'Μάντιν, ἡ ἑγνήμα κακὸν ——
——Οδροὶ γὰρ ἐλεγοὶ γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείραν γαίαν.'

'The Hidden Secret of the Universe is powerless to resist the might of thought, it must unclose itself before it, revealing to sight and bringing to enjoyment its riches and its depths.'
THE
SECRET OF HEGEL

BEING THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM IN
ORIGIN, PRINCIPLE, FORM
AND MATTER

BY
JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING
LL.D Edin. Foreign Member of the Philosophical Society of Berlin
First Appointed Gifford Lecturer (Edinburgh University, 1888-90)

NEW EDITION, CAREFULLY REVISED

EDINBURGH: OLIVER & BOYD
LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
MDCCCXCIII
REFERENCES TO THIS WORK

In *La Dottrina Dello Stato* (pp. 8, 25, 30, 111, 125), by Dr G. Levi, Professore nella R. Università di Catania.

Delle opere, che abbiamo avuto occasione di citare nel corso del nostro ragionamento ricordiamo qui semplicemente il nome degli autori, cioè: lo Stirling, lo Spaventa, il Miraglia, il Köstlin, il Rosenkranz, il Michelet, lo Zeller, il Noak, il Krug, il Chalybaus, il Haym, lo Schubart, il Lewes, il Vacherot, il Willm, il Carle.

Stirling, uno di quelli che più hanno approfondito il pensiero di Hegel.

Parecchi fra i più illustri seguaci o diremo meglio illustratori e fecondatori dei principi di Hegel, come un Gans, un Michelet, un Rosenkranz, un Stirling.

Stirling, in qualche parte del suo bellissimo lavoro.

Lo Stirling, il quale, quando pure non si voglia mettere innanzi a tutti i commentatori e illustratori di Hegel, certissimamente a niuno è secondo, nell’occasione che ribatte le obbiezioni del Haym, a pag. 490, II. vol. della sua limpiddissima e penetratissima esposizione della dottrina hegeliana, alla qual opera egli diede il titolo “the Secret of Hegel” cita—e seg.

In *Hegel als Deutscher Nationalphilosoph* (p. 296), by Professor Rosenkranz:


In *Aus Früherer Zeit* (pp. 11, 149), by Arnold Ruge:

Das Buch des Schotten Stirling über Hegel ist ein grosser Fortschritt in der englischen Philosophischen Literatur—ein Buch, welches Hegel’s Philosophie wirklich verdant hat.
FROM EMERSON AND CARLYLE.

EMERSON.

'I have never seen any modern British book (refers to "Secret of Hegel") which appears to me to show such competence to analyse the most abstruse problems of the science, and, much more, such singular vigour and breadth of view in treating the matter in relation to literature and humanity. It exhibits a general power of dealing with the subject, which, I think, must compel the attention of readers in proportion to their strength and subtlety. One of the high merits of the book is its healthy moral perceptions. . . . If there can be any question when such an incumbent can be found, I shall be glad to believe that Intellectual and Moral Science is richer in masters than I have had opportunity to know. . . . Schwegler came at last. I found on trial that I too could read it, and with growing appetite. I could at least appreciate well enough the insight and sovereignty of the annotations, and the consummate address with which the contemporary critics and contestants are disposed of with perfect comity, yet with effect. . . . The essays I have carefully read. The analysis of Macaulay is excellent. The "Coleridge" painful, though, I fear, irrefutable. . . . The "Tennyson" is a magnificent statue—the first adequate work of its kind—his real traits and superiorities rightly shown. . . . I never lose the hope that you will come to us at no distant day, and be our king in philosophy.'

CARLYLE.

'To whatever I have said of you already, therefore, I now volunteer to add, that I think you not only the one man in Britain capable of bringing Metaphysical Philosophy, in the ultimate, German or European, and highest actual form of it, distinctly home to the understanding of British men who wish to understand it, but that I notice in you further, on the moral side, a sound strength of intellectual discernment, a noble valour and reverence of mind, which seems to me to mark you out as the man capable of doing us the highest service in ethical science too; that of restoring, or of decisively beginning to restore, the Doctrine of Morals to what I must ever reckon its one true and everlasting basis (namely, the divine or supra-sensual one), and thus of victoriously reconciling and rendering identical the latest dictates of modern science with the earliest dawning of wisdom among the race of men. This is truly my opinion.'
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## I.

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There has been a desire expressed that this book should not be altered—in the fear that alteration would spoil it! My regret is that, in the way of alteration, where so much was required, so little was possible. There certainly has been the attempt—a most anxious and painful one—to mitigate for the reader, in translation and commentary, the uncouth unintelligibleness of that extraordinary new German which it has been my fate to deal in. The melancholy fact remains, however, that all these Beings—Being-for-self, Being-for-other, Being-for-one, Being-for-a, &c.—are hopeless: like a child that first reads, one has been obliged to syllabify. Still there have been explanations—alterations, for meaning or in taste, there have been freely put to use many. Nevertheless, with all the foot-notes and all the modifications in text, it is to be acknowledged or professed, that, be it a good or be it not so good, the pile itself—characteristic faults and all—remains essentially the same, if only, as a pile, it may be hoped, somewhat sharper-edged or clearer-surfaced.

It may seem in place now to say a word or two as to the origin of the book itself. Of my nine years' consecutive university winter sessions, the five in Arts left such deep and decided mark on me that I was glad to return to the relative studies when I could; and for this purpose I was for six years in France and Germany. Then, again, if in Classics and Mathematics, it could hardly be said that I was not distinguished, it was certainly in philosophy that I was most so; and in that connexion I could
PREFACE TO NEW EDITION.

not but vividly recollect these, till then academically unheard of, instantaneous three rounds of unrestrainable and unrestrained applause, that crowned the reading of that essay of mine, and filled the old class-room to the roof with dust—the sweetest that, ever in life, I did taste, or shall!

No wonder, then, that my literary leisure went all but wholly to philosophy, and, in the end, specially to that philosophy to which in Germany, as it were, the eyes of all Europe seemed turned. As for Hegel, it was somewhat strange that seeing the name—while still at home and even without a dream of Germany—with surprise, for the first time, in a Review, I was somehow very peculiarly impressed by it. But the special magic lay for me in this—that, supping with two students of German before I was in German as deep as they, I heard this Hegel talked of with awe as, by universal repute, the deepest of all philosophers, but as equally, also, the darkest. The one had been asked to translate bits of him for the press; and the other had come to the belief that there was something beyond usual remarkable in him: it was understood that he had not only completed philosophy, but, above all, reconciled to Christianity itself. That struck!

Probably this will suffice as to the rationale of the appearance of the Secret of Hegel, but, perhaps, the reader would like to know the main biographical facts of Hegel himself.

Hegel was born at Stuttgart on the 27th of August 1770. His father was a government Bureaucrat, and the family one of upper middle-rank. An industrious and zealous student, he was long and variously trained in private and in the Gymnasium at Stuttgart. For five years at the University of Tübingen he was an eminently good student, and of a recognised unofficious, but markedly genial and solid bearing. Thereafter for some years a family-tutor, he habilitated himself at Jena, in 1801, as a Docent in Philosophy. There he was appointed to a Professorship shortly before the political catastrophe ousted him from it again. For two years he edited at Bamberg a political journal. He was then Rector of the Academy at Nürnberg till
called in 1816 to a Professorship at Heidelberg. In 1818 he was translated to Berlin, and speedily became there the master of a widely influential school that was not unfavoured by the Government. He died of cholera on the 14th November 1830. He had been thoroughly educated. He knew French and English, and something of Italian. He was a passed master in Classics, and in knowledge of Aristotle, for example, even led the way. Grounded to the full in Mathematics and the Physical sciences, it was wonderful what he gained for himself by industry outside as it were—say in Art, Painting, Music. His works, as they appear on the shelves, are in a score of volumes. His character was integrity, judgment, and goodwill themselves as husband, father, teacher, man. He was plain, unpretentious, real; as it was said, *Biederkeit* characterised him, but not less *Lustigkeit*: he enjoyed society and very much the excursion of remission, whether lengthened or short. His life has been admirably written by Rosenkranz, himself a most accomplished man of an attractive and susceptible endowment, and of Philosophy an illustrious and most popular Professor.
This is the last fruit, though first published, of a long and earnest labour devoted, in the main, to two men only—Kant and Hegel, and more closely, in the main also, to the three principal works (the Kritiken) of the one, and the two principal works (the Logic and the Encyclopædia) of the other. This study has been the writer's chief—not just to say sole—occupation during a greater number of years, and for a greater number of hours in each day of these years, than it is perhaps prudent to avow at present. The reader, then, has a good right to expect something mature from so long, unintermitted, and concentrated an endeavour; it is to be feared, however, that the irregularity of the very first look of the thing will lead him to believe, on the contrary, that he is only deceived. The truth is, that, after a considerable amount of time and trouble had been employed on an exposition of Kant and a general introduction to the whole subject of German Philosophy, it was suddenly perceived that, perhaps, the most peculiar and important elements to which the study had led, were those that concerned Hegel, while, at the same time, the reflection arose that it was to Hegel the public probably looked with the greatest amount of expectant interest, if also of baffled irritation. This indicates the considerations which led to the hope that the importance of the matter might, in such a case, obtain excuse for a certain extemporaneousness that lay in the form—that, in short, the matter of years might compensate the manner of months.

I do not think it worth while to make any observations on the different sections or parts contained in these pages; I remark
only that if the reader—who probably, nevertheless, will take his own way—would read this book in the order and manner its own composer would prescribe, he will begin with the part marked 'II. A Translation from the Complete Logic of the whole First Section, Quality;' and force himself to dwell there the very longest that he can. Only so will he realise at the vividest the incredulity with which one first meets the strangeness and unintelligibleness of Hegel. Again, in reading the chapters of the 'Struggle to Hegel,' which he will take next, he ought to retain this translation still in his hands. The various portions of this struggle will, in fact, be fully intelligible only to him who endeavours, repeatedly, to advance as far as 'Limit,' either in the translation or in Hegel's own Logic. Finally, after such preliminaries, the translation II., or the correspondent original, should, in company with the commentary and interpretation III., be rigorously, radically, completely studied, and then the rest taken as it stands.*

* The secret of Hegel may be indicated at shortest thus: As Aristotle—with considerable assistance from Plato—made explicit the abstract Universal that was implicit in Socrates, so Hegel—with less considerable assistance from Fichte and Schelling—made explicit the concrete Universal that was implicit in Kant.

Further, to preclude at once an entire sphere of objections, I remark that Kant and Hegel are the very reverse of the so-called 'German Party' with which in England they are very generally confounded. It is the express mission of Kant and Hegel, in effect, to replace the negative of that party, by an affirmative: or Kant and Hegel—all but wholly directly both, and one of them quite wholly directly—have no object but to restore Faith—Faith in God—Faith in the immortality of the Soul and the Freedom of the Will—nay, Faith in Christianity as the Revealed Religion—and that, too, in perfect harmony with the Right of Private Judgment, and the Rights, or Lights, or Might of Intelligence in general.

* This need not alarm the most perfunctory reader, however, who will find three-fourths of the work—as Preface, Conclusion, Commentators, Struggle, and much of the Commentary—sufficiently exoteric and easy.
In intruding on the Public with a work on Hegel, the first duty that seems to offer, is, to come to an understanding with it (the public) as regards the prepossessions which commonly obtain, it is to be feared, not only as against the particular writer named, but as against the whole body of what is called German Philosophy. It will be readily admitted, to be sure, by all from whom the admission is of any value, that just in proportion to the relative knowledge of the individual is his perception as well of the relative ignorance of the community. But this—general ignorance, to wit—were no dispensation from the duty indicated: for just in such circumstances is it that there are prepossessions, that there are—in the strict sense of the word—prejudices; and prejudices constitute, here as everywhere else, that preliminary obstacle of natural error which requires removal before any settlement of rational truth can possibly be effected. We cannot pretend, however, to reach all the prejudices concerned; for, thought in this connexion being still so incomplete, the variety of opinion, as usual, passes into the indefinite; night reigns—a night peopled by our own fancies—and distinct enumeration becomes impossible.

Nevertheless, restricting ourselves to what is either actually or virtually prominent—in the one case by public rumour, and in the other by private validity—perhaps we shall accomplish a sufficiently exhaustive discussion by considering the whole question of objections as reduced to the two main assertions, that German Philosophy is, firstly, obsolete and, secondly, bad. The latter category, indeed, is so comprehensive, that there is little reason to fear but that we shall be able to include under it (with its fellow) all of any consequence that has been anywhere said on the subject.—Of these two assertions in their order, then.

Of the First, certain proceedings of Schelling constitute the angle; but to understand these proceedings, and the influence they
exerted, a word is first of all necessary in regard to what, at the
date in question, was universally held to be the historical progress
of German Philosophy. The sum of general opinion in that regard
we may state at once, in fact, to have been this: Kant was sup-
planted by Fichte, Fichte by Schelling, and Schelling by Hegel.
Any dissension, indeed, as to the sequent signification of this series
was, as is natural, only to be found among the terms or members
to it themselves. Kant, for example, publicly declined the affilia-
tion which Fichte claimed from him. But then this was still
settled by the remark of Reinhold, that, though Kant's belief could
no longer be doubted, it yet by no means followed that Fichte was
wrong. As for Fichte and Schelling, they had had their differences
certainly, the master and the pupil, for the latter had gone to school
to other masters, and had insisted on the addition to the original
common property of a considerable amount of materials from with-
out: nevertheless, it may be taken for granted that they themselves,
though not without reluctance on the part of one of them perhaps,
acquiesced in the universal understanding of their mutual relations.
Hegel again, who had at first fought for Schelling, who had pro-
duced the bulk of that Critical Journal which had on the face of
it no origin and no object but polemically to stand by Schelling—
who, in particular, had written that Dissertatio which demonstrated
the advance of Schelling over all his predecessors, and the conse-
quent truth of the Identitatssystem—who, in a word, seemed to
have publicly adopted this system and openly declared himself an
adherent of Schelling.—Hegel, it is true, had afterwards declared off,
or, as the Germans have it, said himself loose, from Schelling. But
here, too, it was not necessary to take Hegel at his own word; for
who does not know what every such mere declaration, such mere
saying, is worth? Every man, in view of the special nick which
he himself seems to have effected in the end, would fain see elimi-
nated before it all the nicks of his predecessors, but not the less on
that account is that former but the product of these latter. On the
whole, then, despite some little natural interior dissension, it was
certain that Fichte was the outcome of Kant—more certain,
perhaps, that Schelling was the outcome of Fichte, and even
on the whole more certain still that Hegel was the outcome of
Schelling.

Such we may assume to have been the universal belief at the
death of Hegel in 1831. But now it was the fortune of Schelling
to survive Hegel, and for a period of no less than twenty-three
years, during part of which it became his cue to overbid Hegel, and pass him in his turn. During what we may call the reign of Hegel, which may be taken to have commenced, though at first feebly, with the appearance of the *Phaenomenologie* in 1807, Schelling had preserved an almost unbroken and very remarkable silence. No sooner was Hegel dead, however, than Schelling let hints escape him—this was as early as 1832—of the speedy appearance on his part of yet another Philosophy, and, this time, of transcendent and unimagined import. No publication followed these hints, nevertheless, till 1834, when, in reference to a certain translation of Cousin, he gave vent to 'a very sharp and depreciatory estimate of the Hegelian Philosophy,' and on grounds that were equally hostile to his own, from which that of Hegel was supposed to have sprung. Lastly, at Berlin in 1841, he publicly declared his previous Philosophy—and, of course, the Philosophy of Hegel seemed no less involved—to have been a poem, 'a mere poem,' and he now offered in its place his 'Philosophy of Revelation.' Now, with these facts before it, at the same time that all Germany united to reject this last Philosophy as certainly for its part a poem whatever its predecessor might have been, how could the general public be expected to feel? Worn out with the two generations of fever that had followed the *Kritik* of Kant, would not the natural impulse be to take the remaining philosopher of the series at his word, and believe with him that the whole matter had been in truth a poem, a futile striving of mere imagination in the empty air of an unreal and false abstraction? This same public, moreover, found itself, on trial, compelled to forego the hope of judging Hegel for itself, and, while the very difficulty that produced this result would seem to it to throw an anterior probability on the judgment of Schelling, it had every reason to feel convinced that he, of all men, was the one who, in a super-eminent degree, was the best qualified to judge for it. He, by universal acknowledgment, had thoroughly understood and thoroughly summed both Kant and Fichte; by an acknowledgment equally universal, it was his system that had given origin to the system of Hegel: moreover, he had lived longer than Hegel, and had enjoyed, counting from the *Critical Journal*, the ample advantage of more than fifty years of the study of the works of Hegel. If any man, then, possessed the necessary ability, the necessary acquirements, the necessary presuppositions every way, to enable him to understand Hegel, that man was Schelling, and there could, therefore, be no
hesitation whatever in accepting the judgment of Schelling as what, in reference to the Philosophy of Hegel, was to be universally considered the absolutely definitive conclusion, the absolutely definitive sentence. If Schelling were inadequate to understand Hegel, what other German could hope success?—and, the door being shut on Germany, was it possible to expect an ‘open sesame’ from the lips of any foreigner? Rosenkranz remarks of the Times, that ‘it ridiculed the attention which we devoted to the conflict of Schelling with the School of Hegel, and opined that we were abstruse enthusiasts, for the whole difference between Hegel and Schelling came at last to this, that the first was very obscure, and the second obscurer still.’ But surely, in the circumstances described, the Times was not only entitled to say as much as that, but, more still, that the whole thing had been but an intellectual fever, and was now at an end, self-stultified by the admission of its own dream. In fact, as has been said, the declaration of Schelling amounted to a sentence. And so the general public took it—we may say—not only in Germany, but throughout Europe. Thenceforth, accordingly, stronger natures turned themselves to more hopeful issues, and German Philosophy was universally abandoned, unless, as it were, for the accidental studies of a few exceptional spirits. Since then, indeed, and especially since the failure of political hopes in 1848, Germany on the whole has, by a complete reaction, devoted to the crass concretes of empirical science the same ardour which she previously exhibited in the abstract atmosphere of the pure Idea.

This will probably be allowed to suffice as regards the case of the affirmative in reference to the first assertion that German Philosophy is obsolete. What may be said for the negative, will be considered later. Meanwhile, we shall proceed to state the case of the affirmative of the second assertion that German Philosophy is bad.

The proof of this assertion, current opinion usually rests, firstly, on the indirect evidence of the reputed friends of German Philosophy, and, secondly, on the direct findings of its intelligent foes.

Are not the friends of the German Philosophers, we are asked, for example, just all these people who occupy themselves nowadays with Feuerbach and with Strauss; and do not they belong, almost all of them, to an inferior Atheistic-Materialistic set, or, at all events, to those remnants of the Aufklärung, of Eighteenth
Century Illumination, which still exist among us? Then, are not Essayists and Reviewers, with Bishop Colenso, generally spoken of as ‘the German Party’; while, as for Strauss and Renan, are they not, by universal assertion and express name, the pupils of Hegel; and is not the one aim of the whole of these writers to establish a negative as regards the special inspiration of the Christian Scriptures, and shake Faith? There was Mr Buckle, too, who, as is very clearly to be seen, though, to be sure, his mind was not very well made up, and he vacillated curiously between the Deism with an Immortality (say) of Hume and the Atheism without an Immortality of Comte—there was Mr Buckle, who still knew nothing and would know nothing but the Illumination, and did not he round his tumid but vacant periods with allusions to the German Philosophers as ‘advanced thinkers’ of the most exemplary type? By their fruits you shall know them, and shall we not judge of Kant and Hegel by these their self-proclaimed friends, which are the fruits they produced? Nor so judging, and in view of the very superfluous extension—in an age like the present—of scepticism and misery (which is the sole vocation of such friends), shall we hesitate to declare the whole movement bad?

But, besides this indirect evidence of the reputed friends, there is the direct testimony of the intelligent foes of the philosophy and philosophers in question: we possess writers of the highest ability in themselves, and of consummate accomplishment as to all learning requisite—Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, De Quincey, for example—who have instituted each of them his own special inquest into the matter, and who all agree in assuring us of the Atheistic, Pantheistic, and, for the rest, self-contradictory, and indeed nugatory, nature of the entire industry, from Kant, who began it, to Hegel and Schelling, who terminated it. Surely, then, a clear case here, if ever anywhere, has been made out against the whole body of German Philosophy, which really, besides, directly refutes itself, even in the eyes of the simplest, by its own uncouth, outré, bizarre, and unintelligible jargon. Beyond a doubt the thing is bad, radically bad, and deservedly at an end. ‘Advanced thinkers’ come themselves to see, more and more clearly daily, the nullity of its idealism, as well as its obstructiveness generally to the legitimate progress of all sensible speculation, and Mr Lockhart (if we mistake not) had perfect reason, if not in the words, at least in the thoughts, when he
exclaimed to a would-be translator of German Philosophy, 'What! would you introduce that d— d nonsense into this country?'

It would seem, then, that the affirmative possesses an exceedingly strong case as regards both assertions, and that the negative has imposed on it a very awkward dilemma in each. Either grant German Philosophy obsolete, or prefer yourself to Schelling: this is the dilemma on one side. Then on the other it cries: Either grant German Philosophy bad, or justify Scepticism.

Now, to take the latter alternative of the first dilemma would be ridiculous. To take that of the second, again, would be to advance in the teeth of our own deepest convictions.

Scepticism has done its work, and it were an anachronism on our part, should we, like Mr Buckle, pat Scepticism on the back and urge it still farther forward. Scepticism is the necessary servant of Illuminations,—and Illuminations are themselves very necessary things; but Scepticism and Illuminations are no longer to be continued when Scepticism and Illuminations have accomplished their mission, fulfilled their function. It is all very well, when the new light breaks in on us, to take delight in it, and to doubt every nook and corner of our old darkness. It is very exhilarating then, too, though it breed but wind and conceit, to crow over our neighbours, and to be eager to convince them of the excellence of our position and of the wretchedness of theirs. But when, in Schelling's phrase, Aufklärung has passed into Ausklärung,—when the Light-up has become a Light-out, the Clearing-up a Clearing-out—when we are cleared, that is, of every article of our stowage, of our Inhalt, of our Substance—things are very different. As we shiver then for hunger and cold in a crank bark that will not sail, all the clearing and clearness, all the light and lightness in the world, will not recompense or console us. The vanity of being better informed, of being superior to the prejudices of the vulgar, even of being superior to the 'superstition' of the vulgar, will no longer support us. We too have souls to be saved. We too would believe in God. We too have an interest in the freedom of the will. We too would wish to share the assurance of the humble pious Christian who takes all thankfully, carrying it in perfect trust of the future to the other side.

To maintain the negative, then, as regards the two assertions at issue, will demand on our part some care. Would we maintain, as regards the first, that German Philosophy is not obsolete, we must so present what we maintain as not in any way offen-
sively to derogate from the dignity and authority of the intellect and position of Schelling. On the other hand, would we maintain, as regards the second, that German Philosophy is not bad, this too must be so managed that Scepticism, or, more accurately, the continuance of Scepticism, shall not be justified—rather so that German Philosophy shall appear not bad just for this reason, that it demonstrates a necessary end to Scepticism—and this, too, without being untrue to the Aufklärung, without being untrue to the one principle of the Aufklärung, its single outcome—the Right of Private Judgment.

With reference to the first assertion, then, that German Philosophy is obsolete, we hold the negative, and we rest our position simply on the present historical truth, that the sentence of Schelling, however infallible its apparent authority, has not, in point of fact, been accepted. The several considerations which go to prove this follow here together.

Many other Germans, for example, of good ability, of great accomplishment, and thoroughly versed in Schelling himself, have, despite the ban of the latter, continued to study Hegel, and have even claimed for him a superior significance, not only as regards Schelling or Fichte, but even as regards Kant. As concerns other countries, the same state of the case has been attested by the translations which have appeared. Translations are public matters, and call for no express enumeration; and as regards the German writers to whom we allude, perhaps general statement will suffice as well. We shall appeal only, by way of instance, to one friend and to one foe of Hegel. The former is Schwegler, whose premature death has been universally deplored, and whom we have to thank, as well for a most exhaustive and laborious investigation of the Metaphysic of Aristotle, as for what it is, perhaps, not rash to name the most perfect epitome of general philosophy at present in existence.* This latter work is easily accessible, and the summaries it contains are of such a nature generally, and as respects Schelling and Hegel in particular,—though drawbacks are not wanting,—as to relieve us of the fear that its authority in the question will be readily impugned. The foe (i.e. of Hegel) whom we would adduce here is Haym, who applies to Schelling’s estimate of Hegel such epithets as ‘spiteful’ and ‘envious,’ and asserts it to contain ‘rancour,’ ‘misintelligence,’ and ‘a good deal of distortion.’† The same

* Englished, three years later, by the author.
† Vide Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 28.
evidence, both of friend and foe, is illustrated and made good by the present state, not only in Germany, but everywhere in Europe, of the study of the four writers who represent the philosophy in question. As regards Schelling himself, for example, that study may be almost named null, and his writings are probably never read now unless for purposes of an historic and business nature. Reading, indeed, seems unnecessary in the case of what was life-long inconsistency, stained too by the malice, and infected by the ineptitude, of the end. Of Fichte, much of the philosophical framework has fallen to the ground, and what works of his are still current, at the same time that they are in their nature exoteric, interest rather by their literary merits and the intrinsic nobleness of the man. But the hopes that were founded on Kant and Hegel have not yet withered down, and the works of both are still fondled in the hands with however longing a sigh over the strange spell of difficulty that clasps them from the sight. With reference to the former, Germany, at this very moment, loudly declares that with him is a beginning again to be made, and openly confesses that she has been too fast—that aspiration and enthusiasm have outstripped intelligence. As for Hegel, the case is thus put by an accomplished English metaphysician:* ‘Who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen—not any foreigner—seldom even himself. With peaks here and there more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.

... Hegel is impenetrable, almost throughout, as a mountain of adamant.' This is the truth, and it would have been well had other writers but manifested an equal courage of honest avowal. But it is with very mixed feelings that one watches the allures of those who decorate their pages with long passages from the Delian German of this modern Heraclitus, as if these passages were pertinent to their pages and intelligible to themselves—this at the very moment that they declare the utter impossibility of extracting any meaning from what they quote—unless by a process of distillation! Hegelian iron, Hegelianly tempered into Hegelian steel—the absolute adamant—this is to be distilled! Bah! take heart, hang out, sew on your panni purpurei all the same!

The verdict of Schelling, then, seems practically set aside by the mere progress of time; and there appears to lie no wish nearer to

* Professor Ferrier, whose recent death (1864) we are now mourning.
the hearts of all honest students nowadays, than that Hegel (and with him Kant is usually united) should be made permeable. And justification of this wish, on the part of students who are confessedly only on the outside, is to be found in this—that, even from this position, the works of both these writers, however impenetrable in the main, afford intimations of the richest promise on all the deeper interests of man. The Kritik of Pure Reason and the Kritik of Judgment remain still vast blocks of immovable opacity; and even the Kritik of Practical Reason has not yet (1864) been represented with any approach to entirety in England: nevertheless, from this last work there have shone, even on British breasts, some of those rays which filled the soul of Richter with divine joy—with divine tranquillity as regards the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. Hegel is more impervious than Kant; yet still, despite the exasperation, the positive offence which attends the reading of such exoteric works of his as have been attempted to be conveyed to the public in French or English, we see cropping occasionally to the surface in these, a meaningness of speech, a facility of manipulating, and of reducing into ready proportion, a vast number of interests which to the bulk of readers are as yet only in a state of instinctive chaos, and, just on every subject that is approached, a general over-mastering grasp of thought to which no other writer exhibits a parallel. In short, we may say that, as regards these great Germans, the general public carries in its heart a strange secret conviction, and that it seems even to its own self to wait on them with a dumb but fixed expectation of infinite and essential result. On this head, then, the conclusion forced upon us seems to be, that German Philosophy is indeed not understood, but not, on that account, by any means obsolete.

We come now to the negative of the second assertion, that German Philosophy is bad, and have to consider, first of all, what, on the opposite side, has been said for the affirmative, and under the two heads of the indirect evidence of reputed friends, and the direct testimony of intelligent foes. Under the first head, the plea began by alluding to a certain small Atheistico-Materialistic Party; but to this it is sufficient reply to point out that the adherents of a Strauss and a Feuerbach must be widely discriminated from those of a Kant and a Hegel. Further, what the plea states next, that Strauss and Renan are par excellence named the pupils of Hegel, is, as mere ascription, of small moment before the
fact that their supposed master would have found the industry of both, in view of what he had done himself, not only superfluous, but obstructive, contradictory, and even, in a certain point of view, contemptible. Much the same thing can be said as regards the English writers who seem to follow a similar bent: whatever may be the inner motives of these writers (Essayists and Reviewers, &c.), their activity belongs to that sphere of Rationalism against which Hegel directly opposed himself. Still to spread the negative—a negative the spreading of which has long reached ultimate tenuity—and in those days when it is not the negative but the affirmative we need—this would have seemed to a Hegel of all things the most unnecessary, of all things the most absurd.

