here, too, we have the same credulity in the sufficiency of his hobby-horse, the same tendency to superfetation and monstrosity. Strange how such a tough, shrewd, worldly man should have so egregiously deceived himself ! Because he could new-classify and new-name, he actually thinks that he new-knows and new-understands ! He actually believes himself to say something that explains the mystery, when he says materiature has no truth as against Spirit, and when he talks of the monstrous power of contingency in Nature ! No ; the current belief (as shown in Kossuth) that the Germans have got deeper into the infinite than other people is an out-and-out mistake. They have generated much monstrosity both in literature and philosophy, through the longing to be great and new ; to equal the bull, they have blown themselves out like the frog, and burst—that's all ! A few grains of sound thinking can be gathered out of them, but with what infinite labour ! From Fichte, the Ego ; from Schelling, Nil ; from Hegel, amid infinite false, some true classification and distinction ; from old Kant, certainly the most, and with him the study of Metaphysic must in Great Britain recommence.

In regard to Hegel, satisfaction and dissatisfaction are seldom far from each other, but the latter predominates. If, for a moment, the words light up, and

a view be granted, as it were, into the inner mysteries, they presently quench themselves again in the appearance of mere arbitrary classification and artificial nomenclature. The turns are so quick and thorough ! one moment we are north, the next south, and, in fact, we are required to be in both poles at once ! An art that so deftly and so swiftly turns this into that, and that into this, rouses suspicion : we fear it is but the trick of speech ; we fear we have to do with a fencer but all too cunning ; we are jealous of the hot and cold blowing, and, like Sir Andrew Aguecheek, we exclaim, ‘ An I thought he had been so cunning in fence,’ &c.

We cannot help seeing an attempt to knead together all the peculiarities of his predecessors : the categories, freedom, and antinomies of Kant, the Ego and the method of Fichte, the substance and the neutrum of Schelling. It is thus he would make his Absolute Subject, to whom we can see no bridge !—who is either ourselves, or we cannot get at him. If he is not ourselves, he refuses to cohere ; we cannot articulate the bones of this Universal, nor breathe into him individual life ! He will not cohere, indeed ; like the great image in Daniel, he breaks in pieces of his own accord, and falls down futile. The sense is often multiform, like a gipsy’s prophecy or the scrolls of the alchemists. The Singular is being constantly hypostasised, but not as singular—as transformed rather into his huge, vast, self-contradictory, untenable Universal !

D. 1.

The transition from Seyn (Being) to Daseyn (There-being, *That*-being) is a faulty one. The contradiction

latent in Werden (Becoming) itself, and made obvious to thought by alternate consideration of its two antagonistic forms, moments, or elements, is inadequately expressed by Daseyn. The inadequacy is one of excess : Daseyn means more than the idea to which it is applied. Fixedness in the flux, or quasi-permanence in the flux, is the sole notion arrived at by consideration of the contradiction in question. Now Daseyn, it must be admitted, implies, so far as its etymology is concerned, but little more than this. While Seyn is Being, Daseyn is *There-being* or *Here-being* ; while the former is *is*, the latter is *there* or *here is* ; and the *there* or *here*, though in itself an appellative of Space, and though as yet Space and its concerns have no place among these abstract thoughts, involves an error so completely of the infinitely small kind, that it may justifiably be neglected. But an appellative of space is not the only foreign element, the interpolation of which we have here to complain of, and it is not the etymological use of the word which we are here inclined to blame. It is in the ordinary and everyday use of the word that the source of the error lurks. Daseyn, in fact, not by virtue of the step it indicates in the process, but by virtue of its own signification, introduces us at once to a general insphering universe, and particular insphered unities. Nay, Hegel himself tacitly accepts all this new material so conveniently extended to him, for he says at once Daseyn is Quality ; that is, having arrived at the one particular quality, fixedness, he hesitates not to sublime it into the type of all quality, or into quality in general. This, however, is just what the Germans themselves call *Erschleichung* ; there is here the semblance only of exact science, the reality, however, of interpolation and surreptitious adoption. Seyn, Nichts,

Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen (Being, Nothing, Becoming, Origin, Decease), have been turned and tossed, rattled and clattered before us, till the sort of involuntary voluntary admission is extracted, 'Oh, yes, we see; Daseyn is the next step.' But after this admission the logical juggler has it all his own way: *Daseyn being conceded him in one sense, the fine rogue uses it henceforth freely in all.*

It may be objected that we do not sufficiently consider the nature of the *fixedness*—that we do not sufficiently realise what fixedness it is. This fixedness, it may be said, is the fixedness in the flux, the fixedness between coming to be and ceasing to be; and fixedness, so placed, indicates a very peculiar quality—the quality, in fact, of all quality. It is the abstract expression of every existent unity, whether bodily or mental; just such fixedness is the abstract absolute constitution of every existent particular entity; and it is no subreption to call it quality, for every entity that bodily or mentally *is there, is there* by virtue of this fixedness in the coming and going—that is, by virtue of its quality. To this, the only reply is, You admit the objection, you drag in the empirical world. Then they say, Why, we have never excluded it. We admit the presence of *Anschauung* (perception) behind all our reasoning; but we contend that all our reasoning is absolutely free from it, that there is no materiature whatever in it, that it consists of absolutely pure abstract thought. Our Werden is the pure thought of all actual Werdens; our Daseyn is just what of pure thought all actual Daseyns contain. Daseyn is nothing but that abstract fixedness. Then we conclude with—It is all very well to say so, but the presence of actual perception is constantly throwing in prismatic colours, and

the whole process, if it is to be conceived as a rigorous one, is a self-delusion.

This (of 'Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit, und Grenze,' in the full Logic) is the most intricate and the least satisfactory discussion we have yet been offered. There is no continuous deduction: the deduction, in fact, seems to derive its matter from without, and so to be no deduction at all. The distinctions are wire-drawn, equivocal, shadowy, evanescent. The turns and contradictions are so numerous, that suspicion lowers over the whole subject. It is an imbroglio and confusion that no patience, no skill can satisfactorily disentangle. The greater the study, the more do weak points come to light. For what purpose, for example, has *Eigenschaft*, a word involving the same matter, been treated several pages previously in an exoteric fashion, if not to prepare the way for the esoteric fashion here? Then will this hocus-pocus with *Bestimmtheit*, *Bestimmung*, *Beschaffenheit*, *An sich*, *An ihm*, &c., really stand the test of anything like genuine inspection? We are first told that, &c.—He then describes, &c. A very pretty imbroglio, truly! and one that results from the same thoughts being contorted through all manner of different terms. But this is the least of the confusion, the greatest is behind, &c.—We are next told, &c. Suppose we apply his own illustration to his own words, we shall find that in man his *Bestimmung* is *Denken*, his *Bestimmtheit* ditto, his *An sich* ditto, and his *An ihm* ditto. His *Seyn-für-Anderes* is called his *Natürlichkeit*, but might easily be shown to be just *Denken* too. The confusion, in fact, becomes everywhere worse confounded. All seems a mere arbitrary play of words, the player perpetually shifting his point of view without giving notice of the shift. But

what, then, can be the truth here? The truth is, we have just to do with a brassy adventurer who passes himself off as a philosopher, but presents as his credentials only an involved, intricate, and inextricable reformation of the industry of Kant; and this, in the middle of adventurer-like perpetual abuse, derision, and condemnation of this same Kant. The object he seems to have here before his eyes, is the special constitutive quality of *Something*, which is a compound of outer manifestation and inner capability. Then, that there is sometimes an outer manifestation that does not seem directly to depend on the inner force, but to be mere outside. Then, that accidental and essential manifestations are really the same. Then, that a thing changed by influence of something, reacts on that something, contributes elements to its own change and maintains itself against the Other. Water liquid, and water frozen, are the same yet different, for example, two somethings and one something; the negation seems immanent, it is the development of the Within-itself of the Something. Otherness appears as own moment of Something—as belonging to its Within-itself. Then, that the identity and diversity of the two Somethings lead to Limit, &c. &c. The whole business of Hegel is here to reduce these empirical observations into abstract terms, and to treat them as if they were results of thought alone, and as if they were legitimately and duly deduced from his abstract commencement with pure Being. The confusion of language, the interpolation of foreign elements, the failure of exact deduction, the puzzle-headed fraudulence of the whole process, can escape no one. He draws first his great lines of Being and Nothing. Then, over the cross of these two lines, he sets himself, like a painter, to lay

on coat after coat of verbal metaphysic with the extravagant expectation that the real world will at length emerge. The first coat to the cross is Werden; again it is Daseyn; and again it is Fürsichseyn. It also becomes manifest that he alternately paints with two colours and with one: Being and Nothing two, Becoming one, Origin and Decease two, Daseyn one, Reality and Negation two, Something one, An sich and Seyn-für-Anderes two, and so on. It will be found, in fact, that the whole process is but a repeated coating of Being and Nothing, now as diverse and again as identical till the end of the entire three volumes.

Nor is it a bit better with his exoteric works—not a bit with the ‘Philosophy of History,’ the most exoteric of all! Second chapter, second section, second part, it has a strange effect to hear Hegel talk of the Greek and Christian Gods in the same breath: ‘Man, as what is spiritual, constitutes what is True in the Grecian Gods, that by which they come to stand above all Nature-gods, and above all abstractions of a One and Supreme Being. On the other side, it is also stated as an advantage in the Grecian Gods, that they are conceived as human, whereas this is supposed to be wanting in the Christian God. Schiller says, “Men were more Godlike when Gods were more Menlike.” But the Grecian Gods are not to be regarded as more human than the Christian God. Christ is much more Man: he lives, dies, suffers death on the Cross; and this is infinitely more human than the man of beautiful nature among the Greeks!’ Was there ever any really divine sense of the All awakened in him? What curious maundering dreaming, or dreaming maundering, is all that *playing* at philosophising over the Greek Gods! He talks much of abstract and con-

crete ; but, after all, did the concrete ever shine into him but through the abstractions of books? Of the origin of these Gods in common human nature, do we get a single glimpse in all his maundering? They came from other nations and they did not, they are local and not local, they are spiritual and they are natural ; and it is black and white, and red and green, and look here and look there, and this is so and so, and that is so and so : and so all is satisfactorily explained, clear and intelligible ! How could he ever get anyone to listen to such childish theorising—disconnected theorising, and silly, aimless maundering—the thought of his substance, that developes itself from An sich to Für sich, recurring to him only at rare intervals, and prompting then a sudden spasmodic but vain *sprattle* at concatenation and reconciliation? The fact is, it is all maundering, but with the most audacious usurpation of authoritative speech on the mysteries that must remain mysteries. ‘God must take form, for nothing is essential that does not take form ;’ ‘but if God is to appear in an appropriate Expression, this can only be the human form :’—what *is* this maundering—does Hegel *see* anything? What *is* God to Hegel? Does he figure a universal thought, conscience, will, emotion,—a universal spirit? Has that spirit the sense of ‘I’?—can there be thought, conscience, emotion, will, without ‘I’? How am I to figure myself beside this Hegelian universal? How comes my thought to be mine, egoised into my ‘I’? How am I specialised out of the Universal? Is it not a vain wrestling to better name the All in characteristics of mind? Is there any deduction—any explanation?

The exasperating sensation in attempting to construe all this into ordinary words or forms of thought !

It is just that there is no Jenseits, no Yonder, only a Here and Now of Spirit running through its moments ! What relief to the Understanding on such premises, but the Materialism of Feuerbach or the Singleism of Stirner, which seem indeed to have so originated ?

Language contains so many words, distinguished by so very slight, subtle, and delicate meanings, that it gives vast opportunities to a genius such as that of Hegel ; who delights to avail himself of them all, to join them, disjoin them, play with them like an adept, arriving finally to be able to play a dozen games at once of this sort of chess, blindfold. His whole talk seems to be a peculiar way of naming the common,—a simply Hegel's way of speaking of Naturalism. What is, is, and I give such and such names to it and its process,—but I do not fathom or explain it and its process—I merely mention it in other than the usual words.

The 'Vestiges' transcend the actual only in a Physical interest ; but here the Physical is translated into the Metaphysical. The final aim of all is Consciousness ; and said Consciousness is figured, not as subjective, as possessed by some individual, but as objective and general, as substantive and universal. The realised freedom of spirit viewed as substantive Reason, this is the process we are to see taking place, and it is in the form of the State we are to recognise its closest approximation to realisation ! The State is the *nidus* in which are deposited all the successive gains of the world-spirit. The State is the grand *pupa* of existence, surrounded by the necessary elements of nourishment, &c. Mankind are seen, then, like coral insects, subjectively secreting intelligence, and depositing the same objectively in the rock of the State !

Is, then, a Constitution *the* great good, as it were

the fruit and outcome of the whole universe? In spite of all changes in Ideals and Reals, is there an objective spiritual gain handed down from generation to generation? Can this be exhibited? Out of the human real, reposing on and arising from the human ideal, is there a universal real or ideal gained? Can it be characterised? Carlyle, 'as witness Paris-city,' admits that much has been realised; but is not his stand-point chiefly rejection of the objective and assertion of the subjective? Is not that the nucleus of Hero-worship,—which looks for weal from living individuals, not from the objective depositions of Reason (in the shape of Institutions) in time? Is, then, the great practical question that of Hegel, not what was he or what was another, but what are the objective gains of the world-spirit?

Hegel alludes to an 'element in man that elevates him above the place of a mere tool and identifies him with the Universal itself; there is the divine in him, freedom, &c.—the brute is not, &c.—but,' he says, 'we enter not at present on proof; it would demand an extensive analysis, &c. &c.!!' Fancy the audacious cheek of the Professor, beating down his hearers by mere words—giving other names to common categories—as if they were all thereby explained and in his waistcoat pocket! Where is his justification—where is the basis of all those fine airs of superiority? Does he believe more than a Divine government of the world—does he see aught else than the hard lot of much that is good and true? Is the one explained or only named by the word Reason, and the other by Contingency?—'which latter has received from the former, the Idea, authority to exercise its monstrous influence!' Must we not repeat—*dedit verba*?

It is intelligible how the State looms so large in Hegel's eyes. It is a type of the step in Philosophy named the transcending of the Ego. The will and the idea here are not expressions of what is individual, but of what is general. This is true, too, to the aim of the Socratic generalisation which raised up the Universal and Necessary out of the Particular and Accidental. But does all one's worth come from the State? Since the State grows in worth, must not a portion of worth come from the Individual? Is not the individual always higher than the State,—Christ than Jewry, Socrates than Athens, Confucius than China?

Hegel is always pedagogue-like—with him naming is explaining. Nor is it true that *we* are more subjective, the Greeks more objective. Xenophon (the murmurs of the individual Ten Thousand) as well as Homer (Thersites) shows subjectivity to have had greater influence then than now.

How definitively conclusive Hegel is to himself on all these matters in this 'Philosophy of History!' Whether he is in Africa or Europe, America or Asia, he dictates his views equally imperially—his findings are infallible, never doubt it, sir!—Ah me! these sentences on all and everything in the world are quite irreversible! 'In Aschantee, the solemn ceremony begins with an ablution of the bones of the mother of the king in the blood of men:' why does Absolute Wisdom omit to ask itself, *What, if she still live?* The statesman shows his son how very little wisdom is required in the governing of the world; and Hegel makes plain here that Absolute Knowledge has only to assert and again assert, and always assert. How unscrupulous that sniff of condemnation! How unhesitating that decisiveness of sentence in the midst of so

little certainty!—bless you! *he* does not fear! An impure spirit, with impure motives, takes to an ethereal subject, *will* take rank with the best, *will* speak as authoritatively as they, and pours out indiscriminately slag and ore: Germany here, too, true to its character of external intentional effort according to the receipt in its hands. But in that leaden head of his, what strange shapes his thoughts take, and how strangely he names them!

In the Preface to the 'Phaenomenology,' observe the dry, sapless, wooden characterisation, in strange, abstract, prosaic figures, of the hapless plight of the unfortunate Schellingian! Hegel it is, rather than Schelling, who has put in place of reasoning, a curious species of inward vision—applied it is to strange things of wire in an element of sawdust, dull, dead, half-opaque, soundless, fleshless, inelastic—a motion as of worms in a skull of wood—not the rich shapes in the blue heaven of the true poet's phantasy! How he continues throwing the same abstract, abstruse, confused prose figures at Schelling! Verily, as Humboldt says of him, language here has not got to the *Durchbrech*: that is, we may say, perhaps, language remains ever underground here, muffled, and never gets to *break through*, as flowers elsewhere do, or as other people's teeth do! Really, Hegel's rhetoric is absolutely his own. There is something *unbefangenes*—simpletonish—in him: he is still the Suabian lout!

D. 2.

This—referring to a passage in the same Preface—is just a description *in abstracto* of Self-consciousness. The Ego is first unal simplicity,—that is, unal or simple

negativity; but just, as it were, for this very reason (that is, to know itself and be no longer negative, or because it finds itself in a state of negativity) it becomes self-separated into duality—it becomes a duplication, a duad, the units of which confront each other, in the forms of Ego-subject and Ego-object; and then, again, this very self-separation, this very self-duplication, becomes again its own negation—the negation of the duality, inasmuch as its confronting units are seen to be identical, and the antithesis is reduced, the antagonism vanishes. This process of individual self-consciousness has just to be transferred to the All, the Absolute, the Substance, to enable us to form a conception of unal negativity of Spirit passing into the hetercity of external Nature, finally to return reconciled, harmonious, and free into its own self. Surely, too, that process of self-consciousness strikes the key-note of the whole method and matter of Hegel!

An sich may be illustrated by an ill-fitting shoe. First, consciousness is only *in itself*—or, as the German seems to have it, only *at itself*, only in its own proximity: there is *malaise* quite general, indefinite, and indistinct; it is everywhere in general, and nowhere in particular. But, by degrees, the mist and blur, the nebula, resolves itself into foci and shape; Ansichseyn becomes Fürsichseyn, and it is seen—that the shoe is too wide in the heel—*that* and nothing else.

The *intermedium* is the first step in the divine process (the phase of universality, latent potentiality being first assumed); it is reflexion into its own self, and as such only, and no more, it is the awakening of consciousness, the kindling, the lighting, the flashing up of the Ego, which is pure negativity as yet. First, the Ego was only *in* or *at itself*, everywhere in general and

nowhere in particular,—that is, latent only, potential only (the formless infinite, indefinite nebula); then comes reflexion of this into itself or on to itself, and this reflexion is a sort of medium, an element of union, a principle of connection between self and self. In this stage, the previously Indefinite comes to be for itself; that is to say, in the physical world, it is a finite, circumscribed, individual entity, and in the metaphysical a self-consciousness. Reduced to its most abstract form, it is nothing but a Becoming—a becoming something—a focus in the nebula, an Ego in consciousness. Ego is immediate to Ego, focus to focus; the mediacy then leads only to a condition of immediacy. Process is no prejudice to unity, nor mediacy to immediacy; it is a one, a whole, an Absolute, all the same.

The same *reason*—the same forms, processes, peculiar experiences and characters, exist in the outer world which exist in the inner: analogy passes into its very depths—the outer is just the inner, but in the form of outerness or heterity. Thus Hegel, horsed on his idea, penetrates and permeates the whole universe both of mind and matter, and construes all into a one individuality—which is Substance, the True, the Absolute, God.

The idea is evidently substance, for it is common to all; it is the common element; it is the net into which all is wrought, whether physical or metaphysical. Behind the logical categories, there lie side by side the physical and the spiritual. Hegel really meant it—and Rosenkranz is wrong to take it as mere figurative exaggeration—when he says that what is here is ‘the Demonstration of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit.’

Much is Aristotelian in the above. There are reflexes of the *δύναμις* and the *ἐνέργεια*. It is Metaphysic Proper, an inquiry into the essential *τὸ τί ἴστιν*.

Negation to Hegel always seems to produce affirmation, not destruction. Negation seems in him, indeed, but the specific title of the element of variety and distinction. Such element is, in fact, negation. It is negation of its own unity, and each constituent member is the negative of the rest and of the whole.

The whole is to be conceived as an organic idea—a concrete idea—in which *beginning* is to be taken as also ideal, not a thing in time and nature, but a mere thought so and so characterised and articulated with the rest. The same is the case with subjectivity in general, and my subjectivity in special.

‘There are periods when Thought compromises Existence—when it becomes destructive, negative. These are periods of so-called Enlightenment. But Thought, that has done this, must in its turn be looked at.’ The true nature of the Begriff must be seen into; and he who understands Hegel’s word Begriff, understands Hegel.

Despite the intensity of his abstraction, there is always in Hegel a glance at the whole concrete actual universe. Yet to read him is not to judge of things as this or that, but to follow a thread of *aqua regia* that dissolves and resolves the things themselves—a menstruum in which the most hard and solid objects become quick and flow. Hegel, indeed, seems ever to drive into the very grounds of things. Still, his secret is very much the translating of the concrete individual into the abstract general or universal. He is always intelligible when we keep before us the particular individual he is engaged translating; but let us lose the

object, the translation becomes hopeless. The eye must never wander ; let a single hint be missed, let a single stitch drop, the whole is to recommence again. The first chapter of the 'Phaenomenology,' on Sensuous Certainty, is generally looked on as very extravagant and untenable ; still it is really in abstract terms a very fair description of the progress of consciousness from crude Sensation to intelligent Perception. This is its intention, and not a dialectic destruction of an outer world. Still, Hegel may very well speak of a reversion or inversion ; for whereas elsewhere things support thoughts, in him, on the contrary, thoughts support things, and the tendency in the reader to dazzle, dizziness, and *turn*, cannot be wondered at. But the thought being the prius, this method must be right.

D. 3.

Hegel will look at everything and say what it is. In his eyes, what we call the common idea of God is an abstraction utterly vague and predicateless. Then, again, it is thought that is the true mental act applicable to God. God, as a universal, is not only thought, but in the form of thought. We see here, then, that Hegel's system is a universe of thought, in which Nature, the Ego—God himself, in a sense—are but moments ; or the universe is an organon of thought into which all particulars—the whole itself—are absorbed as moments ; and the aggregate of these moments—which, however, is other than an aggregate—constitutes the organic whole. The general conception under the phrase supreme being—as eighteenth century *enlightenment* (in which the bulk even of Ecclesiastics, forgetting their Bible, now share) has it—is quite abstract, quite

formal, or *formell*; that is, it is an empty formal act in which there is no substance—it is a longing opening of the jaws, but there is no nut between them.

The universe in time is viewed grandly as a Spirit whose object is to bring before his own consciousness all that he *is* in himself, and each new fact so brought becomes superseded and transformed as a step to a higher stage. History is really such—consciousness in perpetual enlargement, enfranchisement, elevation. This can be personified as a Spirit; and—*all being thought*—this Spirit is the Universe, the One, the All, God. In it empirical Egos are but as moments, but as scales of thought. It is plain, then, that Philosophy with Hegel will be the developed sum of all preceding Philosophies. The progress *pictured* in the ‘History of Philosophy’ is the process of Philosophy itself; and in Philosophy, this progress is seen in unempirical development. Thought as it *is*, is concrete; that is, it is Idea. The knowledge or science of this, relating as it does to a concrete, will be a system—for a concrete is self-diremption in self-union or self-conservation. And here, then, is it at once necessity and freedom: necessity, as so and so constituted; freedom, as that constitution is its own, and has its own play, its own life. A sphere of spheres it is, each a necessary moment, and the entire idea constituted by the system of these, at the same time that the entire idea *appears* also in each.

The idea is thought, not as formal, but as the self-evolving totality of its own peculiar principles and laws, which it gives to its own self, and not already has and finds to its hand in its own self. This is characteristic of Hegel. He thus avoids the question of a first cause; constituting thought as the first, the

last, and the only. That thought might give itself its own distinctions is evident from language. To use but inadequate examples, *thing* is but a form of *think*, *thankful* but another way of saying *thankful*.

Can creation be accounted for otherwise? Assume God—well, creation is simply his thought; in the world of man and nature we have simply to do with the thought of God. We cannot suppose God making the world like a mason. It is sufficient that God think the world. But we have thus access to the thought of God—the mind of God. Then our own thought—as *thought*—is analogous. So the progress of generalisation is to study thought as thought in the form of a Universal. Thought being viewed in this way, the whole is changed: creation, God, and all else have taken up quite new and different relations; nor is there any longer the difficulty of a beginning, &c. Logic, thus, has to do quite with the supersensual; Mathematic is seen to be quite sensuous in comparison.

In the beginning—Seyn und Nichts, Being and Nothing—there is room for much reflexion. We are not to suppose that it relates to formal and professional Logic only. It must be taken *sub specie æterni*. The whole question, What was the beginning—what was it that was the first?—is there. The answer, God, does not suffice; for the question still recurs, And God—whence? Hegel must be credited with the most profound and exhaustive thought here. It is the first question in universal Metaphysic. What was the beginning? How are we to conceive that? Rather, we feel that it is inconceivable: we feel that, when we answer, Oh, God of course, we have yielded to our own impatience—to our own weariness of what is never-ending, and that the terminus we have so set

up is arbitrary merely, a word mainly ; that, in short, the business is to begin again so soon as we have taken breath and recovered temper. There is a whole school, however, which pronounces this to be the answer ; that is, that answer there is none *for us*. Humanity is to see here its own deficiency and insufficiency of original nature. We are only adequate to a compartment, not to the whole. Our sphere is limited ; our functions must learn and acknowledge their own bounds. Perception and confession of ignorance in regard to all such questions, constitute on our part wisdom and philosophy.

This however, is, in reality, but again the human mind halting for breath, resting for temper. The question recurs, and *will* recur, so soon as action itself, after its own pause, recurs. Not but that the new action may fare similarly, and be obliged to halt with the same result ; a state of matters which will simply continue till there is a successful effort towards the satisfaction of a need which is absolutely inextinguishable, however temporarily appeasable. To a mind like Hegel's, all this is obvious, and he will look steadily along the line, his mind made up to this—that the necessity for an answer shall, so far as he is concerned, *not* be shirked. How are we to conceive the beginning, then, he asks himself, and continues asking himself, till the thought emerges, *What is a beginning?* and in a few moments more he feels he has the thread : of the organon, thought, the distinction beginning is but a moment, but an involved and constituent element, joint, or article. It is but a portion of the articulated apparatus, of the whole system or series. It is a characteristic of the universe, thought—a characteristic among others—that it has a particular pin or pole, or special pinion, named beginning

—a pole which it gives to its own self for its own distribution, disposition, and arrangement.

Gives its own self! the reader may exclaim: why, then there is something *before* the beginning, *that gives* the beginning! Well, yes; but that is not the way to put it. There is thought, and there is nothing but thought; thought is the All, and, as the All, it is, of course, also what we mean by the term *the prius*—it is the first: these terms *prius*, *first*, *beginning*, &c., are, in fact, predicates, attributes of its own, part and parcel of its own machinery, of its own structure, of its own constitution. When we use the expression God, we are just saying the same thing, for God is obviously thought; or God is Spirit, and the life of Spirit is thought. Creation, then, is thought also; it is the thought of God. God's thought of the Creation is evidently the prius of the Creation; but with God to think must be to create, for he can require no wood-carpenry or stone-masonry for his purpose: or even should we suppose him to use such, they must represent thought, and be disposed on thought.* The stone-masonry and wood-carpenry, then, can be set aside as but the accessory and non-essential, and the Creation can be pronounced thought:† whether

* For us, then, truly to think them, is to reproduce the thought of God, which preceded their creation, and which, so to speak, therefore contained them.

† But it is pleonastic to assume stone-masonry and wood-carpenry as independent self-substantial entities, out of, and other than, thought. Let us say rather that thought is perceiving thought, thought is a porceptive thought, or the understanding is a perceptive under-

standing. So Kant conceived the understanding of God. Our perception he conceived to be derivative or sensuous (*intuitus derivativus*); while that of God appeared to him necessarily original and intellectual (*intuitus originarius*). Now the force of this is, that the perception of God *makes* its objects; creation and perception, with understanding of the same, are but a one act in God. Man, Kant conceived, possessed no such direct perception,

direct through thought, or indirect through stonemasonry and wood-carpentry, all recurs to God. Then God viewed personally, on the question of a beginning must still yield the same answer. God is thought, and 'beginning' is but one of its own natural poles, or centres of gravitation, disposition, and revolution.

Now, in the conception 'beginning,' the first step or element, in regard to anything whatever beginning or begun, is—*so far as thought is concerned*—just the thought 'is.' Even God placed under the focus of the category 'beginning,' must have first said to himself 'is,' 'there is.' But in this first step there is no more than that. Descartes called the first step *sum*, but manifestly he ought to have said *est*. The *ego* involved in *sum* is a concrete infinitely higher in ascent than *est*, *esse*, *Seyn*, *Being*. That *there is*, is manifestly the most abstract thought that can be reached. That is, when we perform the process of abstraction, when we strip off all empirical qualities, one after the other, 'is' is the residuum—abstract Being, predicateless 'is.' Even when we think of any natural entity, when we think even of life, say, it is evident that the first step of the beginning is 'is.' But what, even under that point of view, would be the second? Why, 'is not.' There must be, at first (we are using the category, we are seeing through our lens 'beginning' at this moment) a wholly indefinite and indeterminate, and, so to speak, (since the category natural life accompanies our thought

but only a perception indirect through media of sense, which media, adding elements of their own, separated us for ever from the thing-in-itself (or things-in-themselves), at the very moment that they revealed it (or them). But suppose thought in all cases to

be perceptive thought, thought where subject thinking and object thought are identical—identical in difference if you like, even as the *one* side and the *other* side of this sheet of paper are identical in difference—then we come tolerably close to the stand-point of Hegel.

here,) instinctive thought or feeling 'is,' but this must be immediately followed by the thought or feeling 'not.' There is as yet only 'is,' there is nothing else. That is, the very 'is' is nought or not. But throwing off any reference to natural life, and restricting ourselves to thought absolutely and *per se*, it is still plainer that the abstract initial 'is' is identical with the abstract and initial 'non-is.' Because the 'is' is the last product of abstraction; it has no attribute, it is bodiless position; it not only 'is,' but it is 'non.' One can readily see, then, that in Hegel's so abstract, formal, and professional statement of *Seyn und Nichts*, there is involved a creative substratum of the most anxious, persevering, and comprehensive concrete reflection. One can see that he has bottomed the whole question of a beginning. Why he should have set it up so abruptly and so unconnectedly steep, is a query impossible for us to answer. 'Is' and 'is-non,' then, contain the same subject-matter, or the same no subject-matter: each is an absolute and ultimate abstraction; the 'is' is a 'non-is,' and the 'non-is' is in the same sense an 'is.' In this sense, then, Being and Non-being are identical; neither the one nor the other possesses a predicate—they are each nothing. But, if they are the same, they are again not the same, there is a distinction between them, and so on.

From the position that thought is the All and the prius, it follows that thought must contain in itself a principle of progression or movement. Hegel asserts his *method* to be this principle; and we should certainly very decidedly stultify ourselves, if we should suppose that Hegel sets up this method in the merely arbitrary fashion of an impostor bent on some personal result. Hegel's method is the product of reflexion

equally deep and earnest with that which originated his beginning. Thought's own nature is, first, position; second, opposition; and third, composition. It is evident that, however we figure a beginning of thought, in God or ourselves, it must possess a mode of progression, a mode of production, and that is absolutely impossible on a principle of absolutely simple, single, unal identity. The *first*, then, though unal, must have separated into distinctions; and these by union, followed again by disunion and reunion *ad infinitum*, must have produced others till thought became the articulated organon it is now. It is also plain that, were there movement only by separation into contraries without reunion into higher stages, the progress would fail in systematic articulation, and also in improvement. Re-union, then, is evidently a step as necessary as separation. The union of 'is' and 'non-is' in 'becomes,' need also not be confined to logical abstractions, but may be illustrated from the concrete. Every concrete process of Becoming is a union of the two. Resuming our illustration, too, from the life of thought, it is evident that, after the first dim consciousness 'is' and the second 'not,' the third of 'becomes' of a coming to be and of a ceasing not to be must succeed.

D. 4.

The question is, What is Truth? i.e. What is the Absolute? But the Absolute cannot be hopped to by means of some cabalistic hocus-pocus. It must be worked up to. But where does it lie? Wherever it lies, to be known it must come into our knowledge. But we already possess knowledge. Is it so sure that the Absolute is not already there? Let us take our

knowledge just as we have it, and look at it. Let us take knowledge, not in some out-of-the way, enchanted-looking corner, we do not know where, but as it comes up. Let us take this thing knowledge, not as we suppose it, not as in some sublime indeterminateness we imagine it, but as it manifests itself—now and here—to us, just as it at once directly shows or appears. For result—as the ‘Phaenomenology,’ which starts thus, will show—it will be found that the *opinion* of object will disappear, and that there will remain the idea only. Our knowing and what we know are identical. The object becomes, so to speak, intelligised, and the intellect objectivised. The relation between the supposed two is one of mere *otherness* in identity. The object is knowing but in the form of otherness. Knowledge involves the relation of two factors; but they are both the same substance. Knowing, even to know itself, must have a something to know; and this process involves and introduces at once the relation of otherness. Man’s error is the hypostatising of his ideas—the separating of his indivisible self, by a dead wall of his own assumption, into an irreconcilable duality of thinking and thought. We have been desperately hunting the whole, infinite, unreachable heaven for an Absolute, which, folded up within us, smiled in self-complacent security, at the infatuation of its very master. We have wearied heaven and earth with our importunate clamours for a glass that bestrid the bridge of our own nose. What we wanted lay at the door; but to and fro we stepped over it, vainly asking for it, and plunging ourselves vainly into the far forest.

It is the peculiar nature of the idea to be the union of the universal and the particular in the individual.

Here lie the elements of the explanation of the relation which the subjective bears to the objective. Such questions as Life and Death, the Soul, Immortality, God, are to be regarded from a wholly-changed point of view. Death is a constituent of the sphere of the Finite, but the Idea is imperishable. *I am the Idea—you—he—&c.*; but we are also singulars. As singulars, there is change—death; but, as participant of the self-conscious Idea, we are immortal. It is just an all of thought—triple-natured—with infinite gradations and spheres. Freedom, perfect self-consciousness, is the goal. Take it as Nature, the same thing can be said. In fact, it is just a double language, the object and the idea; the same goal, the same gradations in the one as in the other.

The Preface to the 'Phaenomenology' is the plainest piece of speaking anywhere in Hegel, and capable of being put as key to the whole system. It is full of the most hard, heavy, and effective thought, in new, subtle, and original directions; and the expression is *as* heavy and effective. A most surprising light is thrown upon what passes unquestioned under our eyes and among our hands; and the object Hegel sets himself here will be something beyond all precedent, if accomplished.

At present, thought is thus and thus constituted: but the process of which this constitution is the result, is simply experience. A history, then, of the phases of experience since the beginning, the first stage of thought, up to the present, would enable us to understand how this present arose; and thus we should get an insight into the nature of thought itself. *But this process to Hegel has reached the highest stage of absolute thought*: therefore, then, if he can conduct us through

all the stages actually experienced by consciousness from the first to the last, he will conduct us—necessarily, and with full conviction—to *ultimate and absolute thought itself*. We are supposed to see only the bare process itself: but Hegel has helped himself by diligent reference to actual history; and we shall assist ourselves by looking out for reflexions of the same. There is everywhere a power of naming, in consequence of perception of the inner nature and limits of what is looked at, that must give pause, at all events, and open the eyes. The *necessity* and *coherence* of the *systematisation* will, at least, benefit all effort for the future. Hegel, indeed, clamours always for *necessity* and *completeness* of *exposition*. He cannot allow a subject to be attacked from an indefinite, conceded, common ground. The common ground must prove its nature, legitimacy, extent, &c. to the last dregs. He must begin with the beginning, and work all up into a one *bolus* of thought.

D. 5.

Kant, in demonstrating the ‘possibility of a Transcendental Logic,’ begins the *realisation* of Idealism. Idealism before that was but an abstract conception, an announced probability on a balance of reasons. With Kant actual development commences, and he very fairly initiates the business proper of Hegel, which was, not to prove the *principle* of Idealism, but construct its *system*, lay out its *world*. In the series, Kant is as Geometry, Fichte as Algebra, Schelling as Applied Mathematic, and Hegel as the Calculus.

Thinking of Quantity as an intellectual notion to which things must adapt themselves as universal, particular, and singular,—of Quality, and the *à priori*

necessities to which all *à posteriori* elements must submit in its regard,—of Substance and Accident, and the conditions they impose on all experience *before* experience,—one gets to see the origin of Hegel. The Idea, which is the All, is so constituted that it organises itself on these categories—suppose them God's creative thoughts—or suppose them simply the elements of *the monad*, of that which is, the Absolute.

In the 'Kritik of Practical Reason,' pp. 219, 220, Part 8 of the collected Works, occurs a passage which may be translated thus :—

'Because we consider here, in its practical function, *Pure Reason*, which acts consequently on *à priori* principles, and not on empirical motives, the division of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason will necessarily resemble that of a Syllogism. That is, it will proceed from the Universal in the Major (the Moral principle), through a subsumption under the same, in the Minor, of possible acts (as Good or Bad) to the Conclusion, namely, the subjective actualisation of Will (an Interest in the practically possible good and the consequent Maxim). To him who follows with conviction the positions of the Analytic, such comparisons will prove pleasing; for they countenance the expectation that we shall yet attain to a perception of the Unity of the entire business of pure Reason (theoretical as well as practical), and be able to deduce all from a single principle, which is the inevitable demand of human reason; for we can find full satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of all the possessions of our reason.'

More than one deep germ of Hegel seems to lie here. The movement of the Syllogism, for example, is seen here as it were in concrete and material application, and not as only formal and abstract. Then the demand of Unity, of a single principle! The Universal appears in Hegel as the Logic, the Particular as

Nature, the singular as Spirit. Then the Universal, the Abstract, is seen to be the ground of the other two. At page 107 of the 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,' we hear of the electric *brush*—that Electricity is as a *brush*. Well, let us say here, the Logic, the Universal, is the *electric brush*, the Particular (Nature) is the materiature which attaches to and crassifies the ramification of said electric brush to the development, as it were, of a system of organs, and the singular (Spirit) is the one envelope of subjectivity that converts all into an absolute unity, at once absolutely negative and absolutely positive. In this way, we may conceive formed Hegel's *Idée-Monade*. Again, Kant's one general principle is to universalise the particular, objectify the subject, convert *An sich* or nature into *Für sich* or Spirit; and Hegel's really is just the same.

In the Kritik of 'Judgment,' section 86, occurs the following :—

'For (such is the conviction of everyone) if the world consisted of Beings merely inanimate, or some animate and some inanimate, but the animate still without reason, the existence of such a world would have no worth at all, for there would exist in it no being that possessed the slightest notion of any worth. If, again, there were also rational beings supposed to exist, but whose reason was such only as knew to put a value on things according to the relation of nature which these things bore to them (to their own gratification), but not to give to their own selves *à priori*, and independent of the experiences of nature, a value (in free-will), then there were (relative) aims in the world, but no (absolute) End-aim, because the existence of such rational beings would remain still aimless. But Moral Laws are of this peculiarity, that they prescribe to Reason something as aim *without condition*—consequently in the manner in which the notion of an End-aim requires it; and the existence of such a reason as, in the relation of an aim, can be the supreme

law to itself—in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws—can therefore alone be thought as End-aim (Final Cause) of the existence of a world. Is this not so, then there lie in the existence of the same either no aim at all, as regards its cause, or aims without End-aim.’

To this noble passage, let us add portion of the note at the bottom of the same page :—

‘The glory of God is not inaptly named by Theologians, the final cause of creation. It is to be observed, that we understand by the word creation, nothing else than the cause of the existence of a world, or of the things, the substances in it [‘die Ursache vom Daseyn einer Welt;’ literally, to a Hegel, the *original* or *primal thing* or *matter* of the *being there* of a world]; as also the proper notion of the word [Schöpfung, creation, but literally a drawing; compare *scooping*] brings that same sense with it (*actuatio substantiæ est creatio*), which consequently does not already involve the presupposition of a spontaneously operative, and therefore intelligent Cause (whose existence we would first of all prove).’

There were no worth in a world, then, that cannot appreciate worth. The world were blind and worthless without a being that can think. But what is the action on the world of a being that can think? By thinking, he arranges all in his own way—all takes place and meaning, not from itself, but from him (it had no meaning before him). It is thus his own self he projects around him; the *other* is but the *stand* for his own qualities, thereon disposed. The analogy of his own inner construction converts the opacity of the *other* into lucidity, transmutes its rigidity into pliancy; and the *other* remains as nothing when opposed to the qualities it merely sustains. Hegel, in reading Kant, may be conceived as falling on such ideas, and so, as arriving at his anthropological Monad, which, as all that is ours, as all that we can know—anything else, too,

being merely suppositious, i.e., *again our own, again ourselves*—may be reasonably made, All, Absolute, and Infinite. *Actuatio substantiæ est creatio* is a phrase, too, that has not failed to bear fruit in Hegel. Ursache vom Daseyn, and the remarkable phrase '*with laws, not under laws,*' which occurs in the same neighbourhood, may be also viewed as suggestive of Hegelian elements. The passage in Kant offers to the spiritualist or idealist a bulwark impregnable to any materialist, a talisman in the light of which every materialist must fade and die.

On Kant's theory, the world being phenomenal, matter being simply an unknown appulse, giving rise to a subjective material, not necessarily at all like the matter, nor necessarily the same in all subjects, and incapable of comparison as between subjects,—this subjective material (all that holds of sensation or feeling), to become a world, would require a system of forms which can themselves be only subjective, only *ab intra*. These, then, would appear somehow as projected into the subjective material, to form part and parcel of the same. Further, they themselves, though subjective as belonging to the subject, might be *objective* as belonging to *all* the subjects, and as capable of being identified in each by *actual comparison*; they might be of an objective and universally determinable nature. They might come from our intellectual nature, for example. This is Kant. The subjective material in us set up by the unknown outer matter, is received into an objective but internal net of arrangement. Feeling is the matter, but intellect is the form of all experience, however outer and independent it appear to us. Well, Kant succeeds in placing Sensation and Perception under Understanding, and Will under Reason; but he has still Emotion, in

the general scheme of man's faculties, and Judgment in the particular of the cognitive faculties, undiscussed. Now, what is he to do with design and beauty, which still keep apart from Understanding and Reason? If he is right in his world, they cannot come from without; they, too, must be subjective in the sense of coming from within, or they may be due to some harmony of the outer and inner. It is in this way, and from such considerations, that Judgment becomes the sphere of design and beauty, which are of an Emotional nature. One, can see then, what led Kant to be averse to all theoretic arguments about God; for there was nothing noumenal known in Kant's world but the categorical Imperative; all the rest was phenomenal—unknown matter apart—and depended on forms *ab intra*: Kant's theoretical world, in short, or world of *knowledge*, was only phenomenal. Plainly, then to Kant, all form being *ab intra*, design and beauty would present a peculiar phase to him, and would require peculiarly to be dealt with.

It was easy to Kant's followers to see how small a *rôle* was left for matter, and to fall on the idea of expunging it. Hence it was that Fichte attempted to build all up from these internal forms, and to that he required a principle of movement in themselves, and a radiation from a single bottom one through a systematic articulation of all the others. As left by Kant, however, he was still on the platform of consciousness and a subjective intellect; hence his system could only be one of subjective idealism or objective egoism, which terms imply the same thing. From this limited form Schelling freed the advancing system by his principle of an absolute or neutrum into which both Nature and Thought were resolved. But in Schelling the sides

remained apart, and the Absolute had to be sprung to. Hegel examined all, rethought all, and completed all. He perfected, first, the Thought-forms into a complete self-formative system—into an organic and, so to speak, personal whole, to which the particular, Nature, took up the position of, as regards the first, only its other, and in it the universal forms only repeated themselves as in particularity or otherness, while, third, he summed up both in the singular of Spirit. His three parts present analogies to the three of the syllogism, the three cognitive faculties, the three faculties in general &c.; and to the last Kant is repeated.

Hegel in his main principle has certainly put his finger on the rhythmus of the universe. Understanding steps from abstraction to abstraction; but Reason conjoins and concretes them. 'Beginning' is an abstraction, and, as such, is untrue; it is concrete only *with* its end, and so true. Life and death must also for their truth be concretely joined, and the result is the higher new, the birth of the Spirit. God abstractly, as Hegel puts it, is the mere empty word, the infidel God; he is true only as concrete in Christianity, the God-man. So in all other cases. The true notion is the conjunction of the contradictories.

D. 6.

Kant's Categories form really the substance of Hegel; but Hegel's whole endeavour is to conceal this. Hegel seems a crafty borrower generally. His absolute is the neutrum of Schelling, converted into subject by the Ego of Fichte. Aristotle assists him in the further characterisation of this subject through the distinctions of Matter, Form, Actuality, &c. Plato lends his aid in

enabling him to look at it as idea, and to develop it as idea. The very monad of Leibnitz, the triad of Proclus, and the *Qualirung* of Böhme are auxiliary to him. But his infinitely greatest obligations are to Kant, who enables him to lay out his whole system and carry out his whole process.

Must we conceive, as well as name, to understand—but how is the conception of heterisation to Nature possible?

Are we encouraged by the general nature of the case (all being Werden, and Werden being always a union of identical opposites) to believe that even in death there is process, that there again Non-being is passing into Being, and that this applies to all members of the universe, spiritual or material? Or are these abstractions but a system of fantastic and delusive shadows shed of the universe into the brain of man? Or, even so, are they not still thoughts—are they not threads of essential thought, threads from the main of thought, electric threads round which cluster and accrete in sensuous opacity the matter-motes that make the universe? It is important to pause on this. Again, it must be noted that the admission *Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe* is the other important point;—grant that, and Werden cannot be repressed. It is a conjunction of the extremes of thought; for Being is regarded as the primal fount of possibility, while Nothing is that of all impossibility. It seems violent to force us to conjoin them for the birth of reality. Still, each is a thought, and each can be thinkingly examined: if the result declares identity, we must accept it, *it* and its consequences.

Take any actual Concrete, abstract from quality after quality, and observe the result. Let the Concrete be

this paper, for example : well, we say there is whiteness in it, there is cohesion, there is pliancy, &c. &c.—now let us throw out all these, and we shall be left at last with *there is nothing*. The whole question now is, is this *caput mortuum* of abstraction an allowable base for the whole world of thought? In such sentence, it is very plain that *there is* and *nothing*, subject and predicate, are equally nothing, and, so far as that goes, identical ; but the objection is obvious that this results only from their having now no longer any matter of application—any applicability—any use. So long as they were in use, in actual application, in actual work, they were very different. When out of use, they are both of course equally idle, and, so far as any result is concerned, equally null. Food and no food are of identical result—are, so to speak, equally nothing, if placed in a stomach that will not digest. Distinctions are distinctions only when in use ; they are empty, void, null, when unapplied ; and so, unapplied, may be set equal if you will. But where is the warrant to make such equality a foundation for the whole burthen of concrete thought in its abstract, or formal, or logical form? To do so is a feat of ingenuity ; but it is a feat, a trick, a mockery, a delusion ; and the human mind that, dazzled, may admire, will still refuse conviction and assent. There still recurs the question, however, Are we not at liberty to take up the notions Being and Non-being with a view to analysis and comparison? To this the answer must be yes, But that *yes* does not empower you to set Being as identical with Non-being. You say you do not wish so to set them, that it is not you who set them at all, that they set themselves, and that they set themselves as both equal and unequal, and it is this duplicity of relation that sets free the

notion Becoming as a notion that, essentially single, is yet more essentially double and contains both of the others. You say you do not ask us to make any reference to concrete things, outer or inner—that you only wish us to see how abstract thought may build itself, &c. But—

Another objection is the refusal of the mind to believe in a concrete *not* or *nothing*—in the identification of positive determination with negative limitation—yet such is the chief lever of Hegel. In short, the main result will be, as regards Hegel, that we shall have to reject his system as articulated, and yet retain it largely both as a whole and in parts. The system as articulated is probably the result of the mere striving, so common at that time, after universality and necessity, which are the only two elements that can produce a coherent and complete whole, a Kosmos. Still, Hegel *shows* the connexion of positive determination and negative limitation—that they are but different sides of the same reality—that, as abstract thoughts, they coalesce and run together. It must be understood to shadow out also the only possible mode of conceiving an actual beginning.

But, let us do our best, we cannot help feeling from time to time, that there crops out an element of weakness, of mere verbal hocus-pocus, distinctions which will not maintain their objective truth before the test of another language. No : the system that has built itself up so laboriously out of the unresting river must resolve itself into the same again, though largely to its material enrichment. So with the system of Kant. Still, in both, principles of form as well as matter will be found of permanent and abiding worth.

E. 1.

‘Being is the Notion only *in itself*.’ This can be taken, first, subjectively, and second, objectively.

First, subjectively,—the notion is thought, thought in act, a subject, a thinker, a spirit, God, you, I. The notion then (with such meaning) as being, as *is*, as the absolutely first, crude, dim, dull, opaque, chaotic, unconscious, brute *I am*, the first flutter of life, the absolute A in quickening (alphabetic A) is only *in itself*—latent, undeveloped. The German *an*, not quite the English *in*, here. *An* means properly at, beside, near. So the notion *an sich* is the notion *at* itself, like the first speck of life on the edge of the disc. The notion is, as it were, just come to itself. There is no answer possible, in one sense, to what is a thing in itself, for every possible answer would involve what it is for another. *An sich* is thus just *Seyn*; both are equally incapable of direct explanation, neither can be *said*. To *say* it, would be to limit it, to negate it, to give it a determinate manifestation, &c. Whatever were *said*, it would be still more than *that*; *that*, then, would describe it falsely, imperfectly, incompletely, that is, negatively, &c. Latency, undevelopment, inchoation, is what the term implies; and this amounts to the universal universal, the summum genus, the utterly unspecified, indeterminate, indefinite universal principle of all particulars—the *Seyn*—the base, the case, the all-embracing sphere and mother liquor, and yet also the invisible dimensionless *first* of everything manifest. *At bottom, virtually, occultly, independently, absolutely*, are all shades of *An sich*; and they all resolve themselves into *Seyn*, and that into absolute, or abstract, or blank self-identity.

This description of *An sich* is pertinent in every application of the term, whether to the all of things or any single particular whole ; it is a constituent in the thinking of every whole. The universe has no advantage in this respect over this little crystal. This gives a glimpse into the constitution of thought as thought ; of which, it is not right to say that it is subject to such and such poles, but rather that these are just its *modi* and constitute it so and so ; thought is just such.

Second, objectively,—of everything we may form a notion, but the notion is no true notion unless it correspond to its object. Call the object *Seyn* now, then obviously *Seyn* is just the Notion but as yet *an sich*, *in itself*, potentially that is. Or, take it, in a slightly other way. Existence, as it is there before us, or here with us, is just God's *Notion* ; but in this form, it is only the Notion *in itself*, occultly, latently, undemonstrated by explanation and development. Again, the phrase may be taken historically objectively, as symbolising the first stage of thought historically. The hoof of *Seyn* breaks up into the fingers (*Bestimmungen*), which also are (*sind* or *sind seyend*). As thus separated, they are to each other, other.

‘ A setting out of the Notion as here *in itself*, or a going into itself of Being.’ This susceptible of the same points of view : First, subjectively, I set myself out of myself, or I develop myself ; and this just amounts again to—I go into myself. The reference to *me*, of course, to be universalised into reference to *the* whole or any whole.

There are four forms shadowed out then :—1. The first subject ; 2. The present sensuous object ; 3. History as applied to Thought ; 4. The Notion qua notion,

without distinction of object. The three first are but illustrative of the last.

The second forms of a sphere are the finite (the fingers of the hoof). The importance of thinking through predicates and eliminating the subject—as an entity of mere supposition and conception. This the root of the multi-applicability of the Hegelian discussion.

The *first*, the *beginning*, cannot be a *product* or *result*; neither can it contain more than one significate. The beginning must be an absolutely *first*, and also an absolutely *simple*; were it either a derivative or a compound, it would contradict itself and be no beginning. But when we can say, it is, I am, &c., we have a beginning. The beginning of a thing is when it *is*. As with a part, so with the whole. The *am* or *is* is the absolutely first predicate that can be attached. To begin an examination of thought, then, (Logic), is to begin with A in the alphabet of predication, is to begin with the absolutely first predicate, and that is Being. In this shape, it is pure thought; it is utterly indeterminate, incompound, and inderivative or first. Thought is but predication, an ascription or attribution of predicates; for predicate in the thinking subject corresponds to specificate in the thought object; i.e. these are identical, because the specificate can only exist in thought as predicate. The latter term, then, is the preferable in a system of Logic.

‘Seyn is pure abstraction.’ Something of the Hegelian, peculiar use of the word, as the separation and isolation effected by the analysing Understanding, floats here. Suppose we apply, as regards Non-being, the four forms previously applied to Being. 1. The first subject: it is evident *I am* in such position (*first*

subject) is equal to—I am *not* or *nought* as yet.
 2. The present sensuous object also is and is not, for it properly *is* only in its absolutely first principle.
 3. History as applied: at A, thought both was and was not. 4. The Notion qua notion: it *is* in itself, and *not* as it is there. That it is, then, is also that it is not. Even as that outward Seyn, it is *not*—as *not* me, &c. But it is only necessary to think Being in abstract generality.

The Absolute is an affair of thought, it is *not* just as much as it *is*: for *what is* is a *variety*; there is not only identity, but difference also. An absolute cannot be thought without a non-absolute. It is the non-absolute that gives the cue to the absolute. So when we ask what a thing *is*—which is the same as asking what is it in itself—we imply by the very question that it is *not*,—or *why the question?* It is the non-being that gives the cue to the being. Here is a crystal of salt: we ask, what *is* it? The very question involves that *as* it is, it is not. Thought is itself evidently just so constituted; it has opposite poles. Nothing, then, is thus a definition of the Absolute. The Absolute is Nothing. There *is* only the absolute and the non-absolute. Only the synthesis is; neither of its antitheses per se *is*. Pure Seyn is the absolute Negative—of whatever *is*: it is the Absolute, &c. This seen in the Thing-in-itself, in God as merely abstract supreme being of enlightenment, &c. The Nothing of Buddha is precisely the same Abstraction. We seek the universal of Being by abstracting from every particular Being, and the resultant abstraction in which we land is precisely the same entity, however we *name* it—whether Being or Nothing—whether the Supreme Being of Voltaire or the Nothing of Buddha.

What is, is thought, concrete thought, that, of itself, determines itself, thus and thus. The empirical ego—of you or me—with all its empirical realities—*it* and these but forms of thought—modi of the great sea. This great sea still is, truly is, is great and the all, though in me, though in you. The *my* and *me*, the *you* and *yours*, the *in me*, the *in you*, are but constituents of the sea, and can be so placed as to become mere pebbles and cockle-shells *by* it. I deceive myself, you deceive yourself: *I*, this *I*, and *my*, and all *mine*, *you* and *yours*, and *he* and *his*, but mere straws blowing beside the sea. It is my error—a case applicable to you and him, and each of us—to think them *me*, true *me*. These, *me*, true *me*, are only that ocean and that one crystal-drop, that infinite of space and that one eye-gleam, that unreachable all and that invisible point, that everywhere and that nowhere—Thought.

Our discontent with the abstractions Seyn and Nichts arises from their own proper life. They tend of themselves further, that is, to further specification. This attaches to the true idea of a true beginning. Freedom, as form of Nothing, shows the necessity of the existence of Nothing.

Nothing is the same as Being. This is partly as taking each abstractly; but the other meaning hovers near also. The Seyn as Ansichseyn is really the same as Nothing. *Determinate Is*, is built around a womb of nothing, which womb is also called the Seyn. They are thus together Becoming: what is become was *not*, but *is*. The crust upon the gulf which is the womb of all, holds at once of Being and of Non-being: if it *is* this, it is *not* that; it is *not* all, it is but part; that *is*, it is limited, negated, or—contains Nothing quite as much as Being. Said womb, too, being the absolute

A and source and base of all, is the veritable *is*; the other veritably is *not*, its *is* is elsewhere, its *is* is in *another*. Every whole is similarly placed; every whole is similarly a womb of nothing and being. It is in this womb, which is *nothing*, that it veritably *is*; and from it, this nothing, it is, that it develops, that it *draws* what it is. But this drawing or development is just Becoming. Becoming, then, contains both, and is the truth of both. A system of monads thus, and of monads in monads and a monad.

The elements of *Something* are reality and negation—negation that is an *otherwise-being*. This latter is form; it is not the reality, it is form and may vary without affecting the reality. It is thus an otherwise-being of the Reality itself: it is thus the other of the Reality; it is there where the other also finds its other, its bar, its halt; it is the general region of otherness, of distinction, separation, discrimination; it is being-for-other, as it is that of the *being* that alone is for the other; it is there being-for-other also as regards its own self; it is also its being by or with the other; it is there where it is wholly for the other, for distinction, &c. (Realise this by reference to yourself as a Something. Your naturalness, your personality, is your being-for-other; but are *you* in any part of that person? It is *other* than your *reality*.) Otherwise-being is a predicable of each and all, for by the otherwise-being only is it capable of discrimination: it is there where its being is for another.

Something becomes another. This process endless, ceaseless, but what is *othered* is just the other. The something thus *retains* itself. It is thus the true Infinite; *that*, that going over into another, *retains*, in this going over and in this other, distinct reference to its

own self. This the substance or substratum of Kant and Spinoza. In this process, too, or in this notion of Kant and Spinoza, lies Being-for-self (*Fürsichseyn*), or self-reference and self-retention. Despite the *other* and *othering*, that *which is*, still is for itself and by itself, and with itself. This the true Infinite which remains and abides—the negation of the negation—the mediating process of itself with itself—not the bastard Infinite that arises from mere repetition of alternation, and ends in an *ébahi* ‘and so on *ad infinitum*!’ It is our own fault if we make absolute the mere other, the mere finite and changeable.

With Self-referencé (Being-for-self) the principle of Ideality appears; it is here we refer to something that does not exist as there or here, as a *This*, in outside crust, but that is ideally there in the centre—the substance of Spinoza, the substrate of Kant, the absolute of Hegel. The finite is reality, but its *truth* is its ideality. The Infinite of the *understanding* even—the spurious one—is ideal. Here we see that all philosophy, as it idealises reality, is idealism.

To be for, by, and with one’s own self, this is the *Fürsichseyn*, and it is the substance or substrate of Kant, &c. Hegel’s phrase is its *perfect abstract expression*.

One bottom principle—God—must be assumed; but thus all change is quite indifferent, and the true Infinite is this bottom principle that abides. The surface endlessness of difference is but a spurious Infinite.

Self-reference is immediacy, no result of intermediacy; it is directly first and present, it is inderivative, it is uncaused; it is A, it is the first, the absolute—but as negation of negation. The negativity of self-reference involves the exclusion of other units from the one

unit; as, for example, the distinction of my *me* from my empirical affections and experiences. The one self-reference, thus—the single unit—flows over into *Many*. This the vital cell from which arises the whole chapter on Fürsichseyn. This chapter developing thus One and Many, Attraction and Repulsion, &c., mediates the transition from Quality to Quantity, and becomes itself readily intelligible.

The repulsion of the Ones will probably appear forced and artificial, however — perhaps, at best ingenious. To the musing mind, it has a certain credibility. Suppose a subject of the Werden, suppose a beginning and progressing consciousness, the first thought presumably will be *am*, which is tantamount to *is*. Such *is* is but nothing, and must give rise to such thought; but the *not* has also *is*, or positivity, that is, there *becomes*. But if there becomes or arises, there also departs or ceases; while, at the same time, there is between both the quasi-stable moment of there is *there*. Attention is now directed to this quasi-stable moment as such. It has reality, it has determinateness, it implies another, it becomes other, and that equally other. It is thus limited and alterable; but in the midst of this, the subject, the consciousness, remains—by itself and for itself. It is one. But this one, as so produced, as affirmative to self and negative to other, implies several ones, &c. It is possible to figure *what is for itself* as something with qualities—a crystal of salt—in which case there is a mean of passage from the one to the many. Absolutise this crystal to the world: the one is the many, the many the one—or the whole of many, which is Quantity.

That there *is*, there must have been *not*. That *not* is *is*, there must have been *becomes*. But *becomes* is

negative positivity, or it involves quality. But quality, as what it is, is reality; and as what it is not, it is determinateness. But reality with determinateness, or determinate reality, is something. Something, as far as it *is*, as far as it has reality, is *in itself*; while so far as it is determinate, or as far as it has form, it has an element of otherness; for form is where something is other, where *it* may be othered while *it* at the same time remains unaffected. Determinateness is thus the otherwise-being of the something, it is where the being of the something is with other. There also is it that there is the general region of otherness—the region of separation, distinction, discrimination. It is there where the other and all others are separated from the something. It is there where the something is, in every reference, for other. It is there where the something is for, by, and with its own other. The two factors or constituent elements of the something, then, are *Ansichseyn* and *Seyn-für-Anderes*, or the quality *to be in self* and the quality *to be for other*; in which latter phrase, the ‘for’ is equivalent to *for*, *by*, and *with*. Where the something is for, by, and with, another, however, it is there precisely that the bound or limit falls. Something thus, then, is bounded, limited, or finite. It has also, as we have seen, an element of otherness in itself. In fact, the other involved by limit is itself something. Something then becomes something, or the other becomes other, *ad infinitum*. But as it is only the other that is othered, the Self remains for, by, and with itself. But this Being-for-self, the true Infinite, is a principle of ideality, &c. &c. One cell is thus formed—a self-subsistent monad; for self-reference is self-presence or immediacy. As excluding the other, it is absolute.

But even thus, must we not say Hegelianism is the *crystal of Naturalism*?

After all, the navel-string and mother-cake of Hegel are still the *desiderata*. Where does he attach to? whence is he? Well, these are multiform; they may be found generally in the history of philosophy. The absolutely first radical is *sum*, which, objectified, becomes *est* and so on. Fichte's beginning can be shown to lead to Hegel's, as also Schelling's principle, &c. &c. Then there is a beginning findable in this way, that he just takes up the actual as he finds it, and sorts it and names it in his own fashion, and as it leads him. Or he says, God is the Wesen, and God is a Spirit; and matter, &c., as made by him, can be called just his other. He is thought; but as having made matter, this also is *his*—that is, it is just his other. But materiality is in itself just the other of spirituality: the one outer, the other inner; the one extense, the other intense, &c. &c.: in fact, there *are* the Two.

This view not without consolation. The superior actual is certainly thought, which uses up matter as mere aliment, and converts it into its own element. Such is the process, the transformation of the Natural into the Spiritual. Death of the Natural is a matter of course, then; but that involves—as always—a step higher, and there is no destruction. Again matter is itself thought. The *nearest actual* is, after all, the subjective moment of thought. The element of despair lies in the inessentiality of the particular, of the singular subject. Still the singular subject—in *himself*—is the Objective, &c. The sheet-anchor of hope is thought.

The immortality probably no concern of Hegel's; he is above all doubt or anxiety or thought in that respect with his views of Matter, Thought, Spirit, the

Absolute generally. His God, then, le Dieu Absolu, that which is, but that is Thought, Spirit : moi, je suis l'Absolu ; toi, tu es l'Absolu ; lui, il est l'Absolu : il faut que nous nous prosternions devant l'Absolu, ce qui est notre mystère, notre vie essentielle, notre vrai nous-meme, l'Universel, ce qui est, le vrai, le tout, le seul !

E. 2.

There is a certain justification for the Hegelian God-man historically, not only in the outward Christ, but in the fact that, whereas formerly one's God was foreign and external to oneself in a priest, &c., and to be propitiated externally by a sacrifice, by rites, &c., the mind (Reason) is now a law—in conscience—unto its own self, that it obeys God in obeying itself. This, in short, is the identification of man's essential reason with the Divine nature. Thus, then, God is no longer an outer, an other, but within, and Us. Hegel must have largely in view this historical alteration of the historical stand-point. Had Hegel been an honest man and a more generous heart, what fine things we might have had from him ! As this : No proof would ever, or could ever, have been offered of God's existence, had our knowledge of and belief in such existence been obliged to wait for the proof.

REMARK.

The preceding Notes, though not to be regarded as expressive of definitive conclusions in any reference, will, nevertheless, assist such ; and so justify of themselves, we hope, their respite from fire. They are not, we are disposed to believe, hard to understand ; and a reader who has any interest in the subject may be

expected, we shall say, to read them pretty well through. But this effected, there will result, surely, some amount of familiarity with a variety of the leading notions and peculiar terms involved; a familiarity which must somewhat mitigate the shock of the abrupt steepness, the strangeness and the difficulty of the access, which Hegel himself accords. The rôle to be assigned to Thought as Thought, for example—the Metaphysic of a Beginning, the nature of abstract Being, the special significations to be attached to Abstraction, Understanding, Reason, &c.—all this, and other such matter, must, as regards intelligibility and currency, very much gain to the reader as his consideration proceeds. A slight glimpse, too, of the genetic history of the subject may not be wanting. One or two of the summaries, again—that is, if long separation from them may allow me to speak as a stranger in their regard—will be found, perhaps, so far as they go, not without spirit and not without accuracy, nor yet failing, it may be, in something of that dialectic nexus without which Hegel can but yield up the ghost, leaving the structure he has raised to tumble all abroad into the thousand disconnected clauses of a mere etymological discursus.

To such readers as approach Hegel with prejudice and preconceived aversion, even the objections and vituperations which we have unsparingly—but possibly quite gratuitously—expended in his regard, may prove, on a sort of homœopathic principle, not only congenial, but remedial. The ‘charlatan’ of Schopenhauer is, perhaps, the ugliest of all the missiles which have ever yet been flung at Hegel; but others quite as ugly will be found under C. and D. of the present chapter, and it is only the peculiarity of their place,

together with the hope of service, which can excuse us for exhibiting them.

On this head, it may be worth while remarking that it is quite possible that Rosenkranz, who chronicles this reproach of Schopenhauer, is himself not without a certain complacency in view of the same. Not improbably, even as he chronicles it, though with rejection of course, he feels at the same time that there exists in Hegel a side where it is at least intelligible. It was an age of systems, and Hegel produced his. Nor did he feel, the while, under any obligation to explain it, or account for it, or, in any way, *make it down*. To him, it was enough that he had produced it; there it was; let the reader make what he could of it! But just here lay the difficulty! With the others—with Kant, with Fichte, with Schelling—there was a perceived and received beginning,—there was an understood method,—above all, there was a universally intelligible speech. But, Hegel!—Hegel had changed all that. The ball he flung down to us showed no clue; the principles that underlay the winding of it, were undiscoverable; and what professed to be the explication was a tongue unknown; not the less unknown, indeed, but the more exasperating, that it was couched, for the most part, in the oldest and commonest of terms. Yet still—all previous great ones looking small and inferior when dressed in its forms—it was seen, indirectly in this and directly in other respects, to involve claims and pretensions of a dominant and even domineering supremacy. Nay, though at once the necessity and the hopelessness of investigation were felt (*necessity*,—in that there could be no security till a competent jury had sat on that laborious rope of the Hegelian categories, and, after due inspection,

pronounced its sufficiency ;—*hopelessness*, in that the very nature of the case seemed somehow to postpone the possibility of this inquiry into an indefinite future)—the very paramountcy of the pretensions, the very inextricability of the proof, had, with a public so *prepared* as then, strange power to dazzle, seduce, or overawe into acquiescence.

Nor was this hid from Hegel himself ; so that there necessarily arose on his part, as well as on that of his hearers, such secret consciousness as gradually infected and undermined whatever *frankness* the mutual relation might have originally contained. To be obliged to speak, as to be obliged to hear, what is felt to be only half understood, is to be very peculiarly placed ; and the development, in such circumstances, of a certain bias, of a certain disingenuousness, will, in hearer as well as speaker, be hardly prevented. Distrust grows in both ; distrust, which assertion in the one, as acceptance in the other, strives vainly to overbid. You, on the one side, show possession of what is taken for a mystery of price ; why blow away, then, you feel, this mystery, and consequently this price, by any indiscreet simplicity of speech ? You, on the other side, again, are credited with understanding the same ; and the feathers of everyone concerned are flattered the right way when you smile the smile of the initiated—not but that all the while, to be sure, the very fibres of your midriff are cramped to agony with your unavailing efforts to discern.

But there is no necessity to go so far as this in either case. The bias to both, consequent on an equivocal claim, made on the one hand, and granted on the other, suffices. The relations in such a case are unsound, the common-ground largely factitious, and frankness

there can be none. What results is a readiness to fall into *loudness* and—let us say here—*effrontery*, over which hangs ever an air of fraudulence.