Mr Buckle—who comes next—certainly praises Kant as, perhaps, the greatest thinker of his century; and, though he does not name Hegel, he seems to speak of the philosophers of Germany in general as something very exalted. But, observe, there is always in all this the air of a man who is speaking by anticipation, and who only counts on verifying the same. Nor—beyond anticipation—can any broader basis of support be extended to those generous promises he so kindly advanced, of supplying us with definitive light at length on German Philosophy, and on the causes of the special accumulation of Thought and Knowledge—in that great country! It is, indeed, to be feared that those promises rested only on faith in his own invincible intellect, and not on any knowledge as yet of the subject itself. He had a theory, had Mr Buckle, or, rather, a theory had him—a theory, it is true, small rather, but still a theory that to him loomed huge as the universe, at the same time that it was the single drop of vitality in his whole soul.—Now, that such redoubted thinkers as Kant and Hegel, who, in especial, had been suspected or accused of Deism, Atheism, Pantheism, and all manner of isms dear to Enlightenment, but hateful to Prejudice—(or vice versa)—that these should be found not to fit his theory—such doubt never for a moment crossed even the most casual dream of Buckle!

We hold, then, that Mr Buckle spoke in undoubted anticipation, and in absence of any actual knowledge. His book, at all events, would argue absolute destitution of any such knowledge, despite a certain amount of the usual tumid pretension; and it was just when he found himself brought by his own programme face to face with the Germans, that, it appears, he felt induced
to take that voyage of recreation, the melancholy result of which we still deplore. The dilemma is this: once arrived at the actual study of the Germans, either Mr Buckle penetrated the Germans, or he did not. Now, on the one horn, if he did, he surely found, to his amazement, consternation, horror—a spirit, a thought the very reverse of his theory—the very reverse of that superiority to established prejudice and constituted superstition which his own unhesitating conviction had led him so innocently to expect. In other words, if Mr Buckle did penetrate the Germans, he found that there was nothing left him but to burn every vestige of that shallow Enlightenment which, supported on such semi-information, on such weak personal vanity, amid such hollow raisonement, and with such contradictory results, he had been tempted, so boyishly ardent, so vaingloriously pompous, to communicate—to a world in many of its members so ignorant, that it hailed a crude, conceited boy (of formal ability, quick conscientiousness, and the pang of Illumination—inherited probably from antecedents somewhere) as a 'Vast Genius;' and his work—a bundle of excerpts of mere Illumination, from a bundle of books of mere Illumination, disposed around a ready-made presupposition of mere Illumination—as a 'Magnificent Contribution,' fruit of 'Vast Learning,' and even 'Philosophy.'*

Such would have been the case if Mr Buckle had penetrated the Germans: he would have been in haste to hide out of the way all traces of the blunder (and of the blundering manner of the blunder) which had pretentiously brought forward as new and great what had received its coup de grâce at the hands—and thereafter been duly ticketed and shelved as Aufklärung by the industry—of an entire generation of Germans, and at least not less than half a century previously.

On the other horn, if Mr Buckle had not penetrated and could not penetrate the Germans—a supposition not incompatible with the formal ability of even Mr Buckle—vexation the most intense

* The theory entertained in explanation of Mr Buckle here, has not his particular age in regard when he wrote his work, but a youthful ideal, whose burthen was Aufklärung, which had been kindled in him probably from early communication with some—to him—hero or heroes of Aufklärung, and which was filled up by what quotations he was able to make from a miscellaneous and mere reading in the direction of the Aufklärung. In a certain way, there is not much said here as against Mr Buckle: while his talent and love of truth are both acknowledged, his matter is identified with the Aufklärung, and this last consideration is not likely to be taken ill by the friends of the Aufklärung.
would replace the boyish anticipations, the conceited promises, which had been with so much confidence announced. A certain amount of matter was here indispensable; mere hollow, swashbuckler peroration about superstition, fanaticism, and the like, would no longer serve: his own programme forced him to show some of the knowledge which had been here—as he had himself declared—so pre-eminently accumulated, as well as to demonstrate something of the peculiar means and influences which had brought about so remarkable a result. The Theme was Civilisation, and to him civilisation was knowledge,—the accumulation of knowledge, therefore, was necessarily to him the very first and fundamental condition, and of this condition Germany had been publicly proclaimed by himself the type and the exemplar. More generalities would no longer suffice, then—the type itself would require to be produced—the Germans must be penetrated!—But how if they could not be penetrated?

Thus, choosing for Mr Buckle which horn we may, the dilemma is such as to truncate or reverse any influence of his praise on the German Philosophers. Mr Buckle's sanguine expectations, indeed, to find there but mirrors of the same small Enlightenment and Illumination which he himself worshipped, are to be applied, not in determination of Kant and Hegel, but of Mr Buckle himself.

On the general consideration at present before us, then, we are left with the conclusion that the German Philosophers are un-affected by the indirect evidence of their reputed friends.

On the other issue, as regards what weight is to be attached to the verdict of the supposed intelligent foes of the Germans, there were required a special analysis at least of the relative acquirements of each of these; and this would lead to an inquest and discussion of greater length than to adapt it for insertion here. This, then, though on our part an actual accomplishment, will be carried over to another work. We remark only, that if Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, and others have averred this and that of the Germans, whatever they aver is something quite indifferent, for the ignorance of all such, in the field before us, is utter, and considering the pretensions which accompany it, disgraceful.* As for Mr Lockhart, it will be presently seen, per-

* The pretensions of Coleridge have been already made notorious by Professor Ferrier in Blackwood's Magazine for March, 1840. Those of others, though less simple, are equally demonstrable.
haps, that he only made a mistake when he anathematised German Philosophy as ‘nonsense,’ and that it is to that ‘nonsense’ we have probably to attribute some very important results.

As regards the unfriendly ‘advanced thinkers’ who denounce the idealism and jargon of German Philosophy, this is as it should be: for German Philosophy, while it considers the general movement concerned as the one evil of the present, cannot but feel amused with the simple ways of this odd thing which calls itself an ‘advanced thinker’ nowadays. ‘There was a time,’ says Hegel, ‘when a man who did not believe in Ghosts or the Devil was named a Philosopher!’ But an ‘advanced thinker,’ to these distinctions negative of the unseen, adds—what is positive of the seen—an enlightened pride in his father the monkey! He may enjoy, perhaps, a well-informed satisfaction in contemplating mere material phenomena that vary to conditions as the all of this universe—or he may even experience an elevation into the moral sublime when he points to his future in the rock in the form of those bones and other remains of a *Pithecos Intelligen*, which, in all probability (he reflects), no subsequent intelligence will ever handle—but monkey is the pass-word! Sink your pedigree as man, and adopt for family-tree a procession of the skeletons of monkeys—then superior enlightenment radiates from your very person, and your place is fixed—a place of honour in the acclamant brotherhood that names itself ‘advanced!’ So it (still) is in England at present; this is the acknowledged pinnacle of English thought and English science now. Just point in these days to the picture of some huge baboon, and—suddenly—before such enlightenment—superstition is disarmed, priests confess their imposture, and the Church sinks—beneath the Hippocampus of a Gorilla!

And this is but one example of the present general truth, that Spiritualism seems dying out in England, and that more and more numerous voices daily cry hail to the new God, Matter—matter, too, independent of any law—(even law-loving Mr Buckle left behind)—matter, even when organised, pliant only to the moulding influence of contingent conditions! This, surely, may be legitimately named the beginning of the end!

In Germany, indeed, despite a general apathy as under stun expectations shocked, matters are not yet quite so bad; and that they are not yet quite so bad may, perhaps, be attributed to some glimmering influence, or to some glimmering hope of its philo-
sophy yet. Germany is certainly not without Materialism at present; but still even now, perhaps, it cannot be said to be so widely spread there as in either France or England. This we may ascribe to the 'nonsense' anathematised by Mr Lockhart.

Be this as it may, we shall take leave to ascribe to this 'nonsense' another difference between England and Germany which, let it be ascribed to what it may, will as a fact be denied by none. This difference or this fact is, that this country is at this present moment far outstripped by Germany in regard to everything that holds of the intellect—with the sole exception, perhaps, of Poetry and Fiction. Even as regards these, Germany has it still in her power to say a strong word for herself; but, these apart, in what department of literature are we not now surpassed by the Germans? From whom have we received that 'more penetrative spirit' of criticism and biography that obtains at present?

Who sets us an example of completed research, of thorough accuracy, of absolutely impartial representation? Who reads the Classics for us, and corrects and makes them plain to us—plain in the minutest allusion to the concrete life from which they sprang? Who gathers information for us, and refers us to the sources of the same, on every subject in which it may occur to us to take an interest? But literature is not the strong point here: what of science?—and no one will dispute the value of that—is there any department of science in which at this moment the Germans are not far in advance of the rest of Europe?

Now, all this activity which gives to Germany the intellectual lead in Europe is subsequent to her philosophies, and is, in all probability, just to be attributed to her philosophies.—It is quite possible, at the same time, that the scientific men of Germany are no students of what is called the philosophy of their country—nay, it appears to the present writer a matter of certainty that that philosophy is not yet essentially understood anywhere: it by no means follows, on that account, however, that this philosophy is not the motive spring to that science. If the essential secret of philosophy has not been won, still much of the mass has been invaded from without, has been broken up externally, and has fallen down and resolved itself into the general current. Its language, its distinctions have passed into the vernacular, and work there with their own life. Hence it is that Germany seems to possess at present, not only a language of its own, but, as it were, a system of thought-counters of its own for which no other
language can find equivalents. Let anyone take up the *Anzeige
der Vorlesungen*, the notice of lectures at any German University,
and he will find much matter of speculation presented to him;
for everything will seem there to him *sui generis*, and quite dis-
similar to anything of which he may have experience in Great
Britain or in France. Haym* remarks, as regards this vast
difference between the spirit of Germany and that of England,
that to compare the books that issue from the press of the one
country with those that issue from that of the other, one is
tempted to suppose that the two nations move on wholly different
courses.—Now, mere difference would be a matter of no moment;
but what if the difference point to retrogression on one side, and
progression on the other? It is very certain that we are behind
the Germans now, and it is also certain that these latter continue
to rush forward with a speed in every branch of science which
threatens to leave us in the end completely in the lee.

Associating this difference of progress with that difference of
the language used for the purposes of thought, it does seem not
unreasonable to conclude that the former is but a corollary of the
latter. In other words, it appears probable that that 'nonsense' of
Mr Lockhart has been the means of introducing into the German
mind such series of new and marvellously penetrant terms and
distinctions as has carried it with ease into the solution of a
variety of problems impossible to the English, despite the in-
duction of Bacon, the good sense of Locke, and even Adam
Smith's politico-economical revelations.

The denunciations of German Philosophy, then, emitted by
'advanced thinkers,' would seem powerless beside the superiority
of German Science to that of the rest of Europe when collated
with the terms and distinctions of the Philosophy which preceded
it. These advanced thinkers, in fact, are the logical contradictory
of German Philosophy, and, if they denounce it, it in turn—not
denounces, but, lifting the drapery, simply *names* them.

It is, perhaps, now justifiable to conclude on the whole, then,

*Let us compare, to go no further, the scientific works of the English with
those of our own country, and we shall very soon perceive that the type of English
thought is essentially different from that of the German; that the scientific faculty
of the countrymen of Bacon and Locke moves in quite other paths, and makes
quite other stadia; that its combinations proceed by quite other notions, both
principal and accessory, than is the case, in the same respect, with the countrymen
of Kant and Hegel.'—Haym: Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 309.
that, as regards the negative of the assertions that German Philosophy is obsolete or bad, a case has been led of sufficient validity to set aside the opposing plea of the affirmative. It is not to be inferred, however, that the case is now closed, and all said that can be said in support of the Germans. We have spoken of the benefits which seem to have been derived from the very terms; but these surely are not restricted to the mere words, and others, both greater in number and more important in kind, may be expected to flow from the thoughts which these words or terms only represent. It were desirable, then, to know these latter benefits, which, if they really exist, ought to prove infinitely more recommendatory of the study we advocate than any interest which has yet been adduced. It is this consideration which shall form the theme, on the whole, of what we think it right yet prefatorily to add.

The misfortune is, however, that, as regards the benefits in question, they—as yet—only 'may be expected:' it cannot be said that, from German Philosophy, so far as the thoughts are concerned, any adequate harvest has yet been reaped. Nevertheless, this harvest is still potentially there, and, perhaps, it is not quite impossible to find a word or two that shall prefigure something of its general nature and extent. It is evident, however, that, if it is true, be it as it may with the terms, that the thoughts of German Philosophy are not yet adequately turned to account, but remain as yet almost, as it were, beyond the reach whether of friend or foe, there must exist some unusual difficulty of intelligence in the case; and it may be worth while to look to this first. For the duty of a Preface—though necessarily for the most part in a merely cursory manner—is no less to relieve difficulty than to meet objections, explain connexions, and induce a hearing. The difficulty we have at present before us, however, must be supposed to concern Hegel only; what concerns Kant must be placed elsewhere. Nor, even as regards Hegel, is it to be considered possible to enumerate at present all the sources of his difficulty, and for this reason, that a certain knowledge of the matter involved must be presupposed before any adequate understanding can be expected to result. The great source of difficulty, for example, if our inmost conviction be correct, is that an exhaustive study of Kant has been universally neglected—a neglect, as Hegel himself (we may say) chuckles, 'not unrevenged,'—and the key-note of this same Hegel has thus remained inaccessible. Now this plainly concerns a point for which a preface can offer no sufficient
breadth. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, to one or two sources of difficulty which may contain auxiliary matter in themselves, and may prove, on the whole, not quite insusceptible of intelligible discussion at once.

What is called the Jargon of German Philosophy, for example, and has been denounced as Barbarisch by a multitude of Germans themselves (Haym among them), though, under the name of terms and distinctions, it has just been defended, may not unprofitably receive another word. Now, we may say at once, that if on one side this Jargon is to be admitted, it is to be denied on the other. The truth is, that if on one side it looks like jargon and sounds like jargon, on the other it is not jargon, but a philosophical nomenclature and express system of terms. The scandal of philosophy hitherto has been its logomachies, its mere verbal disputes. Now, with terms that float loosely on the lips of the public, and vary daily, misunderstandings and disputes in consequence of a multiplicity of meanings were hardly to be avoided; but here it is that we have one of the most peculiar and admirable of the excellences of Hegel: his words are such and so that they must be understood as he understands them, and difference there can be none. In Hegel, thing and word arise together, and must be comprehended together. A true definition, as we know, is that which predicates both the proximum genus and the differentia: now the peculiarity of the Hegelian terms is just this—that their very birth is nothing but the reflexion of the differentia into the proximum genus—that at their very birth, then, they arise in a perfect definition. This is why we find no dictionary and so little explanation of terms in Hegel; for the book itself is that dictionary; and how each term comes, that is the explanation;—each comes forward, indeed, as it is wanted, and where it is wanted, and just so, in short, that it is no mere term, but the thought itself. It is useless to offer examples of this, for every paragraph of the Logic is an example in point. If the words, then, were an absolutely new coinage, this would be their justification, and the nickname of jargon would fall to the ground. But what we have here is no new coinage,—Hegel has carefully chosen for his terms those words which are the known and familiar names of the current Vorstellungen of the current figurate conceptions which correspond to his Begriffe, to his pure notions, and are as the metaphors and externalisations of these Begriffe, of these pure notions. They have thus no mere arbitrary and artificial sense,
but a living and natural one, and their attachment through the Vorstellung to the Begriff, through the figurate conception to the pure notion, converts an instinctive and blind, into a conscious and perceptive use,—to the infinite improvement both of thought and speech even in their commonest daily applications. The reproach of jargon, then, concerns one of the greatest merits of Hegel—a merit which distinguishes him above all other philosophers, and which, while it extends to us means of the most assured movement, secures himself from those misunderstandings which have hitherto sapped philosophy, and rendered it universally suspect.—Jargon is an objection, then, which will indeed remove itself, so soon as the objector shall have given himself the trouble to understand it.

Another difficulty turns on this word Vorstellung which we have just used. A Vorstellung is a sort of sensuous thought; it is a symbol, a metaphor, as it were an externalisation of thought: or Vorstellung, as a whole, is what we commonly mean by Conception, Imagination, the Association of Ideas, &c. Hegel pointedly declares of this Association of Ideas, that it is not astrick to the three ordinary laws only which, since Hume, have been named Contiguity, Similitude, and Contrast, but that it floats on a prey to a thousand-fold contingency. Now, it is this Association of Ideas that constitutes thought to most of us,—a blind, instinctive secution of a miscellaneous multitude of unverified individuals. These individuals are Vorstellungen, figurate conceptions—ideas—crass, emblematic bodies of thoughts rather than thoughts themselves. Then, the process itself, as a whole, is also nameable Vorstellung in general. An example, perhaps, will illustrate this—an example which by anticipation may be used here, though it will be found elsewhere.—'God might have thrown into space a single germ-cell from which all that we see now might have developed itself.' We take these words from a periodical which preserves itself—and justly—to be in the van at present: the particular writer also to whom they are due, speaks with the tone of a man who knows—and justly—that he is at least not behind his fellows. What is involved in this writing, however, is not thought, but Vorstellung. In the quotation, indeed, there are mainly three Vorstellungen—God, Space, and a Germ-cell. Now, with these elements the writer of this particular sentence conceives himself to think a beginning. To take all back to God, Space, and a single Germ-cell, that is
VORSTELLUNG.

enough for him and his necessities of thought; that to him is to look at the thought beginning, sufficiently closely. But all these three elements are already complete and self-dependent.—God, one Vorstellung, finished, ready-made, complete by itself, takes up a Germ-cell, another Vorstellung, finished, ready-made, complete by itself, and drops it into Space, a third Vorstellung, finished, ready-made, complete by itself. This done—without transition, without explanation, the rest (by the way, another Vorstellung) follows; and thus we have three elements with no beginning—at the same time that we have four with no transition—but the fiat of the writer. This, then, is not thought, but an idle mis-spending of the time with empty pictures which, while they infect the mind of the reader only with other pictures equally empty, tend to infect that of the writer also with wind—the wind of vanity.—'Yes; I looked into Spinoza some time ago, and it was a clear ether, but there was no God:' this, the remark of a distinguished man in conversation, is another excellent example of Vorstellung, figurative conception, imagination—in lieu of thought. If one wants to think God, one has no business to set the eye a-roving through an infinite clear ether in hopes of—seeing him at length! 'I have swept space with my telescope,' says Lalande, 'and found no God.' To the expectation of this illuminated Astronomer, then, God was an optical object; and as he could find with his glass no such optical object—rather no optical object to correspond to his Vorstellung, which Vorstellung he had got he knew not where and never asked to know, which Vorstellung, in fact, it had never occurred to him in any way to question—God there was none! These, then, are examples of Vorstellungen, and not of thought; and we may say that the Vorstellung of the Materialist as to space constitutes a rebuke to the Vorstellung of the Spiritualist as to a clear ether in which it was a disappointment that no God was to be seen! God, whether as revealed to us by Scripture, or as demonstrated by philosophy, is a Spirit; and a Spirit is to be found and known by thought only, and neither by the sensuous eye of the body nor the imaginative eye of the mind.

Unfortunately, it can hardly be said that there is thought proper anywhere at present; and circumstances universally exist which have substituted figurate conception in its stead. In England, for example, the literature with which the century began was a sort of poetical reaction against the Aufklärung, and the element of that literature is Vorstellung, Imagination merely. Acquired
stores, experience, thought,—these were not, but, instead of these, emotions enough, images enough, cries enough! Nature was beautiful, and Love was divine: this was enough—with Genius!—to produce the loftiest works, pictures, poems, even alchemy! An empty belly, when it is active, is adequate to the production of—gripes: and when an empty head is similarly active, what can you expect but gripes to correspond—convulsions namely, contortions of conceit, attitudinisings, eccentric gesticulations in a wind of our own raising? It were easy to name names and bring the criticism home; but it will be prudent at present to stop here. It is enough to say that the literature of England during the present century largely consists of those Genieschwunge, those fervours, those swings or springs or flights of genius, which were so suspicious and distasteful both to Kant and Hegel. Formal personal ability, which is only that, if it would produce, can only lash itself into efforts and energies that are idle—that have absolutely no filling whatever but one's own subjective vanity. Or formal personal ability which is only that, has nothing to develop from itself but reflexes of its own longing, self-inflicted convulsions; it has no thoughts—only Vorstellungen, figurate conceptions, emotional images,—mostly big, haughty ones enough, too. One result of all this, is what we may call the Photographic writing which alone obtains at present. For a long time back, writers have desired to write only to our eyes, not to our thoughts. History now is as a picture-gallery, or as a puppet-show; men with particular legs and particular noses, street-processions, battle-scenes—these—images—all images!—mow and mop and grin on us from every canvass now. We are never asked to think—only to look—as into a peep-show, where, on the right, we see that, and on the left this! Now, this it is which constitutes an immense source of difficulty in the study of Hegel. Lord Macaulay remarks on 'the slovenly way in which most people are content to think;' and we would extend the remark to the slovenly way in which nowadays most people are content to read. Everything, indeed, has been done by our recent writers to relieve us even of that duty, and a book has become but a succession of optical presentments followed easily by the eye. Reading is thus, now, a sort of sensuous entertainment: it costs only a mechanical effort, and no greater than that of smoking or of chewing. The consequence of this reading is, that the habit of Vorstellungen, and without effort of our own, has become so inveterate, that not only are we unable to move in Begriffe, in
pure notions, but we are shut out from all Begriffe by impervious clouds of ready-made Vorstellungen. Thus it is that writers like Kant and Hegel are sealed books to us, or books that have to be shut by the most of us—after five minutes—in very weariness of the flesh—in very oppression of the eyes.

We must bear in mind, on the other hand, that Vorstellungen are always the beginning, and constitute the express conditions, of thought. We are not to remain by them, nevertheless, as what is ultimate. When Kant says that the Greeks were the first to think in abstracto, and that there are nations, even nowadays, who still think in concreto, he has the same theme before him, though from another side. The concrete Vorstellung is the preliminary condition, but it must be purified into the abstract Begriff; else we never attain to mastery over ourselves, but float about a helpless prey to our own pictures. (We shall see a side again where our abstractions are to be re-dipped in the concrete, in order to be restored to truth; but the contradiction is only apparent.)

So much, indeed, is Vorstellung the condition of the Begriff, that we should attribute Hegel's success in the latter to his immense power in the former. No man had ever clearer, firmer Vorstellungen than he; but he had the mastery over them—he made them at will tenaciously remain before him, or equally tenaciously draw themselves the one after the other. Vorstellung, in fact, is for the most part the key to mental power; and if you know a man's Vorstellungen, you know himself. If, on one side, then, the habit of Vorstellungen, and previous formation of Vorstellungen without attempt to reduce them to Begriffe, constitute the greatest obstacle to the understanding of Hegel, power of Vorstellung is, on the other side, absolutely necessary to this understanding itself. So it is that, of all our later literary men, we are accustomed to think of Shelley and Keats as those the best adapted by nature for the understanding of a Hegel. These young men had a real power of Vorstellung; and their Vorstellungen were not mere crass, external pictures, but fine images analytic and expressive of original thought.

‘By such dread words from Earth to Heaven
My still realm was never riven.
When its wound was closed, there stood
Darkness o'er the day like blood.’

‘Driving sweet buds, like flocks, to feed in air.’
'Thou
For whose path the Atlantic's level powers
Cleave themselves into chasms, while far below
The sea-blooms and the oozy woods which wear
The sapless foliage of the ocean, know
Thy voice, and suddenly grow grey with fear,
And tremble and despoil themselves: Oh hear!'

These are Vorstellungen from Shelley (whose every line, we may say, teems with such); and if they are Vorstellungen, they are also thoughts. Keats is, perhaps, subtler and not less rich, though more sensual, less grand, less ethereally pure, than Shelley; Vorstellungen in him are such as these:—

'She, like a moon in wane,
Faded before him, cowered, nor could restrain
Her fearful sobs, self-folding like a flower
That faints into itself at evening hour
But the God fostering her chilled hand,
She felt the warmth, her eyelids opened bland,
And, like new flowers at morning song of bees,
Bloomed, and gave up her honey to the lees.'

How much these images are thoughts, how they are but analytic and expressive of thought, will escape no one.

Compare with these this:—

'And thou art long, and lank, and brown,
As is the ribbed sea-sand.'

This, too, is a Vorstellung; but, in comparison with the preceding, it is external and thought-less, it is analytic of nothing, it is expressive of nothing; it is a bar to thought, and not a help. Yet there is so much in it of the mere picture, there is so much in it of that unexpectedness that makes one stare, that it has been cited a thousand times, and is familiar to everybody; while those of Keats and Shelley are probably known to those only who have been specially trained to judge. By as much, nevertheless, as the Vorstellungen of Keats and Shelley are, so far, it may be, superior to this Vorstellung of Wordsworth's, (Coleridge gives it to him,) inferences may be drawn, perhaps, as to an equal original greater fineness of quality on the part of both the former relatively to the latter. Neither will Coleridge stand this test any better than Wordsworth; and even the maturer products, however exquisite, of Tennyson (whose genius seems bodily to rise
out of these his predecessors) display not Vorstellungen equally
gold-new, possibly, with those of Keats and Shelley.*—Intensely
vivid Vorstellung, this, we may say, almost constitutes Mr Carlyle:
in him, however, it is reproductive mainly; in him, too, it very
frequently occurs in an element of feeling: and feeling is usually
an element hot and one-sided, so that the Vorstellung glares.
The test applied here is not restricted to writers—it can be
extended to men of action; and Alexander and Cæsar, Wellington,
Napoleon, Cromwell, will readily respond to it. Cromwell here,
however, is almost to be included as an exception; for he can
hardly be said to have had any traffic with Vorstellung at all; or
what of that faculty he shows is very confused, very incompetent,
and almost to be named incapable. Cromwell, in fact, had direct
being in his categories, and his expression accordingly was direct
action. We have here, however, a seductive subject, and of end-
less reach; we will do well to return.

There is a distinction, then, between those who move in
Vorstellungen wholly as such, and those who use them as living
bodies with a soul of thought consciously within them; and the
classes separated by this distinction will be differently placed as
regards Hegel: while the former, in all probability, will never
get near him, the latter, on the other hand, will possess the power
to succeed; but success even to them, as habits now are, will
demand immense effort, and will arrive when they have contrived
to see, not with their Vorstellungen, but without them, or at least
through them.

As regards the difficulty which we have just considered, the
division between Hegel and his reader is so, that the former
appears on the abstract, the latter on the concrete side; but we
have now to refer to a difficulty where this position is reversed—
where, Hegel being concrete, the reader cannot get at him, just
for this, that he himself cannot help remaining obstinately
abstract. _The abstractions of the understanding_, this is the word
which is the cue to what we have in mind at present. It is
impossible to enter here into any full exposition of how Hegel,
in the end, regarded understanding, or of how his particular

* Still there is no wish here to do injustice to the perfectly rich imaginations of
both Coleridge and Wordsworth. Nay, the image itself, the "ribbed sea-sand,"
though a little in excess, is not inapplicable, if only the eye, in looking along it,
will stop in time!
regards were in the first case introduced. It must suffice to say at once, that understanding was to Hegel as the god Horos, it was the principle and agent of the definite everywhere; but, as such, it necessarily separated and distinguished into isolated, self-dependent individuals. Now this which has been indicated is our (the readers') element; we live and move among wholly different, self-identical entities which—each of them as regards the other—are abstractly held. This, however, is not the element of Hegel; his element is the one concrete, where no entity is, so to speak, its own self, but quite as much its other; and he holds the key of this concrete in that he has been enabled, through Kant, to perceive that the conditions of a concrete and of every concrete are two opposites: in other words, Hegel has come to see that there exists no concrete which consists not of two antagonistic characters, where, at the same time, strangely, somehow, the one is not only through the other, but actually is this other. Now it is this condition of actual things which the abstractions of the understanding interfere to shut out from us; and it is our life in these abstractions of the understanding which is the chief source of our inability to enter and take up the concrete element of Hegel. The Logic of Hegel is an exemplification of this Cosmical fact, from the very beginning even to the very end; but it will sufficiently illustrate what we have said, perhaps, to take the single example of Quantity.