Again, scholars, men of letters, are, for the most part, by original constitution, and acquired habits—the latter from seclusion mainly—that is, both in temperament and temper, keen, intense, single-sighted, and precipitate; naturally prone, therefore, to exhibit a certain unsparingness, a certain inconsiderate thoroughness, a certain unwitting procacity, as well in demonstrating the failures of others as the successes of themselves. Now this element has decided place in Hegel. This it is that prompts the unnecessary bitterness of his antagonistic criticism, as in the case of Kant, where, from the good, honest, sincere, moderate, and modest soul that fronted him, provocation was impossible, and where, indeed, grace, if not gratitude, should have reduced him to respectfulness as in presence of the quarry of his own whole wealth. This too it is,—*but charged with influence from the disingenuous sphere*,—which lies at the bottom of those very sweeping and unhesitating *pronunziamentos* on every the minutest occurrent detail, no matter how remote, which, *apropos* of the Philosophy of History, have been already alluded to, and in regard to which the reader feels, and cannot help feeling, at once the *aplomb* of the assertion and the insecurity of the knowledge.

There is a side in Hegel, then, where the ‘charlatan’ of Schopenhauer may have at least appeared intelligible even to Rosenkranz. Nay, Rosenkranz himself, in telling us (first words of his *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*) that, in his case, the study of Hegel has been ‘the devotion of a life, alternately attracted and repelled,’ virtually admits that a taint of *doubt* will penetrate

even to the simplest faith and the most righteous inclination. On the whole, the conclusion may be considered legitimate then, that, from the circumstances explained, there is apt to fall on Hegel, a certain air as it were of an adventurer, which it takes all his own native force, all his own genuine weight, all his own indisputable fulness to support and carry off, even in the eyes of those who, in his regard, cannot be considered superficial students.

There is that in the above which may suggest, that it is not the spirit of the partisan which is to be anticipated here; where, indeed, the whole object is neither condemnation, nor vindication, but simply presentation, or re-presentation. To Hegel, that is, we would hold ourselves nakedly susceptible, as to the reader nakedly reflectent. And this is the nearest need at present, for Hegel hitherto has been but scantily understood anywhere; receiving judgments, consequently, not only premature but stupid. This reminds me to say, what is hardly necessary, however, that the objections and vituperations which occur in this chapter are not judgments: they are but the student's travail cries. Again, it is to be noted that, if we judge not against, neither do we judge here for, Hegel. There has been too much difficulty to understand, to think as yet of judging; *this* will follow of itself, however, as soon as *that* has been effected. There is no seeking in all this to speak apologetically of Hegel; such impertinent worldly squeamishness, did it exist, were what alone required apology. Hegel wants none. He is the greatest abstract thinker of Christianity, and closes the modern world as Aristotle the ancient. Nor can it be doubted but much of what he has got to tell us is precisely that which is adapted 'to bring peace'

in our times,—peace to the unquiet hearts of men,—
peace to the unquiet hearts of nations.

The preceding Notes, then, will, it is hoped, prove useful, and constitute, on the whole, no ineffective introduction. In the succeeding chapters, the approach to Hegel becomes considerably closer, to end, as we believe, at last in arrival.

CHAPTER III.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED: THE SECRET OF
HEGEL.

THE paper, from which the present chapter principally derives, superscribed 'The Secret of Hegel,' and signalized by formality of date, &c., has the tone of the contemporaneous record of some just-made discovery. This discovery, if not quite complete—not yet 'the secret' definitively *home*—has certainly still its value, especially to the advancing learner; but the *tone* is too spontaneous and extemporaneous to be pleasant now, and would, of itself, necessitate—did no interest of the learner interfere—considerable rescission, if not total suppression. Nevertheless, the interest of the learner shall be considered paramount, and the *tone* shall not be allowed to pretermitt the paper itself: only, to avoid respective suicide, we shall give such turn to its statements as shall break the edge of what egoism the solitary student may exhibit to himself on emerging into the new horizon which, crowning his own efforts, the new height has suddenly opened to him.

'This morning,' it is thus the paper a little grandiloquently opens, 'the secret of Hegel has at length risen clear and distinct before me, as a planet in the blue;' glimpses, previous glimpses, with inference to the whole, it admits; but it returns immediately again to 'this morning' when 'the secret genesis of Hegel stood suddenly before me.'

‘Hegel,’ the paper continues, ‘makes the remark that he who perfectly reproduces to himself any system, is already beyond it; and precisely this is what he himself accomplished and experienced with reference to Kant.’ Now this is to be applied to the writer of the paper itself, who seems to think that he too has reproduced Kant, and that, accordingly, he has been ‘lifted on this reproduction into sight of Hegel.’ But the pretension of the position does not escape him. Surely, he goes on to soliloquise, he cannot consider himself the first, surely he cannot consider himself the only one who has reached this vision, surely he cannot have the hardihood to say that Rosenkranz and Schwegler, for example, do not understand the very master in the study and exposition of whom they have employed their lives! No, he cannot say that, that would be too much; such men must be held to understand Hegel, and even a million times better than at this moment he, who has still so much of the details to conquer. Still, it appears, he cannot help believing that there is a certain truth on his side, and that, even as regards these eminent Hegelians, so far as he has read them, he himself is the first who has discovered the whole secret of Hegel, and this because he is the first, perhaps, to see quite clearly and distinctly into the origin and genesis of his entire system—from Kant.

The manner in which these writers (we allow the manuscript to go on pretty much in its own way now), and others the like, work is not satisfactory as regards the reproduction of a system, which shall not only be correct and complete in itself, but which shall have the life and truth and actual breath in it that it had to its own author. Their position as regards Hegel, for example, is so that, while to him his system was a

growth and alive, to them it is only a fabrication and dead. They take it to pieces and put it up again like so much machinery, so that it has always the artificial look of manufacture at will. They are *Professors* in short, and they study philosophy and expound philosophy as so much *business*. All that they say is academical and professional;—we hear only, as it were, the cold externality of division and classification for the instruction of boys. Such reproductions as theirs hang piecemeal on the most visible and unsatisfactory wires. They are not reproductions in fact; they are but artificial and arbitrary re-assemblages. But to re-assemble the limbs and organs of the dead body of any life, is not to re-create that life, and only such re-creation is it that can enable us to understand any system of the past. In the core-hitting words of Hegel himself, ‘instead of occupying itself with the Thing, such an industry is ever over it and out of it; instead of abiding in it and forgetting itself in it, such thinking grasps ever after something else and other, and remains rather by its own self than that it is by the Thing, or surrenders itself to it.’

That these men, and others the like, have very fairly studied Hegel, and very fairly mastered Hegel, both in whole and detail, we doubt not at all; neither do we at all doubt that many of them very fairly discern the general relations, though they are inclined to under-rate, perhaps, the particular obligations, of Hegel to Kant. Still there is something—knowing all this, and admitting all this, and acknowledging, moreover, that no claim had probably ever yet a more equivocal look, we feel still as if we must—in short, the claim of discovery is repeated.

For that there is a secret of Hegel, and that there is

a key necessary to this secret, we verily believe Rosenkranz and Schwegler would themselves admit ; thereby, at all events, leaving vacant space for us to occupy, if we *can*, and granting, on the whole, the unsatisfactoriness which we have already imputed to the statements or keys offered by themselves. Yes, there is a secret, and every man feels it, and every man asks for the key to it—every man who approaches even so near as to look at this mysterious and inexplicable labyrinth of Hegel. Where does it begin, we ask, and how did it get this beginning, and what unheard of thing is this which is offered us as the clue with which we are to guide ourselves? And what extraordinary yawning chasms gape there where we are told to walk as on a broad smooth bridge connecting what to us is unconnected and incapable of connexion! There is no air in this strange region ; we gasp for breath ; and, as Hegel himself allows us to say, we feel as if we were upside down, as if we were standing on our heads. What then is all this? and where did it come from? and where does it take to? We cannot get a beginning to it ; it will not join on to anything else that we have either seen or heard ; and, when we throw ourselves into it, it is an element so strange and foreign to us that we are at once rejected and flung out—out to our mother earth again, like so much rubbish that can neither assimilate nor be assimilated.

Yes, something very strange and inexplicable it remains for the whole world ; and yet excites so vast an interest, so intense a curiosity that Academies offer rewards for explanations of it, and even pay the reward, though they get no more satisfactory response than that ‘the curtain is the picture.’ How is this? When, as it were, deputations are sent to them for the purpose,

how is it that his own countrymen cannot give such an intelligible account of Hegel as shall enable Frenchmen and Englishmen to understand what it is he really means to say? Yet the strange inconsistency of human nature! Though this be an admitted fact *now*, we have heard, years ago, a Paris Professor declare his conscientious hatred of Hegel, and his resolution to combat him to the death, and this too in the interest of *spiritualism*? Why the hatred, and why this resolution, if Hegel were not understood? And why treat as the enemy of spiritualism a man whose first word and whose last is Spirit, and only for the establishment of the existence of Spirit? And in England, too, we are no less inconsequent. Sir William Hamilton, even years ago, was reputed to have entertained the notion that he had refuted Hegel, and yet Sir William Hamilton, at that time, was so ignorant of the position of Hegel, with whom his pretensions claimed evidently the most intimate relations, that he classes him with Oken—as a disciple of Schelling!

Sir William Hamilton, however, is not alone here: there are others of his countrymen who at least do not willingly remain behind him in precipitate procacity and pretentious levity. A knowledge of Kant, for example, that is adequate to the distinction of *speculative* and *regulative*, feels itself still strong enough to refute Hegel, having melted for itself his words into meaning at length—*by distilling* them! Another similar example shall tell us that it knows nothing of Hegel, and yet shall immediately proceed, nevertheless, to extend an express report on the Hegelian system; knowing nothing here, and telling us no more, it yet shall crow over Hegel, in the most triumphant and victorious fashion, vouchsafing us in the end the information that

Hegel's works are in twelve volumes! and whispering in our ear the private opinion that Hegelianism is a kind of freemasonry, kept secret by the adepts in their grudge to spare others the labour it cost themselves!

Besides these German scholars who, in England, are situated thus with respect to Hegel, there is another class who, unable to read a word of German, will yet tell you, and really believe they are speaking truth the while, that they know all about Kant and Hegel, and the whole subject of German Philosophy. This class grounds its pretensions on General Literature. They have read certain review articles, and perhaps even certain historical summaries; and, knowing what is there said on such and such subjects, they believe they know these subjects. There never was a greater mistake! To sum up a man, and say he is a Pantheist, is to tell you not one single thing about him. Summaries only propagate ignorance, when used independently, and not merely relatively, as useful synopses and reminders to those who have already thoroughly mastered the whole subject in the entirety of its details.

A large class say, we do not want to go into the bottom of these things, we only want a general idea of them, we only want to be *well-informed people*. This does not appear unreasonable on the whole, and there are departments of knowledge where general ideas can be given, and where these ideas can be used very legitimately in general conversation. But such general ideas are entirely impracticable as regards the modern philosophical *systems*. No general idea can convey these; they must be swallowed in whole and in every part—intellectually swallowed. We must pick up every crumb of them, else we shall fare like the Princess in the Arabian story, who is consumed to

ashes by her necromantic adversary, because unhappily she had failed to pick up, when in the form of a bird, all the fragments which her enemy, in the course of their contest, had tumbled himself asunder into.

To say Kant's is the Transcendental or Critical Idealism; Fichte's, the Subjective Idealism; Schelling's, the Objective Idealism; and Hegel's, the Absolute Idealism: this is as nearly as possible to say nothing! And yet people knowing this much and no more will converse, and discourse, and perorate, and decide conclusively upon the whole subject.

No: it is much too soon to shut up these things in formulæ and there leave them. These things must be understood before we can allow ourselves such perfunctoriness; and to be understood, they must first be lived. Indeed, is not this haste of ours nowadays, and yet this *glauum* and grasp of ours at comprehensiveness, productive of most intolerable evils? For instance, is it not monstrous injustice of Emerson to talk of Hume as if his only title to consideration arose from a lucky thought in regard to causality? Does not such an example as this show the evil of our overhasty formulising? He who believes that even Hume has been yet thoroughly understood, formulised, and superseded (which seems to be the relative frame of mind of Emerson), will make a mistake that will have very detrimental effects on his own development.

These well-informed men, then, who conceive themselves privileged to talk of Kant and Hegel, because they have read the literary twaddle that exists at this present in their regard, would do well to open their eyes to the utter nothingness of such an acquirement in respect to such subjects. In reference to Hegel, Professor Ferrier sums up very tolerably correctly in the words

already quoted ;* ‘ Who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen,—not any foreigner, seldom even himself, &c.’ Different from the rest, Mr. Ferrier, like a man of sense, does not proceed, immediately after having uttered such a *finding* as this, to refute Hegel. When we hear of the worthy old Philister of an Edinburgh Professor, who, regularly as the year came round, at a certain part of his course, announced with the grave alacrity of self-belief in sight of one of its strong points, ‘ I shall now proceed to refute the doctrines of our late ingenious townsman, Mr. David Hume,’ we laugh, and it seems quite natural and reasonable now to all of us that we should laugh. But how infinitely more strongly fortified is the position of the old Edinburgh Professor, relatively to Hume, than that of the (so to speak) new Edinburgh Professor (Sir William Hamilton—say), relatively to Hegel ? Hume’s writing is intelligible to the meanest capacity, Hegel’s, impenetrable to the highest. We know that the old Professor could understand the man he opposed—so far, at least, as the words are concerned ; we know that the new could *not* understand Hegel, even so far as the words are concerned. We know this, for he admits this ; and even asks—‘ But did Hegel understand himself ? ’—

Here is the secret of Hegel, or rather a schema to a key to it :

Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Realities.

This, of course, requires explanation. We suppose the reader to have mastered Kant through the preceding reproduction of his system.† Well, if so, he will have little difficulty in realising to himself the fact that what

* See Preliminary Notice.

† The allusion is to a MS.—appointed with this same schema
The reader will necessarily be dis- to a key to the secret ; he will

we give as a schema to the secret of Hegel, is a schema of the whole Theoretic or Speculative system of Kant in its main and substantial position. Quantity stands for the Categories in general, though it is here still looked at specially. Quantity, then, is an intellectual thought or Begriff, it is wholly abstract, it is wholly logical form. But in Time and Space, we have only another form of Quantity; it is the same thought still, though in them in a state of outwardness; the Category is inward Quantity; the Perception is entirely the same thing outwardly. Then Empirical Realities, so far as they are Quantities (what is other than Quantity in them has other Categories to correspond to it), are but a further *potentiating* of the outwardness of the thought Quantity, but a further materialisation, so to speak. Here lies the germ of the thought of Hegel that initiated his whole system. The universe is but a materialisation, but an externalisation, but a heterisation of certain thoughts: these may be named, these thoughts *are*, the thoughts of God.

To take it so, God has *made* the world on these thoughts. In them, then, we know the thoughts of God, and, so far, God himself. Probably too, we may suppose Hegel to say, Kant has not discovered *all* the Categories, could I but find others, could I find all of them, I should know then all the thoughts of God that presided at the creation of the universe. But that would just be so far to know God himself, God as he is 'in truth and without veil' ('Hülle,' best translated just *hull* here), that is, in his inward thought, without wrappage (hull or husk) of outward material form,

necessarily find it very meagre, very abstract. He will think better of it by and by, however, it is hoped; as it is also hoped that after the	full discussion of the subject as in relation to Kant, it will appear anything but meagre, and anything but abstract.
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God as he is in his 'eternal essence before the creation of the world and any finite Spirit.'

These Categories of Kant are general Thoughts. Time and Space are, according to Kant himself, but the ground-multiples, and still *à priori*, in which these categories repeat or exemplify themselves; and after the fashion of, firstly, these ground-unities (the categories), and, secondly, these *à priori* ground-multiples of the same (Time and Space), must, thirdly, all created things manifest themselves. Kant conceived these relations subjectively, or from the point of view of *our* thought. Hegel conceives them objectively, or from the point of view of *all* thought. Kant said: We do not know what the things are, or what the things are in themselves (this is what is meant by The Thing-in-itself), for they must be received into us through media, and, being so received into us, *they*, so far as we are concerned, cease, so to speak, to be themselves, and *are* only affections of our sense, which become further worked up, but unknown to ourselves, in our intellectual region, into a world *objective*, in that it constitutes *what* we know and perceive, and what we *all* know and perceive, and what, in the intellectual element—being capable there, but not in that of sense, of *comparison*,—we can *all agree upon* (the distinctive feature of the only valuable meaning of objective)—but *subjective* (as dependent simply on the peculiar construction of us) in its whole origin and fundamental nature.

Hegel, for his part, will not view these principles of pure thought and pure sense as only subjective, as attributes that belong to us, and are only in us, as attributes only human: he considers them, on the contrary, as absolutely universal general principles *on* which, and according to which, the all or whole is

formed and fashioned. The universe is one; and the principles of its structure are thoughts exemplifying themselves in pure *à priori* forms of sense, and, through these again, in empirical objects. These empirical objects, then, are thus but as bodies to thoughts, or, rather, as material schemes and illustrations of intellectual notions. They are thus, then, externalised, materialised, or, better, heterised thoughts, (i.e.) thoughts in *another* form or mode; that is, they are but the other of thought. Nay, the pure forms of sense, these pure multiples or manys, named Space and Time, are, themselves, but thoughts or notions in another form. Time in its succession of parts, and Space in such succession of parts, each is but perceptively what the notion Quantity is intellectually. They, then, too, are but thoughts in another form, and must rank, so far, with the empirical objects. We have thus, then, now the Universe composed only of Thought and its Other: thought meaning all the notions which we find implied in the structure of the world, all the thoughts, as we may express it otherwise, which were in God's mind when he formed the world, and according to which he formed the world, for God is a Spirit and thinks, and the forms of his thinking must be contained in his work. Nay, as God is a Spirit and thinks, his work can only be thought; as God is a Spirit, and thinks, the forms of his thinking must be, can only be That which is. In correct parlance, in rigorous accuracy, only God is. It is absurd to suppose the world other than the thought of God. The world then is thought, and not matter; and, looked at from the proper side, it will show itself as such. But a judicious use of the schema of Kant enables us to do this.

Quantity — Time and Space — Material Forms.

Here is thought simply passing into types, into symbols—that is, only into forms or modes of its own self. Properly viewed, then, the world is a system of thought, here abstract and there concrete. To that extent, this view is Pantheistic ; for the world is seen as the thought of God, and *so* God. But, in the same way, all ordinary views are Pantheistic ; for to each of them, name itself as it may, the world is the *work* of God, and *so* God : as the *work* of God, it is the product of his thought, the product of himself, and *so* himself. The Pantheism of Hegel, then, is only a purer reverence to God than the Pantheism of ordinary views, which, instead of hating Hegel, ought to hate only that materialism with which these ordinary views would seek to confound Hegel, but to which he is the polar opposite, to which he nourishes a holier hatred than they themselves.

Here, then, we have arrived at the general conception of the system of Hegel : but this is, by a long way, not enough. Such general conception is the bridge that connects Hegel to the common ground of History, so that he is no longer insulated and unreachable, but can now be passed to in an easy and satisfactory manner. We see now that what he has to say springs from what preceded it ; we now know what he is about and what he aims at ; and we can thus follow him with intelligence and satisfaction. But it is necessary to know a Hegel close.

Kant had the idea, then, but he did not see all that it contained, and it was quite useless so long as it remained in the limited form of principles of human thought. But Hegel himself, perhaps, could not have universalised or objectivised these principles of Kant, had he not been assisted by Fichte and Schelling. Kant showed that our world was a system of sensuous

affection woven into connexion by the understanding, and, principally, by its universal notions, the categories. But Kant conceived these sensuous affections to be produced by the thing-in-itself or things in themselves, which, however, we could not know. Fichte now, seeing that these things in themselves were absolutely bare, naked, and void—mere figments of thought, in fact—conceived they might safely be omitted as supposititious, as not at all necessary to the *fact, from* which we might just as well begin at once, *without* feigning something quite unknown and idle *as* that beginning. All now, then, was a system of thought, and as yet subjective or human thought. For this seemingly baseless and foundationless new world, a fulcrum was found in the nature of self-consciousness.

Till self-consciousness acts, no one can have the notion 'I,'—no one can be an 'I.' In other words, no one knows himself an 'I,' feels himself an 'I,' names himself an 'I,' *is* an 'I,' until there be an act of self-consciousness. In the very first act of self-consciousness, then, the 'I' emerges, the 'I' is born; and before that it simply was not. But self-consciousness is just the 'I,' self-consciousness can be set identical with the 'I:' the 'I,' therefore, as product of self-consciousness, is product of the 'I' itself. The 'I' is self-create, then. 'I' start into existence, come into life, on the very first act of self-consciousness. 'I' then—('I' was not an 'I' before)—am the product of my own act, of my own self-consciousness. Of course, I am not to figure my body and concrete personality here, but simply the fact that without self-consciousness nothing can be an 'I' to itself, and with the very first act of self-consciousness 'I' begins. (We may say, too, what *is*, but is not to itself 'I,' is as good as is

not—which, properly considered, is another clue to Hegel.) Here, then, is something self-created, and it is placed as the tortoise under this new world; for it is from this point that Fichte attempts to deduce, by means of a series of operations of the thought of this ‘I,’ the whole concretion of the universe. Although Fichte attained to a certain generality by stating his Ego to be the universal and not the individual Ego, still a certain amphiboly was scarcely to be avoided; and the system remained airy, limited, and unsatisfactory.

Fichte had developed the outward world from the Ego, as the inferable contradictory of the latter, the Non-ego; but Schelling now saw that the Non-ego was as essential a member in the whole as the Ego; and he was led thus to place the two side by side, as equal, and, so to speak, parallel. Thus he came to the thought, that if from the Ego we can go to the Non-ego, it will be possible to pass through the same series reverse-wise, or from the Non-ego back to the Ego. That is, if we can develop Nature from Thought, we may be able also to find Thought—the laws and forms of Thought—in Nature itself. It is evident that Thought and Nature would be thus but two poles, two complementary poles, the one of Ideality, the other of Reality. But this conception of two poles necessarily introduced also the notion of a centre in which they would cohere. This middle-point would thus be the focus, the supporting centre, from which all would radiate. That is to say, this middle-point would be the Absolute. But the Absolute so conceived is a *Neutrum*; it is neither ideal nor real, it is wholly indefinite and indeterminate. No wonder that to Oken, then, it presented itself as, and was named by him, the

Null. But the general conception of an Absolute and Neutrum operated with fertility in another direction. Every 'I' is just an 'I,' and so we can throw aside the idea of subjectivity, and think of the absolute 'I': but the absolute 'I' is *Reason*. Reason is ascribed to every man as that which constitutes his Ego; we can thus conceive Reason as *per se*, as independent of this particular subject and that particular subject, and as common to all. We can speak of Reason, then, as now not subjective but objective. This new Neutrum, this new Absolute, it could not now cost much difficulty to identify and set equal with the former Neutrum, or Absolute, that was the centre of coherence to Ideality and Reality. But in Schelling's hands, supposing it to have been originally his own, it remained still wholly indefinite, vacuous, idle: it required, in short, the finishing touch of Hegel.

We can conceive now how Hegel was enabled to get beyond the limited subjective form of Kant's mere system of human knowledge, and convert that system into something universal and objective. The thing-in-itself had disappeared, individuals had disappeared; there remained only an Absolute, and this Absolute was named Reason. But Hegel could see this Absolute was a Neutrum, this Reason was a Neutrum; they were but names, and not one whit better than the thing-in-itself. But were the categories completed, were they co-articulated—were they taken, not subjectively as man's, but objectively as God's, objectively just as Thought itself—were this organic and organised whole then substituted for the idle and empty absolute Neutrum of Schelling,—the thing would be done; what was wanted would be effected; there would result an Absolute not idle and void, not unknown and indefinite,

but an Absolute identified with Truth itself, and with Truth in the whole system of its details. The Neutrum, the Reason, the Absolute of Schelling could be rescued from indeterminateness, from vacuity, from the nullity of a mere general notion, by setting in its place the Categories of Kant (but completed, &c.) as *the thing*, which before had been the *name*, Reason. You *speak* of Reason, says Hegel to Schelling, but here it actually *is*, here I show you what it is, here I *bring* it.

As yet, however, we still see only the general principle of Hegel, and the connexion in which it stands *with*, or the connexion in which it arose *from*, the labours of his predecessors. But such mere general principle is quite unsatisfactory. This, in fact, explains why summaries and the mere literature of the subject are so insufficient: the general principle remains an indefinite word—a name merely—till it gets the core and meaning and life of the *particular*. Probably the very best summary ever yet given of Kant is that of Schwegler, and it is very useful to him who already knows Kant; but good as it is, it is only *literature*—(see the vast difference between literary naming, and living, struggling, working thought, by comparing Schwegler's statement of Kant with Hegel's in the *Encyclopædia*!)—it only characterises, it does not reproduce, and it is impossible for any one to *learn* Kant thence. We must see Hegel's principle closer still, then, if we would thoroughly understand it. We take a fresh departure then:

Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Objects.

I have conceived by this scheme the possibility of presenting the world as a concrete whole so and so constituted, articulated, and rounded. But I have not *done* this—I have only conceived it: that is, I have not

demonstrated my conception ; I have not exhibited an actuality to which it corresponds. How set to work to realise this latter necessity, then ? The abstract, universal thoughts, which underlie the whole, and on which Kant has struck as categories, are evidently the first thing. I must not content myself with those of Kant ; I must satisfy myself as to whether there are not others. In fact, I must discover *all* the categories. But even should I discover all the categories, would that suffice ? Would there be anything vital or dynamical in a mere catalogue ? Must I not find a principle to connect them the one with the other—a principle in accordance with which the one shall flow from the other ? Kant, by the necessity he has proclaimed of an *architectonic principle*, has rendered it henceforth for ever impossible for us to go to work *rhapsodically*, contented with what things come to hand, and as they come to hand. By the same necessity he has demonstrated the insufficiency of his own method of uniting the elements of his matter—the method of ordinary discussion, that is, of what Hegel invariably designates *raisonnement*. This *raisonnement*—suppose we translate it *reasonment*—is by Kant's own indirect showing no longer applicable where strict science, where rigorous deduction is concerned. Mere reasoning good sense, that simply begins, and ends, and marches as it will, limited by nothing but the necessity of being such as will pass *current*,—that is, such as begins from the beginning conventionally thought or accepted by the common mind, and passes on by a like accepted method of ground after ground or reason after reason, which similarly approves itself to the common mind, almost on the test of *tasting*,—is no longer enough. There is conviction now only in

rigorous deduction from a rigorously established First. No; after the hints of Kant, mere reasonment or intelligent discussion hither and thither, from argument to argument, ungrounded in its beginning, unsecured by necessity in its progress, will no longer answer. We are now bound to start from a *ground*, a *principium*, an absolutely first and inderivative. It will not do to start from an absolutely formless, mere abstract conception named—by what would be serene philosophical wisdom, but what is really, with all its affectation, with all its airs of infallibility, mere thin superficiality and barren purism—First Cause, &c.: Reason will not stop there. Should we succeed in tracing the series of conditions up to that, we should not remain contented: the curiosity of what we name our Reason would stir still, and set us a-wondering and a-wondering as to what could be the cause, what could be the beginning of the first cause itself. Philosophy, in short, is the *universe thought*; and the universe will not be fully thought, if the first cause, &c. remain unthought.

To complete Philosophy, then, we must not only be able to think man, and the world in which he finds himself, but what we name God also. Only so can we arrive at completion; only so can the all of things be once for all thought, and thus at length philosophy perfected. How are we to think a beginning to God, then? It all lies in our scheme: Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Objects.

Quantity, standing for the categories in general, though itself but a single and even a subordinate category, is Reason, that but repeats itself in its other, Time and Space, and through these again in Empirical Objects. Reason, then, is the thing of things, the secret

and centre of the whole. But Reason can be only fully inventoried, when we have fully inventoried the categories. But when we have done so, is it reasonable to suppose that they will remain an inventory, a catalogue? Is it not likely that, as in their sum they constitute Reason, they will be held together by some mutual bond, and form in themselves, and by themselves, a complete system, an organised unity, with a life and perfection of its own? Nay, even in Kant, even in the meagre discussion of the categories which he supplies, are there not hints that suggest an inward connexion between them? Kant himself deduces Action, Power, Substance, &c., from Causality; and in his discussion of Substance and Accident, do not similar inward connexions manifest themselves? Even in Kant, though he conceives them as merely formal, and as absolutely void till filled by the multiple of, first, perception and then sense, they are seen to be more than formal; they are seen—even in themselves, even abstractly taken—to possess a certain characteristic nature: even thus they seem to manifest the possession of certain properties—the possession, in short, of what Hegel calls *Inhalt*; a certain contained substance matter, essence; a certain *filling* of manifestible action, a certain *Bestimmung* in the sense not only of vocation and destination, but of possessing within themselves the *principles* which conduct to that end or destiny.

This word *Inhalt* we shall translate *Intent*; and this meaning will be found in the end to accord sufficiently with its common one. *Gehalt*, in like manner, will be translated *Content*; and we, in starting with *Intent* and *Content* in England, are not one whit worse off than Hegel himself was in starting with *Inhalt* and *Gehalt* in Germany. Use will make plain. The categories,

then, even abstractly and apart from sense, may be supposed to possess a certain natural *Intent*, a certain natural filling, and so a certain natural life and movement of their own.

Let me, then, we may suppose Hegel to continue, but find the complete catalogue of the categories, and with that the secret principle on which they will rank, range and develop themselves;—let me effect this, and then I shall have perfectly a pure concrete Reason, *pure* because *abstract*, in the sense that abstraction is made from all things of sense, and that we are alone here with what is intellectual only, but *concrete*, in the sense that we have here a mutually co-articulated, a completed, an organic, a living whole—Reason as it is in its own pure self, without a particle of matter, and so, to that extent and considering the source of that Reason, God as he is without hull, before the creation of the world or a single finite intelligence. Nay, why demand more? Why crave a Jenseits, a Beyond, to what we have? Why should not that be the all? Why should we not, realising all that we anticipate by the method suggested—why should we not realise to ourselves the whole universe in its absolute oneness and completeness, and with the whole wealth of its inner mutual interdependent and co-articulated elements? Why not conceive an absolute Now and Here—Eternity—the Idea, the Concrete Idea—that which is—the Absolute, the All? We see the universe—we find the eternal principles of thought on which it rests, which constitute it; why then go further? Why feign more—a Jenseits, an unknown, that is simply a Jenseits and an unknown, an unreachable, an unexistent? No; let us but *think* the universe truly, and we shall have truly entered into possession of the universal life, and of a

world that needs no Indian tortoise for its pedestal and support. Pantheism ! you call out. Well, let it be Pantheism, if it be Pantheism to show and demonstrate that God is all in all—that in him we live, move, and have our being—that he is substance and that he is form, that he is the Absolute and the Infinite !

But conditioned cannot understand the unconditioned, you say ; the contingent cannot understand the absolute, finite cannot understand the infinite ; and in proof thereof you open certain boys' puzzle-boxes of Time and Space, and impale me on the horns of certain infantile dilemmas. Well, these wonderful difficulties you will come to blush at yourselves, when you shall have seen for yourselves, and shall have simply endeavoured to see what I, Hegel, have given you to see.

But what difficulty is there in the Infinite ? Let us go to fact, and not trouble ourselves with fictions and chimeras. Let us have things, and not logical forms (using this last phrase simply as it is now generally understood), and that is the business of philosophy, and this it is that you simply fail to see in my case ; that I give you things, namely, and not words ; that I conduct you face to face with the world as it is, and ask you to look into it : let us have things, then, and where is the difficulty of the Infinite ? Is not the Infinite that which is ? Is there any other infinite than that which is ? Has not that which is been from all eternity, and will it not be to all eternity ? Is not the Infinite, then, that which is ? And what are we sent here for ? Are we sent here simply to dig coals and drink wine, and get, each of us, the most we can for our own individual vanity and pride, and then rot ? What, after all, is the business of man here ? To advance in civilisation, you say. Well, is civilisation digging coals and

drinking wine, &c. ; or is civilisation thought and the progress of thought ? Is there anything of any real value in the end but thinking ? Even in good *feelings*, what is the core and central life ? Is it not the good thought that is in them ? There is no feeling worthy of the name (tickling the soles of the feet, for example, is not worthy of the name) but is as dew around an idea ; and it is this idea which glances through it and gives it its whole reality and life. We are sent here to think, then—that is admitted. But *what* are we sent to think ? Why, what but that which is—and this is infinite ! Our business here, then, even to use your own language, is to think the Infinite. And where is the difficulty, if the instrument with which you approach the Infinite—thought—be itself infinite ? Is it not thought to thought ? Why should not thought be able to put its finger on the pulse of the Infinite, and tell its rhythmus and its movement and its life, as it is, and ever has been, and ever will be ?

And the Absolute ! It is impossible to reach the Absolute ! What, then, is the Absolute ? Bring back your eyes from these puzzle-boxes of yours (Space and Time), which should be no puzzle-boxes, if, as you say you do, you understand and accept the teaching of Kant in their very respect ; bring back your eyes from these puzzle-boxes—bring them back from looking so hopelessly vacuously into—it is nothing else—your own navel—and just see what is the Absolute ? What does thought, in any one case whatever of its exercise, but seek the Absolute ? Thought, even in common life, when it asks why the last beer is sour, the new bread bitter, or its best clothes faded, seeks the Absolute. Thought, when it asked why an apple fell, sought the Absolute and found it, at least so far as outer matter is

concerned. Thought, when, in Socrates, it interrogated the Particular for the General, many particular valours for the one universal valour, many particular virtues for the one universal virtue, sought the Absolute, and founded that principle of express generalisation and conscious induction which you yourself thankfully accept, though you ascribe it to another. Thought in Hume, when it asked the secret foundation of the reason of our ascription of effects to causes, sought the Absolute ; and if he did not find it, he put others, of whom I Hegel am the last, on the way to find it. What since the beginning of time, what in any corner of the earth, has philosophy, has thinking ever considered, but the Absolute ? When Thales said *water*, it was the Absolute he meant. The Absolute is the *Fire* of Anaximenes. The *numbers* of Pythagoras, the *One* of Parmenides, the *flux* of Heraclitus, the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, the *substance* of Spinoza, the *matter* of Condillac,—what are all these but names that would designate and denote the Absolute ? What does science seek in all her inquiries ? Is it not explanation ? Is not explanation the assigning of reasons ? Are not these reasons in the form of Principles ? Is not each principle to all the particulars it subsumes, the Absolute ? And when will explanation be complete, when will all reasons be assigned ? When—but when we have seen the ultimate principle?—and the ultimate principle, whether in the parts or in the whole, may surely be named the Absolute. To tell us we cannot reach the Absolute, is to tell us not to think ; and we *must* think, for we are sent to think. To live is to think ; and to think is to seek an ultimate principle, and that is the Absolute. Nor have we anything to think but *that which is*, which is the Infinite. Merely to live, then, is to think the Infinite,

and to think the Infinite is to seek the Absolute ; for to live is to think. *Your* Absolute and *your* Infinite may be, and I doubt not *are*, quite incomprehensible, for they are the chimeras of your own pert self-will ; whereas I confine myself to the realms of fact and the will of God. So on such points one might conceive Hegel to speak.

Reason, then, and the things of Sense, constitute the universe. But the things of Sense are but types, symbols, metaphors of Reason—are but Reason in another form, are but the other of Reason. We have the same thing twice : here, inward or intellectual ; and there, outward or sensuous. By inward and intellectual, however, it is not necessary to mean what pertains to the human subject : the inward and intellectual to which we allude, is an inward and intellectual belonging not specially to human beings as such, but an inward and intellectual in the form of universal principles of reason, which constitute the diamond net into the invisible meshes of which the material universe concretes itself. Reason, then, is evidently the principle of the whole, the Absolute, for it is Itself and the Other. This, then, is the general form of the universal principle—of the pulse that stirs the all of things. That, which being itself and its other, reassumes this other into its own unity. This, the general principle, will also be the particular, and will be found to apply to all and every subsidiary part and detail.

Nay, what is this, after all, but another name for the method of Fichte—that method by which he sought to deduce the all of things from the inherent nature of the universal Ego ? His method is Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis ; or, in Hegel's phraseology—1, Reason ; 2, its other ; 3, Reason and its other. Now this, though

summing up the whole, has a principle of movement in it, when applied, by which all particulars are carried up ever towards the general unity and completeness of the whole.

If we are right in this idea, and if we but find all the categories, we shall find these flowing out of each other on this principle in such wise that we have only to look on in order to see the genesis of organic Reason as a self-supported, self-maintained, self-moved life, which is the All of things, the ultimate principle, the Absolute. Supposing, then, the whole of Reason thus to co-articulate and form itself, but independently of Sense, and to that extent abstractly, though in itself an intellectual concrete, it will not be difficult to see that it is only in obedience to the inherent nature, the inherent law, that, raised into entire completion in this abstract form, it now of necessity passes as a whole into its Other, which is Nature. For Nature, as a whole, is but the other of Reason as a whole, and so always they must mutually correlate themselves. It is mere misconstruction and misapprehension to ask *how* the one passes into the other—to ask for the transition of the one into the other. What we have before us here is not a mundane succession of cause and effect (such mundane successions have elsewhere their demonstrated position and connexion), but it is the Absolute, that which is, and just so do we find that which is, constituted. That which is, is at once Reason and Nature, but so that the latter is but the other of the former.

If, then, we have correlated and co-articulated into a whole, the subordinate members or moments of Reason, it is evident that the completed system of Reason, now as a whole, as a one, will just similarly comport itself to its other, which is Nature. In like manner, too, as we

found Reason *per se* to constitute a system, an organised whole of co-articulated notions, so we shall find Nature also to be a correspondent whole—correspondent, that is, to Reason as a whole, and correspondent in its constitutive parts or moments to the constitutive parts or moments of Reason. The system of Nature, too, being completed, it is only in obedience to the general scheme that Reason will resume Nature into its own self, and will manifest itself as the unity, which is Spirit, and which is thus at length the final form and the final appellation of the Absolute: the Absolute is Spirit. And Spirit, too, similarly looked at and watched, will be found similarly to construct and constitute itself, till at last we shall reach the notion of the notion, and be able to realise, in whole and in part, the Absolute Spirit, that which is, the Idea.* And, on this height, it will be found that it is with perfect intelligence we speak of Reason, of the Idea, thus: ‘The single thought which Philosophy brings with it to the study of History is simply that of Reason: that it is Reason that rules the world; that, in the history of the world, it is Reason which events obey. This thought, with respect to history, is a pre-supposition, but not with respect to philosophy. There by Speculative Science is it proved that Reason—and this term shall suffice us on this occasion without any nearer discussion of the reference and relation involved to God—that Reason is the substance as well as the infinite power, the infinite matter as well as the infinite form, of all natural and spiritual life. The substance is it, that, namely, whereby and wherein all Actuality has being and support. The infinite power is it, in that it

* The misplacement of terms here will be afterwards found destructive, inasmuch as the inner view does not yet see clearly and comprehensively all that the words really imply.

is not so impotent as to be adequate to an ideal only, to something that only *is* to be and *ought* to be—not so impotent as to exist only on the outside of Reality, who knows where, as something special and peculiar in the heads of certain men. The infinite matter is it, entire essentiality and truth, the stuff, the material, which it gives to its own activity to work up; for it requires not, like functions of the finite, the conditions of external and material means whence it may supply itself with aliment and objects of activity. So to speak, at its own self it feeds, and it is itself and for itself the material which itself works up. It is its own presupposition and its own absolute end, and for itself it realises this end out of the inner essence into the outer form of the natural and spiritual universe. That this Idea is the True, the Eternal, the absolutely Capable, that it reveals itself in the world, and that nothing reveals itself there but it, its honour and glory; this, as has been said, is what is proved in Philosophy, and is here assumed.*

Such, then, we believe to be the secret origin and constitution of the system of Hegel. We do not say, and Hegel does not say, that it is complete, and that no joining gapes. On the contrary, in the execution of the details, there will be much that will give pause. Still in this execution—we may say as much as this on our own account—all the great interests of mankind have been kindled into new lights by the touch of this master-hand; and surely the general idea is one of the hugest that ever curdled in the thought of man. Hegel, indeed, so far as abstract thought is concerned, and so far as one can see at this moment, seems to have closed an era, and has named the all of things in such

* Hegel, *Phil. of Hist.*, 3rd edition, pp. 12, 13.

terms of thought as will, perhaps, remain essentially the same for the next thousand years. To all present outward appearance, at least, what Aristotle was to ancient Greece, Hegel is to modern Europe.

We must see the obligations of Hegel to his predecessors, however, and among these, whatever may be due to Fichte and Schelling, Kant must be named the quarry. It is to be remarked, however, that Hegel did not content himself with these, that he subjected the whole wisdom of the Ancients, and the whole history of philosophy, to a most thorough and searching inquest. And not that only : Hegel must not be conceived as a worker among books alone ; the actual universe as it is in history and present life was the real object of his study, and, as it manifested itself, his system had also to adapt itself ; and never, perhaps, was the all of things submitted to a more resistless and overwhelming understanding.

Still the secret of Kant is the secret of Hegel also : it is the notion and only the notion which realises, that is, which transmutes into meaning and perception the particulars of Sense. That the Ego together with the method of Fichte, and the neutrum of subjectivity together with the correlated Ideal and Real of Schelling, also contributed much, no one can doubt. We can see, too, the corroborative decision he derived from his profound and laborious analysis of the Ancients, and indeed of the whole history of philosophy. Still there remains to Hegel in himself such penetration of insight, such forceful and compellative power as stamp him—as yet—the absolute master of thought.

Had we been happy enough to evolve some of these grand thoughts, whether of Kant or Hegel, it would be with honest pride that we should subscribe our name

to them. These thoughts are not, however, of our origination; and how far they may manifest themselves as at last of our adoption, this is not the place to discuss. It is enough if we have accomplished for the present that which we designed—something of a bridge to the position, intention, and procedure of Hegel.

Note 1.

The transmutation of Kant into Hegel may be presented in yet another manner. Hegel's *Idee* is just Kant's *Apperception*, and the moments in the transformation are these:—Apperception is the word for my essential reality and core, and this not only as regards my subject but as regards my object; for it compels this object to conform, or rather transform itself to it. The object, that is, is a concretion of Apperception through its forms of Space and Time and the categories; and empirical matter is but its contingent Other. What is permanent and universal in the object holds of Apperception. Apperception, however, is not specially mine: it is yours, it is his, it is theirs. There is a universal Apperception, then, and it, together with its empirical other, constitutes the universe. But, on the ideal system, the other of Apperception (the Thing-in-itself) is also itself Apperception. Apperception, then, *is* the universe. Hegel now had only to see into what Apperception consisted of, and then state it as the *Idee*. It is presented thus, as all we know and as complete in itself, so that we need not assume an unnecessary and redundant elsewhere—a superfluous other side, or other place. The notion of Beyond or Ulteriority, this very notion itself must be conceived as forming part of our own system of notions. It

should not be applied out of that system. We have but—there is but—this here and this now.

Note 2.

In thinking God, the necessity for the unity or identity of two contraries is obvious. Jacob Böhme saw into this with great lucidity. Boundless affirmation is a dead, dull, unconscious nonentity. Boundless extension were no universe. Limit is necessary to the realisation even of extension; negation to that of affirmation. If there is to be a product, a thing with articulations and distinctions in it, a system with manifestible properties and qualities, there must be a No as well as a Yes. Negation is quite as real as Affirmation. The mind is the same in the form of memory that it is in judgment: the mind, then, is not a mere Yes, it is a No also. Memory is not judgment; *this* is not *that*; but the one opposite does not cancel the other. In all distinction, the element effective of distinction works through negation: *this is not that*. Without negation, then, there were no distinction, that is, no manifestation, that is, no life. To think God, then, as alive and real, a principle of distinction, of negation must be thought in him—that is, the unity or identity of contraries.

There is a difficulty—(on the Hegelian view)—in connecting myself (as a single separate subject) with the universal object or all. It is difficult to perceive how I am related to it, how I birth from it, or de cease into it, &c. &c. But this whole side, perhaps, is only an apparent difficulty. That which lives, and all that lives is thought; I find my 'I' to be a constituent moment of that all of thought. It is the subjective moment and absolutely necessary and essential to the

life of the whole. In fact, just as when the logical notion (the all of the categories, the intellectual organic principles of the whole) is complete, it breaks through into Nature—in other words, when as complete in itself, it must, like every other moment in the system, relate itself to its other, so the subject as other of the object is absolutely necessary, and they are mutually complementary, and so, both essential constituents in the all of things.

This notion of a life which is thought, is the ground on which, presumably, after Hegel, we must rest the notion of the Immortality of the soul. We are moments in the great life : we are the great life : we are thought and we are life ; and Nature and Time do not master us who are Spirits, but we them which are but forms and pass.

God again, in accordance with the same views, as related to a world of thought, may be looked at variously—in philosophy, as the Absolute—in religion, as the Father, the Creator, the Preserver, God, the inner verity, the Being whom we are to glorify, adore, obey, love. In the Hegelian system there is no contradiction in all this. The religious moment is as essential as the philosophical or the natural.

Hegel's views can conciliate themselves also admirably with the revelation of the New Testament ; for his one object is also reconciliation, the reconciliation of man to God, of the abstract atom which man now is to the Substance of the Universe. Christianity in this way becomes congruent with the necessities of thought. History is *a* revelation, and in History, Christianity is *the* revelation. It revealed to a world that sat amid its own ruins, with its garments rent, and its head in ashes, the religion of *Vision*, of *Love*, of sweet *Submission*.

The Hegelian system supports and gives effect to every claim of this religion. And this, too, without any necessity to put out the eyes of the mind and abdicate reason ; this, too, with perfect acceptance of, and submission to, all the genuine results of criticism, whether French or German, though Hegel deprecates any such industry now, and thinks its purpose has been served.

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel only give definiteness and distinction to the religion of Christ. In Christ the *Vision* was so utter into the glory and the beauty of the all that it passed into *Love*, which, in its turn, was so rich and utter that it passed into *Submission*, also itself the richest and sweetest ; and thus *Perception*, *Emotion*, *Will* coalesced and were the same, and the triple thread of man had satisfaction in its every term. Now to all this *Vision*, and *Love*, and *Submission*, Kant and Hegel give only the definiteness of the intellect ; that is, they assist at the great espousals of Reason and Faith.

Hegel ascribes to Christ the revelation that God is man or that man is God. Now, there is a side to this truth (touched on already) which has escaped notice. Before Christ, God was external to man, and worship or obedience to him consisted in external ceremonies. But since Christ, God is inward to man : he is our conscience. We no longer ask the will of God from external oracles, from external signs, &c., but from our own selves : that is, we are now a law unto ourselves, we are to our own selves in the place of God, we are to ourselves God, God and man are identified. All that, indeed, lies in the principle, so dear to the children of the thin Enlightenment even, the right of private judgment. In this way, then, too, as in every way, is Christ the Mediator, the Redeemer, the Saviour.

The teaching of the Hegelian system as to the free-will of man, is decisive in its exhaustive comprehensiveness of view. The life of the All is to make itself *for* itself that which it is *in* itself—that is, progressively to manifest itself, to make actual what is virtual,—to show evolved, developed its inner secrets, to make its inner outer,—or, best of all, in the phrase with which we began, to make itself *for* itself that which it is *in* itself. Now it is from this that the true nature of the free-will of man flows. So far as it is only *as we are in ourselves* that we can develop ourselves, there is necessity; but, again, it is we ourselves that develop ourselves, which is freedom: both fall together in the notion of *Reason*; *which, to be free, is necessary.*

The following nearer glimpses, though later in date, cohere sufficiently with the preceding to be included in the same chapter. They are distinguished by the letters A. B. C. &c. for convenience of reference, though not distinguished in themselves by diversity of time.

A.

In every sense, Being is a reflexion from (or as against) Non-being. Assume God, and remain contented with such *first*, as the self-explained and self-evident *punctum saliens*, then Creation, *when* it is, is a reflexion from and against the previous nothing, the nothing before it was. Assume thought (spirit) as the *first*, that runs through its own cycle from indefinite An-sich (In-itself) to the complete entelecheia of Für-sich (For-itself), then Being (there is, or am) is a reflexion from and against Non-being. Assume a primal, material atom, then it is a reflexion against Non-being, and without a background of Non-being,

unreceived into an element of Non-being, progress, development of any kind, would be impossible. Every way, the first spark of affirmation is from and against an immediately precedent negation. The first ray of consciousness is felt to be developed as against and on occasion of, a realm of nothing. Being and nothing are indissoluble pairs : they are but obverse and reverse of the same thought, of the same fact ; and their identity is the secret of the world. Take either, you have the other also ; even when hid from you by the abstraction—the abstractive power—of your own understanding, it is not the less there. Try Nothing for a start, and seek thereby to annihilate Being, you will find the attempt in vain ; for, ever, even from the sea of Nothing, a corner of Being will pertinaciously emerge. In short, negation implies affirmation, and not less (nor more) the latter, the former. To negate (negation) is as much in *rerum natura* as to affirm (affirmation). They are ground-factors of the Absolute—of that which is, and which is, just because it is, just because it is and must be,—nameable otherwise also *thought*. Diversity in identity as identity in diversity (but another expression of the one fact, the indissoluble union of affirmation and negation) is the ultimate utterance to which thought can arrive on thinking out the problem of its own existence. This is but an abstraction it may be said. Granted ; it is but a formal enunciation ; nevertheless, let it be seen still that it names the ultimate substantial fact, and that the state of the case would remain the same—suppose the world then to remain—were every human being destroyed. To be sure, in thinking these thoughts we are always attended by a *Vorstellung*, we have always the conception *something* before our imagination and dominating our

understanding. We say always, yes, identity in difference, difference in identity certainly; but then there must have been *something* in which there was the identity in difference, &c. There must have been a substantial something in which that formal and abstract thought was realised—was seen to be true. But this seems self-contradictory. Now how remove this difficulty? How reconcile ourselves to the discrepancy and divarication?

This can be done in no other way than by following out thought in all its directions, each of which will be found to terminate in—*it just is so*. The primitive and radical constituent fact, or property of the all, of that which is, of the Absolute, is just that affirmation and negation, identity and difference, being and nothing, must be taken together as constituting between them but a single truth. Either alone is but half a truth, either alone is meaningless, unsupported, evanescent, either alone, in fact, is no truth: throughout the whole wide universe, either alone exists not; the vacuum itself *is*. If we would have truth, things as they are, then we must take them together as a one identical something even in diversity. This, each can illustrate for himself by referring to any one member of the complement of the universe—a stone, a coin, a river, a feeling, a thought. Nothing can be perceived or conceived that has not this double nature, in which negation is not as necessary a moment of its constitution, as affirmation. In short, it *is* this, because it is *not* that; that really just is, it *is* because it is *not*. Much private reflexion is required to substantiate all this to individual thought. Nevertheless, each faithful individual thinker will find in the end no other conclusion.

What is, then, is thought, whose own ground-constitution is affirmation *and* negation, identity *and* difference. It is easy to see that, if we commence, like the materialists, with a material atom and material forces, the conclusion will be the same. The progress disproves the possibility of absolute original identity. Starting with God, too, this result is immediate. God is a Spirit, God is thought. Thought, that is, is the ultimate element of the universe, and on thought does the whole universe sit. Proceeding *from* thought, the universe is in itself but thought, a *concretion* of thought if you will, still in itself but thought. But from this we have now a substantial, corresponding to our formal, *first*. Thought *and* its other, or God *and* his universe (a unity), is the first fact, and affords a substantial support to the formal truth that identity and diversity, affirmation and negation, being and nothing, coalesce, or cohere in a single unity. Now assuming this to be the primal and rudimentary determination, all additional and progressively further such will be found but successive powers, successive involutions (potentiations) of this, and of this in its essential and native simplicity. The truth is not the one *or* the other, the truth is the one *and* the other, the truth is both. But this re-union (in the case of Nothing and Being) is not a return to the first identity ; the identity which now emerges is the higher one of Becoming. The thought that differentiates Being and Nothing, and then unites them, cannot do so without progress. This elaboration is a new step, and thought finds by its own act that it has arrived at the new and higher fact and thought of Becoming, for Becoming is the substantial union of Being and Non-being. No one can show anything in this world that absolutely *is*, or that

absolutely *is not* ; everything that can be shown, neither is, nor is not, but *becomes* : no man has ever gone *twice* through the *same* street. Not only is the unity ever richer, but the very moments which formed it, become, when looked back upon, themselves richer. Being and Nothing formed Becoming ; but these re-looked at in Becoming are seen now to be Origin and Decease, and so on. In short, thought is what is, and its own inner nature is to be as itself against its other, while its life or progress is to overtake and overpass this other, and re-identify it with its own self, but ever with a rise or increase. This will be found accurately to express the history of thought : this will be found accurately to express the history of the world.

The pulse of thought, then, the pulse of the universe, is just this : that any whole of affirmation being complete, does not remain as such, but, developing its differences, passes over into its own opposite, a movement which further necessitates re-union in a higher form. Every concrete in *rerum natura* will prove the actual existence of this process. According to certain naturalists, in the production of the mammifer, animalcule, worm, fish, reptile, bird succeed each other, overthrow each other, so to speak with Hegel, *refute* each other, but this only by assumption, each into its own self of that which it succeeds and supplants, attaining thus a higher form. Bud, flower, fruit, is the illustrative sequence of the Phaenomenology to the same effect. Even so, thought, face to face only with its own abstract self, will be found to take on a succession of ascending phases, which ever as complete develop differences, pass into their opposites, and reunite into higher unities, till a system results, whole within itself, and consisting of members which accurately correspond with the abstract

universals which the ordinary processes of abstraction and generalisation have (hitherto in a miscellaneous, empirical, and unconnected manner—rhapsodically, as Kant would say) pointed out from time to time in what exists around us.

This system, again, now a whole, obeys the same law, and passes into its opposite, Nature, which opposite, becoming itself complete, re-unites with its co-ordinate, abstract thought, the notion, Logic, to the realisation of both in the higher form of Spirit. The three ultimate forms, then, are Notion, Nature, Spirit, each of which is a whole within itself, and all together unite into the crowning Unity, the Absolute, or the Absolute Spirit, which, as it were, giving the hand to, and placing itself under, the first notion, abstract being, substantiates its abstraction, and conjoins all into the system and light and satisfaction of an explained universe.

This, truly, is the one object of Hegel: to find an ultimate expression in terms of exact thought for the entire universe both as a whole and in detail. It is not as if one took the ball of the world in his hand, and pointing out the clue, should seize it, and unwind all before us: but it certainly is, reverse-wise, as if one took the clue of the unwound ball, and wound it all on again. Or again, we have observed some one hold a concrete, say a coagulum of blood, under a stream of water, till all colour disappeared from the reticulated tissue, till, as it were, all *matter* (washed out of the *form*) disappeared, and left behind only pure form, transparent form. Now this is just what Hegel desires to accomplish by existence. He holds the whole huge concrete under the stream of thought, he neglects no side of it, he leaves no nook of it unvisited; and he

holds up at last, as it were, the resultant and explanatory diamond. In short, the philosophy of Hegel is the crystal of the Universe: it is the Universe thought, or the thought of the Universe.

But suppose we resign these pretensions, which may too readily seem extravagant, and take Hegel in a more every-day manner, we can still say this: That all questions which interest humanity have been by him subjected to such thought as transcends in subtlety, in comprehensive and accurate rigour, what has ever yet been witnessed in the same kind in the history of the planet. In brief, in Hegel we have offered us—*principles*, first principles, those principles which constitute the conscious or unconscious quest of each of us: *theoretically*—as regards what we can *know*; *practically* (or morally)—as regards how we should *act*; and *æsthetically*—as regards the legitimate application of *feeling*: and these three heads, it is plain, (the principles of politics, of course, included) must contain all that interests mankind: these three heads contain a response to the world's one want now;—for the world's one want now is—*principles*.

B.

When one remains, a common case in the study of Hegel, *unintelligent, on the outside*, of his Dialectic, one feels indeed *on the outside*; and the terms take on a very forced and artificial look. One cannot help suspecting then, indeed, externality, labour from the outside, in Hegel also. However laborious (and consequently a very grave sincerity in that respect), one gets to fear the presence of cunning in these deductions, of underhand intention, of interested purpose, of mere jesuistry, casuistry, and contrivance. The double edge

seems to glitter so plainly all about ; this is said, and the opposite has been said, and it appears a matter of mere arbitrary choice whether it is the one or the other that is said and where and when, both being evidently equally sayable anywhere and anywhen, that conviction revolts,—and the whole industry drops down piecemeal before us, a dead and disenchanted hull, an artificial externality, a mere dream of obliquity and bias, set up by the spasmodic effort and convulsive endeavour of a feverish ambition that, in ultimate analysis, is but vanity and impotent self-will.—So shows Hegel when our own cloud invests him. But the cloud rising, ‘lets the sun strike where it clung,’ and before us hangs an enchanted universe again, which a vast giant heaves.

Entrance here may be effected thus (the remark concerns the discussion of *Causality*):—

Take Causality : how is it to be explained ? No explanation has been worth the paper it covered with the exception of—(Hume is most valuable, and an indispensable preliminary)—those of Kant and Hegel. (The equivocal nonsense of Sir William Hamilton in this connexion, has been discussed at full elsewhere.) Kant’s : a function of judgment original to the mind, involving a unity of an *intellectual* plurality ; a *sensuous* plurality, in two perceptive forms (Space and Time),—*sensuous*, but original to the mind, independent of, and anterior to, any actual impression of Sense : these are the elements to be conjoined into the notion of Causality. Well, the *intellectual* unity, which is the function of judgment named Reason and Consequent, is not a unity as such, but is a unity of a multiple, the terms of which are, 1, Reason, and, 2, Consequent. The conjunction involved here of a plurality to a unity is wholly intellectual, and may be called, looking to the form of its

process, an *intellectual schema*. Suppose now another faculty besides judgment to be possessed—originally, and of itself, from the first—of a certain plurality which should be analogous to the plurality contained in the above function of judgment, would not conceivably faculty coincide with faculty, (each being equally in the mind), in such fashion that the plurality of the latter faculty might undergo the influence of the unitising function of the former faculty (judgment) to the production of another *schema* which should also be anterior to experience and original to the mind? Productive Imagination, for example, which holds of sense in that it exhibits objects, and of intellect in that it is not necessarily beholden to any direct intervention of an actual act of special sense for these objects but may spontaneously produce them to itself, may be a faculty capable of exposing to the action of the functions of judgment pluralities of a sensuous nature but still such as are anterior to all actual sense. Productive Imagination is, indeed, nameable in general, only *reproductive*, for the objects it exhibits to itself are—if spontaneously exhibited *then*, and without any calling in of special sense *then*—originally—at least for the most part, products of sense; but it may also merit the name *productive* simply, from this that it may possess in itself objects of its own and anterior to all action of sense whatever. But Imagination is present to Judgment, and the objects of the former are necessarily present to the functions of the latter; there will, consequently, therefore, be conjunct results: one of these is Causality, a result of sensuous multiples (Space and Time) inherent *à priori* in productive imagination brought under that unitising function of Judgment named Reason and Consequent. Or, to take it more particularly once

again : suppose that Time and Space present sensuous multiples analogous to the preceding intellectual multiple, and suppose these forms, though perceptive and sensuous, to be still independent of special sense, to be *à priori*, and to attach to the mind itself, to lie ready formed in the productive imaginative faculty of the mind, in fact, then this faculty, being intellectual, can be conceived capable of presenting its stuff, its multiples directly to the action of the various functional unities of judgment. This is conceivable, and it is conceivable also that the intellectual schema of judgment would reproduce itself as an imaginative, and, so far, sensuous schema out of the peculiar multiples, Space and Time, or that the intellectual schema, unity, notion would receive these (Space and Time) as stuff or matter in which to sensualise or realise itself. Reason and Consequent, then, which is an original function of judgment, and which represents an intellectual schema, or the intellectual unity of a multiple, being applied to an analogous multiple in productive imagination, which is the sequence of time, a sequence which is given necessary (what is second being incapable of preceding what is first in time, so far as time is *as such* concerned), there may conceivably result an imaginative, and so far sensuous schema, which will only want the filling of actual (special) sense, of actual event, to come forward as cause and effect, which, though manifesting itself only in contingent matter (this amounts to the objection of Hume), will bring with it an element of necessity by reason of its intellectual or *à priori* elements (and this is Kant's special industry, his answer, or his complement to Hume). This is Kant's explanation, then. Looked at narrowly, it is a chain of definite links (how much of this chain

did *he* see, who states Kant's Causality to be just a *separate* and *peculiar* mental principle?), a system of definite machinery, attributing no *new*, depending only on *old*, constituents of the mind; but this chain lies still evidently between two unknown presuppositions. The mind and its constitution constitute the presupposition on the one side; no basis of absolute and necessary connexion is assigned to it; we have still loosely to ascribe it to the act and will of God—that it is namely, and *as* it is. The other presupposition is absolutely unknown, absolutely blank things in themselves, which act on special sense to the development of effects in us, which effects we confound with the things, and which, as it were, clothing these unknown things in themselves, become to us the vast system of the outward and inward Universe. There are thus two unknown things in themselves postulated by the theory of Kant, an outward acting on outer sense to the development of the outer world, and an inner (our absolute *ego*, but, as known only through media of sense, unknown *in itself*) acting on inner sense to the development of the inner world of feelings, &c. What we know, then, is, the effects on our senses, outward and inward (for Kant holds an inner sense for our own emotional states), of two unknown things in themselves, and the manipulation to which our faculties (as source of form) subjects these effects (as stuff, or matter). This is the result of the Theoretical Philosophy of Kant. This result he complements, however, by a certainty gained practically of the existence of God, of Immortality and of Freewill, as expounded in his Practical Philosophy. The Theoretical world belongs wholly to the Understanding (so far, at least, as all *constitutive* principles are concerned), and has no traffic (*constitutively*) but

with the Conditioned. The Practical world, on the other hand, belongs wholly to Reason, and is in direct relation with the Unconditioned. The Æsthetic world offers itself between these two extremes as belonging to (the only remaining cognitive faculty) Judgment, and as manifesting, at all events, a certain harmony between the Conditioned and the Unconditioned—a certain possibility of relation between them, not indirect as through sense only, but direct also. So constituted are the three great Kritiken which expound the system of Kant; a system which, as yet, seems only to have been misunderstood and misconstrued even by its inventor's own countrymen. Hegel alone has given him the necessary study; but he has roughly arrogated most of his merits to himself by the addition of his own form, and unmeasured abuse of the form of Kant himself.

Now Hegel, and *his* theory of causality:—

The unknown things in themselves will not content him; he must know them too, and accomplish a system of absolute knowledge. The first look at Causality in Hegel's hands is very disappointing. It issues from Substantiality and passes into Reciprocity, and what occurs between seems only an *abstract description of the phenomena* of Causality. The description is very accurate certainly—nay, rather, it is an exact reproduction of all the movements of our naked thought, when we explain, or, in general, deal with, any example whatever of concrete cause and effect. Now, it strikes us, to describe is not to explain. Kant gives a theory, in which we see an intelligible reason for this, and an intelligible reason for that, till all coheres to a system which satisfactorily explains and accounts for precisely that which we wish explained and accounted for. Hegel does no such thing. He simply describes the

fact—in wonderfully penetrating abstract language certainly (which, however, it costs an agony of mental effort to follow and understand), but still it is just the fact, and as it presents itself there in experience. What are we to make of this then? Are we to understand that abstract description is explanation? Is an absolute generalisation of Causality, in such wise that we have an accurate characterisation which will adapt itself to every concrete example whatever, any accounting for the fact and the notion and the necessity of Causality? To be able to answer this question, is to understand Hegel. It is really so: Hegel's theory of Causality is constituted by an abstract description of the absolute Universal or General of Causality. But just thus it constitutes the notion Causality: it gives position and development to the secret system of the movements of thought—thought, in general, your thought, my thought, all thought—in its regard. We see thus, as it were, the very secret maggots of our brain in motion. But this metaphor must not be dwelt on till it mislead. What we have to see here is that, after all, Hegel's description is, so to speak, not his description, nor anybody's description; his description is the notion, and constitutes the notion, the notion Causality. The notion here is not something belonging subjectively to Hegel, and subjectively described by him. The description is so that it is not subjective but objective; the description is so that its movements are the movements of the notion itself: in short, it is the notion itself that we have objectively before our minds then (if we have but realised the words), the notion in its own nature, in its own inner life and energy and movement. Again, as we have seen, it is transformed *from* one notion, and *to* another, it is but

a transformation in a series of such. Now if we trace this series in either direction, we shall find it to consist of objective notions all similar to that of Causality, all transformed from and to each other in an element of necessary thought, and this too with a beginning, a middle and an end which round into each other, and constitute together a self-complete system. Now this system is what Hegel names Logic.

The question recurs, however, where is the explanation? Where is the connexion with that which is—with the world of reality? After all, it is just abstract thought—just the various thoughts which actual experience of sense occasions in us. We have derived these thoughts from experience—and where is there any explanation in them of experience and the world of experience? Has not Hegel with his abstract scholasticism but simply returned to Locke (with whom all knowledge was a product of experience alone)? And has the world ever seen a more complete case of self-stultification, than this pretending to explain to himself, and this offering to explain to us, the whole mystery of existence, by an infinite series of abstract terms, which it took a lifetime to produce, and which it demands a lifetime in us intelligently to reproduce (the varieties in the form of the reproduction too being commensurate only with the individual readers)—was ever, in short, self-stultification more complete and monstrous? Are not the dicta of Locke and Hegel, though apparently a reversal the one of the other, after all identical? Locke says, Notions are abstractions from Sensations; while, for his part, Hegel says, Sensations are concretions from Notions: where, at bottom, is the difference? Yes, but observe, Hegel's series is the organic system of thought complete—so to speak, *alive* in itself. It is the

thought of sensuous experience ; and it would be hard to say what sensuous experience were, apart from, and beside, this thought. *It is sensuous experience in itself.* Sensuous experience apart from it, does not seem a body even. Sensuous experience can only be called the other of this. *This* is the pith, the truth, the reality, of sensuous experience, and sensuous experience itself beside it, is but its other. Yes, you object, but it is taken from sensuous experience—it is the ultimate winnowing if you will, the crystal if you will, of sensuous experience—but without preceding sensuous experience it could never have been acquired. Yes, we reply, but what matters that ? We do not wish it to be subjective thought ; it is objective thought ; it is thought really *out there*, if you will, in that incrustation that is named world. It, this world and all outer objects, are but sensuous congeries, sensuous incrustations of these thoughts. Did a human subject not exist, it is conceivable that this congeries and incrustation would still exist ; and it would exist still a congeries and incrustation of objective thought. The universe, in fact, is but matter modelled on thought. Thought is a system, and this system is the universe, and the element of sense, or what we conceive as that element, is nothing as against this system, and can only be named with propriety the Other.

But now, if all this be conceived as the Absolute, as simply that which is, is any other explanation required ? Thought is once for all as it is, and as it is, it has been developed before you in a necessary system. In this system Causality has its own place. To demonstrate this necessary system of thought, and to demonstrate the place there of Causality, is to account for and explain Causality. Such is Hegel's work : he does

not move by reasons for this, and by reasons for that ; he rejects what he designates *raisonnement*, reasonment : he believes himself to have explained the universe, when he has demonstrated the notion and the necessary system of notions. To tell *what is*—*truly to tell what is*—this it is to Hegel to philosophise : and Hegel never seeks to transcend *what is*. That which is, is the Absolute ; and it will be enough if, sufficiently fortunate to find the clue, we should be able to unwind that which is, out before our eyes, into its whole system of necessary moments with a necessary first and a necessary last that necessarily connect and cohere together.

Thus Hegel : Thought is the real contents of the universe : in Nature, it is but as other, and in a system as other : in Spirit, it returns from Nature, its other, into its own self, is by its own self, and is its own energy. The Absolute Spirit, then, God, is the first and last, and the universe is but his difference and system of differences, in which individual subjectivities have but their part and place. Subjectivity, however, is the principle of central energy and life : it is the Absolute Form. The thought of subjectivity again, that is, the thought it thinks, just amounts to the whole system of objective notions which are the absolute contents. Thus is man, as participant in the absolute form and the absolute matter, raised to that likeness with God of which the Bible speaks ; but God himself is not detracted from or rendered superfluous. Pantheism is true of Hegel's system, just as it is true of all others, Christianity and Materialism included ; and there is nothing in the system to disprove or discountenance a personal God,—but on the contrary.

C.

Think the Universal, that is, Pure Being, or what is All in general and not any one Particular—and such thought is a necessity, we must sum up the universe in one, we must think Pure Being, we must think the Universal: it is all, but it has no bound, no mark, no line, no point, whether within or without it—there is no within, there is no without, there is no spot in it, of colour, or light, or opacity, there is not a chequer anywhere describable, it is signless, it is noteless, it is nothing, it is all and it is nothing, it is everywhere and it is nowhere; it has identically the same character as nothing, or the same characterlessness. Try nothing: it yields the same result; it is everywhere and nowhere, it is nothing and it is all, for existence as such follows necessarily such an assignment as even that of nothing. Now—here is the great difficulty—how is the universal to become the particular, or how is the particular to get to the universal? Only, one would say, by the addition of another. But this other—any other—contradicts the former Universal. If there be this other, then the former was not the Universal. Such *must* be the case—*unless the other be even in its otherness identical with the Universal*. But how is this conceivable? The same, yet not the same! Identity, yet non-identity! How can such opposites be implicated into formal unity, and difference annulled? Nay, were such process accomplished, how from formal unity, an absolute simple, an absolute one, could plurality, multiplicity, variety be extricated and deduced? Such simple, such one, must remain for ever simple, for ever one. Nay, ‘remain,’ and ‘for ever,’ are determinations inapplicable. What

is attempted to be described, to be said, to be spoken, to be thought, is simply indescribable, unsayable, unspeakable, unthinkable. The proposition, then, is simply a non-ens, an impossibility. Its conception is a conception simply, but as a conception that is inconceivable, it must be named a mere arbitrary supposition of my own, a mere arbitrary position (attitude) of my own self, and which cannot be persisted in, mere *Meynung*, *δόξα*, *opinio*, mine-ing, my-ing, or me-ing. But it cannot in reality be *my'd* or *me'd*: the universal *must* involve the particular, for it *is* othered,—there *is* this diversified universe.

The actual universal, then, is one which involves the particular. What is, then, is at once simple unal universal, and composite plural particular. This is the Infinite, the Eternal, the Never-ending, and the Nowhere-ending; and just so is it the Eternal, that it is itself *and* its other. Were it itself only, and not also its other, it were bounded, limited, finite; it were obstructed, cabin'd, cribbed, confined by this other; it were itself metamorphosed into another by this other; its infinity and universality were negated and denied, and we were forced to look further, to look beyond it for a truer universal that should, by embracing at once it and its other, restore the universal equilibrium and balance.

But have we more here than a mere necessity of our own thought? No doubt, it is a primary antithesis, contrariety, even contradiction, for the other to the universal seems not only contrary but contradictory to—seems to negate, to render nugatory, null, and impossible, any such universal; but is not this an affair of thought simply?

Or are we to suppose it in *rerum natura*, the founda-

tion-stone, the elephant and tortoise, the cross-beams, the fork, the intersection, the crux of the universe? (In more senses than one probably a crux.) Do we see a universal in *rerum natura*, that is at once universal and particular? *See* is an inadequate, an inapplicable word: it would not follow that though we did not *see* such, we might not know such. Seeing is but a province, but a part; surely we cannot consign the Absolute to its keeping, surely we cannot agree to admit its finding as final. But, even a wider province than seeing being allowed us, we are met at once by an objection which seems fatal: a universal, or the universal, never can be known to us: we are such that we never *can* know a universal: *what is other than ourselves, is known as other, that is, as necessarily particular*.* Sense can bring no outer to us that is not particular; sense can bring no inner to us that is not particular: knowledge of a universal is impossible to us. But is knowledge limited to the revelations of sense, and to these revelations as received by sense? In this question we have come to one of the most important turning-points that exist: there is here veritably a most critical parting of the ways, which, as taken, decides on a man's whole future.

To take the facts of sense as the facts of sense, to keep them separate each in its oneness and independence, and live among them thus would be—what? Consider well! Would it not be exactly the life of a lower animal, the life of a beast? Look at the cows grazing! They receive the facts of sense as the facts

* Could Sir William Hamilton have brought his notion to the platform expressed by these dozen words, he might not only have spared himself his *brilliant* Review article, and perhaps a future of mere obloquy, but he might also have been near an answer.

of sense, and in their entire isolatedness and sunderedness. They hunger, they crop the grass, they stumble over a stone, they are stung by a gadfly, they are driven by a man, by a dog, by a stick ; they are excited by a red rag, &c. &c. : may not the cows be represented as stumbling from particular to particular, as knowing no better, and as knowing no other? And in what respect would man differ did he stop by the isolated and individual fact of sense? There are certainly men who might be readily characterised as differing from the lower animals only in the relatively greater number and variety of the sensuous facts received : men who rise and eat and drink and plod or idle, and apparently think not. But can this phase of humanity be considered the *true* phase of humanity? Can these men be said to know truly? Can these men be said to live truly? Or rather, be it as it may with these men, does not Humanity as Humanity, now and from the beginning, comport itself quite otherwise? Is there not one word which describes, accurately describes, exhaustively describes, the conjunct action of universal mankind from the time that was to the time that is and to the time, we may safely add, that will be : the one word, generalisation? In every department of human industry this will be found the case : it and it alone—the process represented by the word generalisation (what we called elsewhere the seeking of the Absolute)—has altered, and alters daily, man's whole universe for him, from the heaven above him, and sun and moon and stars, to the very dust of his footing. This is the plastic force that has moulded universal history. Religions rise at its coming, and at its going fall. Politics are its playthings ; science, its creature. Cities grow, grow, grow—without stop or stay—grow

to its bidding. The whole universe of man is in perpetual transformation, in perpetual flux, in perpetual *rise* beneath it. It is the loom, the ever-changing, ever-growing loom in which the vestments of Humanity—vestments of religion, poetry, philosophy, science—vestments of institutions, governments, customs, manners—vestments of head or neck, or foot or hand or body—are from day to day wrought for him. It in fact actually is: ‘The roaring loom of time which weaves for God the garment we see him by.’

Generalisation attains its summit in universalisation : it would seem, then, that the life of man, the final cause of man, is—to seek the universal. But how does this seeking comport itself with the facts of sense? Does it receive them as they are, and leave them as they are, or does it further manipulate and utterly transform them? Has man, then, been wrongly employed all this time, and ought he to have remained fixed by the facts of sense, and inquired no further? What long vistas of thought and of truth and of instruction, such questions open to us! No; plainly man has not rested by the facts of sense, and as plainly he could not rest by them. But there is system and a purpose in this universe, and of this universe man is indisputably the highest term, the most consummate outcome; what has proved itself his ultimate activity, then, must be allowed the highest place in this system and in this purpose. Generalisation, then, is a necessary moment in the business of the universe, and the effecting of generalisation is the special vocation and destination of man. We have not to stand by the particular of sense, then,—on the contrary, it belongs to us to rise to the universal of Reason; and great already has this rise been. Read Pliny, and consider

what a new heaven and a new earth the generalisation of 1,800 years has effected! Few things are more striking than the second book of Pliny: the creed of ultimate thought 1,800 years ago! All *that* was then the best effort of intelligence; all that was then the likeliest account; that then was the universe thought! Every step in this rise too has been a transformation, often a contradiction, of sense. The earth is *not* a plane, the heavens do *not* turn round over it, the sun does *not* get up in the east and go down in the west, &c. Theoretically, then, the business of man has been to transcend sense, to leave to sense its own truth, but to transmute it into a higher. Morally, also, man has displayed a like progress—against sense and towards reason, let Comte-ites say what they will.

The truth is not attained by the senses, then: before such attainment, the intervention of the intellect is required, the intervention of thought, and that is inevitably the elevation of the particular into the general. Things, then, must be thought as well as felt and perceived, and so only does knowledge result. In searching for the universal, then, in *rerum natura*, we are not limited to our senses but have a right to add to them, nay, we are irresistibly called upon to add to them, as instruments of inquiry, the faculties of the intellect also. That this is so, the very men whom we have instanced as taking their stand by sense, can be adduced to prove. They do think and they must generalise, for they cannot use the rudest language spoken without in the very word (as Hegel points out), river, bread, tree, whatever it may be, rising to a general. Nay, the very beasts of the field that stumble from particular to particular (we follow Hegel directly here, too), are not absolutely without thought, for each of their dull feelings, each

of their dim perceptions is at bottom, thought, thought *in itself*: these feelings, these perceptions, are impossible without thought; are, so far, modes of thought, not thought as thought, but thought *in itself*.

Is there, then, in *rerum natura* the universal or a universal, or is such only an affair of thought? For only an affair of thought, as Hegel remarks, may be something very worthless, as also something very valuable. Chimeras and Hobgoblins and what not are only affairs of thought, but they are utterly worthless. The reason of this is, that they are only of thought, that is, that they are that abstract, formal Universal merely which has not its other, its particular, as identical with it; or, if you will, they are such abstract, formal particular as is identical with its own self only, and has no Universal to which to unite itself. So far as thought, then, is to be of avail in the inquiry, it must not be subjective thought engaged with its own bubbles, but objective thought that has before it a veritable *ens*, and holding consequently both of the particular and the universal. Does thought, does sense, or both, or either, possess such *ens*—an *ens*, then, that is in *rerum natura*?

What at once are Space and Time? Why, at once, both are matters concretely of perception and, so far, of sense. Neither, indeed, is taken in expressly by any sense—we do not smell them, or taste them, or hear them, nor properly do we touch them, or see them—still what is smelt, tasted, heard, touched, seen, is smelt, tasted, heard, touched, seen, as in both. We cannot touch, see, &c., without touching, seeing, &c., extension and motion in extension with consequent lapse of duration; and there is here what amounts to both Space and Time. Space and Time, at

all events, are more than thoughts; whencesoever derived, and however otherwise constituted, they are both objects not of thought only but of perception also. They are really both perceived, through the intervention of Other, it may be, in the first instance, but still they are both perceived. Now of what nature are Space and Time? Is either finite? Has either a limit, whether anywhere, or anywhen? The question, of course, is strictly absurd; for the one is all and anywhere, and the other is all and anywhen; considerations which, occurring to Sir William Hamilton or his school, might have salutarily produced the suppression of a very childish logic and—to say the least—a very equivocal spirit. Nay, there is that, not merely in the phrases *all and anywhen*, *all and anywhere*, but in the simple words *where*, *when*, which might have suggested the due train of reflexion here, and prevented Time and Space from being used as puzzle-boxes to the gravelling of the reason proper of these gentlemen themselves and the further confusion of a confused society. These puzzles, in fact, result only from this that Time and Space are true universals—such universals as are identical with their particular. The question of a limit to a where and a when, then, which, from the very necessity of thought, or, what is the same thing, from the very necessity of their own nature, are at once everywhere and anywhere, everywhen and anywhen, is strictly absurd. Still, we can put the question by way of experiment; and the answer from everyone is precisely what we have shown the simple ideas, *where* and *when*, of themselves suggest. None is the answer; there is no limit to either Space or Time: in their very notion, they are simply pure quantities. There is an objection, however, if not

to the infinitude of Space and Time, at all events to our *knowing* of that infinitude. To know the infinitude of either, would require us to pass through this infinitude. We can only vouch for what we know, and our knowledge of either must be limited: we can neither traverse infinite space, nor endure through infinite time. Therefore, it is said, the conclusion is, they may be finite or they may be infinite, but, so far as we know them, they must be finite. This is but a puerility, a puerility of that fussy, bustling, unmisgiving pretentiousness, which we know to root in shallowness itself, but to which human nature tends silently, weakly, to yield just because of the unmisgivingness, and consequent pertinacity. The solution, of course, is easy, and has been already given in several forms. The one true form is just this, however: Time and Space are simple Quantities, pure Quantities. For the exhibition of the puzzles, we have so often alluded to, we are not confined to Space and Time; let us but take Quantity simply, just the notion Quantity, and we shall find them all to emerge thence: but Quantity is a notion absolutely necessary; we are it, and it is us, just as surely as thought itself. Or to speak more palpably to current conception: Time and Space are given infinite, we know them infinite, we even perceive them infinite, or, at all events, know that, put us where you may or when you may to perceive either, we shall perceive no end to it. They are given infinite, they are known infinite, they are perceived infinite, they *are* infinite—and this is the answer!*

In *rerum natura*, then, there are infinites, there are universals: Space and Time, at least, are two such.

* Let us just add, however, for When, the other is Where, and each they are pure Quantities, the one is is every and any, i. e. each is infinite.

But are they of the class we seek—universals at once themselves and their particular? We have said *yes* already, but we may now more particularly see the reason. Infinite Space has many finite Spaces; infinite Time has many finite Times. Or Universal Space has many particular Spaces; Universal Time has many particular Times.

From these very examples, then, out of *rerum natura*, it is intelligible that there is a Universal which is particular, and becomes realised into singularity again by reflexion into identity, by reference of difference in itself back into identity with itself. Such universal is a true universal. For the universal as such and no more, the particular as such and no more, the singular as such and no more: these are but creatures of subjective thought, and exist not in *rerum natura*. The truth of all the three is their union, and each is what it is, through, and by reason of, the others. This is what is named *the Antithesis*, and it repeats itself at every turn.

The lesson here, then, is, not to take things in isolation, and separation, and individualisation, but together. The main-spring separated from the watch, is but an insignificant bit of metal, useless, without the vestige of a notion, which even a child flings speedily away. To remain standing by the particular to the exclusion of the universal, or by the universal to the exclusion of the particular—in general, to remain standing by the *one* to the exclusion of the *other*, is but an affair of abstract understanding, is but the conversion of an item of a concrete into an abstract whole, is but, as Hegel names it, an abstraction of the Understanding—Understanding as opposed to Reason, which latter, reversing the work of the former,

sumes difference into identity. The truth is not Infinite *or* Finite, but Infinite *and* Finite, not Liberty *or* Necessity, but Liberty *and* Necessity, not Right *or* Wrong, but Right *and* Wrong, not this side *or* that side, up *or* down, but this side *and* that side, up *and* down—in short, the truth is, not the universal *or* the particular, but the universal *and* the particular.

The intolerant should take this lesson — those nervous, peracute individuals who perpetually peremptorily prescribe *their* right to their fellows—who *en revanche* have fire in their bellies to burn up the wrong of everybody else—who would reform, reform, reform, but who, in the end, would only petrify into their own painful thin rigidity the foison of the world!

D.

Hegel is in earnest with Kant's idea. Kant held the mind, by its notions, to *determine*—that is, give unity of form, system, intellectual meaning to—outward multiples or manifolds which corresponded *sensuously* to the inward, or intellectual, multiples or manifolds, involved, comprehended, or embraced in the respective unities of the concrete notions themselves. Kant's notions, however, are few and disjunct. They form no system whether as regards complete compass, or thoroughly interconnected details. They rise not, neither, to their own universal. They give us only, and in an unconnected manner, an explanation of how it is that we give to the *contingent* manifold of sense the *necessary* determinations: One, some, all; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality, reciprocity; possibility, actuality, necessity. Hegel firstly completes and universalises the system of

notions thus begun by Kant. Secondly, he gives this system unity of origin and of interconnexion. Thirdly, he exhibits each notion in its own pure proper nature without admixture of foreign elements of any kind. Fourthly, he demonstrates this system to be Logic, the Idea, the all of thought that is in the universe, and that conditions the universe, and that creates, regulates, and moves the universe. Fifthly, he demonstrates Nature to be only this connected All of thought, not, however, as before, only inwardly to intellect, but now outwardly to sense; that is, he uncloses Kant's imperfect and cramped *schematism of judgment* into the expanse of Nature as explained by the 'philosophy' of the same; and here he leaves no corner unvisited, but demonstrates the presence of the notion in the most crass, refractory, extreme externality—demonstrates all to be but a concretion of the notion.

Thus it is Hegel is in earnest with the idea of Kant, which was, that outward objects arrange themselves around subjective but universal notions of our own; which subjective notions, then, present themselves to us objectively as part and parcel, and very largely part and parcel, of every externality of sense that can come before us. Hegel, indeed, is so complete, that he leaves existential reality at the last as a mere abstraction, as nothing when opposed to the work of the notion. Thus it is intelligible, too—in Hegelian language—that it is the understanding which, coming to objects as an outer to an outer, and taking them as they are, believing them as they are, subjects them to a mere formal external process of reflexion, to which the distinctions it finds remain fixed and incommunicable, and which results only in classified arrangement according to its own unexamined and

disjunct notions—which are only taken for granted—of cause and effect, substantiality, reality, reciprocity, &c. &c. To this mere position, attitude, and operation of the understanding, which is thus separate from the object and separate from the all, and has before it only a pedantically classified chaos of fixed and incommunicable separates or particulars, Hegel opposes Reason, which, according to the inner constitution of the notion, advances at once to the perfect characterisation of every particular, and, at the same time, its identification with, and involution into, the one entity or syllogism, which is at once all, and some, and one. Before the wand of this compulsive conjurer, we see the vast universe stir, shake, move, contract itself, down, down, closer, closer, till the extremest member is withdrawn—the ultimate tip, the last fragment disappears, and the whole is licked up into the pure negativity. Forth from this absolutely negative point, as from an invisible but magic atom, we can see the whole huge universe shaken out again.

E.

Extricate (the reference is to *In itself, For itself, &c.*) the Hegelian double-entendre. If God has created the heaven and the earth—if the thought of God as a Spirit has created the heaven and the earth—that is, simply, if thought is what is, then Seyn, what is (these outward things we see, say), is (are) thought *in itself*. These outward things as products of thought, rather as individuals, as members, as component parts—(and as *necessarily* such, for we cannot conceive God or Thought to act on caprice)—in the totality which makes up that which is,—these outward things are, so

viewed, and the totality being thought, thought *in itself*—in the sense that this Seyn, these existences constitute *what* it (the totality, Thought) is. What is this up-coiled ball? Unravel it—these individuals that sprawl out are *what* the ball is *in itself*. The particularities into which the ball can be unclosed, are what the ball is *in itself*. The illustration is easily applied to the universe, to thought, or to any totality in general. But now if the universe be thought, then the particulars of the universe will be just thought *in itself*. The universe is thought, and whatever is in the universe is thought, and the particulars in the universe just go to make up what thought is *in itself*. Hegel certainly means this by *in itself*; and in that case, it is an external Seyn which the *in itself* refers to. But Hegel also means that the particulars are only particulars,—that they are not the universal, not thought as thought, but thought only as particularised—thought then *in itself*, thought not in its proper form as thought. In this sense, however, it is evident that the *In itself* refers now to something inward.

In the sensuous singulars, then, let us say, into which thought runs out, it sees what it is *in itself*. By reflexion in regard to these, thought becomes *for itself*. It develops, that is, a variety of reflexions in regard to an inner and an outer, a phænomenal phasis and a noumenal principle, substance and accident, cause and effect, &c., by which it explains to itself these particulars and singulars, and so becomes as for itself, as thought to thought. Now, the whole sphere of this reflexion may be named Wesen, or essential inner substance and principle, and consists of reflexes that, as it were, ply between the Seyn or outer, and the Wesen or inner. This Wesen, then, is the *In itself* now; and the

irrepressible presence of Dialectic is seen here. The external Seyn was thought *in itself*; but this *in itself* has passed now into the sense of inner. The Seyn has become Wesen: we ask what is it *in itself*? Then, again, this *In itself* becomes *For itself*, because the *In itself* of a thing is what it really is,—is itself, its centre, its *For itself*, while its outer show is only what is for another—for you and me, or anything other that comes to it externally. Expressions, thoughts themselves seem drunken then, as much under movement as the outer flux which never *is* but always *becomes*. *In itself* has no sooner been accepted as an outer, than it is seen, in the turning of a hand, to have become its own opposite, the innermost inner. But thought in these reflexions being for itself, further perceives that these are thoughts; it is now then led up to the consideration of thought as thought; that is, it is now *In and For itself*, it is thought *in* thought and thought *for* thought. But this result is just the Idea, or the unity of an Objective and a Subjective; but this amounts to Absolute Idealism, or a system in which the Notion is at once pulse and substance. The movement of the notion, then, is to make itself *for* itself what it is *in* itself; and this is its life and existence and purpose as the Absolute, the one monad, the all that is, which life and existence and purpose may all be viewed as identical with the honour and glory of God. God thus characterised, may be considered as determined. But this is not Pantheism. Pantheism is some unreasoning dull belief, that just what we see, and as we see it, is all that is—is God. But here Hegel strikes the mass till it collapse to Deity—a person, a life, a reality, a spirit, an infinity!

F.

Hegel says, 'the finitude of things consists in this,—that their existence and their universal, their body and their soul, are indeed united—else they were nothing—but they are separable and are mutually independent.' Now it is very difficult to see into this, but here is a sort of a meaning. Water is water, a certain particular; but water is HO , or hydrogen and oxygen, and HO can be viewed as relatively its universal. Water is thus finite, its universal being thus other than itself, united to but separable from itself. Hegel's idea, however, probably is, that the finite things are other than thought, which is their true soul, their true universal. With man it is otherwise: he is thought; particular and universal fall together in him. As finite things *are*—*there*—say before us, they are different from their Notion, for their Notion is *what they become*.

G.

If God is the affirmation of all that is, he is likewise, and even so, the negation of all that is: all that is disappears into the very breath that bears it; or, in what it appears, it disappears. This is an excellent example of the dialectic that is, and must be: it is also the platform where the *half* of Sir William Hamilton (for what he entertains is only a half) receives its complement. The nature of the relation between the One and the Many, and their mutual necessity, can be perceived, too, from this.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED.

A.

It is very absurd of Haym, in the manner of a rhetorical expedient familiar to most, to *name* some of the early categories with a *and so on*, to describe the series of these as a long string, to assert their production by an illusory reference every now and then to the world of fact, and so to pronounce them worthless. This industry of Haym's is quite beside the point. This, in fact, is just to miss the categories, and their true nature. What if they should derive from reference to the concrete, actual world as it is? What if they did come thence? If Haym does not like to see them derived thence, whence else, even in the name of common sense, would he wish them? Is there something more veracious and veridic than nature, then—something more real than reality itself?

Is Hegel, then, likely to be very *fell* on this reproach of Haym's, that he has taken his categories from nature, from reality (which is here the sense of nature)? Ah, but Haym will say, the categories profess to be *self-derived*! In one sense the categories profess no such thing, and Hegel has again and again pointed out that the common basis for all, the most abstract as the most concrete, is—empirical fact, actual fact of nature veritably offered and presented to us. This, in truth, is

the secret of Hegel's greatness,—that he has no traffic with any necromantic products of mere thought, but—even in his highest, even in his furthest, even in his most abstruse, recondite, and hard to understand—has ever the solid ground beneath his feet. So is it here : the categories do come from nature and the substantial quarry of actual fact. True also is it, however, that, considered in a generalised form, freed from application in the concrete—considered, as it were, in the element of thought alone, absolutely abstractly for and by themselves (and this just describes the everyday action of thought on any and every object, and why then should thought be ordered to suspend its ordinary procedure here?)—true it is that these categories are seen to constitute a *system by themselves*. But, a system, what does that imply, unless that they are all in mutual connexion, and with means of communication from the one to the other in such wise that if you shall *truly think* any one, you cannot help truly arriving at all the rest? Do you suppose that all that concrete, which you call natural universe, came there without thought, and without thoughts? Do you suppose that the constitution of each separate atom of that concrete does not involve thought and several thoughts? And then, the interconnexion of these atoms to this whole huge universe, is it all an affair without thought, then; or is there not rather an immense congeries of thoughts involved and implied in all these innumerable interconnexions? You seem to think that there is no necessity to take it so; you seem to think that it is enough just to take it as you find it. And how do you find it? Just a basis of so much soil, dirt, earth, out there around us, down there beneath us! You have found it so; it has so come to you, and so you take

it, and you would put no questions to it!—Questions! you say; what do you mean? Why question the common mud? That wants no explaining, does it? *There* it is! As plain as mud, is a proverb: what thought or thoughts can be involved in mere mud? But just this is it: the categories are the thoughts of this mud—the thoughts it implies, the thoughts that presided at its creation, the thoughts that constituted and constitute it, the thoughts that *are* it.—What necessity for all that? you seem to say again. There it just is! If asked how it came there,—Why, we must just say—God!

Now, what do you mean here? Is it not just this: I live, I see, I feel, I think; and there is an innumerable plurality and variety in what I live, in what I see, in what I feel, in what I think. Now, I cannot live, &c. this innumerable plurality, without thinking it all up into a First and One. Is not this very much what you mean when you come to think what you mean? Has any man since the world began ever found it otherwise? Is not God the word, the key-word, for the clearing up to us, up and out of the way, of this innumerable variety? Prove the being of God—proof of the being of God; what absurdity! Prove the breath I breathe—prove the thought I think? That is it—prove the thought I think! I must think, must I not? But to think is—to think is—just in so many words—God! That is the ultimate and extreme goal; or it is the ultimate and all-including centre—the one punctum of stability, the one punctum of certainty in which all thought coils itself to satisfaction and rest. To the central fire and light of reality which is named consciousness, you acknowledge the presence of the one *in*, and the countless *out*: now as absolutely certain as their presence, is the

presence to the same centre, of a first and one that is the reason of both—God. To think is God.

God, then, is a word standing for the explanation of the variety that is. But, standing so, there is no explanation assigned, there is only one indicated. Standing so, there is *indicated* a Being named God ; but there is no Being assigned. Now, let us be in earnest with this natural fact—and it is a natural fact—as we are with all other natural facts ; let us not simply name it, and know that it is there, and so leave it. Let us turn to it rather, and look at it. Once, when we heard thunder and saw lightning, we cried, God ! God ! and ran into our caves to hide ourselves ; but by-and-by we took courage, and stood our ground, and waited for thunder and lightning, till now we have made them, as it were, even our domestic servants. So *was* a natural fact, so *is* it. As in this case, so in a thousand others, God was the exclamation that summed to us variety ; and as in it, so in them, it was not allowed to remain a mere exclamation, a mere word, but had to transmute itself from word to thing, or, better, had to transform itself from the *Vorstellung*, the crude figurate conception, into the *Begriff*, the intellectually seen notion. Now, such varieties as these of thunder and lightning were but examples of variety in general, were but examples of the main fact, the variety of this universe. Now, it is not as regards any particular variety, but as regards the universal variety, that the word God is used now-a-days for the First and One ; and this is what we have now to consider. (Of course, Religion is a concrete of certain doctrines, and God, as the centre of these, is a word having many meanings—a word designative of a thought subject of many predicates besides First and One. It is only the natural fact that

man must think God, and must think God as First and One, and not the developed predication of Religion, which is sought to be considered here, however.)

The cry that rises spontaneously to the lips on sight of this living variety, is God ; and the necessity of the cry is, a First and One, a meaning to the All ! Now this First and One, *which we must think*, let us take courage and stand to see. But, let us observe well, it is as yet just a First and One,—not some vast Grandeur—some huge, formed, or unformed, Awe of the imagination, which we merely *mean*, but know not ; it is just a First and One, the fact before thought, not the phantom before imagination : in a word, it is the Begriff, and not the Vorstellung, which we seek to take courage before, and stand to see.

So far as *thought* is concerned, then, the word God for us as yet indicates a First and One, or an explanation of the variety. *Explanation*, indeed, is preferable to First and One—for it implies not only a First and One, but also a transition to the many, to the variety, from the First and One.* Let us take it so, then. God, in what the word indicates as yet to thought, amounts to no more than the explanation. God is the explanation. But how *must* an explanation, or the explanation, be thought ? *For this explanation must belong to an element of necessity* ; it can be no matter of contingency and chance ; it must be something in its nature absolutely fixed and certain. How, then, *must* it be thought ? for very certainly only in one way *can* it be thought. This is the question of questions ; this is the beginning of thought ; this is the first of Hegel ; this is Alpha : how *must* we think the explanation ? *Can* we,

* Consider what perfection of two simple words One and Many abstraction the philosophy of the embraced all the meaning we here Greeks had reached, to whom the indicate.

for example, think the explanation a thing, a stone perhaps? Can we think it water, or fire, or earth, or air? * Can we think the explanation the sun or the moon? Can we think it Space? can we think it Time? To all we shake the head. But we have science now, and great groups of things have received explanations of their own: can any of these explanations be extended to the case before us?

Is Magnetism an explanation for us? Can we think the First and One, that has power of transition to the Many, Electricity? Can we think a first of Electricity, and a succession out of its identity of All? Can Electricity make an opaque atom? You have read the 'Vestiges,' and you have very great confidence in the Electric *brush*. That the *brush* should become a nebula is quite conceivable to you; nor less conceivable is it that the nebula should opacify *in foci*, and so give birth to an opaque atom. To the question, Can Electricity make an opaque atom, you answer then, Perhaps!—Can this atom take life? The electric brush is still powerful within you, and you answer again, Perhaps!—Can this life develop and develop, and rise and rise? you still say, Perhaps. Can this life become in the end man and thought? you still say, Perhaps. Now this is the present material theory of creation; this is the Explanation, this is the First and One with transition to the Many, this is the God of the Materialists. The Materialists are to themselves *practical* men; they depreciate the Imagination, and they cry up the Understanding: it is a remarkable fact, however, that the bulk of self-named practical men are the slaves of phantasy merely.

* It is thus, as we see from the mythological explanation) philosophy arises. Ancients, that abstract thought begins: so after mythology (the

Consider how it is here! Electricity, as yet, is but a name used as indicating the common principle of certain separate facts. The facts remain still of an interrupted, scattered, ill-connected nature, and the common principle, in its vagueness, remoteness, shadowiness, is as unsatisfactory as the facts: neither the One nor the Many cohere well to each other; neither the One nor the Many cohere well to themselves, or, in other words, the relative science is yet very imperfect. Electricity, thus, being something unknown, and, as we say, mysterious, is in famous fettle for the use of Imagination, who can easily apply it, in her dreaming way, in explanation of anything unknown, seeing that being unknown itself, it is capable of all. It is Imagination, then, and not Understanding, which, in the case before us, takes up Electricity as a phantom which is dreamed a First and One with transition, &c., but which is no known One and of no known series. But an idol of the phantasy, where explanation is the quest, is empty and inexplicable. A mere name will not suffice here. If you want my conviction, you must get me to understand Electricity as a First and One; you must somehow contrive to place it before me in transition to the Many. Has electricity as yet really effected a single transition? Electricity is the power of the water-drop, you say. But even as you take it, electricity is not the water-drop: no, even according to you, it is Hydrogen and Oxygen that are the water-drop. You make experiments, you demonstrate the power of electricity in the water-drop to be equal to I know not what immensity of horse-power. But what is that to HO.? What does your electricity do there? Why is it necessary? Your explanation has infinitely complicated the explanation, infinitely deepened the mystery. Besides, is it so sure

that this power is actually in the water-drop? Your experiment was a process, your experiment was not the water-drop. The electricity was a product—a product of your energy, of your operation, of your process, of your experiment. The water-drop was left on one side. Is it not to be suspected that Chemistry now-a-days is largely synthetic where it is thought analytic, multiplicative where it is thought divisive, involutive where it is thought evolutive? Show me a single transition of electricity from A to B, where B is richer and more various than A, yet still A. Show me a single opaque atom which is electricity and only electricity. Show this single atom becoming another. Show me this atom taking life. Show me this life becoming another, becoming a higher. Show me life becoming thought. To suppose electricity thus augmenting itself, is it not mere superfetation of *imagination*, mere poverty of *thought*? In *practical* men, too, to whom spades are spades! Can the understanding be ever asked to look on at such a process—at electricity as the unal first, that passes into *another*, an atom, an infinity of atoms, an infinite variety of atoms—that passes again into *another*, life and an infinity of lives,—that passes yet again into *another*, thought and an infinity of thoughts? But suppose this: electricity made matter, matter organisation, organisation thought! What all this time have you been doing with Space and Time? Has electricity made these also? If not, then it is not a first and one. The God of the Materialist, then, has had a God before him who made Space and Time;—rather, perhaps, the Materialist was so lost in his evolution of electricity, that he forgot all about Space and Time. But let us suppose electricity adequate to Space and Time also—what is the result then? Why,

then we have—certainly what is wanted—a First and One with power of transition to the Many, a single material principle whose own duplication and reduplication have produced the All. But what is this? A simple—in a manner, unsensuous, too, as invisible, intangible, &c., in *itself*—that holds virtually in it—that holds virtually within its own unity and simplicity—Matter and Time and Space, and Man and Thought and the Universe,—why this is—Idealism! Between the electricity of the Materialist and the thought of the Idealist, where is the difference? Each is a simple that virtually *is* the congeries, a unity that virtually *is* the Many. *Ex hypothesi*, electricity in its very first germ involved the capacity to become all the rest, that is, virtually *was* all the rest—that is, all the rest is virtually, that is, ideally, *in it*. The rest, in the first instance, was not actually, but only virtually or ideally in it. The Materialist must, then, to this extent admit himself an Idealist, and that there is no difference between himself and his former opposite save in the first principle. The one says Thought, the other Electricity, but both mean the First and One which contains all the rest, which implies all the rest;—the First and One in which all the rest ideally are or were. We have only now to consider the principles; and if any preference can be detected in either, it will be sound reasoning to adopt the preferable. In this way, either the Materialist must, seeing its superiority, adopt Thought and become wholly an Idealist; or the Idealist must, seeing its superiority, adopt Electricity and become partially a Materialist, that is, so far as his first principle is concerned. But the first principle which is to contain all the rest, being supposed material and outward, evidently presupposes Space and Time. It must be granted, then, that Electricity, if adequate to all the

rest, is inadequate to Space and Time, and leaves them there absolutely unexplained, absolutely foreign to its own self. Here, then, the advantage is with the other principle, Thought, which is not outward, but inward—which is independent of Space and Time, which involves Space and Time. You can never pack Space and Time into an outward, but you may, and very readily, into an inward. Thought has an advantage over Electricity here, then. Again, a second advantage possessed by the former over the latter is, that an inward is still nearer to me—certainly to myself, the centre of all certainty—than any outward. Again, an inward is liker myself, is more homogeneous than an outward. And again, let it be said at last, Thought, as an infinitely more powerful principle than Electricity, is also an infinitely preferable one. But you object here—Thought is conditional on man, Electricity is independent. The answer is easy : It is not certain that Electricity is independent, and it is quite certain that Thought is as independently present in the universe as Electricity. The world is but a congeries of means to ends, and every example of such involves a thought. The wing that beats the air is a thought ; an eye that sees, a sense that feels, an articulation that moves, a pipe that runs, a scale that protects,—all these, and myriads such—and they are thoughts—are as independent in nature as Electricity. There is not an atom of dust but exhibits quantity and quality ; Electricity itself exhibits power, force, causality—and these are thoughts. The Idealist may now say to the Materialist, then,—Idealism, in the end, being common to both, and my rationale of the same being infinitely preferable to yours, you are bound, on all laws of good reasoning, to abandon your own and adopt mine.

How must the explanation be thought ? We name—

and even the Materialist will not say no—the explanation God, and, as we have seen, these predicates *must* be thought in his regard: that he is First, that he is One, and that in him is transition to the Many. Now, it is by necessity of thought that we attach these predicates, and the question is, does not the necessity of thought go further? We say, it will be observed, transition, and not creation; and the reason is, that creation is an hypothesis of imagination, and not a necessity of thought as thought. Creation is but a clumsy rationale: it is what Kant would call a synthetic addition; it is a mere addition of a pictured something to a pictured nothing; it is a metaphor of imagination, and not a thought of thought proper: in a word, it is a *Vorstellung*, not a *Begriff*; a crude, current, figurate conception, and not a notion. Creation is but the metaphor of transition; the former is the *Vorstellung*, the latter is the notion. The predicates we have hitherto found are certain, then: they *must* be allowed. We think, and to think is that. To think is to seek an explanation, and an explanation is a First and One with capability of transition to all actual examples of the Many. But this principle evidently of First and One becomes the many, and becomes the various, even by virtue of its capability of transition. As many, as various, it is endless, it is unlimited; it is now, was, and ever will be; and, however various, it is still at bottom one and the same. This is to be granted: the Materialist calling it a principle, the Spiritualist and the Idealist calling it God, a Spirit, Thought, agree in this, that the principle (call it as you will) must be thought as One, as First, as capable of transition (say creation, if you will), as unlimited whether in Time or Space, and yet as at bottom always self-identical. But a self-identity that

can become other, both in number and in kind, is an identity with itself that becomes different from itself. The principle (the *principium*) contains in it, involves, implies both identity and difference. This is plain: granted identity alone, and you have identity, identity—*perdrix, toujours perdrix*—till the end of time, which is never. For progress, then, for a single step, it is absolutely necessary that your receipt should contain not identity alone, but difference also. Have paper and the colour of paper only, and all the painting in the world will never make a mark. To suppose God creator of this universe by act of his will, alters not the matter one jot: in that case, he has thought difference, he has willed difference, he has made difference. The difference is still derived from his identity. Without his identity, the poised universe of difference shakes, sinks, vanishes, disappears like smoke. In short, God as *thought*, and not merely imagined, involves a coexistence of identity *and* difference, of unity *and* plurality, of first *and* last.

The predicates which we have at this moment in characterisation of the principle or principium are: Firstness, unity, plurality, identity, difference, illimitation, and limitation. Why, here are quite a succession of categories from a single necessary thought. All of these are themselves necessary thoughts. No thinker that lives and thinks, but must think one and many, identity and difference, limitation and illimitation, &c. The misfortune is, indeed, that while he *must* think both of the members of each of these pairs, he conceives it his duty somehow to think only one, and that to think both would be self-stultification, and a contradiction of the laws of thought themselves. He will see—at least he ought to see—now, however, that he

has been practising a cheat on himself, and that he *must* think both.

Now these are thoughts, and absolutely necessary thoughts, for these thoughts are actually in the universe, and on them the universe actually is made. Even were there no man in the world, and were the world supposed still to exist, there would be in the world unity and plurality, and difference and identity, and limitation, &c. Nay, there are single things that are at once all these. Space is unity, and space is plurality; space is identity, and space is difference; space is limitation, and space is illimitation. And as it is with space, so it is with time. But neither space nor time, nor both, can be the principle, the principium themselves: let them exist for ever and everywhere, let them coexist for ever and everywhere, still they are barren—still from such clasps as theirs not one atom of thought shall spring, not one atom of matter shall drop.

There are categories, then; and, like water from a sponge, they exude from the very nature of things. It is no objection, then, this of Haym's, that we have Nature at our back when we state these categories. That such is the case, is beyond a doubt. Still, these categories, exuding from the concrete, do come together into a common element or system, and they are the thoughts which the nature of things involves, whether there be a human thinker or not, and which are capable of being discerned directly a human or any other thinker comes upon the scene.

The first thought, of course, is simply that of First. *Before* there was a first—if that be possible—there was the thought of it. The first is the first, and that is the thought even prior to the thing. Suppose it was

a grain of sand that was first, why that grain of sand involves thought: it is there in quantity and quality, it is alone, it virtually contains all, &c. All these are thoughts, and *first* itself is a thought. But *what* is first? Why, just God, the principle, just what is. What is, is the first that is. But what is, is. What is involves Being. Ah, there we have it: Being is the absolutely first, the absolutely universal predicate in *thinking* this universe, *figure* the subject of predication as you may. Being, that what is, is, this is the first, and this also is the immediate or the inderivative. It is what is, and we do not ask for anything higher as producer of it; it is what is, and it is consequently the first. Now, as Being is the necessary first, it will suffice for the present to assert that what Haym calls the long string of the categories just *necessarily ravel out of it*, and simply assures itself of its own truth by that occasional glimpse at the concrete actual to which Haym would wholly attribute it. And such we think a legitimate mode of illustrating the possible or probable incubant thoughts of Hegel.

Hegel's general undertaking, indeed, seems to be, to restore the evolution immanent to thought itself (which evolution has only presented itself concretely and chronologically in the particular thinkers preserved in history)—to restore this evolution to universal consciousness, in abstract purity, and in such wise that the whole movement and every moment of the movement should be understood as each veritably is, with Idealism, or rather the Idée-Monad, as the result, and thereby infinitude retrieved for man in union and communion with God—what we may call, 'Recovered Paradise to all mankind.'

It is no mere process of the generalisation of

particular historical facts, however, that we are to see in Hegel. History, no doubt, lies decidedly behind the system, but the connexion between them is probably of a subtler nature than the usual generalisation. We are not to suppose that Hegel has taken the exact concrete facts of the history of philosophical thought as it has manifested itself in time, and so to speak, broken, and trod, and pressed them down into an ultimate lymph which is thought itself in its own nature and in its own life—not to suppose that he has grasped the solid masses themselves, and compressed and kneaded them till they became the transparent and plastic essence which is his Logic,—but rather that, along the long range of solid rocks from Thales to Kant—at the foot of these—he has laid himself down as the pure and harmonising mirror into which their pure reflexions fall. Till the reader, then, has acquired a certain ease of traffic, as it were, not with the bodies, but with the souls of facts, the reference to history in Hegel may as readily—to use a foreign expression—*disorient* as *orient* him.

B.

Hegel acts on the dictum of Aristotle, ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσις ἐστίν, in the sense that the *finding* of the knot is the *loosening* of it, for we may name a main object with him to be the elimination of the antithesis by demonstration of the antithesis; which said antithesis is at first Being, and Non-being and at last the absolute Subject-Object, the Spirit, that which is in itself and by itself and for itself, the Absolute, the concrete reciprocal of all reciprocals. It is also to be seen that this reciprocity or reciprocation is in its

nature notional, is identical with that which Kant discovered to constitute perception, which to him was, shortly, the subsumption of the particular under the universal to the development of the conjunctive singular. Kant, too, perceived that Sensation and Perception were but externally what thought, or the categories, were internally. Kant, however, did not bring his thoughts together. This was done by Hegel to the production—and by no other means—of the Hegelian system. He saw, first of all, in a perfection of consciousness which Kant lacked, this reciprocity of inner and outer, of thought and sense. He saw also that these elements related themselves to each other as universal and particular; and, seeing as much as that at the same time that the whole reach of Kant's theory of perception was clear before him, a theory in which all the three moments of the notion have place, it was not difficult for him to complement and complete them by the addition of the singular. Quite generally, then, he was able to state to himself that the ultimate truth of the universe was just this: Notional reciprocation pervades the whole, and is the whole; and, more particularly, in this movement the ultimate point of repose is the production of the singular by its subsuming the particular (which is as *matter*, that is, negation, or simply difference) under the universal (which is *form*, or affirmation, or identity).

Seeing this, the next step or question would be, how put together all the details in completeness and perfection—how interconnect, how systematise them? Having come to that which is most general as the ground unit, or rather as the ground form, it would be natural to make it the first, and endeavour to find a transition from it to the rest. Hegel's first step, then,

in this light, would be, in the first instance, to exclude sense and perception as the mere other or copy of the more important intellect. In such restriction, his element evidently were the purely Logical. Now, the categories lying before him, he had in them logical elements not due to the merely subjective movement of Notion, Judgment, and Syllogism ; and he could not possibly escape the thought of an objective logic as a necessary addition to the usual subjective one.

Now, how begin? What category was the most general objective one? It was manifestly not Relation or Modality ; for both Relation and Modality concern a foregone conclusion—presuppose, that is, their own substrate. It must either be Quantity or Quality. But the latter is evidently prior to the former. The quantity of any what is a secondary consideration to the thought itself ; and we see Kant himself succumbing to the necessity of this priority in his ‘*Kritik of Judgment.*’ Let us begin with Quality, then. But what is the most universal Quality, so far as all particular qualities are abstracted from, and there is question only of quality as it is thought, question only of the thought of Quality? Why, Being! Being is a qualitative thought, and it is, at the same time, the most abstract, the most universal of all thoughts. But should we commence with this thought, transition from it, movement is no longer possible by process of logical generalisation : such possibility can be attained only through the reverse process of logical determination or specification. But a specification, beginning with such first, would, if ended, especially if ended in a circle of return—be a complete system ; and a specification, again, can be effected only through the addition of the necessary differentia. But just such power

possessed the formula derived from Kant. For the genus was the same as Kant's general notion, the difference the same as his particular notion (*we* may call it so, for, though to Kant it was only materials of sense, *we* know now that even so it is only the other of thought, it still is *in itself* thought), and the species stood to the genus and differentia just as the singular stood to the universal and the particular.*

Seyn, Being, would be a beginning, then ; but how find a differentia by which to convert it into a species, which species, too, should be the absolute species proxima? We have found the universal genus, but how find the universal differentia? Why, if the one is Being, if the one is the universal identity—and manifestly the ultimate genus must be the universal identity, and, looking at it in that way, Being is easily seen to be just this—the other must be, as already named indeed, the universal difference, the universal source of distinction and separation, which just is negation, *not*, or *nothing*. The universal difference, then, is but the contrary of the universal genus ; and our very first step has brought us to the *antithesis* at its sheerest and abruptest.

But, subsuming *not* or *nought* under Being, which is precisely what we have to do in a process of logical specification or determination, what species results? To subsume *not* under Being, or to incorporate *not* with Being, is to give *not* the character of Being—is, so to speak, to *being-ate not*—is to give Being to not : and what does that amount to but a Becoming? Nought passing into Being (Being passing into Nought, if you will) is surely Becoming. Now, this as first reciprocation

* It is Kant's theory of perception that underlies this.

is type of all the rest. Take Hegel's widest or most general division of Logic, Nature, Spirit : the last subsumes the second under the first ; Spirit logicises Nature ; Spirit is the conjunctive Singular of the Universal Logic and of the Particular Nature ; Spirit is the concrete One of identity and difference. Again, Spirit is the ultimate sublimation or concretion of the form Becoming, as Logic is of Being (identity) and Nature of Non-being (difference).

Of other Hegelian divisions, Begriff subsumes Wesen under Seyn, or Begriff, Notion, gives Being to what is called Wesen, or essential principle ; Maass subsumes Quantity under Quality, or Measure *qualifies* Quantity. Fürsichseyn, singular Being, subjective Being, subsumes Daseyn, particular Being, objective Being, natural Being, under Seyn, universal Being, subjective *and* objective Being, logical Being, &c. &c. In the Philosophy of Nature, as in that of Spirit, the triplicity is certainly not so formally exact as it is in these examples ; but it still aims at the same pattern, and throughout the Logic it remains almost always perfectly true to itself. This is obvious in such examples, for instance, as Daseyn, Quality, Something ; Identity, Difference, Ground ; Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c. ; where the third member is the product of the subsumption of the second under the first, or results, so to speak, by *infecting* the second with the nature of the first. In fact, the object is to be serious with the notion of reciprocity and its resolution in a relation. The antithesis constituted by reciprocity is taken in its abstractest form as Being and Nothing, and it is gradually raised to its ultimate concretion of subject and object. The first resolute relation, too, Becoming, is contained in the last, the Absolute Spirit.

We are to suppose the threads of the antithesis gradually thickening from the lowest to the highest, and the relation, or the *crossing* of the threads, gradually thickening likewise. Throughout, then, we have but the antithesis in its series of stages.

This explication goes pretty deep into the nature of the Hegelian industry; but Hegelian writing is not thereby at once made current, readable at sight. No; Hegelian *difficulty* largely remains: not that it is because, as Goethe thought, Hegel wanted lightness, or because, as Humboldt thought, speech had never come to a thorough breaking-through with him. No: the reason of the difficulty lies partly in the fact that Hegel will give no sign of the origin of his system, nor of the concretes that lie under his abstract characterisation; partly in the fact, too, that this characterisation is abstract, and the most abstract that has ever yet been exemplified in this world: partly again in this, that he has sought to make the abstract evolution of his Logic parallel with the concrete evolution of philosophical thought in history; and partly, finally, that each sphere demands for its characterisation its own words, which words remain ever afterwards intelligible only when referred to the sphere where they, as it were naturally, took birth and presented themselves. No reader, however intelligent, will ever be at ease with Hegel till he has gone through the whole system of Logic with such diligence and completeness as to have ever all the technical words present to his consciousness in the exact sense in which they were employed by Hegel. Even so, Hegel himself is often in such an agony of difficulty with the refractoriness of his own materials, and *what* he sees is so hard to be learned from the abstraction of the language, that

there is little hope of ready reading in such an element ever for anyone.

One other source of difficulty lies in the artificiality and formalism which are everywhere present in the construction. With each new product a new differentia is necessitated to be derived from this product, which reunited to the product gives rise to a third and higher. Such a method entails outside effort, and the appearance of artificial straining. Still, Hegel is to be considered as genuine. He might certainly have made himself perfectly easy to be understood, had he explained his connexion to Kant, and described what he would be at both in principle, method, and result; and so far suspicion and ill-will will always follow him. Nevertheless, Hegel is the historical continuator of Kant, and he has really carried forward the interest of philosophy as received from the hands of Kant. Nay, with all its artifice, his method is the true one—that is, if Kant was right, and a *science* of Metaphysic is now founded and begun—and the elevation of the antithesis must henceforth be the business of philosophy, as it is of experience probably, and life itself.

C.

Few things more tantalising, after all, than Hegel's constant reference to the Notion, the Begriff. What, of course, is meant, is the logical notion, or the notion as notion. It will not do, however, to have recourse here to merely technical Logic, to merely technical definition, and content ourselves with a mere phrase, a mere abstract expression. Any mere technicality of any mere book is something very different from what Hegel aims at. *The* Notion, in fact, is the concrete notion; the notion is the

notion that was taken up by Kant, and which, passing through the hands of Fichte and Schelling, reached finally those of Hegel himself. *The Notion*, then, is simply Kant's notion ; and the transformation of Kant's *notion* into Hegel's Idea, is the one business of the Hegelian Logic. The Notion, in short, is Reciprocity. For this is the true name for the purpose that impelled Kant in a similar direction in Metaphysic to that of Copernicus in Astronomy. Kant sought to invert the relation ; sought rather more than this—to reciprocate the relation—to prove objects not only *affecting*, but *affected* ; that is, not only influencing us, but influenced by us. The notion, then, passing from Hume to Kant in the form of Causality, was converted by the latter—virtually—into that of Reciprocity. Reciprocity—this is the ultimate abstraction for, the ultimate generalisation of, the work of Kant ; this is this work's true appellation. Most wonderful is the penetrating, rendering, irresistible force of Hegel. Thought becomes reduced before him to its ultimate nerve : the volumes of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, are transformed to sentences in a paragraph ; and the vast Kant has become a single word. Substance becomes Causality, Causality becomes Reciprocity, and Reciprocity becomes the Notion. In Kant, however, it was only the notion *an sich*, the notion *in itself* ; it had the immediacy, the identity, the instinctivity, the unconsciousness of Nature. In Kant it only *appeared*, but it knew not its own self in him ; or Kant was quite unconscious that the one notion which moved in his whole industry was Reciprocity. From Kant and the stage of immediacy, it soon passed, however, to Fichte and Schelling, or the stage of reflexion, the stage of the difference, the stage of negation, the stage

of particularisation, and as soon, finally, to Hegel, or the stage of complete and total reconciliation and insight—the stage of singularisation, which is the stage also of the restoration of immediacy by the sublation of mediacy (the negation of the negation, or, what is the same thing, commediation with self). Reciprocity on this last stage, being developed to its issues, is now the Idea, which one word expresses the resolution of objectivity in reciprocity with subjectivity and of subjectivity in reciprocity with objectivity into the concrete reciprocity of the notion, the logical notion, the notion as notion, which is itself a reciprocity, and the ultimate reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity. All this, of course, is very hard to realise to understanding; but, after a due analysis both of Kant and Hegel, the desired ‘light’ will always ‘go up’ to honest labour.

All this can be said differently; it is all capable of being expressed in the Aristotelian formula that relates to Form, Matter, and perfect Actualisation. The *δύναμις*, *ὑλη*, and *ἐντελέχεια* * of Aristotle amount precisely to the Begriff, Urtheil, and Schluss of Hegel. In fact, all that is said in Hegel is but the single principle involved in this formula, in one or other of its innumerable forms: always and everywhere with him and in him we have to do wholly and solely with the resultant unity of a triple reciprocity. And in this, it may be, Hegel has hit an essential, or the essential secret

* Dr. Thomas Brown was talking of the ‘mystic Entelecheia’ of Aristotle as something unfathomable at a time when it had been familiar to Hegel at least for some years. Later English lexicons profess to convey it perfectly by the word ‘Actuality;’ but it is, perhaps, doubtful whether they yet understand it in this way—that the acorn is *Form*, the elements it absorbs are *Matter*, and the consummation of both in the perfect oak is the Entelechy.

of the universe. ‘*Omne trinum perfectum rotundum*; all good things are three: three is the sacred number, the fundamental figure, the foot that scans the rhythm of the Universe.’ This is the ultimate cell, the multiplication and accumulation of which has built the All. The universal becomes particular, and both are resolved or combined into singularity, which, indeed, only realises each. Any cell in its material, structure, and function, will be found to illustrate this. Such, indeed, is the inner nature, the inner movement, the rhythm of self-consciousness itself; and self-consciousness is the *prius* of All. It is the first and centre, and all else are but reduplications, inspissations, crassations of it outwards. This simplicity constitutes a great difficulty in Hegel; for with whatever he may be occupied, he can always only see in it the same form, and speak of it in the same dialect. Hegel’s so frequent utterance in regard to immediacy which has made itself such by resolution of mediacy attaches itself to the same principle. It hangs with this, too, that what is to explain, account for, or act as *ground* in any reference, is always with Hegel the stage which is named Schluss, Entelechy, Singularisation, Reconciliation, &c., the nature of which just is that it is an Immediate resultant from Mediacy, the inner nerve being always reciprocity.

Hegel just modified and developed the stand-point of Kant. In his hands, for example, the categories must become the category or the notion; and this again, freed from subjectivity, and looked at objectively as what is, must become the Absolute or the Idea in its first, or simplest, or most abstract form or principle. When, indeed, ‘the light went up’ to him from Kant, his object would be to complete these categories, these

substantial creative notions, — to complete them, to found them, and to derive them from a principle—from a something first, simple, and certain. But, with such abstract generalised notions or universals before him, the inquest or request would naturally be the abstract generalised universal notion as notion. From this he could *begin*: this should be the life of all the other generalised notions (as being *their* universal), and through them of all existence generally. What is this ultimate notion, then? What is *the* notion as such? Where find it?—how conceive it? These presumably were Hegel's first thoughts, and we are here certainly on his real trail, which Haym, with all his laborious investigation of the Hegelian steps in the writings themselves both published and manuscript of Hegel, has unquestionably missed. This, indeed, could only manifest itself (as in our case it *did* only) to one who stood at last on an exhaustive analysis of the 'deduction of the categories.' From such coigne of vantage, there is a sudden glimpse at last into the initial secret of Hegel, his junction to the world of his predecessors, the one broad bridge that at once made him and them, a one and identical common country.

With all effort, Hegel could not expect to attain what he sought immediately. But as regards where he ought to search, he would find himself naturally referred to Logic. But what is Logic? what is the foundation of Logic? How came Logic to birth? What is so named, is seen at first sight to imply, at all events, that all other concretes are left out of view, presumably, perhaps, as considered to their ultimate, and that thought abstractly, thought as thought, is what is now examined. Historically, then, all objective elements and interests are behind Logic; or, historically, so situated is the

genesis of Logic. In other words, Logic is the historical outcome of the investigation of all particular concretes which present themselves. So it is that Logic becomes, as it were, the biographic ghost of history in its element of abstract or generalised thought. Nay, the steps of generalisation which present themselves, so to speak, historically in the life of the public individual, may be seen to repeat themselves—in the progress from instinct to reason, from brutality to morality, &c. &c.—biographically in the life of the private individual. In this manner there is the glimpse of a concrete Logic obtained. But Hegel must be conceived as returning from such general view to the particular question, What is the notion as notion? And in the answer to this question it is that the origin, the principle, the form, and even, in a certain light, the matter of the Hegelian system lie. But we may come to the same point from other directions.

There is in the brain of Hegel a dominant metaphor. This metaphor relates to a peculiar evolution which is characterised thus: It begins, of course, with a first; but this first is presently seen to imply its opposite, which opposite, developed in its turn, coalesces with the former to the production of a third, a new form, constituted by and containing, but only *impliciter* the two former as moments. This third, this new form, develops *itself* now up to the full of *its* unity, and is presently seen to imply *its* opposite—with the same results. Now, we have to conceive this process repeated again and again till an end is reached; which end, we have further to conceive, passes back into the first, and thus the whole movement constitutes a simple circle. Each link in this circular chain, too, is seen to be a kind of triple unity. Ever, indeed, there seems somehow

a flight of three, the last of which is always a return to the first, but changed, as if it were richer, heavier, more complete—more completely developed, in fact. Each of the three terms concerned must be conceived to begin, to fill, to reach its full ; and when full, to show, as it were, the germ of its opposite, which rising up into its full, seeks union and coalescence with its former to a new production. This is the one metaphor of the thought of Hegel ; and even here we can see that we have never moved from the spot ; for this metaphor is but another way of expressing the one movement or principle already characterised in so many ways as δύναμις, ὕλη, ἐντελέχεια ; Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss ; Universality, Particularity, Singularity ; Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis ; Being, Essence, Notion, &c. &c. Wherever we are, in Hegel indeed we have ever the same triplet before us in one or other of its innumerable forms. Always there are the two opposites or reciprocals which coalesce like acid and alkali to a base—a base in which they still implicitly are, but only as moments. This base, again, if the result of its moments, is really their base, their ground, their foundation, their *Grundlage*. If they found it, it founds them. It is the mother-liquor into which they have passed : it is a living base out of which they can arise and show themselves, and into which they can again disappearingly return. This is the Hegelian metaphor : a ground, a base, from which arise members, which again withdraw themselves—a differentiated *Common* or *One*. And what is this but the disjunctive or reciprocal whole of Kant, suggested to him by the disjunctive judgment, and discussed by him at so much length, and with such fresh, new, and creative vigour ? A sphere of reciprocity : this is the whole. This is the Hegelian Idée-Monad.

The reciprocity still must be understood as notional reciprocity—the triple reciprocity of universal, particular, and singular, each of which, as reciprocal of the others, holds the others in its own way, and is in fact the others. It is Identity gone into its differences indeed, but still even in these identical with itself. Differentiated identity, or identified difference, constitutes the one reciprocal sphere of Hegel—a sphere which is the whole universe—a sphere which is each and every atom in the universe—a sphere which, as self-consciousness, or rather as *the Notion* (self-consciousness in its simplest statement), is the one soul, the one spirit—which is life, vitality itself—and the only life, the only vitality. Thus it is—which is so curiously characteristic of the Hegelian philosophy—that every attempt to understand or explain any the least considerable of its terms becomes a flight into the system itself. So, for particular example, is it that the third is always the base and the truth of the first and second. We see this corroborated by fact; for it is simply the progress of thought to give itself the new as the reason or explanation or ground of the old, or of what preceded it. Thus it is that the modern world is the truth of the ancient, Spinoza the truth of Descartes, Hume the truth of Locke, and Kant the truth of Hume, as Hegel is of Kant. On this last particular ground, and in harmony with the whole system, Begriff is third where Seyn and Wesen are first and second. The Hegelian Logic even outwardly presents these three stadia, and the reason lies in the Hegelian notion, or is just another side of the Hegelian metaphor. There is opposed to Perception this world of outer images: these constitute the Seyn, the Immediacy. But now Understanding takes what Perception offers—

will not content itself with what Perception offers as it is offered, will treat this in its way, and insists on demanding the inner nature of this outer nature, the inner being of this outer being ; it insists on satisfaction to its own *Reflexion*, and demands the *Wesen* of this *Seyn*, the inner essentia of this outer appearance, the *Noumenon* of the *Phænomenon*. But all this can be said in the two words, *Begriff* and *Urtheil*. The act of Perception may be named the immediate *Begriff*, the *Begriff* in itself: *in itself* as being yet only virtual, that is, existent and factual, but object of consciousness as yet neither to itself nor anything else ; in itself, too, as really in *itself*, for every particular into which the whole sphere (or notion) goes asunder, constitutes, each with each, just what the sphere or notion is in itself ; and in itself as really in itself in this sense, that to whatever yet it may develop itself, that development depends on, is conditioned by, the first natural germ as it was in itself when first manifested. In particular explanation of the third or last phase, it may be stated that self-will is *the notion in itself* of the whole developed notion of morality. At the same time, it will be as well to enter a caveat against this statement being supposed to favour what is called the selfish system. Self-will is the notion of morality in itself ; but it is only through its negative of humiliation and submission that it reaches its own consummation ; and this can hardly be a dogma of the Selfish System.

But if the act of Perception be the notion in itself, the act of Understanding is the notion for itself. Perception is content to hold its matter just as it is, and asks no further. Understanding is not so content ; Understanding will not so hold its matter, Understanding must peep and pry and spy into, Understanding

must separate, its matter—separate it for its own passage into it: Understanding, too, having once effected this separation, *keeps it up*; it regards this separation as the truth; it holds each part to be in its truth only when separated from the whole, and in isolation by itself: Understanding, that is, puts faith only *in its own abstractions*. Perception holds what we may call its matter—Perception itself being only relatively as form—*immediately*; whereas Understanding will hold and must hold this matter (the same matter) only *mediately*. But the object or matter immediately is the object or matter in itself, and the object or matter mediately is just the object or matter for itself. Understanding, then, will not have the object otherwise than as it is mediately, as it is in reflexion, as it is for and by itself. Understanding, that is, scouts outer nature, and will have inner nature. Though it has it there as in Perception, it still asks *what is it?* It demands the Wesen of this Seyn. Seyn, then, is the *intent*, ingest, or matter of all Perception; and Wesen is the *intent*, ingest, or matter of all Understanding: and this matter in Perception is only *unmittelbar* or *an sich*, while in Understanding it is *mittelbar* or *für sich*. In Perception, that is, it is just the undeveloped Begriff, just what is apprehended or begrasped in its first direct unity; but in Understanding it is the judgment—(a judgment has been passed on the matter in regard to what it is)—and the judgment is the *Ur-theil*, the primal or primitive *parting*, the *dis-cernment*. But now is the opportunity of the third branch of Logic, of Reason, to reunite in the *Schluss*, what has been separated by Understanding in the *Urtheil*, and restore it to the unity of perception in the higher form of reason: in which form it is *the* notion, the logical notion, the

true and complete notion, and Seyn and Wesen are now complemented by their third.

But here now, then, we have a new triad for the principle of Hegel: Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning! The three stadia of common Logic are, after all, representative of what Hegel would be at! The three stadia of common Logic constitute but a stage of the Hegelian evolution—constitute between them but the Hegelian Notion—and in very perfect form! Hegel too, then, has seen into the depths of the meaning of the common Logic; and he cooperates with Kant to restore it from death and inanity to life and wealth. How striking this placing parallel with each other the forms—Perception and Simple Apprehension; and the matters—Seyn and Begriff! What vision this of Understanding as that which separates and remains fixed by what it separates—the judgment, the Urtheil, which is the primitive parting! What new truth in the function of Reason as reconciliant speculation, which restores the notion, the first product as it came to us, but now in its very truth! What wonderful sagacity to regard all—Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss—as but the turns of a single movement, which movement is the one essential secret of all that is!

But this—the psychological triad of Perception, Understanding, and Reason, or the logical one of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning—is capable of being applied both historically and biographically. Historically—Seyn, the intent of Perception, sufficed the earliest men. The Notion, the Begriff, what was simply begrapsed and begriped of Simple Apprehension, was enough for them. They asked no questions, they simply lived; it was an era of Faith. How many times the Notion, meaning thereby the whole logical

movement—and that is tantamount to the whole vital movement—has passed through its own phases historically, cannot be said. There seems good reason for supposing the philosophy of Aristotle to have been in some sort an Absolute Idealism; and in that case, the Greeks at all events represent one complete cycle of the Notion. We see the stage of Perception and Seyn, or of Simple Apprehension and Begriff, the age of faith, in Homer. Then the first appearance of the Urtheil, of the separating and *dis-cerning* Understanding, the first appearance of the Negation, is the turning of such thinkers as Thales and the other Ionics on the Seyn, outer being, and the questioning of it, the demanding the Wesen, the inner principle of it, the resolution of it by reflexion into its differences, water, fire, earth, and what not. Then the separation, the reflexion, the abstraction, the generalisation so begun—a beginning of Idealism it is, for even Water when proposed as *the* principle by Thales is, as Hegel tells us, but a beginning of Idealism; if it is *the* principle, it is a unity which ideally holds, which ideally is, the total variety—waxed more and more perfect, more and more pure, in the succeeding philosophers. We have Pythagoras, for example, seeking an explanation in the numerical difference, which is so far an abstracting from outer solidity. Then we have the first absolutely abstract thought, the Eleatic being. In fact, Heraclitus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, can be all used as types of certain stages of the movement of the notion and applied in explanation of the system of Hegel. Of this movement, we may conceive the modern world to constitute another cycle. In the Middle Ages, there was simple apprehension—the reign of Faith. Then came Reflexion to break into

this unity, and set up the differences as principles. This Reflexion, as in Greece so here, culminated in an age of Aufklärung. People conceived themselves fully enlightened as to their ancient folly, and hastened to rid themselves of it at the shortest—in some cases, as Carlyle has it, by setting fire to it. But, looking at this Reflexion only in the philosophical element, and omitting Descartes, Spinoza, and the rest, we remark that the Aufklärung culminated in David Hume, and passing from him to Kant, received from this latter its first turn into the final form, completed by Hegel, of the universal reconciliant Idea or Schluss of Speculation and Reason. This last form is what we have now to welcome: the doubts, despairs, despondencies of mere reflexion are ended; we have to quit the penal fire of the negative, and emerge into the sunshine of the new and higher positive—of the positive which restores to us, and in richer form, all that understanding, all that reflexion, all that scepticism and the enlightenment of the eighteenth century had bereft us of. Thus does the Notion describe its cycles; and it may be remarked of these, that each, though full, is a rise on its predecessor. The Greek, though a complete cycle, is still, as it were, in the form of the first moment, Seyn; it is a cycle *an sich*. The modern world again is dominated by Wesen, and may be named a cycle *für sich*. To believe the analogy, we shall be followed then by a cycle *an und für sich*, in which Reason shall predominate! How strangely this coheres with prophecy and the utterances of Scripture!

What is said historically, may be said biographically: Seyn, Wesen, Begriff, or Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss, are the three stages in the life of every thinker.

Why the Notion, Begriff, is third to Being and

Essence, will have now made itself apparent in a variety of ways. The directest is simply that of what is: Seyn is the first form, Wesen the second, and Begriff the third. This explains itself at once by reference to the faith of the religious era, the unrest of the reflective era (Hume), and the restored repose of the rational era effected by the Notion of Kant and Hegel. The third form can be easily seen, too, though preceded by the others, to be at the same time the ground, *Grundlage*, or containing base of these. We may remark here, too, that we have now the necessary light whereby to place and appreciate Comte. The *constitution of the Notion* really gives him a show of truth as regards an age of Religion and an age of Metaphysic; but it is a fatal error to suppose them past only, and not still operant, now and always: Comte, too, knows nothing of the *how* or *why*, or real nature of his ages, and it is amusing to compare his third and final (the *Aufklärung*) with that (Reason, Faith) of Kant and Hegel. Comte, with the smirking, self-complacent sufficiency of the shallow, orders us to return to Seyn (Perception), Phenomena; and knows not, that he brings to the examination of the same, all the categories of reflexion, full-formed, and in that he drifts a prey to these categories, thinks himself by their means (whose nature is hid from him) master of the Phenomena!

D.

The third paragraph of the opening of the third volume of the *Logic of Hegel*, entitled 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen,' may be translated thus:—

'Objective Logic, which considers Being (Seyn) and Inbeing or Essentity (Wesen), constitutes properly

the genetic exposition of the Notion. More particularly, Substance is the *real Inbeing*, or Inbeing so far as it is united with Outbeing (*Seyn*) and gone over into Actuality. The Notion has, therefore, Substance as its immediate presupposition ; or Substance is that in itself which the Notion is as in manifestation. The dialectic movement of Substance through Causality and Reciprocity onwards, is therefore the immediate genesis of the Notion, and by this genesis its Becoming is represented. But its Becoming, like Becoming everywhere, implies that it (the Becoming) is the reflexion of what becomes into its Ground, and that the next presentant other into which the former (that which is engaged becoming) has passed, constitutes the truth of this former. Thus the Notion is the truth of Substance ; and while the particular mode of relation in Substance is Necessity, Freedom manifests itself as the truth of Necessity, and as the mode of relation in the Notion.'