To us, as regards quantity, continuity is one thing, and discretion quite another: we see a line unbroken in the one case, and but so many different dots in the other. Not so Hegel, however: to him continuity is not only impossible without discretion, and discretion is not only impossible without continuity, but discretion is continuity, and continuity is discretion. We see them, abstractly, apart—the one independent of, different from, the other: he sees them, concretely, together—the one dependent on, identical with, the other. To Hegel it is obvious that continuity, and discretion, not either singly, but both together, constitute quantity—that, in short, these are the constitutive moments or elements of the single pure, abstract, yet in itself concrete, notion, quantity. If a continuum were not in itself discrete, it were no quantity; and nowhere in rerum natura can there be found any continuum that is not in itself discrete. Similarly, if a discretum were not in itself continuous, it were no quantity, and so on. In
fact, to the single notion, quantity, these two sub-notions are always necessary: it is impossible to conceive, it is impossible that there should be, a How much that were not as well continuous as discrete: it is the discretion that makes the continuity, and it is the continuity of discretion that makes quantity; or it is the continuity that makes the discretion, and it is the discretion of continuity that makes quantity. Quantity is a concrete of the two; they are indivisibly, inseparably together in it. Now every notion—truly such—is just such disjunctive conjunct or conjunctive disjunct. Hence it is that dialectic arises: false in us as we cannot bring the opposing characters together, because of the abstractions of the understanding; true in Hegel, because he has attained to the power of seeing these together, that is, in their truth, their concrete, actually existent truth.

For example, it is on the notion, quantity as such, on the dissociation and antagonism of its warp and woof—of its two constituent moments, that all those supposed insoluble puzzles concerning the infinite divisibility of time, space, matter, &c., depend; and all disputes in this connexion are kept up by simply neglecting to see both sides, or to bring both of the necessary moments together. My friend tells me, for instance, that matter is not infinitely divisible, that that table—to take an actual case—can be passed over, can both factually and mathematically be proved to be passed over, and hence is not infinite, but finite. I, again, point out that division takes nothing away from what it divides; that that table, consequently, (and every part of the table is similarly situated,) is divisible, and again divisible usque ad infinitum, or so long as there is a quantity left, and, as for that, that there must always be a quantity left—for, as said, division takes nothing away. Or I too can bring my Mathematics, and certainly with equal evidence.—In this way, he persisting on his side, I persisting on my side, we never come together. But we effect this, or we readily come together, when we perceive that both sides are necessary to the single One (Quantity), or that each, in fact, is necessary to the other. In short, quantity as continuous is infinitely divisible; as discrete, it consists of parts which are as ultimate and further indivisible. These are the two points of view, under either of which quantity can be set; and, more than that, these two points of view are, each of them, equally essential to the single thing, quantity, and are the moments
which together constitute the single thing (correctly notion), quantity.

This is not the place to point out the entire significance of the single fact that is suggested here, nor of how Hegel was led to it, and what he effected with it: this which we so suggest were a complete exposition of the one secret and of the entire system of Hegel. Such exposition is the business of the general work which we here introduce; but it will be found brought in some sense to a point—though necessarily imperfectly, as the reader arrived there will readily understand—in the 'last word' at the end of the volume. Our sole object at present is to illustrate the difficulty we labour under relatively to Hegel from the abstractions of the understanding, and to render these themselves, to some preliminary extent, intelligible.

We may add, that the above is the true solution to those difficulties which have at different times been brought forward as paradoxes of Zeno, or as antinomies of Kant. The case, as summed by Hegel, (see under Quantity,) will be found to be particularly disastrous not only to the German, but even to the Grecian—not only to the Hegelian, but even to the Aristotelian—pretensions, of such men as Sir William Hamilton, Coleridge, and DeQuincey. The two last, indeed, with that 'voice across the ages,' between them, are even ludicrous.

It is to be feared that the view given here of the difficulties of Hegel will prove disappointing to many. As was natural to a public so prepared by the passions, the interjections, the gesticulations of those whom we regard as our recent men of genius, the general belief, in all probability, was, and still is, that Kant and Hegel are difficult because they 'soar so high,' because they have so very much of the 'fervid' in them, and especially because they are 'mystic.' To be disabused of these big figurate conceptions on which we rise so haughtily may prove a pain. Indeed, as by a sudden dash on the solid ground, it may be a rather rude shaking out of us of these same bignesses, to be brought to understand that the difficulties of Hegel are simply technical, and that his Logic is to be read only by such means as will enable us to read the Principia of Newton—industry, tenacity, perseverance! In England, ever since these same fervid men of genius, a vast number of people, when they are going to write, think it necessary, first of all, to put their mouths askew, and blow the bellows.
of their breasts up: only so, they hope, on the strong bias of their breath, to 'soar'—to blow themselves and us, that is—'into the Empyrean!' But Hegel, alas! never puts his mouth askew, never thinks of biasing his breath, never lays himself out at all for the luxury of a soar. Here are no ardours—fervours; here is an air so cool, so clear, that all such tropical luxuriances wither in it. Hegel, no more than Kant, will attempt anything by a Genieschwung: all in both is thought, and thought that rises, slowly, laboriously, only by unremitting step after step. Apart from thought qua thought, Kant and Hegel are both very plainfellows: Kant, a very plain little old man, whose only obstacle to us is, after all, just his endless garrulity, his iterating, and again iterating, and always iterating Geschwätz; Hegel, a dry Scotsman who speaks at, rather than to us, and would seem to seek to enlighten by provoking us! It is not at all rhetoric, eloquence, poetry, that we are to expect in them, then; in fact, they are never in the air, but always on the ground, and this is their strength. Many people, doubtless, from what they hear of Hegel, his Idealism, his Absolute Idealism, &c., will not be prepared for this. They have been told by men who pretended to know, that Hegel, like some common conjuror, would prove the chair they sat on not a chair, &c &c. This is a very vulgar conception, and must be abandoned, together with that other which would consider Hegel as impracticable, unreal, visionary, a dreamer of dreams, 'a man with too many bees in his bonnet.' Hegel is just the reverse of this; he is wholly down on the solid floor of substantial fact, and will not allow himself to quit it—no, not for a moment's indulgence to his subjective vanity—a moment's recreation on a gust—broom-stick—of genius. Hegel is a Suabian. There are Suabian licks as well as Lockerby licks. Hegel is as a son of the border, home-spun, rustic-real, blunt: as in part already said, there are always the sagacious ways about him of some plain, honest, deep-seen, old Scotsman. Here, from the Aesthetic, is a little illustrative specimen of him.

'Romances, in the modern sense of the word, follow those of Knight-errantry and those named Pastoral. In them we have Knight-errantry become again earnest and substantially real. The previous lawlessness and precariousness of outward existence have become transformed into the fixed and safe arrangements of civilised life; so that Police, Law, the Army, Government, now
replace the chimerical duties which the Knight-errant set himself. Accordingly, the Knight-errantry of the modern Hero is correspondently changed. As an individual with his subjective ends of ambition, love, honour, or with his ideals of a world reformed, he stands in antagonism to this established order and *prosa* of actuality, which thwarts him on all hands. In this antagonism, his subjective desires and demands are worked up into tremendous intensity; for he finds before him a world spell-bound, a world alien to him, a world which he must fight, as it bears itself against him, and in its cold indifference yields not to his passions, but interposes, as an obstacle to them, the will of a father, of an aunt, societal arrangements, &c. It is especially our youths who are these new Knights-errant that have to fight their way through that actual career which realises itself in place of their ideals, and to whom it can only appear a misery that there are such things at all as Family, Conventional Rules, Laws, a State, Professions, &c., because these substantial ties of human existence place their barriers cruelly in the way of the Ideals and infinite Rights of the heart. The thing to be done now, then, is for the hero to strike a breach into this arrangement of things—to alter the world, to reform it, or, in its despite, to carve out for himself a heaven on earth, to seek out for himself the maiden that is as a maiden should be—to find her, to woo her, and win her and carry her off in triumph, maugre all wicked relations and every other obstruction. These stampings and strugglings, nevertheless, are, in our modern world, nothing else than the apprenticeship, the schooling of the individual in actual existence, and receive thus their true meaning. For the end of such apprenticeship is, that the subject gets his oats sown and his horns rubbed off—accommodates himself, with all his wishes and opinions, to existent relations and reasonableness; enters into the concatenation of the world, and earns for himself there his due position. One may have ever so recalcitrantly laid about him in the world, or been ever so much shoved and shouldered in it, in the end, for the most part, one finds one's maiden and some place or other for all that, marries, and becomes a slow-coach, a Philistine, just like the rest: the wife looks after the house; children thicken; the adored wife that was at first just *the one*, an angel, comes to look, on the whole, something like all the rest: one's business is attended with its toils and its troubles, wedlock with household cross; and so there are
the reflective Cat-dumps (Katzeu-jammer) of all the rest over again"—If the reader will but take the trouble to read this Scoticè, the illustration will be complete.

It is a mistake, then, to conceive Hegel as other than the most practical of men, with no object that is not itself of the most practical nature. To the right of private judgment he remains unhesitatingly true, and every interest that comes before him must, to be accepted, demonstrate its revelancy to imperical fact. With all this, however, his function here is that of a philosopher and his philosophy, while the hardest to penetrate, is at once the deepest and the widest that has been yet proposed. If the deepest and the widest, it is probably at this moment also the most required.

It has been said already that our own day is one—a pretty late one, it is to be hoped—in that general movement which has been named Aufklärung, Free-thinking, the principle of which we acknowledged to be the Right of Private Judgment. Now Kant, who participated deeply in the spirit of this movement, and who with his whole heart accepted this principle, became, nevertheless, the closer of the one (and the guide of the other)—by this, that he saw the necessity of a positive complement to the peculiar negative industry to which, up to his day, both movement and principle had alone seemed adequate. The subtle suggestions of Hume seemed to have loosened every joint of the Existent, and there seemed no conclusion but universal scepticism. Against this the conscientious purity of Kant revolted, and he set himself to seek some other outlet. We may have seen in some other country the elaborate structure of a baby dressed. The board-like stiffness in which it was carried, the manifest incapacity of the little thing to move a finger, the enormous amount and extraordinary nature of the various appliances—swathes, folders, belts, cloths, bandages, &c., points and trusses innumerable—all this may have struck us with astonishment, and we may have figured ourselves addressing the parents, and, by dint of invincible reason, persuading them to give up the board, then the folder, then the swathe, then the bandage, &c.; but, in this negative action of taking off, we should have stopped somewhere; even when insisting on free air and free movement, we should have found it necessary to leave to the infant what should keep it warm. Nay, the question of clothes as a whole were thus once for all generalised, and debate, once
initiated, would cease never till universal reason were satisfied—
till the infant were at length fairly rationally dressed. As the
function of the Aufklärung (for it is nothing less) must stop
somewhere, then, when it applies itself to the undressing of the
wrong-dressed baby, so must the same function stop somewhere
when it applies itself to the similar undressing of the similarly
wrong-dressed (feudally-dressed) State. A naked State would
just be as little likely to thrive as a naked infant: and how far
—it is worth while considering—is a State removed from absolute
 nudity, when it is reduced to the self-will of the individual con-
trolled only by the mechanical force of a Police?

No free-thinking partisan of the Illumination has ever gone further
than that; no partisan of the Illumination has ever said, Let the
self-will of each be absolutely all: the control of a Police (Protec-
tion of Person and Property) has been a universal postulate, insisted
on by even the extremest left of the movement. Yet there are those
who say this—there are those who say, Remove your meddlesome
protection of the police; by the aid of free competition we can
parson and doctor ourselves, and by the aid of free competition,
therefore, we can also police ourselves: remove, then, here also
your vicious system of checks, as all your no less vicious system
of bounties and benefits; let humanity be absolutely free—let
there be nothing left but self-will, individual self-will pur et
simple! There are those who say this: they are our Criminals! Like
the cruel mother whose interest is not in its growth, but in
its decease, our criminals would have the naked baby. But if
self-will is to be proclaimed the principle, if self-will is the
principle, our criminals are more consistent than our 'advanced
thinkers,' who, while they assert this principle, and believe this
principle, and think they observe this principle, open the door to
the Police, and find themselves unable to shut it again, till it is
driven to the wall before the whole of reason, before Reason herself
who enters with the announcement that self-will is not the
principle, and the direct reverse of the principle.

Now, Kant saw a great deal of this—Kant saw that the naked
baby would not do; that, if it were even necessary to strip off
every rag of the old, still a new would have to be procured, or life
would be impossible. So it was that, though unconsciously to
himself, he was led to seek his Principles. These, Kant came to
see, were the one want; and surely, if they were the one want in
Oh it say while live schools from it this make) thanatingly, a now. That will, absolutely independent, absolutely free. Even the Illumination demands for self-will clothing and control. At lowest it demands Police; for the most part, it adds to Police a School and a Post-office; and it sometimes thinks, though reluctantly, hesitatingly, that there is necessary also a Church. It sees not that it has thus opened the whole question, and cannot any longer, by its will, close it. When Enlightenment admits at all the necessity of control, the what and how far of this control can be argued out from this necessity—and self-will is abandoned. For it is Reason
that finds the necessity, it is Reason that prescribes the control; and Reason is not an affair of one or two Civic Regulations, but the absolute round of its own perfect and entire System. In one word, the principle must not be Subjective Will, but Objective Will; not your will or my will or his will, and yet your will and my will and his will—Universal Will—Reason! Individual will is self-will or caprice; and that is precisely the one Evil, or the evil One—the Bad. And is it to be thought that Police alone will ever suffice for the correction of the single will into the universal will—for the extirpation of the Bad?

To this there are wanting—Principles. And with this want Kant began; nor had he any other object throughout his long life than the discovery of Principles—Principles for the whole substance of man—Principles Theoretical, Practical, and Aesthetic: and this Rubric, in that it is absolutely comprehensive, will include plainly Politics, Religion, &c., in their respective places. This is the sole object of the three great works of Kant; and they respectively correspond, as is easily seen, to the three divisions just named. This, too, is the sole object of Hegel; for Hegel is but the continuator, and, perhaps, in a sort the completer, of the whole business inaugurated by Kant.

The central principle of Kant was Freiheit, Free-will; and when this word was articulated by the lips of Kant, the Illumination was virtually at an end. The single sound Freiheit was the death-sentence of the Aufklärung. The principle of the Aufklärung, the Right of Private Judgment, is a perfectly true one. But it is not true as used by the Aufklärung, or it is used only one-sidedly by the Aufklärung. Of the two words, Private Judgment, the Aufklärung accentuates and sees only the former. The Aufklärung asks only that the Private man, the individual, be satisfied. Its principle is Subjectivity, pure and simple. But its own words imply more than subjectivity—its own words imply objectivity as well; for the accent on Private ought not to have blinded it to the fact that there is equally question of Judgment. Now, I as a subject, you as a subject, he as a subject, there is no guarantee of agreement: I may say A, you B, and he C. But all this is changed the instant we have said Judgment. Judgment is not subjectively mine, or subjectively yours, or subjectively his: it is objectively mine, yours, his, &c.; it is a common possession; it is a thing in which we all meet and agree. Or, it is not sub-
jective, and so incapable of comparison,—but objective, capable of comparison, and consequently such that in its regard we virtually do all agree and, in the end, actually shall all agree. Now, Private Judgment with the accent on Private is self-will; but with the accent on Judgment, it is Freiheit, Freedom Proper, Free-will, Objective Will, Universal Will. This is the Beginning: this is the first stone of the new world which is to be the sole work of at least several succeeding generations.—Formally subjective, I am empty; exercising my will alone, I am mere formalism, I am only formally a man; and what is formal merely is a pain and an obstacle to all the other units of the concrete—it is a pain and an obstacle to itself—it is a false abstraction in the concrete, and must, one way or other, be expunged.* The subject, then, must not remain Formal—he must obtain Filling, the Filling of the Object. This subject is not my true Me; my true Me is the Object—Reason—the Universal Thought, Will, Purpose of Man as Man. So it is that Private Judgment is not enough: what is enough is Judgment. My right is only to share it, only to be there, present to it, with my conviction, my subjective conviction. This is the only Right of the Subject. In exercising the Right of Private Judgment, then, there is more required than what attaches to the word Private; there must be some guarantee of the Judgment as well. The Rights of the Object are above the Rights of the Subject; or, to say it better, the Rights of the Object are—the true Rights of the Subject. That the Subject should not be empty, then—that he should be filled up and out to his true size, shape, strength, by having absorbed the Object,—this is a necessity; only so can the Private Judgment be Judgment, and as such valid.—If, then, the Aufklärung said, Self-will shall work out the Universal Will by following Self-will, Kant and Hegel put an end to this by reversing the phrase, and by declaring, Self-will shall work out, shall realise Self-will—that is, effect a true will of any kind—by following the Universal Will. The two positions are diametrically opposed: the Aufklärung, with whatever belongs to it, is virtually superseded. The Aufklärung is not superseded, however, in the sense of being destroyed; it is superseded only in that, as it were, it has been absorbed, used as food, and assimilated into a higher form. The Right of Private Judgment, the Rights of Intelligence

* Let the reader recall to mind any abstract person he may know, and think how deranging and unbearable he is.
—these, the interests of the Aufklärung, are not by any means lost, or pushed out of the way: they are only carried forward into their truth. Nay, Liberté—Egalité—Fraternité themselves are not yet lost; they, too, will be carried forward into their truth: to that, however, they must be saved from certain merely empty, formal subjectivities, blind remnants of the Aufklärung, furious sometimes from mistaken conscientiousness; furious, it is to be feared, sometimes also from personal self-seeking.

But what is the Object?—what is Reason?—what is objective Judgment? So we may put the questions which the Aufklärung itself might put with sneers and jeers. Lord Macaulay, a true child of the Aufklärung, has already jeeringly asked, 'Who are wisest and best, and whose opinion is to decide that?'—Perhaps an answer is not so hopeless as it appeared to this distinguished Aufgeklärter. Let us see—

It was not without meaning that we spoke of Reason as entering with the announcement that Self-will was not the principle, and we seek firstly to draw attention to this, that Reason does not enter thus only for the first time now; there is at least another occasion in the world's history when she so entered. The age into which Socrates was born was one of Aufklärung, even as that of Kant and Hegel. Man had awoke then to the light of thought, and had turned to see by it the place he lived in, all the things that had fallen to his lot,—his whole inheritance of Tradition. Few things that are old can stand the test of day, and the sophists had it speedily all their own way in Greece. There seemed nothing fit any longer to be believed in, all was unfixed; truth there seemed none but the subjective experience of the moment; and the only wisdom, therefore, was to see that that experience should be one of enjoyment. Thus in Greece, too, man was emptied of his Substance and reduced to his senses, his animality, his relationship to the monkey—and, for that part, to the rat. Now it was, then, that Socrates appeared and demanded Principles, Objective Standards, that should be absolutely independent of the good-will and pleasure of any particular subject. Of this quest of Socrates, the industries of Plato and Aristotle were but Systematisations. It was to Thought as Thought that Socrates was led as likely to contain the Principles he wanted, and on that side which is now named Generalisation. Socrates, in fact, seems to have been historically the first man who expressly and consciously generalised,
and for him, therefore, we must vindicate the title of the True Father of Practical Induction. A, he said, is valour, and B is valour, and C is valour; but what is valour universally? So the inquiry went forward also as regards other virtues, for the ground that Socrates occupied was mainly moral. Plato absolutely generalised the Socratic act, and sought the universal of everything, even that of a Table, till all such became hypostasised, presences to him, and the only true presences, the Ideas. Aristotle substituted for this Hypostasis of the Ideas the theory of the abstract universal (Logic), and a collection of abstract generalised Sciences (Ethics, Politics, Poetics, &c.). Thus in Greece, too, Reason, in the person of Socrates, entered with the announcement that the principle is not self-will, but a universal.

But were such principles actually found in Greece? And, if so, why did Greece perish, and why have we been allowed to undergo another Aufklärung? It will be but a small matter that Socrates saw the want, if he did not supply it: and that he did not supply it, both the fate of Greece and we ourselves are here to prove! It must be admitted at once that Socrates and his followers cannot have truly succeeded, for in that case surely the course of history would have been far otherwise. The first corollary for us to draw, however, is—Look at the warning! Aufklärung, Illumination, Enlightenment, destroyed Greece; it lowered man from Spirit to Animal; and the Greek became, as now, the serf of every conqueror. In Rome we have the same warning, but—material appliances being there so infinitely greater, and the height from which the descent was made being there, perhaps, so much higher—in colours infinitely more glaring, forms infinitely more hideous, and with a breadth and depth of wallowing misery and sin that would revolt the most abandoned. It is to be noted, too, that for Socrates, Rome had only Cicero—(the vain, subjective, logosophic Cicero, who, however, as pre-eminently a master of words, will always be pre-eminent with scholarly men). In presence of such warnings, then, the necessity of a success in the quest of objective standards greater on our part than that on the part of Socrates, becomes of even terrible import. Nevertheless, again, the unsuccess of the latter and his followers was by no means absolute. Such principles as are in question were set up by all of them. By way of single example, take the position, 'That it is better to suffer than to do injustice,' where, as it were, the subject
gains himself by yielding himself. We shall afterwards see, too, that Aristotle had at least reached terms of the concrete notion about as good as any that can be given yet. Nevertheless, it is to be said that, on the whole, the inquest in their hands proved unsuccessful: their principles remained a loose, miscellaneous, unceriorated many; the concrete notion was probably blindly touched only; unity and system were never attained to; and, in the main, the ground occupied at last was but that of formal generalisation and the abstract universal.

But now at last have we succeeded better?—do we know Reason?—have we the Object? Or, in the phrase of Macaulay, can we tell who are wisest and best, and whose opinion is to decide that?—In the first place, we may say that the question of wisest and best is pertinent only to the position of Hero-worship; a position not occupied by us—a position which sets up only the untenable principle of subjectivity as subjectivity. A man is not wisest and best by chance only, or caprice of nature; we were but badly off, had we always only to wait for our guidance so—we were but badly off, were it left to each of us, as it were, to taste our wisest and best by subjective feeling. A man is wisest and best by that which is in him, his Inhalt, his Filling—his absorbed, assimilated, and incorporated matter: it is the Filling, then, which is the main point; and in view of that Filling, abstraction can be made altogether from the great man it fills. Lord Macaulay's questions, then, (and those of Hero-worship itself,) are seen, abstraction being made from the form, to be identical with our own—do we know Reason, have we the Object?

Now, if it were question of an Algebra, a Geometry, an Astronomy, a Chemistry, &c., I suppose it would never occur to anyone to ask about the wisest and best, &c.; I suppose, in these cases, it is a matter of little moment whether we say Euler, Bourdon, or Peacock; Euclid, Legendre, or Hutton; Berzelius, Liebig, or Reid, &c.: I suppose the main thing is to have the object (otherwise called the subject) itself, and that then there would be no interest in any wisest and best, or in opinion at all. In the matter of Will, Reason, Judgment, then, did we but know the Object, the Universal, and could we but assign it, in the same way as we know and assign the Object, the Universal, in the case of Algebra, Chemistry, &c., the problem, we presume, would, by universal acknowledgment, be pretty well solved. But just
this is what Hegel asserts of Philosophy. We hear much in these days of Metaphysics, Philosophy having crumbled down definitely into ruins—this, by an unworthy misapplication and perversion, on the authority of Kant himself—this, at the very moment that Hegel claims for himself the completion of the Kantian Philosophy into a Science, an exact Science, and its establishment for ever—this, from men more ignorant of what they speak about, let any Mandarin in China!—Nay, if we are to believe Hegel—and no man alive is at this moment competent to gainsay him—the exploit is infinitely greater still, the science accomplished infinitely more perfect and complete than any Algebra, Astronomy, Chemistry, or other science we possess. This perfection and completion we may illustrate thus: Geometry is an exact science; it rests on demonstration, it is thoroughly objective, it is utterly independent of any subjective authority whatever. But Geometry is just a side-by-side of particulars; it is just a crate of miscellaneous goods; it properly begins not, ends not; it is no whole, and no whole—product of a single principle. Now, let us conceive Geometry perfected into this—a perfectly-rounded whole of organically-articulated elements which out of a single principle arise and into a single principle retract,—let us conceive this, and we have before us an image of the Hegelian System. This science, too, is to be conceived as the Science of Science—the Scientia of Scientia; it is to be conceived to contain the ultimate principles of all things and of all thoughts—to be, in a word, the essential diamond of the universe. These pretensions have, of course, yet to be verified. Nevertheless, the Concrete Notion, which is the secret of Hegel, will be found a principle of such rare virtue that it recommends itself almost irresistibly. The unity and systematic wholeness, too, attract powerfully, and not less the inexpugnable position which seems, at length, extended to all the higher interests of man. And at last we can say this,—should the path be but a vista of the imagination and conduct us nowhere, it yields at every step the choicest aliment of humanity—such aliment as nourishes us strongly into our true stature.

To such claims of this new Science of Philosophy, there lies a very close objection in Germany itself. ‘In all practical matters,’ the German is said to be ‘slow,’ and, indeed, ‘quite behind;’ and such quality and such position are held to comport but ill with
the alleged pre-eminence of his philosophy.—In the first place, we may say in reply, that the fact is capable of dispute: the rising of 1848 and other democratic movements may be pointed to; and the German, with reference at least to his philosophy, may be declared much too fast, and much too rash. In the next place, what is meant by 'practical matters,' is Politics, and Politics such as the Aufklärung accepts; all those measures, namely, which, be they in themselves bad, or be they in themselves good, lead nowhere at present unless to that American Constitution of no Institution but an incompetent Police.* His philosophy teaches the German to view these things in another light than that of the unverified Aufklärung: that is very certain. But the truth of the whole matter is just this—that German Politics cannot as yet be attributed to German Philosophy, for that philosophy cannot be said to be yet known in Germany. Even what political influence has overflowed from the writings of Hegel or of Kant, or from the general terms and distinctions of philosophy, has not fallen on the masses, but on isolated students, who are by no means induced thereby to put shoulder to shoulder with the remnants of the Aufklärung. Any argument against German Philosophy from Politics, as Politics appear to an ordinary English eye, is to be held, therefore, as inapposite. Yet, probably, it is true that all true Germans are slow; that all true Germans, however small the number, wait—wait till we understand, till they understand how to advance: for Reform, the Reform of Illumination, is but as a detected trick of the trade which cannot any longer raise a hope. These Germans, then, wait for principles of position, and leave to others the completion of that single principle of negation—'throw off every tie of feudalism'—which the Aufklärung still so cheerfully executes, in the simple faith that it is realising something positive—new Sciences, new Political Systems, and what not! Such principles these Germans hope, too, to find in their philosophy—were it but once open to them. Nor even were it found incomplete when open, would it then wholly disappoint, did it but still appear—as all the rest only are, Algebra, Astronomy, Chemistry, &c.—a science begun.

We have now said nearly all that we desired to say by way of

* As this was written the New York Police was being charged with inefficiency on a public occasion: neither had the Austrian and French defeats issued in a German Empire.
Preface, with the view of meeting objections, explaining connexions, removing difficulties, and demonstrating something of the value of the proffered wares, as well as of our present need for them. We shall only add now a word of conclusion by naming a little nearer some of the Principles concerned.

To Kant the three interests that were vital, and which lay at the centre of every thought and movement in him, were the Existence of God, the Freedom of the Will, and the Immortality of the Soul. These three positions Kant conceived himself to have demonstrated, and in the only manner at once consistent with themselves and with the thinking faculties of man. This is the fact. It is precisely in these themes that Hegel follows Kant; these are his objects also: yet it is precisely here—especially in reference to God and Immortality—that the teaching of Hegel has been held, and by what is called his own school, to be inexplicit. Not the less, however, is it to be said that every step of his system is towards the Immortality of the Soul, that every step is towards the Freedom of the Will, that every step is towards God. Hegel, in truth, would restore to us all that Understanding, all that Reflexion, all that the Illumination has deprived us of, and that, too, in a higher and richer form, and not less in the light and element of the Illumination itself, and in perfect harmony with its principle and truth. Hegel, in fact, completes the compromise of Understanding by the complement of Reason. Philosophy is to him not Philosophy unless, or rather Philosophy is to him only Philosophy when, it stands up for the substance of Humanity, for all those great religious interests to which alone we virtually live. Accordingly, it is not only the interests of what is called Natural Religion that he seeks to restore, but those of Christianity itself: there, too, he would complete the compromise of Understanding by the complement of Reason. Surely, then, these are great matters!

What we shall take leave to name the Historic Pabulum, this alone is the appointed food of every successive generation, this alone is the condition of the growth of Spirit; and this food neglected, we have a generation that but vacillates—vacillates, it may be, even into temporary retrogression. This last is the unfortunate position now. The Historic Pabulum passing from the vessel of Hume, was received into that of Kant, and thence finally into that of Hegel; but from the vessels of the two latter
the generations have not yet eaten.—This is the whole.—Europe
(Germany as Germany is itself no exception) has continued to
nourish itself from the vessel of Hume, notwithstanding that the
Historic Pabulum has long since abandoned it for another and
others. Hence all that we see. Hume is our Politics, Hume is
our Trade, Hume is our Philosophy, Hume is our Religion,—it
wants little but that Hume were even our Taste.

A broad subject is here indicated, and we cannot be expected
at present to point out the retrogression or the beside-the-point of
all philosophy else, as in the case of Reid, Stewart, &c. Neither
can we be expected to dwell on the partial re-actions against the
Aufklarung which we have witnessed in this country; as, firstly,
the Prudential Re-action that was conditioned, in some cases,
by Public considerations, and in others by only Private ones;
secondly, the Re-action of Poetry and Nature, as in Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Shelley, &c.; and thirdly, the Germanico-Literary Re-
action, as in Carlyle and Emerson. The great point here is to see
that all these re-actions have been partial and, so far as Thought
qua Thought is concerned, incomplete, resting for their advance-
ment, for the most part, on subjective conceit (calling itself to
itself genius, it may be), that has sought aliment, inspiration, or
what was to it prophecy, in contingent crumbs. Hence it is that
what we have now, is a retrograde re-action—a Revulsion—and of
the shallowest order, back to the Aufklarung again; a re-action
the members of which call themselves ‘advanced thinkers,’
although at bottom they are but friends of the monkey, and would
drain us to our Senses. In this Revulsion—in this perverted or
inverted re-action, we must even reckon Essayists and, Reviewers,
Strauss, Renan, Colenso, Feuerbach, Buckle, and others. It is
this retrogressive re-action, this revulsion to the Aufklarung, that
demonstrates the insufficiency of the previous progressive re-actions
against the Aufklarung, Prudential, Poetical, and Germanico-
Literary. In short, the only true means of progress have not
been brought into service. The Historic Pabulum, however
greedily it has been devoured out of Hume, has been left untouched
in the vessel of Hegel, who alone of all mankind has succeeded in
eating it all up out of the vessel of Kant. This is the true nature
of the case, and these generations, therefore, have no duty but
to turn from their blunder—a blunder, it is to be admitted, at the
same time, not quite voluntary, but necessitated by certain
difficulties—and apply themselves to the inhaustion of the only food on which, it will be found, Humanity will thrive.*

* "Aufklarung, a word which, meaning in its ordinary use simply enlightenment—up-lighting or lighting-up—may be translated, with reference at once to the special up-lighting implied, and a certain notorious exposition of it, the Age of Reason." This, from Essay on Lord Macaulay in 1860, was, at least as known to me, the first British mention of a German word that is now somewhat current. When enlightenment is said in England, the hearer has no call to think of infidelity, but his own word to a German suggests at once a whole historic movement (of 18th century) which issued in an opening of the eyes to the Biblical lacunae. This has had a shallow result in many or most—a salutary only in a few, who regret to hear or see, on every new step of science, the constant repetition of a supposed quite enlightened, 'You see?' which is now utterly irrelevant. Men of science may be right in their negative; but that is no reason why they should fail to recognise the positive. Educated people ought really to be ashamed of a raid that is now out of date, and only blocks 'advance.' After all, it is simply vulgar.
THE SECRET OF HEGEL.

I.

PROLEGOMENA—THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

One approaches Hegel for the first time—such is the voice of rumour and such the subjects he involves—as one might approach some enchanted palace of Arabian story. New powers—imagination is assured (were but the entrance gained)—await one there—secrets—as it were, the ring of Solomon and the passkeys of the universe. But, very truly, if thus magical is the promise, no less magical is the difficulty; and one wanders round the book—as Aboulfaouaris round the palace—irritto, without success, but not without a sufficiency of vexation. Book—palace—is absolutely inaccessible, for the known can show no bridge to it; or if accessible, then it is absolutely impenetrable, for it begins not, it enters not, what seems the doorway receives but to reject, and every attempt at a window is baffled by a fall.

This is the universal experience; and one is almost justified to add, that—whether in England, or in France, or in Germany itself—this, the experience of the beginning, is, also,—all but equally universally—the experience of the end. And yet how one cloaks the hurt, how one dat verba dolori, how one extenuates defeat—nay rather, perhaps, how one rises in triumph over the worthless, which is, however, only the sour! 'It is but scholasticism,' one is happy enough to see at last; 'or a play upon words;' 'at all events there is no advance in it on Plato,' 'or on Aristotle,' 'or on Plotinus,' 'or on Thomas Aquinas;' 'at least that Being and
Nothing "is" the same, is but a béhise of good, heavy, innocent Teutschland; 'and then there cannot be a doubt but everyone must recoil at the reconciliation of contraries; 'aye, and shudder at Pantheism!' But not thus is it that Hegel will be laité, and not thus is it that—in the end—our own ignorance shall be hailed as knowledge.

But, if it be thus with those who admit defeat—with those, that is, who actually acknowledge their inability to construe (though for the most part, at the same time, with the consistency of an ostrich, they comically assume to confute), it must be confessed that one's satisfaction is not perfect, either, with those who arrogate a victory and display the spoils. A victory! one is apt to mutter, yes, a victory of the outside—a victory, as it were, of the table of contents—a victory of these contents themselves, perhaps, but so that it looks like a licking of them all up dry—a victory then which has been, not chemically or vitally, but only mechanically effected; effected in such wise, indeed, that the displayed spoils (the books they write) consist but of a sort of logical Petrefactenkunde, but of a grammatical fluency of mere forms, which, however useful to a professor as a professor, affect others like the nomenclature of Selenography; whose Mars Magnum and Lacus Niger and Montes Lucis (if these be the names) are names only—names, that is, of seas and lakes and mountains in the Moon, which can possess correspondent substance, consequently, for him only who reaches it—a consummation plainly that must be renounced by a Selenographer.

It is in view of this difficulty of Hegel that the chapters bearing in their titles to refer to the struggle to Hegel have been, though with considerable hesitation, submitted to the reader. They consist, for the most part, of certain members of a series of notes which, as it were, fell by the way—exclamation is natural to pain—during the writer's own struggle to the Logik and the Encyclopædia. Originating thus, these notes (though sometimes written as if referring to a reader) brought with them no thought of publication so far as they themselves were concerned; many of them, indeed, were destroyed before any such thought occurred; and as the rest remained, they remain still, for to change them now would be but to anachronise and stultify them. Imperfections, then, of all sorts are what is to be looked for in them; but still the hope is entertained that they may assist, or that, should they fail to assist; they may succeed to encourage; for, representing various
stages of success, or unsuccess, in the study of Hegel, they may be allowably expected to have peculiar meaning for more than one student, who, finding his own difficulties reflected in what claims to have passed them, may feel himself stimulated afresh to a renewed attempt.

In the circumstances of the case too, I am sure the reader will not deem it unreasonable that he should be warned that the opinions expressed in these notes—both as interimistic and provisional in themselves, and as always referring to another, whether from the point of view of Hegel or from that of his commentator—must not be regarded as deliberate products of either, but must be viewed only as a preparatory scaffolding to be afterwards removed.

I shall always recollect the first time I opened the Encyclopaedia of Hegel. It was the re-edition by Rosenkranz (Berlin, 1845) of Hegel’s own third edition, a compact, substantial, but not bulky volume, with clear and well-sized type, that seemed to offer a ready and satisfactory access to the whole of this extraordinary system. Surely, was the thought, there will be no difficulty in making one’s way through that! What a promise the very contents seemed to offer, if floating strangely in such an air of novelty! First of all, three grand Parts: the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of Spirit! Evidently, something very comprehensive and exhaustive was about to be given us! For Logic, Nature, Spirit—which last of course could only refer to intelligence, or to thinking, willing, feeling self-consciousness in general—being all three explained to us, there manifestly could remain nothing else to ask after. Then the Sub-parts! As the Parts were three, so under each of the three the Sub-parts were also three. Under Logic: the doctrine of Being, the doctrine of Essence, the doctrine of the Notion. Under Nature: Mechanic, Physic, Organic. Under Spirit: Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, Absolute Spirit. Nor did two trichotomies suffice; there was a third into the majuscules A, B, C, a fourth into the minuscules a, b, c, a fifth into the grammata α, β, γ, and lastly (not to mention an occasional excursion to the Hebrew Aleph, Beth, Gimel), the discussion in the body of the work was seen—a sixth (seventh) trichotomy—to proceed by the numbers 1, 2, 3. The outer look at least was attractive; there was balance, there was symmetry, and the energy of a beginner could at lowest hope that it was in presence, not of artifice and formality, but of nature and
reality. At all events, be it as it might with the form, the matter was unexceptionable, and promised knowledge of the most complete, interesting, and important nature. For under Logic, there were not only Propositions, Syllogisms, &c., to be discussed, but all the great questions of Ontology also, as Being, and Existence, and Noumenon, and Phenomenon, and Substance, and Cause and Effect, and Reciprocity, &c. &c. Then the treatment of Nature seemed an extremely full one; for Static, and Dynamic, and Mechanic, and Chemistry (Chemism rather), and Geology, and Botany, and Physiology, and much else, seemed all to have place in it. Lastly, at once how pregnant and how new the matter of the Philosophy of Spirit appeared! Psychology, Morals, Religion, Law, Politics, Society, Art, and Philosophy: these were the subjects discussed, but all in a new order, and under new categories, and with strange new associates at their sides. What was Being-for-self, for example, and what was Phenomenology, and the World of Appearance, and, above all, what was the Absolute Idea?

But let us cease to wonder—let us begin to read

Well, we have read the Fore-word of Rosenkranz. We have found in it, certainly, a considerable sprinkling of—to us—new words; some of them, too, of endless syllable, Mongolic, merely stuck together on the agglutinative principle, such as Sichinsichselbst-streflichtiren (which does not occur here, however), or Incinander-greifen (which does); but we have gone through with it—we seem to ourselves to have understood it—there is no hidden difficulty in it, so far as we can judge. Though we have heard in it, too, that there is a split in the school, and that Hegelianism is not in Germany what it was; we have been told as well that this Encyclopædia is a national treasure, the estimation of which will only grow with time; that other sciences are obliged to conform themselves to the notions it contains, and that it presents a pregnant concentration beside which the Manuels de Philosophie of the French and others are but shallow maulders, empty and antiquated. For our own part, moreover, we have felt ourselves, throughout the reading, in presence of what is evidently both a highly developed, and a wholly new, method of general thought. Altogether the Fore-word of Rosenkranz is a word of encouragement and hope.

We go further now—we enter upon Hegel himself. Alas! Hegel is not Rosenkranz, and the Fore-word—after a thousand efforts, with surprise, with incredulity, with astonishment, with
vexation, with gall, with sweat—seems destined for ever to remain the *Hind-word* also.

Even if a ray of light seems suddenly to leap to you, most probably your position is not one whit the better for it; for the gleam of the beginning proves, for the most part, but a meteor of the marsh; a meteor with express appointment, it may be even, to mislead your vanity into the pitfall of the ridiculous. You shall have advanced, let us assume, for example, to the words: 'The Idea, however, demonstrates itself as Thought directly identical with itself, and this at the same time as the power to set itself over against itself, in order to be for itself, and in this Other only to be by itself.' You shall have seen into these words, let us say, so far; and you shall have smirkingly pointed them out to friends, and smiled complacently over the hopeless blankness that fell upon their features; but in the smirk, and in the smile, and in the delusion that underlies them, you shall have, like Dogberry, to be 'written down an ass' the while. These words but abstractly state the position of Idealism—do they? And so, hugging yourself as on a secret gained, you relax pleasedly into the cloudland of the *Vorstellung*, to see there, far off across the blue, the whole huge universe iridescently collapse into the crystal of the Idea. You will yet see reason to be ashamed of your cloudland, to be disappointed with your secret, how true soever, and to find in every case that you have not yet accomplished a single step in advance.

The Encyclopaedia proves utterly refractory then. With resolute concentration we have set ourselves, again and again, to begin with the beginning, or, more desperately, with the end, perhaps with the middle—now with this section, now with that—in vain! Deliberate effort, desultory *dip*—tis all the same thing. We shut the book; we look around for explanation and assistance.

We are in Germany itself at the moment (say); and very naturally, in the first instance, we address ourselves to our own late teacher of the language, 'Other writers,' he replies, 'may be this, may be that; but Hegel!—one has to stop! and think! and think!—Hegel! Ach Gott!' Such a weary look of exhausted effort lengthens the jaw! and it is our last chance of a word with our late teacher; for henceforth he always unaccountably vanishes at the very first glimpse of our person, though caught a mile off!

But here is a friend of ours, an Englishman, of infinite ability,
of infinite acquirement, conversant with many languages, but
especially conversant with German, for he has held for years a
German appointment, and rejoiced for years in a German wife.
He will assist us. With what a curious smile he looks up, and
shakes his head, after having read the two or three first sen-
tences of the first preface to the Encyclopedia! This preface is
Hegelian iron certainly, and with the tang of Hegelian iron in
every word of it; but, looking at it now, it is difficult to under-
stand that it should ever have seemed hard. Nor do I suppose
that it really was hard to the friend alluded to. Only, the closely
wrought concentration must have seemed exceedingly peculiar;
and it must have been felt that in such words—common and
current as they are—as Inhalt, Vorstellung, Begriff, and even
dässerliche Zweckmässigkeit, äussere Ordnung, Manier, Ueber-
gänge, Vermittlung, &c., there lay a meaning quite other than the
ordinary one; a meaning depending on some general system of
thought, and intelligible consequently only to the initiated.

We are driven back on books again then; and we have recourse
to the Life of Hegel as written by Rosenkranz. This writer
possesses at once a facile and a lucid pen, beneath which, too,
there rise up ever and anon the most expressive images, the most
picturesque metaphors Image, metaphor, faculty, lucidity, all
seem ineffectual, however, the instant they come to be applied to
what alone concerns us—the philosophy of Hegel. The per-
spicuity and transparency which give light everywhere else, here
suddenly—so far as we are concerned—vanish; and there is an
incontinent relapse, on our part, into the ancient gall. Let the
reader look, for example, at these, the first two sentences of what
appears in the work referred to as a formal statement of the
system of Hegel!

‘Philosophy was to him the self-cognition of the process of the
Absolute, which, as pure Ideality, is not affected by the vicissitude
of the quantitative difference of the Becoming which attaches to
the Finite. The distinction of the Pure Idea, of Nature, and of
the Spirit as personification of history, is eliminated in the total
totality of the Absolute Spirit that is present in them.’

The reader will do well to refer to the original, and to examine
from time to time the succeeding page, or page and a half, in test
of his own proficiency. Insight into Hegel will have begun, when
the passage referred to has become sun-clear. Not more than
begun, however, for the glance into the system involved here
extends only to the 'totality,' and, compared with a knowledge which were truly knowledge, is altogether inadequate. In the case of Hegel, there is nothing more deceptive than what are called general views. It is extreme injustice to all interests concerned, to sum up his system in a paragraph; and still worse to fancy that it is understood, and finished off, and done with in the single word Pantheism. He who would know Hegel, must know what Hegel himself would call das Einzelne, and even das Einzelne des Einzelnen; that is, he must not content himself with some mere fraudulent or illusory general conception of the whole; but he must know 'the particular' (strictly, 'the singular'), and 'the particular of the particular.'

The System of Hegel is this: not a mere theory or intellectual view, or collection of theories or intellectual views, but an Organon through which—as system of drill, instruction, discipline—passed, the individual soul finds itself on a new elevation, and with new powers. A general view that shall shortly name and give shortly to understand—a single statement that shall explain—this were a demand not one whit more absurd as regards the Principia of Newton than as regards the Logic of Hegel. Of the latter, as of the former, he only knows anything who has effected actual permeation. Fancy the smile into which the iron of Hegel broke when the never-doubting M. Cousin requested a succinct statement of The System! 'Monsieur,' said he, 'ces choses ne se disent pas succinctement, surtout en français!'

The Life of Hegel by Rosenkranz, then, however interesting, however satisfactory otherwise, failed there—at least for us—where only we wished it to succeed. It extended no light for perception of the System. There it was dark and impervious—as dark and impervious as the Encyclopaedia itself. The opening sentences of the relative statement and the succeeding passages already referred to were flung, in the wonder they excited, to more than one correspondent, and the 'total totality' remained an occasion of endless smile.

From all this it was evident, then, that the System of Hegel was something eminently peculiar, and that, if it were to be understood at all, the only course that remained was to take it in its place as part and parcel of what is called German Philosophy in general; and, with that object, to institute, necessarily, a systematic study of the entire subject from the commencement. Now that commencement was Kant; in regard to whom, so far,
at least, as Hume and the philosophy of Great Britain generally were concerned, we might assume ourselves to possess what preliminary preparation was specially required. With Kant, then, without carrying the regression further, and with reasonable hope of success, we might begin at once.

The *Kritik of Pure Reason* was accordingly taken up, and an assiduous study of the same duly set forward. The *Introduction* and the *Aesthetik* necessitated, indeed, the closest attention and the most earnest thought in consequence of the newness of the matter and the imperfections of the form, but offered on the whole no serious impediment. It was otherwise, however, with the *Transcendental Analytik*, the burthen of which is the *Deduction of the Categories*, pronounced by Hegel what is *hardest* in Kant—even pronounced by Kant what is hardest in himself. Here there was pause; here the eyes wandered; here they looked up in quest of aid from without.

The translations that offered themselves to hand were most of them to be regarded but as psychological curiosities. They seemed on the whole, in fact, to have been executed as it were with the eyes shut, or as if in the dark; and consequently they fell on the eyes of the reader like a very ‘blanket of the night,’ against the overpowering weight of which no human lid could stir. Reinhold,* Schwegler;† not were procured, but fell in the way, scarcely with the required profit. The former was one of those nervously clear, nervously distinct individuals who blind with excess of light and deafen with excess of accent; while the latter, excellent, admirable, afforded only a summary that was scarcely of any avail to the interest concerned—the Deduction of the Categories. Saintes‡ extended a thin varnish of the ‘Literature of the Subject;’ but, as regarded the main object of a full perception of what that really was that the *Kritik of Pure Reason* strove to, he was as far from throwing any satisfactory light on Kant, as afterwards Vera.§ on the whole, to

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† Schwegler : Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss.
‡ Saintes. Vie et Philosophie de Kant.
§ Vera: Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel

It must be understood that these censures come from one whose desire was thoroughly to see into the whole connexion and details of the systems in question, and that consequently another who should only aim at a ‘general conception’ may feel very differently towards some of the works mentioned. Rosenkranz and Sibree,
me—at least in the one little volume—was from throwing a sufficient one on what I really wanted to know of Hegel. Three Vorträge (just to complete the digression here which the reference to Vera has begun) of Kuno Fischer, besides that they came years too late, were not done justice to by acquisition and perusal of the two volumes on Kant which were announced to follow. Haym (Hegel und seine Zeit) was a man of genius, but all his admirable writing, all his brilliantly-pointed expression, failed to convince me that there was nothing in Hegel. The prefatory notice to the extracts of Frantz and Hillert, a slender pamphlet on Hegel’s subjective Logic published by Chapman, Gruppe—‘Gegenwart, &c, der Philosophie,’ Fortlage—‘die Lücken des Hegelschen Systems’ (I may also mention Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, and Lewes’s Biographical History of Philosophy)—these and the other works already named constitute what in my case is the Literature of the subject; and, though very readily allowing each its own peculiar merits—(Schwegler’s book is indispensable)—it is not too much to say that a single satisfactory idea on the main thing wanted by a struggling student who would be thorough, is not to be got from the whole of them. He who after such reading supposes himself to possess an adequate conception of Kant and Hegel simply deludes himself.*

On the whole, the conclusion at this stage was, that we must return to the principals. If we really desired to come to any knowledge of Kant and Hegel, or, for that part, of Fichte and Schelling either, it was with Kant and Hegel, with Fichte and Schelling, that we had alone to do. Accordingly, Tennemann, Chalybaeus, Michelet, though heard of, were not consulted. Neither were the Elucidations to Hegel by Rosenkranz inquired for; and the same author’s suggestive. Reformation of the Hegelian Logic only came to hand when it was no longer required. The pertinent articles in the Conversations-Lexicon for example, speak alike highly of the work of Vera; and they are both authorities of weight. Rosenkranz, as is well known, is the Hegelian par excellence. And I have no hesitation in characterising Mr Sibree’s translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of History as by far the best contribution to German philosophy that has as yet (1864) appeared in England. The one work is no test: Vera has written many works on Hegel, all excellent He himself, besides, was one of the most amiable, accomplished, and delightful of men.

* The reader will remember that the reference above to Schwegler’s book preceded by some years any thought of its translation by the author. (New note.)
were too short to be of much service as regards the ‘Philosophies’
themselves; but useful light was obtained here and there on the
technical meanings of German philosophical terms.

It was a consolation to learn from another such encyclopedic
work, whose name I forget, that Hegel had been a shut book both
to Goethe and Schiller, and that, as regards Jean Paul, it was in a
manner an expression wrung from him, that Hegel was ‘the
subtlest of all metaphysical heads, but a very vampire of the
living man.’ In a like reference, it was not unpleasing to know
that the Kritik of Pure Reason had remained opaque to Goethe,
and to perceive from the words conveying it, that the claim of
the same great man to an understanding of the Kritik of
Judgment was perhaps not less susceptible of a negative than
of an affirmative. Such evidences of the difficulty, then, were a
consolation to the suffering individual student, at the same time
that everything seemed to confirm the truth of his conclusion,
that, in this case, as in most others, the true policy was to pass
by the subordinates, and hold perseveringly by the principals.

But again; if we may neglect what is named the ‘Literature of
the subject,’ as but a parasitic consequent, how far, it may be
asked, are we justified in assuming this or any movement to lie
in its principals alone, and—what is the same thing on another
side—how far is it possible to separate the consideration of
any such movement from the consideration of its literature?
These questions probably enable us to open at best what we
would proceed to say. The movement, of which there is question
at present, is an intellectual movement of such a nature as is
not rare in history. The Germans commonly distinguish such
movements by the word Gährung, which signifies zymosis, fer-
mentatio, ferment. Now the dramatic zymosis of England, at
the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth
century, presents a considerable analogy to the philosophical
zymosis of Germany at the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth century; while neither of them,
perhaps, can well be surpassed, as an example of the class, by
any other which has occurred in history. In both, the same
passionate enthusiasm, the same eager haste, the same burning
rush, the same swift alternation of io triumphë, the same pre-
cipitation and superhetation of production. Man, strung to his
utmost, vies his utmost; and each new day brings forth its
portent; which portent, again, in its place and season, is as
temporary centre and feeding fuel to the growing, glowing, and inflaming hubbub.

Germany, for its part, however, was luckily free, as indeed behaved philosophy, from an element of sense which deformed and disgraced the English ferment. For such pure white flames as Kant and Fichte, the substance proper of the spirit was oil enough; the natural speed of their own life sufficed them; they required not, like Marlow, the fierce combustible of wine, as it were to give them edge upon themselves, that so they might eat into themselves, and devour up their own sweetness in an instant's rush. Yet Fichte, absolutely without a fear—absolutely without a misgiving in the intensity of his sincerity, in the intensity of his honesty, in the intensity of his conviction, was as swift and precipitate as even Marlow. Of this, his every act, his every word is proof. He kindles to Kant, he writes his 'Kritik of All Revelation' in four weeks, he rushes to Königsberg, he extends to Kant this same 'Kritik' by way of introductory letter. He becomes professor at Jena; his lectures are as inflaming fire, and his works—Wissenschaftslehre, Rechtslehre, Sittenlehre—leap from him like consecutive lightnings. The Journal he edits is, for its plainness of speech, confiscated by the Government: he rises up, he rushes to the front, he defends, he appeals, he listens to no private Hush, man! hold your tongue, we are going to look over it; he will have 'lawful conviction' or 'signal satisfaction.' Submit to be threatened! it is he will threaten, he will quit—quit and take his people with him; he and they will found a university for themselves! So single, so entire in his conviction of his first philosophy, this is no impediment to equal singleness, to equal entirety in his conviction of his second. Then, when the political horizon darkens over his country, he calls his compatriots to arms—calls to them through the very roulades of the French drums, calls to them in the very hearing of the French governor! Nor when, as if in answer to his call, the war arises, does the student slink into his study as if his work were done. No! the word is but exchanged for the deed; and in the doing of the deed, both he and his brave wife fall a sacrifice to their own nobleness! * The eagle Fichte! whose flight was arrow-straight, whose speed the lightning's! Or take him in less serious and more amusing circumstances. The enthusiasm in the days of Marlow, the drunkenness of intellence could not be greater than

* But she recovered, while he died. (New.)
this. Fichte visits Baggesen, whom as yet he has not seen; Baggesen has a child at the point of death, and cannot receive Fichte. They cannot part thus, however: Baggesen comes to Fichte in the stair; and there the two of them, Fichte and Baggesen, find Consciousness a subject so interesting, that, in such position, in such circumstances, they remain discussing it an hour and a half, turning away, the one from the other, at last, each, we may suppose, as in the dream of a seraph.

It must be admitted, indeed, that the excitement in Germany took on, in some respects, larger proportions than that in England. The numbers of the affected, for example, were much greater in the former country than in the latter. The former country, indeed, would probably count by hundreds as the other by tens. Schulze, Kraus, Maimon, Krug, Kiesewetter, Erhard, Eberhard, Heydenreich, Bouterweck, Bendavid, Fries, Reinhold, Bardili, Beck, Hülsen, Köppen, Suabedissen—these really are but a tithe of the names that turn up in the German fluctuation, and each of them is to be conceived as but a seething froth-point in the immeasurable yeast.

In these zymoses, then, whether in Germany or in England, we may say that those who took part in them were stirred to their very depths; that they stood up, as it were, convulsed; that they emulously agonised themselves mutually, to the production of results, in both countries, on the whole transcendent, almost superhuman. Now, however wide was the seething sea in England, we all know, in these days, that it has subsided round a single, matchless island, Shakspeare, the delight, the glory, the wonder of the world; beside which, it is, on the whole, only by a species of indulgent indifference on our parts that we allow certain virtuosi to point out the existence of some ancillary islets. But just as it is in England as regards the dramatic zymosis, it is, or will be, in Germany as regards the philosophic; only, the latter country, perhaps, will distinguish its single island by a double name. We have arrived now at the point where an answer to the questions which we have left a short way behind us is easy, is self-evident. The seething thing, named English Drama, or German Philosophy, is one thing; and the practical outcome of the seething, another. Thus different, each, then, may be considered apart and by itself; and two diverse branches of human industry are seen to become hereby possible. He who shall make it his business to watch the gathering of the materials for the
seething—the first bells or bubbles of the same—the further progress, all the consecutive phases as they appear in time—will be the Phenomenologist or Historian of the Seething. By this historian, plainly, no detail is to be neglected, nor is any name to be omitted.

A very different task, however, is his who would take the other branch, and discuss only the settled outcome of the ferment: and this is the task in special reference to German Philosophy which we here would desire to attempt; a task which is, probably, insusceptible as yet of the form of art—which as yet cannot be effected, as it were, by a picture, by a statue, or even by a homogeneous essay, but which must content itself with the ground in its regard being simply broken into. For us then, with such object, the majority of the names tossed over in the turmoil will have no interest; for us, in short, the principals will suffice. And thus, by another road, we are brought to the same conclusion as before—to neglect, namely, the 'Literature of the subject;' and this, not only so far as it follows, but also so far as—so to speak—it accompanies the ferment. But again the terms principals and outcome are not necessarily coincident. In the ferment of the English Drama, Marlow, Ben Jonson, and others may, even beside Shaksppeare, be correctly enough named principals; yet it is the last alone whom we properly term outcome. As it is, then, in the English movement, so probably will it be in the German also; and in this light, perhaps, there awaits us a closer circum-scription yet than that which we had already reached. In other words, there may be principals here, too, whom, in part or in whole, it is not necessary to regard as outcome.