It was in reading this passage that the historic 'light went up to us' as to what the Begriff really meant. Of course, it was known, we may say, all along previously, that, as stated by Schwegler and Haym, it was a tenet of Hegel that the history of philosophy was, in outward concretion and contingency, what the development of the Notion was in the inward concretion and necessity of Logic. But still, on the whole, the tenet was looked loosely at, in the manner of Haym and Schwegler themselves, as a mere analogy and ideal, as a mere Regulative, and not by any means as a Constitutive. Schwegler expresses this thus:—'History is no sum in arithmetic to be exactly cast up. Nor anywhere in the history of philosophy, either, can there be talk of an *à priori* construction ; what is factual cannot be applied as the illustrative exemplification of a ready-made notional schema:

but the data of experience, so far as capable of a critical inquest, are to be taken as ready-furnished to us, and their rational connexion is to be analytically exposed ; only for the arrangement and scientific articulation of this historical material can the Speculative idea supply a Regulative.' As said, however, in reading the above passage from Hegel, 'a light went up,' and Hegel was seen to be much more in earnest with his peculiar tenet than it seemed to have occurred to anyone even to surmise. It was seen, in fact, that *the Notion* was Kant's notion, and that its genesis lay in the thinking of the philosophers who had preceded him,—in the thinking, that is, of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, to whom Substance really presented itself—though each named it otherwise, perhaps—as what was the whole object of inquiry and research. Concrete facts do undoubtedly lie behind the abstraction of Hegel ; and if this abstraction can, on one side, be viewed as the development of thought as thought, apart from any other consideration, it can also be viewed, on the other side, as being but the counterpart of the actual particular facts of history. To him, indeed, who is well read in history in general, and in that of philosophy in particular, the light now offered will shine into meaning many tracts of Hegel which might have appeared previously quite impervious.

In further reference to the exposition of Substance being the genesis of the Notion, we remark, that what is in and for itself, is to itself at once its own ground and its own manifestation, its own identity and its own difference, its own affirmation and its own negation, &c. &c. Now Substance is all this : the notion conveyed by this word is just that it is its own Wesen and its own Seyn, its own Inbeing and its own Outbeing, its own ground

and its own manifestation, &c. It is evident that the sort of movement involved here in this species of play between inside and outside, ground and manifestation, identity and difference, may be appropriately termed reflexion: for neither factor is, in itself, absolute, independent, isolated, &c.; neither factor has an independent existence—both have only a relative existence, either is quite as much in its other as in itself. The *ground* is *ground* just because of the *manifestation*, and the *manifestation* is *manifestation* just because of the *ground*. Thus they are reciprocals, and reciprocals in unity. Again, the Notion—that is, our notion, Kant's notion, or rather now Hegel's notion—is the unity of Being and Reflexion, or Seyn and Wesen. The categories, or in their universal, the category, let us say, is as much outward as inward; it is *what is*, whether we look outwards or inwards; that is, it is Seyn, Being. And again, inasmuch as in it we can look both outwards and inwards, it involves or is Reflexion; that is, the Notion is the Unity of Being and Reflexion. In fact, all that is wished to be said here (beginning of fourth paragraph of 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen'), is that the movement of Substance is manifestation of what it is in itself, and this manifestation is identical with what it is in itself, and Substance and Manifestation are just identical together and in general: further, that this movement of Substance is evidently identical with the movement of the Notion, and the former constitutes thus the genesis of the latter. In other words, the evolution of Substance through Causality, Reciprocity, &c., in the heads of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant terminated in the genesis of the *Idea* in the brain of Hegel. In short, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, &c. are simply abstracted from, and the development which these and

others gave to Substance (for the object then was an inner principle or truth that should explain phenomena—and such is Substance) may be considered as the development of Substance itself, or as the dialectic movement of the plastic All of thought which was then in the form of Substance.

Substance unites in its own self both of the correlative sides: it is that which as Inbeing is also Outbeing; it is both inner ground and outer manifestation; that is, it is Actuality, or what actually is. There can be no doubt but the thoughts of Descartes, and the rest, circled around the poles which these simple ideas represent. 'Substance is that in itself which the Notion is in manifestation.' This means, Kant's Notion which is now in actual manifestation—is but a development from Substance; and Substance, therefore, was *in itself* what Kant has actually developed it into. The dialectic movement of Substance through Causality and Reciprocity onwards is therefore the immediate genesis of the Notion; and by this genesis its Becoming is represented. Till the present moment, however, this literal truth to history on the part of Hegel, especially as concerns the characteristic tenets both of Kant and himself, has remained invisible. Categories, Dialectic, Method, have all been regarded as appurtenances of the system, and of nothing but the system: close literal generalisation, though in ultimate abstraction, of actual outer facts seems never to have been suspected; and Hegel's claim on actual history has simply given rise—so far as precise fact was concerned—to incredulous shakings of the head. The truth in general, however, is what was said a short way back, of Hegel being a pure mirror into which fell the pure reflexions of the long line from Thales to Kant; and in particular the truth is, that the

text of the Logic may in this place be regarded as a direct allegory of the actual origin of the Idea of Hegel in his studies of his immediate predecessors, especially Kant.

Hegel does not stop at reciprocity, and it may appear wrong, therefore, to assert that the notion is reciprocity. It is to be admitted that the notion is beyond and more than simple reciprocity : still it preserves the colour and lineaments of its parent ; and the notion is a reciprocity, the Notion, in fact, is the notional reciprocity represented by any one of the many triads we have already seen. This, we may just point out in passing, has escaped Rosenkranz, who mistakes the genesis of the Notion so absolutely, that he proposes a reform of the Hegelian Logic, the main item of which is—the stultification of actual history, first of all—the insertion of Teleology between Reciprocity and the Notion ! It wants but a very slight glance at the system to discern that it is a triple sphere of triple spheres endlessly within one another almost in the fashion of a Chinese toy, and that the essential principle of each triplicity is reciprocity. Compare Logic and Nature, for example, as they appear in the system : is it not as if there were an inner congeries hanging down side by side with an outer congeries, without direct transition from the one to the other, but each perfectly parallel to the other—parallel, that is, in reciprocity ? Is not the Hegelian method but an evolution or development—an expansion through all that is, of the Notion ? Is it not simply an exhibition or demonstration of the Notion *in* all that is in existence, or an arrangement of all that is in existence on the Notion ? What is the precise meaning, for example, now, of Hegel's rejection of what he calls *raisonnement* ? Why, *raisonnement* is the method that existed

while causality was the notion ; but that method it is proper to withdraw and change, now that reciprocity (in a notional form certainly) is the notion. This is a true insight into the most characteristic and obscure of all the very extraordinary *procédés* of Hegel. While causality reigned, explanation consisted in assigning a reason for a consequent ; that is, *raisonnement* was the method. Now, however, that reciprocity reigns, it is reciprocity that must guide, and constitute henceforth (till a new principle) the method of all theorising, and of all explanation. And this is simply what Hegel has performed : instead of accounting for this universe by a series of causes and effects, or reasons and consequents, he has simply carried his notional reciprocity, orderingly, arrangingly, into it, and presented it to us as a sphere of spheres, all of which follow notional reciprocity as their law and principle.

What is said in regard to the relativity, or mode of relation which obtains in Substance as opposed to that which obtains in the Notion, is very important, and displays a most deep and unmistakable historical dye. On the stage of Substance, man, as his thought could only then show to him, was under Necessity ; and Necessity constituted then the great subject of discussion : but here, on the stage of notional reciprocity, the prius of which exhibits itself as subjective or of the nature of thought, we are in an element of Freedom, that element being thought or reason, which is but our inmost selves, and which to obey, then, is but to obey ourselves—is but Self-obedience, and that is Liberty. It is historical also, that he who first announced the notion of reciprocity, and in its subjective or notional form, was the same Kant who was the first to demonstrate, as if by exact proof, this fact of our Moral

Liberty or Freedom. Is it not wonderful concentration on the part of Hegel, then, to shut up such enormous masses as the discussions of Kant in single and brief phrases?

Still, there is difficulty enough: this (the fourth paragraph of 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen') is, on the whole, one of those hopeless passages which so often bring the reader of Hegel into the gall of vexation and the bitterness of despair. One can fancy that the dogged German student—to whom at least the language is vernacular, and to whom, consequently, there is nothing extraordinary, nothing actually maddening in the mere sound—passes steadily on right through all this, and arrives at the very end, not only of the passage, but of the volume, with all in his memory. One can understand, too, that so arrived, and so endowed with and by memory, the solid German student will be able henceforth to philosophise like the rest—will be able to gloze and prose, and pose his Begriffe as sagely and as solemnly as any of them. One feels hardly as well satisfied as the German student with this state of the case, however: it is one thing to maunder eruditely in the chair of a Professor, but quite another to see clearly on the feet of a man. To get Hegel by heart may content a Rosenkranz; but the necessity of the Briton is to see. In the Egyptian fog of the first sentence of the above paragraph, however, is it possible to any man, Briton or other, to see? How hopeless the British student of Hegel finds himself in such a quandary as this! Of course, he is at a full stop. If he has not yet tried the second book of the objective Logic, winged by hope from the reference, he tries it now, but speedily shuts it again to begin at the first which is but too evidently the preliminary necessity.

The first, however, is no less obdurate than the others ; and the baffled reader finds himself impotent, imbecile, flushed, on the outside of a vast block, inaccessible, impenetrable, hopeless as the flank of Atlas. But is Hegel always then to remain this intemperate height ? Not so : the historical and other clues which we are here engaged on will be found, in the end (as we have largely seen already), adequate to a successful ascent here and everywhere.

Philosophy has reached in Kant an entire new position. Kant may be named that position *an sich* ; Fichte and Schelling, the same *für sich* ; and Hegel is its *an und für sich*—the absolute power, the pure negativity, that, as absolute power, *reflects* itself with itself, and so is *an und für sich*. Hegel thus indicates that he has consummated the whole task of the ages by bringing the All to the last orb and drop and point of unity in the negative *für sich* ; that is, the All both in the one whole and the infinite details ; and this, too, for itself or consciously, the fully objectivised or filled subjectivity, and the fully subjectivised or vitalised objectivity—which latter result indicates a life that, as it were, eats up all objects into its own self, into its own unity, so that all that is remains at last the *reine Negativität* ; *negative* in that it has negated all into itself ; but *negative*, too, in that it can negate itself into All, the One into the Many as well as the Many into One, Unity into Variety as well as Variety into Unity, Identity into Difference as well as Difference into Identity.

But just this is the Notion, or the Notion is just the pure negativity that negates its One (the Universal) into Many (the Particular), and negates this Many again into the One which is the concrete Singular and

Unity of both. This is but the general expression of the Notion; but no notion is different. No object in the outer world even but is so constituted: a grain of sand even is a universal which has passed into a particular, and has again cohered into a singular. Nay, apart from this constitution, what is the sand? Can any one tell this? Is it sayable? Anything else, in truth, is but abstract reference to itself, and is what the Germans call a *Gemeintes*—a thing meant, a thing *opined* merely. In fact, we are to track and trace the Notion everywhere. Everything runs through its moments. These moments constitute the universal movement. Consider these moments in the form of the three historical periods, of the three physiological acts, or best of all, of the three logical functions! As Seyn (Simple Apprehension), for example, we have the first reflexion of the Notion, as Nichts (Judgment) the second, and as Werden (Reason) the third, which last is the negation of the negation, or the restoration of the first in higher form.

Hegel, then, completed Kant by ascending to the category of the categories—the category as such, the Notion. This, without doubt, he was enabled to effect by a careful analysis of the source from which Kant himself had supplied himself—Formal Logic. The result of this analysis was discernment of the notion, and consequently of the fact, that all Philosophy (Ontology included) had gone into Logic, which fact he henceforth proclaimed. He saw, moreover, that the entire of philosophic thought which had preceded the new position inaugurated by Kant, constituted what might be named an *Objective* Logic. The realisation of this Objective Logic, he was gradually enabled to accomplish by a profound study of the history of philo-

sophy, but always in the company of the Kantian categories and his own generalisation of the same. He found, for example, that a beginning was almost indifferent (the beginning of all philosophy that preceded Kant viewed as an Objective Logic, which is the true beginning, being unconsidered), inasmuch as what was everywhere, and repeated itself everywhere, was simply the Notion. Quantity, for instance, (as seen in Kant,) formally expresses the notion in universality, particularity, and singularity. Nay, Quantity in its notion is but the Notion. Quality is equally so, for its third member, Limitation, is very inadequately represented by this word. Relation exhibits the same nature. Other assonances, but essentially of the same character, present themselves. Thus, Immediate is the unparticularised Universal, Reflexion is the Particular, and the commediated result or notion is the Singular. In short, these and other triads represent the Notion. With this mode of viewing all things, it is not difficult to see that Seyn is just the beginning that would occur to thought; and the history of philosophy demonstrates it to have so occurred, and as such. It is the universality as such, the ultimate generality or abstraction; it is the Immediate—it is formal, it is identical; as it was the first stage of historical thought, so it is the first stage of biographical thought—it is the absolutely first and simple, that is, it is the first of everything and the base of everything. How else can one begin than by saying *it is*? The *is* must be simply accepted; what we have to do is to understand it. It is stupid abstraction to seek to start before *is*, *is*. The beginning as beginning is just *it is*; till you can say that, you can say nothing; and it is the first thing you can say: indeed, should you go back into an ultimate analysis

of what is, it is the first thing you *must* just *simply* say. It is just the beginning of Descartes (in a way) generalised from *I am* to *it is*, or simply *is*, or simply *to-be* or *being*. In fact, it is to say no more than this—to say, with eighteenth-century enlightenment, *God is* : for the three letters there are (as used) a bare word, and wholly undetermined. The beginning of Fichte, the Ego, so also the Identity of Schelling : these are at bottom just the same thought as Being.

It is, besides, the fundamental base : every particular feels—granting it power to feel—that Being is its first and centre and secret and life. Nay, it is the one absolutely inextinguishable entity. Conceive all life withdrawn—endeavour to conceive the annihilation of even Space and Time ; still you will find you cannot get rid of *Being*, of the notion *is*. Do all you can to reduce the universe to nothing, to conceive that it is an accident that there should be existence at all ; endeavour your utmost to conceive that all this is superfluous, and that there might just be nothing ; do this and endeavour this, and you will find even Nothing turns up, ever somehow, the thought *is*, the thought *there is*—the thought of Being, of Existence. That there should be nothing at all is an inconceivable empty abstraction. We are bound, then, to admit a centre of existence, of being, independent even of Space and Time ; and what is this but Idealism ? Where *can* this centre be, which *will* be, even if you destroy Space, where but in thought ? He that will in his solitary walks occupy himself earnestly with such reflexions, will at last find ‘ a light go up ’ to him, a light in which he will see space shrinking into disappearance, and yet being, existence, solid and immovable as the centre and the core of thought itself. We cannot annihilate being, we

must just begin with it and say, there *is*. But this being is a notion, and will take on the forms of the notion. It comes to us in the first form of the Notion, which is the universal, the affirmative, the immediate, the identical, the formal, the abstract, the *ansich*. But just because it is a notion, a true notion, its universal will *part* into the particular, its affirmative pass into the negative, its *ansich* free itself through opposition to *fürsich*, &c. &c. ; and in similar terms the third step to concreter unity may also be described. Thus, then, the whole progress will be a flight ever of three stages, each new flight being always stronger and stronger, till, by guidance of the notion itself and its own native rhythm, we exhaust the universe, and reach the totality—articulated into itself—absolute truth, the Absolute.

Hegel had convinced himself well that this was the method, by historical study, by biographical thought, and by reference to outward nature and the concrete everywhere. Deep examination of Kant gave him the notion, *the form*, while universal study, of the most enormous, exhaustive, and penetrative character, gave him the *material*. The result is still human ; but it is, perhaps, the most stupendous human result which has ever been witnessed.

CHAPTER V.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONCLUDED.

A.

THE beginning is Kant, whose notion was that objects adapted themselves to the subject. This is his Copernican notion—his notion in its simplest form. Its particularisation is, the Categories as functions of Apperception, and in possession of a complex or manifold, in the shape of the sensuous but *à priori* forms, Space and Time. This particularisation constituted to Kant an *à priori* subjective machinery—form—by which our sensations (matter—*à posteriori*, in that they are excited by causes external to ourselves, but *subjective*, quite as much as the *à priori* elements, in that they are simply *our own* states) are taken up and converted or projected into the connected world of experience or of perceptive objects. In this way, each of us inhabits a universe of his own subjective sensational states (still nameable inner *or* outer) reticulated into nexus, law, and system by his own subjective intellectual functions. The sensational elements, further, being incapable of comparison as between subject and subject, are thus—in the more important derivative moral sense of the word—strictly *subjective*; while the intellectual elements, on the contrary, being capable of demonstration, through comparison, as the same in each of us and common to us all, are thus—in the more important sense the word derived from its use in reference to

morals—*objective* ; objective, that is, in their validity and evidence, though subjective in their constitution and place as of the mind and belonging to the mind.*

Further, this world which Kant would have us inhabit is, *theoretically* (that is, so far as direct knowledge is concerned), phenomenal only. All that we know, every actual *object* of our knowledge, is indebted for its matter (*form* merely is inadequate to the constitution of any *object* of knowledge) to sense, either outer or inner : but sense, being a medium, conveys no knowledge of what the thing which affects sense *is*, but only of what or how it *appears*. Still, though all that we *know*—even our own Ego—is phenomenal, there are legitimate *inferences* to the Noumena of Things-in-

* These two senses of the words *subjective* and *objective* ought to be well understood and well discriminated by every student of philosophy. We shall not be supposed to say too much, when we characterise Sir William Hamilton as the self-professed and—in this country—the all-acknowledged conqueror and destroyer as well of Kant as of Hegel, both of whom he certainly treats with an habitual insolence which that ‘even-handed justice that commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice to our own lips’ may yet direct to the detection and exposure of arrogant but baseless pretension even in a man of much formal ability. For, after a careful and protracted analysis, we cannot find Sir William Hamilton, *from the manner in which he understands the words*, whether using them ‘himself or quoting them from others, to have had any glimpse of their second, derivative, and more peculiarly German and important sense.

Yet this is the sense in which the words are principally used by Hegel, who may be even found speaking slightly of the other sense as the common one ; and as for Kant, the ‘Kritik of Practical Reason’ is certainly the most interesting and easy of all his writings, and it is in that work that the sense alluded to—though not quite foreign to the ‘Kritik of Pure Reason’—seems, we may say, to have taken birth ; while in his ‘Streit der Facultäten’ there occur even prominently these formally defining words :—‘Welche zwar subjective Wichtigkeit (für mich), aber keine objective (für Jedermann geltende) enthielten.’ One would have expected a destroyer of Kant and Hegel to have first of all understood Kant and Hegel ; and one would certainly have expected also any one who pretended to understand Kant and Hegel to have understood two of their commonest and currentest terms.

themselves without us, of God above us, and of our own Ego as a free and immortal spirit within us. The sensational elements, to which we owe the matter or manifold or simply *many* of knowledge, are *à posteriori*, then ; and the intellectual elements, to which we owe the form or nexus or unities and unity of knowledge, are *à priori* : the latter, that is, are part and parcel of our original structure and constitution, while the former are, so far as their *occasions* are concerned, derivative from elsewhere, or, as we name it, from experience, *for* which we have in this reference to wait. But the two terms (things), what is *à priori* and what is *à posteriori*, are too heterogeneous to clasp and weld together at once and without more ado. There is an intermediate element in and through which they cohere with each other. This is the provision of a *formal* manifold, a *perceptive* manifold (Space and Time), which, being at once, as perceptive, sensational, and, as formal and *à priori*, intellectual, constitutes a medium in which the matter of affection (sensations) and the form of function (categories, notions) coalesce to the production of this whole formed universe, outer and inner. Shortly, then, the many of affection are mediated into the one of function through the intellectual and *à priori*-placed, but sensational and *à posteriori*-presentant, perceptive forms of Space and Time ; which are thus, as limitlessly projected spectra or cones of illumination, subjective as but within us, but objective as appearing *with* everything from without as *from* without. In this way, then, we see that sensation undergoes the manipulation of intellect.*

* Hamilton's theory of perception can be described, after all, in much the same words ; for it holds sensations to be converted into the formed world by subsequent acts of the intellect. There is a vast difference between the thoughts and the thinkers, however. Kant, who is all tolerance, and gentleness, and sweetness, and receptivity, and

But in this notion of Kant, that which was the spark to Hegel lay here: the Category—as Quantity, Quality, Relation &c.—though a unity, was a unity of a multiple,

breadth, thinks a thought the subtlest in penetration, the richest in contents, the most consistent in nexus, the most comprehensive in compass, the most entire in system, which, till then, the world had ever witnessed. Hamilton, all edge and point, has thought, in emptiness and confusion, with arrogant claims to refute, with arrogant claims to originate, his own self-stultification merely. Hamilton, for example, admits Kant to have proved the *à priori* nature of Space and Time; but has no sooner made the admission, than he hastens, supervacaneously doubling them, to assert Space and Time to be also *à posteriori*, and thus establishes his inability to perceive the true nature of Kant's doctrine—his inability to perceive that it is a wider and simpler generalisation than his own,—his inability to perceive that it is a rationale which contains his own, which surpasses his own, and which refutes his own. The *inferences* of intellect, again, to which he attributes the great bulk of our perceptive possessions, are only spoken of; or, again, they are simply included under a so-called principle of the Conditioned, which is itself only named or spoken of, and never—despite the weak supposititious illustrations from Space and Time, &c.—demonstrated. Curious, Hamilton could not see that Kant gave existence and reality and system to all he wanted and to all he merely named, and that he indulged in such crudities about the nerves, the seat of

the soul, light enabling the soul, as through another eye, to see its bodily eye and extension there, &c. &c.; not forgetting the *quantification of the predicate*, which is probably the most open-eyed self-stultification which lust of originality ever induced a man to begin, or stubbornness of conceit ever forced him to persist in. The fact is, Hamilton could (in Hegelian sense) only *understand*—that is, sequences of two terms, sequence in isolation from sequence. His sharp, quick, keen, but, probably, essentially small faculty took in as much as that with great promptitude and precision; but he could not (also in Hegelian sense) *think*—conjoin the remote through a middle and comprehend all into a system of concrete unity. In *positive* illustration of Hamilton's faculty, for example, let us remark that in reading what he says on Causality, or on that theory (say) that derives the idea of power from a transference to outer objects of our own *nisus* in volition, we see that to this notion the counter-notion has risen up very clear to him—the counter-notion that there is, first, no consciousness *in fact* of any such *nisus*, and that, second, even such consciousness would not yield the apodictic necessity which is just what is wanted. This, again, is saying too much for Hamilton; for it is to speak as if these thoughts were original to Hamilton, which they are not. The truth here, then, is this: Hamilton perfectly apprehended Hume's relative reasoning,

which multiple Kant named the *intellectual* schema. Now—and here properly is the spark—Time and Space are found to possess *sensuous* multiples, to constitute *sensuous* schemata, which accurately correspond with these *intellectual* multiples or schemata. The sensuous multiples, in fact, of Space and Time are only *externally* what the intellectual multiples of the Categories are *internally*; nay, special sense itself is but the same multiple, only placed in degree more *external* still. That is, there is the centre, the unit Self-consciousness; then immediately by this centre lies the multiple of the Category: next to the multiple of the category, again, lies that of Time; the multiple of Space is external to that of Time: lastly, on the absolute outside there lie the multiples of Special Sense, or our actual Sensations. Here are just, as it were, three degrees (counting Time and Space together) of the externalisation of central self-consciousness—three forms of the same unit. To Hegel—to whom, further, the things-in-themselves (generally expressed in the singular as the thing-in-itself) that Kant figured as *causes* of our special sensations, were manifestly mere unnecessary assumptions, mere abstractions of reflexion, and supererogatory additions to the sensations themselves—the subjectivo-objective nature of the whole world sprung up clear at once. That the world of sense is but a repetition *externally* of

and cleared it into its simplest and sharpest. Quick intelligence, luminously distinct statement—such function as this was what belonged eminently to Hamilton; but he overlaid it with conceit, vanity, and the rage of originality, and gave himself opportunity thus to practise his special talent only in a very superficial, desultory scanty, and

weak-willed manner; preferring to the steady exercise of his peculiar gift the easy clipping from libraries of a sporadic erudition which looked deep, but was—as we are sorry to conclude from the evidence of a most anxious analysis undertaken with the expectation of the very opposite result—shallow.

the *internal* category—here at once is the idea both of his Objective Logic and of his Philosophy of Nature. In this way, what we call Hegel's *Idée-Monad* must arise to him—an absolute, a sum of all, a one and only reality that was at once the subject and the object in absolute concrete unity and identity.

But, having got this *notion* of Kant, which now *in* him and *for* him had grown or become the *Idea*, how did he proceed to realise his conception in actual execution? The first step could be no other than to complete the categories, which were now seen to be the secret of the world; for as they themselves were the whole *inner*, it was but an externalisation of themselves that constituted the whole *outer*.

This was the first act, and beyond doubt Hegel was most active and industrious, and indeed wholly unwearied, in studying Kant in their regard; and not only Kant, but all other philosophers, ancient and modern: and not only philosophers and books merely, but Nature without him, and Mind within him, and History as record and preservative solution of both.

This study would conceivably result in a collection; of which collection, as we see still from the mere outside, that of Kant—not only as regards the Categories proper, but also the Notions of Reflexion, the Ideas, &c.—constitutes the bulk still, and still infinitely the best. But even on the principles of Kant, Hegel could not content himself with a mere collection. All in Kant disposes itself *architectonically* (Kant's own word) on, and derives itself *architectonically* from, a single principle. After Kant, in fact, an architectonically-principled system is a necessity, and indispensable. How find a new architectonic principle, then? Categories have manifested themselves to be the whole truth; but Categories are

notions—notions relatively abstract, if in themselves concrete—ultimate generalisations : all that is necessary is simply to generalise *them*, and so obtain their universal, or the Notion as Notion. But what is the Notion as Notion ? It will be no formal identity either : it also will probably contain a multiple like the rest. In this multiple, too, probably there will lie the means of transition ; which being carried out, may terminate in ultimate instance by leaving the Categories an organic system.

Here now, again, Hegel just simply follows the lead of Kant. As Kant went to formal Logic for his *judgment*, or category, Hegel betakes himself thither also in search of his *notion*. Nay, little hesitation was left him as to where specially to look for his notion ; for Kant having already used up *Judgment* for his Categories, and *Reasoning* for his Ideas, formal Logic had now only *Simple Apprehension* to offer ; and Simple Apprehension was, besides, the precise rubric to which the nature of the case referred him (Hegel) in any question of notions, or a notion. As Kant found the forms of the Judgment to be Quantitative, Qualitative, &c., so quite as readily Hegel finds the forms of the Notion to be Universal, Particular, and Singular. These three forms constitute the multiple of the Notion as Notion. But the idea of an architectonic principle could not let these forms again merely fall out of each other : it demanded nexus for them, too, and union in a common whole. Here it is that Hegel manifests great subtlety of insight. Indeed, in this whole matter, Hegel presents vast industry, vast labour, vast thought ; the result of which was—to say it in sum—his modification of the Aristotelian Logic, or his Subjective Logic, for which, nevertheless, it is right to add, abundant materials already lay in the works of Kant.

But here, as specially regards an architectonic principle, and the forms of the Notion itself, Hegel again directly follows the hint of Kant. Kant transformed the classifications of the Judgment—under the rubric of technical Logic, so named—into actual functions of the thinking subject—into actual functions of Apperception or Self-consciousness. Hegel similarly vitalised and subjectivised the technical forms of the Notion. Hegel, following the abstract notion into its abstract movements of life in the actual thought of the subject, saw that that movement was the Universal (in the sense of the all-common, the common whole, the one, the monad, the absolute—for this movement is the movement of the Notion in absolute generality), determining itself to a Particular, from which it returns again to itself, but as Singular. This, certainly, is the ultimate nerve of thought. We certainly, for our parts, ordinary persons in this ordinary material world, separate independent subjects beside separate independent objects, conceive ourselves to be determined by these objects, and to return to ourselves from them or their examination with, so to speak, a mere *colouring*—knowledge. But the position of Idealism is once for all held by Hegel, and the subject accordingly is, in his eyes, self-determined; so that the absolute universal of the subject's innermost or most characteristic movement, is the universal (himself), determining himself to the particular (his state as object), and returning to himself from the same as singular (the notion, the knowledge gained, the reunion of the particular, the other, the negative of the universal, with itself or with this universal). This is the nerve of self-consciousness; and self-consciousness is the Absolute—the dimensionless point that, though point and dimensionless, is the

Universe. Self-consciousness is the universal, the all-common (as in German), or the common whole that is: but it thinks itself; and itself thought is to itself its object, its negative, its particular, which so is just the particular of the universal. But so long as itself is to itself in the form of object, or other, which it considers, it has not completed the act of thought: that act is completed when it returns, as knowledge, to itself as singular, that is, from the particular back into the universal. This is the single secret of Hegel; and his obscurest writing is but an abstract, and so almost mystifying description of all this.

But let us open our eyes to the step we have just taken. Self-consciousness was, to us, a short way back, the centre, and all the rest was as the circumference external to it. But in this mode of looking, the centre is simply a dead identity, a mere abstract formless unity. Now, however, we have given a multiple, a life, a movement to the centre itself; for we have found that it is just the notion as notion, the category of categories, the universal into which these are generalised. Self-consciousness, in short, is now identified with the notion, and all now is in living nexus from the inmost centre out to the extremest verge. But let us open our eyes a little wider, and ask how stands it now with the concrete universe, and what sort of a philosophical or religious creed must we now entertain? Well, we must now suppose self-consciousness the Absolute. There is no difficulty in this word Absolute. Electricity, for example, is the Absolute of the materialists: it is to them the first, the all, and the only, which gradually condenses (or gyrates, it may be) into an opaque atom and all atoms, which again gradually

organise themselves into the functions of life and thought, &c. Electricity, capable of all this, were very intelligibly an Absolute. True, as we have seen, it would still be a defective Absolute, and so no Absolute, for it assumes Space and Time as quite independent of itself: still, what we are required to conceive under the word Absolute will be easier to us from this reference to the industry of the materialists. Well, we are now to suppose Self-consciousness the Absolute. Self-consciousness necessarily, and of its own self, is, and is What is. Self-consciousness is its own foundation of support, and its own *prius* of origination. Self-consciousness, being but thought, requires evidently no foundation to support it: it is independent, indeed, not only of considerations of Space, but also of those of Time. Space and Time belong to it, not it to them; and notions, consequently, of a foundation on which to support it, or of a *prius* to which to attach it, are manifestly inapplicable to it. It is *the* necessity. Since there is a universe, something must have been necessary. Now this something is just Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is the necessity to be. It is in the nature of Self-consciousness that it should be its own cause, and its own necessity, and its own world. Thought is a necessity and the only necessity, and thought is Self-consciousness. But should we be satisfied with Self-consciousness as the One, how account for the Many, the variety of this formed Universe? Self-consciousness is no formal identity, no abstract unit: it involves a multiple, it is a movement. It is to the evolution of this multiple, to the continuation of this movement, and *on its own necessity*—the necessity of thought as thought—that we are to attribute the whole. But all this is very difficult to realise in conception. On the one hand,

this primary vesicle, or atom, or call it what you may, of thought, which grows into the universe, though named thought, seems to differ but little from any supposed primary atom of matter to whose development the universe might be ascribed. In fact, idealism in this way is just a sort of materialism. This evolution of an absolute necessity seems as mechanical, cold, cheerless, and unsatisfactory under the one name as under the other. Whether, so to speak, it is seed-thought or seed-matter which grows into the universe, seems to us to make no difference, and the whole affair becomes not even Pantheism, but simply Materialism—idealistic Materialism if you will, without question of a God at all. On the other hand, and looking at it in another way, where am I to conceive self-consciousness unless in myself? Am I the Absolute? Am I God, then? There is that in the very question which confutes the supposition. I, with my aches and my pains, with my birth and my death, am too manifestly in involution with Nature—am too manifestly in subordination to the powers of Nature, to the very vermin of Nature—ever to entertain any such absurd notion. Nay, it is this very involution with Nature which gives countenance to the counter opinion as maintained by the materialists. My birth and my death are processes which differ in no essential respect from those exhibited in the birth and death of the vilest rat that ever crawled. I am an animal even as the rat is. His death is but the cessation of so much machinery: no soul glides by that whitened tongue as he gnaws the trap that stifles him; no one can believe in any soul there; no one can believe in any exhalation thence. The rat and his birth and his death are but affairs of matter plainly, mere gross matter, despite an anatomical organism and

physiological processes as wonderful as our own. How in our case, then, believe in the unproved, in the un-evidenced allegation of a soul separable from our bodies, which allegation has been got up by some of the weaker brethren in support of their own vanity? Assuredly, when we consider mere Nature alone, the creed of the materialist brings with it a weight of conviction which sets absolutely at nought any such dream as an absolute self-consciousness in mere humanity. How, then, are we at all to conceive this self-consciousness of Kant and Hegel, which is to be supposed the one truth of which all else that is constitutes but forms? Well, in the first place, Hegel might answer, You are only asked to look at the fact; make it conceivable afterwards to yourself, or not, as you may. The fact just is, that all that is (and every item of all that is) exhibits in its deepest base the type of self-consciousness, the type of thought; and even thus far you are secured from the materialist and his mere suggestion of what we named seed-matter. Nay, as we have shown already, a single seed-matter which was, however infinitely extended in Space or prolonged in Time, yet at one certain time and in one certain space, virtually or impliciter this whole formed variety of organisation, thought, &c., would amount to a principle, not materialistic, but idealistic. Fancy Electricity at one time all and alone! Well, it is something invisible, imponderable, &c. &c., and it is a single entity, yet it contains in it the possibility of becoming absolutely all that we see and think now; that is, Electricity, so characterised in itself, was then *virtually* all that is now: what is this but idealism? Even thus your seed-matter shows itself identical with seed-thought—*only* that seed-thought contains Time and Space, which seed-matter does not. But you have no warrant to suppose

seed-thought at all from our doctrine, if by seed-thought we are to suppose a principle impersonal and brute. Thought or self-consciousness cannot be impersonal : thought or self-consciousness, however endowed with power of development and evolution, *always* implies a subject. Now, it was to this subject that your last and most serious difficulty related. But why should this subject appear to you so difficult, and why should you hesitate to name it God ? The self-consciousness of the universe is the divine self-consciousness, and not the human : why should this seem difficult on the Hegelian notion ? Perhaps the difficulty lies here—that we see no provision as yet for more than one self-consciousness, and that we cannot understand the transition from the one divine self-consciousness into the many human. It is to be said, however, that Hegel demonstrates number and quantity to be a necessity of the Notion ; that he exhibits the Notion, or rather the Idea, externalising itself into Nature, to which field man, so far as he is animal, certainly belongs ; and that he afterwards delineates the development of Spirit, in which sphere also man, in that he thinks, &c., has place. Perhaps you are not satisfied yet, however, and the Absolute Spirit, into which as into a subjective focus Hegel would fain direct all, looms out very vague and hazy to you ; perhaps the personality both of God and man seem to you to be suddenly extinguished again in what you named already seed-thought ; perhaps the whole result may seem to you but an indefinite Pantheism, in which if the individual human subject is not himself the Absolute, it is difficult or impossible to say what he is. But why should it be impossible to conceive the divine idea as externalising itself, and man holding of God both in Nature and in Spirit ? The self-

reflecting pool of a pool was mentioned, some chapter or two back, when an attempt was made to illustrate these thoughts: and why should a reflected but self-reflecting droplet of a self-reflecting drop be impossible on the Hegelian system? Hegel has demonstrated the subordination—the nothingness of Nature as against Spirit. He has thereby saved you—who are Thought and a Spirit—from Nature. Now, you are once for all in the universe, you are no waif of chance, you are an outcome of the *Necessity to be*—and this not only in the externalisation of Nature, like the rat, but in the original and primitive substantivity of thought—why not conceive yourself, by continuation of the same necessity, then, Spirit still in communion with the Spirit of God, when the death of the body shall have given birth to Spirit? What is there in the Hegelian system to render such conception more difficult now than it had seemed previously? Does God, conceived as creating Nature, and as creating man the probationer of Nature, that is to inherit an immortality of Heaven or Hell according to the events of his probation—is this conception, taken just so, in any respect easier than the probable conception of Hegel? Cannot we, at all events, rise from Hegel with a clearer, firmer conviction of the existence of an infinite principle in this universe—with a clearer, firmer conviction of this infinite principle being Thought, Spirit—and with a clearer, firmer conviction that man partakes of this infinite principle, and that consequently he is immortal, free, and in communion with God? For, I confess it all comes to this, and that Philosophy is useless if inadequate to this. A philosophy, in fact, whose purpose and effect are not to countenance and support all the great interests of Religion, is no philosophy, but a material for the fire only.

But, it may be objected here, if the end of philosophy is only religion, philosophy will be superfluous, should its end be attainable independently of itself; there is revealed religion, and it brings its own evidence, and why should this cumbersome and vague and unsatisfactory interposition of philosophy be foisted in at all? This, the gravest of questions, deserves the gravest and sincerest of answers.

The answer lies in the necessity of History; and, in the case before us, this necessity of history is named *Aufklärung*. This single word, in fact, constitutes the answer to the question considered. Eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which is the *Aufklärung* alluded to, cannot now be regarded as a temporary and accidental outbreak of Infidelity principally French; it has now taken its place as an historical movement, and must now be acknowledged as a necessary member of the appointments of Providence. The French Criticism, English Criticism, German Criticism, which belonged to that movement, cannot any longer be ignored: on the contrary, all the ascertained and approved results of these must now be admitted into that common stock of the possessions of Humanity which is named Truth or Knowledge. But the position of Revealed Religion does not remain unmoved the while. For one thing, Revealed Religion must henceforth consent to place its documents on the ordinary and common basis of Evidence, historical and other; and, indeed, it is precisely the nature of this evidence which renders desirable any appeal to Philosophy. The humble pious Christian who performs his probation of earth in full consciousness of the eye of Heaven, is certainly independent of Philosophy, and has, to that extent, no call to seek its aid. In fact, it is to consult the interests of Truth as Truth,

to admit here that in the bliss of conviction the humble pious Christian who may never have heard of Philosophy, is probably preferably situated to the greatest philosopher that ever lived. It follows not from this, however, that there is not that in Philosophy which even to the humble pious Christian would constitute a gain. In the singleness of his view, in the singleness of his endeavour, he who would be religious merely becomes narrow and thin and rigid. The warmth that should foster becomes with him the fire that shrivels; while the light, the mild light that should guide, becomes constricted in his strait heart into the fierce flash that misleads. Humanity wells from him; he becomes a terror and an edge from which even his children flee. To give the due breadth, then, to this too keen edge, it may have been that the *Aufklärung*, in the purposes of Providence, appeared; and just such function does Philosophy possess for all, for the fierce in Faith as for the no less fierce in the so-called Reason still arrogated to themselves by the fragments of *the Illumination*. Man must not rigidly restrict himself to a single duty, but must unclothe himself into the largeness of his entire humanity. It is good to know all things—the stars of heaven and the shells of earth, and not less the wondrous entities which Philosophy discloses in the bodiless region of thought as thought. The humble pious Christian, then, independent of Philosophy as regards his Faith, may still profitably resort to the same for the *pasture* of his *humanity*. But Religion is not confined to the humble only; and never was there a time in the history of humanity when the proud heart longed more ardently than now to lay itself down in peace and trust within the sanctuary of Religion, an offering to God. Now for these latter is it that Religion

—since the *Aufklärung*—must appeal to Philosophy. And just to fulfil this function was it that Kant and Hegel specially came. The former, breathing ever the sincerest reverence for Christianity, had no object during his long life but the demonstration to himself and others of the existence of God, the freedom of the Will, and the immortality of the Soul. The latter followed in the same cause, and, in addition to the reconstruction of the truths of natural religion, sought to reconcile to Philosophy Christianity itself.

This, then, as regards Hegel is ever to be borne in mind, whatever doubts and difficulties may afflict the student, that his one object is the reconstruction of Religion, both Natural and Revealed, and on the higher basis which the *Aufklärung*, so far as it has approved itself true to the essential interests of humanity, demands. Very obscure, certainly, in many respects is the system of Hegel, and in none, perhaps, obscurer than in how we are to conceive God as a Subjective Spirit, and man as a Subjective Spirit, and God and Man as in mutual relation. Beyond all doubt, however, Hegel really attempts this and believes himself to fulfil this. It is to be said, too, that the contradiction which is objected to the *thought of Hegel* may be equally objected to the *fact of the universe*. Finite and Infinite, Conditioned and Absolute, both *are*; and of this *fact*, the dialectic of Hegel may be the true *thought*. Confiding in such hope, let us proceed and see to the bottom the true nature of this immeasurable Hegelian claim.

Hegel, then, converted the Simple Apprehension of the technical Logician into a vital function, the Notion *qua* Notion, Self-consciousness in its ultimate nerve—Self-consciousness, so to speak, in its ultimate throb. But he has carried the same lesson of Kant into other

fields. Technical Logic in its technical forms corresponds with actual vital functions; but so it is everywhere—the history of Thought itself, if vitally resumed, will be found to correspond with facts of individual consciousness. The various philosophers are but thought itself on its various stages; and instead of reading this movement as the outer thing which history usually appears to us, we ought to read it as the organic movement of thought as thought. Spinoza, for example, thinking Substance, is but the Notion as Substance developing itself; and abstracting from Spinoza, we can quite easily conceive the process, and consider the process as a plastic movement in and by itself. Passing to Hume, Substance becomes Causality, or the Notion, leaving the form of Substance, assumes that of Causality. Abstract now from Hume, then, and observe the plastic movement itself, which speedily transforms Causality into Reciprocity, and through Reciprocity (in the brain of Kant—for it is not only that Reciprocity follows Causality and Causality Substance in the tables of Kant, but Kant performed the act of reciprocity, he altered the relative position of Subject and Object, or through him this position became indifferent) into the Notion. But, the Notion!—what notion? Why, just Kant's notion—for Kant's notion is *virtually* identical with the notion *qua* notion of Hegel, or Kant's notion just is this notion but *in itself*. Hegel's Notion, in fact, is the absolute universal of thought, the primal or ultimate nerve, which is both the primitive and original form, and the primitive and original matter of all that is; and Kant's Notion is at bottom nothing else, for Kant's Notion is that Objects adapt themselves to the Subject, that things obey or adapt themselves to Notions, that the categories are multiples which repeat themselves

externally—in a word, that the Notion (the category is a Notion) is the original and only vitality. Nay, Kant, though he knew it not himself, really *named* the Notion, and in its ultimate abstraction, when he asked, ‘Why are *synthetic judgments, à priori*, possible?’ This is what Hegel means when he says *the* Notion; and if anyone will take the trouble to read ‘Of the Notion in general,’ with which the Subjective Logic opens, or ‘the Absolute Idea’ with which it closes, he will probably *now, after these explanations*, be able to perceive that Hegel himself, both esoterically and exoterically, though even in the latter case grudgingly and enigmatically as it were, confirms the statement. In very truth, the abstraction of Hegel is often of a quasi-allegorical nature; and the origin, history, and progress of the Kantian Philosophy are very much the matter of the same in the sections alluded to.

Hegel, then, despite his enigmatic disclosures, has well kept his own secret; but the instant one applies the keys which have now been given, the whole flies asunder into ease and light.

The movement of the abstract notion, (it is *relatively* always abstract, though *inherently* also always concrete,) for example, has three steps. In the first, it is the Universal, that is, it is *in itself*, as it were, passively shut together into its own identity, virtually the all and each but undeveloped; in the second, it is the Particular, or it is *for itself*, that is, it surveys itself, has given itself an object, and so has *differentiated* itself into subject and object; and in the third, it is the Singular, or subject and object have coalesced again, or just it has gone together with its own self again, that is, it is *in and for itself*, or rather, *in, for, and by itself*. But these are the three parts also of the one organic logical movement,

which one organic movement of thought may just, indeed, be named the Notion: the first step is Simple Apprehension, the second is Judgment, and the third is Reason or Reasoning. The connexion, perhaps, is best seen in the German words for the objects of these three departments (which together constitute the whole) of Technical Logic,—Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss. The Begriff is the Notion yet in its entirety, in its unity, in its identity, as begripped, begripped, or begrasped together. The Urtheil is the Ur-theil (Ordeal in English—compare theil, deal, and the French tailler), the primitive or first *parting*, the judgment which is a *dis-cernment*, that is, both a separation and an elevation into special notice of a *part*. The Schluss is the shut, the close, the return of the movement to unity. As Begriff, then, there is but unity, self-identity, a mere formal oneness; but as whole, common whole, universal, which we have taken it to be, it yet virtually contains all in itself—all variety, that is, or all particulars; it is only not yet *stated*, or *expressed*, in this form, not yet this form *in position* (Gesetzt): it, therefore, virtually all these, but not yet ‘set’—gesetzt, or formally stated—as all these, is as yet *in itself*; or its own substantial variety is as yet only virtual, only in itself. The Begriff-stage of the Notion is, therefore, only the Notion *an sich*, or in itself. This is the *δύναμις* of Aristotle. But this state of the case is changed in the Urtheil. A process of sundering has taken place—a movement of reflexion; the Notion is aware of something (itself still, and so is the movement reflexion) which is the object, the particular. But, on the ideal basis, object being but subject, we may say that the Begriff, which as Begriff is only *in itself*, is now as Ur-theil, *for itself*: that is, it has an object, or there is something *for it*,

which something again being but itself, it itself may just be said to be *for itself*. As Schluss, or Singular, again, the Notion has returned to itself, and is *in and for itself*. But on this stage, it is again a unity, a self-immediate, and in a higher form than it was at first, because it has returned to itself enriched by the particular which it discerned—or into which it discerned, in the judgment. This new unity, as a unity, and as self-immediate, may again be considered as in the form of Begriff, that is, as *in itself*, and again as passing into the form of judgment *for itself*, and returning into a new Schluss as *in and for itself*.

Now this is the whole of Hegel, and this is his ultimate secret. These are the steps : *An sich*, *Für sich*, *An und für sich*. They have analogues in Aristotle and elsewhere ; but unless they be regarded simply in their derivation from Kant, they will be misunderstood.

One can see that with this principle the idealist has a great advantage over the materialist, so far as a consistent cosmogony is concerned. In the first place, were the theory of the materialist to prove satisfactory, his conclusion would, by its own dialectic, strike round from materialism into idealism ; for an invisible, impalpable, imponderable, and so already very immaterial and ideal Something, like Electricity, which in itself or virtually were all that is, would be, and could be, nothing but idealism. And in the second place, the theory of the materialist is very unsatisfactory : for a single material simple, even if able to add to its size by its own duplication, could never even by an eternity of duplication add anything but itself to itself, it could never add another than itself ; again, whatever may be asserted, or plausibly theorised, no transition of matter to thought, to organisation, to multiplicity, even to a

single other, *has* ever been proved ; and, lastly, could a material One *vary* itself into a Many, not only material but spiritual, and not only *so* material, but also *otherwise* material, and had such process been actually proved, Time and Space would remain unaccounted for on the outside still. How different it is with the ideal principle ! It is at once not only a One, but a Many ; it is at once evidently a principle of transition in itself, and it is proved such ; it is at once adequate to matter (its other) and to thought ; moreover, it is adequate to Time and Space : lastly, in addition, it is the nearest verity to, the most vital fact in, each of us, and it requires neither an elephant of support nor a tortoise of origination—it is *causa sui* and *principium sui*.

But let us apply what we have found in direct explication of the system of Hegel as it stands. The Notion as Notion, as organic whole of the movements we have seen, is to be the architectonic principle which is to be beginning, middle, method, and result to the whole of philosophy. How begin, then ? Why, just the Notion *is*. *Is* is a verity ; so that there *must be* is a verity, and it is the Notion that just *must be* and *is*. The Notion *is*, and the Notion firstly is *in itself*. Now the Notion in itself is the stage of the Begriff or of Simple Apprehension, and the object here on the great scale is Nature. Nature is the notion yet begrasped together, the Notion as before Simple Apprehension, or Perception and Sensation. It is in Nature that the Notion is as yet only latent, only virtual, only potential, only impliciter, only *an sich*. Nature will afterwards appear as the Notion also *Ausser sich* : the two ideas are at bottom not incompatible, but identical ; such is the dialectic of thought and speech ; and this is no prejudice to us here regarding Nature as the Notion *an sich*. But if it is in

Nature that the Notion is an *sich*, it is in Spirit, or in feeling, willing intelligence, that the Notion becomes *für sich*, or consciously looked at; and again it is in the realm of abstraction from both these concretes, from the concrete of a Subject as well as from the concrete of an Object—it is in Logic that the Notion is in and for itself. But thought is the prius of all; therefore it is, that in the universal rubric, the ordinary order is reversed, and what is last as in phenomenal evolution is first as in noumenal fact. In this way, then, we can see into the first inscription found in the Hegelian writings—Logic, Nature, Spirit. Still, there are reflexions possible in an opposite sense which, on the principles of Hegel, would justify the same triad, and in the same order: it is possible to look at Logic as if it were the Notion an *sich*, at Nature as if it were the Notion *für sich*, and at Spirit as if it were the Notion an und *für sich*; and it is quite possible that Hegel, though he directly styles Logic ‘the science of the Idea in and for itself,’ did regard, and did arrive at, his general division in this latter manner: it is certain he places Logic relatively to Nature and Spirit as on a stage of An *sich*, and that he regards Spirit as the highest form of the Idea. The result of Logic, to be sure, is the Idea in and for itself; but even thus the result can be regarded as a new Begriff, as a new unity in itself, and again developed into a new in and for itself, or Spirit.

But, however this be, let us take each of these grand forms, one after the other, and apply the same formula. Let us take Logic, and confine ourselves to the Notion as in the element of the same. Now in this element what is the most *immediate* or an *sich* form of the Notion? Why, that What is, is just What is or Being. What now in the same element is it *for itself*? Here

we have to consider that we are in a moment of reflexion ; that we seek a mediate, not an immediate ; that we say to ourselves, what *is* : What is ?—that is, what is it in its essence, its principle, its true inner nature, its true self ; what is the In-being of that Out-being, or what is Being as *for itself* ? The answer plainly is *Wesen*. Lastly, what is it that unites these ?—what is it that is *in and for itself* ? The Notion as Notion is what is in and for itself, and unites in itself both Seyn and Wesen.

In these three forms, now, we have the three moments of thought as they have manifested themselves in outer history. The last stage, the Begriff, refers to the Begriff of Kant, and is the stage of the development of the Kantian philosophy ; though Begriff, it is a stage of Reason, a stage of Schluss. Wesen is the stage of reflexion, and has reference to the period of the Aufklärung, where an inner explanation is demanded of everything ; that is, where the movement is reflexion, where what is direct and immediate is not accepted as such, but its principle is demanded. This is called also the stage of Understanding proper, as faculty which seeks, and maintains for its own sake, distinctions, which are at bottom, however, but separations and isolations. That this is the stage of Urtheil or Judgment is also well seen. Seyn precedes reflexion ; it is the stage of instinctive natural belief, that takes what is as it is there at first hand before it. We may conceive reflexion to be an affair of the modern world, and to cover the whole field from Bacon to Kant. Seyn precedes Bacon, and Reason is subsequent to Kant.

Taking now Seyn apart from Wesen and Begriff, and applying our formula, what is the result ? Now here the Notion is in the element of Being ; there is no reference to inner principle or to notion : there is no

appeal either to reason or understanding, but simply to sensuous perception. We are in presence only of what is sensuously before us : but still it is that as thought, as logically thought. What is Being as logically thought *in itself*? What is—to wit, what, so to speak, superficially is, as logically thought *in itself*, is plainly Quality. Quality is what is directly perceived as constituting What *is* in itself. *For itself* now is Quality gone into its differences, the negative moment of Quality ; but that is—a little consideration is certainly necessary here—Quantity. In Quantity, what superficially *is*, is *for itself* ; for it is an out-of-one-another, a mere externality. Measure, again, is evidently the union of both Quality and Quantity. The correctness of Quality and Quantity to the formula becomes beyond a doubt on referring to the mode in which Hegel regards both. In the triad Seyn, Daseyn, Fürsichseyn, the same principles will be seen. Being is just the moment of Simple Apprehension, the stage of the Begriff, the undifferentiated universal. Daseyn, again, is the universal gone into its difference, gone into its particularity, and the union of both is the singularity of Fürsichseyn. Seyn, Nichts, Werden, Being, Nothing, Becoming, constitute again a triad of the same nature. Nichts is the negative moment, the judgment, while Werden is the moment of Reason which re-unites the two preceding moments into a new third. Under Daseyn, again, we have Daseyn as such, Finitude and Infinitude : and here the An sich or simple formal identity, the Für sich, or the Urtheil, or the difference, and the An und für sich, or concrete identity, or Schluss, are all apparent. Then under Daseyn as such, there is Daseyn in general, Quality as its difference, and Something as the conjunctive Schluss. Under all the

divisions of Daseyn, in fact, will be found the attempt to begin with formal abstract identity as the universal or common whole, and pass through the difference and particular to the new or concrete singular whole. The same thing is mirrored in Quantity, Quantum, Degree, and repeated in all the sub-forms, as will be seen if these are properly analysed, to an extraordinary degree of closeness. The formula of Identity, Difference, and Reconciliation of both are seen in *Wesen*, *Erscheinung*, and *Wirklichkeit* also. Certainly, the matter occasionally proves refractory; but the formula is never let go, but is ever the principle of transition in every discussion. In fact, the movement of the Notion as Notion, which may be described as the reciprocity of a disjunctive sphere, is attempted to be imitated everywhere. Let us just set down a few more of these Hegelian rubrics by way of additional examples.

Subjectivity, Objectivity, Idea, might almost be used as names for the movement itself. Then Positive, Negative, and Infinite Judgments; Categorical, Hypothetic, and Disjunctive (the last as specially viewed by Kant and Hegel refers to a concrete sphere); Assertoric, Problematic, Apodictic. Under Judgment we do in one or two cases, indeed, find, not a triplicity, but a quadruplicity; but under 'the Absolute Idea' in the conclusion of the Logic will be found some reasonings which, without being directly applied by Hegel to these particular instances, very well explain how the triplicity may be stated as a quadruplicity.

The formula again manifests itself in Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology, and also in the subordinate divisions under each of these heads. Logic and its sub-forms stand not alone either, but under Nature and Spirit the same principle can be everywhere traced.

In short, the beginning is always with the form in which the notion is naturally direct or immediate to us ; it is the notion as it presents itself in its undeveloped virtual *in itself*, in its formal identity or selfness, in its unbroken universality. This is a stage which is subjectively the stage of sensation passing into perception. Logically, it is the stage of Simple Apprehension and the Begriff. Then the middle is the stage of Reflexion : the universal, self-identical unit passes now into its differences, into its *particularities* ; and its particularities are just its differences, for relatively to the genus, the species is particular, and a genus in its species is just in its differences, or the species are just the differences of the genus. This is a negative stage, a stage of separating and discriminating understanding only. Humanity on this stage is in a period of Aufklärung, and sharp emphatic division and distinction is peremptorily accentuated on all subjects and interests. The negative is after all pain, however ; and this stage is always one of finitude, unhappiness, discontent : it is now that Hegel's Unglückliches Bewustseyn reigns. The last stage is the stage of Reason, of Re-union and Reconciliation. Historically, it is a period when the wounds of the Aufklärung are healed.

From this scheme, a thousand utterances of Hegel, unintelligible else, will spring at once into meaning. It does not follow, however, that Hegel will henceforth be quite easy to read. No ; Hegel's dialect remains as abstract as ever : the dialectic of the transition is often in such refractory matter, that it is laboured to insupportable pain, or subtle to evanescence ; and in brief, Hegel will never be easy reading. A useful hint here will be, that Hegel often uses words so in their directly derivative sense, that this sense and the usual sense, as

it were, coquet with each other into a third sense. The reader must always look narrowly at the composition and analytic sense of the words used. Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss, are alone sufficient to exemplify both the analytic signification and the coquetry. The Urtheil, for example, even as the Ur-theil, or primitive *parting*, is still the Judgment, &c.

This, then, is the special origin and peculiar nature of the Hegelian method—a method which claims to be a form identical with the matter : and the claim must be allowed ; for what is concerned, is thought in essential form, and so also in essential matter. Still, however, the system, even in that it is developed on a formula, has the formalism and artificial look which attend such, in a sort, mechanical aids everywhere else ; and after all, it is the matter, or what may be specially discussed, that in the end—despite the discovery and application of an absolute, or the absolute form—will assign the relative value of the total industry. Perhaps, what is really good in the system, would be quite as good if disencumbered of the stiffness of the form, and freed from the stubborn foreignness of the language. This we have yet to see.*

B.

The central Ego is externalised into the Category—that into Time, that into Space, that into Sensation. In ultimate generalisation, again, the form of the Category is Universality, Particularity, and Singularity. In that ultimate form, moreover—of the Notion as Notion—the Category is scarcely any longer to be named *externalisation*, but rather simply *expression* of the Ego ; for the form indicated by the Category is the

* The form, as absolute form, can never cease to have value.

form of the Ego as the Ego. The Ego is, firstly, the Universal ; it is Identity, it is Immediacy, it is *An sich*. The Ego, secondly, surveys itself ; that is, it gives itself, or becomes to itself, the *Particular*, the *Difference*, the *Dis-cernment*, the *Reflexion* : it is *Für sich* (and *Anders-seyn* and *Seyn-für-Anderes* are evidently just identical with *Für sich*, the moment the Ego is the All). The Ego, thirdly, returns from survey of itself with increase of knowledge ; that is, returning into itself (the universal) from or with the particular, it does not just reassume its old identity, but is now the Singular, which is Identity in Diversity, Immediacy in Reflexion, the Universal in the Particular, or it is *An und für sich*.

The multiple of the Category as Category, or of the Notion as Notion, will constitute at once the beginning, middle, and end of the organic whole. But this multiple is the common form of all the particular multiples presented in the several Categories ; and that common form, or the ultimate generalisation of the function of the Categories, is the conjunction of a Many into a One. But this just amounts to the union of *Particularity* and *Universality* into *Singularity*. This, again, is precisely the movement of Apperception itself. The reduction of the manifold, under the Category, to or in Apperception—this is the singularisation of a particular through a universal ; and this is just the form and movement of self-consciousness as self-consciousness, of the Ego as Ego. Nay, the same terms constitute an exact abstract expression of the movement we call *Perception*, and Kant's philosophy amounts to a new theory of this concrete act.

The example of the restoration of external dead forms (the Propositions, Syllogisms, &c. of technical

Logic) into internal living functions was, as was his habit, *generalised* by Hegel. *The Begriff*, the Notion, the ultimate Generality or Universality, in complete abstraction from all and every Subject, substantiated as the objective All of existence—this is not the only result in the hands of Hegel of an extension of the principle of Kant. The same principle was applied to a variety of other, if not to all other concrete fields. There are fields, indeed, where this principle seems instinctively applied by common consent. Textile Manufacture, Ceramic Art, and a hundred other similar industries, are always objectively conceived and spoken of by us : we look at them as distinct objects in themselves, and that develop themselves, and we do not refer to the successive subjects that manipulated them. Now, what we do in such cases, Hegel did in the case of abstract thought. He abstracted from the historical subjects of philosophy, and placed philosophy itself as a plastic object forming itself before him. Hegel has stated this openly himself, but he has not been rightly taken at his own word ; and this most important step for the interpretation of his writings has, as it were, been taken short, to the production of a stumble.

By History itself, Hegel has repeated the same process ; but perhaps this process is more remarkable in its application to Religion. Religion is a concrete sphere of man's world, actually, vitally *there*, and manifesting itself on various stages of development and evolution even like the rest. People talk of the proof for the existence of God who is the object of Religion, as if we could not know this object, nor have religion without this proof. But, as Hegel points out, if we had been obliged to wait for the proof in order

to have religion and a knowledge of God, neither religion, nor such knowledge, would be now in the world. Religion is a fact of man and man's world, manifesting itself in successive phases like every other of his concrete surroundings. Hegel then took the series of its phases, as the successive developmental movements of a plastic object, and exhibited it to us so, in complete abstraction or separation from its complicating and encumbering subjectivities. Now this step of Hegel is precisely the step required to be taken by many well-meaning men now-a-days, to whom the letter of religion seems to cause so much difficulty and uneasiness that they desire to see it still proceeded against in the manner of the *Aufklärung*. The letter of religion, however, ought to be seen to be but a subjectivity, but an external and transitory form, and the plastic object itself which is now, was always, and ever will be, is what alone ought to be looked at. It is but the thought of an infant which in these days — especially after a Hegel — finds itself arrested by arithmetical questions in regard to the Israelites, or by Astronomical, Geological, or other difficulties, in regard to the Bible generally. Hegel is not further behind in his arithmetic than others, probably; yet it was by force of absolute and eternal truth that he regarded the Christian Religion as the Revealed Religion, and it was with consistent conviction that he bore himself throughout life as a sincere adherent of the Lutheran faith. To him, it was clear that the *Aufklärung* had accomplished its work, that to attempt to continue that work was a blunder and an anachronism, and that, on the contrary, it was the business of the new day, assimilating into itself the truth of its predecessor, yet to atone for the damages

wrought by that predecessor, and restore the rights of that higher Faith and Reason to which, in its subjection to the Understanding merely, it—this same predecessor, the Aufklärung—had done so much injustice. How superfluous, then, how retrograde, how simply silly all your Feuerbachs and Strausses (to say nothing of Bishop Colenso, and ‘Essays and Reviews’) would have appeared to him! *So far as happiness was concerned*, Hegel knew well that the humble pious Christian who had never heard of discrepancy, difficulty, or doubt, was even infinitely superior to the profoundest philosopher in existence; and he would have considered it a very thin sincerity, a very painful conscience, a very mistaken conscience, which, in the interests of Theoretic truth, should insist on damaging the Practical (Moral and Religious) truth of a soul so blessed. To Hegel the repose of such souls was sacred. No doubt, he felt that their enlargement theoretically, or so far as knowledge (insight) is concerned, was desirable, but *practically* they were at present well, and disturbance in behalf of theory (knowledge) might advantageously be postponed till the work of the *Understanding* should be fairly seen into, and the reign of *Reason* established. Disturbances there had already been enow; our souls were miserable, and the world was reeling asunder into a selfish Atomism under the influence of the Aufklärung: it was time to stop all that, it was time to bring the Aufklärung itself to the bar and demonstrate its insufficiency: it was time, in short, to complement, and atone for Understanding by Reason, in the keeping of which latter was the higher and highest weal of man—Religion, God, the freedom of the Will, the immortality of the soul, and all the blessings of the Evangile of Christ.*

* Had Bishop Colenso and the Essayists and Reviewers, then,

The philosophy of Hegel, then, is simply this substantive or objective history of philosophy: it is philosophy as plastic object unfolding itself in entire freedom from every external subjective, from every external chronological concomitant or ingredient. With special reference to Hegel himself, we see philosophy, in the relative development, passing from the Begriff of Kant into the Idea of Hegel. This point, however, has probably been generally missed. Men saw, indeed, that Hegel characterised Philosophy as that in abstraction which its own history is in concretion; but they hardly believed him in earnest. They saw here and there some analogy between certain of the categories in abstract Logic, and certain of the actual doctrines of the historical philosophers, Ionic, Italic, Eleatic, &c.; but they never supposed that the Logical progress was to be considered as strictly parallel with the Historical progress; still less did they suppose that the conception was continued into modern philosophy; and least of all that that peculiar Logic of Hegel contained a demonstration of its own derivation from the philosophy of Kant. They believed, on the contrary,

understood their age, instead of thrusting the *negative* on Faith, they would have demonstrated to Understanding its mere blindness to the *affirmative*, and would thus consequently, instead of bringing misery to the happy, have brought happiness to the miserable. It is the business of no man now-a-days to continue the Aufklärung. We acknowledge what it has done for us, but we go our own way the while. No *negative* criticism of the *letter* shall longer blind us to the *affirmative* of the *spirit*. If Christianity, so far as external history is

concerned, must submit to the ordinary imperfections of empirical *form*, it can still irrefutably rest its authority on the inspiration of its *matter*, and strengthen itself into safety and security by a conjunctive reference to the supernatural and revelatory character of history in particular and the world in general, as well as to the demonstration of Reason in the new philosophy. It is the business of to-day to bind up our still-dripping wounds, and not to continue piercing us with the cold point of Eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

that the former was a system *sui generis*, an edifice apart—a system and edifice independent of all other systems and edifices, whether of Kant or others. One feels that this allegation must expect opposition, however. The connexion of the Hegelian system with the history of philosophy has not been ignored by subsequent German students and critics, but again and again formally maintained. Haym, for example, in the very second paragraph of his book avers, ‘as it (the philosophy of Hegel) is the history of philosophy *in nuce*, so it is philosophy *in nuce*.’ It is impossible for words to say in any more direct fashion that the philosophy of Hegel is the history of philosophy. Still, it is to be asserted here that the connexion of the system of Hegel with history is understood in a very different sense by Haym from that which we suppose ourselves at present to entertain. Haym, after all, has not attained to the truth as regards Hegel; but, on the contrary, his whole work can only be styled a laborious failure. Haym represents the system of Hegel as something quite arbitrary and artificial, which has arisen in obedience to a desire to make the Real harmonise with the Ideal, and according to conceptions of Grecian symmetry. This, the result of Haym, is a complete and total mistake: Haym makes Hegel act on an external motive, whereas Hegel really acted on one internal; Haym makes Hegel to labour consciously towards an ideal object, whereas Hegel worked consciously towards a real object. Hegel, in fact, takes philosophy, actual philosophy, as it comes to him from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, and remoulds it onwards on its own objective principles, and not on his own subjective ones—just as Kant receiving philosophy from Hume, attempted honestly to mould it onwards thence. Rosenkranz

and Schwegler seem equally *out* with Haym on these points.

The proof of the truth of what lies here will consist in this,—that, after all other explanations, Hegel has remained as obscure and unintelligible as ever ; whereas—as we presume, that is—after the explanation contained here, the Hegelian system will henceforth be found everywhere accessible, everywhere penetrable. It is a curious thing, this contrast between words and the meaning of words. Haym's words are perfect ; they seem to state the case quite as directly as those of Hegel : yet they refer to facts widely different, and the full force and application of Hegel's words have only now been explained. Neither was it from Hegel's own words in reference to Logic being that in abstraction which the history of philosophy is in concretion, that the light of the true meaning rose on my own mind. This light was only a consequence of vision into the Kantian deduction of the categories, of vision into thought and its externalisation which became thus the universe, of vision into the assumption by Hegel of that point of view, and of a widening perception of a universal application of this principle everywhere in the writings of Hegel. Perceiving that Hegel had discerned externalisation of the multiple of the category to be the real burthen of the industry of Kant, I conceived this discernment would constitute to Hegel his own subjective *first*, and I sought to get on the trail of the actual manner in which he was led to those gradual steps from this first which terminated in his own full-formed, apparently wholly insulated, apparently all but impenetrable, extraordinary system. This trail I thought would be most likely to manifest itself in his Subjective Logic. I set to read this with this notion, and there

went up to me the sudden light: why, that abstract characterisation means Kant, this again Fichte and Schelling, and that other Hegel himself; in fact, it just expresses the development of the Begriff; there it is *An sich* with Kant, here *Für sich* with Fichte and Schelling, and there, finally, it is *An und für sich* with Hegel: that so abstract paragraph, in short, is the history *in nuce* of Philosophy in Germany!! Now here the key was complete, and a realisation effected of the words of Hegel in a field and with a literality of which Haym had never dreamed.

In this there lies a correction for those who are perpetually finding the historical views of the great masters perfectly anticipated in crumbs of their predecessors: for in the light of a subsequent idea words may readily seem to convey that of which, as written and when written, they had not the remotest glimpse. The industry that would attribute the merit of the new light to the preceding perfectly dark words is vulgar, mean, ignoble, false and fraudulent in various ways: it is false and fraudulent, for example, to the great historical name in its injustice; and it is false and fraudulent in that it seeks to procure for itself the credit of research and the glory of originality. Thus, here, words may be found in many writers directly enunciative of the connexion of Hegel's philosophy with the history of philosophy—such words are perfectly direct there in his own works—at the same time that these writers themselves had no perception of the close and literal application which we have just affirmed.

How striking the course of thought: Substance, Causality, Reciprocity, Begriff, Idee! Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel, are all there. The reciprocity lay in Kant, who altered the relative positions of subject and object, and thus was the notion, the notion of reciprocity, *an sich*. In Fichte and Schelling, the notion of reciprocity passes into its differences of subjectivity and objectivity, and becomes *für sich*. Kant is the notion in immediate or universal form; Fichte and Schelling, the notion in particular form. But it is Hegel who takes the notion of reciprocity as such, who converts it into the *an und für sich*, the concrete singular, and exhibits it everywhere as the substantial, original creative *cell*, and as the substantial, original, universal *system* of cells—the *Idee*.

To shut up Hegel in a phrase seemed possible only in the far future: yet what virtually sums Hegel, is pretty accurately conveyed by the phrase, the notional reciprocity of a single disjunctive sphere.

C.

The opening determinations of the system present themselves so abruptly, that one is apt to ask: How did Hegel come upon them? Cannot they be connected in some ordinary way with ordinary thought? Is there no means of bridging over the chasm between ourselves here and Hegel there? Hegel very rightly asserts that all this is discoverable just in what the notion of a Beginning brings with it, and it may be recommended to everyone to think out the matter from this point of view for himself: still, what the above questions indicate as the want of the inexperienced reader is to be found in the genesis of Hegel from Kant, and in the successive notions which arose to the former in the progress of that genesis.