The reader, indeed, may have already perceived a tendency on our part to talk somewhat exclusively of Kant and Hegel; and may already, perhaps, resent the slight thereby implied to Fichte and Schelling, as to men who have hitherto ranked on the same platform as equals themselves, and no less equals of the others also. No man, for instance, will subordinate Fichte to Schelling; yet, as there has been assigned to Kant the relative place of Socrates, and to Hegel that of Aristotle, so there has always been reserved for Schelling no less proud a place—the place of Plato. It may well be asked, then, why should Fichte and Schelling give way to Hegel? Is it possible to take up the works of either of the former without perpetually coming on Anklange—on assonances to Hegel for which this latter seems the debtor?
Do not sources apparently of special inspiration to Hegel crop out all through the 'Ideen' and the 'Transcendental Idealismus'—all through the 'Wissenschaftslehre,' and the 'Rechtslehre,' and the 'Sittenlehre'? Are not the considerations contained in these works largely the material on which at least Hegel turns? Whence else could there have been extended to him the rails or the rails whereby his waggon was enabled to roll forward with filling to the inane? In what respect is the single quest of Schelling or of Fichte to be distinguished from that of Hegel or of Kant? Is it not true that there is but one quest common to all the four of them? Is not, after all, this quest with each but, in one word, the à priori? Do not they all aim at an à priori deduction of the all of things—a deduction which shall extend to man the pillars of his universe, and the principles as well by which he may find support and guidance in all his ways and wishes? If, then, they are thus successive attempts at the same result, why should they not all of them be equally studied? To this we may answer, that, so far as there is a succession, there is no wish to deny the right of any of them to be studied. We seek a practical concentration only, and, in the interest of that concentration, we would eliminate everything that is extraneous, everything that is superfluous—but nothing more. Now, as regards Kant, there is no room for doubt; his place is fixed, not only by common consent, but by the very nature of the case. It was he who originated the whole movement, and without him not a step in it can be understood. As regards Hegel, not so much to common consent is it that he owes his place, as to the inexorable sentence of history; for there has been no step since his death which is not to be characterised as dissolution and demise. But if Hegel be the historical culmination and end, both Fichte and Schelling must submit to be historical only so far as they lead to him—only so far as they approve themselves in his regard as nexus of mediation to Kant. Now, at a glance, there is much in both of them that is extraneous, and incapable of being regarded as historically connective in any respect. Fichte, for example, had two philosophical epochs; and if both belong to biography, only one belongs to history. The epochs of Schelling were, I suppose, three times more numerous; but, of them all, only the second and third are historical; those, namely, which, following the first, the initiatory identification with Fichte, sought to vindicate for Nature an independent place beside the Ego, and
then resumption for both into an indefinite Absolute. Nay, of
the two epochs just named, it is even possible that we ought to
strike off the latter; for there are not wanting good reasons to
maintain that the work of this epoch—the resumption, namely, of
both Nature and the Ego into the Absolute—belongs, not to
Schelling but to Hegel. Some of these reasons we shall see
presently. Meantime, we shall assume the philosophical majority
of Hegel to commence with the publication of the 'Phaeno-
menologie des Geistes,' in '1807. On this assumption, the
historical works of Fichte are the 'Wissenschaftslehre' in its
various forms, the 'Grundlage des Naturrechts,' and the 'System
der Sittenlehre'; while the 'Ideen zu einer Philosophie der
Natur,' the 'Von der Weltseele,' the 'Erster Entwurf eines
Systems der Naturphilosophie,' the 'System des Transcendentalen
Idealismus,' and the 'Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie,'
shall represent the historical works of Schelling.

It is very probable, however, that even these conclusions will
become to the student, as he advances, doubtful. With Fichte
and with Schelling, his satisfaction will not always be unmixed;
and reasons will begin to show themselves for believing Hegel—
however apparently their debtor, both for stimulation and
suggestion—to have, after all, in the end, dispensed with both,
and taken a fresh departure from Kant for himself. In such
circumstances, he will incline to think still further concen-
tration both justifiable and feasible. No doubt it is interesting,
he will say, to see the consecutive forms which the theme of
Kant assumes now in the hands of Fichte, and now in the hands
of Schelling. No doubt this is not only interesting, but also,
for Hegel, in some sort adjuvant. Still, if it is true that all
culminates in Hegel, and that Hegel himself has made good his
attachment to Kant, with practical elimination of all that is
intermediate, then, evidently, for him whose object is the outcome
only, Fichte and Schelling are no longer indispensably necessary.
Then the dissatisfaction with these writers themselves!

As writers—this, at least, is the experience of the present
student—Fichte and Schelling were incomparably the most
accomplished of all the four, and offered by far the least imped-
ment to the progress of a current intelligence. Schelling, however
(his vindication of nature as in opposition to Fichte, and such
like, being neglected), seemed to have little to offer as stepping-
stone to Hegel besides what we may call, perhaps, his Neutrum
of Reason—his generalised Universal of Reasons—which neutrum again coalesces in effect with the absolute neutrum, which resumes into itself both nature and the ego, both objectivity and subjectivity. And even as regards this, probably by far the most important element nameable Schellingian in Hegel, there were considerations which might just reverse the received relation of its origin.

The facts on which the considerations alluded to rest are these:—Hegel, when his time was come and his system—at least in its first form—lay complete in his desk, wrote to Schelling disclosing his intention to enter the career of Letters, or rather Philosophy, and asking his advice as to where to settle. He feared the literary revel and riot of Jena, he said: would not Bamberg, with opportunities to study Roman Catholicism, be a judicious preliminary residence? Hegel wrote this letter in November 1800, and his arrival in Jena the following January was the result of the correspondence. Now Schelling, who had but just summed and completed himself—and had but just given himself to the world as summed and completed—in his 'System des Transcendentalen Idealismus,' is found, immediately after his first meetings with Hegel, and with signs of haste and precipitation about him, offering himself to the world again, new summed, new completed—this time, indeed, as he professed, finally summed, finally completed, in—what was at least partially antagonistic of the immediately previous sum—his 'Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie.'

These facts are few, but they probably cover a whole busy beehive of human interests both as regards Schelling and as regards Hegel. Haym, for example, a writer of brilliant genius, whom we have already mentioned, scarcely hesitates to insinuate that this haste of Schelling was probably not unconnected with the new-comer Hegel—this, as thinking, perhaps, of the proverbial communicativeness of first meetings. If, then, Hegel, on these occasions communicated anything to Schelling, the burthen of such communication would be most probably the Neutrum or Absolute; for, while it is the most prominent element in Hegel that can be called Schellingian, it is precisely in the last-named work of Schelling's that it emerges on the whole fully formed and fully overt. In this way, this same neutrum or absolute may be viewed as the honorarium or hush-money paid by the Unknown to the Known for the privilege of standing on the latter's shoulders and in the light of the latter's fame. For possibly the application of Hegel to Schelling was not without its calculations. It broke
a long silence, and it concerned correspondents very differently placed. Hegel was by four years and five months the senior of Schelling: as yet, nevertheless, he had done nothing; he was but an obscure tutor, and his existence was to be wholly ignored. Schelling, on the contrary, though so much his junior, was already an old celebrity, a placed professor, an established author, a philosopher the rival of Fichte, the rival of Kant. To Hegel, unknown, obscure, of no account, nothing, but who would rank precisely among these highest of the high—who would, in fact, as the paper in his desk prophesied to him, be all—the immense advantages that would lie in Schelling's introduction, in Schelling's association of him with himself as philosophical teacher, as literary writer, could not be hid. Why, it would be the saving to him of whole years of labour, perhaps of a whole world of heart-breaks. There is, quite accordingly, a peculiar tone, a peculiar batedness of breath in the letter of Hegel: admiration of Schelling's career, almost amounting to awe, is hinted; he looks to Schelling with full confidence for a recognition of his disinterested labour (the paper in his desk), even though its sphere be lower; before trusting himself to the literary intoxication of Jena, he would like preliminarily to strengthen himself somewhere else, say at Bamberg, &c. &c. It is difficult to avoid distrusting all this, for we feel it is precisely Jena he wants to get at, and we know that he was not slow to come to Jena when Schelling bade him. Then, we seem to see, Bamberg had served its turn; it and its opportunities for the study of Catholicism might now go hang! what was wanted had been got.

In their first meetings at Jena, then, such being the relative positions of the two former fellow-students, Hegel, it may be supposed, would naturally desire to conciliate Schelling—would naturally desire indirectly to show him that the advantages of a partnership would not, after all, be so very wholly on one side,—would naturally desire to make him feel that he (Schelling) had not done so ill in giving the stranger the benefit of his introduction and the prestige of his fame. Very probably, then, Hegel would not hesitate, in such circumstances, to show Schelling, if he could, that in his (Schelling's) own doctrines there lay an element which, if developed, would extend to the System the last touch of comprehensiveness, simplicity, and symmetry.*

Certainly in the eyes of all this is what Hegel, in his 'Differenz des Fichteschen System'
But this Neutrum or Absolute will be found to be very fairly expressed, and more than once too, in the 'Transcendental Idealismus!'

An 'absolut Identisches' in which the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' shall coalesce is talked of in various places. We may instance these:—At page 29, we hear of 'ein Absolutes, das von sich selbst die Ursache und die Wirkung—Subject und Object—ist;' at pages iv. and v. of Preface, an 'Allgemeinheit' is talked of, in which 'das Einzelne völlig verschwindet;' again, at page 29, the 'Selbstbewusstseyn' is identified with Nature, and both with the absolute identity of Subjective and Objective; lastly, pp. 4, 5, we have the following: 'Nature reaches the highest goal, to become wholly object to its own self, only through the highest and last reflexion, which is nothing else than Man, or, more generally, that which we name Reason, through which (reflexion) nature first returns completely into its own self, and whereby it becomes manifest that nature is originally identical with that which is recognised in us as what is intelligent and conscious.'

This would seem to dispose definitively of any pretensions of Hegel. But again, it is a curious thing that, once a doctrine has become historically established, we are often startled by expressions in the works of previous writers which seem accurately to describe it; yet these previous writers shall have no more insight into the doctrine concerned than any Indian in his woods; and we ourselves should have found something quite else in the expressions, had we read them before the doctrine itself was become historically overt. Small individuals there are in the world, however, who ferret out such ex post facto coincidences, and assume to denounce thereby some veritable historical founder as but a cheat and a thief and a plagiarist! Now, this might have happened here, and Schelling, for all his expressions in the Transcendental Idealism, might have been quite blind to their real reach till he had had his eyes opened by the communications of Hegel; in which circumstances, too, it would be ill-natured to blame him for showing haste to make good his own in the eyes of the public. It is certain that a Universal of Reason lies much more in the way of the notions of Hegel than in that of those of Schelling, who, in the duality of reality here and ideality there, and Schellingischen Systemen,' did for Schelling. Schelling, as everybody knew, sank both sides of his philosophy into an Indifferenzpunkt. If this punkt was implicitly an absolute for Schelling, perhaps Hegel made it for him even explicitly such. (New.)
seems to leap to a neutrum which, as indifference, is a neutrum, which is zero (the Null') rather than an absolute, rather than reason. Be all this as it may, we are compelled, as it comes to us, to attribute this tenet to Schelling; and the Hegelian may still take to himself the consolation which, indeed, lay open to his master—he may sardonically look on at the little use Schelling made of it—at the little use Schelling could make of it, as it wanted to him that connexion with Kant which enabled Hegel, by giving body to the form, to realise his system.

For the rest, the balanced magnet of an absolute, and more, the subordination of all to Art as highest outcome of this absolute itself—the restlessness and inconstancy of his faith whether as regards others or himself,—his silence during the life of Hegel, his malicious breaking of silence after the death of Hegel, and the little intelligence he seemed to show of the very system he broke silence on,—all this dissatisfied with Schelling, and left an impression as of the too ebullient ardour that o'erleaps itself. Schelling has been said to resemble Coleridge, and not without reason so far as the latter's similarly ebullient youth is concerned. Doubtless, too, some will see in both a like versatility of opinion, and a like unsatisfactoriness of close: but, in these respects, any likeness that can be imputed is not more than skin-deep; and otherwise, surely, not many points of comparison can be offered. Coleridge, exquisite poet, was, with all his logosophy, no philosopher; and it is difficult to believe even that there is any single philosopher in the world whom he had either thoroughly studied or thoroughly understood. Schelling had both studied and originated philosophy. Than Coleridge, consequently in that regard, he was infinitely profounder in acquisition, infinitely profounder in meditation of the same; he was infinitely clearer also, infinitely more vigorous, infinitely richer, and more elastic in the spontaneity of original suggestion and thought.

As for Fichte, having overcome the difficulty of his second proposition, which is that of Entgegensetzung, all seemed easy so far as study was concerned; and undoubtedly there lay in certain of his political findings—in his method of movement by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and in that his undeniable and most valuable contribution, the unconditionedness of the notion of the ego—elements to which Hegel owed much; but—notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the impetuous nobleness of the man, whose unhesitating headlong singleness, if to be viewed with
Mr Carlyle as a rock at all, must be viewed as a rock, not at rest, but in motion, irresistible from without, nor yet quite resistible from within,—the general aspect of the system is, on the whole, unsubstantial and unreal; the in and in of the development wearies and awakens doubt, and one finds oneself easily sympathyng with the aged and somewhat chagrined Kant, when, in a letter to Tiefrunk, he characterises it as a 'sort of ghost,' a mere 'thought-form,' 'without stuff,' which is incapable of being 'clutched,' and which accordingly 'makes a wonderful impression on the reader.'

On the whole, then,—for us,—but very little material could be pointed to as separating Hegel from Kant; nay, this material itself could be derived quite as well at first hand from the original quarry, as at second hand from the trucks of the quarry-men; and generally, in all respects, it was Hegel who specially continued and developed into full and final form all the issues which Kant had ever properly begun.' The true principals, then, were Kant and Hegel; and, they being won, all others might be cheerfully neglected. Neither as regards their difficulty, surely, was there any reason to dread eventual despair, were but the due labour instituted. What they understood, another might understand; and for no other purpose than to be understood, had these their works been written, had these their works been published.

Let us confine ourselves to Kant and Hegel, then; nay, for the start, let us confine ourselves in them to those works of theirs which are specially occupied with the express scientific statement of their respective systems. In a word, let us at first confine ourselves to three works of each: as regards Kant, to the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' 'the Kritik of Practical Reason,' and the 'Kritik of Judgment;’ as regards Hegel, to the 'Phaenomenologie des Geistes,’ the 'Logik,’ and the 'Encyclopaedie.’ This, then, is what has been done—indeed, to the production of greater restriction still, from the above enumeration, 'the Phaenomenologie des Geistes’ is, on the whole, to be eliminated.*

The present work relates to Hegel alone; and the immediately succeeding chapters present a series of notes which, as products of an actual struggle to this author, may prove, perhaps, not unadapted to assist, or at least encourage, others in a like undertaking.

The reader, meantime, is not to suppose that by confining our-

* Of course this does not mean that the student is not, eventually, to know all the works of the Masters. (New.)
selves to Kant and Hegel, we wish it to be inferred that we consider these writers beyond the reach of some of the same objections already stated as regards Fichte and Schelling. The restriction in question is not due to any such motive, but depends only on considerations of what really constitutes the thing called German Philosophy; in regard to which, at least in the first instance, every restriction seemed necessarily a boon, if at once productive of simplification, and not incompatible with a sufficiently full statement of the essential truth of the subject. By such motives is it that we have been actuated: and be it further understood that our present business is not with objections, not with judgment of the systems at all, but only as yet—and if possible—with their statement and exposition.
CHAPTER II.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE TO HEGEL.

A. 1.

The Idea is thought: thought consists of ideas—to think is to follow ideas. Thought, then, as whole of ideas, is an element sui generis, and will possess its own organic order; ideas will follow an order native to and inherent in them: but the general, the universal of all ideas may be called the Idea. The idea, then, is self-identical thinking; self-identical because in its own nature the idea is two-sided—an objective side is, as it were, exposed and offered to a subjective side, and the result is the return, so to speak, of the idea from its other, which is its objective side, into itself, or subjective side, as satisfied, gratified, and contented knowledge. We are not required to think of existent nature in all this, but only of the nature of a general idea—of the idea in its own self. Besides being self-identical thinking, it is thus also seen to be, as defined by Hegel, the capability of opposing or exposing itself to itself, and that for the purpose of being in its own self and for its own self—just its own self, in fact. In this process the objective side can evidently be very properly called its state of otherness or heterogeneity; and it is only when it arrives at this state of otherness or heterogeneity, and has identified it with itself, that it can be said to be by itself—that is, at home and reconciled with itself.

The notion of a general idea—idea as a general, as a universal—the idea is taken and looked at by the mind, and is seen to possess this immanent process or nature. But idea follows idea—or the idea is in constant process: to show the order and train of these, or the moments of this process, may be called the system of thought, that is, of Logic, then. Now, what is concerned here, is not the succession of ideas as they occur subjectively on what is called the association of ideas, but it is that succession which occurs in real thinking, in thought as thought—in objective
thought, in the performance of the Idea's own immanent process and function.

Now, how then will the Idea, the speculative Idea, arise and develop itself in any subject? The first question that will naturally suggest itself will relate to Being. The idea will be first asked, or will first ask itself, to exercise its function, to do its spiriting on the fact of existence, for the nearest and first character of the Idea is that it is. The idea, then, first of all, holds itself as a mirror to the general thought of existence—to Being in its abstract generality, to the mere essence of the word is. Now, it cannot do so without the opposite notion of nothing also arising. It is implies or involves it is not, or, at all events, it was not; it cannot help saying to itself, the moment it looks at it is, it was not. Not and is, then, is and not, must arise together, and cannot help arising together. Neither can they help flowing into the kindred notions, origin and decease, or coming to be and ceasing to be. The instant we think of Being, Existence, just as Being, Existence, in general, without a single property or quality, the notions of not, of coming to be, and of ceasing to be (which are both included in Becoming), must follow and do follow. So is it with us when we think, so is it with our speculative ideas—that is, so is it with the speculative idea—the Idea then; and so was it also in History. The first philosophical systems must have revolved around these simple notions, and Hegel is quite in earnest when he maintains the coincidence of History and of Logic. What is this Seyn, this Being? Whence comes it? Whither goes it? What is change? What is the influence of number, quantity, proportion? Why is it? These are the simple questions that circle round Being, Origin, Decease, Becoming. What is it particularly to be—individually to be (Daseyn, Fürsichseyn)? These really are the questions of the Ionics, of the Eleatics, of Herachitus, of Pythagoras, of Democritus, &c.

Now these notions are all capable of being included under the designation Quality, for they are all replies to Qualis? Mere existence as an idea soon passes into that of special or actual existence that really is and continues to be in the middle of that coming to be and ceasing to be. It is next also seen to be not only existent in the middle of this process, but individually existent, as it were personally existent. The whole progress of Hegel through Seyn, Nichts, Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen, Daseyn, Reality, Negation, Something, Other, Being-in-itself, Being-for-other, Precise Nature,
manifested Property, Limit, &c.; these may be viewed as adumbrations of stages of infantile consciousness: Dim thought that there is, that there is nothing, that there comes to be, that there ceases to be, that there is a middle state that is in the coming to being and the going from being; that this is marked-off being, defined being; that there is a definite and an indefinite; that there was negation, that there is reality; that this reality thickens itself under reflexion and reference on reality and on negation, and from reality to negation, and from negation to reality, into a something that is what it is to be in itself, in which distinction disappears and it remains a familiar Unity.

When a blind man recovers sight, all is a blur, an indistinct formless blur that seems to touch him, that is not distinguished from himself, or that conceivably he could not have distinguished from himself, had he not learned from the other senses that there was another than himself. Now, a child is in the position of the blind man who recovers sight, but without ever having learned a single item from any other sense, or in any other manner. Naturally, then, that there is, &c., abstract Seyn, &c., will be the sequence of unrecorded consciousness. Distinctions of quality will certainly precede those of quantity—the differences of kind will be seen before the fact of the repetition of an individual.

This Logic, then, may be viewed as the way we came to think—the way in which thought grew, till there was a world for Reflexion, for Understanding to turn upon. Even this, then, is an othering of its own self to see its own self, and it is the mode in which it did other itself. It is quite apart from nature or from mind raised into spirit; it is the unconscious product of thought; and it follows its own laws, and deposits itself according to its own laws. Hegel, as it were, swoons himself back into infancy—trances himself through all childhood, and awakes when the child awakes, that is, with reflexion, but retaining a consciousness of the process, which the child does not. It is a realisation of the wish that we could know the series of development in the mind of the child. His meaning of Reflexion, of Understanding, of Reason, comes out very plain now, for the process is a transcending of the Understanding, and a demonstration of the work of pure Reason. Then, again, it is common to us all—it is an impersonal subject.

To repeat—conceivably there is first a sense of being—or the vague, wide idea Being; there is no I in it; I is the product of
reflexion; it is just a general there is; it is the vast vague infinite of Being; it has its circumference everywhere, and its centre nowhere. That is plain—that Being is at once such centre and circumference; for though it is vast, and everything and everywhere—and, at the same time indefinite, and vague and nowhere—still, as Being, as a vast that is, there is a principle of punctual stop in it—of fixture, of definiteness; it is indefinite and indeterminate, but, as is, it is also definite and determinate.

This is conceivably the first sense of Being. But evidently in what has been already said there is a sense of Nothing involved. It is the boundless blank, that is, and no more; it is the roofless, wall-less, bottomless gulf of all and of nothing: senses or ideas of Being and Nothing, like vast and infinite confronting vapours—the infinite vaporous warp and infinite vaporous woof, confronting, meeting, interpenetrating, wave and weave together, waft and waver apart, to wave and weave together again.

Then, as the only conceivably true existence—the only thing conceivably worth existence—is mind, thought, intelligence, spirit,—this must have been the first, if not as man, then as God. And the first of the first was such process. The sense of the indistinguishable—the necessity, the besoin of the distinguishable! No, then, is the principle that creates distinction. There is no use to explain this; we can go back no further: it is the universe—it is what is. Understanding begins, so to speak, when Reason ceases.

The Logic, then, is the deposit and crystallisation in Reason previous to Reflexion. It is the structure that comes ready constructed to Understanding. The detection of its process is the analysis or resolution of what the understanding looks upon as something simply and directly there—something ready to its hand, something simply and directly given, and which is as it is given. It is what each of us has done for himself during infancy and childhood, in darkness and unconsciousness; or it is the work of Reason before Reflexion. We see, then, that understanding, which transcends so much, as in astronomy, &c., must itself be transcended, and speculative reason adopted instead. Carlyle's unfathomableness of the universe must be seen to rest on understanding.

After all, too, there may be Jacob Böhmic cosmogonic ideas at bottom: no saying how far he allows these notions of Being and Nothing to take the form of forces, and build up the All. If
there be no Jenseits—only a here and this—which supposition does not, in Hegel's way, infringe in the slightest the truth of Immortality—then his theory is as good as any. How otherwise are we to conceive a beginning? A beginning is what is begun, and is not what is begun. The beginning of all beginnings cannot differ. Being, too, is the basal thought and fact of all. Nothing, the principle of distinction and difference, is equally basal. It is very difficult to conceive objective thought, however, and to conceive it gradually developing itself into this actual concrete me, with these five fingers, which now write on paper, with pen and ink, &c. Something seems always to lie in the actual present, the actual immediate, that says such a genesis from abstract thought is impossible. Yet again, a genesis of thought from mere matter—that is equally impossible; thought must be the prius: then how conceive a beginning and progress with reference to that prius? Our system of reconciliation (English Idealism) is a deus ex machina: I—the thinking principle—am so made that such a series presents itself! Which just amounts to—I am tired thinking it; I just give it up to another, and say he cuts the knot—believing my own saying with much innocence and simplicity, and resting quite content therein, as if I really had got rid of the whole difficulty and solved the whole matter. English Idealism, in its one series, is certainly a simpler theory than the ordinary one, that there are two series—that first it (the object) and that then I (the subject) are so made. Stone-masonry and wood-carpentry are thus spared the Prius. Yet, again, there is nothing spared the Prius; all has been thrust into it, out of the way, as into a drawer, which is then shut, but it is all still in the drawer. Whether it (the object) is so made and I (the subject) am so made, or only I am so made, the so is in the Prius; whatever else be in the Prius, the Prius is responsible to that extent: the so is; and since the so is, the Prius must be so. We are still in presence, then, of the whole problem, which is simply the So. All this is plain to a Hegel, and all this he would meet by his absolute idealism. Hegel has a particular dislike to the deus of modern enlightenment, which he names an empty abstraction. An abstract summum—an abstract prius—and nothing more, seems indeed to constitute what goes to make up the idea, when we examine it closely. But if Hegel ridicules the deus of deism, it must be allowed he is sincere in his devotion before
God—who, as every man's own heart—as tradition, as Scripture tells us, is a Spirit. Nor does he believe that he contradicts either Reason or Scripture when he endeavours 'to know God.' Hegel is probably right in opening his eyes to a deus ex machina, and in desiring to draw close to God, the Spirit, in that he endeavours to deduce from this universe, the universal Subject of this universe. Nevertheless, his principle has much more the look of a mere regulative than of a constitutive—and it is a constitutive that we must have.

A. 2.

Plato discovers a boyish delight in the exercise of the new-found power of conscious generalisation extended to him by Socrates. Hegel seems to have learned a lesson in this art from Plato, for ταυτόν and θάτερον, or identity and otherness, which are the instruments or moments of the generalisation of the latter, seem to perform a like function in the dialectic of the former. The Socratic evolution of the idea—through elimination of the accidental from the concrete example—presents analogies (when transferred from mere ethical ideas to ideas in general) to both the Heraclitic and the Eleatic modes of thought. The accidental which is eliminated, is analogous to the fluent and changeable of Heraclitus; while the idea that remains is analogous to the permanent and abiding One of the Eleatics. As if what is were an absolute Being, but also a relative—yet really existent—Non-being. In the relations of the Ideas, the principle of Identity is Eleatic, that of Difference is Heraclitic. The Ideas are the Universal and Necessary in the Particular and Contingent: the latter is only by reason of them; still the former come forward or appear only in it. How very analogous the categories, the dialectic, &c. &c., of Hegel to all this!

B.

One, single, empirical man cannot be taken, but he and what he embodies are universalised, as it were, into a universal subject. The Logic is the immanent process of the Reason of this subject. The logical values are, as it were, depositions from the great sea of reason; and yet, by a turn, the great sea takes all up again into its own transparent simplicity and unity. We are admitted
to the ultimate and elementary fibres of the All. Being and Nothing interweave to Becoming. Coming to be and Ceasing to be interweave to So-to-be, to So-being, or Here-being—to sublunary existentiality, to mortal state, which again is just Quality. Reality and Negation interweave to Something and Other. In Something and Other, the subtle delicacy of the thought-manipulation comes well to light, and displays the nature of the whole work, which is the construction of the Thing-in-itself from materials of thought only. So it is that the understanding succeeds reason, and turns on the work of reason as on its material. Let us rapidly sketch the development in a single wave.

There is a tree, a horse, a man—there is a feeling, there is a passion, there is a thought. All these phrases are, without doubt, universally intelligible. Now, in the whole six of them, there is presents itself as a common element; and it suffers no change in any, but is absolutely the same in all. There is a tree, &c.—there is a thought, &c.—however different a thought may be from a tree, or a feeling from a house, the phrase there is has precisely the same meaning when attached to tree or house that it has when attached to thought or feeling. Let us abstract, then, from these subjects, from these words, and repeat the phrase there is, there is, till the special element which these two words contribute begins to dawn on our consciousness. Let us repeat to ourselves there is with reference to matters not only outward, but inward; and let us repeat it, and again repeat it, till it acquires, so to speak, some body as a distinct thought. If we succeed well with the two words there is, we shall find no difficulty in making one other step in advance, and in realising to ourselves a conception of what is meant by the bare word is.

But the reader must understand that he is to do this. He is now to cease reading, and to occupy himself a good half-hour with the ruminating of what he has just read. If he contents himself with simple perusal, he will find himself very soon stopped by insurmountable obstacles, and most probably very soon compelled to give up in disgust. But if he will devote one half-hour in the manner we have indicated, the result will be a perfect conception of the meaning of is, that is, of Abstract or Pure Being, of Abstract or Pure Existentiality, of the Hegelian Sein. And most appropriately is it named abstract; for it is the ultimate and absolute Abstract. It is that which may be abstracted or extracted from every fact and form of existence, whether celestrial or terrestrial,
material or spiritual. Rather it is the residue when we abstract from all these. It is the absolutely terminal calc—the absolutely final residuum that continues and must continue for our thought when abstraction is made from the whole world. Let there be no stone, no plant, no sea, no earth, no sun, no star in all the firmament—let there be no mind, no thought, no idea, no space, no time, no God—let the universe disappear—we have not yet got rid of is: is will not, cannot disappear. Let us do our best to conceive the universe abolished—let us do our best to conceive what we call existence abolished—still we shall find that we cannot escape from the abstract shadow is which we have indicated. Being is absolutely necessary to thought; to thought, that is, it is absolutely necessary that there be Being. Ask yourself, What would there be, if there were just nothing at all, and if there never had been anything—neither a God, nor a world, nor an existence at all? Ask yourself this and listen! Then just look at the question itself, and observe how it contains its own dialectic and contradiction in presupposing the Being it is actually supposing not to be!

It may appear to the reader a very simple thought, this, and a very unnecessary one: still, if he will consider that it is the universal element—that there is nothing in the heaven above nor in the earth beneath where it is not present, and that it is as essential a constituent of thought as of matter, it will probably appear not unnatural that it should be begun with in a system of Universal Logic, of Universal Thought. Without it there is no thought, and without it there is no thing. Take it even as a matter of conception, it is that which is absolutely first—that which, without us or within us, is absolutely over-against us, absolutely immediate, absolutely and directly present to us. The Eleatics had a perfect right to exclaim, ‘Being only is, and nothing is just nothing at all!’