The Categories in Kant had a burthen, a manifold, an ingest, a matter of their own. They and this matter, though subjective in origin, though in us, projected themselves out there into the objects, and came back to us (in sensation) with the objects and in the objects, forming in fact, though unconsciously to us, *a* most important, or *the* most important, portion of the objects. This is the first thought that, conceivably, rose to Hegel in the genesis in question ; and he may be supposed to express it to himself thus : The object is formed by me, wholly by me ; for the thing-in-itself which has been left as an unknown noumenon by Kant, is but an abstraction, and exists not. What is, is my sensation, in my Space and Time, in my Categories, and in my Ego. But each Ego as Ego is identical with my Ego as Ego. What substantially is, then, what necessarily is, what universally is—what, apart from all consideration of particular Subjects or Egos, objectively is, is—Sensation in the net of Space and Time ganglionised into the Categories. All is ideal, then ; but this ideal element (the common element that remains to every subject on elimination of the individual subject) can only be named an objective one. Now in this objective element there are two parts—one capable of being described as sensuous, and the other as intellectual. But these two parts are not wholly discrepant and heterogeneous. The sensuous part, for example, is but a copy, but an externalisation of the intellectual part. The former is but the *other* of the latter. The latter, then, is the more important, and contains all that, essentially and substantially, its other is. In such relation, indeed, its other is to it as nothing. Neglecting the *other*, or the copy, then, let us confine our attention to the categories, to the intellectual part, to the inner part,

of which the other is but the other, or, what is the same thing, a repetition sensuously and outwardly.

Well, these categories declare themselves at once as objective thoughts. So far as there is an *out*, they are out there objectively in the world; or the world is made on these categories, on these thoughts. This, then, is the first Hegelian thought: the category is objective, is in the object or forms the object. To know all the categories, then, would be to know all the thoughts which formed the universe—to know all the thoughts, indeed, which *are* the universe. But such knowledge, concerning as it does the thoughts of God, would be tantamount to a knowledge of God himself.

From this scheme it will be evident, how completely all that is peculiarly Hegelian lay already in the findings of Kant.

But to look more closely, we may say that directly this light went up to Hegel, it would naturally and necessarily be the categories that would engross all his attention—the categories of Kant. What were they? Where had Kant got them? How had Kant manipulated them? Could nothing more be made of them? Here, surely, was a most promising field for an aspirant to the honours of philosophy; and most thoroughly, it must be said, was it ransacked, and turned over, and re-modelled, and re-made, and re-presented by Hegel. Re-presented indeed, so that any trace of the original, or any trace of connexion with the original, appeared irreparably obliterated, absolutely effaced. The same work which established Hegel, however, serves also to discover him; and this is the thorough and laborious and persevering investigation of that which is the hardest part,—the part too universally neglected,—but the essential part, the essential and central secret indeed

of the whole system, of Kant—the deduction of the Categories.

It is curious to watch the manœuvres of Hegel here, the manner in which, when led to the subject, he speaks of these categories of Kant. By way of example, let us refer to a very remarkable Note which occurs in the ‘*Allgemeine Eintheilung*’ of his *Logic* (Berlin, 1833, pp. 52, 53). The correlative text runs thus : ‘ Kant has, in latter times, set opposite to what has been usually named *Logic*, another *Logic*, a *transcendental Logic* namely. That which has been here named *objective Logic* would correspond in part to that which with him is the *transcendental Logic*. He distinguishes it from what he names universal *Logic* in such wise that it (α) considers the notions which refer themselves *à priori* to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole *matter* of objective knowledge, or that it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object, and (β) at the same time relates to the origin of our knowledge so far as it (our knowledge) cannot be ascribed to the objects. It is to this second side that the philosophical interest of Kant is exclusively directed. His main thought is, to vindicate the *categories* for self-consciousness, as for the *subjective Ego*. In consequence of the direction thus imposed, the view remains standing fast within consciousness and its antithesis [of an object and subject, to wit] ; and besides the empirical element of sensation and perception, it has something else left over which is not entailed and determined by thinking Self-consciousness, a *Thing-in-itself*, a something foreign and external to thought ; though it is easy to see that such an *Abstractum*, as *Thing-in-itself*, is itself only a product of thought, and that, too, only abstracting thought.’ The Note itself runs thus :—‘ I may mention that I take frequent notice

in this work of the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous), because this philosophy—its more particular character as well as the individual parts of the execution may be considered as they may in this work or elsewhere—constitutes the base and starting-point of later German Philosophy, and this its merit remains undetracted from by what may be excepted to in its regard. In the objective Logic frequent reference requires to be made to it for this reason also, that it enters into particular consideration of important, more special sides of the logical element, while later discussions of philosophy have, on the contrary, paid little heed to this (the Logical element), have partly indeed exhibited in its regard often only a barbarous—but not unrevenged—contempt. The philosophising which is the most widely extended among us, passes not beyond the Kantian results, that reason can come to know no true material content, and as regards absolute truth that we are to be directed to Belief. In this philosophising, however, the beginning is immediately made with that which in Kant is the result, and consequently the preceding executive development, which is itself a philosophical Cognition, and from which the result issues, is cut off beforehand. The Kantian philosophy serves thus as a bolster for indolence of thought, which quiets itself with this, that all is already proved and done with. For actual knowledge, and a definite real something of thought which is not to be found in such sterile and arid self-tranquillisation, application, therefore, is to be made to the mentioned preceding executive development.’ Now, in the passage from the text, the Hegelian objective Logic is said to correspond partly to the Kantian transcendental Logic. This, then, in one point of view, may be considered as an admission of

the one system being partly derived from the other. The remark, however, is casual and general, and, taking into its scope, as it does, the whole of the transcendental Logic without restriction to the deduction of the categories, it really gives no hint that would lead anyone to put any stress on the connexion, or expect anything further from its development than what lay on the surface, viz., that the categories of Hegel included, among others, those of Kant. No such remark could give the slightest intimation of the secret that lay for discovery in the deduction of the categories. The two points which are stated in characterisation of the position of Kant, are in reality identical. They are given quite in the language of Kant, and not a trace of that turn which made them Hegel's can be found in them. Hegel passes lightly over them, indeed, to state that Kant's leading thought is to vindicate the categories for the subjective Ego (that is, as functions of the subjective Ego), and he concludes by alluding to the defective and inconsistent nature of the Kantian theory. No one from such writing could believe that Hegel was aware that any particular advantage had accrued to him from the Kantian system; and when one reads the bitter, relentless, wholly unrespecting criticism with which we find Kant perpetually assailed throughout the whole course of Hegel's unabridged Logic, the very last idea that would occur to anyone would be that the system of Hegel is contained all but ready-formed in the system of Kant—that it emerged, indeed, from the same almost at a scratch of the nail. Nay, it is Kant's treatment of these very categories (to which Hegel owes all) that Hegel, nevertheless, censures the oftenest and the most unexceptively. A page further on than the last just quoted, for example, we find Hegel

expressing himself as follows :—‘ Inasmuch now as the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-called *transcendentality* of the Categories, the result of their treatment issued void ; what they are in themselves, without the abstract relation to Ego common to all, as regards their nature as against and their relation as towards one another, has not been made an object of consideration ; the knowledge of their nature, therefore, has not found itself in the smallest furthered by this philosophy : what alone is interesting in this connexion presents itself in the critique of the Ideas.’ How very misleading all this writing is ! We know that the *Ideas* are universally considered less satisfactory than the *Categories* ; yet Hegel, when blaming the latter, can bestow a word of praise on the former ! Impossible to think, then, that Hegel lies so very completely in these very categories ! Again, Hegel is perpetually telling us that all his divisions into Books, Sections, Chapters, &c., are only something external, something added as mere convenient rubric for reference *after* the system itself has of itself run through all its own moments. Who can think otherwise, then, than that this system is a peculiar life, a life of its own, and a life apart ? Who for a single moment would be tempted to suspect that in Kant, too, lay the principle and principles of these divisions, which must have all presented themselves to Hegel not after the system, but wholly beforehand ? But let us look at the Note now.

Here he acknowledges the philosophy of Kant to be the basis and the starting-point of the later German philosophy. But *cela va sans dire*—who does not know that ? Is it not common-place that Fichte rose out of Kant, and so on ? Does the acknowledgment lead in the slightest to a perception of the peculiar obligations of

Hegel to Kant? Not by any means : he apologises for his frequent notice of Kant, '*which may appear to many quite superfluous*,' and the award he extends to the philosophy of Kant is made magnanimous by allusion to the defects of its execution and particular details ! In fact, not any particular derivation of Hegel from Kant, but just the trivially current derivation of Fichte and of German philosophy in vague generality from Kant, is what Hegel's words would naturally call up to any reader here. Again, he admits that Kant enters more particularly into the consideration of Logic than later philosophers. But we recollect that transcendental *Logic* is on the very outside of the book of Kant ; the admission, too, is quite slight and general ; and so Hegel's observation here passes as one quite superfluous and of no importance. He points out then, that later philosophers have begun with the Kantian *result*—which result again is *misleadingly* (and largely untrue) characterised in terms of censure—and have dispensed with any knowledge of the preceding execution. But this execution is philosophical cognition, and the advantage of a return to it is hinted. There is nothing in all this to prompt any inference of the particular truth of the case relatively to Hegel. Observe, however, the three words which are isolated from the rest by dashes,—‘but not unrevenge’d;’—they refer to the contempt of later German philosophers with respect to Logic. It is not Logic in general that is in Hegel's head at this moment, however. No ; what is really there is the deduction of the categories, and ‘not unrevenge’d’ is a chuckle aside over what he (Hegel) has gained and they (Fichte and Schelling) have lost in that regard. This seems very clear as soon as the real nature of the relation subsisting between Kant and Hegel is seen into.

But none of these words, whether in the text or the note, would have given the slightest intimation of their *home* meaning to anyone as yet ignorant of that relation: and much less would they have revealed that relation. They are of such a nature, however, that they seem to shelter Hegel from the possible charge of injustice to Kant, and of having meanly concealed the true nature of his vast obligations to Kant—*when these obligations shall have otherwise become known*. They certainly contain the truth *implicitly*; they are very far, however, from expressing the truth *explicitly*; and Hegel must for ever bear the brand of having *grudged the light*. These words, it is true, are not the only ones used by Hegel when he has his own relation to Kant in his mind: there occur here and there others—especially in ‘Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen’—which, like these, amount to admissions, but act the part neither of revelation nor acknowledgment till he who reads them has contrived to obtain for himself the necessary light *from elsewhere*.

The scheme of the Kantian categories we have already presented in such form, that no one who has any knowledge of Hegel can possibly help exclaiming, Why, Hegel is all there! Hegel certainly owes to Kant his main principles in every way, and his leading views in general. Hegel, to be sure, is an intellect of irresistible force, and, in the course of his exposition, there occur infinite originalities, infinite new lights, which are of the greatest import to the development of thought and the future history, probably, of the world. The looking at Apperception, the Categories, the intellectual manifold of these and the sensuous one of Space and Time, Sensation, Free-will, the Antinomies, the Ideas, the Notions of Reflexion—the looking at these and

other such, the materials of the inexhaustibly rich Kant, *in an objective manner*, was a most happy light that went up to Hegel, and quite comparable to that light which went up to Kant out of the materials of Hume. And how interesting these lights are! The light that went up to Hume out of Locke, is as historically visible as those two others; and the true nature of philosophy and the history of philosophy will never be understood as it *is*, by the student of philosophy, till these lights go up to him in the same way they went up to their first possessors. As regards Hegel, too, some rays of the light that rose up to him apparently all out of Kant, must be attributed, as we have said already, to Fichte and Schelling. The objectivising of the Categories and their system constituted probably, in the main, *the* light that made Hegel. Such *implicit* admissions, as we have seen, then, cannot screen Hegel from the reproach of ingratitude to Kant—ingratitude, rude, coarse, brutal in its expression—or from the macula of mean and interested concealment—a macula not one whit lightened or lessened by this, that the concealment was calculated to become, if need were, a grudging and equivocal revealment. That utter insulation of Hegel, that absolute inaccessibility which has remained so long obdurate, that impenetrable hardness of form and speech—we may regard all this—though a peculiar dialect was inevitable—as to some extent matter of intention. It is certain Hegel saw that he was not understood; and it is now equally certain that, with a word about his derivation from Kant, he might have made all easy at once. He was surprised by sudden death, however, at a time of life when he might reasonably have expected to have lived, say, at least some ten years longer; and it is quite

possible that, had he been spared, he might have condescended to explain the enigma and have kindly vouchsafed us some mitigation of the hardness of his forms and dialect.

It is not to be unconsidered, either, that the German polemical tone is of a coarser nature generally than would be tolerable in England. Hegel, in one of his papers and in so many words, calls some one 'a liar!' Hegel, indeed, is, in this respect, always consistent with himself, and Kant and the individual just alluded to are by no means exceptions. Hegel's polemical tone everywhere is always of the hardest, of the most unsparing—always, if we may say so, of the most unmincing and butt-end description. One has but to think of all occasions on which his biographer allows us to see Hegel in conflict, to become aware of a general bearing quite correspondent to the burthen of what has been already said. We hear of him, for example, apropos of one of his most friendly fellow-professors, who, in the programme of the session, had presumed to recommend to his students—out of love—a work of Hegel: we hear of him when in conflict with a Roman Catholic priest who had taken umbrage at the manner in which Hegel, in his public lectures, had expressed himself in respect to a mouse which was supposed to have nibbled the Host: we hear of him in his literary or philosophic societies: and on all such occasions, we cannot help getting to think of Hegel as of a man of an audacious stomach—as of a man of a bold, truculent, and unhesitating self-will. His attitude to Schelling bears this well out also. We saw already, how he broke ground, when his time had come, by writing to Schelling—in what calculated manner, and with what probable views. Well, once in Jena, we have to see him a declared Schel-

lingian. He starts forward at once to the front, indeed, as the most zealous and pugnacious of disciples, and he fights for his master with all the unhesitating brass of an advocate by special retainer. In a few years, however, when Hegel can dispense with prominence on another man's height, the manner in which he 'says' himself 'loose' from Schelling is as hard, ruthless, and determined as is well conceivable. This is to be seen in the preface to the *Phaenomenology*, a work which, previous to its publication, Schelling told its author he looked forward to as the deepest work of the age! That hard heart of Hegel, that relented not, at such words, to mitigate his preface! and to Schelling what bitter commentary on his own expectations that preface must have seemed! Many years later, again, the manner in which Hegel writes to his wife of his having unexpectedly met Schelling at a watering-place, seems a sneer somehow, a sneer that tells the whole story of what Schelling must have thought Hegel at first, and of what Schelling must have thought Hegel at last. It is to be borne in mind, too, that when Hegel was exhibiting the most fervid zeal for Schelling, and demonstrating with an air of perfect conviction the advance which Schelling's position constituted, as compared not only with that of Fichte, but with that of Kant also—at that very moment he had in his desk the first sketch of his own system, a system that lay directly in that of Kant, a system that proved the contempt entertained by Schelling for the execution and details of Kant, and for Logic in general to have been, as we have seen, 'not unrevenged.' It lay in the nature of the Hegelian iron, then, to kick out of sight the ladders of his rise, to provide for self, to take measures afar off, and to set deep plans for the realisation and particularisation of

Self. His attitude in later years to Government coheres with the same view. It certainly lay in the nature of his philosophy to profess Constitutional Conservatism and *perhorresce* the usually inconsiderate and shallow innovator of prejudice and passion; but to connect himself so closely, as he did, with the Ministers of the day, and to become, as it were, their fee'd and recognised fighting-man, their retained gladiator, their staunch bulldog of philosophy on hire—it was in the nature of his own self-seeking that this lay. Let us study and appreciate Hegel, indeed, as long and deeply as we may, a tone will cling to him that still brings somehow involuntarily to the palate 'savour of poisonous *brass*.'

The insulation of Hegel, then, the rubbing out of his own footsteps, the removal of all preliminary and auxiliary scaffolding, the concealment generally—despite a certain equivocal revealment—of his relation to Kant, must be pronounced, in great part at least, an operation of prepense calculation and intentional design. This operation it is our present business here to render abortive; and the means to this lie in a statement of the general nature of the Kantian Categories, of the special light that went up to Hegel in their regard, and of his *probable* steps and mode of transit from this light to his complete system. It was with this statement we were engaged, when called off to animadvert on the blame which, dashed somewhat by certain considerations, must attach to Hegel, of an interested disownment of Kant and concealment of the first steps of his own operations.

What they were—where they had been got—these Categories, then,—this was not difficult to perceive. They were derived from the various classes of propositions, as these propositions presented themselves in the ordinary text-books of technical or Aristotelian Logic.

The various kinds of propositions (or judgments) Kant conceived must relate to the various kinds of the act of the faculty of Judgment itself, or to the various functions of this faculty. The functions of this faculty, then, in such case, were either Quantitative, Qualitative, Relative, or Modal. As Quantitative, again, they were either Universal, Particular, or Singular; as Qualitative, either Affirmative, Negative, or Limitative; as Relative, either Categorical, Hypothetic, or Disjunctive; and as Modal, either Problematic, Assertoric, or Apodictic. But full details occur in the special consideration of Kant himself, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to state now that Kant transformed the technical classes of propositions into functions of judgment, and into certain *à priori* ground-notions of synthesis, correspondent to these functions, and resultant from them. Here, then, we see what the Categories are and where they were got.

But Kant similarly transformed the technical classes of Syllogisms into certain *à priori* ground-notions of Synthesis which he named the Ideas. The function of these Ideas was only Regulative, whereas that of the Categories was Constitutive. But, what is the important point for us at present, the former are a vitalisation of Reason, while the latter perform the same service for Judgment. To technical or formal Logic, then, was it plainly that Hegel was referred, when he sought to investigate the Categories, and endeavour, by the completion of their system, to complete the system also of ground-thoughts, which not only permeated and arranged the universe, but which actually constituted and created it, all that held of Sense being but a copy and repetition of all that held of Intellect.

In this search Hegel found himself, even as regards

the Categories and Ideas, to make many modifications. Still in Judgment and Reason he had, on the whole, been forestalled by Kant. There was one division of Logic, however, which still lay virgin and untouched by Kant, the First namely, or that which has been inscribed Simple Apprehension. Well, as Kant had been so successful with Judgment and Reason, it was at least possible that a like success might attend an investigation of Simple Apprehension also, if conducted on the same principles and directed by the same view. But Kant's Categories were Notions and, as Notions, ought to belong to Simple Apprehension. There was thus a connexion between Simple Apprehension and Judgment; they were not wholly isolated and incommunicable; the forms of the one might pass into the forms of the other; the one, indeed, might be but a gradation of the other. Here we have in perfection one of the most special and peculiar of all the Hegelian levers. Kant himself blindly expressed this in relating the Categories to Apperception or Self-consciousness: he failed to perceive that, as Notions, they might have been set down as ground-acts of Apprehension, and that Apprehension then might be set identical with Apperception or Self-consciousness. Had Kant seen this, he would probably have utilised in his peculiar way, and adopted into his system, the whole body of Technical Logic.

But again, the Categories are generalisations, and the question in that light is spontaneous: Can they not be generalised further? As *the* original functions of Apperception itself, this at first sight seems impossible, and they themselves ultimate. Still they are Notions, and the universal of them is *the* Notion. But the Notion as the Notion is just the Faculty as the Faculty, Apprehension as Apprehension, or Apperception as Apperception.

Here is another example of gradation in the same matter, another coalescence of differences into identity : the faculty and the function were both seen to constitute, so to speak, the same stuff and to possess the same life. There is involved here another of the great Hegelian levers—the elimination, that is, of faculties ; the elimination, indeed, of all substrata of functions, qualities, thoughts, &c.—the reduction of all to *Gesetz-seyn*, which we may translate, perhaps, reflexion, or adjectitiousness.

Again, the one function of all the Categories is, the conversion of the Universal, through the Particular, into the Singular. Such is the absolutely generalised function of the Categories as they are understood by Kant. This, then, is *the* Notion, and this is the inner movement of the Notion as Notion. Nay, such is the inner movement of Apprehension, such is the inner movement of Apperception itself. This is the pulse of Self-consciousness ; this is the nerve of the Ego. This movement, this pulse, this nerve, is what is *ultimate*—rather what is *first*—in the constitution of this universe. This is the First and One (throb) which has expanded into the All : this is Vitality ; this is the Infinite Form and the Infinite Matter ; this is the Absolute ; this is What is.*

The conception of the Notion as Notion, then, was not for Hegel far to seek ; and this notion, with such views, and so instructed by Kant, he could not very well have missed. The Categories were but generalisations ; it was but natural to demand a generalisation of *them*. This was imposed on him, too, by his very necessity to attain a First and One. Nay, consideration of Kant's Apperception itself would lead him to Simple

* This, we may add also, is how sible, or *the* Notion is *the* *a priori* *Synthetic Judgments* are possible, or *Synthetic Judgment*.

Apprehension, and to the same thought. He was in search of a principle by which he might obtain a beginning, secure a method of progression, and complete a system : such quest as this lay at once to hand, the instant he perceived the reach of the Notion of Kant as expressed in the Categories, especially when these were objectivised. Hegel knew from Kant that in every Notion there was matter and form ; and it was not difficult for him to perceive that what Kant called the intellectual schema, was the multiple contained in the Notion and tantamount to its *matter*. In regard to the Notion as Notion, it would be with joy he would perceive that there Matter and Form—as was a particular want of Schelling—coalesced and were identical ; that the movement which constituted the Form of the Notion, constituted also its Matter. Kant himself defines a pure notion to be such as arises out of the understanding, ‘ *auch dem Inhalte nach*,’ also as regards matter. (Logik in Kant’s Works, p. 270.)

At page 271 of the same work, these words might have proved suggestive to Hegel :—‘ The Idea does not admit of being obtained by Composition (Aggregation) ; *for the Whole is here sooner than the part.*’ At all events, this is a main tenet of Hegel on the question of the original *tortoise* of the universe. There cannot be a doubt that Hegel had examined with great attention the Logic of Kant ; and there is much matter there capable of proving richly suggestive. At page 274, we have the following, after an admirable account of Abstraction in general which we can recognise as the source of Hegel’s incessant word *abstract* :—‘ The abstractest Notion is that which has with none that is different from it anything in common. This is the Notion of Something ; for what is different from it is

Nothing, and has therefore with Something nothing in common.' Again, from page 279, these words might be very significant for Hegel : — ' By means of continued Logical Abstraction there arise always higher, as, on the contrary, by means of continued Logical Determination always lower Notions. The greatest possible abstraction yields the highest or abstractest notion—that from which there cannot be any further predicate (or significate) *thought-off*. The highest completed Determination would yield a thoroughly determinate Notion, or such a one that no further significate could be thought *to it*.'

Altogether, it was not difficult for Hegel, once possessed of that glimpse by which Ego was seen to be externalised by the Category, the Category by Time and Space, and these by Sensation, to perceive that Apprehension itself (or Apperception or the Ego) perfectly generally expressed, would constitute the Notion, and that a thorough completion and articulation of a system of Categories from the Notion would constitute, in the strictest language, a consummate philosophy, or the entirety of those universal principles according to which the universe was organised, and of which the whole outward was but a repetition. As regards his method, too, it was plain that if he was to begin with what was most general, he must proceed to what was most particular (the Singular), and thus his progress would be, not a generalisation, but a specification or individualisation—logical Determination, in short. The passages just cited from the Logic of Kant, then, may perhaps not be without bearing on the beginning, progress, and termination of Hegel. For his beginning is that which is abstractest of all, his progress logical Determination, and his termination that which is concretest of all. In this, what is last supports and is ground to all that

precedes ; for it is verily that which is ; and all that has been done, has been to begin with the simplest link of the complicated chain that constitutes the interior of the ultimate principle, and let all manifest itself in development towards this ultimate concrete whole. This whole, again, is with Hegel ‘ sooner than the part ; ’ the Seyn is just the Seyn, or What is, is ; and Hegel conceived that, as a philosopher, he had nought to do but demonstrate this Seyn in its intellectual principles and constitution ;—and thus Hegel was an empiricist.

Hegel has clung very closely to Kant, then, and his special guide seems to have been frequently the latter’s special Logic itself. There are additional proofs of this. The work in question begins thus :—‘ Everything in Nature, as well in the lifeless as in the living world, takes place according to rules.’ Now, one may say that Hegel’s single industry has been to carry out this into all and every : his one idea has been to exhibit *all* as an organism, and *every* as a necessary member of the same. Then, again, Kant follows this up by observing that at the bottom of the crude, unconscious concrete that, in the first instance, every and each human interest is seen to constitute, there lies an intellectual pure system which acts, as it were, as the supporting skeleton and as more. For instance, under Speech, which, as it first *shows*, is so very crude a concrete, something so very unconscious and uninvestigated, there lies a very decided pure intellectual system, on and round which all the rest gathers as so many motes on and round a system of pure rays—Grammar (a Grammatik). ‘ Thus,’ says Kant, ‘ for example, Universal Grammar is the form of language in general : some, however, speak, without knowing grammar ; and he who speaks without knowing it, really has a gram-

mar and speaks according to rules, of which, however, he is unconscious.' He then continues:—'Just as all our faculties in general, Understanding in especial, is in its acts astrict to rules, which may be investigated by us. Understanding, indeed, is to be regarded as the source and as the faculty of rules. . . . It is eager to seek rules, and satisfied when it has found them. The question occurs, then, as Understanding is the source of rules, on what rules does it itself proceed? . . . These rules we may think *for* themselves, that is, *in abstracto*, or without their application [which is accurately the moment of understanding, judgment, Ur-theil, abstraction, or *für sich* in Hegel]. . . . If we now, however, set aside all ingredients of knowledge [it would be more intelligible to an Englishman or a Frenchman to say *Perception*], which derive only from the objects, and reflect solely on the operation of understanding in general, we discover those rules which in every respect, and quite irrespective of any and every particular object of thought, are absolutely necessary, just because without them we should not be able to think [or perceive] at all. These rules, therefore, can be seen, and seen into, *à priori*, that is, independently of all experience, because they concern merely the conditions of the operation of understanding in general, be it pure or empirical, without distinction, indeed, of the objects at all. . . . Thus the science which consists of these universal and necessary rules, is merely a science of the Form of our cognition through understanding, or of thought. And we may form for ourselves, therefore, an Idea of the possibility of such a science, in the same way as of a Universal Grammatik (or Grammar), which shall regard nothing further than the mere form of Speech in general, apart from words, which

constitute only the matter of speech. This science of the necessary laws of understanding and reason in general, or—what is the same thing—of the mere form of thought in general, is called Logic. Thus as a science which considers all thought in general, irrespective of the objects, which are only as the matter of thought, Logic will constitute the foundation of all the other sciences, and must necessarily be regarded as the *Propaedeutic* of all exercise of the understanding.’ Most readers read such sentences without realising the thought of their writer; they seem to them to allude only to what is called formal Logic, which, everybody knows, abstracts from all *matter* of thought; and they pass on without any consideration further. Not so Hegel: he enters into the very mind of Kant, and sees what *he* sees. But what Kant sees is not the Aristotelian Logic, but a pure *Form*, which, subjective in that it is of intellectual or mental origin, is yet veritably objective, a pure objective shape, to which every actual material object must congrue. Kant sees, in fact, a diamond net of intellect—pure form—which the *matter* of special sense (as it were, falling and condensing on the net) crassifies into actual outer objects. This is in rude outline Kant’s new theory of perception, which, it is doubtful, any mortal has hitherto understood, unless Hegel. Hegel, whether he called it perception or not, saw perfectly well what it was, and spent his life in the realisation of it. He saw Kant’s notion here—which he could afterwards identify with the Notion as Notion—he saw that of which Kant said ‘we might form an Idea,’ and of this he just—by infinite labour—formed (or realised) *the Idea*: Hegel’s *Idee* is nothing but Kant’s Idea (but, as here in Kant, the Idea is but *notion*, but *an sich*) of the possible science suggested.

Kant *ideates* an *à priori* diamond objective net of perception: Hegel realises the same as a systematic articulately-detailed whole—his Logic; which, viewed as an objective whole, he names (probably with reference to the word as used here by Kant)—the Idea. Kant's *transcendental* Idea, then, is now to be conceived as simply developed unto the *Logical* Idea of Hegel. Or, to say it otherwise, the Logic of Hegel is intended to *be* in absolute truth all that Kant *pictures*; it would be the diaphanous skeleton, the inner, necessary, pure, abstract system, pure as a Grammatik, pure as a Mathematic, pure as an Algebra—pure as an ultimate, perfectly generalised Calculus—on and round which the innumerable opaque motes of outer matter should gather, group, and dispose themselves into the concrete world of thought and sense. Hegel set himself in earnest to realise the idea of Kant, and sought to find a pure *Noetic* of Knowledge (Logic) as others seek to find the pure Grammatik of Speech (Grammar). If Hegel's Logic, indeed, is not this, it is nothing. But it is this—perhaps not perfectly—it is this, and has discovered those pure essentiaes of thought which are the spring and levers of the whole. For example, a whole universe of concrete sorrow, whole lifetimes of concrete anxiety, concentrate themselves in those simple essentiaes *Finite* and *Infinite*—concentrate themselves, and demonstrate themselves, and answer themselves, resolving and clearing themselves into insight and peace. Our most earnest English writers now-a-days—to confine ourselves to writers—may be conceived as just staggering blindly back at present caught in the last draught of the receding Aufklärung. 'To be blown about the desert dust,' or 'sealed within the iron hills,' a particle of matter: this they ponder, all of them.

To them, 'time has become a maniac scattering dust,' 'life a fury slinging flame,' 'and men but flies, that sting, lay eggs, and die.' The great bulk of earnest men, now-a-days, in short, longing for Religion, yearning for God and Immortality, weeping towards Christ, longing, yearning, weeping towards all those essential truths of Humanity which the light of the understanding, brought to the fierce focus of the *Aufklärung*, has shrivelled into ashes within their hearts—such men may all be conceived as at certain seasons sitting hour after hour in gloom and silence pondering these things, and rising at length with a sigh, and the mournful refrain, No hope, no hope! But these two words, *Finite* and *Infinite*, being discussed in ultimate abstraction (which is their truth), in Logic proper—at once the knot resolves itself and the cloud lifts.

Kant, in the same sense, characterises this conceived Logic as the 'Universal art of Reason, the *Canonica Epicuri*,' and that, as such, 'it borrows no principles from any other science.' And again, he says—'In Psychology we consider how thought is seen and known usually to proceed, not how it must or ought to proceed;' but 'in Logic we do not want to know how the understanding is, and how it thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking—but how in thinking it must and ought to proceed: Logic is to teach us the correct use of the understanding, that is, that use of understanding that agrees with its own self.' And here we are not to deceive ourselves that the burthen of the ordinary definition of Logic, the right use of Reason, is what is aimed at. No; what is aimed at is something very different: it is the intellectual objectivity of knowledge as opposed to the sensuous objectivity of the same; for even of the latter, the former is the

essential antecedent, or there is no sensuous objectivity in which the intellectual elements do not constitute the essence. How very earnest Hegel has been with all this, and how completely he has assimilated it, is, on accurate acquaintance, very plain. 'The question,' says Kant, 'is not what and how much does understanding know, or how far does that knowledge extend ; but in Logic the question is only how will the understanding know its own self,' that is, its own pure form, and forms, that lie *in abstracto* under the crass and opaque concrete. Again, he defines his transcendental Logic to be that 'in which the object itself is conceived as an object of mere understanding,' which surely is tantamount to calling said Logic an objective Logic. And he winds up with the following express definition in small capitals :—'Logic is a rational science not as regards mere form only, but as regards matter also ; a science *à priori* of the necessary laws of thought, but not in respect of any particular objects, but in respect of all objects in general ;—a science, therefore, of the correct exercise of understanding and reason in general, but not subjectively, that is, not with reference to empirical (psychological) principles *as* the understanding *does* think, but objectively, that is, with reference to *à priori* principles *as it must and should* think.' What study Hegel has made of all this, his Logic demonstrates. Here, again, Hegel's idea is well seen :—'Technical or Scientific Logic is a science of the necessary and universal rules of thought, which can and must be known *à priori*, independently of the natural exercise of understanding and reason *in concreto*, although they can be first of all discovered only by means of the observation of said natural exercise.' Here, too, is something very Hegelian :—In this Logic 'not the smallest regard is to

be entertained whether of the *objects* or of the *subject* of thought.' This is accurately the Hegelian Logical Idea, which is (though *in abstracto*) the concrete thought of all that is, elimination being made of all reference to any actual empirical object or any actual empirical subject.

Kant, to be sure, declares that Logic 'can be no science of speculative understanding,' for so it were an 'organon' for discovery, acquisition, and addition, and no mere '*propaedeutic*' or 'canon' for regulation and 'dijudication;' while Hegel, on his side, seems to have converted Logic just into this speculative organon. Nevertheless, this very act of Hegel may be not unconnected with this very remark of Kant. As regards method, again, Kant says:—'By Method is to be understood the mode and manner in which a certain object, to whose cognition this method is to be applied, may be rendered capable of being completely understood: it must be taken from *the nature of the science itself*, and, *as a necessary order of thought thereby determined, it does not admit of alteration.*' Again, he accurately distinguishes Philosophy from Mathematic, and points out the absurdity of applying the method of the latter to the former. Many passages, both in the *Kritik of Pure Reason* and in the *Logic*, can easily be found to prove this, and we need not quote. In reference to philosophy, he says there belongs to it, 'firstly, an adequate complement of rational facts; secondly, a systematic articulation of these facts, or a synthesis of the same in the Idea of a whole.' Again:—'Every philosophical thinker builds, so to speak, his own work on the ruins of another; none has ever been realised, that was complete in all its parts.' Then we have much about wisdom as opposed to knowledge, which repeats itself in the practical sections of Hegel ('Miso-

logie,' found here too in the Logic of Kant—but that is Plato's), and then there occurs this eminently Hegelian sentence: 'Philosophy is the only science which is capable of procuring us this inner satisfaction [of wisdom, that is, in act as well as knowledge]; for it closes, as it were, the scientific circle, and through it then only do the other sciences first acquire order and connexion.' Hegel's historical idea seems here too: 'He who would learn philosophy, must regard all the systems of philosophy only as the history of Reason in its exercise,'—of Reason, that is, as it has historically manifested itself in actual operation. Schelling also has this thought at full in the 'Transcendental Idealism;' yet it is to be observed that though Kant's words, or Schelling's words, name *now* the Hegelian Idea, neither Kant nor Schelling saw the Hegelian Idea then.

We are not to lose sight, meantime, of the bearing which Logical Determination has on the method and system of Hegel. The common secret of all these philosophisings, Kantian, Fichtian, Schellingian, was generalisation or abstraction. It lay at hand then, that the most abstract notion would, in a system, be the natural commencement. But, this accomplished, the question would then arise, how are we to *proceed*, in what manner *advance* from this beginning? It cannot be by further abstraction or generalisation, for we suppose ourselves at the abstractest and most general already: determination, then, specification, is the only principle of transition left us. But, supposing this to be the method we must adopt, how put it into operation, and where end it? are the next questions. As regards putting it into operation, that is possible by finding for every genus the differentia by addition of which it (the genus) will be transformed into the

immediately subordinate species ; and as regards an end, that will take place, when we have reached the most concrete conception that belongs to this universe. *The beginning*, then, will probably not be difficult, inasmuch as it is just the *genus summum*, or the last product of abstraction : neither presumably will *the end* be difficult, as, if we find the true method, it will come of itself. The whole difficulty now, then, relates to this method : *how*, being in possession of a *genus*, can we find, without addition of any other element, the *differentia* which will convert it into its first *species* ? This seems impossible ; for Logic holds that the genus is the common element, while the *differentia* is that which is peculiar to the species,—just that, in short, which distinguishes the species from the genus. We are at once at a stop here, then ; and it seems that even if we had the *beginning*, the *summum genus*, any advance from it would be impossible, as it is a *differentia* that is the necessary instrument of movement, and a *differentia* lies not in the genus, least of all in the *summum genus*, but is to be found only in the species. Now, in what has been said lies the germ and motive of all Hegel's reasoning as regards a beginning, and of that principle as well which is named the Hegelian principle *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, and which has always been objected to Hegel as his absurd contradiction of all the laws of Logic, of thought, and of common sense—objected to him, too, invariably with that shallow exultation and exaltation peculiar to the opponent who is utterly ignorant of the man he fights, as if the mere objection were an absolutely unanswerable and utterly annihilative refutation and reply. But that Hegel is right, there is the universe for proof : God himself could not have created the world, had the *summum genus* been *only* *summum genus*, and had a

differentia required to be waited for, from an elsewhere that existed not. It all lies there. The beginning and the movement of Hegel ought to be now perfectly intelligible, and so far, likewise, reasonable. There are truths absolute—incapable of being changed even by absolute power, and this is one of them: the three angles of a triangle are not more absolutely equal to two right angles than the unity of difference and identity is absolutely true—since the world *is*. Logically expressed, what has been said amounts to this: Logical Determination is only possible if the genus really contains and implies the differentia of the immediately following species. Now let us try this in actual working; let us find the summum genus, and let us see whether the differentia be not held in it at least *impliciter*. But here we are just again saying, though in another form, what we have already so often repeated. The Genus is the Begriff, the Differentia is the Ur-theil, and the Species is the Schluss: we have not yet got beyond *An sich*, *Für sich*, and *An und für sich*! The same movement, the same form press ever in upon us; and they are those of the Notion. But to apply.

Seyn, Being, is the most abstract notion of all. Everyone will find this the case on trial: Kant directly states this both in the conclusion of his Transcendental Analytic, and in his Logic; and Hegel repeatedly points out that it is equivalent to the sum of all realities. Seyn is the beginning, then—Seyn is the summum genus: does it contain *impliciter* the Differentia? Or Being is the Begriff, what is the first Ur-theil both as parting and judgment? But this was identified but lately as the moment of abstraction or *für sich*: what, then, is Being in absolute abstraction, or *für sich*? Why, Nothing. At first glance, then, it seems wholly

hopeless to search for any differentia here, where all is vague and indeterminate, and Being itself has but the value of Nothing. But what is to come after? or what is the first species under Being? Why, in Being as Being, there is as yet nothing; it is a sea from which not a scale of distinction can be landed. The first step in such a sea towards a distinction must be a Becoming. Becoming, then, is more particular than Being: by what is it more particular? Being implies that there is; but Becoming implies both that there *is*, and that there *is not*. *Is not*, then, or simply *not*, is what it contains more than Being. But if, by any means, we could have found this *not* first of all, though implicitly, in Being we should have found the differentia necessary for its conversion into the species Becoming. But we found this: absolutely abstract Being was just at the same time Nothing; Being as Being was predicateless, &c. &c.

The same process applied to Becoming will detect there, implicitly contained, the differentia that converts it into Daseyn; and Daseyn conveys that there not only is, but that there is actually *there*, or *here*, or *now*. Quality is found impliciter in Daseyn, and Daseyn is thereby converted into Etwas, Something. This, in short, seems the course of the march of Hegel from beginning to end.

Of course, it is easy for us, with Hegel's scheme before us, to state the examples; while for Hegel the construction of his scheme, with all that he had to assist him in the general conception of Determination through the addition of differentiæ, would prove very difficult. Still, though he must have had great trouble, the receipt being so very plain, the accomplishment of the process would plainly be very possible to patient trial.

It is to be understood that Hegel did not look at the process as altogether external, artificial, technical form. He had come upon it, doubtless, when endeavouring to accomplish for the matter of Simple Apprehension what Kant had accomplished for that of Judgment and Reason, &c. No doubt, Hegel vitalised logical Determination into the process of the concrete; and, no doubt, Hegel was perfectly correct in this. The concrete, and the ultimate principle of the concrete—let us even name it God—must contain identity, and it must also contain diversity. Progress is possible only from *this* to *that*; but these very words imply *other* and *others*, diversity. But God is not to be viewed as two-fold—in God's unity, then, identity and diversity must both cohere, without prejudice the one to the other. This is a deep subject: Hegel, however, has probably thought it out; his result being that difference is as essential to the Absolute—that is, to this universe, and the principle and principles of this universe—as identity itself. So long, indeed, as we remain by identity, by that which is always self-identical, and nothing but self-identical, march there is none; but in that God created the world, he demonstrated that self-identity was not alone what constituted *him*. Negation is as necessary as affirmation, then;—nay, Spinoza asserts *omnis determinatio* to be *negatio*, implying thereby that the particular arises only by particularisation, that is, by *differentiating*, by *differencing* the conceived original identity. In all philosophy, then, negativity is an essential constituent, as it is an essential constituent of the eternal frame of things. Kant had his negative in the form of a Thing-in-itself, and Fichte could not move without the same principle, but rarified into the *Anstoss*, the appulse, or reflecting plane of impact.

Hegel, for his part, like the royal thinker he was, resolves these negatives into the ultimate negative of *nothing, nought, or not*, negation as such. In fact, the ultimate principle is to him the pure Negativity; and even such is Ego as Ego, or Self-consciousness as Self-consciousness: even such is *the* Notion; for, like Ego, on the one side in every case it negates all difference into its own identity; while, on the other side (like Ego also in the case of Idealism, or as God), it negates its own identity into all difference. Here is a glance into the very depths of Being, and it belongs to Hegel. Very probably, he made progress easy to himself by the ready formula, Find your *differentia* (always *implicit* in the *genus*), and add it *explicit* to the *genus* for the formation of the *species*: still, he had in his mind concrete truth in the shape of the necessity of difference to identity and of all the consequences of the same. The Ur-theil, the *dis-cernment*, is quite as necessary as the Begriff, the *conception* (here for notion). What is *in itself* must become *for itself*; and unity stepping asunder into *different*s, that is Ur-theil, that is *dis-cernment*. We are not content with the immediate identity of Sense, for example; we demand the mediacy, the explanation of Understanding, which is a movement between *different*s. Hegel's principle, then, is more than mere formula: what, in fact, we here refer to under the series genus, differentia, and species, is identical with that expression of his principle which Hegel generally uses—namely, That everything passes into its opposite, but again resumes the same to production of a higher form: for what else in logical language is this, but just that the *genus* contains the *differentia*, and, by manifesting and resuming the same, it passes into the *species*? This logical language, then,

is no mere dead formula, not a mere form in a book ; it is a form that pervades and animates the universe itself. The identity of the seed passes into its differences and becomes the tree. As Hegel's own illustration has it, bud, blossom, fruit, follow each other, refute each other ; yet the last still contains the others, and it is only identity which has passed into its differences. Hegel, face to face with nature, saw that this principle was true ; face to face with history, he found it true ; face to face with thought in his own soul, it still showed true ; and face to face with the history of philosophy, it was no less true. Everywhere he tried it, and everywhere the answer was the same. Still, it is to be understood that even a Hegel cannot escape the appearance of formalism and mechanism which the application of a formula always entails. There is a certain formal mechanism in the very initial questions, What is the absolutely abstract genus ? what is the absolutely abstract differentia ? and in the answers, The absolutely abstract genus is the absolutely abstract identity—the absolutely abstract sum of all realities, which is just Being as Being ; the absolutely abstract difference can only be Nothing ; the absolutely abstract species, from the addition of such difference to such identity, can only be the absolutely abstract Becoming. These, perhaps, are the bottom thoughts ; but absolutely abstract thoughts look very formal beside these *material* things, sky and earth and air, and bird and beast and man. It is but formalism, it is but a dry gulp to us to take down Logic as creating principle of this Nature—yet still what help ?

Thus, then, at all events, tracing Hegel from Kant, we have gone deep into the former, and have well-nigh surprised, perhaps, his whole secret. We can throw

yet another light, however, which of course hangs with what has been already said. Hegel consistently sought in the history of philosophy for the thought which had immediately preceded his own, in the belief that the nexus between them would prove the differentia of the latter. Or we may say this otherwise.

The results reached can be conceived as accruing to Hegel from an examination of the subjective side, as it were, of the industry of Kant. There is yet another side of the same industry, the objective. It, doubtless, occurred to Hegel spontaneously, that differentiation was the principle of the objective and historical progress of thought in outward manifestation as a succession of thinkers. Still this also, so far as the expression is concerned, lies in Kant. We have seen already the sentence, 'He who would learn philosophy must regard all the systems of philosophy only as the history of the exercise of Reason,'—that is, the systems of philosophy are the history of Reason itself. Schelling also has the same thought in complete fulness, and, we may add, that thought also which Hegel realised in the 'Phaenomenology.' Both thoughts hang together, indeed, and belong to the same fact. Indeed, the vitalisation of Logic was itself sufficient to such historical notions, for it showed that these dead linguistic formulæ had formerly been alive in actual historical thought.

Objectively, then, the thought of Hegel was preceded by that of Kant, as that of Kant was preceded by those of Hume, Locke, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Descartes. That is to say, the thought of Substance was the objective thought that immediately preceded the thought of Kant; and, more closely still, it was Substance gone into Causality which was the immediate foregoer of

the Notion of Kant. Now, Kant, so far as Substance was concerned, had completed the series appertaining to the relation involved by adding Reciprocity. Reciprocity, indeed, is the name that not inaptly describes the peculiar view with which Kant followed up the suggestions of Hume. Kant, for example, referred all to the reciprocity of Noumena. What constituted knowledge was Phænomena derived from the reciprocal action of the Noumenon within and the Noumenon without. Rather, Kant inverted the previous relative positions of these two Noumena by subordinating the object (which had previously been the principal) to the subject (which had previously been secondary), and thus by such inversion generated a certain virtual reciprocity. At all events, from reciprocity *the Notion* of Hegel directly takes life: it is just with reciprocity that Hegel has seriously occupied himself. He has concentrated his attention on the peculiar manner in which Kant derives this notion of reciprocity from the logical function of the disjunctive judgment, and has thus gradually created his own Notion or Idea, which just is, that What is, is a concrete unity, the life of which lies in the principle of reciprocity, and more particularly in the notional form of that principle as it exhibits itself even in Kant himself. For in Kant, we find the singular to be but a sort of reciprocal result from the reciprocal interaction of the particular and the universal. This is best seen in the Kantian rationale of a perceptive act—a rationale, as yet, however, that probably waits exposition, and is universally unknown. This concrete unity, the disjunctive sphere—a single cell, say—is to be conceived possessed of the reflex life of consciousness. A good illustration suggests itself.

In a letter written to a literary veteran, some twenty years ago, by a stricken youth,—in one of those intrusions which are, to budding letters, in the light of love, so natural, but to budded letters, in the light of experience, so unendurable,—there occurs the following passage :—‘ I lie in the centre of this *me*, this dew-drop, round which the rays of Deity, interpenetrating and passing through it, paint the spectrum of the universe.’ This may be allowed to be a fair symbol for idealism in general ; and the same youth, separated by many years from any knowledge of German, stumbled in his thoughts on what may perhaps be allowed to be a fair symbol for the phase of idealism which now occupies us. It is this : Conceive a Magician, a man of mighty power, a Prospero, so to place before the eyes of a Miranda a scale of fish, a plume of bird, a tooth of beast, a leaf of branch, a pebble from the rock, a grain of sand, &c., so, and so strangely, that they should liquidly collapse somehow before her eyes—taking her with them—into the aforesaid dew-drop ! Now this is a *Vorstellung* of the *Begriff* of Hegel,—or better, perhaps, of his Idea. The All, What is, is, so far as Logic is concerned, the Idea. Now, this Idea is but a dew-drop which, by a triplicity of reciprocity in itself, develops itself, or rather at any time can develop itself, into the universe. As it is, in the first instance—that is, as simple unity or identity, knowledge or particularity—there can be none in it : it is just What is *an sich*, in itself. But let it, by virtue of its own inner negativity, negate, isolate a single point of its yet undisturbed periphery, and there result immediately a particular and a universal which collapse into a singular. The dew-drop, the lucid vesicle, is conceived capable of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness as act may be conceived as the Form, the

embracing element, the *prehens*; while the object of self-consciousness may be conceived as the *matter*, the *Inhalt*, the *intent* or ingest, or the *prehensum*: lastly, the realisation of the *prehensum* to the *prehens* may be conceived as a singular act of knowledge, a union of Form and Matter, an Entelecheia. The applicability of several of the Hegelian triplets must at once suggest itself: the moments of the movement, for example, are all respectively susceptible of the names, Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; Immediacy, Mediacy, and Both; Identity, Difference, restoration of Identity, &c. &c.

Again, in further explanation, it is to be considered that the 'Phaenomenology' precedes the 'Logic,' and that the latter work consists, in a measure, but of the abstract conclusions of the former work; which conclusions being placed together, are seen to form a system apart by themselves.

There is possible yet another glimpse of the industry of Kant which will greatly assist to an adequate conception of the industry of Hegel. Looked at in a large and generalised fashion, the industry of Kant was, in ultimate instance, to reduce all the concreter interests of man to the three cognitive faculties. The result of the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' for example, is to reduce the whole theoretic world, the whole world of knowledge (for the thing-in-itself = O) to Understanding (Simple Apprehension); the result, again, of the 'Kritik of Judgment' is to reduce the whole æsthetic world, the world of feeling or emotion, under Judgment; and, lastly, the 'Kritik of Practical Reason' refers the Practical world, the world of Will, to Reason. This is sufficiently singular in itself; and, no doubt, it was sufficiently singular to attract the special attention of

Hegel. What a light it must have proved to this latter indeed! The whole universe brought back into cognition, just as if all the light ever shed by the sun were arrested, and compressed, and brought back into his single focus! That the thing thought was but the faculty thinking, or that *known* and *knowing* were one! That the forms of thought, which collectively might be named Logic, were the real secrets and souls of the whole immeasurable external chaos! Such thoughts as these might entrance anyone; such thoughts as these even spring to meet us from this side of Kant as from others; and such thoughts as these are the main and master thoughts of Hegel. Of the realisation of such thoughts, indeed, it is that his whole laborious work and works consist. If Kant reduced all to the three cognitive faculties, Hegel but performed the same feat under another form when he reduced all to the Notion; for the three cognitive faculties are but the three moments of the Notion. One can readily see now how it is that considerations of Logic dominate everywhere in Hegel; and one can now readily understand, also, his contempt of Nature as something no more real than our ordinary trains of ideas that float at random. One can now understand, too, how it is that there is a greater difficulty in Hegel, and that is the transition to God. In the mean time, we may quiet ourselves by remembering that Hegel enters on the consideration of God on a much higher sphere, where it is not Logic, but the concreter interest of Religion, that is concerned.

In this way, probably, we may have accomplished something not altogether unsatisfactory towards some explanation of the origin, principle, form, and matter—generally—of Hegel.

D.

A short but luminous formula for Hegel—perhaps as good as any that can be devised—is this :—

The Substantive is What is ;

But the Adjective is the Substantive :

Therefore, the Adjective is What is.

Or the Whole is Adjectivo-substantive.

If it be objected that these are but objective moments, and that the subjective moment is absent, the latter may be added by considering the *adjective* as now *pronominally*, as it were, reflected into the *verb*.

Thus the Notion manifests itself in Grammar also. It is strange, this pertinacity of the Notion ! How striking as regards Christianity, the Religion of Truth, that its moments correspond accurately, as we have seen, to those of the Notion ! It is the religion of *Vision* (as through the lily into the inner glory, the glory of God), of *Love*, of *Submission* ; and these correspond to the trefoil of man, *Cognition*, *Emotion*, *Volition*, and so to the trefoil of the Notion.

E.

The last word of the secret of Hegel that is probably now required, is contained in the last paragraph of 'Reciprocity,' and constitutes the conclusion of the objective and the commencement of the subjective Logic. This last word is the Begriff of the Begriff ; a phrase often enough used by followers of Hegel, in the sense of totality, probably, but it is doubtful if ever by any of them in the sense meant by Hegel himself, who, however, has, in his own way, explained his meaning—tolerably exoterically, too, to him who has the true

nature of the industry of Kant fairly before his mind—in the sections ‘Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen,’ and ‘Die Absolute Idee.’ The original German must here be thoroughly studied, for an English translation would be so uncouth as absolutely to repulse approach. Some notion of what is intended may perhaps be caught from this: Conceive the particular—and that just amounts to, Take the organic series of particulars as the middle—then the negative reflexion of these as to themselves collectively as an organic whole, is the universal; while this same negative reflexion of themselves to themselves as a unit, is the moment of singularity. Conceive your thirty-two teeth negatively reflected into themselves as a *case*, and also negatively reflected into themselves as a *bite* (their own functional act), and, through the rough *Vorstellung*, something of the *Begriff* may shine! This conception being properly understood—at the same time that it is borne in mind that the whole and all is self-conscious thought—universality and singularity are thus seen to be identical, while the particular is also identical with each, and is held between them as in a transparent distinction, so that all three coalesce—and the result is a triune transparent distinction.

Why is it *after* RECIPROCITY? Because such is the truth of actual history: it came to birth so—after Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity—or after Spinoza, Hume, and Kant. Its relation to reciprocity appears in this—that, as it comes forward here, it is in the form of *Schluss*, and—in *Seyn* and *Wesen* respectively—has already been *Begriff* and *Urtheil*: though itself the *Begriff*, then, it, as in the form of *Schluss*, resumes the others and completes the reciprocity. Here in the form of *Schluss*, it constituted in the form of *Begriff*

the beginning of the whole. Under Seyn, then, where the Begriff was im Begriffe, or as Begriff, all was An sich,—all the distinctions also. Hence the particular form there of other to other. In the same way, we perceive that the Begriff under Wesen being im Urtheile, the form is that of separation into Reflexions. We have now to understand that the Begriff being im Schluss, has reached the perfection of its form and terminates in the Idea. The special movement under each division is always the same, however: 1, Simple Apprehension; 2, Judgment; 3, Reason;—for Hegel is always in earnest with the realisation of the living pulse of Logic. *Matter*, indeed, cannot be his business here. That business is—not surely with a first *artificer*, and *what* he made and *how* he made it—but with thought and the demonstration of thought as the absolute organ or organism, and the organic all or absolute. Thus it is that he always bears it with him, that thought, though it is itself the object—looks on this object as *another*, in such wise that its knowledge of the same is of a negative nature intelligible, perhaps, from this illustration—that, in the movement of the sun, what is *seen*, is just the negative of what *is*. Hegel would convert the new principle into Science; but such science—of the Notion—can only be Logic.

Verständige Vernunft, or vernünftiger Verstand, we may remark here, amounts to plurality in unity, or unity in plurality; just what Kant meant, but only as it were An sich, or implicitly and virtually, by his Einheit and Mannigfaltiges; and this is the reciprocity which Hegel has in view. Verstand here is taken so that its strict etymology falls into and modifies its ordinary meaning. There is an idiomatic use of Verstehen which illustrates the Hegelian sense:

Verstehen, that is, sometimes means, to become stale, to be injured by long standing, as it were to stand itself away. The relation this meaning bears to the fixed isolation, the sundered identity, which Hegel would have us perceive to be implied by Understanding, is tolerably obvious. Hegel always regards the particle *Ver* as equivalent to *trans*, and as referent to a process of transition or transformation the nature of which is characterised by the root. So *Allgemein*, *Besondern*, and all the Hegelian terms. Kant's phrase *Anschauender Verstand* is equivalent to the Hegelian *Verständige Vernunft*. In *Bestimmen*, too, see the etymological look—it is a giving *voice* (*Stimme*) to What is ; or Logical Determination (*Bestimmung*), the whole process of Hegel, is but a sort of naming of Adam. *Geist*, similarly, is an excellent word for the ultimate, absolute, and positive Unity : the living *Spirit* of the moment is always the co-including and realising point of the All.

As regards both Understanding and Reason (in its dialectic part), it is not difficult to understand the word negative as applied to their function. We may just say generally, indeed, that thought has no purpose and no act but to negate *Seyn* taken as what sensuously is. But, more particularly, Understanding negates the unal self—thus effecting an *intercern* or *interpart*. Reason negates the negation, not into nothing, but into the restored unal self. Here we see : 1, Unal Self—Simple Apprehension, or *Begriff* ; 2, Intercern—Judgment, or *Ur-theil* ; 3, Resolution of Difference into a Unal Self of differents—Reason and *Schluss*. Everywhere the Notion is a *Negativität* : the Particular is negative—part negating part, &c. ; the Universal, as negating the parts, is negative ; and the Singular, as negating all into

the absolutely self-identical unit of Self, is eminently negative and eminently the *reine* negativität. In fact, what we have everywhere is division in the indivisible, separation in the inseparable, difference in the identical ; so that identity is abstraction and the form of abstraction.

Such sentences as the following will be now intelligible, and may prove illustrative : ‘This *spiritual* movement, which in its *Unity* [i.e. im Begriff] gives itself its characteristicity [i. e. its determinate and determining variety, as im Urtheil], and in its characteristicity its equality with itself [resumption of All-gemeines and Be-sonderes into Ein-zelnes im Schluss], which is thus the immanent evolution of the Notion, is the absolute method of cognition, and, at the same time, the immanent soul of the *import* itself’ —import here amounting to that which the All, both substantially and formally, is. ‘The *Nature*, the peculiar inner Being, the veritably *eternal* and *substantial* element in the multiplicity and contingency of the phenomenal and passing Outward, is the Notion of the Thing.’ ‘Only in its Notion has something actuality ; so far as it is diverse from its Notion, it ceases to be actual, and is null ; the side of tangibility, palpability (Handgreiflichkeit), and of sensuous out-of-selfness (Aussersichseyn) belongs to this null side.’ The sensuous never is, but always is not ; the notion, then, is its truth ; what it is apart from that notion is evidently a nothing : take the page before us, for example. In illustration of the *life* of the Notion, we must bear in mind the progress of history, in all departments, from, 1, Instinctive life, through, 2, Requirements of Reflexion into, 3, Reason. This, in the concrete, is not to be looked for in the exactitude of a formula : often

we see retrocessions of the individual, a fall-back from Understanding to Sense, as in Reid, into perfect amentia, as in one of his followers. On the whole, in the Begriff of the Begriff we see that Hegel has returned to substantiality, fact, life, while Kant, in his categories, was still in distinctions of mere formal Logic. Kant thus may be said to have had only a *regulative*, while Hegel has a *constitutive*, force. Before such merits one relents to conceive Hegel as absorbed in creation, and never sufficiently *on his own outside*, as it were, to explain his origin from Kant. But this origin and the debt to Kant are not to be forgotten. Now, for instance, the Quality, Quantity, and Measure of the commencement are just the manifold of Kant. Quality is Kant's Sensation; and Quantity his Perception (*Anschauung*), seen in the pure Quantities which are the pure Perceptions, Space and Time. Measure is added by easy suggestion. Then *Wesen* comes in as Understanding or the Categories proper (of Relation).

Thus, then, we see plainly how actual fact of life and history coheres with general Logic. Being, Nothing, Becoming, through all the intermediate steps, are just finally hammered into, and correspond respectively to, the closing triunity—Logic, Nature, Spirit. Legends of all peoples exemplify the same. Eden is but Simple Apprehension passing into Judgment. Then the Good Principle is Being, the Bad, the Negative. Faust, again, is the latter stage of the era of Judgment, the stage named by Hegel, '*Das unglückliche Bewusstsein*;' the Understanding has done its work, Reason has not yet begun, and all around is but empty abstraction, without a single rest for Faith (or Hope) of any kind: and the result is but a precipitation into the senses; more commonly now-a-days the end is but

vague despair and an impotent sighing for all that has been lost.

The Categories we may conceive as an internal web invisible to us, and of which, so long as they are uninvestigated, we are but the prey. Still, to most individuals, certain categories become enlarged—isolated thickenings occur in our inner web—which as thickened come before consciousness—and from which as Ganglia our single *Spirit* issues. In this manner, we may conceive ourselves enabled to analyse and pass judgment on the characters of men—by exhibiting, that is, their ganglionised or hypertrophied and ossified categories, of which they were the slaves. The *thin* man acts from a single category; the *rich* man is a rich *spirit* resultant from many categories mutually related in a healthy common system. Cromwell, though so inarticulate, drew breath from a vast bulk of categories; and from the weight of the Universal it was that he possessed his irresistible mass and momentum; nor was the Universal that led him, in the slightest hollowed out, as is so common everywhere at present, by the wind of the Vanity of the Singular. The bad effects of such wind are very apparent in Napoleon. Wellington is otherwise; but his Universal was simply the red tape of England.

Hegel's work is this: the spider of thought—a point—spinning its web of thought around itself: the Bombyx of Eternity, the Cocoon of Eternity, and their unity in Eternity itself! Hegel takes Kant's notion as the secret, the key, of the universe. It is at once the absolute Form and the absolute Import. And it is this Form and this Import which only involve themselves throughout the whole system, from the lowest, simplest, and abstractest of abstractions up

to the highest, most complex, and concretest of concretes. Once possessed of the Kantian notion, his way was successively to discharge its concretion till it reached an ultimate tenuity, and thence to let it remake itself again. Or we may say that Hegel lies in a consideration of the absolute adversatives—negation, position, &c. He saw that thought was but as a football from inner to outer, and from outer to inner, &c.; and he resolved to make shuttle what had previously been but shuttlecock; that is, he wove together into indissoluble unity by relation what hitherto had been irreconcilably disunited by this very same relation. This is another synonym for his work, as that of Reason, repairing and restoring what had been injured and destroyed by the eighteenth century, in the work of Understanding. If the reflexion of Spinoza and Hume has unfixed and unsettled all, the reflexion of Kant and Hegel will again restore all to place and to peace. Hegel's one object, indeed, has been a demonstration of the absolute *intussusception*. The result is a crystal sphere—perfectly transparent—but covered with infinite tracery of intussusipient lines—opaque yet transparent—which appear and disappear—in the own movement of the sphere's own inner.

F.

A good way to state the main notion of Hegel is this: What is, says Spinoza, is Thought and Extension, which again are but modifications (even as *attributes* they amount to this) of one and the same—God. Hegel says of this that there is no transition in it, no deduction, no mutual connexion. Now Hegel's secret is just to add the missing element; or it is the intro-

duction of intermediation and connexion into the divided and disunited trinity of Spinoza. This, of course, is said roughly and generally to give a general and rough idea ; for in reality the Nature of Hegel is not derived from, and is something very different to, the Extension of Spinoza : at all to compare, indeed, such vast organic wholes as the Logic, Nature, and Spirit of Hegel with the mere phraseologies of Spinoza in reference to Thought, Extension, and God, is possible only in a wide manner on the mere outside. Still, to assist us to an understanding of Hegel, let us say that what he did was to introduce *nexus* and *connexus* into the three of Spinoza. Following this out, then, Hegel says, Extension, that is the Particular ; Thought, that is the negative reflexion of this Particular into itself as the Universal ; God, that is the negative reflexion of this same Particular into itself as the Singular, which is thus seen to be a union of both, and each, indeed, is but the other. Now this *revolts* ; for God, at first sight, is in this way lost to us. God in this way appears a mere creation of our own thought—in its barest form, indeed, a mere human reflexion. This conclusion is not quite legitimate, however. We assign to God a variety of attributes ; or God cannot be conceived without a variety of attributes : in a word, then, there is God's unity, and there is God's variety. Now, if we can suppose Extension adequately to collect and represent all God's variety, then assuredly we shall not be very far wrong if we assume God's unity to be the negative reflexion into itself of God's variety, that is, of extension. This reflexion, moreover, does not belong to us ; it must be conceived as objective fact independent of us. Besides, we are not at all occupied at present with the *truth*, but only with the *fact* of Hegel.

This huge box has long lain shut—we open it—we lay out the contents: this is *our* work. By and by probably,—a separate work,—the appraiser will follow with *his* work, and tell us the *value*. One thing, it is absurd to think of God as an entity somewhere in Space, visible and palpable, could we but get *there*. ‘I have swept space with my telescope,’ says Lalande, ‘and found no God.’ The absurdity of the Atheist is seen in that, but there is no less also reflected in it the absurdity of crude Theism which as yet has not reached thought proper, but only figurate conception (*Vorstellung*). But since Hegel, however it be with the God of Hegel, we must certainly always substitute now *Begriff* for *Vorstellung*, intellectually thought notion for sensuously seen image. God is no longer to be pictured in Space; he is not locally, topically in Nature; God is a *Spirit*, and can *be* only in the spiritual world, only in the absolute world, which is Thought.

Logic has always appeared under the three rubrics of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. In this respect, Hegel’s Logic does not differ from any other, or, if it differs, it differs only in being truer to the rubric. Hegel’s Logic is, from first to last, in matter and method, in form and substance, in book and chapter, in section and paragraph, in sentence and even *word*, nothing but Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, this itself is but one of the sacred names,—just one of the synonymes of the whole. Judgment is but the negative reflexion of Simple Apprehension into itself, and Reason is but the negative reflexion that sums both. Nay, each is so much the other, all is so dialectic, that, it may be, Hegel himself sometimes mistakes the cue and places as Particular what is

Universal, &c. This is but the Notion ;—that is, in one of its forms. Everywhere in Hegel we have before us only the Notion. Being, Nothing, Becoming : *Being* is but Simple Apprehension (Perception, if you will) at its abstractest ; *Nothing* is the act of Judgment on *Being* ; it is the negative reflexion of pure Being into itself ; *Becoming* is the act of Reason on Being, and is both Being and Nothing in concrete unity, the truth of both, the Singular that is. It is just as if we said : Everything that is, is ; Everything that is, is not ; Everything that is, is Both—that is, it becomes. Each of these averments, too, is true—only the last is the concrete truth, the others are but abstractly true. Reason, in fact, is always to be assumed as the concrete moment that is base or mother-liquor to the two abstract moments of Simple Apprehension and Judgment. How natural is all this in the circumstances ! The Idealist can only look to Logic when in search of those principles which are the prius of all : the Idealist, too, as in the moment of Reason, is but the natural third, and the concrete truth, to the Perceptive animal whose object is Seyn, and the abstracting Critic (or Judge) whose object is Wesen.

We are to understand, then, that Hegel, from first to last, is but touching or tapping, into its various successive forms, the primitive or original cell of the Notion—or the triune Reflexion. There is the crystal sphere—tap it—lines of reflexion glance in it by which there are seen two in one or a triple unity, Becoming, in which both Being and Nothing nestle. Another touch and Becoming is Become—Here-being, There-being, or So-being. Again, a tap, and reflexions glance of Reality and Negation which collapse to Something, and thence again expand into Being-for-

other and Being-in-self. These collapse, in their turn, to Determination. Determination sunders into the duplicity of *Beschaffenheit* and shuts again into the Unity of Limit. Limit, sundering into the duplicity of the spurious Infinite, clasps together again in the unity of the genuine Infinite, and so on. Perhaps, in the above statement, from Being-for-other and Being-in-self onwards, the movement of the series appears in simpler and more consistent form than in Hegel himself. Now, all these changes take place, so to speak, without moving from the spot—Hegel never abandons the notion with which he starts, and all change is from Reflexion on it, or, rather, in it. How completely Rosenkranz has missed all this may be seen from a single glance into the work which professes to reform the Hegelian Logic. There the very ghost of dialectic has disappeared; unity is never for a moment thought of; and we have before us but the words of a dictionary tumbled hither and thither illustratively.

Even when, in the true Infinite, he has reached the verge of Being, and has passed into Quantity, Hegel has not yet moved from the spot: Quantity but resumes what precedes, though *in another*, that is, as another sphere. Again, Quantity returns to Quality, and both collapse into Measure. In this way, through an extraordinary alternation of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, repeated in an extraordinary alternation of their own forms, we reach, at last, the Absolute Spirit. Now Hegel's addition to Spinoza, as described above, gives the general nature of this Absolute Spirit at the shortest. The Particular, Nature, is negatively reflected into the Begriff (Thought, Logic), which is the Universal, and, through this also, into the Singular of the Spirit. In the very statement, there glitters the hem

of truth in such a variety of directions, that it seems to bring with it its own authentication. When the objection—it is only Human Reflexion—occurs, let it occur, also, that Human Reflexion is Thought. Let it occur, too, that it is to be conceived as an objective reflexion, not something formal, but something intensely concrete. If it is but a reflexion, it is a reflexion from, and contains the absolute wealth of, both Thought as Thought and Nature as Nature. It is not the mere abstraction of Spinoza ; it is, on the contrary, the concrete of concretes. In fact, it cannot be otherwise ; Nature, Thought, each alone, both together, necessitate the reflexion of God ; God is their truth, and, though a necessity of formal thought, is also a necessity of concrete existence.