Look at it again, now; call up the shadow is—let us once more realise to ourselves all that we think when we say there is with any reference or with no reference—let us place before us the conception of abstract existence, of abstract Seyn, and we shall perceive that it is characterised by a total and complete absence of any possible predicate. It is the absolute void, the absolute inane. Like the mathematical point, it is position without magnitude; and again, it is magnitude without position—it is everything in general, and nothing in particular: it is, in fact, nothing.
If this prove repugnant to the reader, let him ask himself, what then is it, if it is not nothing? or let him ask himself, what then is nothing? and the result of his deepest pondering will be that, after all, the shadow *nothing is the shadow is*—that abstract nothing and abstract being, or the abstract *not and the abstract is*, contain precisely the same thought, and that the one, quite as much as the other, is the absolute void, the absolute inane—that the one quite as much as the other is position without magnitude, and magnitude without position—that each involves and implies the other, and that both are all in general, and nothing in particular. It is absolutely indifferent, then, which we take first, as either only leads to the other. *Nothing*—the conception contained in the absolutely abstract *Nothing*, involves the position implied in abstract *Being*, and the latter is as absolutely predicableless as the former. The shadow *is*, abstract existentiality, will, if the endeavour to think it be continued long enough, be seen in the end to be the absolute nothing, the absolute void. There is no object whatever suspended in it; nay, there is not even space to admit of either object or suspension. For the reader is required to realise the conception *there is* in reference not only to material things, but in reference also to immaterial things—ideas, thoughts, passions, &c., where already qualities of space are excluded. And then, again, *nothing or not* similarly perseveringly pondered and realised to thought, will be seen in the end to imply *is or Being*, and to possess an absolutely identical characterisation, or an absolutely identical want of characterisation, as *is* or *Being*.

The reader may possibly feel it absurd, unreasonable, even unnatural, to be asked to occupy himself with such thoughts; but we pray him not to be disheartened, but in simple and good faith to believe that the call is made on him for his best endeavours to co-operate with us, not without hopes of a solid and satisfactory result. That *Being* should be *Nothing*, and *Nothing* *Being*, is not absurd, if only that *Being* and that *Nothing* be thought which we have done our best to indicate. We are not fools, and we discern as perfectly as another the difference of house and no house, dinner and no dinner, a hundred dollars and no dollar.

The reader must have the goodness to recollect that our *Nothing* is the abstract *Nothing*—the thoroughly indeterminate, and not the, so to speak, concrete and determinate *Nothing* implied in that word when used as the contrary of some concrete and determinate *Something*. No dinner is nothing certainly, but then it is a quali-
fied nothing: it is a nothing that refers to a special something. dinner; it contains in itself, so to speak, this reference, and so is distinguished from other analogous terms. We hope, then—and, however apparently unmeaning our language may be, we hope also that the reader will lend us his faith yet awhile longer—that it is now plain to everyone that, in our sense of the terms, Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same. They are both absolute blanks, and each is the same blank; still it must be understood that our sense is the true sense of Pure Being and Pure Nothing—the true sense of Being and Nothing taken strictly as such, taken in ultimate analysis. Again, it is still true that Being is not Nothing and Nothing is not Being. We feel that though each term formulates the absolute blank, and the absolutely same blank, there is somehow and somewhere a difference between them. They point to and designate the absolutely same thought, yet still a distinction is felt to exist between them. Being and Nothing are the same, then, and they are not the same. Each formulates and implies the same elements; but one formulates what the other only implies, which latter, in turn, formulates what the former only implies. Being formulates, so to speak, Being and implies Nothing; while Nothing implies Being, but formulates Nothing. Being implies negation but accentuates position; while Nothing implies position but accentuates negation. But this is just another way of saying they are the same. The two conceptions, as pointing to absolutely the same thought, are still essentially the same. Their difference, however, when the two are steadily looked at in thought, is seen to generate a species of movement in which they alternately mutually interchange their own identity. Being, looked at isolatedly, vanishes of its own accord, and disappears in its own opposite; while Nothing again, similarly looked at, refuses to remain Nothing, and transforms itself to Being. The thought Being leads irresistibly to the thought Nothing, and the thought Nothing leads as irresistibly to the thought Being: that is, they disappear mutually into each other.

The real truth of the whole thought, therefore, is represented by neither the one expression nor the other: this truth is seen to lie rather in the movement we have indicated, or the immediate passage of the one—no matter which we make the first—into the other. The truth of the thought, then, is that they mutually pass, or, rather, that they mutually have passed, the one into the other. But what is this process? If Being pass into Nothing, is not that
the process that we name decease? and if Nothing pass into Being, is not that the process that we name birth, or origin, or coming to be? Are not both processes a coming to be—in the one case, Nothing coming to be Being, and in the other Being coming to be Nothing? Are they not both, then, but forms of Becoming, and does not the general process Becoming contain and express the whole truth of Being and of Nothing?

The abstract thoughts, then, that we name Pure Being and Pure Nothing are so mutually related that they are the same, and yet not the same; in other words, they are susceptible of distinction, but not of separation. Again, the abstract process of which birth, growth, decay, death, &c., are concrete examples, and which we name pure or abstract Becoming, is so constituted that it presents itself as the truth of both Being and Nothing; it is seen to contain both as in their own nature inseparable and inseparable, and yet distinguishable, but only by a distinctivity which immediately resolves and suppresses itself. Their truth, in fact, is this mutual disappearance of the one into the other, this mutual interchange; and that is precisely the process that we name Becoming. The truth of the matter is that the one passes into the other—and not that they are—but this is Becoming.

There may, to the general reader, appear something unsatisfactory in all this, as though it were a mere playing upon words. It is not what he has been accustomed to; he is not at home in it; he feels himself in doubt and embarrassment. He has been led, in a manner new and strange to him, from one thought to another; he is not sure that the process is a legitimate one; and he is in considerable apprehension as to the results. Still we beg a little further attention on his part, and we shall not hurry him. He may suspect us of having practised on him a mere tour de force; but as yet he has not gone very far, and we entreat him to retrace his steps and examine the road he has already beaten. Let him realise to himself again the thought is, pure being, and he will find himself impelled by the very nature of the thing, and not by any external influence of ours, to the thought not, nought, or pure nothing. Having then realised these thoughts, he will find again that they, in their own peculiar mutual influences, imply the process, and impel him involuntarily to the thought, of pure Becoming.

If we consider now the process or thought expressed by the term Becoming, we shall see that in it Being and Nothing are elements.
or, rather—to borrow a word from mechanical science—Moments. Becoming is the unity of both; neither is self-dependent, each is distinct, yet each disappears into the other, and Becoming is the result of the mutual eclipse of both. They are thus, then, moments of Becoming, and, though transformed and—so to speak—vanished, they are still there present, and still operative and active. Becoming has two forms according as we begin with Being and refer to Nothing, or begin with Nothing and refer to Being. It is evident, too, that Coming to be, and Ceasing to be, involve a middle ground of reality, that is: nay, Becoming itself, as based on the diversity of its moments, and yet as constituting their disappearance, involves a neutral point, a period as it were of rest, where Becoming is become. This neutral point, this period of rest, in the process of Becoming where Becoming is become, this middle point of reality between Coming to be and Ceasing to be, we name There-being or So-being, that is the being distinguishably there, or the being distinguishably so, what we might also call state—Daseyn, ordinary existency, finite existency.

The reader, probably, will not have much difficulty in realising to himself this further step which, not we, but the thing itself, the idea itself, has taken. Pure Being leads irresistibly to Pure Nothing, and both together lead irresistibly to pure Becoming, the forms or moments of which are Coming to be and Ceasing to be: now, between these moments, or in the mutual interpenetration of these moments—that is to say, in Becoming itself—there is involved or implied an intermediate punctum that is, a middle point of unity of repose—this point, this stable moment, or quasi-stable moment, in which Becoming is as it were Become, is There-being or So-being. Becoming indicates absolutely a become, and that become—as such and in perfect generality—is mortal state, sublunariness, in every reference, but in no special.

So-being, then, as being no longer becoming but become, is eminently in the form of being; or, in other words, So-being emphatically is. The one-sidedness, however, does not in reality exclude the other element, the not, the nothing; Becoming lies behind it—it is but product of Becoming, and both elements must appear. The other element, indeed, the not, will manifest itself as the distinctive element. (We are now, let us remark, following Hegel almost literally, as the reader will see for himself by referring to the original or to the actual translation which he will find elsewhere.)
So-being, or There-being, is being, but it is now predicable being. It is not like pure being, wholly unlimited, wholly indeterminate; it is now, on the contrary, limited and determinate. But limitation is negation. So-being, in fact, is Being qualified by a Non-being; but both present themselves in a condition of intimate and perfect interpenetration and union. The resultant unity is, as it were, no compound, but a simple. Neither element preponderates over the other. As far as So-being is being, so far is it non-being, so far is it definite, determinate, limited. The defining element appears in absolute unity with the element of being, and neither is distinguished from the other. Again, the determinating principle, viewed as what gives definiteness, as itself definiteness, as definiteness that is, is quality. Quality is the characteristic and distinctive principle of So-being. But as So-being is constituted, so is Quality. Quality, with special reference to the positive element of So-being, quality viewed as being, is Reality, while, on the other hand, with reference to the negative element, viewed as determinatingness, it is Negation.

We see, then, the presence of distinction, difference in So-being; we see in it two moments, one of reality and one of negation. Still it is easy to see also that these distinctions are null; in fact, that quality is inseparable from So-being, and that these moments are inseparable from quality; that is, that they subsist—or consist—there in absolute unity. Each, in fact, can be readily seen to imply and constitute the other; or each is reflexion from and to the other. But the resolution or suppression of distinction is a most important step here, for from it results the next determination, one of the most important of all. For this perception yet withdrawal of distinction involves a reflexion, a return from the limit or difference back to the reality. But this reflexion, this doubling back to and on itself—implies at the same time absorption or assimilation of the limit, the difference—is the special constitutive nature of So-being. But a further thought springs up to consciousness here. In saying all this, we are manifestly saying of So-being, that it is in itself or within itself (for reflexion from, with absorption of, the limit into the reality itself is nothing else)—that it is a somewhat that is, or just that it is Something.

Something, then, as Self-reference, as simple reference to self, is the first negation of the negation. Arriving at the negation, reflexion took place back on itself with resolution of the negation. Something, then, as negation of the negation is the restoration of
simple reference to self, but just thus is it mediation, or commodiation of itself with itself. This principle manifests itself, but quite abstractly, even in Becoming; and it will be found in the sequel a determination of the greatest importance. But if reflexion back to and on itself in So-being gives birth to Something, a similar reflexion in regard to negation gives birth to the conception or determination of otherness, or other in general. So-being, then, appears again in these moments as Becoming, but of this Becoming the moments are no longer abstract Being and Nothing, but—their selves in the form of So-being—Something and Other.

Here the reader will do well once again to retrace his steps, and ascertain accurately the method which has determined results so important and striking. The results Something and Other are the most important we have yet obtained, and it is absolutely necessary to be decided as to the legitimacy or non-legitimacy of their acquisition.

We started then with Being, in which, as abstract, the decisive point is its indefiniteness, through which indefiniteness it passes into Nothing. Being and Nothing, in their mutual interchange of identity, led directly to Becoming, which, in its own nature, and in the opposition of its moments, manifested a quasi-permanent middle point of There-being or So-being. So-being, then, manifested itself as Being with a limit, with a restriction. The element being was its proximate genus, while the limit was its differentia. The proximate genus appears, then, as Reality, while the differentia appears as negation. Between being and limit, proximate genus and differentia, reality and negation, a process of reflexion, as between reciprocally reflex centres, takes place, rather has taken place. This reflexion, on the side of reality, elicits the conception of simple reference to self, which involves a being in or within self, of somewhat within itself or Something. On the side of negation, reflexion elicited the conception of otherness, of another, of other in general. And it is these determinations of Something and Other which we have now to examine.

Something and Other readily show themselves as interchangeable. Each is Something, and each is relatively Other. True, the Other is constituted by this reference to Something, but it manifests itself as external to this Something. It may thus be isolated and considered by itself. But thus considered, it presents itself as the abstract other, the other as other, the other
in itself, the other of itself, the other of the other. Physical nature is such other. It is the other of Spirit. Its nature, then, is a mere relativity, by which not an inherent quality, but a mere outer relation is expressed. Spirit, then, is the true Something, and Nature is what it is only as opposed to Spirit. The quality of Nature, then, isolated and viewed apart, is just that it is the other as other, that it is that which exists externally to its own self (in space and time, &c.)

C. 1.

That there is, is thought only in itself. Thought in itself—come to itself—come to be—constitutes is. Thought in its very commencement and absolute beginning—the very first reference of thought—the very first act of thought—could only be is—i.e. the feeling, sentient, or sense of Being. This is the Cogito-Sum of Descartes, and this is the Ich-Ich of Fichte. In fact, the Ich-Ich of Fichte having passed through the alembic of Schelling and become a neutrum, an impersonativum, receives from Hegel the expression of est—Seyn—which single word conveys to him the whole burthen of the phrase, 'Seyn ist der Begriff nur an sich,' or 'Being is the Notion only in itself.'

To Hegel, a commencement, a beginning, is not, as it is to us, a creature of time, an occurrence, a thing that took place; it is a mere thought—a thought that possesses in itself its own nature, and in the sphere of thoughts its own place. And just thus is it again for Hegel a creature of time, an event, an occurrence, a thing that took place. To Hegel, then, the idea of a commencement is unavoidable; but still it is only an idea so and so constituted and so and so placed in respect of others. To us it is more than an idea—it is an event, an actuality. To Hegel it is also, in one sense, more than an idea. To Hegel also it is an event, an actuality; but still to him it remains in its essence ideal—it remains an idea so placed and so constituted that we name it event, actuality, &c. To us, too, the notion of a beginning is an unavoidable and absolutely necessary presupposition; but this beginning we attribute to the act of an agent—God. In the system of Hegel, God, too, is present; and without God it were difficult to see what the system would be; but to Hegel, when used as a word that contains in it a dispensation from the necessity of a beginning, this word amounts only
to a deus ex machina; or the idea which it is supposed to imply, being but an ultimate abstraction, void, empty (in fact, idea-less), is slighted by him as the le dieu-philosophe, the deus of the Aufklärung—for by such phrases we may at least allow ourselves to translate his thought. To Hegel the introduction of this deus is only a postponement of the question, only a removal of the difficulty, and that by a single step; it is but the Indian elephant, which, if it supports the world, demands for its own feet the tortoise. To Hegel, in his way, too, God is a Subject, a Person, a Spirit; but as that he is the sphere of spheres and circle of circles, in whose dialectic evolution the notion of a beginning is a constitutive point, element, or moment, but at the same time not participating in that material and sensuous nature which we attribute to the character of a beginning.

Still, when our object is a beginning in relation to thought as thought—to thought perfectly universally, whether the reference of our view be to the thought of God, or to the thought of man, we must all of us admit that a beginning of thought is to thought a presupposition absolutely necessary. Such necessity exists for my thought, for your thought, for all thought—let us say, then, for thought in general. But the beginning of thought as thought could only be that it was. All that thought beginning could say for itself would be is, or, if you like, am; both words referring simply, so to speak, to the felt thought of existence in general. The absolutely first as regards thought just is—thought is, or rather the possibility of thought, is, for as yet it is only undeveloped and unformed. We look at thought as it was necessarily constituted at the moment of its supposed birth, and entirely apart from involution in any material organ or set of organs—with that or these we have nothing to do, our whole business is with thought, and with thought as it in its own self unfolded and expanded itself. We have nothing to do with any physiological process—we watch only thought, the evolution of thought, the process of thought. Taking thought, then, supposititiously at its moment of birth, we can only say of it, it is. Nay, as already remarked, it could only say is, or am, of itself, or to itself; for thought is reflex, thought speaks to itself, thought is conscious, and the very first act of thought—thought in blindness, dumbness, and, in a certain sense, in unconsciousness—would, of necessity, be a sense of Being. Thought, then, begins with the single predicate is (or am), and its further progress or process will
evidently consist of an evolution or multiplication of predicates; thought will simply go on naming to itself what it finds itself to be; —and this is just the history of the world. It is at this system of predication, then—at this evolution of predicates—that here, in logic, we are invited to assist.

The meaning of the phrase, 'Being is the Notion only in itself,' will probably now be beginning to show itself. The Begriff, the Notion, has just come to be; Der Begriff ist, or cogito-sum; for Begriff is cogito, and sum is is. Thought now is, thought is in itself, it has come to itself so far; it refers to itself, to its being; it has come to be, it simply is—as yet, however, only in itself. There is, as yet, only blank self-identity.

It will not be too much to say further, here also, that as thought grows, the characteristics, the predicates that will add themselves, will all possess as well the form of Being—they will all be—we shall be able to say of each of them, it is. Further, we shall be able to say that they are distinguishable, that is that they are different, that is that they are other to other. The very process of the growth—the progression—will be from one to the other, a constant transition, that is, to other, others, or otherness. The reason common to all this is just that as yet the Notion is only in itself, the form as yet is only that of a Seyn, of a Being, of an Is, of simple self-identity.

The process is predication merely—a substrate or subject is excluded, and there can be no form of proposition or judgment. It is a progression from predicate to predicate—because the progress of Reason before consciousness—the Seyn—is rather a process of deposition and concretion, and implies neither subject nor proposition.

C. 2.

Shall I be able to conduct you through this vast Cyclopean edifice—this huge structure—this enormous pile—this vast mass—that resembles nothing which has ever yet appeared in France or England or the world? One of those vast palaces, it is, of Oriental dream, gigantic, endless,—court upon court, chamber on chamber, terrace on terrace,—built of materials from the east and the west and the north and the south—marble and gold and jasper and amethyst and ruby,—old prophets asleep with signet rings—guarded by monsters winged and unwinged, footed and
footless,—there out in the void desert, separated from the world of man by endless days and nights, and eternally recurrent and repeating solitudes,—lonely, mysterious, inexplicable,—a giant dreamland, but still barbaric, incoherent, barren! After all, the omnium gatherum of infinite laboriousness,—a Chinese puzzle, a mighty ball (in snow-ball fashion) of picked-up pieces of broken crystal—reflexions of Heraclitus, and Parmenides, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and Aristotle, and Plotinus, and Proclus, and Descartes, and Spinoza, and Kant, and Fichte, and Jacob Böh�, and a thousand others! No growth after all, but a thing of infinite meddle and make—a mass of infinite joinings, of endless seams and sutures, whose opposing edges no cunning of gum, or glue, or paste, or paint can ever hide from us!

Like Goethe, Hegel is a proof of the simple open susceptibility and ready impressibility of the Germans. Contrary to general supposition, they are really inoriginate. Nothing in Germany grows. Everything is made: all is a Gemachtes. It is an endless recurrence to the beginning, and a perpetual refissing of the old, with hardly the addition of a single new original grain.

Hegel coolly accepts the new position—demands no proof, supplies no proof—only sets to work new-arranging and new-labelling. All is ideal, and all is substance, but all must have the schema of subject. Nature is but the other of Spirit, and the Logical Idea unites them both. This is parallel to the scheme of Spinoza—Extension, Thought, and Substance. The general schema is to be considered applicable also as particular, or as method. All are ideas; they must be classified, then—thrown into spheres, objective, subjective, and so on. The logical are the common categories—the secret machinery of the whole—the latent, internal, invisible skeleton.

Say a pool of water reflects the world above. Now, let there be no above, but let the pool still reflect as before. The pool, then, becomes in itself reflector and reflexion, subject and object—Man. Restore now again the above which we withdrew, the above that was reflected in the pool—the mighty blue gulf of the universe; and call that the reflexion of a mightier—to us invisible—pool, which is thus also reflector and reflexion, subject and object, but, as pool of all pools, God. This is an image of Hegel’s world. He will have no Jenseits, no Yonder and Again; all shall be Diesseits, a perpetual Here and Now. God shall be no mystery; he will know God. He will apply the predicates and name the
subject. The logical formulae are the real predicates of God. God is that real and concrete—not that unreal and abstract, not that nonentity and nowhere that is understood as the dieu of the Philosophes, the infidel god. Being and Non-being are the ultimate secrets of the universe, the ultimate and essential predicates of God.

He blinks no consequences; each individual as only finite, as only Daseyn, as only quasi-permanent moment must be resolved into the Werden, which alone is the truth of Being and Non-being. He will pack all into the form he has got—he will not see that anything sticks out of it—he will not allow himself to think that either he or we see that it is a packing.

Again, the system is like the three legs which are the symbol of the Isle of Man. Throw it as you will, it keeps its feet. Turn it, toss it, it is ever the same, and triune. There is a magical toy just like it—consisting of three plates or so—seize any one of them, and all clatters down into the same original form.

The Thing-in-itself is a mere abstraction, a surface of reflexion, a regulative. Is, taken immediately, that is, without reflexion, is a pure abstraction. It is a pure thought—a mere thought. Hegel sees thus an immense magical hollow universe construct itself around from a few very simple elementary principles in the centre.

He has completely wrested himself from mere mortal place—on the outside—groping into a concrete delusion. He sees himself like a planet circling round a centre; he sees that his own nature mirrors that centre; then he forcibly places himself in the centre, to take up, as it were, the position of God, the Maker, and sees himself—as mere man—as concrete delusion—circle round himself.

How small must all other men appear to him—that trip over his Seyn and his Nichts—what fearful laughter is in this man!

Does he not come out from the centre of that world, that den, that secret chamber of his, begrimed with powder, smelling of sulphur—like some conjuror,—hard and haggard, his voice sepulchral and his accents foreign, but his laugh the laugh of demons? Contrast this with the simple pious soul, on the green earth, in the bright fresh air, patiently industrious, patiently loving, piously penitent, piously hopeful, sure of a new world and a new life—a better world and a better life—united to his loved ones; there for ever in the realms of God, through the merits of his Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.
C. 3.

In Wesen Hegel has to exhibit the metaphysical nature of Essence; the peculiarity of which is assumed by us to lie in this, that it alone constitutes the reality, while the manifestation constitutes the unreality, nevertheless, at the same time, also, the manifestation depends on the essence, and yet, no less, the essence depends on the manifestation. This is a simple idea; but with this, and this only, Hegel contrives to wash over page after page. Such a conception quite suits the nature of the man; his delight is endless in it. He looks at it incessantly, finding ever some new figure, some new phrase for the extraordinary inter-relations of essence and manifestation. And never were such words written —selcouth, uncouth, bizarre, baroque—pertinent and valuable only to a Hegel. Style and terminology how clumsy, inelegant, obscure! Then the figures, like 'life in excrement,' an endless sprawl—an endless twist and twine—endless vermiculation, like an anthill.

We will not remain content with the manifestation, we must pierce through it to the centre verity, he says; it is the background that contains the true, the immediate outside and surface is untrue. Then this knowledge is a reflexive knowledge—it does not take place by or in the essence—it begins in another, it has a preliminary path to travel—a path that transcends the directly next to us, or, rather, that enters into this. Thought must take hints from the immediate, and thus through inter-agency attain to essence. Then—and so on! Strange, meaningless, stupid as all this may seem, it is still the same thing that is spoken of—the mutual relations that result from a thing considered at once as essence and manifestation. The manifestation exhibits itself as real and unreal, as separable from essence and inseparable, and the whole idea is the product of a process of reflexion between the two parts—between the sort of negative abstraction or interior that is viewed as what is eminently real and that corresponds to essence, and the affirmative manifestation or exterior, that is yet viewed as relatively negative and unreal Essence, in short, is an idea resulting from reflexes between an outer manifestation and an inner centre or verity. Such is the whole metaphysic of the matter, and to this we have page after page applied.*

* This just shows, however, that we must verify our categories—our distinctions —our common terms of thought and speech.
C. 4.

Kant ideally constructed all as far as the Thing-in-itself, God, Immortality, &c. Fichte transmuted the Thing-in-itself into the Anstoss, the Appulse, and summed up the others under the Ego. Schelling got rid of Ego, Anstoss, &c., in his neutrum of the Absolute. Hegel only mediated what Kant had left immediate, up to the stand-point of Schelling; that is, he deduced by a process of evolution the Thing-in-itself, &c. The means he adopted consisted of his expedients of abstraction and reflexion. Through these he succeeds in showing the mediate nature of these Bestimmungen, values, previously looked on as immediate.

There is much that is suggestive in Kant, much that is sound and pregnant; but there is again even in him, mainly Britanic as he is, the German tendency to ride an idea to death—to be carried on one’s hobbyhorse, nothing doubting, far into the inane. The non-reality of his categories, the inconceivableness of their application, the unsatisfactoriness of his conclusions on time and space, the insufficiency of his schema of time in regard to causality (bunglingly borrowed, though it be, and in a crumb-like fashion, by Sir W. Hamilton)—all this, and much more, must be held as evident. Then Fichte develops a most pregnant conception in that of the pure Ego, but he stops there; or, rather, everyone instinctively refuses to follow him further on his hobbyhorse of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and wonders at the simple, futile laboriousness of the noble, honest man. Schelling and his neutrum must content themselves with their temporary or contemporary influence. He was ever, as it were, a susceptible, ardent stripling—a creature of books and the air of chambers. His transcendence of the Ego only misled Hegel, and his neutrum is untenable. If ever man dropped into the grave an ‘exasperated stripling’ of fourscore, it was Schelling. He longed to be great; but neither Fichte, nor Spinoza, nor Jacob Böhm, nor Plotinus, nor Hegel could supply him with a bridge to what he coveted. Hegel has a brassier and tougher determination to be original at all costs than Schelling. He attacks all, and he reconciles all. He is as resolute a Cheap-John, as cunning and unscrupulous and unhesitating a hawker, as ever held up wares in market. Here, too, we have the same credulity in the sufficiency of his hobbyhorse, the same tendency to superfetation and monstrosity. Strange
how such a tough, shrewd, worldly man should have so egregiously deceived himself! Because he could new-classify and new-name, he actually thinks that he new-knows and new-understands! He actually believes himself to say something that explains the mystery, when he says materiature has no truth as against Spirit, and when he talks of the monstrous power of contingency in nature! No; the current belief (as shown in Kossuth) that the Germans have got deeper into the infinite than other people is an out-and-out mistake. They have generated much monstrosity both in literature and philosophy, through the longing to be great and new; to equal the bull, they have blown themselves out like the frog, and burst—that's all! A few grains of sound thinking can be gathered out of them, but with what infinite labour! From Fichte, the Ego; from Schelling, Nil, from Hegel, amid infinite false, some true classification and distinction; from old Kant, certainly the most, and with him the study of metaphysic must in Great Britain recommence.

In regard to Hegel, satisfaction and dissatisfaction are seldom far from each other, but the latter predominates. If, for a moment, the words light up, and a view be granted, as it were, into the inner mysteries, they presently quench themselves again in the appearance of mere arbitrary classification and artificial nomenclature. The turns are so quick and thorough! one moment we are north, the next south, and, in fact, we are required to be in both poles at once! An art that so deftly and so swiftly turns this into that, and that into this, rouses suspicion: we fear it is but the trick of speech; we fear we have to do with a fencer but all too cunning; we are jealous of the hot and cold blowing, and, like Sir Andrew Aguecheek, we exclaim, 'An I thought he had been so cunning in fence,' &c.

We cannot help seeing an attempt to knead together all the peculiarities of his predecessors: the categories, freedom, and antinomies of Kant, the Ego, and the method of Fichte, the substance and the neutrum of Schelling. It is thus he would make his Absolute Subject, to whom we can see no bridge!—who is either ourselves, or we cannot get at him. If he is not ourselves, he refuses to cohere, we cannot articulate the bones of this Universal, nor breathe into him individual life! He will not cohere, indeed; like the great image in Daniel, he breaks in pieces of his own accord, and falls down futile. The sense is often multiform, like a gipsy's prophecy or the scrolls of the alchemists.
The singular is being constantly hypostasised, but not as singular—as transformed rather into his huge, vast, self-contradictory, untenable Universal!

D. 1.

The transition from Seyn (Being) to Daseyn (There-being, That-being) is a faulty one. The contradiction latent in Werden (Becoming) itself, and made obvious to thought by alternate consideration of its two antagonistic forms, moments, or elements, is inadequately expressed by Daseyn. The inadequacy is one of excess: Daseyn means more than the idea to which it is applied. Fixedness in the flux, or quasi-permanence in the flux, is the sole notion arrived at by consideration of the contradiction in question. Now Daseyn, it must be admitted, implies, so far as its etymology is concerned, but little more than this. While Seyn is Being, Daseyn is There-being or Here-being; while the former is as, the latter is there or here is; and the there or here, though in itself an appellative of space, and though as yet space and its concerns have no place among these abstract thoughts, involves an error so completely of the infinitely small kind, that it may justifiably be neglected. But an appellative of space is not the only foreign element, the interpolation of which we have here to complain of, and it is not the etymological use of the word which we are here inclined to blame. It is in the ordinary and everyday use of the word that the source of the error lurks. Daseyn, in fact, not by virtue of the step it indicates in the process, but by virtue of its own signification, introduces us at once to a general insphering universe, and particular insphered unities. Nay, Hegel himself tacitly accepts all this new material so conveniently extended to him, for he says at once Daseyn is Quality, that is, having arrived at the one particular quality, fixedness, he hesitates not to sublime it into the type of all quality, or into quality in general. This, however, is just what the Germans themselves call Erschleichtung; there is here the semblance only of exact science, the reality, however, of interpolation and surreptitious adoption. Seyn, Nichts, Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen (Being, Nothing, Becoming, Origin, Decease), have been turned and tossed, rattled and clattered before us, till the sort of involuntary voluntary admission is abstracted, 'Oh, yes, we see; Daseyn is the next step.' But after this admission the logical
juggler has it all his own way: Daseyn being conceded him in one sense, the fine rogue uses it henceforth freely in all.

It may be objected that we do not sufficiently consider the nature of the fixedness—that we do not sufficiently realise what fixedness it is. This fixedness, it may be said, is the fixedness in the flux, the fixedness between coming to be and ceasing to be; and fixedness, so placed, indicates a very peculiar quality—the quality, in fact, of all quality. It is the abstract expression of every existent unity, whether bodily or mental; just such fixedness is the abstract absolute constitution of every existent particular entity; and it is no subreption to call it quality, for every entity that bodily or mentally is there, is there by virtue of this fixedness in the coming and going—that is, by virtue of its quality. To this, the only reply is, You admit the objection, you drag in the empirical world. Then they say, Why, we have never excluded it. We admit the presence of Anschauen (perception) behind all our reasoning; but we contend that all our reasoning is absolutely free from it, that there is no materiature whatever in it, that it consists of absolutely pure abstract thought. Our Werden is the pure thought of all actual Werdens; our Daseyn is just what of pure thought all actual Daseyns contain. Daseyn is nothing but that abstract fixedness Then we conclude with—It is all very well to say so, but the presence of actual perception is constantly throwing in prismatic colours, and the whole process, if it is to be conceived as a rigorous one, is a self-delusion.

This (of 'Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit, und Grenze,' in the full Logic) is the most intricate and the least satisfactory discussion we have yet been offered. There is no continuous deduction: the deduction, in fact, seems to derive its matter from without, and so to be no deduction at all. The distinctions are wire-drawn, equivocal, shadowy, evanescent. The turns and contradictions are so numerous, that suspicion lowers over the whole subject. It is an imbroglio and confusion that no patience, no skill can satisfactorily disentangle. The greater the study, the more do.weak points come to light. For what purpose, for example, has Eigenschaft, a word involving the same matter, been treated several pages previously in an esoteric fashion, if not to prepare the way for the esoteric fashion here? Then will this hocus-pocus with Bestimmtheit, Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit, An sich, An ihm, &c., really stand the test of anything like genuine inspection? We are first told that, &c.—He then describes, &c. A very pretty imbroglio,
truly! and one that results from the same thoughts being contorted through all manner of different terms. But this is the least of the confusion, the greatest is behind, &c.—We are next told, &c. Suppose we apply his own illustration to his own words, we shall find that in man his Bestimmung is Denken, his Bestimmtheit ditto, his An sich ditto, and his An ihm ditto. His Seyn-für-Anderes is called his Natürlichkeit, but might easily be shown to be just Denken too. The confusion, in fact, becomes everywhere worse confounded. All seems a mere arbitrary play of words, the player perpetually shifting his point of view without giving notice of the shift. But what, then, can be the truth here? The truth is, we have just to do with a brassy adventurer who passes himself off as a philosopher, but presents as his credentials only an involved, intricate, and inextricable reformation of the industry of Kant; and this, in the middle of adventurer-like perpetual abuse, correction, and condemnation of this same Kant. The object he seems to have here before his eyes, is the special constitutive quality of Something, which is a compound of outer manifestation and inner capability. Then, that there is sometimes an outer manifestation that does not seem directly to depend on the inner force, but to be mere outside. Then, that accidental and essential manifestations are really the same. Then, that a thing changed by influence of something, reacts on that something, contributes elements to its own change and maintains itself against the Other. Water liquid, and water frozen, are the same yet different, for example,—two somethings and one something; the negation seems immanent, it is the development of the Within-itself of the Something. Otherness appears as own moment of Something—as belonging to its Within-itself. Then, that the identity and diversity of the two Somethings lead to Limit, &c. &c. The whole business of Hegel is here to reduce these empirical observations into abstract terms, and to treat them as if they were results of thought alone, and as if they were legitimately and duly deduced from his abstract commencement with pure Being. The confusion of language, the interpolation of foreign elements, the failure of exact deduction, the puzzle-headed fraudulence of the whole process, can escape no one. He draws first his great lines of Being and Nothing. Then, over the cross of these two lines, he sets himself, like a painter, to lay on coat after coat of verbal metaphysic with the extravagant expectation that the real world will at length emerge. The first coat to the cross is Werden; again it is Daseyn; and again it is
OBJECTIONS TO HEGEL.

47

It also becomes manifest that he alternately paints
with two colours and with one Being and Nothing two, Becoming
one, Origin and Decease two, Daseyn one, Eeality and Negation two,
Something one, An sich and Seyn-fiir-Anderes two, and so on.
fact, that the whole process is but a repeated
It will be found,
coating of Being and Nothing, now as diverse and again as identical
till the end of the entire three volumes.
Nor is it a bit better with his exoteric works not a bit with

Fursichseyn.

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Philosophy of History/ the most exoteric of
chapter, second section, second part, it has a strange
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Hegel talk of the G-reek and Christian Gods in the same breath
Man, as what is spiritual, constitutes what is true in the Grecian
gods, that by which they come to stand above all Nature-gods, and
above all abstractions of a One and Supreme Being. On the
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"

an advantage in the Grecian gods,
is supposed to be
wanting in the Christian God. Schiller says, Men were more
Godlike when gods were more menlike.” But the Grecian gods
are not to be regarded as more human than the Christian God.
Christ is much more Man: he lives, dies, suffers death on the
Cross and this is infinitely more human than the man of beautiful nature among the Greeks
Was there ever any really divine
sense of the All awakened in him ? What curious maundering
dreaming, or dreaming maundering, is all that j)laying at philosophising over the Greek gods
He talks much of abstract and concrete but, after all, did the concrete ever shine into him but through
the abstractions of books ^ Of the origin of these gods in common
human nature, do we get a single glimpse in all his maundering ?
They come from other nations and they did not, they are local and
not local, they are spiritual and they are natural and it is black
and white, and red and green, and look here and look there, and
this is so and so, and that is so and so and so all is satisfactorily
explained, clear and intelligible
How could he ever get anyone

other side,

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that they are conceived as human, whereas this

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disconnected theorising, and
maundering ^the thought of his substance, that
develops itself from An sich to Fiir sich, recurring to him only at
rare intervals, and prompting then a sudden spasmodic but vain
The fact is, it is all
s;pTattU at concatenation and reconciliation ^
maundering, but with the most audacious usurpation of authoritaGod
tive speech on the mysteries that must remain mysteries.
must take form, for nothing is essential that does not take form
to listen to such childish theorising
silly,

aimless

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'but if God is to appear in an appropriate expression, this can only be the human form:'—what is this maulder—does Hegel see anything? What is God to Hegel? Does he figure a universal thought, conscience, will, emotion,—a universal spirit? Has that spirit the sense of 'I?'—can there be thought, conscience, emotion, will, without 'I?' How am I to figure myself beside this Hegelian universal? How comes my thought to be mine, egoised into my 'I?' How am I specialised out of the Universal? Is it not a vain wrestling to better name the All in characteristics of mind? Is there any deduction—any explanation?

The exasperating sensation in attempting to construe all this into ordinary words or forms of thought! It is just that there is no Jenseits, no Yonder, only a Here and Now of Spirit running through its moments! What relief to the understanding on such premises, but the Materialism of Feuerbach or the Singleism of Stirner, which seem indeed to have so originated?

Language contains so many words, distinguished by so very slight, subtle, and delicate meanings, that it gives vast opportunities to a genius such as that of Hegel; who delights to avail himself of them all, to join them, disjoin them, play with them like an adept, arriving finally to be able to play a dozen games at once of this sort of chess, blindfold. His whole talk seems to be a peculiar way of naming the common,—a simply Hegel's way of speaking of naturalism. What is, is, and I give such and such names to it and its process,—but I do not fathom or explain it and its process—I merely mention it in other than the usual words.

The 'Vestiges' transcend the actual only in a physical interest; but here the physical is translated into the metaphysical. The final aim of all is consciousness; and said consciousness is figured, not as subjective, as possessed by some individual, but as objective and general, as substantive and universal. The realised freedom of spirit viewed as substantive reason, this is the process we are to see taking place, and it is in the form of the State we are to recognise its closest approximation to realisation! The State is the nidus in which are deposited all the successive gains of the world-spirit. The State is the grand pupa of existence, surrounded by the necessary elements of nourishment, &c. Mankind are seen, then, like coral insects, subjectively secreting intelligence, and depositing the same objectively in the rock of the State!

Is, then, a Constitution the great good, as it were the fruit and
outcome of the whole universe? In spite of all changes in ideals and reals, is there an objective spiritual gain handed down from generation to generation? Can this be exhibited? Out of the human real, reposing on and arising from the human ideal, is there a universal real or ideal gained? Can it be characterised? Carlyle, 'as witness Paris-city,' admits that much has been realised; but is not his standpoint chiefly rejection of the objective and assertion of the subjective? Is not that the nucleus of Hero-worship,—which looks for weal from living individuals, not from the objective depositions of reason (in the shape of institutions) in time? Is, then, the great practical question that of Hegel, not what was he or what was another, but what are the objective gains of the world-spirit?

Hegel alludes to an 'element in man that elevates him above the place of a mere tool and identifies him with the Universal itself; there is the divine in him, freedom, &c.—the brute is not, &c.—but,' he says, 'we enter not at present on proof; it would demand an extensive analysis, &c. &c.!!' Fancy the audacious cheek of the Professor, beating down his hearers by mere words—giving other names to common categories—as if they were all thereby explained and in his waistcoat pocket! Where is his justification—where is the basis of all those fine airs of superiority? Does he believe more than a Divine government of the world—does he see aught else than the hard lot of much that is good and true? Is the one explained or only named by the word Reason, and the other by Contingency?—'which latter has received from the former, the Idea, authority to exercise its monstrous influence!' Must we not repeat—dedot verba?

It is intelligible how the State looms so large in Hegel's eyes. It is a type of the step in philosophy named the transcending of the Ego. The will and the idea here are not expressions of what is individual, but of what is general. This is true, too, to the aim of the Socratic generalisation which raised up the universal and necessary out of the particular and accidental. But does all one's worth come from the State? Since the State grows in worth, must not a portion of worth come from the individual? Is not the individual always higher than the State,—Christ than Jewry, Socrates than Athens, Confucius than China?

Hegel is always pedagogue-like—-with him naming is explaining.
Nor is it true that we are more subjective, the Greeks more objective. Xenophon (the murmurs of the individual Ten Thousand), as well as Homer (Thersites), shows subjectivity to have had greater influence than now.

How definitively conclusive Hegel is to himself on all these matters in this 'Philosophy of History!' Whether he is in Africa or Europe, America or Asia, he dictates his views equally imperially—his findings are infallible, never doubt it, sir!'—Ah me! these sentences on all and everything in the world are quite irreversible! 'In Ashantee, the solemn ceremony begins with an ablation of the bones of the mother of the king in the blood of men,' why does Absolute Wisdom omit to ask itself, What, if she still live? The statesman shows his son how very little wisdom is required in the governing of the world; and Hegel makes plain here that Absolute Knowledge has only to assert and again assert, and always assert. How unscrupulous that sniff of condemnation! How unhesitating that decisiveness of sentence in the midst of so little certainty!—bless you! he does not fear! An impure spirit, with impure motives, takes to an ethereal subject, will take rank with the best, will speak as authoritatively as they, and pours out indiscriminately slag and ore: Germany here, too, true to its character of external intentional effort according to the receipt in its hands. But in that leaden head of his, what strange shapes his thoughts take, and how strangely he names them!

In the preface to the 'Phaenomenologie,' observe the dry, sapless, wooden characterisation, in strange, abstract, prosaic figures, of the hapless plight of the unfortunate Schellingian! Hegel it is, rather than Schelling, who has put in place of reasoning, a curious species of inward vision—applied it is to strange things of wire in an element of sawdust, dull, dead, half-opaque, soundless, fleshless, inelastic—a motion as of worms in a skull of wood—not the rich shapes in the blue heaven of the true poet's phantasy! How he continues throwing the same abstract, abstruse, confused prose figures at Schelling! Verily, as Humboldt says of him, 'language here has not got to the Durchbrech: that is, we may say, perhaps, language remains ever underground here, muffled, and never gets to break through, as flowers elsewhere do, or as other people's teeth do! Really, Hegel's rhetoric is absolutely his own. There is something unbefangenes—simpletonish—in him: he is still the Suabian lout!
THE PROCESS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

51

D. 2.

This—referring to a passage in the same preface—is just a description in abstracto of self-consciousness. The Ego is first unreal simplicity,—that is, unreal or simple negativity; but just, as it were, for this very reason (that is, to know itself and be no longer negative, or because it finds itself in a state of negativity) it becomes self-separated into duality—it becomes a duplication, a duad, the units of which confront each other, in the forms of Ego-subject and Ego-object; and then, again, this very self-separation, this very self-duplication, becomes its own negation—the negation of the duality, inasmuch as its confronting units are seen to be identical, and the antithesis is reduced, the antagonism vanishes. This process of self-consciousness has just to be transferred to the All, the Absolute, the Substance, to enable us to form a conception of unreal negativity of Spirit passing into the heterogeneity of external nature, finally to return reconciled, harmonious, and free into its own self. Surely, too, that process of self-consciousness strikes the key-note of the whole method and matter of Hegel!

An sich may be illustrated by an ill-fitting shoe. First, consciousness is only in itself—or, as the German seems to have it, only at itself, only in its own proximity: there is malaise quite general, indefinite, and indistinct; it is everywhere in general, and nowhere in particular. But, by degrees, the mist and blur, the nebula, resolves itself into foci and shape; Ansichseyn becomes Fürsichseyn, and it is seen—that the shoe is too wide in the heel—that and nothing else.

The intermediate is the first step in the divine process (the phase of universality, latent potentiality being first assumed); it is reflexion into its own self, and as such only, and no more, it is the awakening of consciousness, the kindling, the lighting, the flashing up of the Ego, which is pure negativity as yet. First, the Ego was only in or at itself, everywhere in general and nowhere in particular,—that is, latent only, potential only (the formless infinite, indefinite nebula); then comes reflexion of this into itself or on to itself, and this reflexion is a sort of medium, an element of union, a principle of connection between self and self. In this stage, the previously indefinite comes to be for itself; that is to say, in the physical world, it is a finite,
circumscribed, individual entity, and in the metaphysical a self-consciousness. Reduced to its most abstract form, it is nothing but a Becoming—a becoming something—a focus in the nebula, an Ego in consciousness. Ego is immediate to Ego, focus to focus; the mediacy then leads only to a condition of immediacy. Process is no prejudice to unity, nor mediacy to immediacy; it is a one, a whole, an absolute, all the same.

The same reason—the same forms, processes, peculiar experiences and characters, exist in the outer world which exist in the inner: analogy passes into its very depths—the outer is just the inner, but in the form of outerness or heterenity, alienation. Thus Hegel, horse on his idea, penetrates and permeates the whole universe both of mind and matter, and construes all into a one individuality—which is Substance, the True, the Absolute, God.

The idea is evidently substance, for it is common to all; it is the common element; it is the net into which all is wrought, whether physical or metaphysical. Behind the logical categories, there lie side by side the physical and the spiritual. Hegel really meant it—and Rosenkranz is wrong to take it as mere figurative exaggeration—when he says that what is here is 'the demonstration of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit."

Much is Aristotelian in the above. There are reflexes of the δύναμις and the ἐνέργεια. It is Metaphysic Proper, an inquiry into the essential τὸ τί ἐστιν.

Negation in Hegel always seems to produce affirmation, not destruction. Negation seems in him, indeed, but the specific title of the element of variety and distinction. Such element is, in fact, negation. It is negation of its own unity, and each constituent member is the negative of the rest and of the whole.

The whole is to be conceived as an organic idea—a concrete idea—in which beginning is to be taken as also ideal, not a thing in time and nature, but a mere thought so and so characterised and articulated with the rest. The same is the case with subjectivity in general, and my subjectivity in special.

'There are periods when thought compromises existence—when it becomes destructive, negative. These are periods of so-called enlightenment. But thought, that has done this, must in its turn be looked at.' The true nature of the Begriff must be seen into; and he who understands Hegel's word Begriff, understands Hegel.
Despite the intensity of his abstraction, there is always in Hegel a glance at the whole concrete actual universe. Yet to read him is not to judge of things as this or that, but to follow a thread of aqua regia that dissolves and resolves the things themselves—a menstruum in which the most hard and solid objects become quick and flow. Hegel, indeed, seems ever to drive into the very grounds of things. Still, his secret is very much the translating of the concrete individual into the abstract general or universal. He is always intelligible when we keep before us the particular individual he is engaged translating; but let us lose the object, the translation becomes hopeless. The eye must never wander; let a single hint be missed, let a single stitch drop, the whole is to recommence again. The first chapter of the ‘Phaenomenologie,’ on Sensuous Certainty, is generally looked on as very extravagant and untenable; still it is really in abstract terms a very fair description of the progress of consciousness from crude Sensation to intelligent Perception. This is its intention, and not a dialectic destruction of an outer world. Still, Hegel may very well speak of a reversion or inversion; for whereas elsewhere things support thoughts, in him, on the contrary, thoughts support things, and the tendency in the reader to dazzle, dizziness, and turn, cannot be wondered at. But the thought being the prius, this method must be right.

D. 3.

Hegel will look at everything and say what it is. In his eyes, what we call the common idea of God is an abstraction utterly vague and predicateless. Then, again, it is thought that is the true mental act applicable to God. God, as a universal, is not only thought, but in the form of thought. We see here, then, that Hegel’s system is a universe of thought, in which Nature, the Ego—God himself, in a sense—are but moments, or the universe is an organon of thought into which all particulars—the whole itself—are absorbed as moments; and the aggregate of these moments—which, however, is other than an aggregate—constitutes the organic whole. The general conception under the phrase Supreme Being—as eighteenth century enlightenment (in which the bulk even of Ecclesiastics, forgetting their Bible, now share) has it—is quite abstract, quite formal, or formell; that is, it is an empty
formal act in which there is no substance—it is a longing opening of the jaws, but there is no nut between them.

The universe in time is viewed grandly as a spirit whose object is to bring before his own consciousness all that he is in himself, and each new fact so brought becomes superseded and transformed as a step to a higher stage. History is really such—consciousness in perpetual enlargement, enfranchisement, elevation. This can be personified as a Spirit, and—*all being thought*—this Spirit is the Universe, the One, the All, God. In it empirical Egos are but as moments, but as scales of thought. It is plain, then, that philosophy with Hegel will be the developed sum of all preceding philosophies. The progress *pictured* in the 'History of Philosophy' is the process of philosophy itself; and in philosophy, this progress is seen in unempirical development. Thought as it is, is concrete; that is, it is Idea. The knowledge or science of this, relating as it does to a concrete, will be a system—for a concrete is self-diremption in self-union or self-conservation. And here, then, is it at once necessity and freedom: necessity, as so and so constituted; freedom, as that constitution is its own, and has its own play, its own life. A sphere of spheres it is (each a necessary moment) and the entire idea constituted by the system of these, at the same time that the entire idea *appears* also in each.

The Idea is thought, not as formal, but as the self-evolving totality of its own peculiar principles and laws, which it gives to its own self, and not already has and finds to its hand in its own self. This is characteristic of Hegel. He thus avoids the question of a first cause; constituting thought as the first, the last, and the only. That thought might give itself its own distinctions is evident from language. To use but inadequate examples, *thing* is but a form of *think*, thankful but another way of saying *thinks*ful.

Can creation be accounted for otherwise? Assume God—well, creation is simply his thought; in the world of man and nature we have simply to do with the thought of God. We cannot suppose God making the world like a mason. It is sufficient that God think the world. But we have thus access to the thought of God—the mind of God. Then our own thought—*as thought*—is analogous. So the progress of generalisation is to study thought as thought in the form of a universal. Thought being viewed in this way, the whole is changed: creation, God, and all else have taken up quite new and different relations; nor is there any
THE GENERAL IDEA.

longer the difficulty of a beginning, &c. Logic, thus, has to do quite with the supersensual; mathematic is seen to be quite sensuous in comparison.

In the beginning—Seyn und Nichts, Being and Nothing—there is room for much reflexion. We are not to suppose that it relates to formal and professional logic only. It must be taken sub specie aeternitatis. The whole question, What was the beginning—what was it that was the first?—is there. The answer, God, does not suffice; for the question still recurs, And God—whence? Hegel must be credited with the most profound and exhaustive thought here. It is the first question in universal metaphysic. What was the beginning? How are we to conceive that? Rather, we feel that it is inconceivable: we feel that, when we answer, Oh, God of course, we have yielded to our own impatience—to our own weariness of what is never-ending, and that the terminus we have set up is arbitrary merely, a word mainly; that, in short, the business is to begin again so soon as we have taken breath and recovered temper. There is a whole school, however, which pronounces this to be the answer; that is, that answer there is none for us. Humanity is to see here its own deficiency and insufficiency of original nature. We are only adequate to a compartment, not to the whole. Our sphere is limited; our functions must learn and acknowledge their own bounds. Perception and confession of ignorance in regard to all such questions, constitute on our part wisdom and philosophy.

This however, is, in reality, but again the human mind halting for breath, resting for temper. The question recurs, and will recur, so soon as action itself, after its own pause, recurs. Not but that the new action may fare similarly, and be obliged to halt with the same result; a state of matters which will simply continue till there is a successful effort towards the satisfaction of a need which is absolutely inextinguishable, however temporarily appeasable. To a mind like Hegel's, all this is obvious, and he will look steadily along the line, his mind made up to this—that the necessity for an answer shall, so far as he is concerned, not be shirked. How are we to conceive the beginning, then, he asks himself, and continues asking himself, till the thought emerges, What is a beginning? and in a few moments more he feels he has the thread: of the organon, thought, the distinction beginning is but a moment, but an involved and constituent element, joint, or article. It is but a portion of the articulated apparatus, of the
whole system or series. It is a characteristic of the universe, thought—a characteristic among others—that it has a particular pin or pole, or special pinion, named beginning—a pole which it gives to its own self for its own distribution, disposition, and arrangement.

Gives its own self! the reader may exclaim: why, then there is something before the beginning, that gives the beginning! Well, yes; but that is not the way to put it. There is thought, and there is nothing but thought; thought is the All, and, as the All, it is, of course, also what we mean by the term the prius—it is the first: these terms prius, first, beginning, &c., are, in fact, predicates, attributes of its own, part and parcel of its own machinery, of its own structure, of its own constitution. When we use the expression God, we are just saying the same thing, for God is obviously thought; or God is Spirit, and the life of Spirit is thought. Creation, then, is thought also; it is the thought of God. God’s thought of the Creation is evidently the prius of the Creation; but with God to think must be to create, for he can require no wood-carpentry or stone-masonry for his purpose: or even should we suppose him to use such, they must represent thought, and be disposed on thought.* The stone-masonry and wood-carpentry, then, can be set aside as but the accessory and non-essential, and the Creation can be pronounced thought:† whether direct through thought, or indirect through stone-masonry and wood-carpentry, all recurs to God. Then God viewed personally, on the question

* For us, then, truly to think them, is to reproduce the thought of God, which preceded their creation, and which, so to speak, therefore contained them.

† But it is pleonastic to assume stone-masonry and wood-carpentry as independent self-substantial entities, out of, and other than, thought. Let us say rather that thought is perceiving thought, thought is a perceptive thought, or the understanding is a perceptive understanding. So Kant conceived the understanding of God. Our perception he conceived to be derivative or sensuous (intuitus derivatius); while that of God appeared to him necessarily original and intellectual (intuitus originarius). Now the force of this is, that the perception of God makes its objects; creation and perception, with understanding of the same, are but a one act in God. Man, Kant conceived, possessed no such direct perception, but only a perception indirect through media of sense, which media, adding elements of their own, separated us for ever from the thing-in-itself (or things-in-themselves), at the very moment that they revealed it (or them). But suppose thought in all cases to be perceptive thought, thought where subject thinking and object thought are identical—identical in difference if you like, even as the one side and the other side of this sheet of paper are identical in difference—then we come tolerably close to the standpoint of Hegel.
of a beginning must still yield the same answer. God is thought, and ‘beginning’ is but one of its own natural poles, or centres of gravitation, disposition, and revolution.

Now, in the conception ‘beginning,’ the first step or element, in regard to anything whatever beginning or begun, is—so far as thought is concerned—just the thought ‘is.’ Even God placed under the focus of the category ‘beginning,’ must have first said to himself ‘is,’ ‘there is.’ But in this first step there is no more than that. Descartes called the first step sum, but manifestly he ought to have said est. The ego involved in sum is a concrete infinitely higher in ascent than est-esse, Seyn, Being. That there is, is manifestly the most abstract thought that can be reached. That is, when we perform the process of abstraction, when we strip off all empirical qualities, one after the other, ‘is’ is the residuum—abstract Being, predicateless ‘is.’ Even when we think of any natural entity, when we think even of life, say, it is evident that the first step of the beginning is ‘is.’ But what, even under that point of view, would be the second? Why, ‘is not.’ There must be, at first (we are using the category, we are seeing through our lens ‘beginning’ at this moment) a wholly indefinite and indeterminate, and, so to speak (since the category natural life accompanies our thought here), instinctive thought or feeling ‘is,’ but this must be immediately followed by the thought or feeling ‘not.’ There is as yet only ‘is,’ there is nothing else. That is, the very ‘is’ is nought or not. But throwing off any reference to natural life, and restricting ourselves to thought absolutely and per se, it is still plainer that the abstract initial ‘is’ is identical with the abstract and initial ‘non-is.’ Because the ‘is’ is the last product of abstraction; it has no attribute, it is bodiless position; it not only ‘is,’ but it is ‘non.’ One can readily see, then, that in Hegel’s so abstract, formal, and professional statement of Seyn und Nichts, there is involved a creative substratum of the most anxious, persevering, and comprehensive concrete reflection. One can see that he has bottomed the whole question of a beginning. Why he should have set it up so abruptly and so unconnectedly steep, is a query impossible for us to answer. ‘Is’ and ‘is-non,’ then, contain the same subject-matter, or the same no subject-matter: each is an absolute and ultimate abstraction; the ‘is’ is a ‘non-is,’ and the ‘non-is’ is in the same sense an ‘is.’ In this sense, then, Being and Non-being are identical, neither the one nor the other possesses a predicate—they are each nothing. But, if they are
the same, they are again not the same, there is a distinction between them, and so on.

From the position that thought is the all and the prius, it follows that thought must contain in itself a principle of progression or movement. Hegel asserts his method to be this principle; and we should certainly very decidedly stultify ourselves, if we should suppose that Hegel sets up this method in the merely arbitrary fashion of an impostor bent on some personal result. Hegel's method is the product of reflection equally deep and earnest with that which originated his beginning. Thought's own nature is, first, position; second, opposition; and third, composition. It is evident that, however we figure a beginning of thought, in God or ourselves, it must possess a mode of progression, a mode of production, and that is absolutely impossible on a principle of absolutely simple, single, unal identity. The first, then, though unal, must have separated into distinctions, and these by union, followed again by disunion and reunion ad infinitum, must have produced others till thought became the articulated organon it is now. It is also plain that, were there movement only by separation into contraries without reunion into higher stages, the progress would fail in systematic articulation, and also in improvement. Re-union, then, is evidently a step as necessary as separation. The union of 'is' and 'non-is' in 'becomes,' need also not be confined to logical abstractions, but may be illustrated from the concrete. Every concrete process of Becoming is a union of the two. Resuming our illustration, too, from the life of thought, it is evident that, after the first dim consciousness 'is' and the second 'not,' the third of 'becomes'—of a coming to be and of a ceasing not to be—must succeed.