But, it occurs to be objected again, is it not very general this, very thin, abstract, and bodiless—this outcome of a universal Spirit, the highest expression of which is not as in you and me, but in societies, institutions, literatures, arts, philosophies, &c. ? Is this abstract and generalised result of the human race as human race all that we are to get as God ? *Call* it Idealism if you will, what is it better than Materialism ? Is that abstract result—institutions, laws, arts, &c.—ought better than a *matter* into which, even as we form it, we perish, as the coral insect *lives* only that he may *die* into the coral rock ? Is this, then, the end of all the hopes of man ? God is but an abstract generalisation of Thought ! and for the carrying forward of this abstract generalisation is it only that we emerge !—emerge but to cease ! This we are to call our true selves, and to this we are to sacrifice ourselves ! It is but natural to think thus. It is one-sided, however, to speak of the result of thought as an abstraction and

generalisation ; there is neither abstraction nor generalisation—as usually understood—here present ; what we have here is a *life*. What we have here is the organised universe and its organised outcome. Spirit is the word. Hegel has always meaning in his words, and by spirit he means not a ghost, not an airy vaporous body, but the essential concrete of all, which is a Spirit. In what Spirit do you live, and think, and act ? Ever, in every age, the essential, organic, vital drop of the whole is its Spirit ; and with each new age, the Spirit is ever richer—intellectually, morally, emotionally. Nature, then, and Man—Nature and Thought—all that is here, just taken together as an organised body—what can the soul of this body be but even such a Spirit as is here indicated ? Such Spirit is the Thought, the Emotion, the Will of such a body. Leave *Vorstellung*, pass to *Begriff*—shut not only your Byron and open your Goethe (in every way a very finite step)—but take the infinite step from all writers who have ever yet written to this most extraordinary Hegel.

In such abstractions, you say, there is no hope for you ! What, then, are *you* ? What would you wish yourself to be, if not the perfection of your own thought and your own will ? Apart from *that*, what are *you*, that *you* should be saved ? And are you not saved ? Are not man and nature and all things Thought, and where is Thought, if not in you, who are to yourself the Ego, the I, in which all meet ? You are but *Modus*—not the Absolute ; finite—not the Infinite : you must perish ! Consult Hegel and see the necessity of the *Modus*. And what is perishing ? What is Death ? Where *are* these, when, What is, is Thought ? *Modus*—finite !—is it not true that you at the same time *are* ? What is, is Thought. Absurd that you

should be continued! Why so? On the contrary, it is no more absurd that you should be continued than that you *are*. That you *are* is the guarantee of your *necessity*. God is a concrete Spirit—not an abstract unit—why should not the death of the body be the birth of Spirit?—and why should not you *continue* united to the universal Spirit then, even as you are so united here, in Natural form, now?—But all this is premature! As yet we only seek to understand and express: as yet we have not attempted to think and judge: as yet we have had enough to do to find our way; as yet we have not had time to think.

The general conclusion, this length, is that the Secret of Hegel is the tautological reciprocity of the Logical Notion, which is a concrete in itself; and this is to be found expressed in the last paragraph of the Section ‘Reciprocity.’

REMARK.

These Notes of the Struggle to Hegel are now concluded. Their general nature and burthen are—effort to understand and express Hegel; and a certain adoption of the side of Hegel will be granted as allowable to the effort *to express* for the sake even of efficiency, especially in the case of a student only speaking to himself in preparation for the public. The state of the fact is accurately depicted here.

These Notes it was proposed to follow up by a general chapter on the Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter of the System, which should methodically bring to a focus all the *findings* in these respects which are, in a necessarily irregular and imperfect manner, indicated in the Notes themselves. This chapter, however, is reserved for the present, as its composition is

likely to be more efficient *after* completion and publication of a statement of Kant which is now in sketch.

Meantime, we may say this : The Principle is the Notion as expressed at the end of 'Reciprocity' ; the Form (or Method) is the movement of this Notion ; and the Matter is the development, or simply the introduction, of this Notion into the entire wealth of the outer and inner Universe. As regards Origin again, that lies in Kant ; and in this respect we may name six special references : There is the light derived from—1, The externalisation of the Categories ; 2, The generalisation of the same ; 3, The utilisation of the branch of Logic (S. Apprehension) left vacant by Kant ; 4, The *realisation* of Logic in general ; 5, The Kantian theory of Perception ; and, 6, The reduction of what we may call the concrete faculties of man, Cognition, Emotion, Will, under his abstract ones, as named in Logic, S. Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. Lastly, as regards Kant, not only did he breathe the precise tendency, exhibited and perhaps perfected by Hegel, towards a philosophy which should be a complete and co-articulated system in explanation of the All, but there lie scattered over the whole field of his labours a thousand hints, which must have proved of the greatest service to Hegel. Some of these we have already seen ; but there lie a multitude more both for the seeing and the seeking. By way of example, here is a small one :—

Metaphysic has, as the special aim of its inquiry, only three Ideas : God, Freedom, and Immortality, *and so that the second united with the first shall lead to the third as a necessary conclusion (Schlussatz).*'

Indeed, we may quote further :—

All else, with which this Science is occupied, serves merely as means to attain to these Ideas and their reality. These Ideas are not required in aid of Natural Science but to transcend Nature. The attainment of them would render Theology, Morals, and, through the union of both, Religion, consequently the highest ends of our existence, dependent merely on speculative Reason and on nothing else. In a systematic exposition of these Ideas, the order given, would, as the synthetic, be the most appropriate; but in the labours, which must necessarily precede any such exposition, the analytic, or reverse, arrangement will be better adapted to the end proposed: for here, in fulfilment of our great design, we proceed from what experience offers us immediately to hand Psychology, to Cosmology, and thence to the cognition of God.*

Particular points of derivation as regards both Fichte and Schelling have been already alluded to. The ‘Transcendental Idealism’ of the latter, in especial, is so full of such points, that the reader conversant with the subject experiences in the perusal of this work a series of interesting surprises. We may yet illustrate this statement by the quotation of examples, if room should offer. But, on the whole, whatever suggestions may have proceeded from others, Kant, the original quarry, was alone adequate to stimulate Hegel to the accomplishment of what he did accomplish; and these two writers may be directly affiliated as cause and consequence. I may add to the six special references above, that the point in which Kant and Hegel are, perhaps, seen closest, is the fact that the *à priori Synthetic Judgment* of the one, and which was set up as the single angle of inquiry, is simply an *sich*

* Kant, Krit. d. R. V. Trans. Dialectic. Book I. Section 3, Note.

what *the* Notion of Hegel is an und für sich. It is to be considered also that, in what follows, much will occur adapted to bring into the true ultimate focus all that we have already seen as regards the explanation of the operations and general industry of Hegel.

II.

A TRANSLATION FROM THE *COMPLETE LOGIC* OF
THE WHOLE FIRST SECTION, *QUALITY*.

FIRST SECTION.

DETERMINATENESS OR DEFINITENESS (QUALITY).

BEING is the indefinite *Immediate*; it is devoid of definiteness as in reference to *Essentity*, as also of any which it might possibly have within itself. This reflexion-less *Being* is *Being* as it is only in its own self.

As it is indefinite, it is quality-less *Being*; but, *in itself*, the character of indefiniteness attaches to it, only in contraposition to the Definite, to the Qualitative. Definite *Being* as such, then, contraposing itself to *Being* in general, the very indefiniteness of the latter constitutes its *Quality*. It will be found, therefore, that *First Being* is *in itself* definite, and consequently,

Secondly, that it goes over into *There-being*, is *There-being*; but that this latter as finite *Being* sublates itself, and goes over into the infinite Reference of *Being* to its own self, i. e.,

Thirdly, into *Being-for-self*.

CHAPTER I.

BEING.

A.

BEING, pure Being,—without any further definition. In its indefinite Immediacy, it is only equal to itself, and neither is it unequal as regards *Other*; it has no diversity within itself, and none in any reference outwards. Should any Determination or Intent [Form or Matter] be supposed in its regard, which might be distinguished in it, or by which it might be distinguished from another, it would not be held fast in its purity. It is pure indefiniteness and vacancy. There is nothing to be perceived in it,—so far as it is at all allowable to speak of perceiving at present,—or it is only this pure, void perceiving itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this void thought, this void thinking. Being, the indefinite Immediate, is, in fact, *Nothing*, and neither more nor less than *Nothing*.

B.

NOTHING.

NOTHING, pure Nothing; it is simple equality with itself, perfect vacancy, determination-lessness and intent-lessness [form-lessness and matter-lessness]; undistinguishedness in itself. So far as it is allowable to mention Perception or Thought here, the distinction [we may remark] is admitted, of whether *something* or *nothing* is perceived or thought. The perceiving or the thinking nothing has therefore a meaning; both

[perceiving *nothing* and perceiving *something*] are distinguished, thus Nothing is (exists) in our perception or thought; or rather it is empty perception and thought themselves; and the same empty perception or thought as pure Being. Nothing, therefore, is the same form, or rather formlessness,—and so in general the same,—as what pure Being is.

C.

BECOMING.

1. *Unity of Being and Nothing.*

PURE Being and pure Nothing is, therefore, the same. What is the truth, is neither Being nor Nothing, but that Being,—does not pass over,—but has passed over into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. But the truth is just as much not their undistinguishedness, but that they *are not the same*, that they are *absolutely distinguished*, but still, nevertheless, unseparated and inseparable, and either immediately *disappears in its opposite*. Their truth is, therefore, this *movement* of the immediate disappearance of the one in the other; *Becoming*; a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a distinction which has equally immediately sublated itself.

REMARK 1.

The Antithesis of Being and Nothing in common conception.

Nothing is usually opposed to *Something*; Something, however, is already a definite *Bëent* [Existent], which distinguishes itself from other Something (something else); and so also, therefore, the Nothing opposed to the Something, is the Nothing of a given Something,—

a definite Nothing. Here, however, Nothing is to be taken in its indefinite simplicity. Should it be considered more accurate that Non-being, instead of Nothing, be opposed to Being, there were nothing to object to this as respects the result, for in *Non-being* the reference to Being is implied ; both, Being and the Negation of Being, are enunciated in *One*, Nothing, as it is in *Becoming*. But we are concerned here, first of all, not with the *form* of the *opposition* (form, also, at the same time, of the *co-reference*), but with the abstract, immediate negation, nothing purely for itself, reference-less Negation,—what might be expressed also, were it wished, by the mere word *Not*.

The Eleatics first of all, especially Parmenides, enunciated the simple thought of *pure Being* as the Absolute, and as the one truth : *only Being is, and Nothing is altogether not*,—enunciated this (in the fragments of Parmenides which remain) with the pure intoxication of thought when for the first time it has apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction. In the Oriental systems, in Buddhism essentially, Nothing, as is well known, the Void, is the Absolute Principle. The deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward, against that simple and one-sided abstraction, the higher total notion of *Becoming*, and said : *Being is as little as Nothing is, or all flows*, that is, all is *Becoming*. The popular, particularly Oriental proverbs, that All that is has the germ of its death even in its birth, while death, on the other hand, is entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of Being and Nothing. But these expressions have a substrate, on, or in, or by which the transition takes place ; Being and Nothing are held asunder in time, are represented as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction, and

therefore not so that they are in, by, and for themselves the same.

Ex nihilo nihil fit—is one of the positions to which in Metaphysic great importance was ascribed. There is to be seen in it either only the empty Tautology, Nothing is Nothing; or if the Becoming (*fit*) is to have actual meaning in it, then, inasmuch as only nothing comes out of nothing, there is rather in fact no Becoming present in it, for Nothing remains in it Nothing. Becoming implies, that Nothing does not remain Nothing, but passes over into its other, into Being. If the later especially Christian Metaphysic rejected the position, From Nothing arises Nothing, it maintained necessarily a transition from Nothing into Being: however *synthetically* or merely *conceptively* it took this position, still there is contained, even in the most imperfect Union, a point in which Being and Nothing coincide, and their distinguishedness disappears. The proposition, From Nothing comes Nothing, Nothing is just Nothing, has its special significance in its contrariety to Becoming in general, and consequently also to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who, waxing even fanatic in its defence, maintain the position Nothing is just Nothing, have no consciousness that they thereby express adhesion to the abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics; essentially, too, to that of Spinoza. The Philosophical opinion which holds, Being is only Being, Nothing is only Nothing, as valid principle, merits the name of *Identitätssystem*: this abstract identity is the essence of Pantheism.

If the result, that Being and Nothing are the same, seems startling or paradoxical in itself, there is just nothing further to be said; it were more reasonable

to wonder at this wondering, which shows itself so new in philosophy, and forgets that there present themselves in this science quite other determinations than in ordinary consciousness and in the so-called Common Sense of Mankind, which is not just exactly sound sense or sound understanding, but understanding grown up and hardened into abstractions, and in the belief or rather the superstition of abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing, in every example, in everything actual, in every thought. What was said above of Immediacy and Mediacy (which latter implies a reference to another, and so *Negation*), the same thing must be said of Being and Nothing, *That nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything that in itself contains not Both, Being and Nothing.* As, in such reference, indeed, the question is of a certain Something and Actual, those elements are in it no longer in the perfect untruth, in which they are as Being and Nothing, but in a further developed form, and have become (conceived, for example, as Positive and Negative), the former posited, reflected Being—the latter posited, reflected Nothing; but Positive and Negative imply, the one Being and the other Nothing as their abstract Ground-principle. Thus in God himself, Quality, Energy, Creation, Power, &c. involve essentially the element of Negativity,—they are a bringing into existence of an *Other*. But an empirical illustration by means of examples of the position maintained would be here quite superfluous. As now, indeed, this unity of Being and Nothing lies once for all established as first Truth and basis, and constitutes the element of all that follows, all further Logical determinations—There-being, Quality, in general all

notions of philosophy—are examples of this Unity quite as much as Becoming. But what names itself common (or sound) sense, so far as it rejects the undividedness of Being and Nothing, may be invited to try to discover a single example where the one is separated from the other (Something from Limit, or the Infinite, God, as has been just mentioned, from energy in act). Only these empty things of thought, Being and Nothing, themselves, are such separated things, and it is they which by said understanding are preferred to the truth, the undividedness of both, which is everywhere before us.

It were vain to seek to meet on all sides the perplexities into which ordinary consciousness, in the case of such a logical proposition, misleads itself, for they are inexhaustible. It is possible only to notice a few of them. One source of such perplexity, among others, is that consciousness brings with it to the consideration of such abstract logical position, conceptions (representations) of a concrete *Something*, and forgets that there is no question of any such here, but only of the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing, and that it is these alone which are to be held fast.

Being and Non-being are the same thing; it is, *therefore*, the same thing, whether I am or am not, whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are or are not in my possession. Such inference or such application of the proposition alters its sense completely. The Proposition contains the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing; the application, on the other hand, makes of these a determinate Being and determinate Nothing. But, as has been said, the question here is not of determinate Being. A determinate, a finite Being, is such as refers itself to

others; it is a complex which stands in the relation of necessity with many other such, with the whole world. As regards the reciprocating system of the whole, Metaphysic might advance the—at bottom tautological—allegation, that were a single dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse. In the instances opposed to the position in question, something appears as not indifferent, whether it is or is not, not for the sake of Being or Non-being, but for the sake of its Import, which Import connects it with other such. If a determinate complex, any determinate There-being be presupposed, this There-being, because it is determinate, is in manifold relation to other complexes; it is not indifferent to it, then, whether a certain other complex with which it stands in relation, is or is not; for only through such relation is it essentially that which it is. The same thing is the case with conception (non-being being taken in the more determinate sense of conception as against actuality), in the context of which the Being or Non-being of an Import, which is conceived as determinately in relation with something other, is not indifferent.

This consideration involves what constitutes a main moment in the Kantian criticism of the Ontological argument for the existence of God, which is regarded here, however, only in reference to the distinction of Being and Nothing in general, and of determinate Being or Non-being, which there presents itself. There was presupposed, as is well known, in said so-called proof or argument, the Notion of a Being, to whom all realities accrue, and consequently also existence, which was likewise assumed as one of the realities. The Kantian criticism took stand specially by this, that existence or being (which is here synonymous) is no

quality, or no *real predicate*; that is, is not a notion of something which can be added to the *notion* of a thing.* Kant wants to say here, that Being is no element of comprehension. Thus, he continues, the possible would contain no more than the actual; a hundred actual dollars contain not in the least more than a hundred possible ones; that is, the former have no other logical comprehension than the latter. For this Comprehension, considered as *isolated*, it is in fact indifferent to be or not to be; there lies in it no difference of Being or Non-being—this difference on the whole affects it not at all; the hundred dollars become no less if they are not, and no more if they are. A difference must come only from elsewhere. ‘On the other hand,’ suggests Kant, ‘there is more in my means in the case of a hundred actual dollars, than in that of the mere notion of the same, or their possibility. For the *object* in the case of actuality is not merely analytically contained in my notion, but *adds itself synthetically* to my notion (which is a *determination of my condition*), without these said hundred dollars themselves being in the least increased by this Being besides my notion.’

There are presupposed here two kinds of conditions, to use the Kantian expressions (which are not without confusion and clumsiness): the one, which Kant names notion, but by which conception (representation) is to be understood; and another, the state of means. For the one as for the other, for one’s means as for one’s conception, a hundred dollars are a complex of comprehension, or, as Kant expresses himself, ‘they add themselves *synthetically* thereto;’ I as possessor of a hundred dollars, or as non-possessor of the same, or again, I as conceiving a hundred dollars, or not

* Kant’s *Kritik der r. Vern.* 2te Aufl. S. 628 ff.

conceiving them,—there are certainly here cases of a different Comprehension. Stated more generally: The abstractions of Being and Nothing cease both to be abstractions, when they receive a determinate comprehension (or import): Being is then Reality, the determinate Being of a hundred dollars; Nothing, Negation, the determinate negation of the same. This element of comprehension itself, the hundred dollars, when taken abstractly by itself, is in the one unchanged, the same that it is in the other. But now that Being further is taken as state of one's means, the hundred dollars come into relation to a state; and for this state, the *determinatum* which they are is not indifferent: their Being or Non-being is only *alteration*; they are transferred to the sphere of There-being. When, therefore, it is urged against the unity of Being and Nothing, that it is nevertheless not indifferent, whether this and that (the hundred dollars) be or be not, it is a delusion to transfer to mere Being and Non-being the difference of whether I have or have not the hundred dollars—a delusion which, as has been shown, rests on the one-sided abstraction which leaves out of view the determinate There-being present in such examples, and holds fast mere Being and Non-being; as, on the other hand, it (the delusion) transforms the abstract Being and Nothing, that [here, in this Logic] should alone be apprehended, into a determinate Being and Nothing—into a There-being. Only There-being contains the real difference of Being and Nothing, namely, a *Something* and an *Other*. This real difference, instead of abstract Being and pure Nothing and their only *opined* difference, is what floats before conception (Representation).*

* The original runs—‘Statt des abstracten Seyns und reinen Nichts,

As Kant expresses himself, there comes 'through the fact of existence something into the context of collective experience;' 'we obtain thereby an additional object of *perception*, but our *notion* of the object is thereby not increased.' That, as appears from the preceding illustration, is as much as this—through the fact of existence, essentially just because something is a determinate Existence, it is in connexion with other, and among such also with a perceiving agent. 'The Notion of the hundred dollars,' says Kant, 'is not increased by perception.' The *Notion* here is the already-noticed *isolatedly*-conceived (represented) hundred dollars. In this isolated form, they are indeed an empirical matter, but cut off, without connexion and determinateness towards *other*: the form of identity with themselves takes from them the reference to other, and makes them indifferent whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called notion of a hundred dollars is a false notion: the form of simple reference to self does not belong to such limited, finite matter itself; it is a form put on it and lent to it by subjective understanding: a hundred dollars are not a Referent of self to self, but a changeable and perishable.

The thought or conception (representation), before which only a determinate Being, There-being, floats, is to be referred to the previously-mentioned beginning of *Science* made by Parmenides, who purified and elevated his own conception (representation), and thereby that of all following times, into the *pure thought*, Being as such, and in that manner created the element of science. That which is *first* in *Science* has of necessity to show

und ihrem nur gemeinten Unterschiede.' The last phrase is in the dative, though governed, like those

which precede it, by *Statt*: this is a slip of the pen, unless there exist a rule in such cases unknown to me.

itself *historically* as *first*. And we have to regard the Eleatic *One* or *Being* as the first of the knowing of the *Thought*. *Water* and such material principles are hypothetically to be considered to be, or *would* be the Universal [or *All-common*] principle; but they are as material things not pure thoughts: *Numbers* are neither the first simple unal thought, nor that which is permanent in itself, but the thought which is quite external to itself.

The reference back from *particular finite* Being to Being as such in its completely abstract universality, is to be regarded not only as the very first theoretical, but as even also the very first practical postulate. When, for example, there is a To-do made,—as about the hundred dollars, that it makes a difference in the state of my means, whether I *have* them or *not*, or that it makes a still greater difference to me whether I am or not, whether Other be or not,—the reminder may be held up—without mentioning that there doubtless are actual means, to which such possession of a hundred dollars is indifferent—that Man, in his moral thought, ought to raise himself to such abstract universality as would render it in truth indifferent to him whether the hundred dollars, let them have whatever quantitative relation they may to the actual state of his means, are or whether they are not—indifferent to him even whether he himself be or not (in finite life, that is, for a state, determinate Being is meant), &c.—even ‘*si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinæ,*’ was the utterance of a Roman, and much more the Christian ought to find himself in this indifference.

There is still to be noticed the immediate connexion in which the elevation over the hundred dollars, and all finite things in general, stands with the Ontological

proof and the cited Kantian criticism of the same. This criticism has by its popular example made itself universally plausible: who does not know that a hundred actual dollars are different from a hundred merely possible dollars—that they constitute a difference in my state of means? Because, therefore, in the case of the hundred dollars this difference manifests itself, the Notion—that is, the determinatum of comprehension as mere possibility—and the Being are different from each other; and so, *therefore*, also God's Notion is different from his Being; and just as little as I can bring out of the possibility of a hundred dollars their actuality, so little can I 'grab out' of the notion of God his existence: and the ontological proof is nothing but this 'grabbing'-out of the existence of God from his notion. Now, if certainly it is not without its own truth that Notion is different from Being, God is still more different from the hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the *Definition of Finite Things*, that in them Notion and Being are different, Notion and Reality, Soul and Body are separable, and they themselves consequently perishable and mortal: the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is just this—that his Notion and his Being are *unseparated* and *inseparable*. The true criticism of the Categories and of Reason is exactly this—to give cognition an understanding of this difference, and to prevent it from applying to God the distinguishing characters and relations of the Finite.

REMARK 2.

Defects of the Expression Unity, Identity, of Being and Nothing.

There is another reason to be mentioned contributive to the repugnance against the proposition relative to

Being and Nothing: this reason is, that the expression of the result, furnished by the consideration of Being and Nothing, in the proposition, *Being and Nothing is one and the same*, is imperfect. The accent is laid mainly on their being *one and the same*, as is the case in the Proposition of a Judgment in general, where the Predicate it is, which alone enunciates what the Subject is. The sense seems, therefore, to be, that the difference is denied—which difference, at the same time, nevertheless, is immediately forthcoming in the proposition; for it names *both* terms, Being and Nothing, and implies them as things different. It cannot be intended, at the same time, that abstraction is to be made from them, and only their unity is to be held fast. This sense would of itself manifest its own one-sidedness, inasmuch as that from which abstraction is to be made, is, nevertheless, actually present and expressly named in the proposition. So far now as the proposition, Being and Nothing is the same, enunciates the identity of these terms, but in truth just as much implies them both as different, it contradicts itself in itself and eliminates itself. Holding this still closer, there is here a proposition stated, which, considered nearer, involves the movement to disappear through its own self. But just so there happens in its own self that which is to constitute its special purport—namely, Becoming.

The proposition contains thus the result—it is that in itself. The point, however, which is to be noticed here, is the want, that the result is not itself *expressed* in the proposition; it is an external reflexion which discerns it in it. Here, then, in the beginning this universal remark must at once be made, that a proposition, in the form of a judgment, is not competent to express

speculative truths: a knowledge of this circumstance is sufficient to set aside much misunderstanding of speculative truths. A judgment is an *identical* reference between subject and predicate: abstraction is made thereby from this, that the subject has still more characters than those of the predicate; as well as from this, that the predicate has more extension than the subject. Now, if the Import in hand is speculative, the non-identity of subject and predicate is also an essential moment; but in a judgment this is not expressed. The paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of later philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought, arises frequently from the form of the simple judgment, when applied in expression of speculative results.

In order to express the speculative truth, the want may, in the first place, be attempted to be supplied by the addition of the contrary proposition, as here, Being and Nothing is not the same. But thus the further want arises that these propositions are unconnected, and so exhibit the Import in hand only in the state of Antinomy, while this Import refers itself to one and the same thing, and the terms which are expressed in the two propositions are to be directly united,—a union which can then be enunciated only at the same time as a movement, an unrest of incompatibles. The most common injustice which is done speculative matter, is to make it one-sided—to bring forward, that is, only one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot, then, be denied that this proposition is maintained—As true as is the statement, so false it is; for if the one proposition of a speculative nature be taken, the other ought, at least, to be equally considered and assigned. There is here yet to be mentioned that unfortunate

word Unity. *Unity* designates still more than *identity* a subjective reflexion ; it is especially taken as the relation which arises from *comparison*, from external reflexion. So far as such reflexion finds the same thing in two different objects, there is a unity present in such wise, that there is presupposed as regards this unity, the perfect indifference of the objects which are compared, so that this comparing and unity nowise concern the objects themselves, and are a doing and determining external to them. Unity expresses, therefore, the quite *abstract* self-sameness, and sounds the harder and the harsher, the more those things of which it is enunciated show themselves directly different. For Unity it would be, therefore, so far better to say only, unseparatedness or inseparableness : but thus, again, the Affirmative of the relation of the whole is not expressed.

Thus the whole veritable result which has here yielded itself is Becoming. And this is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of Being and Nothing ; but it is contained in this movement, that pure Being is immediate and simple ; that it is, therefore, equally pure Nothing ; that the difference of these is, but just as much that it eliminates itself and is not. The result, then, equally maintains the difference of Being and of Nothing, but as only a *meant* or *opined* one.

One *opines* that Being is rather directly other than what Nothing is, that there is nothing clearer than their absolute difference, and that there seems nothing easier than to assign it. It is, however, just as easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is *unsayable*. *Those who would persist in the difference of Being and Nothing, let them challenge themselves to assign in what it consists.* Had Being and Nothing any determinateness by which they might be distin-

guished, they would be, as has been observed, determinate Being and determinate Nothing—not pure Being and pure Nothing, as they are to be taken here. Their difference, therefore, is entirely empty; each of the two is in the same manner the Indeterminate: the difference, therefore, lies not in them, but in a *Third*, in *Opinion*. But opinion is a form of the Subjective which does not belong to this series of statement. The Third, however, in which Being and Nothing have their support, must present itself here also, and it has already presented itself here: it is Becoming. In it they are as Differents; Becoming *is* only so far as as they are different. This Third is another than they: they consist only in another; that is to say as well, they consist (or subsist) not by and for themselves. Becoming is the maintainment or maintaining medium of Being as well as of Non-being; or their maintainment is only their Being in *One*; just this their maintainment is it that just as much eliminates their difference.

The challenge to assign the difference of Being and Nothing includes that other also, to say, what then is Being and what is Nothing? Let those who strive against perceiving that the one as well as the other is only a *transition* into each other—and who maintain of Being and of Nothing this thing and the other—state what they speak of, that is, set up a *definition* of Being and Nothing, and demonstrate that it is correct. Without having complied with this first requisition of ancient Science, the logical rules of which they accept and apply in other cases, all that they maintain in regard to Being and Nothing are but assertions, scientific nullities. Should it be said, Existence, so far as this in the first place can be taken as synonymous with Being, is the *complement* to

Possibility, we have thus presupposed another character, possibility; Being is not enunciated in its immediacy, not even as self-subsistent, but as conditioned. For Being which is *mediated*, we shall reserve the expression Existence. But one represents to oneself Being—perhaps under the figure of pure light, as the clearness of untroubled seeing—Nothing again as absolute Night, and one attaches their difference to this well-known sensuous diversity. In truth, however, if one will represent to oneself more exactly this very seeing, one will easily perceive that there will be seen in absolute light just as much and as little as in the absolute dark; that the one seeing as much as the other is pure seeing—seeing of Nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same. Only in determinate light—and light becomes determinate through darkness—in troubled light, therefore, just as only in determinate darkness—and darkness becomes determinate by light—in illuminated darkness, can anything be distinguished, because only troubled light and illuminated darkness possess in themselves distinction, and are thereby determinate Being—There-being, or So-being.

REMARK 3.

The Isolating of the Abstractions, Being and Nothing.

The unity, whose moments are Being and Nothing as inseparable the one from the other, is itself, at the same time, different from them, and thus to them a *Third*, which in its own most strictly proper form is *Becoming*. *Transition* is the same as *Becoming*; only that in the former, the two, from the one of which to the other of which the transition is made, have

more the aspect of being at rest apart from each other, and the transition is rather conceived as taking place *between* them. Wherever and however Being or Nothing is in question, there this Third must be present also; for these subsist not by themselves, but *are* only in Becoming, in this Third. This Third, indeed, has numerous empirical forms; but these are put aside or neglected by abstraction, in order to hold fast these its own products, Being and Nothing, each *per se*, and display them safe from transition. In reply to such simple procedure of abstraction, we have just equally simply to point to empirical existence, in which only said abstraction itself is something, has a Here-being. Through whatever reflexional forms, indeed, the separation of the inseparable is sought to be attained, there is independently present in every such attempt the opposite of its own self, and so, without recurring or appealing to the nature of the facts themselves, we may always confound every such attempt out of its own self, just by taking it as it gives itself, and demonstrating in it its own other. It would be lost pains to seek, as it were, to arrest all the sallies and windings of Reflexion and its reasonment, in order to cut off and render impossible to it all the shifts and shuffles by which it conceals its own contradiction from its own self. For this reason, also, I refrain from noticing numerous self-called refutations and objections which have been brought forward against the doctrine that neither Being nor Nothing is anything true, and that only Becoming is their truth; the mental training calculated to give insight into the nullity of such refutations—or rather, quite to banish all such weak suggestions from oneself—is to be effected only by a critical knowledge of the forms of the understanding;

but those who are the most fertile in such objections fall-to at once with their reflexions upon the first propositions, without—by an enlarged study of Logic—helping or having helped themselves to a consciousness of the *nature* of these crude reflexions.

We shall consider, however, a few of the results which manifest themselves when Being and Nothing are isolated from each other, and the one placed out of the sphere of the other, so that their transition is negated.

Parmenides held fast by Being, and was but consistent with himself, in affirming at the same time of Nothing, that it in nowise is; only Being is. Being thus completely by itself is the Indeterminate, and has, therefore, no reference to Other: it seems, therefore, that *from this beginning* there can be no further *progress* made—from it itself, that is—and any progress can only be accomplished by the joining on to it of something foreign, something from *without* and elsewhere. The step forward, that Being is the same as Nothing, appears, then, as a second absolute beginning—a transition that is *für sich* (*per se*), and adds itself externally to Being. Being would be, in general, not the absolute Beginning, if it had a determinateness; it would then depend on another, and would not be immediate, would not be the Beginning. If it be, however, indeterminate, and so a true beginning, neither has it anything by which to lead itself over into another; it is at once the *End*. There can just as little anything break or dawn out of it, as anything break or dawn into it; in Parmenides, as in Spinoza, there is no transition from Being or Absolute Substance to the Negative, the Finite. But if transition nevertheless is to be made—which, as has been remarked, in the case of reference-less and

so progress-less Being, can only take place in an external fashion,—such transition or progress is a second, a new beginning. Thus Fichte's absolutely first, unconditioned axiom, $A=A$, is position, Thesis; the second is opposition, Antithesis; this latter is now to be considered *partly* conditioned, *partly* unconditioned (and so contradiction in itself). Now this is a progress of outer Reflexion, which just as well again negates what it started with as an Absolute,—the Opposition, the antithesis is negation of the first identity,—as it, at the same time, immediately, expressly reduces its second unconditioned to a conditioned. If, however, on the whole, there were any right to proceed, i. e. to sublimate the first beginning, such right must have been of this nature, that it lay in this First itself that another could connect itself with it; that is, the First must have been a Determinate. But the Being [of Parmenides]—or, again, the Absolute Substance [of Spinoza]—does not enunciate itself as such. On the contrary, it is the Immediate, the still absolutely Indeterminate.

The most eloquent, perhaps forgotten, delineation of the impossibility to come from an Abstract to a Further and to a union of both is made by Jacobi in the interest of his polemic against the Kantian *synthesis* à priori of Self-consciousness, in his Essay on the attempt of Criticismus to bring Reason to or under Understanding (Jac. Werke, iii. Bd.). He states (S. 113) the problem thus: That there be demonstrated the occurrence or the production of a *synthesis* in a *Pure* [blank unity], whether of consciousness, of space, or of time. 'Space is *one*, Time is *one*, Consciousness is *one*;—tell me now, then, how any one of these three ones shall—*purely*—multiply itself in itself: each is only *one*, and *no other*; an identical one sort, a *the- this- that Selfsameness*!

without *the*-ness, *this*-ness, *that*-ness; for these slumber with the *the*, *this*, *that*, still in the infinite=O of the Indeterminate, from which each and every *determinate* has yet to expect its birth. What brings into these three infinitudes, *finitude*; what impregnates space and time à priori with number and measure, and converts them into a *pure manifold*; what brings the *pure Spontaneity* (I) into oscillation? How gets its pure vowel to a consonant—or rather, its *soundless* uninterrupted *sounding*—how, interrupting itself, breaks it off, in order at least to gain a sort of Self-sound (literally vowel), an *accent*?' One sees from this that Jacobi has very sharply recognised the *non-ens* of abstraction, whether a so-called absolute (i. e., only abstract) Space, or a so-characterised Time, or a so-characterised pure Consciousness, Ego; he remains immovable in it for the purpose of maintaining the impossibility of a transition to Other, the condition of a synthesis, and to a synthesis itself. The synthesis, which is meant, must not be taken as a conjunction of characters already there *externally*; the question is partly of the genesis of a Second to a First, of a Determinate to a beginning Indeterminate,—partly, again, of *immanent* synthesis, synthesis *à priori*, a Unity of Differents that *is* absolutely (or that in and for itself *is*). Becoming is such immanent synthesis of Being and Nothing; but because synthesis mostly suggests the sense of an external bringing together of things full-formed, ready-present, externally confronting each other, the name synthesis (synthetic unity) has been justly left out of use. Jacobi asks, *how* does the pure vowel of the Ego get to its consonant, *what* brings determinateness into indeterminateness? The *What* were easily answered, and in his own fashion has been already answered by Kant;

but the question of *How* amounts to, in what mode and manner, in what relation, and so on, and demands thus the statement of a particular category; but of mode and manner, of categories of the understanding, there cannot be any question here. The question of *How* belongs itself to the erroneous ways of Reflexion, which demands comprehensibleness, but at the same time presupposes its own fixed categories, and consequently feels itself armed in advance against the reply to its own question. Neither has it with Jacobi the higher sense of a question concerning the *necessity* of synthesis; for he remains, as has been said, fixed in the abstractions, in order to maintain the impossibility of a synthesis. He describes (S. 147) with particular vivacity the procedure in order to reach the abstraction of space. 'I must for so long strive clean to forget that I ever saw, heard, touched, or handled anything at all, my own self expressly not excepted. Clean, clean, clean must I forget all motion; and precisely this *forgetting*, because it is hardest, I must make my greatest concern. I must get everything in general, as I have got it thought away—also completely and entirely shot away, and leave nothing whatever over but only the forcibly kept perception of infinite *immutable space*. I may not therefore *again think into it* my own self as something distinct from it, but at the same time connected with it; I may not allow myself to be simply *surrounded* and *pervaded* by it: but I must wholly *pass over* into it, become one with it, *transmute* myself into it; I must leave nothing over of myself, but *this my perception* itself, in order to contemplate it as a veritably self-subsistent, independent, single and sole manifestation.'

In this quite abstract purity of continuity,—that is,

indefiniteness and void of conception,—it is indifferent to name this abstraction space, or pure perception, pure thought ;—it is quite the same thing as what the Indian names *Brahma*, when, externally motionless and no less internally emotionless, looking years long only to the tip of his own nose, he says within himself just *Om, Om, Om*, or perhaps just nothing at all. This dull, void consciousness, conceived as consciousness, is Being (*das Seyn*).

In this vacuum, says Jacobi further, he experiences the opposite of what he is assured by Kant he ought to experience : he finds himself, not as a *plurality* and *manifold*, but rather as a *unit* without any plurality and variety ; nay, ‘I am the very *impossibility*, am the *annihilation* of all variety and plurality,—can, out of my pure, absolutely simple, unalterable nature, *restore again*, or raise ghost-like within myself, not the smallest particle of any such ;—thus all out-of and near-one-another-ness, all thereon founded variety and plurality, reveals itself in this purity as *purely impossible*.’

This impossibility is nothing else than the *tautology*—I hold fast by the abstract unity, and exclude all plurality and variety ; hold myself in the difference-less and indeterminate, and look away from all that is distinguished and determinate. The Kantian synthesis *à priori* of self-consciousness—that is, the function of this unity to sunder itself, and in this diremption or sundering to maintain itself—is attenuated by Jacobi into the same abstraction. This ‘synthesis *in itself*,’ the ‘original *ordeal*,’ is onesidedly reduced by him into ‘the copula in itself ;—an *Is, Is, Is*, without beginning and end, and without What, Who, and Which : this repetition of the repetition continued *ad infinitum* is the sole business, function, and production of the all-

purest synthesis ; it itself is the mere, pure, absolute repetition itself.' Or, indeed, we might say, rather, as there is in it no remission,—that is, no negation, distinction,—it is not a repetition, but only undistinguished simple Being. But is it then still synthesis, when Jacobi omits precisely that by which the unity is synthetic unity?

In the first place, when Jacobi plants himself thus fast in the absolute (i.e. abstract) space, time, and consciousness,—it is to be said that he, in this manner, misplaces himself into, and holds himself fast in, something empirically false ; there empirically exist no space and time, which were not limited, not in their continuity filled with variously-limited There-being and Vicissitude, so that these limits and alterations belong unseparated and inseparably to Space and Time : in like manner, consciousness is filled with determinate sensation, conception, desire, &c. ; it does not exist separated from a particular matter of some sort. The empirical *transition*, moreover, is self-evident : consciousness can make, indeed, void space, void time, and void consciousness itself, or pure Being, its object and ingest ; but it remains not with such, it presses forward out of such void to a better,—i.e. in some manner or other, a more concrete ingest, and however bad an ingest may be otherwise, it is *so* far better and truer : just any such ingest is a synthetic one in general ; synthetic taken in the more universal sense. Thus Parmenides gets to be busied with his *delusion* and his *opinion*, the opposite of Being and of Truth ; so, too, Spinoza with his attributes, modes, extension, motion, understanding, will, &c. The synthesis involves and shows the untruth of those abstractions ; in it they are in unity with their other—

not, therefore, as self-subsistent—not as absolute, but directly as relative.

The demonstration of the *empirical* nullity of empty space, &c. is not, however, that with which we have to do. Consciousness certainly can abstract, can fill itself with the indeterminate also; and the abstractions it then holds fast are the *Thoughts* of pure Space, Time, pure Consciousness, pure Being. Now, it is the thought of *pure* space, &c.—i.e. *pure* space, &c.—which is in itself to be demonstrated as null: i.e., that it as such is already its own contrary; that as it is there in its self, its contrary has already penetrated into it; it is already of itself gone forward out of itself—is determinateness.

But this manifests itself immediately in their regard [that is, as regards *pure* space, time, &c.]. They are, as Jacobi profusely describes them, results of abstraction; they are expressly determined as *undetermined*; and this—to go back to its simplest form, amounts to Being—is Being. Just this *Indeterminateness* of Being, however, is what constitutes its determinateness; for Indeterminateness is opposed to Determinateness: it is consequently, as contraposed, itself the Determinate or Negative, and the pure, quite abstract Negative. This Indefiniteness or abstract negation, which Being in this manner has in its own self, is what outer as well as inner reflexion enunciates when it takes it as equal to nothing, and declares it an empty thing of thought, Nothing. Or it may be expressed thus: Since Being is determinationless, it is not the (affirmative) determinateness, which it is, not Being but Nothing.

In the pure reflexion of the Beginning, as it has been taken in this Logic with *Being* as such, *transition* is still concealed: as *Being* is taken only as *Immediate*, *Nothing* breaks by it *only immediately* forth. But all

following determinations, as There-being which is next, are more concrete; as regards There-being, that is *posited* which contains and produces the contradiction of those Abstractions, and therefore their transition. As regards Being as said Simple, Immediate, the remembrance that it is the result of perfect Abstraction, and so for that very reason but abstract Negativity, Nothing, becomes lost from view behind the Science which within its own self, expressly from *Essence* onwards, will present said one-sided Immediate as a Mediate, in which Being is posited as *Existence*, and the Mediating agency of this Being as *the Ground*.

In the light of said remembrance, the transition from Being into Nothing may be represented (or, as the phrase goes, *explained* and made *intelligible*) as something even light and trivial. It may be said, for example, that without doubt Being which has been made the beginning of the Science (and of Science) is Nothing; for we can abstract from everything; and when one has abstracted from everything, there remains, of course, nothing over. But, it may be continued, the beginning is thus not an Affirmative, not Being, but just Nothing; and Nothing is then also the End, at least as much so as Immediate Being, and even still more. The shortest way is to let such reasoning take its own course, and look on to see how the results it vaunts are characterised. Taking it for granted, then, that Nothing were the result of said *raisonnement*, and that now, consequently, the Beginning must be made with Nothing (as in Chinese Philosophy), there were no necessity on that account to stir a hand; for before one could stir a hand, this Nothing would have just as much converted itself into Being (see above, B., Nothing). But, further, said abstraction from all and

everything (which *all* then is, nevertheless, *bëent*) being presupposed, it is still to be more exactly understood; the result of the abstraction from all that is, is first of all abstract Being, Being in general; as in the cosmological proof of the existence of God from the contingent being of the world (over which being the ascent or advance contained in the proof is made), Being is still brought up along with us, Being is determined as Infinite Being. But abstraction can certainly again be made from this pure Being also; Being, too, can be thrown into the all from which abstraction has been already made; then remains Nothing. It is still possible for us, would we but forget the *thinking* of Nothing—i. e., its striking round into Being—or did we know nothing of this, to continue in the style of *One may this, One may that*: we may, for example (God be praised!), abstract also from the Nothing (as, for that part, the creation of the world itself is but an abstraction from Nothing), and then there remains not Nothing, for it is just from it we have abstracted, and we are once more landed in Being. This *One can, One may*, gives an external play of abstraction, in which the abstracting itself is only the one-sided activity of the Negative. Directly at hand, it lies in this very *One can, One may*, itself, that to it Being is as indifferent as Nothing, and that just as much as each of the two disappears, each of them equally also arises: again, it is equally indifferent whether we start from the act of the Nothing, or from the Nothing; the act of Nothing—i. e., the mere abstracting—is no more and no less anything True than the mere Nothing.

The Dialectic, according to which Plato handles *the One* in the Parmenides, is also to be regarded rather as a Dialectic of external reflexion. Being and *the One*

are both Eleatic forms, which are the same thing. But they are also capable of being distinguished : it is thus Plato takes them in the Dialogue mentioned. Having removed from the *One* the various characters of whole and parts—of being in itself, of being in another, &c.—of figure, time, &c.,—the result is that Being does not belong to the *One*, for only in one or other of these modes does Being attach to any one Something (p. 141, e., vol. iii., ed. Steph). Plato then proceeds to handle the position, *the One is* ; and we have to see how, from this proposition, the transition to the *Non-is* of the *One* is accomplished. It takes place by *comparing* the two elements of the proposition advanced, *the One is*. This proposition contains *the One* and *Being* ; and *the One is* contains more than when we say only, *the One*. In this that they are *different*, then, is demonstrated the moment of Negation which the proposition holds within it. It is obvious that this path (method) has a presupposition, and is an external reflexion.

In like manner as *the One* is here placed in connexion with Being, may that Being which is supposed capable of being held fast by itself and abstractly, be demonstrated—in the simplest fashion, without calling in Thought at all—to be in a union which implies the contrary of that which is supposed to be maintained. Being, taken as it is immediately, belongs to a *Subject*, is an enunciation, has an empirical Here-being in general, and stands, therefore, on the level of limitation and the Negative. In whatever phrases or flexions the understanding may express itself, when struggling against the unity of Being and Nothing, and appealing to what is immediately before us, it will find just in this very experience nothing but *determined* Being, *defined* Being, Being with a limit or Negation [*a term, an end*],—that

very unity which it rejects. The maintaining of immediate Being reduces itself thus to an empirical existence, the *exhibition* of which cannot be rejected, because it is the immediacy without (outside of) Thought, to which its own appeal is made.

The case is the same with Nothing, only reverse-wise, and this Reflexion is familiarly known and has often enough been made in its regard. Nothing, taken in its immediacy, shows itself as *Be-ing* or *Be-ent* (as a thing that *is*); for it is in its nature the same as Being. Nothing is thought, Nothing is represented (conceived), it is spoken of; it *is* therefore. Nothing has in thought, representation, speech, &c., its Being. This Being again is furthermore also distinguished from it: it is therefore said, that Nothing is indeed in Thought, Representation; but that on that account not *it* is, not to it as such does Being attach, that only Thought or Representation is this Being. Notwithstanding this distinction, it is just as much not to be denied that Nothing stands in connexion with a Being, but in *connexion* (reference, relation), though it implies difference also, there is a unity with Being. In whatever manner Nothing be enunciated or exhibited, it shows itself in combination, or if you will contact, with a Being, unseparated from a Being, or just in a *There-being*.

But in that Nothing is thus demonstrated in a *There-being*, usually still this distinction of it from Being is wont to float before the mind,—namely, that the *There-being* of Nothing [its presence in this sublunary existence] is entirely nothing appertinent to it itself; that it does not possess Being for and by its own self, that it is not Being as such. Nothing is only absence of Being, as darkness is only absence of light, cold only absence of heat, &c. Darkness (the strain continues)

has only meaning in reference to the eye, in external comparison with the Positive, Light; and just so is cold only something in our sensation. On the other hand, Light, Heat, like Being, are *per se*, for themselves, the Objective, the Real, the Actuose, of absolutely quite another quality and dignity than those Negatives—than Nothing. We find it frequently adduced as a very weighty Reflexion and important Cognition, that darkness is only absence of light, cold only absence of heat. But in this field of empirical matters it may be empirically remarked, in reference to said acute reflexion, that in light darkness certainly shows itself Actuose, inasmuch as it defines, determines it as colour, and thereby to it itself only first of all imparts visibility; for, as formerly observed, in pure light vision is just as little possible as in pure darkness. But the visibility is actuality in the eye, and in that actuality the Negative has just as much share as the light itself, which passes for the Real and Positive. In like manner, cold makes itself perceivable enough in water, our sensation, &c. &c.; and when we refuse to it a so-called objective reality, we have with that won altogether nothing as against it. But it might further be objected, that here too, as above, it is a Negative of definite Import that is spoken of, and that we have not steadily remained by Nothing itself, to which Being is, as regards empty abstraction, not inferior—nor, indeed, superior. But it were well to take by themselves cold, darkness, and the like definite negations, in order to see what is involved in this common constitution which they exhibit. They are not then to be considered as Nothing in general, but as the Nothing of light, heat, &c.—of something definite, of an *Implex*, an *Intent*: they are thus determinate, and, if we may say so,

implicant Nothings, *intaining* Nothings (meaningful Nothings). But a *definedness*, *determinedness*, is, as comes again further on, itself a Negation: they are thus negative Nothings. But a negative Nothing is something affirmative. The striking round of Nothing, by reason of its definiteness (which definiteness manifested itself a little while ago as a There-being—a real state of being—in a subject, in water, or whatever else), into an affirmative, appears to a consciousness which remains fixed in the abstraction of the understanding as the greatest of paradoxes, however simple it is to perceive that the Negation of a Negation is a Positive. To be sure, on the other hand, the perception of this simple truth may appear to a like consciousness—and just because of its simplicity—as something trivial, on which therefore high and mighty understanding need bestow no attention. The matter meanwhile has, with all this, its own correctness: nay, not only has this correctness, but possesses, because of the universality of such forms or determinations, an infinite extension and universal application. It were not amiss, as regards these things, then, to pay a little attention after all. (Original curiously tangled: see p. 105, Werke, vol. iii. ed. 1833.)

It may be still remarked, as regards the transition of Being and Nothing into one another, that it ought to be taken up into the mind—just so—without any further operation of reflexion. It is immediate and quite abstract because of the abstraction of the *transient* moments; i. e., because in either of these moments the determinateness of the other moment is not yet *set* (manifested as implied), and so as means by which the transition were to be effected. Nothing is not yet posited (manifested as implied) in Being, though Being

is *essentially* Nothing, and *vice versâ*. It is, therefore, inadmissible to apply here further-determined connective media, and conceive Being and Nothing in any relation whatever : said transition is not yet a relation. It is, therefore, not allowable to say, Nothing is the Ground of Being ; or, Being is the Ground of Nothing ; Nothing cause of Being, &c. ; or, transition is possible into Nothing only under condition that something *is*, or into Being only under the condition of Non-being. The species of inter-reference cannot be further defined, unless the co-referred sides themselves were at the same time further determined. The connexion of Ground and Consequent, &c. has no longer mere Being and Nothing as the sides which it combines, but expressly Being which is Ground, and something which is to be sure posititious, and not self-subsistent, but which, however, is not the abstract Nothing.

REMARK 4.

Incomprehensibleness of the Beginning.

We may perceive from the preceding, what is the nature of the Dialectic against a beginning of the world, and also its end, by which the eternity of matter should be supposed proved ; i.e., of the Dialectic against Becoming, Origin or Decease, in general. The Kantian Antinomy respecting the finitude or infinitude of the world in space and time receives more particular consideration further on, under the notion of Quantitative Infinitude. Said simple ordinary Dialectic rests on the holding fast of the antithesis of Being and Nothing. It is proved in the following manner, that there is no beginning of the world, or of anything else, possible :

There cannot anything begin, neither so far as it is,

nor so far as it is not: for so far as it *is*, it does not first begin; and so far as it is *not*, neither does it begin. Should the world or anything else be supposed to have begun, it must have begun in nothing. But nothing is no beginning, or there is no beginning in nothing: for a beginning includes in it a Being; but nothing contains no Being. Nothing is only Nothing. In a Ground, Cause, &c., when the Nothing is so determined or defined, an affirmation, Being, is contained. For the same reason there cannot anything cease. For in that case Being would require to contain Nothing. But Being is only Being, not the contrary of itself.

It is obvious that there is nothing brought forward here against Becoming, or Beginning and Ending, this unity of Being and Nothing, but their assertoric denial and the ascription of truth to Being and Nothing, each in division from the other. This Dialectic is, nevertheless, at least more consistent than reflective conception (representation). To this latter, that Being and Nothing *are* only in separation, passes for perfect truth; but, on the other hand, it holds beginning and ending as equally true characterisations: in these latter, however, it *de facto* assumes the undividedness of Being and Nothing.

On the presupposition of the absolute partedness of Being from Nothing, the beginning—as we so often hear—or Becoming, is certainly something *incomprehensible*; for we make a presupposition which sublates the beginning or the becoming, which nevertheless we *again* grant; and this contradiction, which we produce ourselves, and whose resolution we make impossible, is what is *incomprehensible*.

What has been stated is also the same Dialectic which understanding uses against the notion which the higher analysis gives of infinitesimal magnitudes. This

notion is treated more in detail further on. These magnitudes are defined as such, that they ARE *in their disappearance*, not *before* their disappearance, for they were then finite magnitudes ;—not *after* their disappearance, for they were then nothing. Against this pure notion it has been objected, and again and again repeated, that such magnitudes are *either* something *or* nothing ; that there is no *middle state* (state is here an inappropriate, barbarous expression) between Being and Non-being. There is here, too, assumed the absolute separation of Being and Nothing. But, on the other hand, it has been shown, that Being and Nothing are in effect the same, or, to speak the same dialect, that there is nothing whatever which is not a *middle state* between Being and Nothing. Mathematic has to thank the adoption of said notion, which understanding contradicts, for its most brilliant results.

The adduced *raisonnement*, which makes the false presupposition of the absolute separatedness of Being and Non-being, and adheres immovably to the same, is to be named, not Dialectic, but Sophistry. For Sophistry is *raisonnement* from a groundless presupposition, which is accepted without examination and thoughtlessly ; but we call Dialectic the higher rational movement, in which such seemingly absolutely separated things pass over into one another—through themselves—through that which they are—and the presupposition sublates itself. It is the dialectic immanent nature of Being and Nothing themselves to manifest their unity—Becoming—as their truth.

2. Moments of Becoming.

Becoming, Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be, is the unseparatedness of Being and Nothing ; not the unity

which abstracts from Being and Nothing ; but as unity of Being and Nothing, it is this definite, determinate [concrete] unity, that in which as well Being as Nothing *is*. But thus as each *is*, only unseparated from its other, each also *is not*. *They ARE*, therefore, in this unity, but *as* evanescents, only as things eliminated, resolved, sublated. They sink down from their previously-conceived *self-subsistency* into *moments*, distinguished and distinguishable, but resolved.

Considered on the side of their distinguishedness, each is in it as oneness with the other. Becoming, then, contains Being and Nothing as *two unities such* that each of them is itself unity of Being and Nothing. The one is Being as immediate and as reference to Nothing ; the other, Nothing as immediate and as reference to Being : the elementary distinctions are in unequal value in these unities.

Becoming is thus in a double form. In the one, Nothing is as immediate : this form is as beginning from nothing which refers itself to Being, or, what is the same thing, passes over into Being. In the other, Being is as immediate : this form is as beginning from Being which passes over into Nothing. The former is Origin or Coming-to-be ; the latter, Decease, Ceasing, or Ceasing-to-be.

Both are the same, Becoming, but, as these so diverse directions, they reciprocally interpenetrate and paralyse each other and themselves. The one is Ceasing-to-be ; Being passes over into Nothing, but Nothing is equally the contrary of itself, a passing over into Being, Coming-to-be. This Coming-to-be is the other direction ; Nothing passes over into Being, but Being equally sublates itself, is a passing over into Nothing, Ceasing-to-be. They sublate not themselves *mutually*, not the one the other

externally; but each sublates itself in itself, and is in its own self the contrary of itself.

3. *Sublation (resolution) of Becoming.*

The equilibrium into which Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be reflect themselves, is, at first hand, Becoming itself. But Becoming equally goes together into peaceful unity. Being and Nothing are in it only as disappearing; but Becoming as such is only through their distinguishedness. Their disappearing, therefore, is the disappearing of Becoming, or the disappearing of the disappearing itself. Becoming is an untenable unrest, which sinks together into a peaceful result.

Or it might be expressed thus: Becoming is the disappearing of Being in Nothing and of Nothing in Being, and the disappearing of Being and Nothing in general; but it rests, at the same time, on the distinguishedness of these. It contradicts itself, therefore, within itself, because it unites within itself what is opposed to itself, but such a union destroys itself.

This result is a *disappearedness*, but not as Nothing; —as Nothing it were only a relapse into one of the distinctions already sublated, not a result of Nothing *and* of Being. It is now unity of Being and Nothing in reposing simplicity. But reposing simplicity [a fixed, simple, incompound oneness] is Being, so, nevertheless, that it is no longer *per se* (for and by itself), but as form [determination, characterising element] of the Whole.

Becoming, thus as transition into the unity of Being and Nothing, which unity is as *bëent* (existent), or has the shape and aspect of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *There-being* [particularised,

definite existence, or real *state* of Being, taken quite generally].

REMARK.

The expression, Sublation.

Aufheben und das Aufgehobene (das Ideelle), *sublation* and *what is sublated* (and so only *idéellement*, not *réellement* is), this is one of the most important notions of Philosophy, a ground-form which repeats itself everywhere and always, the sense of which is to be exactly apprehended and particularly distinguished from Nothing. What sublates itself, does not, on that account, become Nothing. Nothing is the *Immediate* [directly present to us]; what is sublated, on the other hand, is a *Mediate*, it is a Non-béent—but as *result*—which set out from a Being: it has, therefore, the definite particularity from which it derives still *in itself* [impliciter, virtually, materialiter, not formaliter; what anything has *in itself*, it implies or involves]. Aufheben, *To sublate*, has two senses, now signifying as much as to *preserve, maintain*, and again as much as to *cause to cease, to make an end of*. Even *preserving* includes the Negative in it—this Negative, that Something, in order to be conserved is removed or withdrawn from its Immediacy, from a There-being open to external influences. What is sublated or resolved is thus, at the same time, preserved; it has only lost its immediacy, but it is not on that account annihilated. The two characters of sublation just stated, may be described *lexikalisch* as two significations of the word. It is striking to find language using the same word for two contradictory predicables. To speculative thought, it is gratifying to find words which have a speculative meaning in their own selves. The German lan-

guage has a considerable number of these. The double meaning of the Latin *tollere* (which the Ciceronian wit—*tollendum esse Octavium*—has made notorious) is more circumscribed, its affirmative character amounting only to a lifting-up. A thing is sublated, resolved, only so far as it has gone into unity with its opposite; in this closer determination, as what is reflected, it may be fitly named Moment. Weight, and Distance from a point, are called, with reference to the Lever, its mechanical Moments, because of the identity of their action, notwithstanding their diversity otherwise; the one being, as it were, the Real of a weight, and the other the Ideal or Idëell of a line, a mere character of space (S. Encycl. Hegel, 3te Ausgab. § 261, Anm). The remark must often occur to be made, that philosophy uses Latin expressions for reflected characters, either because the mother-tongue has not such as are required, or if having them, as here, because they remind more of what is *immediate*, while the foreign tongue suggests rather what is *reflected*.

The nearer [more concrete or determinate] sense and expression which—now that they are moments—Being and Nothing receive, has to effect itself in the consideration of There-being, the unity in which they are conserved or put by. Being is Being, and Nothing is Nothing, only in their distinguishedness from each other; in their truth again, in their unity, they have disappeared as these characters, and are now something else. Being and Nothing are the same; *therefore, because they are the same, they are no longer Being and Nothing*, and possess now a different determination (or characterisation): in Becoming, they were Origin and Decease; in There-being, as a differently-determined unity, they are again differently-determined moments.

This unity remains now their base [the ground, the mother-liquor that holds them], from which they do not again issue in the abstract sense of Being and Nothing.

CHAPTER II.

THERE-BEING.

THERE-BEING is definite, determinate Being; its determinateness, definiteness, is *bëent* determinateness, *bëent* definiteness, Quality. Through its quality, is it, that *Something is*,—and as in opposition to *Another*. Through its quality, likewise, is it *alterable* and *finite*. Through its quality is it *negatively* determined; and not only so as opposed to *Another*, but directly *in it*. This its negation as, in the first instance, opposed to the *Finite* Something, is the *Infinite*; the abstract antithesis in which these distinctions [Finite and Infinite] appear, resolves itself into the Infinitude, which is without antithesis, into *Being-for-self*.

The discussion of There-being has thus the three Divisions—

- A. There-being as such;
- B. Something and Other, Finitude;
- C. Qualitative Infinitude.

A.

THERE-BEING AS SUCH.

IN There-being

- a. as such, its determinateness, first of all, is
- b. to be distinguished as *Quality*. This (quality), however, is to be taken as well in the one as in the

other determination of There-being,—as *Reality* and as *Negation*. But in these determinatenesses [*determinata, definita*] There-being is at the same time reflected within itself; and evolved or stated as such, it is

c. *Something, a There-bëent.*

a. *There-being in general.*

There-being issues from Becoming. There-being is the simple oneness of Being and Nothing. Because of this simplicity (singleness), it has the form of an Immediate. Its mediating process, Becoming, lies behind it; it (this process) has sublated itself, and There-being therefore appears as a First, as what one might begin from, set out from. It is at first hand in the one-sided character (determination) of Being; the other character (moment) which it contains, Nothing, will likewise manifest itself in it in contraposition to the former.

It is not mere Being, but *There-being*; etymologically taken, Being in a certain *place*; but the idea of space is not relevant here. According to its Becoming, There-being is, in general, Being with a Non-being, in such wise that this Non-being is taken up into simple unity with [the other moment] Being. Non-being taken up into Being in such wise that the concrete [resultant] whole is in the form of Being, of Immediacy, constitutes *Determinateness* as such [i. e. definiteness, particularity, peculiarity—tangibility, palpability, recognisableness, cognisableness, distinguishableness.]

The Whole is likewise in the *Form*, i. e., *Determinateness* of Being, or it is—(for Being has in Becoming shown itself likewise to be only a moment, i. e.)—a sublated, negatively-determined somewhat. It is

such as yet, however, only *for us in our reflexion*; it is not yet thus *evolved* in itself. But the determinateness as such of There-being will be the evolved and overt one, which is also implied in the expression *There-being*. The two distinctions are always to be kept well in view; only what is *evolved, explicit* in a notion, belongs in the developing consideration [considered or observed development] of the same, to its implex of comprehension; while any determinateness that is not yet evolved in its own self belongs to our reflexion, whether employed on the nature of the notion itself, or only on external comparison. To call attention to a determinateness of the latter sort can only serve to illustrate or pre-indicate the course which will exhibit itself in the evolution. That the Whole, the oneness of Being and Nothing, is in the *one-sided* determinateness of Being, is an external reflexion; but in the Negation, in Something and *Other*, &c., will it reach *position*, evolution. To notice the distinction referred to was here necessary; but to keep account of all the observations which Reflexion may allow itself, would lead to the prolix anticipation of what must yield itself in the matter in hand. Such reflexions may, perhaps, serve to facilitate a collective view and understanding generally; but they are attended by the disadvantage of being possibly regarded as unauthorised statements, reasons, and bases for the further development. They are to be taken, therefore, for no more than they are, and must be distinctly separated from what is a moment in the progress of the thing itself.

There-being corresponds to the Being of the previous sphere. Being, however, is the Indefinite; there present themselves on this account no significates in it. But There-being is a definite being, a *concrete*; there

manifest themselves, therefore, directly in its regard a number of significates, distinguishable relations of its moments.

b. *Quality*.

Because of the Immediacy in which in There-being, Being and Nothing are one, they do not exceed each other, they do not go beyond each other; as far as There-being is *bëent*, so far is it Non-being, so far is it determined, defined. Being is not the *Genus*, Determinateness not the *Species*. The Determinateness has not yet detached itself from the Being; indeed, it will not again detach itself from it; for the truth which is now established as ground and base is the unity of Non-being with Being; on it as ground appear all further determinations. But the reference, in which Determinateness stands here to Being, is the immediate unity of both, so that there is evolved as yet no distinction of them.

Determinateness thus isolated *per se* (for itself), as *bëent* definiteness, is Quality;—an entirely Simple Immediate. (*Determinateness* in general is the more universal term; it may be Quantitative as well [as Qualitative], and also still further determined.) Because of this simplicity (and singleness) there is nothing further to be said of Quality as such.

But There-being, in which Nothing quite as well as Being is contained, is itself the standard for the on-sidedness of Quality as only *immediate* or *bëent* determinateness. Quality is to be exhibited quite as much in the character of Nothing, in which case then the immediate or *bëent* determinateness is exhibited as one such distinguished against other such, and so as a reflected one: Nothing thus as the Determinate of a Determinateness, is equally a something reflected, it is a *Negation*.

Quality distinguished as *bëent* is *Reality*; Quality as fraught with a Negative, is *Negation* in general, also a Quality, but which has the value of a want, and which further on is determined as Limit, Boundary.

Both are a There-being, but in the *Reality* as Quality with the accent that it is a *Bëent*, it is concealed that it contains the Determinateness, therefore also the Negation: the *Reality* passes therefore only as something positive, from which negation, limitation, want, is excluded. The Negation taken as mere want would be what Nothing is; but it is a There-being, a Quality only determined with a Non-being.

REMARK.

Reality may seem a word of much ambiguity, because it is used of various and even opposed interests. In a philosophical sense, we may speak, perhaps, of *merely empirical reality* as a worthless There-being. But when it is said of Thoughts, Notions, Theories, *they have no reality*, this means that no *Actuality* attaches to them: *in itself* or in the Notion, the Idea of a Platonic Republic, for example, may very well be true. Its worth is here not denied to the Idea, and this latter is allowed to keep its place, as it were, *beside Reality*. But opposed to so-called *mere* Ideas, *mere* Notions, the Real has the value of the alone true. The sense in which in the one case the decision as regards the truth of a matter is assigned to external There-being, is just as one-sided as when the Idea, the essential principle, or even the inner feeling, is represented as indifferent towards outer There-being, or is, perhaps, considered indeed just so much the more excellent, the more it is removed from Reality.

In reference to the expression *Reality*, we may make

mention of the former Metaphysical Notion of God which, in especial, constituted the basis of the so-called ontological proof of the There-being of God. God was defined as the *sum of all realities*; and of this sum it was said that it included no contradiction, that the realities neutralised not the one the other; for a Reality is to be taken only as a perfection, as an *affirmative* that contains no negation. The realities are thus not mutually opposed, not mutually contradictory.

It is assumed in the case of this notion of Reality, that this latter still remains when all Negation is thought out of it; but just thus all its Determinateness is cancelled. Reality is Quality, There-being; on that account, it implies the moment of the Negative, and by it only is it the Determinate which it is. In the so-called *eminent* sense, or as *infinite* (in the usual meaning of the word),—as they say it should be taken,—Reality is extended into the Indeterminate, the Indefinite, and loses its meaning. God's Goodness is not to be goodness in the usual, but in the eminent sense; not different from his Justice, but *tempered* by it (a Leibnitzian term of accommodation, reconciliation); just as, on the other hand, his Justice is to be tempered by his Goodness: thus neither goodness is any longer goodness, nor justice any longer justice. Power is to be tempered by Wisdom; but in this way it would not be Power as such, for it were in subjection to the other: Wisdom is to be enlarged to Power, but in this manner it disappears as *the End and Means determining* Wisdom. The true notion of the Infinite and its *absolute* unity, which will present itself later, is not to be conceived as a *tempering*, mutual *limitation* or *mixture*, which is but a superficial relation, held, too, in an indeterminate mist, with which only notionless figurative Conception

(Representation) can content itself. Reality, which in the above definition of God is taken as determinate Quality, when extended beyond its determinateness ceases to be Reality ; it is converted into, or has gone back to, abstract Being ; God as *pure* Reality in all Reality, or as *sum* of all Realities, is the same formlessness and matterlessness as the empty absolute in which all is one.

Again, Reality being taken in its determinateness, then, as it, Reality, contains essentially the moment of the Negative, the sum of all realities becomes just as much a sum of all negations—the sum, then, of all contradictions,—directly, as it were, the absolute Power in which all that is determinate is absorbed. But as this absolute all-absorbing power *is* itself only so far as there still remains opposed to it *a not yet absorbed*, it becomes, when thought as extended into fulfilled, boundless Power, only the abstract Nothing. Said Reality in all Reality, the Being in all There-being, which is to express the notion of God, is nothing else than abstract Being, the same thing as Nothing.

Determinateness is Negation as affirmatively exhibited ; *Omnis determinatio est negatio*—this is the proposition of Spinoza. It is a proposition of infinite importance ; only the Negation as such is formless abstraction. It is not to be imputed to Speculative Philosophy, however, that it views Negation, or Nothing, as an *ultimum* : Negation is such to Speculative Philosophy just as little as Reality [as such] is to it the True.

Of this proposition, that Determinateness is Negation, the unity of the Spinozistic Substance, or that there is only one Substance, is—the necessary consequence. Thought and Being (or Extension), the two attributes, namely, which Spinoza has before him, he was obliged

in this unity [of substance] to set into one (for as determinate realities they are negations), the infinitude of which *one* is their unity : according to Spinoza's definition, of which more again, the infinitude of anything is its affirmation. He took them, therefore, as *attributes*—that is, such that they have not a separate principle of maintenance, a Being in, for, and by themselves, but are only as sublated, as Moments ; or rather they are to him not even moments, for his substance is what is quite determinationless in its own self, and his *attributes*, as also indeed his *modi*, are distinctions which an external understanding makes. In like manner, the substantiality of Individuals cannot subsist in the face of said proposition. The individual is reference to himself by this, that he sets limits to everything else ; but these limits are just so limits to himself also, references to what is other—he has his There-being not within himself. The individual is certainly *more* than only what is on all sides limited ; but this *more* belongs to another sphere of the Notion : in the Metaphysic of Being he is a Determinate simpliciter ; and that what is so constituted, that the Finite as such be supposed in, by, and for itself [absolute]—against this [supposition] Determinateness asserts itself essentially as negation, and drags him [the individual, the finite] into the same negative movement of the Understanding, which makes all disappear in abstract Unity, in Substance.

The Negation stands immediately opposed to the Reality : further on, in the special sphere of the Reflected Determinations, it becomes opposed to the Positive, which is the Reality reflecting to or on the Negation,—the Reality, *by* or in which the Negative *seems* (shines, shows),—the Negative, i. e., which is as yet concealed in the Reality as such.

Quality is *then* specially *Property*, when in an *external reference* [co-reference, connexion] it manifests itself as *immanent determination* [in the sense of *so-constituted*, immanent nature]. By *properties* of herbs, for example, we understand determinations [manifested powers] which are not only in general *proper* to a Something, but imply also that it by them, in reference to others, *maintains* itself in a peculiar manner [its *own proper*], and allows not the foreign influences set in it to take their own course, but makes good its own determinations in the Other,—although, indeed, it *excludes* not this other. The more quiescent definitenesses, as Figure, Shape, are, on the other hand, not always called properties, possibly not even qualities, inasmuch and so far as they are conceived as *alterable*, not identical with the *Being* or *Beingness* [i. e. of whatever may be in question].

The *Qualirung* or *Inqualirung* (the Agonising or Inagonising, inward pain-ing, pang-ing, throe-ing),—an expression of Jacob Böhme—of a Philosophy that goes into the *Deep*, but a troubled deep,—signifies the movement of a quality (the *sour*, *bitter*, *fiery*, &c.) in its own self, so far as it in its negative nature (in its *Qual*, its pang) expresses and affirms itself through Other—signifies in general the Unrest of the Quality in itself, by which it produces and maintains itself only in conflict.

c. *Something*.

In There-being, its determinateness has been distinguished as Quality ; in Quality as there-béent, there is the Distinction (or the Difference)—of the Reality and of the Negation. By as much now as these distinctions are present in There-being, by so much are they also null

and eliminated. The Reality contains itself the Negation; it is There-being—not indeterminate, abstract Being. No less is the Negation There-being—not the Nothing that *would be* abstract, but set here as it is *in itself*, as Bëent, as appertinent to There-being [as it were, incorporated with There-being]. Quality in general is thus not divided from There-being, which is only definite, determinative, qualitative Being.

This sublation of the distinction is more than a mere withdrawal and external leaving out again of the same, or than a simple turning back to the simple beginning, to There-being as such. The Distinction cannot be left out; for *it is*. The *factum*—what is present—therefore, is There-being in general, Distinction *in it*, and resolution of this Distinction; There-being not as distinctionless, like in the beginning, but as *again equal to itself through resolution of the Distinction*, the simplicity (unality) of There-being *mediated* through this resolution. This sublatedness of the Distinction is the Determinateness proper of There-being [as it were, its special specificity]; it is thus Insichseyn, Being-within-Self: There-being is a There-Bëent—a Something.

The *Something* is the *first Negation of the Negation*, as simple bëent reference to self. There-being, or Living, Thinking, and so further, determines itself essentially [that is, in and from its own nature] as a There-being-one, a Living-one, Thinking-one (Ego), &c. This Determination is of the highest importance, in order not to stop by There-being, Living, Thinking, &c., as generalities—for the same reason, not by the Godhead instead of God. *Something* rightly passes with crude conception (representation) for a *Real*. Nevertheless, Something is still a very superficial determination; just as Reality and Negation, There-being

and its Determinateness, though no longer the empty Being and Nothing, remain, all the same, quite abstract determinations and definitions. For this reason they are also the most current expressions, and the Reflexion, that is philosophically *un-formed*, uses them most, casts its distinctions in their mould, and *opines* to possess thus something veritably good, and firmly fixed and definite. The Negative of the Negative is as Something only the beginning of the Subject;—the Being-within-Self only first of all quite indefinite. It determines itself further on first as Bëent-for-Self and so on, till only for the first time in the Notion it attains the concrete intensity of the Subject. As basis of all these determinations, there lies at bottom the Negative Unity with Self. But therewithal the Negation as *first* Negation, as Negation *in general*, is to be firmly distinguished from the *second*, the Negation of the Negation, which is the concrete *absolute* Negativity, just as the *first*, on the contrary, is only the *abstract* Negativity.

Something is Bëent as the Negation of the Negation; for this Negation is the restoring again of the simple reference to self;—but just thus is *Something* withal the *Mediation of itself with itself*. Here in the Simple of Something, then still more definitely in Being-for-Self, in the Subject, &c., is there present—Mediation of self with self; even already in Becoming is Mediation present, but only the quite abstract Mediation; Mediation with self has reached *position* in Something, so far as Something is determined as simple *Identical*. Attention may be directed to the presence of Mediation in general, as opposed to the principle of the mere Immediacy of Knowledge from which (according to it) Mediacy is to be excluded; but no particular attention need be

called to this moment of Mediacy in the sequel, for it is to be found throughout, and everywhere, in every Notion.

This Mediation with itself which Something is *in itself*, taken only as Negation of the Negation, has no concrete determinations as its sides ; so it collapses into the simple unity which Being is. Something *is*, and is also a There-beënt ; it is *in itself* further also Becoming, which, however, has no longer only Being and Nothing as its moments. The one of these, Being, is now There-being, and, further, a There-beënt. The second is equally a There-beënt, but determined as Negative of the Something—an *Other*. The Something as Becoming is a transition, whose moments are themselves Somethings, and which itself, therefore, is *alteration* ; — a Becoming already become *concrete*. Something, however, *alters* (others) itself first of all only in its Notion ; it is not yet in *position* as thus mediating and mediated ;—it is set, first of all, only as simply maintaining itself in its reference to self, and its Negative is set as equally qualitative, as only an *Other* in general.

B.

FINITUDE.

a. Something and Other ; they are, first of all, indifferent as regards each other ; an Other is also an immediately There-beënt, a Something ; the Negation falls thus outside of both. Something is *in itself* as against its Being-for-Other. But the Determinateness belongs also to its *In-itself*, and is

b. its *Qualification, Determination*, which equally passes over into *So-constitutedness, Talification*, which, identical with the former, constitutes the immanent

and, at the same time, negated Being-for-Other, the *Limit* of the Something which is

c. the immanent determination of the Something itself, and this latter is thus the *Finite*.

In the first division, in which *There-being* in general was considered, this had, as first taken up, the character of *Beënt*. The moments of its development, Quality and Something, are, therefore, equally of affirmative nature. In this division, on the other hand, there develops itself the Negative element which lies in *There-being*, which there (in the first division) was only first of all Negation in general, *First Negation*, but now has determined (or developed) itself up to the point of the Being-within-itself of the Something, to the Negation of the Negation.

a. *Something and an Other.*

1. Something and Other are both, in the first place, *There-beënt*, or Something.

Secondly, each is equally an Other. It is indifferent which is first named Something; and just because it is *first* named is it Something (in Latin, when they present themselves both in one proposition, they are both called *aliud*, or the one the other, *alius aliud*; in the case of a mutual reciprocity, the expression *alter alterum* is analogous). If we call one *There-being* A, and the other B, B is, in the first instance, determined as the Other. But A is just as much the other of B. Both are, in the same manner, Others. The expression *This* serves to fix the distinction and the Something which is to be taken as affirmative. But *This* just expresses that this distinguishing and picking out of the one Something is a subjective designating falling *without* the Something itself. Into this external monstration

falls the entire determinateness; even the expression *This* contains no distinction; all Somethings are just as much *These* as they are also Others. One opines or means by *This* to express Something perfectly determined; it escapes notice that Speech, as work of Understanding, enunciates only what is General, except in the name of a single object: the individual name, however, is meaningless in the sense, that it does not express a Universal, and appears as merely posititious, arbitrary; for the same reason, single names can also be arbitrarily assumed, given, or changed.

Thus, then, Otherwise-being appears as a Determination foreign to the There-being that is so distinguished, or the Other appears *out of* the single There-being; partly, because a There-being is determined as Other, first of all only through the *comparing* of a Third [you or me]; partly, because it is other only by reason of the Other that is out of it,—but is not so determined *per se* or for its own self. At the same time, as has been remarked, even for conception (representation), every There-being is distinguishable as an other There-being, and there remains not any one There-being that were distinguishable only as a There-being, that were not without or on the outside of a There-being, and, therefore, that were not itself an Other.

Both are equally determined as Something and as Other, consequently as *the same thing*, and there is so far no distinction of them. *This self-sameness* of the determinations, however, falls only into outer Reflexion, into the *comparing* of both; but as the *Other* is at present constituted, it is *per se* the Other, in reference indeed to the Something, but it is *per se* the Other also *outside of, apart from the Something*.

Thirdly, therefore, the *Other* may be taken as isolated,

in reference to its own self; *abstractly* as the Other; the τὸ ἕτερον of Plato, who opposes it to the *One* as one of the moments of Totality, and in this manner ascribes to *the Other* a special *nature*. But thus *the Other* taken as such is not the Other of Something, but the Other in itself, that is, the Other of itself. Such Other in its own determination is Physical Nature; it is the Other of the Spirit: this its definition is thus at first a mere Relativity, by which there is expressed, not a Quality of Nature itself, but only a reference external to it. But in that the Spirit is the true Something, and Nature therefore in itself is only what it is in regard of (Gegen) the Spirit, its quality, so far as it (Nature) is taken *per se*, is just this,—to be the Other in itself, *The out-of-itself-Beënt* (in the forms of Space, of Time, of Matter).

The Other by itself is the Other in itself, so the Other of itself, so again the Other of the Other; so, therefore, that which within itself is Unequal simpliciter, that which negates itself, that which *alters* and others itself. But just thus it remains identical with itself, for that into which it alters itself is the *Other*, which has no determination further or else; but what *alters* itself is, in no different way but in the same, determined as an Other: in this latter, therefore, *it goes together*, in all cases, *only with its own self*. It has thus *position* given it as what is reflected into self with sublation of the Otherness; as self-identical Something from which, consequently, the Otherness, which is at the same time Moment of it, is merely *a distinguishedness*, not as something itself which is appertinent to it.

2. Something *maintains* itself in its non-There-being; it is essentially *one* with it, and essentially *not one* with it. It stands, therefore, in *reference* to its Otherwise-being; it is not absolutely its Otherwise-being. Other-

wise-being is at once contained in it, and *separated* from it ; it is *Being-for-Other*.

There-being as such is immediate, reference-less ; or it is in the determination of *Being*. But There-being as enclosing within itself Non-being, is *determinate* Being, Being negated within itself, and then nextly Other,—but because at the same time it also maintains itself in its negation, only *Being-for-Other*.

It maintains itself in its non-There-being, and is Being ; but not Being in general, but as reference to self opposed to its reference to Other, as Equality with itself opposed to its Inequality. Such a Being is *Being-IN-itself*.

Being-for-Other and Being-IN-itself constitute the *two moments* of the Something. There are two pairs of determinations present here : 1, Something and Other ; 2, Being-for-Other and Being-in-itself. The former pair contain the reference-lessness of their determinateness ; Something and Other fall asunder. But their truth is their reference ; the Being-for-Other and the Being-in-Self are, therefore, the former determinations *posited* or *explicit* as *moments* of one and the same,—as determinations, which are co-references, and in their unity remain in the unity of There-being. Each of them itself, therefore, contains *in it* at the same time also its other moment, the moment that is distinguished from it.

Being and Nothing in their unity, which is There-being, are no longer as Being and Nothing ;—they are this only out of their unity. Thus, too, in their unresting unity, in Becoming, they are Origin and Decease.—Being in the Something is Being-in-Self. Being, the reference to self, the equality with self, is now no longer immediate, but reference to self only as Non-being of the Otherwise-being (as There-being reflected *within*

itself). Just so Non-being as moment of the Something is, in this unity of Being and Non-being, not non-There-being in general, but Other, and, more determinately, viewed at the same time in reference to the *distinguishing* of Being from it, *reference* to its non-There-being, Being-for-Other.

Thus Being-in-Self is firstly negative reference to the non-There-being; it has the Otherwise-being out of it, and is opposed to the same: so far as something is *in itself*, it is withdrawn from Otherwise-being and from Being-for-Other. But, secondly, it has Non-being itself also *in it*; for it is itself the Non-being of the Being-for-Other.

The Being-for-Other, again, is firstly negation of the simple reference of the Being to itself which is to be first of all There-being and Something; so far as Something is in another or for another is it without its own Being. But, secondly, it is not the non-There-being as pure Nothing; it is non-There-being that points or refers to its Being-in-Self, as to its Being reflected within its own self, just as on the other hand the Being-in-Self points or refers to the Being-for-Other.

3. Both moments are determinations of that which is one and the same, namely, the Something. Something is *in itself*, so far as it is returned into its own self out of the Being-for-Other. Something has again also a determination or *circumstance in itself* (the accent falls here on *in*) or *in it*, so far as this circumstance is outwardly *in it*, a Being-for-Other.

This leads to a further determination. Being-in-Self and Being-for-Other are in the first place different; but that Something has *in it* the same thing which it is *in itself*, and contrariwise what it is as Being-for-Other, the same thing is it also *in itself*—this is the identity

of the Being-in-Self and the Being-for-Other, in accordance with the determination, that the Something itself is one and the same of both moments, and therefore they are in it undivided. This identity yields itself formally, as we see, in the sphere of There-being, but more expressly in the consideration of Essentivity, and then of the relation of Inwardness and Outwardness, and in the precisest degree in the consideration of the Idea as the unity of the Notion and of Actuality. One opines to say something lofty with the *In-itself*, as with the *Inner*; but what Something is *only in* itself, that also is only *in it*; *in itself* is only an abstract, and so even external determination. The expressions, there is nothing *in it*, or there is something *in that*, imply, though somewhat obscurely, that that which is *in* one, belongs also to one's Being-in-Self, to one's inner genuine worth.

It may be observed, that the sense of the Thing-in-itself yields itself here, which is a very simple abstraction, but which for long was a very important determination, something *distinguished* as it were, just as the proposition, that we do not know what the things are in themselves, was a much-importing wisdom. Things are *in themselves*, so far as all Being-for-Other is abstracted from, that is as much as to say in general, so far as they are thought without any determination whatever; as Nothings. In this sense truly one cannot know what the thing *in itself* is. For the question *what* requires that *determinations* be assigned; inasmuch, however, as the things, of which they are to be assigned, are to be at the same time *things in themselves*—that is to say, just without determination—there is thoughtless-wise introduced into the question the impossibility of an answer, or there is made only an absurd answer. The thing *in itself* is

the same as that Absolute, of which nothing is known but that all is one in it. One knows then perfectly well what is in these things in themselves; they are as such nothing but truthless, empty abstractions. What, however, the thing *in itself* is in truth, what is truly *in itself*, of this Logic is the exposition, in which, however, something better is understood by *In itself* than an abstraction—namely, what something is in its Notion: this latter, however, is concrete in itself, comprehensible (notion-able, knowable) as notion in general, and cognisable as determined within itself and as connected system of its determinations within itself.

Being-in-Self has at nearest the Being-for-Other as its counter-standing moment; but there is also opposed to the same—*Position* or *Explicitness*; in this expression there lies also the Being-for-Other, indeed, but it implies definitely the already-accomplished bending back (reflexion) of that which is not *in itself* into that which is its Being-for-Self, into that in which it is *positively*. The Being-in-Self is usually to be taken as an abstract manner of expressing the notion; *Position* falls specially only into the sphere of Essentity, of objective reflexion; the Ground (ratio) *posits* (exinvolves, eximplies) that which is grounded by it; the Cause still more brings an Effect *forward*, a There-being whose self-subsistence is *immediately* negated, and which has the sense in it, to have its affair, its Being in another. In the sphere of Being, There-being *comes* only *forward* from Becoming, or there is implied with the Something, an Other, with the Finite the Infinite; but the Finite *produces* not the Infinite, *posits* the Infinite not. In the sphere of Being, the *self-determining* of the notion is only first of all *in itself*; thus is it only transition—a passing over; even the reflecting determinations of

Being, as Something and Other, or the Finite and Infinite, though they essentially refer to each other, or are as Being-for-Other, have the value of what is *qualitative* and subsistent *per se*; the Other *is*, the Finite, like the Infinite, appears equally as immediately beënt, and standing firm *per se*; their sense seems complete even without the other. The Positive and Negative, on the other hand, Cause and Effect, however much they are also taken as isolatedly beënt, have at the same time no meaning without the one the other; there is in themselves their *seeming* the one into the other, the seeming of its other in each. In the various spheres of determination, and especially in the progress of the exposition, or more accurately, in the progress of the notion to its exposition, it is a main matter always well to distinguish this, what is yet *in itself* and what is *posited*, likewise the determinations as in the Notion and as *posited* or as *Being-for-Other*. This is a distinction which belongs only to the Dialectic development, and which the Metaphysical philosophy, as also the Critical, knows not; the Definitions of [former] Metaphysic, as its presuppositions, distinguishings, and concludings, seek only to maintain and produce what is *Beënt*—and that, too, *Beënt-in-itself*.

The Being-for-Other is, in the unity of the Something with itself, identical with its *In-itself*; the Being-for-Other is thus *in* the Something. The determinateness thus reflected into itself is by this again *simply beënt*, and so again a quality—the *Determination* or the *Qualification*.

b. *Qualification, Talification, and Limit.*

The *In-itself* into which the Something is reflected out of its Being-for-Other into itself is no longer abstract

In-itself, but as negation of its Being-for-Other it is *mediated* through the latter, which is thus its moment. It is not only the immediate identity of the Something with itself, but the identity through which the Something is what it is *in itself* also *in it*; the Being-for-Other is *in it*, because the *In-itself* is the sublation of the same, is out of the same into itself; but quite as much also, be it observed, because it is abstract, and therefore essentially affected with Negation, with Being-for-Other. There is here present not only Quality and Reality, *beënt* determinateness, but determinateness that is beënt *in itself*, and the development is to *posit* it [exhibit, express it] as this determinateness reflected into itself.

1. The quality which the *In-itself* in the simple Something essentially in unity with its other moment, the Being-*in-it*, is, can be named its Determination (qualification), so far as this word in exact signification is distinguished from Determinateness in general. The Determination (qualification) is the affirmative Determinateness, as the Being-in-itself, with which the Something in its There-being remains congruous against its involution with other by which it might be determined—remains congruous, maintains itself in its equality with itself, and makes it good (its equality) in its Being-for-Other. It *fulfils* its determination (qualification, vocation) so far as the further determinateness, which manifoldly grows through its relation to Other, becomes—in subjection to, or agreement with, its Being-in-itself—its *filling*. The Determination implies this, that what Something is *in itself*, is also *in it*.

The Determination of Man is thinking Reason: Thought in general is his simple Determinateness, by it he is distinguished from the lower animals. He is

thought *in* himself (an sich), so far as it (thought) is at the same time distinguished from his Being-for-Other, his special naturality and sensuous nature by which it is that he is immediately connected with Other. But thought is also *in* him; Man himself is thought, he *is there* as thinking, it is his existence and actuality; and further in that it is in his There-being (There-ness) and his There-ness (Existence) is in thought, it is *concrete*, it is to be taken with Implement and Complement, it is thinking Reason, and thus is it Determination of Man. But this determination is again only *in itself* (only an sich) as an Is-to-be (a Sollen, a Devoir); that is, it, together with the complement, which is incorporated into its *In-itself*, is in the form of *In-itself* in general, *against* the There-being not incorporated into it, which complement is thus at the same time still as externally opposing, immediate Sense and Nature.

2. The filling of the Being-in-itself [the *In-itself* simply] with determinateness is also distinguished from the determinateness which is only Being-for-Other and remains out of the Determination. For, in the field of the Qualitative, there remains to the Differences or Distinctions even in their sublation [alluding to the various *Moments* of the *Daseyn* or the *Etwas*] immediate qualitative Being as opposed the one to the other. What the Something has *in it* divides then, and is, on this side, external There-being of the Something, which is also *its* There-being, but belongs not to its *In-itself*. The Determinateness is thus *Talification* [*So-constitutedness*, and that amounts to *Property*, or, indeed, *Accident*].

So or otherwise constituted is Something as engaged in external influence and relations. This external reference on which the Talification depends, and the becoming determined by another, appears as something

contingent. But it is quality of the Something to be given over to this externality, and to have a Talification.

So far as Something *alters* itself, the alteration falls into the Talification; it is that in the Something which becomes another. It [Something] itself maintains itself in the alteration which touches only this unsteady superficies of its Otherwise-being, not its Determination (Definition, Qualification).

Qualification and Talification are thus distinguished from each other; Something is in its qualification indifferent to its talification. What, however, the Something has *in it*, is the middle term of this syllogism that connects both. The being *in* the Something, rather, showed itself to fall into these two extremes. The simple middle is the *Determinateness* as such; to its identity belongs as well qualification as talification. But the qualification passes over *per se* into talification, and the latter into the former. This lies in the preceding; the connexion is more particularly this: So far as what Something is *in itself*, is also *in it*, it is affected with Being-for-Other; the qualification is thus as such open to the relation to Other. The Determinateness is at the same time moment, but contains at the same time the qualitative distinction to be different from the *In-itself*, to be the Negative of the Something, or another There-being. The determinateness, which thus includes within itself the other, being united with the In-itself brings Otherwise-being into the In-itself, or into the qualification, which is thereby reduced to talification. Contrariwise, the Being-for-Other, isolated as talification and taken *per se*, is *in it* the same thing as what the Other as such is, the Other in itself, that is, of itself; but thus it is self-to-self referent There-being, thus Being-in-itself with a deter-

minateness, and therefore *Qualification*. Thus, so far as both are to be held apart from each other, on the qualification depends the talification, which appears grounded in an External, in another in general, and the foreign determining is determined also at the same time by the special immanent qualification of the Something. But further, the talification belongs to what the Something is *in itself*: with its talification Something alters itself.

This alteration of the Something is no longer the first alteration of the Something merely as regards its Being-for-Other; this first one was only the alteration appertinent to the inner notion, was the *in-itself*-beënt one; the alteration now is alteration *posited* (exhibited) in the Something. The Something itself is further determined, and the negation appears as immanent to it, as its developed Being-within-itself.

In the first place, the transition of the qualification and the talification into one another is the sublation of their difference; but thus is There-being or Something in general replaced; and, inasmuch as it is a result out of that difference, which still comprehends in itself the qualitative Otherwise-being, there are two Somethings, but not only others opposed to one another in general, in such wise that this negation were still abstract and fell into the comparison only, but it is now rather as *immanent* to the Somethings. They are as there-beënt indifferent to each other; but this their affirmation is no longer immediate, each refers itself to itself *by means of* the sublation of the Otherwise-being, which in the qualification is reflected into the In-itself.

Something relates itself thus *out of its own self* to the Other, because Otherwise-being is contained within it as its own moment; its Being-within-self

comprehends negation within itself—the negation by means of which in any case it has now its affirmative There-being. But from this (its affirmative There-being) the other is also qualitatively distinguished ; it is thus set down as *out of* the Something. The negation of its other is just the quality of Something, for as this sublation of its Other is it Something. Therewith does the Other first properly oppose itself to a There-being itself: to the first Something, then, the Other is only externally opposed ; but again as they, in effect, directly cohere, that is, in their notion, their connexion is this, that There-being *has gone over* into Otherwise-being, Something into another—Something, as much as the Other, is another. So far now as the Being-within-itself is the Non-being of the Otherwise-being which is contained in it, but at the same time *distinguished* as beënt, the Something itself is, the negation, *the ceasing of another in it* ; it is determined as comporting itself negatively against it, and as at the same time maintaining itself thereby ;—this Other, the Being-within-itself of the Something as Negation of the Negation, is its *In-itself*, and this sublation is at the same time *in it* as *simple* negation, namely, as its negation of the other Something external to it. There is *one* determinateness of these Negations or Somethings which is as well identical with the Being-within-itself of the Somethings, as Negation of the Negation, as it also, in that these Negations are as other Somethings mutually opposed, joins them together out of themselves and equally disjoins them from one another (the one negating the other)—the *Limit*.

3. Being-for-Other is indefinite, affirmative community of Something with its Other ; in Limit, the Non-being-for-Other exhibits itself, the qualitative negation of the Other, which latter is thereby excluded from the

Something reflected into its own self. The development of this notion is to be observed, which manifests itself, however, rather as *involvement* and contradiction. This contradictory character shows at once in this, that the Limit as negation of the Something, negation reflected into self, contains *ideally* in it the moments of the Something and of the Other, and these are at the same time, as distinguished moments in the sphere of There-being, set down as *really, qualitatively diverse*.

α. Something, then, is immediate, self-to-self-referent There-being, and has a limit in the first instance as against Other. The Limit is the Non-being of the Other, not of the Something itself; the Something limits in its limit its Other. But the Other is itself a Something; the Limit, then, which the Something has against the Other, is likewise Limit of the Other as a Something—Limit of this latter so that by it it excludes from itself the first Something as *its* Other,—or is a *Non-being of said Something*. The Limit, thus, is not only Non-being of the Other, but Non-being as well of the one as of the other Something,—Non-being, consequently, of the Something in general.

But Limit is essentially the Non-being of the Other—Something at the same time, then, *is* through its Limit. Something, in that it is limiting, must submit to be limited; but its Limit, as a ceasing of the Other in it, is at the same time itself only the *Being* of the Something; *this latter is through it that which it is, has in it its quality*. This relation is the external manifestation of the fact that the Limit is Simple, or the *First*, Negation, at the same time also that it is the other relation, the Negation of the Negation, the Within-itself of the Something.

Something, therefore, is, as immediate There-being, Limit to other Something; but it has this Limit *in it*, and is Something through agency of it, which is just as much its Non-being. Limit is the mediating means or agency, the medium, whereby Something and Other *each as well is as is not*.

β. So far now as Something in its Limit is and is not, and these moments are immediately, qualitatively separated, the non-There-being and the There-being of the Something fall asunder, apart from each other. Something has its There-being (its existence) *out from* (or as it is otherwise also conceived *in from*) its Limit; but just so the Other also, because it is Something, is *without* its Limit. *It* (the Limit) is the middle between both, and in *it* they cease. They have their There-being on the other side, the one from the other, of their Limit; the Limit as the Non-being of each is the Other of both.

It is in respect to this diversity of Something from its Limit, that the Line appears as Line only without (out from) its Limit, the Point; the Plane as Plane without the Line; the Body as Body only without its limiting Plane. This is the side on which the Limit occurs first of all to Conception (Representation)—the Out-of-itself-ness of the Notion,—and hence its manifestation by preference in things of space.

γ. But, further, Something, as it is without or out of the Limit, is unlimited Something, only There-being in general. Thus, then, it is not distinguished from its Other; it is only There-being, has therefore the same determination as its Other—each is only Something generally, or each is Other; both are thus *the same thing*. But, again, this their directly immediate There-being implies the *Determinateness* as Limit, in which both are what they are, distinguishably from each other. But this

determinateness as Limit is equally their *common* distinguishableness, at once their unity and diversity—unity and diversity of the same things, just like There-being. This double identity of both (There-being and Limit) contains this, that the Something has its There-being only in the Limit, and that, inasmuch also as the Limit and the immediate There-being are at the same time each the Negative, the one of the other, the Something, which is established as only in its Limit, just as much sunders itself from itself, and points away over and beyond itself to its Non-being, pronouncing this its Being, and so passing over into the same. To apply this to the preceding example, and as regards the *finding* that Something is what it is only in its Limit,—the Point is not Limit of the Line, only in such wise that the latter just ends in the former, and is as There-being only out of the former; neither is the Line similarly Limit of the Plane, nor the Plane similarly Limit of the Solid: but in the Point the Line also *begins*; the Point is the absolute beginning of the Line; even when conceived as on both sides unlimited, or, as it is called, infinitely *produced*, the Point constitutes the Element of the Line, as the Line of the Plane, and the Plane of the Solid. These Limits are the Principle (Principium) of that which they limit; just as Unity, for example, as the hundredth, is the Limit indeed, but also the Element of the whole hundred.

The other *finding* is the unrest of the Something in its Limit, in which, nevertheless, it is immanent—its restlessness as the *contradiction* which impels it out beyond its own self. Thus the Point is this Dialectic of its own self—to become Line, the Line the Dialectic to become Surface, the Surface universal Space. Of these there occurs the definition, that the

Line originates in the motion of the Point, the Surface in that of the Line, &c. This movement, however, is considered then as something arbitrary, or as something just thus and thus conceived. This consideration, however, is annulled specially by this, that the Determinations from which the Line, &c. should be supposed to originate are, as regards the Line, &c., their Elements and Principles, and at the same time also nothing else than their Limits: in this manner the origin cannot be considered as arbitrary, or only so-conceived. That Point, Line, Surface, *per se*, contradicting themselves, are *Beginnings*, which repel themselves from themselves, that the Point, for its part, passes over through its Notion out of itself into the Line, *moves itself in its own self*, and gives origin to the Line, &c. &c.—this lies in the Notion of Limit as immanent in the Something. The application belongs to the consideration of space; but to indicate it here—it is thus that the Point is the absolutely abstract Limit, but *in a There-being* (in a definite thereness); this latter (a *thereness*) is taken still quite indefinitely, it is the so-called absolute, *i.e.* abstract space, the absolutely continuous Out-of-one-another-ness. From this, that the Limit is not abstract Negation, but is *in this There-ness*, is *spatial* determinateness, it results that the Point occupies space, has space, is spatial, is the contradiction, that is, which unites in itself at once abstract negation and continuity, and so is the *going-over* and the *gone-over* into the Line, &c., just as also for the same reason it results that there is no such thing as a Point, or a Line, or a Surface.

Something, with its immanent Limit, established as the contradiction of its ownself, by which contradiction it is directed and impelled beyond itself, is the *Finite* as such.

c. *Finitude.*

There-being is determinate ; Something has a Quality, and is in it not only determined, but limited ; its quality is its limit, possessing which, it remains in the first instance affirmative quiescent There-being. But this negation developed—in such wise that the antithesis of its There-being and of Negation as its immanent Limit is itself the Within-itself of the Something, and this latter consequently is in itself only Becoming—constitutes its Finitude.

When we say of things, *they are finite*, we understand by that, that they not only have a determinateness, Quality not only as Reality and beënt-in-self distinctive nature, that they are not merely limited—for as such they have still There-being without their limit—but rather that Non-being constitutes their nature, their Being. Finite things *are*, but their reference to self is, that they refer themselves to themselves *negatively*, even in this reference to themselves dispatch themselves beyond themselves, beyond their Being. They *are*, but the truth of this Being is their *End*. The finite thing *alters* itself not only like Something in general, but it *passes away* and it is not merely possible for it to pass away—as if it could *be* without passing away : but the Being as such of finite things is to have the germ of their passing away as their Within-self ; the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.

α. *The Immediacy of Finitude.*

The thought of the finitude of things brings this sadness with it, because it is the qualitative negation pushed to its point, in the singleness of such determina-

tion, there is no longer left them an affirmative Being *distinguished* from their destination to perish. Finitude is, because of this qualitative simple directness of negation (which has gone back to the abstract antithesis of Nothing and Decease as opposed to Being), the most stiff-necked Category of Understanding; Negation in general, *Tality*, *Limit*, reconcile themselves with their Other, the *There-being*; even the abstract Nothing, *per se*, is given up as an abstraction; but finitude is negation as *in itself fixed*, and stands therefore up abrupt over against its affirmative. What is Finite admits readily of being brought to flux—it is itself this, to be determined to its *End*, but only to its *End*;—it is rather the refusal to let itself be affirmatively brought to its affirmative, the Infinite, to let itself be united with it; it is posited as inseparable from its Nothing, and all reconciliation with its Other, the Affirmative, is thereby truncated. The destination of finite things is not further than their *End*. Understanding remains immovable in this hopelessness of Finitude, in that, regarding Non-being as the true nature of things, it makes it at the same time *imperishable* and *absolute*. Only in their Other, the Affirmative, were it possible for their perishableness to perish; but thus their finitude would divorce itself from them, and it is, on the contrary, their unalterable Quality, *i.e.* their Quality that passes not over into its Other, into its Affirmative; *it is thus eternal*.

This is a very important consideration; that, however, the Finite is absolute—this stand-point will not readily be taken to itself by any Philosophy, or View, or by Understanding (Common Sense). The opposite rather is expressly present in the maintaining of the Finite; the Finite is the Limited, the Transitory; the Finite is *only* the Finite, not the Imperishable; this

lies immediately in its constitution and expression. But the question is, whether in the mode of looking, the *Being of Finitude* is stuck by, whether the *Perishableness* remains, or whether the Perishableness and the *Perishing perishes*, whether the *Passing-away passes away*? That this latter, however, is not the case, is the Fact even in that view of the Finite which regards the *Perishing or Passing-away* as the ultimum of the Finite. It is the express averment that the Finite is irreconcilable and inconsistent with the Infinite, that the Finite is absolutely opposed to the Infinite. To the Infinite, Being, absolute Being is ascribed; the Finite thus remains opposite it, held fast as its negative; incapable of union with the Infinite, it remains absolute on its own side; Affirmation could come to it only from the Affirmative, the Infinite, and it would perish so; but a union with the Infinite is that which is declared impossible. If it is not to remain opposed to the Infinite, but to pass or perish, then, as has been already said, just its Passing is the Ultimum, not the Affirmative, which would be only the Passing of the Passing. If, however, the Finite is not to pass away in the Affirmative, but its end is to be conceived as the Nothing, then we are again back to that first abstract Nothing which is long since passed.

In the case of this Nothing, however, which is to be *only* Nothing, and to which at the same time an existence is attributed in Thought, Conception, or Speech, there presents itself the same contradiction as has just been signalised in the case of the Finite, only that it only *presents* itself there, while in Finitude it *expressly* is. *There* it appears as subjective, *here* it is maintained — *the Finite stands opposed in perpetuity to the Infinite*, what is in itself null *is*, and it is *as* in itself null. This

is to be brought intelligibly before consciousness ; and the development of the Finite shows that it (*in it*), *suo Marte*, as this contradiction, falls together in itself, and actually resolves this contradiction by this—not that it is only perishable and perishes, but that the Perishing, the Passing, the Nothing, is not the Last, the *ultimum*, but that it perishes and passes.

β. *To-be-to, or Obligation-to, and Limitation (Bound).*

—This contradiction, indeed, is directly abstractly present in this, that the *Something* is Finite, or that the *Finite* is. But Something or Being is no longer abstract, but reflected into self, and developed as Being-within-Self which has in it a Qualification and a Talification, and still more definitely, a Limit, which as what is Immanent in the Something, and constitutive of the quality of its Being-within-Self, is Finitude. We have now to see what moments are contained in this notion of the Finite Something.

Qualification and Talification manifested themselves as *sides* for external reflexion ; the first, indeed, itself implied Otherwise-being as belonging to the In-itself of the Something ; the externality of the Otherwise-being is on one side in the proper internality of the Something, on the other side, it remains as externality distinguished therefrom—it is still externality as such, but *in* the Something. But in that, further, the Otherwise-being is determined as Limit, or just as negation of the negation, the Otherwise-being immanent to the Something is demonstrated or is stated as the reference of the two Sides, and the Unity with itself of the Something now (to which Something as well the Qualification as the Talification attaches) is its reference as turned to its ownself, the reference of its beënt-in-self Qualification to its immanent Limit, which reference at the

same time negates in it this its immanent Limit. The self-identical Within-Itself refers itself thus to itself as its own Non-being, but as Negation of the Negation, as negating the same thing in it which at the same time preserves in it There-being, for that is the Quality of its Within-Itself. The proper Limit of the Something taken thus by it as a Negative, that at the same is essential and intrinsic, is not only Limit as such, but Limitation (Bound). But the Limitation here is not alone what is expressed as negated (not alone the-as-negated-*Posited*); the Negation is double-edged, seeing that what is the *posited* Negated is the *Limit*; for this (Limit) in general is what is common to the Something and the Other, and also determinateness of the Being-in-self-ness of the Qualification or Determination as such. This Being-in-self, as the negative reference to its Limit (this latter being at the same time distinguishable from it), is thus to itself as Limitation (Bound),—the *To-be-to*, or *Obligation-to* (*Devoir*, *Sollen*).

That the Limit, which is in the Something in general, prove itself as only Limitation (Bound), the Something must at the same time within its own self *transcend it* (the Limit), must refer itself in itself *to it as to a Non-beënt*. The There-being of the Something lies quiescently indifferent, as it were *beside* its Limit. Something, however, transcends its Limit, only so far as it is its sublatedness, the In-itself which is negative to it (the Limit). And in that it (the Limit) is in the Determination (manifestible peculiar nature) itself *as Limitation*, Something transcends so *its own self*.

The *To-be-to* (*Sollen*) contains therefore the double distinction, now Determination as beënt-in-self Determination against the Negation, and again Determination as a Non-being that is distinguished as Limitation from

it, but at the same time that is beënt-in-self Determination.

The Finite Thing has thus determined itself as the reference of its Determination to its Limit; the former is in this reference *To-be-to* (Sollen), the latter is *Limitation*. Both are thus moments of the Finite—both consequently themselves finite, as well the *To-be-to* as the *Limitation*. But only the *Limitation* is *expressed* as the Finite; the *To-be-to* is only limited *in itself*, or for us. Through its reference to its own immanent Limit, has it *Limitation*; but this its Be-limitation is concealed in the In-itself, for in its There-being, that is, in its Determinateness as against *Limitation*, it is expressed as the In-itself.

What is to be, or is under obligation to be, *is* and at the same time *not*. If it *were*, it were not merely *to be*. The *To-be-to* has therefore essentially a *Limitation*. This *Limitation* is not something foreign; that which only is to be, is the *Determination* (Destination) which is now expressed as it is in fact, namely, at the same time only a *Determinateness*.

The Being-in-itself of the Something remits itself in its *Determination* therefore into the *Is-to-be*, or the *Ought-to-be*, in this way, that the same thing which constitutes its Being-in-itself is in one and the same respect as Non-being; and that, too, in this wise, that in the Being-within-self, the negation of the negation, said Being-in-itself is as the one negation (the Negating one) unity with the other, which is at the same time as the qualitatively other, Limit, through which, said unity, is as *reference* to it (Limit). The *Limitation* of the Finite is not something external, but its own *Determination* is also its *Limitation*; and this (*Limitation*) is as well its own self, as also the *To-be-to*; it is what

is common to both, or rather that in which both are identical.

As *To-be-to*, now again further, the Finite thing passes *beyond* its Limitation; the same determinateness which is its negation, is also sublated, and is thus its Being-in-itself; its Limit is also not its Limit.

As *To-be-to*, consequently, *Something is raised above its Limitation*, again contrariwise only as *To-be-to* has it *its Limitation*. Both are inseparable. Something has a Limitation, so far as in its Determination or Destination it has the Negation, and the Determination or Destination is also the sublatedness of the Limitation.

REMARK.

The Ought-to, Is-to, Obligation-to, the To-have-to, or To-be-to (Sollen, Devoir), has played recently *un grand rôle* in Philosophy, especially in reference to Morality, and likewise Metaphysically in general as the last and absolute notion of the Identity of the Being-in-self, or of the reference *to Self*, and of the Determinateness or Limit.

You *can*, for you *ought*—this expression, which was supposed to say a great deal, lies in the notion of the To-be-to. For the To-be-to is the being beyond the Limitation; Limit is sublated in it, the Being-in-itself of the To-be-to is thus identical reference to self, and so the abstraction of *the being able to*. But, conversely, it is equally true, you *can not* just because you *ought*. For in the To-be-to there equally lies the Limitation as a Limitation; said Formalism of the *Possibility to* has in it a Reality, a qualitative Otherwise-being, over against itself, and the mutual reference of both is the contradiction, consequently *the not being able to*, or rather the *Impossibility-to*.

In the To-be-to, begins the transcendence of Finitude, Infinitude. The To-be-to is what, further on in the development, exhibits itself, with reference to said Impossibility-to, as the *Progressus in infinitum*.

As regards the Form of the *To-be-tō* and the *Limitation*, two prejudices may be more particularly animadverted on. In the first place, great stress is usually laid on the Limitations of Thought, of Reason, &c., and it is maintained that the Limitation *cannot* be passed. There lies in this averment the witlessness, that just in the very determining of Something as Limitation, the Limitation is already passed. For a determinateness, Limit, is only determined as Limitation in antithesis to its Other in general, or as against its *unlimited* part ; the Other of a Limitation is just the Beyond over the same. The Stone, the Metal, is not beyond its limitation, just because the latter is not limitation *for it*. If, however, as regards such general propositions of mere understanding, that the Limitation cannot be transcended, Thought will not take the trouble to endeavour to see what lies in the notion, attention may be directed to the Actual, where such positions will be found to manifest themselves as what is most *unactual*. Just by this, too, that Thought *is-to-be* something higher than the Actual, is to keep itself apart from it in higher regions—that is, in that it is itself determined as a To-be-to—on one side it reaches not as far as to the Notion, and, on the other side, it is its hap to comport itself just as untruly towards the Actual as towards the Notion. Because the Stone thinks not, not even feels, its Limitedness is not Limitation *for it*, that is, is not in it a negation for the thought, feeling, &c., which it does not possess. But even the Stone is as *Something* distinguished into its Determination or In-

itself and into its There-being, and to that extent even *it* transcends its Limitation ; the Notion which it is *in itself* implies identity with its Other. If it is an acidifiable base, it is oxidisable, neutralisable, &c. In the oxidation, neutralisation, &c., its Limitation *to be there (here)* only as base sublates itself ; it transcends its Limitation, just as the acid sublates its limitation to be as acid ; and the *To-be-to*, the *obligation* to transcend its Limitation, is (in the acid as well as in the caustic base) so *much* present, that it is only by dint of force that these can be kept fixed as—waterless, that is, purely non-neutral—acid and caustic base.

Should an existence, however, contain the Notion, not merely as abstract Being-in-self, but as beënt-for-self Totality, as Instinct, as Life, Feeling, Conception, &c., it effects out of itself this—to be, and to pass out, over and beyond the Limitation. The plant transcends the Limitation to be as Germ, and just as much the Limitation to be as Blossom, as Fruit, as Leaf ; the germ becomes a developed plant, the blossom fades away into, &c. &c. A sentient existence in the Limitation of hunger, of thirst, &c., is the impulse to pass out beyond this Limitation, and it effects this transcendence. It feels *pain*, and the privilege of sentient nature is to feel pain ; there is a negation in its *Self*, and this negation is determined in its feeling *as a Limitation*, just because Sentient existence has the feeling of its *Self*, which Self is the Totality that is out and beyond said determinateness (of hunger). Were it not out and beyond it, it would not feel it as its negation, and would have no pain. But it is Reason, Thought, which we are required to suppose incapable of transcending Limitation—Reason, which is the *universal*, which, *per se*, is out and beyond *the*, i. e. *all* particularity,

which is nothing but Transcendence of Limitation. It is true that not every going-beyond or being-beyond the Limitation is a veritable emancipation from this latter, a genuine affirmation ; the *To-be-to* itself is such imperfect transcendence, and an abstraction in general. But the pointing to the wholly abstract universal suffices as against the equally abstract assurance that the Limitation cannot be transcended, or, indeed, the pointing to the Infinite in general against the assurance, that the Finite cannot be transcended.

A seemingly ingenious fancy of Leibnitz may here be mentioned : if a magnet had consciousness, it would regard its direction to the North as a determination of its own will, a law of its freedom. Rather, if it had consciousness, and so Will and Freedom, it would possess thought, and so space would be for it as *universal* space, implying *all* directions, and thus the *one* direction to the North would be rather as a Limitation of its freedom, just as it would be a Limitation to be kept fixed in one spot, for Man, but not for the Plant.

The *To-be-to* on the other side is transcendence of the Limitation, but only a *Finite transcendence*. It has therefore its place and its value in the field of the Finite, where it holds fast the Being-in-itself as opposed to the Limited part, and maintains it (the Being-in-itself) as the Rule and the Essential, opposed to what, in comparison, is the Null. Duty is a *To-be-to*, an *Obligation-to*, directed against the particular Will, against self-seeking greed and self-willed interest ; it is enjoined as a *To-be-to*, an *obligation-to*, on the Will so far as it, in its capability of movement, can deviate from the True. Those who estimate the *To-be-to* of Morals so high, and opine that Morality is to be destroyed, if the *To-be-to* is not recognised as ultimum and as Truth, just as the *raison-*

neurs, whose understanding gives itself the ceaseless satisfaction to be able to adduce a To-be-to, an Ought-to, and so *a knowing better*, against everything that presently is—who therefore will as little allow themselves to be robbed of the ought-to—perceive not that for the Finitude of *their* circle, the ought-to is perfectly recognised. But in the Actual itself it stands not so hopeless with Reason and Law, that they only *ought* to be,—it is only the *abstractum* of the Being-in-itself that maintains this—just as little so, as that the Ought-to is in itself perpetual, and, what is the same thing, the Finite absolute. The Kantian and Fichtian Philosophy assigns the ought-to, the to-be-to, as the highest point of the solution of the contradictions of Reason; it is, however, rather only the stand-point of Fixture in Finitude, and so in contradiction.

γ. *Transition of the Finite into the Infinite.*—The Ought-to, *per se*, implies the Limitation, and the Limitation the Ought-to. Their reference to each other is the Finite entity itself, which contains them both in its Being-within-itself. These moments of its Determination are qualitatively opposed to each other; the Limitation is determined as the negative of the Ought-to, and the Ought-to equally as the negative of the Limitation. The Finite entity is thus the contradiction of itself in itself; it sublates itself, passes away. But this its result, the negative in general, is (α) its very *Determination* (Qualification or its In-itself); for it (the result) is the negative of the negative. The Finite is thus in passing away not passed away; it has in the first instance become only *another* Finite, which however is equally a passing away as transition into another Finite, and so on *ad infinitum*. But (β) this result being considered closer, the Finite has in its passing away,

this negation of itself, attained its Being-in-itself, it has *gone together with itself* in it. Each of its moments contains just this result: the Ought-to passes over the Limitation, i. e., over its own self; but over it, or as its other, there is only the Limitation itself. The Limitation, however, points immediately out over itself to its Other, which is the Ought-to; but this again is the same disunion of *Being in itself* and of *Being there* as the Limitation, that is, it is the same thing; out over itself then it goes together equally only with its own self. This *identity with itself*, the negation of the negation, is affirmative Being, and so the Other of the Finite—the Finite as that which is to have the first negation as its determinateness—that Other is *the Infinite*.

C.

THE INFINITE.

The Infinite in its simple notion may in the first instance be regarded as a new Definition of the Absolute; it is as the determinationless reference to self, put as Being and Becoming. The forms of There-being fail or fall out in the series of the determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the Absolute, because the forms of its sphere are, *per se*, immediately expressed or put only as Determinatenesses, as finite in general. The Infinite, however, appears directly as absolute, being expressly determined as negation of the Finite, and thus there is reference expressly made in the Infinite to the Limitedness of which Being and Becoming (though in themselves neither showing nor having any Limitedness) might yet, perhaps, be not unsusceptible—and any such Limitedness is negated in it's, the Infinite's, regard.

Even thus, however, the Infinite is not yet in effect excepted from Limitedness and Finitude; the main point is to distinguish the true notion of the Infinite from the bastard or spurious Infinite, the Infinite of Reason from the Infinite of Understanding. The latter, indeed, is the finitised Infinite, and it will be found that just in the attempt to keep the Infinite pure and apart from the Finite, the former is only finitised.

The Infinite is

a. *in simple Determination* the Affirmative as negation of the Finite :

b. it is thus, however, in alternating determination with the Finite, and is the abstract, one-sided Infinite :

c. the self-sublation of this Infinite with that of the Finite as a *single process*—is the *veritable Infinite*.

a. *The Infinite in general.*

The Infinite is the negation of the negation, the Affirmative, the *Being*, which out of the Limitedness has again restored itself. The Infinite *is*, and in a more intense sense than the first immediate Being; it is the veritable *Being*, the rising out over the Limitation. At the name of the Infinite there arises to Feeling and to Spirit its own *Light*, for Spirit is not herein only abstractly with itself, but raises itself to its own self, to the Light of its Thinking, of its Universality, of its Freedom.

First of all as regards the notion of the Infinite, it has been found that There-being in its Being-in-itself determines itself as Finite, and transcends the Limitation. It is the nature of the Finite itself, to transcend its own self, to negate its negation, and to become infinite. The Infinite thus does not stand as something

ready-made and complete, *per se*, *over* the Finite, in such wise that the Finite has and holds its permanence *out of* or *under* the former. Nor do we only as a subjective Reason cross over the Finite into the Infinite. As, for instance, when it is said that the Infinite is the Notion of Reason, and through Reason we raise ourselves over the things of Time, this takes place nevertheless without prejudice to the Finite, which is nowise concerned in said elevation—an elevation which remains external to it. So far, however, as the Finite itself is raised into the Infinite, it is just as little any foreign force which effects this on it, but its nature is this,—to refer itself to itself as Limitation, Limitation as such and also as *To-be-to*, and to transcend the same (Limitation), or rather as reference to self to have negated it and to be beyond it. Not in the sublation of the Finite is it that there arises the Infinite, but the Finite is only this, through its very nature to become (rise) to the Infinite. Infinitude is its *Affirmative Determination*, that which *in itself* it truly is.

Thus the Finite has disappeared in the Infinite, and what is, is only the *Infinite*.

b. *Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite.*

The Infinite *is*; in this immediacy it is at the same time the negation of another, the Finite. Thus as *beënt*, and at the same time as non-being of another, it has fallen back into the category of the Something, as of a Determinate in general,—or more accurately, because it is There-being reflected into self and resulting through sublation of the Determinateness in general, expressed or put consequently as There-being that is

distinguished from its Determinateness, it has fallen back into the category of Something with a Limit. The Finite in view of this Determinateness stands opposed to the Infinite, *as real There-being*; they stand thus in qualitative *reference* as *constant* or *permanent* out of each other; the *immediate Being* of the Infinite awakes the Being of its Negation, the Finite again, which in the first instance seemed lost in the Infinite.

But the Infinite and Finite are not in these categories of *reference* only; both sides are further determined as merely *Others* mutually. That is to say, the Finite is the Limitation expressed as the Limitation, it is There-being with the Determination (nature) to go over into its Being-in-itself, or infinitely to *become*. Infinitude is the Nothing of the Finite, its *Being-in-itself* and its *To-be-to*, but this at the same time as reflected into self, the *To-be-to* carried out, or only self-to-self-referent quite affirmative Being. In Infinitude there is the satisfaction present that all Determinateness, Change, all Limitation, and with it the To-be-to itself, have disappeared—determinateness is expressed as sublated, the Nothing of the Finite. As this negation of the Finite is the Being-in-self determined, which (Being-in-self) thus as negation of the negation is affirmatively within itself. This affirmation, however, is as qualitative *immediate* reference to self, Being; and thus the Infinite is reduced to the category that it has the Finite as *another* opposed to it; its negative nature is expressed as the *beënt*, and so first and immediate, negation. The Infinite is in this manner burdened with the antithesis to the Finite, which, as *Other*, remains at the same time determinate real There-being, though it is expressed as—in its Being-in-itself, the Infinite—at the same time, sublated; this (Infinite)

is the Non-Finite ;—a Being in the determinateness (form) of negation. Opposed to the Finite, the sphere of beënt determinatenesses, of Realities, is the Infinite, the indeterminate void, the *other side* of the Finite, which (Finite) has its Being-in-self not in its There-being, which (There-being) is a determinate one.

The Infinite counter the Finite thus expressed or put in qualitative reference of Other to each other, is to be named the spurious Infinite, the Infinite of the Understanding, to which it has the value of the highest, of absolute truth ; to bring Understanding to a consciousness of this, that, in that it opines to have reached its satisfaction in the reconciliation of the truth, it, on the contrary, is landed in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction—this must be effected by the contradictions into which it falls on all sides, as soon as it attempts application and explication of these its categories.

This contradiction is immediately present in this, that the Finite as There-being remains counter the Infinite ; there are thus *two* determinatenesses ; there are two worlds to hand, one infinite and one finite ; and in their reference the Infinite is only Limit of the Finite, and is thus only a determinate, even *finite Infinite*.

This contradiction develops its *Intent* into more express forms. The Finite is the Real There-being which thus dialectically remains, even in that transition is made to its Non-being, the Infinite ;—this latter has, as has been shown, only the first, immediate negation as its determinateness counter the Finite, just as the Finite as regards said negation has, as negated, only the value of an Other, and therefore is still Something. When, consequently, Understanding, elevating itself out

of this finite world, mounts to its highest, the Infinite, this finite world remains stationary for it as a This side, so that the Infinite appears only *beyond* the Finite, *separated* from the Finite, and just thus the Finite separated from the Infinite;—both assigned *distinct* places,—the Finite as There-being, Being on This side, and the Infinite again, the *In-itself* indeed of the Finite, but a Yonder away into the dim, inaccessible distance, *out of* which the Finite finds itself and remains here.

Sundered thus, they are just as essentially *referred* to each other by the very negation which separates them. This negation, co-referent of *them*, the self-reflected Somethings, is the mutual Limit of the one counter the other; and that, too, in such wise that each of them has *in it* the Limit not merely counter the other, but the negation is their *Being-in-self*; each has thus the Limit, even *per se* or independently *in it*, in its separation from the other. The Limit, however, is as the first negation; both are thus limited, finite in themselves. Still, each is also as affirmatively referent of self to self the negation of its Limit; it thus immediately repels it from itself as its Non-being, and, qualitatively separated therefrom, it sets it as *another* Being apart from itself, the Finite its Non-being as this Infinite, this latter just so the Finite. That from the Finite to the Infinite necessarily, i. e. through the determination of the Finite, transition must be made, and the Finite raised as into its Being-in-self, is easily granted, seeing that the Finite is determined, as persistent There-being indeed, but, at the same time, *also* as what is *in* itself null, and therefore what in its own determination (nature) resolves itself; while the Infinite again is indeed determined as attended by negation and Limit; but, at the same time also as what is beënt *in*

itself in such wise that this abstraction of the self to self referent Affirmation constitutes its determination, and with such determination consequently the Finite There-being lies not in it. But it has been shown that the Infinite itself reaches its affirmative Being as result only *by means* of the negation, as negation of the negation, and that this its Affirmation taken as only simple, qualitative Being, brings down the negation it contains to simple immediate negation, and so consequently to Determinateness and Limit, and this [qualitative Being again] then as in the same way contradictory to its Being-in-itself is excluded from it as not *its*, rather is put as what is opposed to its Being-in-itself, the Finite. In that thus each, just *in it* and from its own Determination, is *implication* of its Other, they are *inseparable*. But this their unity is *concealed* in their qualitative Otherness; it is the *internal one, which only lies at bottom*.

Hereby is the manner of the manifestation of this unity determined; expressed in the *There-being* it is as a striking round or transition of the Finite into the Infinite, and *vice versâ*; so that the Infinite only *stands forward* in or by the Finite, and the Finite in or by the Infinite, the Other in or by the Other, that is to say, each is an own proper *immediate* existence in or by the Other, and their reference is only an external one.

The process of their transition takes the following complete shape. Transcendence is made beyond the Finite into the Infinite. This transcendence appears as an external act. In this void beyond the Finite what arises? What is the positive element therein? Because of the inseparableness of the Infinite and Finite (or because this Infinite, thus standing on its own side, is itself Limited), Limit arises; the Infinite has dis-

appeared—its Other, the Finite, has entered. But this entrance of the Finite appears as an event external to the Infinite, and the new Limit as such a one as arises not out of the Infinite itself, but, nevertheless, is just there. There is thus present a relapse into the previous Determination which has been sublated to no purpose. But this new limit is itself only such as is to be sublated, or transcended. So there has thus again arisen the void, the nothing, in which, just in the same manner, again Determinateness, a new Limit, is met with—*and so on, ad infinitum.*

There is present the alternation of the Finite and the Infinite; the Finite is finite only in reference to the To-be-to or the Infinite, and the Infinite is only infinite in reference to the Finite. They are inseparable, and at the same time absolutely Others to one another; each has itself the Other of it *in it*; thus each is unity of it and of its Other, and is in its determinateness *There-being*, not to be that which it itself is, and which its Other is [*quasi* *There-being* and *There-being not to be*, i. e., the nature *not to be*, &c.].

It is this reciprocal determination which, negating its own self and its own negation, presents itself as the *Progressus ad Infinitum*, which in so many forms and applications has the value of an Ultimate, beyond which there cannot be any further transition, but Thought, arrived at this, *And so on, ad infinitum*, supposes itself to have reached its end. This Progress appears always when *relative* determinations are pushed to their antithesis, so that they are in inseparable unity, and yet to each counter the other a self-subsistent *There-being* is ascribed. This Progress is therefore the *contradiction* which is not resolved, but is always only enunciated as *present*.

There is an abstract transcendence present, which remains imperfect, in that this *transcendence* is not itself *transcended*. The Infinite is there before us ; it is, to be sure, transcended, for a new Limit is assumed, but just thus rather we are only back in the Finite. This bastard Infinite is *in itself* the same thing as the perpetual *To-be-to* ; it is indeed the negation of the Finite, but it cannot in truth free itself therefrom ; this comes forward in itself again as its Other, because this Infinite only is as in *reference* to the Finite which is other to it. The Progress in infinitum is therefore only the self-repeating sameness, one and the same wearisome *alternation* of this Finite and Infinite.

The Infinitude of the infinite Progress remains burdened with the Finite as such, is limited thereby and itself *finite*. But thus, consequently, it were assumed in effect as Unity of the Finite and Infinite. But this unity is not reflected on. This unity, however, is that alone which in the Finite evokes the Infinite, and in the Infinite the Finite: it is, so to speak, the mainspring of the Infinite Progress. This Progress is the *externale* of said Unity, and *Conception* remains standing by this *externale*—by the perpetual repetition of one and the same reciprocation, an empty unrest to advance further out over the limit into the Infinite, which advance *finds* in this Infinite a new limit, by which, however, it is just as little able to call a halt as in the Infinite. This Infinite has the fixed determination of a Further side which cannot be reached, just for this very reason, that it *is not to be* reached,—just because there is no leaving off from the determining of it, as the Further side, as the *beënt* negation. In consequence of this its nature, it has the Finite as a Hither side opposed to it, which can as little raise itself into the Infinite, just

for this reason, that it has this determination of a There-being generative of *Another*, generative consequently of a perpetual repetition—generative of itself in its *beyond itself* again, and yet, at the same time, as different therefrom.

c. *The Affirmative Infinite.*

In this hither and thither of an alternating conclusion, now of the Finite, and again of the Infinite, the truth of these is already *in itself present*, and all that is necessary is simply *to take up* what *is* present. This movement hither and thither constitutes the external *Realisation* of the Notion; what the notion contains *impliciter* is *expliciter*, formally expressed, in this (outer realisation), but *externally*, as falling asunder; the comparison of these diverse moments is all that is required to yield the *Unity* which gives the Notion itself;—the *Unity* of the Infinite and Finite is, as has been often remarked already, and as deserves now specially to be remembered, a one-sided expression for this unity as it is in truth; but the elimination of this one-sided statement must also lie in the externalisation of the notion which is now before us.

Taken in its first, simply immediate statement, the Infinite is only as transcendence of the Finite; it is in its Determination [definition, express nature] the negation of the Finite; thus the Finite, as only that which is to be transcended, is the Negation of itself just *in it*—just that negation which the Infinite is. There lies thus in *each*, the Determinateness of the *Other*,—yet, according to the infinite Progress, they are to be mutually excluded, and only reciprocally to follow each other; neither can be stated and comprehended without the Other, the Infinite not without the Finite, the Finite

not without the Infinite. When what the Infinite is, is *said*, the negation, namely, of the *Finite*, the Finite itself, is *co-enunciated* ; for the Definition or Determination of the Infinite, it cannot be *dispensed with*. People require only to *know what they say* to find the Finite in the Infinite. Of the Finite, for its part, it is at once granted, that it is what is Null, but just its Nullity is the Infinitude, from which it is thus inseparable. In this way of regarding them, they may seem to be taken with *reference* to their Other [or only in their *reference*]. Now should they be supposed *reference-less*, in such wise that they are connected only by an *And*, they will stand as if mutually opposed, self-subsistent, each only in itself. Let us see now, how in such shape they are constituted. So placed, the Infinite is *one of the two* ; but as *only* one of the two it is itself finite—it is not the whole, but only one side ; it has in its Opposite its Limit ; it is thus the *finite Infinite*. Or there are only *two Finites* before us. Just in this, that it is thus placed as *sundered* from the Finite, and therefore as *one-sided*, lies its Finitude, and therefore its unity with the Finite. The Finite, for its part, placed as *per se* apart from the Infinite, is *this reference to self*, in which its relativity, dependency, its passingness is removed ; it is the same self-substantiality and affirmation of itself which the Infinite is taken to be.

Both modes of consideration, though seeming at first to have a different Determinate for their start—so far as the former is supposed to view them only as *Reference* of the Infinite and Finite to each other, of each to its Other ; and the latter is supposed to hold them apart from each other in their complete isolation,—give one and the same result ; the Infinite and Finite, viewed according to the *reference* of both to one another,

which reference was to be external to them, but which is essential to them, neither being what it is without it, contain thus each its Other in its own Determination (Definition), just as much as each taken *per se*, regarded in itself, has its Other lying in it as its own Moment.

This yields, then, the—decried—Unity of the Finite and Infinite—the Unity, which is itself the Infinite, which comprehends in itself its own self and the Finite—and therefore is the Infinite in another sense than in that, according to which the Finite is separated from it and placed on the other side. In that they must be as well distinguished, each, as already shown, is also itself *in it* the unity of both; and thus there are two such unities. The common element, the unity of both Determinates, as unity, expresses both in the first place as negated, seeing that each is supposed to be that which it is in their distinguishedness; in their unity they lose, therefore, their qualitative nature;—an important Reflexion against Conception (Representation), which will not emancipate itself from this—to hold fast, in the the unity of the Infinite and Finite, these according to the quality which they are supposed to have as taken apart, and therefore to see in said unity only the contradiction, not also the resolution of the same by the negation of the qualitative Determinateness of both; thus the directly simple, universal unity of the Infinite and Finite is falsified.

But further, in that now also they are to be taken as different, the unity of the Infinite, which each of these moments is, is differently determined in each of them. The Infinite, so determined, has *in it* the Finitude which is distinguished from it; the former is in this unity the *In-itself*, and the latter is only

Determinateness, Limit *in it*; but it is a Limit which is the directly Other of it (the Infinite), its antithesis; its Determination, which is the *In-itself* as such, becomes by the falsifying addition of a quality of such a nature vitiated; it is thus a *finitised Infinite*. In like manner, in that the Finite as such is only the Non-*In-itself*, but by reason of the unity in question has likewise its opposite *in it*, it becomes raised above its value, and that too, so to speak, infinitely; it is expressed as the *Infinitised Finite*.

In the same manner, as previously the simple, is the double unity of the Infinite and Finite falsified by Understanding. This takes place here also by this, that in the one of the two unities the Infinite is taken as not negated, rather as the *In-itself*, in which therefore there is not to be Determinateness and Limitation; the *In-itself* were by this depreciated and vitiated. Contrariwise, the Finite is likewise held fast as the non-negated, though in itself null, so that in its connexion with the Infinite it is raised to that which it *is* not, and is thereby—not disappearing but rather perpetually continuing—unfinitised against its own distinctive Determination.

The falsification, which, with the Finite and the Infinite, Understanding commits in holding fast their mutual reference as qualitative diversity, in maintaining them as in their nature separated and indeed absolutely separated, is occasioned by forgetting that which for Understanding itself the Notion of these moments is. According to this notion, the unity of the Finite and Infinite is not an external bringing together of them, nor a combination, alien and repugnant to their distinctive nature, in which combination there would be conjoined, what were *in* themselves separated and

opposed, mutually self-substantial and existent, and consequently incompatible ; but each is just *in it* this unity, and that only as *sublation* of itself, in which neither has any advantage over the other as regards *In-itself-ness* and affirmative There-being. As already shown, the Finite is only as transcendence of itself ; there is contained therefore in it, the Infinite, the Other of itself. Just so is the Infinite only as transcendence of the Finite ; it implies, therefore, essentially its other, and is, consequently, *in it* the Other of itself. The Finite is not sublated by the Infinite as by an independent Power existing apart from it ; but it is its Infinitude, to sublate itself.

This sublation is, consequently, not Alteration or Otherness in general, not sublation of *Something*. That in which the Finite sublates itself, is the Infinite as the negating of the Finite ; but this latter is long ago itself only There-being determined as a Non-being. It is, therefore, only the *Negation* which in the *Negation* sublates itself. Thus for its part Infinitude is determined as the Negative of Finitude, and, consequently, of Determinateness in general, as the void Further side ; its self-sublation in the Finite is a turning back from empty flight, a *Negation* of the Further side, which Further side is a *Negative* in itself.

What is present, then, is in both the same Negation of the Negation. But this is *in itself* reference to itself, affirmation but as return to itself, i. e. through the *mediation*, which the negation of the negation is. These determinations are what is to be essentially kept in view : the second point, however, is, *that* they are *expressed* in the infinite progress, but, *as* they are expressed in it, not yet in their ultimate truth.

In the first place, in it, both, as well the Infinite as

the Finite, are negated—both are, and in the same manner, transcended; secondly, they are expressed as distinct and different, each after the other, as *per se* positive. We take thus these two determinations comparably apart, as in the comparison, an outer comparison, we have separated the two modes of consideration, that of the Finite and Infinite *in their reference*, and that of the same *each taken per se*. But the Infinite Progress expresses more; there is present in it, also, the *connexion* of what is likewise distinguished, directly nevertheless only as transition and alternation. Let us see now in a simple Reflexion what in effect is present.

First, the negation of the Finite and Infinite, which is expressed in the infinite Progress, may be taken as simple, consequently as separate, and only successive. Starting with the Finite, the Limit is transcended, the Finite is negated. Now, then, we have the Further side, the beyond of the same, the Infinite: but in this latter the Limit again *arises*, and thus we have the transcendence of the Infinite. This twofold sublation nevertheless is expressed partly in general only as an external traffic and alternation of the moments, partly not yet as a *Unity*; each of these transcendings is a special apposition, a new act, so that they fall thus asunder from one another. There is, however, also further present in the infinite Progress their *reference*. There is, *firstly*, the *Finite*; *then* it is transcended—this negative or beyond of the Finite is the Infinite; *thirdly*, this negation is again transcended—there arises a new Limit, again a *Finite*. This is the complete, self-closing movement, which has arrived at that which constituted the Beginning; *the same thing* from which we *started* *arises*, i. e. *the Finite is restored; the same thing has*

therefore gone together with itself, has in its Beyond only found itself again.

The same is the case as regards the Infinite. In the Infinite, the Beyond of the Limit, there arises only a new Limit, which has the same destiny, as Finite to be necessarily negated. What we have thus again is the *same* Infinite, which disappeared previously in the new Limit: the Infinite, therefore, through its sublation, across through the new Limit, is not farther advanced, neither has it been removed from the Finite, for this latter is only this, to go over into the Infinite,—nor from itself, for it has *arrived by itself*.

Thus both, the Finite and the Infinite, are this *movement*, to return to themselves through their negation; they are only as *Mediation* within themselves, and the affirmative of both contains the negation of both, and is the negation of the negation. They are thus *result*, and not, consequently, what they are in the determination of their *beginning*; — not the Finite, a There-being on its side, and the Infinite, a There-being or *In-itself-being* beyond the There-being, i. e. beyond that which was determined as finite. The unity of the Finite and Infinite is so very repugnant to Understanding only on this account, that it presupposes as perpetual or persistent the Limitation and the Finite as well as the *In-itself*; thus it fails to see the negation of both, which is factually present in the infinite Progress, as well as that they therein only present themselves as Moments of a Whole, and that they arise only by means of their contrary, but essentially just so by means of the sublation of their contrary.

When, in the first instance, the return to self was regarded as the return as well of the Finite as of the Infinite to itself, there manifests itself in this result an

incorrectness which is connected with the one-sidedness just commented on; the Finite is now the Infinite again, taken as *starting-point*, and by this only is it that there arise *two* results. But it is absolutely indifferent, which is taken as beginning; and so the difference which produced the duplicity of the results, disappears of itself. This is likewise expressed in the every-way unlimited line of the infinite Progress, wherein each of the moments appears with like alternate presentation, and it is quite external, where we catch on, and with what begin. They are in it distinguished, but in like manner the one as only Moment of the Other. In that both of them, the Finite and the Infinite, are themselves moments of the Process, they are, *in community, the Finite*; and in that they are just so in community negated in it and in the result, this result as negation of said Finitude of both is with truth named the Infinite. Their distinction is thus the *double meaning* which both have. The Finite has the double meaning firstly to be only the Finite *counter* the Infinite, that stands opposed to it; and, secondly, to be *at once* the Finite and its opposing Infinite. The Infinite also has the double meaning, to be *one* of said two moments—thus is it the spurious Infinite—and to be the Infinite in which said both, it itself and its Other, are only moments. How, therefore, the Infinite is in effect before us, is, to be the Process, in which it submits to be only *one* of its Determinations counter the Finite, and thus only one of the Finites, and to sublate this difference of itself from itself into the affirmation of itself, and to be through this mediation as *true* Infinite.

This distinctive Determination of the true Infinite cannot be contained in the Formula, already animadverted on, of a *unity* of the Finite and Infinite; *unity* is

abstract motionless equality with self, and the moments are just thus as unmoved Beënts: the Infinite, however, is, like both of its Moments, rather essentially only as *Becoming*, but *Becoming* now *further determined* in its moments. *Becoming* has at first hand abstract Being and Nothing for its Determinations; as *Alteration*, it has *There-beënts*,—Something and Other; now, as the Infinite, it has Finite and Infinite, themselves as *Becoments*.

This Infinite, as a returned-ness into self, reference of itself to itself, is *Being*, but not Determination-less, abstract Being, for it is formally set as negating the negation; it is consequently also *There-being*, for it contains the negation in general, and consequently Determinateness. It *is* and is *there*, present, now. Only the spurious Infinite is the Beyond, because it is *only* the negation of the Finite given as Real,—thus it is the abstract, first Negation; *only* as negatively determined, it has not the affirmation of *There-being* in it; held fast as only negative, it is supposed to be even not *there*, it is to be supposed unreachable. But this unreachableness is not its highness, but its want, which has its ultimate ground in this, that the Finite as such is held fast *as beënt*. The Untrue is the Unreachable; and it must be seen, that such Infinite is the Untrue. The image of the Progressus ad infinitum is the straight line, only in the two limits of which is the Infinite, and always only where the line,—and it is *There-being*—not *is*, and which (line) proceeds out beyond to this its non-*There-being*, i. e. to the Indeterminate; as true Infinitude, recurved into itself, the image is the circle, the line which has reached itself, which is closed and completely present, without beginning and end.

The true Infinite thus in general as *There-being*,

which is put as *affirmatively* counter the abstract negation, is *Reality* in a higher sense than the former one, which was determined as *simple* Reality; it has here obtained a concrete *Intent*. The Finite is not the *real*, but the Infinite. Thus, too, Reality becomes further on determined as *Essentity*, *Notion*, *Idea*, &c. It is superfluous, however, to repeat such earlier, abstracter, categories, as Reality, on occasion of the concreter, and to apply them in the place of determinations more concrete than they are in themselves. Such repetition, as to say that the *Essentity* or that the *Idea* is the *Real*, has its occasion in this, that to unformed thought, the abstractest categories, as *Being*, *There-being*, *Reality*, *Finitude*, are the currentest.

The recalling of the category of Reality has here its preciser occasion, in that the negation, against which it is the affirmative, is here the negation of the negation, and so it (Reality itself) is put as opposed to that Reality, which finite *There-being* is.—The negation is thus determined as identity; the *Ideell** is the Finite as it is in the true Infinite,—that is, as a Determination, *Intent*, which is distinguished, but not self-subsistently beënt, only as *Moment*. Ideality has this concreter sense, which by a negation of finite *There-being* is not completely expressed. As regards Reality and Ideality, however, the antithesis of Finite and Infinite is understood so that the Finite passes for the *Real*; the Infinite, on the other hand, for the *Idéal*: in the same way as further on the notion is regarded as an *Idéal*, and *only*

* The Ideal has a more determinate meaning (of the Beautiful and what bears on it) than the *Idéal*; the former has not yet any application here; for this reason the expression *Ideell* is here used.

As regards Reality there is no such distinction; the *Reel* and the *Real* are well-nigh synonymous; the shading of the two expressions, as it were, counter each other, has no interest. [Hegel's Note.]

Idëell, There-being on the contrary as the Real. Thus it avails nothing to have the special expression of the Idëell for the assigned concrete determination of the negation; in said antithesis, the one-sidedness of the abstract negative which attaches to the spurious Infinite is returned to, and the affirmative There-being of the Finite persisted in.

The Transition.

Ideality may be named the *Quality* of Infinitude; but it is essentially the Process of Becoming, and consequently a transition (as was that of Becoming into There-being), which is now to be assigned. As sublation of Finitude, i. e. of Finitude as such, and just as much of its only opposing, only negative Infinitude, this return into self is *reference to its own self—Being*. As in this Being there is negation, it is *There-being*; but as this negation is further essentially negation of the negation, self to self-referent negation, it is that There-being which is named *Being-for-self*.

REMARK 1.

The Infinite—in the usual sense of the spurious Infinite—and the Progress into the infinite, like the *To-be-to*, are the expression of a *contradiction*, which gives itself out as solution and as ultimum. This Infinite is a first elevation of sensuous Conception (Representation) over the Finite into *the Thought*, which, however, has only the *Intent* of Nothing, of that which is *expressly* given and taken as Non-bëent—a flight beyond the Limited, which flight collects itself not into itself, and knows not how to bring back the negative into the positive. This *uncompleted Reflexion* has both of the

determinations of the true Infinite—the *antithesis* of the Finite and Infinite, and the *unity* of the Finite and Infinite—perfectly before it, but brings not these *two thoughts* together; the one brings along with it the other inseparably, but it (the Reflexion) lets them only *alternate*. The manifestation of this alternation, the infinite Progress, always appears wherever the contradiction of the *unity* of two Determinations and of their *antithesis* is persisted in. The Finite is the sublation of itself; it includes in itself its negation, Infinitude,—*the unity of both*; Process is made out *beyond* over the Finite to the Infinite as its Further side,—*separation of both*; but beyond the Infinite there is another Finite—the beyond, the Infinite, contains the Finite,—*unity of both*; but this Finite is also a negative of the Infinite,—*separation of both*, and so on. Thus in the relation of causality, cause and effect are inseparable; a cause which should have no effect is not a cause, as an effect which should have no cause is no longer an effect. This relation gives therefore the infinite progress of *causes* and *effects*; something is determined as cause, but it has, as a Finite (—and it is finite just specially because of its separation from the effect) itself, a cause, i. e. it is also effect; consequently, the *same thing* which was determined as cause, is also determined as effect—*unity of cause and effect*;—what is now determined as effect has again a cause, i. e. the cause is to be *separated* from its effect and taken as a *different* something;—this new cause is again itself only an effect—*unity of cause and effect*;—it has another for its cause—*separation* of both determinations, and so on *ad infinitum*.

A more special form can be given the Progressus in this way: it is asserted that the Finite and the Infinite are one unity; this false assertion requires now

to be corrected by the opposite one, that they are directly different and mutually opposed; this again is to be corrected, into the assertion that they are inseparable, that the one determination lies in the other, through the averment of their unity, and so on *ad infinitum*. In order to understand the nature of the Infinite, it is no difficult request, that we should have a consciousness that the Infinite Progress, the developed Infinite of Understanding, is so constituted as to be the *alternation* of the two Determinations, of the *unity* and of the *separation* of both moments, and then again that we should also have a consciousness, that this unity and this separation are themselves inseparable.

The resolution of this contradiction is not the recognition of the equal correctness and of the equal incorrectness of the two statements;—this were only another form of the persistent contradiction; but the *Ideality* of the two, as in which they, in their difference as mutual negations, are only *moments*; said monotonous alternation is factually as well the negation of their *unity* as of their *separation*. In it (the Ideality) is just as factually present what has been shown above, that the Finite passes beyond itself into the Infinite, but just so beyond the same again it finds itself spring up anew, and consequently therein it only goes together with its own self, as the Infinite similarly; so that the same negation of the negation becomes the *affirmative* result, which result demonstrates itself consequently as their Truth and Primitive. In this Being consequently as the *Ideality* of both of the characters distinguished, the contradiction is not abstractly vanished, but resolved and reconciled, and the thoughts are not only complete, but they are also *brought together*. The nature of speculative thought shows itself in this detailed example in

its special form, it consists alone in the taking up of the opposed moments in their unity. In that each shows itself factually to have *in it* its contrary, and in the same to go together with itself, the affirmative truth is this unity that gives movement to itself within itself, the taking together of both thoughts, their infinity,—the reference to self—not the immediate, but the infinite one.

The Essence of Philosophy, by such as are already in some degree familiarised with thought, has been frequently placed in the problem,—to answer, *How the Infinite comes out of itself, and into Finitude?* This, it is usually supposed, cannot possibly be made *comprehensible*. The Infinite, by the notion of which we have arrived, will in progress of the present development *further* determine itself, and show *in it*, in all the multiplicity of the forms, what is here demanded, or *How it*, if we are to express ourselves thus, *comes to Finitude*. At present we consider this question only in its immediacy, and in regard to the previously considered sense which the Infinite is wont to have.

On the answering of this question it is supposed in general to depend *whether a Philosophy exist*; and in that people give out that they will be content to let it rest on this, they believe themselves to possess in the question itself, a sort of *questio vexata*, an unconquerable Talisman, through which they are firmly secured *against* any answer, and consequently against Philosophy and the establishment of Philosophy. But even in other objects a certain *education* is presupposed, in order to understand *how to put questions*, and still more in philosophical objects is such education to be presupposed necessary in order to attain a better answer than that only the question is worth nothing. As regards such questions, it is usually fair to point out,

that the matter does not depend on the words, but that it is intelligible from one or other of the phrases of the expression, what it is it depends on? Expressions of sensuous Conception (Representation) as *going* and *coming out*, and the like, which are used in the question concerned, awake the suspicion, that it (the question) belongs to the position of ordinary conception, and that for the answer also there are expected just such sensuous conceptions, as are current in common life and have the shape of a sensuous similitude or metaphor.

When, instead of the Infinite, *Being* in general is taken, then the *determining* of Being, that is, a Negation or Finitude in it, seems more readily intelligible. Being, to be sure, is itself the Undetermined, but it is not immediately *expressed* in it that it is the contrary of the Determined. Whereas the Infinite has this *expressed*; it is the *Non-Finite*. The unity of the Finite and Infinite seems thus immediately excluded; it is on this account that uncompleted reflexion is at its stubbornest against this unity.

It has been shown, however, and, without entering further into the determination of the Finite and Infinite, it is immediately evident, that the Infinite in the sense in which it is taken by the Reflexion alluded to,—that is, as contraposed to the Finite,—has *in it* its Other, just because it is contraposed to it, and is therefore already limited, and even finite, the spurious Infinite. The answer to the question, How the Infinite becomes Finite, is consequently this, that *there is* no such thing as an Infinite, that is *first of all* Infinite, and which is afterwards under a necessity to become finite, to go out into the Finite, but it is *per se*—by and for its own self—already just as much finite as infinite. The question assumes that the Infinite is on

one side *per se*, and that the Finite, which has gone out into separation from it, or which may have come whencesoever it may, is, separated from it, truly *real*—here rather it is to be said, that this *separation* is *incomprehensible*. Neither such Finite nor such Infinite has truth; the untrue, however, is unintelligible. But it must just as much be said, they are intelligible; the consideration of them, even as they are in Conception (Representation), that in the one the distinctive nature of the other lies, to have simple insight into this their inseparableness, is to *comprehend* them; *this inseparableness is their Notion*. In the *self-substantiality* of said Infinite and Finite, again, said question sets up an untrue *Intent*, and implies at once an untrue reference of the same. On this account it is not to be answered, but rather the false presuppositions it implies—i. e. the question itself—are to be negated. Through the question of the truth of said Infinite and Finite, the position is altered, and this alteration retaliates on the first question [quasi questioner] the perplexity which it sought to inflict; this question of ours is to the Reflexion from which the first question issues, *new*, as such Reflexion possesses not the speculative interest which, by and for its own self, and before it co-refers determinations, seeks to ascertain whether these same determinations are, in the manner in which they are presupposed, anywise true. So far, however, as the untruth of said abstract Infinite, and of the similar Finite which is to remain standing on *its* side, is recognised, there is to be said as regards the exit of the Finite out of the Finite, that the Infinite goes *out* into the Finite, just because, in the manner in which it is taken as abstract unity, it has no truth, and no principle of subsistence or consistence *in it*; and conversely,

for the same reason of its nullity, the Finite goes *in* into the Infinite. Or rather it is to be said, that the Infinite is eternally gone out into the Finite, that, no more than pure Being, is it absolutely alone *per se*, without having its Other in itself.

Said question, How the Infinite goes out into the Finite, may contain the still further presupposition, that the Infinite *in itself* includes the Finite, and consequently is *in itself* the unity of itself and of its Other, so that the difficulty refers itself essentially to the *separating*, which as such is opposed to the presupposed unity of both. In this presupposition, the antithesis which is held fast, has only another form; the *unity* and the *distinction* are separated and isolated from each other. Said unity, however, being taken not as the abstract indeterminate unity, but as the *determinate* unity of the Finite and Infinite, as it already is in said presupposition, the distinction also of both is already present in it,—a distinction which, at the same time, is not a letting-loose of these into separated self-dependency, but retains them in the unity as *idëell*. This *unity* of the Infinite and Finite and their *distinction* are the same *inseparablè* as Finitude and Infinitude themselves.

REMARK 2.

The Position, that the Finite is *idëell*, constitutes *Idealism*. The Idealism of Philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognising the Finite as not a veritable Beënt. All Philosophy is essentially Idealism, or at least possesses it as its Principle, and the question is only how far has it carried out this Principle? Philosophy is this as much as Religion; for religion just as little recognises the Finite as a veritable *Being*, as an

Ultimate, Absolute, or as a Non-posititious, Uncreated, Eternal. The contrast of idealistic and realistic *Philosophy* is therefore without import. A Philosophy which should ascribe to the finite There-being as such, genuine, ultimate, absolute Being, would not deserve the name of *Philosophy*; the Principles of the Ancient or of the Modern Philosophies, Water, or Matter, or Atoms, are *Thoughts*, Universals, Idëells, not Things, as they directly find themselves before us, i. e. in sensuous singleness; even Water as maintained by Thales is not such *thing*, for, though certainly empirical water is meant, it is also conceived at the same time as the *Itself* or *Essence* of all the other *Things*; and these are not self-substantial entities, grounded in themselves, but they are *expressed* out of another, or Expressions of another (the Water), i. e. they are idëell. The Principle, the Universal, being named the *Idëell*,—(as still *more* the Notion, the Idea, the Spirit, are to be named *Idëell*), and then again single sensuous Things being to be conceived as idëell—or as sublated in the Principle, in the Notion, or more truly in the Spirit,—attention may be directed, in passing, to the same *double side*, which showed itself in the Infinite; that is to say, that at one time, the Idëell is the concrete, the veritably Beënt, but at another time again, just as much its *moments* are what is idëell, namely what is sublated in it,—in effect, there is only the One concrete Whole, from which the Moments are inseparable.

By the Idëell is especially meant, as commonly opined, the form of Conception (Representation); and what is in my conception in general, or what is in the Notion, the Idea, in the Imagination, &c. is called Idëell, so that Idëell applies even to Fancies—conceptions, which are not only diverse from the Real, but are to be

supposed essentially not real. In effect the Spirit is the Idealist proper ; in it, as it is when feeling, conceiving, still more when thinking and comprehending, the *Intent* or object is not as the so-called *real There-being* ; in the singleness of the Ego, such external Being is only sublated—it is *for me*, it is *idöell* in me. This subjective Idealism, be it the unwitting Idealism of Consciousness in general, or be it consciously enunciated and upheld as Principle, regards only the conceptive Form according to which an *Intent* (an object) is Mine ; this Form is upheld in systematic subjective Idealism, as the only true one, to the exclusion of the Form of Objectivity or Reality, or of the *external There-being* of the *Intent*. Such an Idealism is *formell*, inasmuch as in its attention to the form it neglects the matter of Conception or Thought, which matter or *Intent*—whether conceived or thought—may with all this remain quite in its Finitude. With such Idealism, there is nothing *lost*, as well because the reality of such finite matter—*There-being* and its finite complement—is retained, as because (inasmuch as it is abstracted from) said matter is to be regarded as of no consequence *in itself* ; and again there is nothing *won* with it, just because there is nothing lost, for the Ego, the Conception, the Spirit, remains filled with the same Finite matter. The antithesis of the *form* of subjectivity and objectivity is certainly *one* of the *Finities* ; but the *matter*, how it appears in sensation, perception, or even in the more abstract element of conception (representation), of thought itself, contains Finities in abundance, which (Finities), by exclusion of the single form of Finitude alluded to, that of subjective and objective, are not yet by any means got rid of, and have still less disappeared of themselves.

CHAPTER III.

BEING-FOR-SELF.

IN Being-for-self qualitative Being is completed ; it is infinite Being. The Being of the beginning is determination-less. There-being is sublated (negated), but only immediately sublated (negated) Being ; it thus, in the first case, contains only the first, just immediate negation ; Being is indeed equally retained, and in There-being both are united in simple unity ; but just on that account they are in themselves mutually unequal ; their unity is not yet *in position*. There-being is, therefore, the sphere of Difference, of Dualism, the field of Finitude. The determinateness is Determinateness as such—a relative, not absolute determinedness. In Being-for-self, the difference between Being and Determinateness or negation is posited and equated ; Quality, Otherwise-ness, Limit, as also Reality, Being-in-itself, To-be-to, &c., are the imperfect infigurations of the negation into Being, so that in them the difference of both is still taken for granted. In that in Finitude, nevertheless, the negation has gone over into Infinitude ; into the *posited* negation of the negation, it, (the negation) is simple reference to self, and, therefore, in itself the equation with Being, absolute-determinate Being.

Being-for-self, is, *firstly*, immediate Being-for-self-ity, One.

Secondly, the One goes over into the plurality (many) of Ones,—*Repulsion* ; which otherwise-ness of the One resolves itself in the Ideality of the same, *Attraction*.

Thirdly, the reciprocal determination of Repulsion and Attraction, in which they sink together (collapse) into equilibrium, passes over (and so also Quality, which in Being-for-self reached its point) into *Quantity*.

A.

BEING-FOR-SELF AS SUCH.

The total notion of Being-for-self has yielded itself. It is only now necessary to point out that the *conception* corresponds to the *notion*,—the conception which we attach to the expression, Being-for-self,—in order to be authorised to use said expression for said notion. And so, indeed, it would seem ; we say that something is for itself, so far as it negates otherwiseness, its reference to and communion with other, so far as it has repelled these, or abstracted from them. The other is in it only as sublated, as *its moment* ; Being-for-self consists in this, that it has so gone beyond the limitation, its otherwiseness, that, as this negation, it is the infinite *return* into itself. Consciousness contains as such *in itself* the determination of Being-for-self, in that it *represents to itself* an object which it feels, perceives, &c., that is, in that it has within it the *intent* of this object, which *intent* is thus in the manner of an *Idëell* ; consciousness is, in its very perception, in general in its involution with its negative, with its other, *by its own self*. Being-for-self is the polemical negative attitude towards the limiting Other, and through this negation of it, it is *a Being reflected within itself*, although *beside* this return of consciousness* into

* *Consciousness* is instead of *Being-for-self* here — a grammatical confusion of no moment.

itself and the ideality of the object, the reality of this latter is also preserved in that it is, at *the same time*, known as an external There-being. Consciousness is thus *apparent*, or it is the Dualism on one side to know of an object outer and other to it, and on the other side to be *for itself*, to have the object idéell in it—to be not only by such other, but in it also by its own self. *Self-consciousness*, on the other hand, is Being-for-self as completed and *set*; the side of reference to *another*, an outer object, is eliminated. Self-consciousness is thus the nearest example of the presence of infinitude,—of an infinitude abstract, indeed, but which, at the same time, nevertheless, is of a quite other concrete nature than Being-for-self in general, the infinitude of which latter has still only a quite qualitative determinateness.

a. *There-being and Being-for-self.*

Being-for-self, as already intimated, is Infinitude sunk together into simple Being; it is There-being, so far as the negative nature of infinitude, which is the negation of the negation, in the now, once for all, explicit form of the *immediacy* of Being, is only as negation in general, as simple qualitative determinateness. Being, in a determinateness such that it is There-being, is, however, directly also diverse from Being-for-self, which is only Being-for-self so far as its determinateness is said infinite one; still There-being is, at the same time, moment of the Being-for-self; for this latter contains certainly also Being that has been subjected to negation. Thus the determinateness, which in There-being as such is *another*, and *Being-for-other*, is bent back into the infinite unity of the Being-for-self, and in

Being-for-self the moment of There-being is present as—Being-for-One (or just Being-for-*a*).

b. *Being-for-One.*

This moment expresses how the Finite is in its unity with the Infinite, or is as Idëell. The Being-for-self has not negation *in it* as a determinateness or limit, and not therefore as reference to a There-being other from it. Though this moment has been designated as *Being-for-One*, there is still not yet anything present for which it were,—the One not, whose moment it were. In effect such is not yet fixed in Being-for-self; that for which Something (—and there is here no Something—) were, what the other side in general should be, is in like manner moment, just only Being-for-One, not yet One. There is thus as yet an indistinguishableness of the two sides, which two sides may flit before the mind in the Being-for-One; there is only *a* Being-for-Other, and because it is only *a* Being-for-Other, this Being-for-Other is also only Being-for-One; there is only the *one* ideality—of that *for* which or *in* which there should be a determination as moment—and of that *which* should be moment in it. Thus Being-for-one and Being-for-self form no veritable determinatenesses counter each other. So far as the difference is assumed for a moment and a Being-for-self-ity is spoken of here, this latter is the Being-for-self-ity as sublatedness of the Otherwiseness, and this (Being-for-self-ity) again refers itself to itself as to the sublated other, and is therefore *for-One*; it refers itself in its other only to itself. The Idëell is necessarily *for-One*, but it is not for *another*; the *One*, for which it is, is only itself. — Ego, therefore, the Spirit in

general, or God, are Idëells, because they are infinite ; but they are not idëell, as beënts-for-self, diverse from that that is for-One. For so they were only immediate, or, nearer, There-being and Being-for-other ; for that which were for them, were not themselves but another, if the moment of being for-One attached not to them. God is therefore *for himself*, so far as he is himself that that is *for him*.

Being-for-Self and Being-for-One are therefore not different imports of Ideality, but are essential, inseparable moments of it.

REMARK.

The Expression Was für eines?

The apparently, at first sight, singular expression of our language for the question of quality, *what for a thing* (was für ein Ding) something is, gives prominence, in its reflexion-into-self, to the moment considered here. This expression is in its origin idealistic, seeing that it asks not, what this thing A is *for another* thing B, not what this man is for another man ;—but what this is for a thing, for a man ? so that this Being-for-One has, at the same time, come back into this thing itself, into this man himself, and that *which is* and that *for which* it is, is one and the same thing,—an Identity, such as Ideality must also be considered to be.

Ideality attaches in the first instance to the sublated determinations, as diverse from that in which they are sublated, which again may be taken as the Real. In this way, however, the Idëell is again one of the moments and the Real the other ; but Ideality is this, that both determinations are equally only *for-One*, and pass valid only *for-One*, which *One* ideality is just thus undistinguished Reality. In this sense, Self-conscious-

ness, the Spirit, God, is the Idëell, as infinite reference purely to self,—Ego is for Ego, both are the same thing; Ego is twice named, but of such a two, each is only *for-One*, idëell; the Spirit is only for the Spirit, God only for God, and only this unity is God, God as Spirit. Self-consciousness, however, as consciousness passes into the difference of itself and of another, or of its ideality in which it is perceptive, and of its reality in that its perception has a determinate *intent* (object), which *intent* has still the side to be known as the unresolved negative, as *There-being*. Nevertheless, to call Thought, Spirit, God, *only* an Idëell, presupposes the position on which finite *There-being* passes for the Real, and the Idëell or the *Being-for-One* has only a one-sided sense.

In assigning the *principle* of Idealism, in a preceding Remark, it was said that the decisive question in the case of any philosophy was, how far has this principle been carried out in it? As regards the mode of carrying this out, a further remark may be made in reference to the category by which we stand. On this point the question is,—whether, beside the *Being-for-self*, Finite existence is not still left independently standing,—moreover, again, whether there be already set in the Infinite itself the moment *for-One*, a bearing of the Idëell to its own self as Idëell. Thus the Eleatic Being, or the Spinozistic Substance, is only the abstract negation of all determinateness, without ideality being set in it itself;—with Spinoza, as will be considered again further on, infinitude is only the absolute *affirmation* of a thing, and thus only unmoved unity; his substance, therefore, comes not even to the determination of *Being-for-self*, much less to that of subject or of Spirit. The Idealism of the

pure and lofty Malebranche is in itself more explicit ; it contains the following ground-thoughts : — As God comprehends within himself all the eternal verities, the Ideas, and Perfections of all things, in such wise that they are only *his*, we for our part see them only in him ; God awakes in us our sensations of objects through an action which has nothing sensuous in it, in consequence of which we infigure (conceit) to ourselves that we obtain not only the Idea of the object, which Idea represents its Essentivity, but the sensation also of its There-being (‘ De la Recherche de la Vérité, Eclairc. sur la Nature des Idées,’ etc.) As then the eternal Verities and Ideas (Essentivities) of Things are in God, so also is their sensuous outer There-being in God, *idëel*, and not an actual There-being ; though our objects, they are only *for-One*. This moment of explicit and concrete Idealism, which is wanting in Spinozism, is present here, inasmuch as the absolute ideality is determined as *knowing*. However deep and pure this Idealism is, nevertheless the above relations partly contain much that is indeterminate for thought, while, again, their *intent* (the matter they concern) is partly quite immediately concrete (Sin, Redemption, &c., appear in them just directly so) ; the logical character of infinitude, which should of necessity be its basal element, is not completed for itself, and so this lofty and filled Idealism, though certainly the product of a pure speculative spirit, is not yet that of a pure speculative, or veritably foundation-seeing and seeking, Thought.

The Leibnitzian Idealism lies more within the limit of the abstract notion. The Leibnitzian ideating Essentivity, the *Monad*, is essentially an *Idëell*. Ideation is a Being-for-self in which the determinatenesses are

not limits, and consequently not a There-being, but only moments. Ideation is also, indeed, a more concrete determination [*Vorstellen* comprehends in it Perception, &c.], but has here no wider meaning than that of Ideality; for with Leibnitz even what is without any consciousness is a Concipient, a Percipient. In this system, then, otherwise-ness is eliminated; spirit and body, or the monads in general, are not *Others* for one another, they limit not each other, and have no influence on one another; all relations in general fall away, under which might lie a There-being as ground and source. The manifold is only an idéell and inner one, the monad in it remains referred only to its own self, the changes develop themselves within it, and are no references of it to others. What on the real side is taken as there-beënt reference of the monads to one another, is an independent only *simultaneous* Becoming, shut in to the Being-for-self of each of them. That there is a plurality of monads, that consequently they are also determined as others, nowise affects the monads themselves; this is the reflexion of a Third (party) that falls outside of them; they are not in themselves others to one another; the Being-for-self is kept pure, without the side-by-side-there of a There-being. But just here lies the uncompletedness of this system. The Monads are such Concipients only *in themselves* (*an sich*), or in God, as the Monad of Monads, or just *in the System*. Otherwiseness is still present; let it fall into what it likes, into the ideation itself, or however the Third be characterised, which considers them as others, as a plurality. The plurality of their There-being is only excluded, and that only for the moment, the monads are only set by abstraction as such that

they are Non-Others. If it is a Third party that sets their Otherness, it is also a Third party that withdraws the same; this whole movement, indeed, which makes them *idéal*, falls on the outside of them. Should one remind us that this movement of thought falls nevertheless itself only within an ideating monad, one must be reminded as well that the very *intent* of such thought is within its own self external to itself. Transition is made from the unity of the absolute ideality (the monad of monads) immediately, without understanding how (— through the figurate conception of creation) to the category of the abstract (referenceless) plurality of a There-being, and from this equally abstractly back again to the same unity. The Ideality, the ideation in general, remains something *formell*, as much so, even when elevated into or as consciousness. As in the already adduced fancy of Leibnitz about the magnetic needle, if it had consciousness, considering its direction to the north as a determination of its own free will, consciousness is only thought as one-sided *form*, which is indifferent to its determination and *intent*, so the ideality of the monads is a form that remains external to the plurality. Ideality is to be immanent to them, their nature is to be ideation; but their relation is on one side their harmony, which falls not into their There-being [their existence as an outward world of sense], this harmony is therefore Pre-established; on the other side, this their There-being is not conceived as Being-for-other, nor further as Ideality, but is determined only as abstract plurality; the ideality of the plurality, and the further determination of the units into harmony, is not immanent and proper to this plurality itself.

Other Idealism, as, for example, the Kantian and

Fichtian, gets not further than the To-be-to (Sollen) or the *infinite progress*, and remains in the Dualism of There-being and Being-for-self. In these systems the Thing-in-itself, or the infinite *appulse*, enters immediately indeed into the Ego, and becomes only *a for-it*; but still departure is thus made from a free other-wise-ness, which perpetually abides as a negative *Being-in-itself*. The Ego, therefore, may be characterised as the Idëell, as Beënt-for-self, as infinite reference to self; but the Being-for-One is not completed to the disappearance of said *ultra* or *ulterius* of a Thing-in-itself, or of said direction (in the appulse) *towards* an *ultra*.

c. *One.*

Being-for-self is the simple unity of itself and of its moment, the Being-for-One. There is only one determination present, *the reference-to-itself of the sublation*. The moments of Being-for-self have collapsed into indistinguishableness, which is immediacy or Being, but an immediacy which founds itself on the negating which is set or posited as its determination. The Being-for-self is thus Being-for-self-ity; and in that in this immediacy its inner import disappears, it is the quite abstract limit of itself,—One, or the One.

We may remark beforehand on the difficulty which lies in the following exposition of the *development* of the One, and on the reason of it. The moments which constitute the notion of the One as Being-for-self go asunder in it; they are, 1, Negation in general; 2, two negations; 3, and so of *a Two* that are the same thing; 4, that are directly opposed; 5, reference to self, identity as such; 6, *negative reference and yet to self*. These moments go asunder here by this, that

the form of *Immediacy*, of Being, comes in in the case of Being-for-self as Being-for-self-ity ; through this immediacy, *each* moment becomes set as a special beënt determination ; and nevertheless they are equally *inseparable*. Of each determination thus its contrary must be equally said ; it is this contradiction which, by the abstract *totality* of the moments, constitutes the difficulty.

B.

ONE AND MANY.

The One is the simple reference of Being-for-self to itself, in which reference its moments have collapsed into themselves, in which therefore it has the form of *immediacy*, and its moments therefore are now *There-beënts*.

As reference of the *negative* to itself the One is a Determining,—and as reference to itself it is infinite *Self-determining*. But because of the immediacy now again present, these *differences* are no longer only as moments of one and the same self-determination, but they are set at the same time as *beënt*. The *Ideality* of the Being-for-self as Totality thus strikes round, firstly, into *Reality*, and that, too, into the most fixed and abstract, as *One*. Being-for-self is *in the One the set* unity of Being and There-being, as the absolute union of the reference to other and of the reference to self ; but now there enters also the determinateness of Being *counter* the determination of the *infinite negation*, counter the Self-determination, so that, what *One* is *in itself*, it is now only *in it*, and consequently the negative is another as distinguished from it. What shows itself as *there before it* distinct from it, is its own *Self-determining* ; its unity with itself thus as dis-

tinguished from itself has sunk into *Reference*, and as *negative* unity is negation of itself as of *another*, *exclusion* of the One as of another from itself, the One.

a. *The One in its own self.*

In its own self is the One on the whole; this its Being is no There-being, no determinateness as reference to other, not talification; it is this, that it has negated this circle of categories. The One is consequently incapable of any Becoming-Otherwise; it is *un-otherable*, unalterable.

It is undetermined, no longer so, however, as Being is so; its indeterminateness is the Determinateness which reference to itself is, an absolute Determined-being, or absolute Determinedness; *set* (*settled*) Being-within-self. As from its notion self-to-self-referent negation it has the difference within it,—a direction from itself away out to other, which direction, however, is immediately turned round, because from the moment of *Self*-determining there is no other to which to go, and so has gone back into itself.

In this simple immediation, the mediation of There-being and Ideality even has disappeared, and so consequently also all diversity and multiplicity. There is *nothing* in it (within it); this *nothing*, the abstraction of the reference to self, is here distinguished from the Being-within-self itself, it is a *set issue* (an *eximplicatum*), because this Being-within-self is no longer the Simple (unit) of the Something, but has the determination, that, as mediation, it is concrete; as abstract, however, it is indeed identical with One, but diverse from its determination (qualification). This nothing so-determined and as in a *One* (*in One* or just in *a*) is the

nothing as vacuum, as void. The void is thus the *Quality* of the One in its immediacy.

b. *The One and the Void.*

The One is the Void as the abstract reference of the negation to itself. But from the simple immediacy, the affirmative Being of the One which is still present, the void as the Nothing is directly different, and in that they stand in *one* reference, of the One itself namely, their difference is *express* or *explicit*; but different from what is Beënt (*the* Beënt), the nothing as void is *out of* (outside of) the beënt One.

The Being-for-self, in that in this manner it determines itself as the One and the Void, has again reached a state of *There-being*. The One and the Empty have, as their common simple basis, the negative reference to self. The moments of the Being-for-self come out of this unity, become mutually external; in that the quality of *Being* comes in through the *simple* unity of the moments, it (this quality of Being) sets itself to *one side*, and so down to *There-being*, and therein its other quality, the negation in general, places itself opposite, similarly as *There-being* of the Nothing, as the Void.

REMARK.

The One in this form of *There-being* is the stage of the category, which with the Ancients presented itself as the *Atomistic* principle, according to which the *Essentia* of Things is, the Atom and the Void (τὸ ἄτομον or τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν). Abstraction, advanced to this form, has acquired a greater determinateness than the *Being* of Parmenides, and the *Becoming* of Heraclitus. However *high* it places itself in that

it makes this simple determinateness of the One and the Void the principle of all things, reduces the infinite variety of the world to this simple antithesis, and makes bold out of this latter to know the former, no less *easy* is it for crude figurate conception to set up for itself, in its Reflection, *here* Atoms and *there*, just alongside, an Empty. It is no wonder, therefore, that the atomistic principle has at all times maintained itself; the equally trivial and external relation of *Composition*, that requires to be added in order to attain the semblance of a Concrete and of a variety, is equally popular with the atoms themselves and the void. The One and the Void is Being-for-self, the highest qualitative Being-within-self, fallen into complete *externality*; the immediacy or the being of the One, because it is the negation of all otherwiseness, is set as no longer determinable and alterable; in view of its absolute reserve and repulsiveness, therefore, all determination, variety, connexion, remains for it but a directly external reference.

The atomistic principle, nevertheless, remained not in this externality with its first thinkers, but besides its abstraction it had also a speculative burden in this, that the vacuum was recognised as the source of motion; which is quite another relation of the atom and the void than the mere side by side of these, and their indifference mutually. That the Empty is the source of movement, has not the unimportant sense that something can only move itself in an Empty and not in a Space already filled, as in this latter there would be found no more place; in which sense the Empty would be only the presupposition or condition, not the *ground* (*ratio*) of motion; just as here also movement itself is presupposed as already existent, and the Essential, a

Ground of it, is forgotten. The view, that the Empty is the Ground of Motion, contains the deeper thought that in the negative generally there lies the Ground of the Becoming, of the unrest of Self-movement; in which sense, however, the negative is to be taken as the veritable negativity of the Infinite. The Empty is Ground of Movement only as the *negative* reference of the One to its *negative*, to the One, i. e. to its own self, which, nevertheless, is set as a There-beñt.

In other respects, however, further determinations of the Ancients respecting the shape and position of the atoms, the direction of their movement, are arbitrary and external enough, and stand withal in direct contradiction to the fundamental determination of the Atom. With the Atom, the principle of the highest externality, and consequently also of the highest notionlessness, Physic suffers in its molecules, its particles, as also that Political Science which starts from the single will of the Individuals.

c. *Many Ones.*

REPULSION.

The One and the Void constitutes Being-for-self in its nearest or first *There-being*. Each of these moments has negation for its determination, and is at the same time set as a There-being. As regards the former, the One and the Void is the *reference* of the negation to the negation as of another to its other; the One is the negation in the form of Being, the Empty the negation in the form of Non-being. But the One is essentially only reference to itself as referent *negation*, i. e., is itself what the Empty out of it is supposed to be. Both, however, are also *set* as an affirmative *There-being*, the one as the Being-for-self as such, the other as indeter-

minate There-being generally, and each as referent to the other as to *another There-being*. The Being-for-self of the One is, nevertheless, essentially the Ideality of the There-being and of the Other; it refers itself not as to another, but only *to itself*. But in that the Being-for-self is fixed as *One* (an *a*), as a *Beënt* for self, as *immediately* existent, its *negative* reference to *self* is at the same time reference to a *Beënt*; and as this reference is at the same time negative, that, to which it refers itself, remains determined as a *There-being* and *another*; as essentially *reference to its own self*, the other is not the indeterminate negation as a *Void*, but is similarly *One*. The One is thus a *Becoming of* (rather *to*) a *plurality of Ones*.

Properly, however, this is not quite a *Becoming*; for *Becoming* is a going over from *Being* into *Nothing*; *One*, here on the contrary, becomes only *One*. *One*, as *referred*, implies the negative as reference, has the negative therefore itself *in it*. Instead of *Becoming*, there is therefore, firstly, present the proper immanent reference of the *One*; and, secondly, so far as this reference is negative and the *One* at the same time *beënt*, it is itself that the one drives off *from itself*. The negative reference of the *One* to itself is *Repulsion*.

This *Repulsion*, thus as *position* of a plurality of *Ones* but through *One* itself, is the special coming out of itself of the *One*, but to such ones out of it as are themselves only *One*. This is the repulsion in accordance with *the Notion*, that repulsion which is *in itself*. The second repulsion is different from this one, and is that which floats, in the first instance, before the conception of outer reflexion, as not the production of the *Ones*, but only as a mutual distance of presupposed *Ones* already *there*. It is to be seen

now, then, how said *in-itself*-beënt repulsion determines itself into the second, the external one.

First of all, we have to fix for certain, what characters the many Ones as such possess. The Becoming to the Many, or the becoming-produced of the Many, disappears immediately, as a becoming-set (*implied*); the produced Ones are Ones, not for other, but refer themselves infinitely to themselves. The One repels only *itself* from itself, therefore *becomes* not, but *already is*; what is conceived as the repelled one is likewise a *One*, a *Beënt*; repelling and being-repelled attaches in the same manner to both, and constitutes no difference.

The Ones are thus *prae-set* (*presupposed*) as counter one another;—*set* (*implied*) through the repulsion of the One from itself; *prae* (of the *pre*-supposed), set as *not* set; their being-set is sublated, they are *Beënts* counter one another, as referent of themselves only to themselves.

The plurality appears thus not as an *Otherwiseness*, but as a determination perfectly external to the One. One, in that it repels itself, remains reference to itself; as so also that one that is taken at first as repelled. That the Ones are *other* counter each other, are held together in the determinateness of plurality, nowise concerns, therefore, the Ones. If the plurality were a reference of the Ones themselves to one another, they would limit each other, and would have a Being-for-other affirmatively *in* them. Their reference—and this they have through their virtual unity—as it is here *set*, is determined as none; it is again the previously-determined *Void*. This void is their limit, but a limit external to them, in which they are not to be *for one another*. The limit is that in which what are limited as well *are* as *are not*; but the void is determined as the pure Non-being, and only this constitutes their limit.

The repulsion of the One from itself is the *Explication* of that which—in *itself*—the One is ; but Infinitude, as laid *asunder* (out-of-one-another, explicated) is here *Infinitude come out of itself*, but it is come out of itself through the *immediacy* of the Infinite, of the One. This Infinitude is quite as much a simple reference of the One to One, as rather the absolute referencelessness of the One ; the former as according to the simple affirmative reference of the One to itself, the latter as according to the same reference as negative. Or the plurality of the One is the own proper *setting* of the One ; the One is nothing but the *negative* reference of the One to itself, and this reference, therefore the One itself, is the Many Ones. But just thus the plurality is directly external to the One ; for the One is just the sublation of the Otherwiseness, the repulsion is its reference to self, and simple equality with itself. The plurality of the Ones is Infinitude as unconcerned self-producent Contradiction.

REMARK.

The Leibnitzian Idealism has been already noticed. We may add here, that, from the *ideating monad* onwards, which monad is determined as beënt-for-self, it advanced only to Repulsion as just considered, and indeed only to plurality as such that in it the Ones are each only for itself, indifferent to the There-being and Being-for-self of any Others, or as such that in it in general *Others* are not in any way for the One. The monad is *per se* the completely isolated *world* ; it requires none of the others ; but this inner variety which it has in its ideation alters nothing in its determination as beënt only for itself. The Leibnitzian Idealism takes up plurality immediately as one *given*,

and comprehends it not as a repulsion of the monad ; it has plurality, therefore, only on the side of its abstract externality. The Atomistic has *not* the notion of Ideality ; it takes the One not as such that it comprehends *within itself* both moments, the Being-for-self and the Being-for-it, not therefore as an Idëell, but only as simple, dry Being-for-self-ity. But it goes beyond the mere indifferent plurality ; the Atoms come into further mutual determination, though properly only in an inconsequent manner ; whereas, on the contrary, in the indifferent independency of the Monads, plurality remains as fixed and immovable *Ground-determination*, so that their reference falls only into the Monad of Monads, or into the reflecting Philosopher.

C.

REPULSION AND ATTRACTION.

a. *Exclusion of the One.*

The many ones are *Beënts* ; their There-being or reference to one another is Non-reference, it is external to them ;—the abstract Void. But they themselves are now this negative reference to themselves (to one another), as to *beënt* others ;—the exhibited contradiction, Infinitude set (expressed) in immediacy of Being. Thus now the Repulsion *finds* that *immediately before* it, which is repelled by it. It is in this determination *Exclusion* ; the One repels from itself the many Ones only as unproduced by it, as non-set by it. This repelling is, reciprocally and universally, relatively limited by the Being of the Ones.

The plurality is in the first instance not *set* otherwise-ness (not expressly so determined) ; the limit is only the

Void, only that in which the Ones *are not*. But they also *are* in the limit; they are in the void, or their Repulsion is their *common Reference*.

This reciprocal repulsion is the set (express) *There-being* of the many ones; it is not their Being-for-self, so that they were only distinguished in a Third something as a many or a much, but it is their own Distinguishing and preservative of them. They negate themselves (each other) mutually, set one another as such that they are only *for-One*. But they *negate* just as much, at the same time, this, *that they are only for-One*; they *repel* this their *Ideality* and *are*. Thus the moments are sundered, which are directly united in the Ideality. The One is in its Being-for-self also *for-One*, but this One, for which it is, is itself; its distinction from itself is immediately sublated. But in the plurality the distinguished One has a *Being*; the Being-for-One, as it is determined in the exclusion, is therefore a Being-for-other. Each becomes thus repelled by another, sublated and made a One that is not *for itself*, but *for-One*, and that another One.

The Being-for-self of the many ones shows itself, therefore, as their self-preservation, through the mediation of their mutual repulsion, in which they mutually sublate themselves, and set the others as a mere Being-for-Other; but, at the same time, this self-preservation consists in this, to repel this Ideality, and to set the Ones, not to be for another. This self-preservation of the Ones through their negative reference to one another is, however, rather their dissolution.

The Ones not only *are*, but they conserve themselves through their reciprocal exclusion. Firstly, now, that by which they should keep firm hold of their diversity counter their becoming negated is their *Being*, and that,

too, their Being-in-self counter their reference to other ; this Being-in-self is, that they are *Ones*. But *all are this* ; they are in their Being-in-self the *same thing*, instead of having therein the fixed point of their diversity. Secondly, their There-being and their mutual relation, i. e. their *setting themselves as Ones*, is a reciprocal negating ; this, however, is likewise *one and the same* determination of them all, through which then they rather set themselves as identical ; as by this, that they are *in themselves* the same thing, their ideality which was to be as resultant through others is *their own*, and they therefore just as little repel it. They are thus in their *Being* and in their *setting* only *one* affirmative unity.

This consideration of the Ones, that, in both of their determinations, as well so far as they are, as so far as they mutually refer, they show themselves as only one and the same thing and indistinguishable, is our comparison. It is, however, to be seen what in their mutual *reference* itself is *set* (express) in them. They *are*, this is in this reference presupposed,—and are only so far as they mutually negate themselves, and repel at the same time from themselves this their ideality, their negatedness, i. e. so far as they negate this mutual negating. But they are only so far as they negate, and so, in that this their negating is negated, their *Being* is negated. It is true, in that they *are*, they were not negated by this negating, it is only an externality for them ; this negating of the other rebounds off from them and reaches only touchingly their surface. But again only through the negating of the others do they turn back into themselves ; they are only as this mediation, this their return is their self-preservation and their Being-for-self.

In that again their negating effectuates nothing, through the resistance which these *Beënts* as such or as negating offer, they return not back into themselves, maintain themselves not and are not.

The consideration was previously made that the Ones are the same thing, that each of them is *One*, just like the other. This is not only our reference, an external *bringing together*, but the repulsion is itself reference, the One excluding the Ones refers itself to them, the Ones, i.e. to its own self. The negative relation of the Ones to one another is thus only *a going together with self*. This identity into which their repulsion goes over is the sublation of their diversity and externality, which as Excludents they were rather mutually to maintain.

This setting of themselves on the part of the many Ones into a single One is Attraction.

REMARK.

The Unity of the One and the Many.

Self-dependency pushed to the point of the beënt-for-self unit is that abstract *formell* self-dependence which is self-destructive; the extremest, stubbornest error which takes itself for the most perfect truth;—*appearant* in concreter forms as abstract freewill, as pure Ego, and then further as the Bad. It is that free-will which so misunderstands itself, as to set its substantial being in this abstraction, and in this Being-by-self flatters itself purely to win itself. This self-dependency is more definitely the error to regard that as negative, and to maintain oneself against that as negative, which on the contrary is one's very Being. It is thus the negative bearing to one's own self which, in that it

would win its own very Being, destroys the same, and this its act is only the manifestation of the nullity of this act. Reconciliation is the recognition of that against which the negative bearing goes as rather one's true Being, and is only as a leaving-off from the negativity of one's Being-for-self instead of persisting in it.

It is an ancient saying, that the One is Many, and in especial that the Many is One. As regards this the observation may be repeated, that the truth of the One and the Many expressed in propositions appears in an inadequate form, that this truth is to be understood and expressed only as a Becoming, as a Process, Repulsion and Attraction, not as Being, in the way in which in a proposition it is set as quiescent Unity. The dialectic of Plato in the Parmenides concerning the deduction of the Many from the One, namely from the proposition, One is, has been already noticed and remarked upon. The inner dialectic of the notion has been assigned; the easiest way is to take the dialectic of the proposition, that the Many is One, as external reflexion; and external it may well be here, seeing that the object also, the Many, is what is mutually external. This comparison of the Many with one another gives at once the fact that the one is absolutely characterised just as the other is; each is One, each is One of the Many, *is* excluding the Others;—so that they are absolutely only the same thing, or absolutely there is only *one* determination present. This is the *fact*, and there needs only to take up this simple fact. The obstinacy of the understanding stubborns itself against taking this up, because before it, and rightly too, there flits *also* the difference; but this difference is as little excluded because of said fact, as certainly said fact

despite said difference exists. One might, as it were, console understanding as regards its simple apprehension of the Fact of the difference by assuring it that the Difference will presently come in again.

b. *The one One of Attraction.*

Repulsion is the self-severing of the One firstly into Many, the negative bearing of which is powerless, because they mutually presuppose one another as Beënts ; it (Repulsion) is only the To-be-to (Sollen) of Ideality : this latter, however, is realised in Attraction. Repulsion goes over into Attraction, the many Ones into one One. Both, repulsion and attraction, are at first hand different, the former as the Reality of the Ones, the latter as their set Ideality. Attraction refers itself thus to repulsion, so that it has this latter as its *presupposition*. Repulsion furnishes the material for Attraction. Were there no Ones, there would be nothing to attract ; the conception of lasting attraction, of the *consumption* of the Ones, presupposes an equally lasting *production* of the Ones ; the sensuous conception of attraction in space holds the stream of the attracted Ones to *last* ; in place of the atoms which disappear in the attracting punctum, there comes forward another Many out of the void, and on, if it is desired, *ad infinitum*. If attraction were conceived as accomplished, i.e. the Many brought to the point of a single One, there would only be an inert One, there would no longer be any attraction present. The Ideality there-beënt in attraction has still *in it* the character of the negation of itself—the many Ones to which it is the reference, and attraction is inseparable from repulsion.

Attraction attaches, in the first instance, equally to each of the many Ones as *immediately* present Ones; none has a preference over the other: there seems thus an equilibrium in the attraction present, properly an equilibrium of Attraction and of Repulsion, and a dull repose without there-beënt Ideality. But there can be no speaking here of a preference of any such one over another, which would be to presuppose a determinate difference between them—the attraction rather is the setting of a present indistinguishableness of the Ones. Only attraction itself is the *setting* of a One different from the rest; they are only the immediate Ones which through repulsion are to conserve themselves; but through their set negation there arises the One of attraction which therefore is determined as the *mediated* One; the One that is *set* as One. The first Ones, as immediate Ones, turn not in their Ideality back into themselves, but have this (ideality) in another.

The one One, however, is the realised Ideality that is set in the One; it is attractive through the mediation of repulsion; it implies this mediation within itself as *its determination*. It absorbs thus the attracted Ones not into itself as into a point, i.e. it does not abstractly sublate them. In that it implies repulsion in its determination, this latter retains the Ones as Many at the same time in it; it brings, so to speak, by its attracting, something for (before) itself, it gains an *extension* or a filling. There is thus in it Unity of repulsion and attraction in general.

c. *The reference of Repulsion and Attraction.*

The difference of One and Many has determined itself as the difference of their mutual *Reference*, which has

divided itself into two references, Repulsion and Attraction, of which each, in the first instance, stands self-dependently out of the other, still so that they essentially cohere. The as yet indeterminate Unity of these has to yield itself more closely.

Repulsion, as the ground-determination of the One, appears first, and as *immediate*, like its Ones which, produced by it, are still at the same time set as immediate. The Repulsion appears, thus, indifferent to the Attraction, which adds itself externally to it as thus presupposed. On the other hand, Attraction is not presupposed by Repulsion; so that in the *setting* and *being* of this latter the former appears to have no share, i.e. so that Repulsion is not already *in it* the negation of itself, the Ones are not already *in them* negated. In this way, we have repulsion abstractly *per se*; as similarly attraction has, counter the Ones as Beings, the side of an immediate There-being, and comes to them quite as another.

If we take accordingly bare repulsion thus *per se*, it is the dissipation of the many ones into the indefinite, beyond the sphere of repulsion itself; for it is this, to negate the reference of the many to one another; referencelessness is their—they being abstractly taken—determination. Repulsion, however, is not simply the Void; the Ones as referenceless are not repellent, not excludent, as their Determination requires. Repulsion is, though negative, still essentially *reference*; the mutual repulsion and flight is not the freeing from that which is repelled and fled from, the Excludent stands still in *connexion* with that which is excluded by it. This moment of reference, however, is attraction, and so consequently in repulsion itself; it is the negating of that abstract repulsion according to which

the Ones were only self-to-self referent Beënts, non-excludent.

In that, however, departure is taken from the repulsion of the there-beënt Ones, and so also attraction is set as coming externally to them, both are—with their inseparableness—still kept asunder as diverse determinations; it has yielded itself, however, that not merely repulsion is presupposed by attraction, but just as much also there takes place the counter reference of repulsion to attraction, and the former has just as much in the latter its presupposition.

By this determination they are inseparable, and at the same time they are determined as *To-be-to* and *Limitation*, each counter the other. Their *To-be-to* is their abstract determinateness as of *Beënts-in-themselves*, which determinateness, however, is withal directly directed beyond itself, and refers itself to the *other* determinateness, and thus by means of the *other* as *other* each is; their self-dependency consists in this, that in this mediacy of being they are set as *another* Determining for one another: Repulsion as setting of the Many, Attraction as setting of the One, the latter at the same time as negation of the Many, and the former as negation of their ideality in the One, so that only by *means* of repulsion attraction is attraction; and only by *means* of attraction, repulsion is repulsion. That therein, however, the mediation with self through *other* is rather in effect negated, and each of these Determinations is mediation of itself with itself, this yields itself from their nearer consideration, and leads them back to the unity of their notion.

In the first place, that each presupposes itself, refers itself in its presupposition only to itself, this is already present in the mutual bearing of Repulsion and Attraction while still only relative.

The relative repulsion is the reciprocal repulsion of the many ones which are conceived as finding themselves immediate, and already in existence *there*. But that there are many ones, is repulsion itself; the presupposition which it was supposed to have is only its own setting. Further, the determination of *Being* which, in addition to their being *set*, was supposed to attach to the Ones—by which they were *prae* or there beforehand—belongs likewise to the repulsion. The repelling is that whereby the ones manifest and maintain themselves as ones, whereby they as such *are*. Their Being is the repulsion itself; it is thus not a There-being relative to another, but relates itself entirely only to its own self.

The attraction is the setting of the One as such, of the real One, against which the many in their There-being are determined as only ideël and disappearant. Attraction thus at once presupposes itself—sets itself as *out before*—to be *ideëllement* in the form, that is, of the other ones, which otherwise are to be Beënt-for-Self and Repellent-for-*Others*, and so also therefore for an attracting something. Against this determination of repulsion they attain ideality not only through relation to attraction, but it is presupposed, it is the *in-itself*-beënt ideality of the Ones, in that they as Ones—that conceived as attracting included—are one and the same thing and undistinguished from one another.

This Its-own-self-prae-Setting (its own presupposition) of both elements, each *per se*, is further this, that each contains in itself the other as moment. The Self-presupposing generally is *in one* the setting itself as the *negative* of itself;—Repulsion, and what is so presupposed is the *same thing* as what presupposes—Attraction. That each *in itself* is only moment, is the transition of each

out of itself into the other, is to negate itself in itself, and to set itself as the other of itself. In that the One as such is the coming-asunder-from-itself, it is itself only this, to set itself as its other, as the Many, and the Many are only equally this, to fall together into themselves and to set themselves as their other, as the One, and just in it only to refer themselves to themselves, each in its other just to continue itself—there are thus also present, but virtually and unseparated, the coming-asunder-from-self (Repulsion) and the setting-of-self-as-one (Attraction). It is *set*, however, in respect of the relative repulsion and attraction, i.e. those whereby immediate *there-beënt* ones are presupposed, that each itself is this negation of it *in it*, and so also consequently the continuity of it into its other. The repulsion of there-beënt Ones is the self-conservation of the one by means of the mutual repulsion of the others, so that (1) the other ones are negated *in it*, the side of its There-being or of its Being-for-other, but this side is just thus attraction as the Ideality of the Ones—and that (2) the One is *in itself* without reference to the Others; but not only is the *In-itself* as such long since gone over into the Being-for-self, but *in itself*, by very determination, the One is said Becoming of Many. The Attraction of there-beënt Ones is the ideality of the same and the setting of the One, in which thus it (attraction), as negation and as production of the One, sublates itself—as setting of the one is *in it* the negative of itself, Repulsion.

With this the evolution of Being-for-self is completed, and arrived at its result. The One as referring itself *infinitely*, i.e. as set negation of the negation to its own self, is the mediation or process, that it repels from itself itself as its absolute (i.e. abstract) otherwiseness (the Many), and, in that it refers itself to this its non-

being, negatively, as sublating it, is just therein only the reference to its own self ; and One is only this Becoming, or such that in it the determination, that it *begins*, that is, that it is set as Immediate, as Beënt, and that likewise as result it has restored itself as One, i.e. the equally *immediate*, excludent One, has disappeared ; the process which it is, sets and contains it always only as a thing sublated. The sublating, determined at first only as relative sublating, *reference* to other There-beënt-ity, which reference is thus itself a different repulsion and attraction, demonstrates itself just thus to go over into the infinite reference of mediation through negation of the external references of Immediates and There-beënts, and to have as result just that Becoming which in the retentionlessness of its moments is the collapse, or rather the going together with itself into simple immediacy. This *Being*, in the form which it has now *attained*, is *Quantity*.

To review shortly the moments of this Transition of Quality into Quantity, the Qualitative has for its Ground-determination Being and Immediacy, in which immediacy the limit and the determinateness is so identical with the Being of the Something that the Something with its alteration (that of the determinateness) disappears itself ; thus *set* it is determined as Finity. Because of the immediacy of this unity, in which the *difference* has disappeared, which difference, however, is still *in itself* there (in the unity of Being and Nothing), this difference falls as *otherwiseness* in general *out of* said unity. This reference to other contradicts the immediacy in which the qualitative determinateness is reference to self. This otherwiseness sublates itself in the infinitude of Being-for-self, which realises the difference (which, in the negation of the negation, it has *in it* and within itself)

as one and many and as their references, and has raised the Qualitative into its veritable unity, i.e. into the unity that is set as no longer immediate but as self-commediating unity.

This unity is thus (α) Being, only as *affirmative*, i. e. *immediacy* mediated with itself through the negation of the negation, Being is set as the unity that interpenetrates and pervades its own determinatenesses, Limit, &c., which are set as sublated in it: (β) There-being; it is in this determination negation or determinateness as moment of the affirmative Being, no longer *immediate*, nevertheless, but reflected into itself, referent of self, not to other, but to self; what is *simpliciter*—what is determined *in itself*—the One; the otherwiseness as such is itself Being-for-self: (γ) Being-for-self, as that Being that continues itself all through the determinateness, and in which the One and *In-itself*-determined-ness is itself set as sublated. The One is at the same time as gone out beyond itself and determined as *Unity*, the One consequently, the directly determined Limit, set as the Limit, which is none, which is in or by Being, but to which Being is indifferent, or which is indifferent to Being.

REMARK.

The Kantian construction of matter by means of forces attracting and repelling.

Attraction and Repulsion, as is well known, are usually regarded as *forces*. It will be proper to compare this definition of them, and the dependent relations, with the notions which have come out in their regard. In the conception alluded to (of forces) they are considered as self-dependent, so that they refer

themselves not through their nature to each other ; i.e. that each is not to be considered only a moment *transient* into its contrary, but as immovably and persistently opposed to the other. They are further conceived as coalescing in a Third, Matter ; so, however, that this Becoming into One is not considered as their truth, but each is rather a *First* and a Beënt-in-and-for-self, while matter or affections of it are set and produced by them. When it is said, that Matter *has within itself* the forces, there is understood by this unity of them a connexion, notwithstanding which they are at the same time presupposed as existent in themselves and free from each other.

Kant, as is well known, *constructed* matter out of the repulsive and attractive forces, or at least, as he expresses himself, set up the metaphysical elements of this construction. It will not be without interest to view this construction more closely. This *metaphysical* exposition of an object which seemed not only itself, but in its properties to belong only to Experience, is for one part worthy of notice in this, that it, as an essay of the notion, has at least given the impulse to the more recent philosophy of Nature,—that philosophy which makes Nature its scientific ground, not as a Something sensuously *given* to perception, but which ascertains its properties from the absolute notion ; for another part also because stand has been frequently taken by said Kantian construction, and it has been considered a philosophical beginning and foundation of Physics.

Such an existence as sensuous matter, is, indeed, no object of Logic, just as little so as space and the forms of space. But there underlie the repulsive and attractive forces, so far as they are regarded as forces of

sensuous matter, these same pure determinations of the One and the Many and their mutual references, which have been just considered, and which I have named Repulsion and Attraction because these names present themselves at nearest.

Kant's procedure in the deduction of matter from these forces, named by him a *construction*, deserves not, when considered close, this name, unless every kind of reflection, even the analytic, be nameable construction, as indeed for that matter later Nature-philosophers have called *construction* the most vapid *raisonnement* and the most groundless *mélange* of an arbitrary imagination and a thoughtless reflection,—which specially employed and everywhere flourished the so-called Factors of Attraction and Repulsion.

Kant's procedure is at bottom analytic, and not constructive. He presupposes the conception of matter, and then asks what forces are necessary to produce its presupposed properties. Thus, therefore, on one side, he requires an Attractive force, because *through Repulsion alone without Attraction no matter could properly exist.* ('Anfangsgr. der Naturwissensch,' S. 53, f.) On the other side he derives repulsion equally from matter, and alleges as ground of this, *because we conceive of matter as impenetrable*, and this because matter presents itself to the *sense of touch*, through which sense it manifests itself to us, in such a determination. Repulsion therefore is, further, at once thought in the *Notion* of matter, because it is just immediately *given* with it; but Attraction, on the contrary, is attached to it through *inferences*. There underlies these inferences, however, what has just been said, namely, that a matter which had only repulsive force would not exhaust what we conceive by matter. This, as is plain, is the

procedure of a cognition, reflective of experience,—a procedure which first of all perceives peculiarities in the phenomena, places these as foundation, and for the so-called *explanation* of these, assumes correspondent *elements* or *forces* which are to be supposed to produce said peculiarities of the phenomena.

In regard to the difference spoken of as to how the repulsive force and as to how the attractive force is found by cognition in matter, Kant observes, further, that the attractive force *belongs* quite as much to the *Notion* of Matter *although it is not contained in it*. Kant italicises this last expression. It is impossible to see, however, what is the distinction which is intended to be pointed out here; for what belongs to the *Notion* of a thing *must* veritably be *contained in this thing*.

What makes the difficulty, and gives occasion to this empty expedient, consists in this, that Kant one-sidedly, and quite beforehand, reckons in the notion of matter only that property of Impenetrability, which we are supposed to perceive by touch, on which account the repulsive force, as the holding-off of another from itself, is to be supposed as immediately *given*. But again, if matter is to be considered as incapable of being *there*, of existing, without attraction, the ground for the assertion of this must be a conception of matter drawn from experience; attraction, therefore, must equally be findable in experience. It is indeed easy to perceive that Matter, besides its Being-for-self, which sublates the Being-for-other (offers resistance), has also a connectedness of what *is* for itself [of its parts, that is, identified with itself], *extension* and *retention* in space—in solidity a very fast retention. Explicative physical science demands for the tearing asunder, &c.

of a body a force which shall be stronger than the mutual attraction of its particles. From this verity, reflection may quite as directly deduce the force of attraction, or assume it to be *given*, as it did in the case of repulsion. In effect, when the Kantian reasonings from which attraction is to be deduced are looked at (the proof of the theorem that the possibility of matter requires a force of attraction as second fundamental force, *loc. cit.*), they are found to contain nothing but that, with mere Repulsion, matter could not exist in space. Matter being presupposed as occupying space, continuity is ascribed to it, as ground of which continuity there is assumed an attracting force.

Granting now, then, to such so-called construction of matter, at most an analytic merit—detracted from, nevertheless, by the imperfect exposition—the fundamental thought is still highly to be prized—the cognising of matter out of these two opposed characters as its producing forces. Kant's special industry here is the banishment of the vulgar mechanical mode of conception, which takes its stand by the single character, the impenetrability, the Beënt-for-self Punctuality, and reduces the opposed character, the *connexion* of matter within itself, or of several matters mutually (these again being regarded as particular ones), to something merely *external*;—the mode of conception which, as Kant says, will not admit any moving forces but by Pressure and Push, that is, but by influence from without. This *externality* of cognition always presupposes motion as already externally existent in matter, and has no thought of considering it something internal, and of comprehending it itself in matter, which latter is just thus assumed *per se* as motionless and inert. This position has only before it common mechanics, and not

immanent and free motion. Although Kant removes this externality in that he converts attraction, the mutual reference of material parts, so far as these are taken as mutually separated, or just of matter generally in its Out-of-its-self-ness, into a *force of matter itself*, still on the other side his two fundamental forces, within matter, remain external and self-dependent, each *per se opposite* the other.

However null was the independent difference of these two forces attributed to them from this standpoint of cognition, equally null must every other difference show itself, which in regard to their specific nature is taken as something which is to pass for firmness and solidity (a *terra firma*), because they, when regarded in their truth as above, are only moments which go over into one another. I shall consider these further differentiations as Kant states them.

He defines, for example, attraction as a pervading force by which one matter is enabled to affect the particles of another even beyond the surface of contact—*immediately*; repulsion, on the contrary, as a surface-force by which matters are enabled to affect each other only in the plane of contact common to them. The reason adduced for the latter being only a surface-force is as follows:—‘The parts in mutual contact limit the sphere of influence the one of the other, and the repelling force can affect no remoter part, unless through those that lie between; an immediate influence of one matter on another, that should be supposed to go right through the parts or particles in consequence of an extensive force (so is the Repulsive force called here) is impossible.’ (‘S. ebendas. Erklär. u. Zusätze, S. 67.’)

It occurs at once that, *nearer* or *remoter* particles of matter being assumed, there must arise, in the case of attraction also, the *distinction* that one atom would, indeed, act on *another*, but a *third* remoter one, between which and the *first*, or the attracting one, the *second* should be placed, would enter directly, and in the first instance, the sphere of the interposed one next to it, and the first consequently could not exercise an *immediate* simple influence on the *third* one; and thus we have a *mediated* influence as much for attraction as for repulsion. It is seen, further, that the *true penetration* of an attracting force must consist in this, that all the particles of matter in and for themselves attract, and not that a certain number are passive while only one is active. As regards repulsion, it is to be remarked, that in the adduced passage, particles are represented in *mutual contact*, that is, we have at once the *solidity* and *continuity* of a *ready-made* matter which allows not any repulsion to take place through it or throughout it. This solidity of matter, however, in which particles *touch each other*, that is, are no longer separated by any vacuum, already presupposes the remotion of repulsion; particles in mutual contact are, following the sensuous conception of repulsion that is dominant here, to be taken as such that they do not repel each other. It follows quite tautologically, then, that *there* where the non-being of repulsion is assumed, there cannot be repulsion. But this yields no additional descriptive character as regards the repulsive force. If this be reflected on, however, that particles touching each other touch only so far as they still keep themselves *out of each other*, the repulsive force will be discerned necessarily to exist, not merely on the surface, but within the sphere which is to be supposed a sphere of attraction only.

Further, Kant assumes that 'through attraction matter only occupies a space without filling it' (*loc. cit.*); 'because matter does not by its attraction fill space, this attraction is able to act through the empty space, as no matter intervenes to set bounds to it.' This conclusion is about of the same nature as that which supposed above something to belong to the notion of a thing, but not to be contained in the thing itself: only so can matter *occupy* yet not *fill* a space. Then it was through *repulsion*, as it was first considered, that the ones mutually repelled each other, and mutually referred to one another only negatively—that is, just *through an empty space*. But here it is attraction which preserves space empty; through its connecting of the atoms it does *not fill* space, that is as much as to say, *it maintains the atoms in a negative reference to one another*. We see that Kant unconsciously encounters here what lies in the nature of the thing—that he ascribes to attraction precisely the same thing that he, at the first view, ascribed to repulsion. In the very effort to establish and make fixed the difference of the two forces, it had already occurred, that the one was gone over into the other. Thus through repulsion matter was to fill a space, and consequently through it the empty space to disappear which attraction leaves. In effect, in that it eliminates empty space, it eliminates the negative reference of the atoms or ones, i.e. their repulsion; i.e. repulsion is determined as the contrary of itself.

To this obliteration of the differences there adds itself, still further, the confusion that, as was remarked in the beginning, the Kantian exposition of the opposed forces is analytic, and throughout the whole investigation, matter which was to have been derived only from

these its elements appears from the first ready-formed and fully constituted. In the definition of the surface-force and of the pervading force, both are assumed as moving forces, whereby *matters* are to be supposed capable of acting the one way or the other. They are enunciated thus, then, as forces not such that only through them should matter exist, but such that through them matter, already formed, should only be moved. So far, however, as there is question of forces by means of which various matters might act on each other and impart movement, this is quite another thing than the determination and connexion which they should have as the moments of matter.

The same antithesis, as here between Repulsion and Attraction, presents itself further on as regards the centripetal and centrifugal forces. These seem to display an essential difference, in that in their sphere there stands fast a One, a centre, towards which the other ones comport themselves as not beënt-for-self; the difference of the forces, therefore, can be supported by this presupposed difference of a central one and of others as, relatively to it, not self-subsistent. So far, however, as they are applied in explanation—for which purpose, as in the case also of repulsion and attraction, they are assumed in an opposed quantitative relation, so that the one increases as the other decreases—it is the movement which they are to explain, and it is its inequality which they are to account for. One has only to take up, however, any ordinary relative explanation—as of the unequal velocity of a planet in its course around its primary—to discern the confusion which prevails in it and the impossibility of keeping the quantities distinct, so that the one, which in the explanation is taken as decreasing, may be always taken as increasing, and

vice versâ. To make this evident, however, would require a more detailed exposition than can be here given; all the necessary particulars, nevertheless, are to be found again in the discussion of the *Inverted Relation*.


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