D. 4

The question is, What is truth? i.e. What is the Absolute? But the absolute cannot be hopped to by means of some cabalistic hocus-pocus. It must be worked up to. But where does it lie? Wherever it lies, to be known it must come into our knowledge. But we already possess knowledge. Is it so sure that the absolute is not already there? Let us take our knowledge just as we have it, and look at it. Let us take knowledge, not in some out-of-the-way, enchanted-looking corner, we do not know where,
but as it comes up. Let us take this thing knowledge, not as we suppose it, not as in some sublime indeterminateness we imagine it, but as it manifests itself—now and here—to us, just as it at once directly shows or appears. For result—as the 'Phaenomenologie,' which starts thus, will show—it will be found that the opinion of object will disappear, and that there will remain the idea only. Our knowing and what we know are identical. The object becomes, so to speak, intelligised, and the intellect objectivised. The relation between the supposed two is one of mere otherness in identity. The object is knowing but in the form of otherness. Knowledge involves the relation of two factors; but they are both the same substance. Knowing, even to know itself, must have a something to know; and thus process involves and introduces at once the relation of otherness. Man's error is the hypostasising of his ideas—the separating of his indivisible self, by a dead wall of his own assumption, into irreconcilable duality of thinking and thought. We have been desperately hunting the whole, infinite, unreachable heaven for an Absolute, which, folded up within us, smiled in self-complacent security, at the infatuation of its very master. We have wearied heaven and earth with our importunate clamours for a glass that bestrid the bridge of our own nose. What we wanted lay at the door; but to and fro we stepped over it, vainly asking for it, and plunging ourselves bootlessly into the far forest.

It is the peculiar nature of the Idea to be the union of the universal and the particular in the individual. Here lie the elements of the explanation of the relation which the subjective bears to the objective. Such questions as Life and Death, the Soul, Immortality, God, are to be regarded from a wholly-changed point of view. Death is a constituent of the sphere of the Finite, but the Idea is imperishable. I am the Idea—you—he—and; but we are also singulars. As singulars, there is change—death; but, as participant of the self-conscious Idea, we are immortal. It is just an all of thought—triple-natured—with infinite gradations and spheres. Freedom, perfect self-consciousness, is the goal. Take it as nature, the same thing can be said. In fact, it is just a double language, the object and the idea; the same goal, the same gradations in the one as in the other.

The preface to the 'Phaenomenologie' is the plainest piece of speaking anywhere in Hegel, and capable of being put as
key to the whole system. It is full of the most hard, heavy, and effective thought, in new, subtle, and original directions; and the expression is as heavy and effective. A most surprising light is thrown upon what passes unquestioned under our eyes and among our hands; and the object Hegel sets himself here will be something beyond all precedent, if accomplished.

At present, thought is thus and thus constituted: but the process of which this constitution is the result, is simply experience. A history, then, of the phases of experience since the beginning, the first stage of thought, up to the present, would enable us to understand how this present arose; and thus we should get an insight into the nature of thought itself. But this process to Hegel has reached the highest stage of absolute thought: therefore, then, if he can conduct us through all the stages actually experienced by consciousness from the first to the last, he will conduct us—necessarily, and with full conviction—to ultimate and absolute thought itself. We are supposed to see only the bare process: but Hegel has helped himself by diligent reference to actual history, and we shall assist ourselves by looking out for reflexions of the same. There is everywhere a power of naming, in consequence of perception of the inner nature and limits of what is looked at, that must give pause, at all events, and open the eyes. The necessity and coherence of the systematisation will, at least, benefit all effort for the future. Hegel, indeed, clamours always for necessity and completeness of exposition. He cannot allow a subject to be attacked from an indefinite, conceded, common ground. The common ground must prove its nature, legitimacy, extent, &c. to the last dregs. He must begin with the beginning, and work all up into a one bolus of thought.

D 5.

Kant, in demonstrating the ‘possibility of a Transcendental Logic,’ begins the realisation of idealism. Idealism before that was but an abstract conception, an announced probability on a balance of reasons. With Kant actual development commences, and he very fairly initiates the business proper of Hegel, which was, not to prove the principle of idealism, but construct its system, lay out its world. In the series, Kant is as Geometry, Fichte as Algebra, Schelling as Applied Mathematic, and Hegel as the Calculus.
Thinking of Quantity as an intellectual notion to which things must adapt themselves as universal, particular, and singular,—of Quality, and the *à priori* necessities to which all *à posteriori* elements must submit in its regard,—of substance and accident, and the conditions they impose on all experience before experience,—one gets to see the origin of Hegel. The Idea, which is the All, is so constituted that it organises itself on these categories—suppose them God’s creative thoughts—or suppose them simply the elements of the *Monad*, of that which is, the Absolute.

In the ‘Kritik of Practical Reason,’ pp. 219, 220, Part 8 of the collected Works, occurs a passage which may be translated thus:

‘Because we consider here, in its practical function, pure Reason, which acts consequently on *à priori* principles, and not on empirical motives, the division of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason will necessarily resemble that of a syllogism. That is, it will proceed from the universal in the Major (the moral principle), through a subsumption under the same, in the Minor, of possible (particular) acts (as good or bad) to the Conclusion, namely, the subjective actualisation of Will (an interest in the practically possible good and the consequent *Maxim*). To him who follows with conviction the postions of the Analytic, such comparisons will prove pleasing; for they countenance the expectation that we shall yet attain to a perception of the unity of the entire business of pure reason (theoretical as well as practical), and be able to deduce all from a single principle, which is the inevitable demand of human reason; for we can find full satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of all the possessions of our reason.’

More than one deep germ of Hegel seems to lie here. The movement of the syllogism, for example, is seen here as it were in concrete and material application, and not as only formal and abstract. Then the demand of unity, of a single principle! The universal appears in Hegel as the Logic, the particular as Nature, the singular as Spirit. Then the universal, the abstract, is seen to be the ground of the other two. At page 107 of the ‘Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,’ we hear of the electric brush—that electricity is as a brush. Well, let us say here, the Logic, the universal, is the electric brush, the particular (Nature) is the materiature which attaches to and crassifies the ramification of said electric brush to the development, as it were, of a system of organs, and the singular (Spirit) is the one envelope of subjectivity that converts all into an absolute unity, at once absolutely negative and absolutely positive. In this way, we may conceive formed Hegel’s *Ideé-Monade*. Again, Kant’s one general principle
is to universalise the particular, objectify the subject, convert An sich or nature into Für sich or spirit; and Hegel's really is just the same.

In the Kritik of 'Judgment,' section 86, occurs the following:—

'For (such is the conviction of everyone) if the world consisted of beings merely inanimate, or some animate and some inanimate, but the animate still without reason, the existence of such a world would have no worth at all, for there would exist in it no being that possessed the slightest notion of any worth. If, again, there were also rational beings supposed to exist, but whose reason was such only as knew to put a value on things according to the relation of nature which these things bore to them (to their own gratification), but not to give to their own selves a priori, and independent of the experiences of nature, a value (in freewill), then there were (relative) aims in the world, but no (absolute) end-aim, because the existence of such rational beings would remain still abstruse. But moral laws are of this peculiarity, that they prescribe to reason something as aim without condition—consequently in the manner in which the notion of an end-aim requires it; and the existence of such a reason as, in the relation of an aim, can be the supreme law to itself—in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws—can therefore alone be thought as end-aim (final cause) of the existence of a world. Is this not so, then there he in the existence of the same either no aim at all, as regards its cause, or aims without end-aim.'

To this noble passage, let us add portion of the note at the bottom of the same page:—

'The glory of God is not inaptly named by Theologians, the final cause of creation. - It is to be observed, that we understand by the word creation, nothing else than the cause of the existence of a world, or of the things, the substances in it ['die Ursache vom Daseyn einer Welt;'] literally, to a Hegel, the original or primal thing or matter of the being there of a world]; as also the proper notion of the word [Schöpfung, creation, but literally a drawing; compare scooping] brings that same sense with it (actuatio substantiae est creatio), which consequently does not already involve the presupposition of a spontaneously operative, and therefore intelligent Cause (whose existence we would first of all prove).'

There were no worth in a world, then, that cannot appreciate worth. The world were blind and worthless without a being that can think. But what is the action on the world of a being that can think? By thinking, he arranges all in his own way—all takes place and meaning, not from itself, but from him (it had no meaning before him). It is thus his own self he projects around him; the other is but the stand for his own qualities, thereon disposed. The analogy of his own inner construction converts the opacity of the other into lucidity, transmutes its rigidity into pliancy; and the other remains as nothing when opposed to the
qualities it merely sustains. Hegel, in reading Kant, may be conceived as falling on such ideas, and so, as arriving at his anthropological monad, which, as all that is ours, as all that we can know—anything else, too, being merely suppositional, i.e. *again our own, again ourselves*—may be reasonably made, All, Absolute, and Infinite. *Actuatio substantiae est creatio* is a phrase, too, that has not failed to bear fruit in Hegel. Ursache vom Daseyn, and the remarkable phrase ‘*with laws, not under laws,*’ which occurs in the same neighbourhood, may be also viewed as suggestive of Hegelian elements. The passage in Kant offers to the spiritualist or idealist a bulwark impregnable to any materialist, a talisman in the light of which every materialist must fade and die.

On Kant’s theory, the world being phenomenal, materiature being simply an unknown appulse, giving rise to a subjective material, not necessarily at all like the materiature, not necessarily the same in all subjects, and incapable of comparison as between subjects,—this subjective material (all that holds of sensation or feeling), to become a world, would require a system of forms which can themselves be only subjective, only *ab intra*. These, then, would appear somehow as projected into the subjective material, to form part and parcel of the same. Further, they themselves, though subjective as belonging to the subject, might be *objective* as belonging to all the subjects, and as capable of being identified in each by *actual comparison*; they might be of an objective and universally determinable nature. They might come from our intellectual nature, for example. This is Kant. The subjective material in us set up by the unknown outer materiature, is received into an objective but internal net of arrangement. Feeling is the matter, but intellect is the form of all experience, however outer and independent it appear to us. Well, Kant succeeds in placing Sensation and Perception under Understanding, and Will under Reason; but he has still Emotion, in the general scheme of man’s faculties, and Judgment in the particular of the cognitive faculties, undiscussed. Now, what is he to do with design and beauty, which still keep apart from Understanding and Reason? If he is right in his world, they cannot come from without; they, too, must be subjective in the sense of coming from within, or they may be due to some harmony of the outer and inner. It is in this way, and from such considerations, that Judgment becomes the sphere
of design and beauty, which are of an Emotional nature. One can
see, then, what led Kant to be averse to all theoretic arguments
about God; for there was nothing noumenal known in Kant's
world but the Categorical Imperative; all the rest was pheno-
menal—unknown materiature apart—and depended on forms \textit{ab in}
\textit{tra}: Kant's theoretical world, in short, or world of \textit{knowledge}, was
only phenomenal. Plainly, then to Kant, all form being \textit{ab in}
\textit{tra}, design and beauty (which only show \textit{ab extra}) would present a peculiar
phase to him, and would require peculiarly to be dealt with.

It was easy to Kant's followers to see how small a rôle was left
for materiature, and to fall on the idea of expunging it. Hence it
was that Fichte attempted to build all up from these internal
forms, and to that he required a principle of movement in them-
selves, and a radiation from a single bottom one through a
systematic articulation of all the others. As left by Kant,
however, he was still on the platform of consciousness and a
subjective intellect; hence his system could only be one of
subjective idealism or objective egoism, which terms imply the
same thing. From this limited form Schelling freed the advancing
system by his principle of an absolute or neutrum into which
both nature and thought were resolved. But in Schelling the
sides remained apart, and the absolute had to be sprung to.
Hegel examined all, rethought all, and completed all. He perfected,
first, the thought-forms into a complete self-formative system—
into an organic and, so to speak, personal whole, to which the
particular, nature, took up the position of, as regards the first,
only its other, and in it the universal forms only repeated them-
selves as in particularity or otherness, while, third, he summed up
both in the singular of Spirit. His three parts present analogies
to the three of the syllogism, the three cognitive faculties, the
three faculties in general, &c.; and to the last Kant is repeated.

Hegel in his main principle has certainly put his finger on
the rhythmus of the universe. Understanding steps from abstrac-
tion to abstraction; but Reason conjoins and concretes them.
‘Beginning’ is an abstraction, and, as such, is untrue; it is
concrete only \textit{with} its end, and so true. Life and death must also
for their truth be concretely joined, and the result is the higher
new, the birth of the Spirit. God abstractly, as Hegel puts it, is
the mere empty word, the infidel God; he is true only as concrete
in Christianity, the God-man. So in all other cases. The true
notion is the conjunction of the contradictories.
D. 6

Kant’s Categories form really the substance of Hegel. Hegel seems an apt borrower generally. His absolute is the neutum of Schelling, converted into subject by the Ego of Fichte. Aristotle assists him in the further characterisation of this subject through the distinctions of Matter, Form, Actuality, &c. Plato lends his aid in enabling him to look at it as idea, and to develop it as idea. The very monad of Leibnitz, the triad of Proclus, and the Qualirung of Böhme are auxiliary to him. But his infinitely greatest obligations are to Kant, who enables him to lay out his whole system and carry out his whole process.

Must we conceive, as well as name, to understand—but how is the conception of heterisation or alienation to Nature possible?

Are we encouraged by the general nature of the case (all being Werden, and Werden being always a union of identical opposites) to believe that even in death there is process, that there again Non-being is passing into Being, and that this applies to all members of the universe, spiritual or material? Or are these abstractions but a system of fantastic and delusive shadows shed of the universe into the brain of man? Or, even so, are they not still thoughts—are they not threads of essential thought, threads from the main of thought, electric threads round which cluster and accrete in sensuous opacity the matter-motes that make the universe? It is important to pause on this. Again, it must be noted that the admission Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe is the other important point,—grant that, and Werden cannot be repressed. It is a conjunction of the extremes of thought; for Being is regarded as the primal fount of possibility, while Nothing is that of all impossibility. It seems violent to force us to conjoin them for the birth of reality. Still, each is a thought, and each can be thinkingly examined: if the result declares identity, we must accept it, it and its consequences.

Take any actual concrete, abstract from quality after quality, and observe the result. Let the concrete be this paper, for example: well, we say there is whiteness in it, there is cohesion, there is pliancy, &c. &c.—now let us throw out all these, and we shall be left at last with there is nothing. The whole question now is, is this caput mortuum of abstraction an allowable base for
the whole world of thought? In such sentence, it is very plain that there is and nothing, subject and predicate, are equally nothing, and, so far as that goes, identical; but the objection is obvious that this results only from their having now no longer any matter of application—any applicability—any use. So long as they were in use, in actual application, in actual work, they were very different. When out of use, they are both of course equally idle, and, so far as any result is concerned, equally null. Food and no food are of identical result—are, so to speak, equally nothing, if placed in a stomach that will not digest. Distinctions are distinctions only when in use; they are empty, void, null, when unapplied, and so, unapplied, may be set equal if you will. But where is the warrant to make such equality a foundation for the whole burthen of concrete thought in its abstract, or formal, or logical form? To do so is a feat of ingenuity; but it is a feat, a trick, a mockery; a delusion; and the human mind that, dazzled, may admire, will still refuse conviction and assent. There still recurs the question, however, Are we not at liberty to take up the notions Being and Non-being with a view to analysis and comparison? To this the answer must be, Yes, but that yes does not empower you to set Being as identical with Non-being. You say you do not wish so to set them, that it is not you who set them at all, that they set themselves, and that they set themselves as both equal and unequal, and it is this duplicity of relation that sets free the notion Becoming as a notion that, essentially single, is yet more essentially double and contains both of the others. You say you do not ask us to make any reference to concrete things, outer or inner—that you only wish us to see how abstract thought may build itself, &c. But—

Another objection is the refusal of the mind to believe in a concrete not or nothing—in the identification of positive determination with negative limitation—yet such is the chief lever of Hegel. In short, the main result will be, as regards Hegel, that we shall have to reject his system as articulated, and yet retain it largely both as a whole and in parts. The system as articulated is probably the result of the mere striving, so common at that time, after universality and necessity, which are the only two elements that can produce a coherent and complete whole, a Cosmos. Still, Hegel shows the connexion of positive determination and negative limitation—that they are but different sides of the same reality—that, as abstract thoughts, they coalesce and
run together It must be understood to shadow out also the only possible mode of conceiving an actual beginning.

But, let us do our best, we cannot help feeling from time to time, that there crops out an element of weakness, of mere verbal hocus-pocus, distinctions which will not maintain their objective truth before the test of another language. No: the system that has built itself up so laboriously out of the unresting river must resolve itself into the same again, though largely to its material enrichment. So with the system of Kant. Still, in both, principles of form as well as matter will be found of permanent and abiding worth.

E. 1.

'Being is the Notion only in itself.' This can be taken, first, subjectively, and second, objectively.

First, subjectively,—the notion is thought, thought in act, a subject, a thinker, a spirit, God, you, I. The notion then (with such meaning) as being, as is, as the absolutely first, crude, dim, dull, opaque, chaotic, unconscious, brute I am, the first flutter of life, the absolute A in quickening (Alphabetic A) is only in itself—latent, undeveloped. The German an, not quite the English in, here. An means properly at, beside, near. So the notion an sich is the notion at itself, like the first speck of life on the edge of the disc. The notion is, as it were, just come to itself. There is no answer possible, in one sense, to what is a thing in itself, for every possible answer would involve what it is for another. An sich is thus just Seyn; both are equally incapable of direct explanation, neither can be said. To say it, would be to limit it, to negate it, to give it a determinate manifestation, &c. Whatever were said, it would be still more that; that, then, would describe it falsely, imperfectly, incompletely, that is, negatively, &c. Latency, undevelopment, inchoation, is what the term implies; and this amounts to the universal universal, the summum genus, the utterly unspecified, indeterminate, indefinite universal principle of all particulars—the Seyn—the base, the case, the all-embracing sphere and mother liquor, and yet also the invisible dimensionless first of everything manifest. At bottom, virtually, occultly, independently, absolutely, materialiter, are all shades of An sich; and they all resolve themselves into Seyn, and that into absolute, or abstract, or blank self-identity.
This description of An sich is pertinent in every application of the term, whether to the all of things or any single particular whole; it is a constituent in the thinking of every whole. The universe has no advantage in this respect over this little crystal. This gives a glimpse into the constitution of thought as thought; of which, it is not right to say that it is subject to such and such poles, but rather that these are just its modi and constitute it so and so; thought is just such.

Second, objectively,—of everything we may form a notion, but the notion is no true notion unless it correspond to its object. Call the object Seyn now, then obviously Seyn is just the Notion but as yet an sich, in itself, potentially that is. Or, take it, in a slightly other way. Existence, as it is there before us, or here with us, is just God's Notion; but in this form, it is only the Notion in itself, occultly, latently, undemonstrated by explanation and development. Again, the phrase may be taken historically objectively, as symbolising the first stage of thought historically. The hoof of Seyn breaks up into the fingers (Bestimmungen), which also are (sind or sind seyend). As thus separated, they are to each other, other.

'A setting out of the Notion as here in itself, or a going into itself of Being.' This susceptible of the same points of view: First, subjectively, I set myself out of myself, or I develop myself; and this just amounts again to—I go into myself. The reference to me, of course, to be universalised into reference to the whole or any whole.

There are four forms shadowed out then:—1. The first subject; 2. The present sensuous object; 3. History as applied to Thought; 4. The Notion qua notion, without distinction of object. The three first are but illustrative of the last.

The second forms of a sphere are the finite (the fingers of the hoof). The importance of thinking through predicates and eliminating the subject—as an entity of mere supposition and conception; this is the root of the multi-applicability of the Hegelian discussion.

The first the beginning, cannot be a product or result; neither can it contain more than one significate. The beginning must be an absolutely first, and also an absolutely simple; were it either a derivative or a compound, it would contradict itself and be no beginning. But when we can say, it is, I am, &c., we have a beginning. The beginning of a thing is when it is. As with a
part, so with the whole. The *am* or *is* is the absolutely first predicate that can be attached. To begin an examination of thought, then, (logic), *is* to begin with *A* in the alphabet of predication, is to begin with the absolutely first predicate, and that is Being. In this shape, it is pure thought; it is utterly indeterminate, incompound, and inderivative or first. Thought is but predication, an ascription or attribution of predicates; for predicate in the thinking subject corresponds to specificate in the thought object; i.e. these are identical, because the specificate can only exist in thought as predicate. The latter term, then, is the preferable in a system of logic.

'Seyn is pure abstraction.' Something of the Hegelian, peculiar use of the word, as the separation and isolation effected by the analysing understanding, floats here. Suppose we apply, as regards Non-being, the four forms previously applied to Being. 1. The first subject: it is evident *I am* in such position (*first* subject) is equal to—*I am not* or *nought* as yet. 2. The present sensuous object also is and is not, for it properly *is* only in its absolutely first principle. 3. History as applied: at *A*, thought both was and was not. 4. The notion qua notion: it *is* in itself, and *not* as it is there. That it is, then, is also that it *is* not. Even as that outward Seyn, it is *not*—as *not* me, &c. But it is only necessary to think Being in abstract generality.

The absolute is an affair of thought, it is *not* just as much as it *is*: for *what* *is* is a *variety*; there is not only identity, but difference also. An absolute cannot be thought without a non-absolute. It is the non-absolute that gives the cue to the absolute. So when when we ask what a thing *is*—which is the same as asking what *is* it in itself—we imply by the very question that it is *not*, —or *why* the *question*? It is the non-being that gives the cue to the being. Here is a crystal of salt: we ask, what *is* it? The very question involves that *as* it is, it is not. Thought is itself evidently just so constituted; it has opposite poles. Nothing, then, is thus a definition of the absolute. The Absolute is Nothing. There *is* only the absolute and the non-absolute. Only the synthesis is; neither of its antitheses per se *is*. Pure Seyn is the absolute Negative—of whatever *is*: it is the Absolute, &c. This seen in the Thing-in-itself, in God as merely abstract supreme being of enlightenment, &c. The Nothing of Buddha is precisely the same abstraction. We seek the universal of Being by abstracting from every particular being, and the resultant
abstraction in which we land is precisely the same entity, however we name it—whether Being or Nothing—whether the être suprême of Voltaire or the nothing of Buddha.

What is, is thought, concrete thought, that, of itself, determines itself, thus and thus. The empirical ego—of you or me—with all its empirical realities—its and these but forms of thought—modi of the great sea. This great sea still is, truly is, is great and the all, though in me, though in you. The my and me, the you and yours, the in me, the in you, are but constituents of the sea, and can be so placed as to become mere pebbles and cockle-shells by it. I deceive myself, you deceive yourself: I, this I, and my, and all mine, you and yours, and he and his, but mere straws blowing beside the sea. It is my error—a case applicable to you and him, and each of us—to think them me, true me. These—me, true me—are only that ocean and that one crystal-drop, that infinite of space and that one eye-gleam, that unreachable all and that invisible point, that everywhere and that nowhere—Thought.

Our discontent with the abstractions Seyn and Nichts arises from their own proper life. They tend of themselves further, that is, to further specification. This attaches to the true idea of a true beginning. Freedom, as form of Nothing, shows the necessity of the existence of Nothing.

Nothing is the same as Being. This is partly as taking each abstractly; but the other meaning hovers near also. The Seyn as Ansichseyn is really the same as Nothing. Determinate Is, is built around a womb of nothing, which womb is also called the Seyn. They are thus together Becoming: what is become was not, but is. The crust upon the gulf which is the womb of all, holds at once of Being and of Non-being: if it is this, it is not that; it is not all, it is but part; that is, it is limited, negated, or—contains Nothing quite as much as Being. Said womb, too, being the absolute A and source and base of all, is the veritable is; the other veritably is not, its is is elsewhere, its is is in another. Every whole is similarly placed; every whole is similarly a womb of nothing and being. It is in this womb, which is nothing, that it veritably is; and from it, this nothing, it is, that it develops, that it draws what it is. But this drawing or development is just Becoming. Becoming, then, contains both, and is the truth of both. A system of monads thus, and of monads in monads and a monad.

The elements of Something are reality and negation—negation
that is an otherwise-being. This latter is form; it is not the reality, it is form and may vary without affecting the reality. It is thus an otherwise-being of the Reality itself: it is thus the other of the Reality; it is there where the other also finds its other, its bar, its halt; it is the general region of otherness, of distinction, separation, discrimination; it is being-for-other, as it is that of the being that alone is for the other; it is there being-for-other also as regards its own self; it is also its being by or with the other; it is there where it is wholly for the other, for distinction, &c. (Realise this by reference to yourself as a Something. Your naturality, your personality, is your being-for-other; but are you in any part of that person? It is other than your reality.) Otherwise-being is a predicable of each and all, for by the otherwise-being only is it capable of discrimination: it is there where its being is for another.

Something becomes another. This process endless, ceaseless, but what is othered is just the other. The something thus retains itself. It is thus the true infinite; that, that going over into another, retains, in this going over and in this other, distinct reference to its own self. This the substance or substratum of Kant and Spinoza. In this process, too, or in this notion of Kant and Spinoza, lies Being-for-self (Fürsichseyn), or self-reference and self-retention. Despite the other and othering, that which is, still is for itself and by itself, and with itself. This the true infinite which remains and abides—the negation of the negation—the mediating process of itself with itself—not the bastard infinite that arises from mere repetition of alternation, and ends in an ebahn 'and so on ad infinitum!' It is our own fault if we make absolute the mere other, the mere finite and changeable.

With Self-reference (Being-for-self) the principle of Ideality appears; it is here we refer to something that does not exist as there or here, as a This, in outside crust, but that is ideally there in the centre—the substance of Spinoza, the substrate of Kant, the absolute of Hegel. The finite is reality, but its truth is its ideality. The infinite of the understanding even—the spurious one—is ideal. Here we see that all philosophy, as it idealises reality, is idealism.

To be for, by, and with one's own self, this is the Fürsichseyn, and it is the substance or substrate of Kant, &c. Hegel's phrase is its perfect abstract expression.

One bottom principle—God—must be assumed; but thus all
change is quite indifferent, and the true infinite is this bottom principle that abides. The surface endlessness of difference is but a spurious infinite.

Self-reference is immediacy, no result of intermediacy; it is directly first and present, it is indervative, it is uncaused; it is A, it is the first, the absolute—but as negation of negation. The negativity of self-reference involves the exclusion of other units from the one unit; as, for example, the distinction of my me from my empirical affections and experiences. The one self-reference, thus—the single unit—flows over into many. This the vital cell from which arises the whole chapter on Fürsichseyn. This chapter developing thus One and Many, Attraction and Repulsion, &c., mediates the transition from Quality to Quantity, and becomes itself readily intelligible.

The repulsion of the Ones will probably appear forced and artificial, however—perhaps, at best ingenious. To the musing mind, it has a certain credibility. Suppose a subject of the Werden, suppose a beginning and progressing consciousness, the first thought presumably will be am, which is tautamount to is. Such is is but nothing, and must give rise to such thought; but the not has also is, or positivity, that is, there becomes. But if there becomes or arises, there also departs or ceases; while, at the same time, there is between both the quasi-stable moment of there is there. Attention is now directed to this quasi-stable moment as such. It has reality, it has determinateness, it implies another, it becomes other, and that equally other. It is thus limited and alterable; but in the midst of this, the subject, the consciousness, remains—by itself and for itself. It is one. But this one, as so produced, as affirmative to self and negative to other, implies several ones, &c. It is possible to figure what is for itself as something with qualities—a crystal of salt—in which case there is a mean of passage from the one to the many. Absolutise this crystal to the world: the one is the many, the many the one—or the whole of many, which is Quantity.

That there is, there must have been not. That not is is, there must have been becomes. But becomes is negative positivity, or it involves quality. But quality, as what it is, is reality; and as what it is not, it is determinateness. But reality with determinateness, or determinate reality, is something. Something, as far as it is, as far as it has reality, is in itself; while so far as it is determinate, or as far as it has form, it has an element of other-
ness; for form is where something is other, where it may be othered while it at the same time remains unaffected. Determinateness is thus the otherwise-being of the something, it is where the being of the something is with other. There also is it that there is the general region of otherness—the region of separation, distinction, discrimination. It is there where the other and all others are separated from the something. It is there where the something is, in every reference, for other. It is there where the something is for, by, and with its own other. The two factors or constituent elements of the something, then, are Ansichseyn and Seyn-für-Anderes, or the quality to be in self and the quality to be for other; in which latter phrase, the 'for' is equivalent to for, by, and with. Where the something is for, by, and with, another, however, it is there precisely that the bound or limit falls. Something thus, then, is bounded, limited, or finite. It has also, as we have seen, an element of otherness in itself. In fact, the other involved by limit is itself something. Something then becomes something, or the other becomes other, ad infinitum. But as it is only the other that is othered, the Self remains for, by, and with itself. But this Being-for-self, the true Infinite, is a principle of ideality, &c. &c. One cell is thus formed—a self-subsistent monad; for self-reference is self-presence or immediacy. As excluding the other, it is absolute.

But even thus, must we not say Hegelianism is the crystal of Naturalism?

After all, the navel-string and mother-cake of Hegel are still the desiderata. Where does he attach to? whence is he? Well, these are multiform; they may be found generally in the history of philosophy. The absolutely first radical is sum, which, objectified, becomes est and so on. Fichte's beginning can be shown to lead to Hegel's, as also Schelling's principle, &c. &c. Then there is a beginning findable in this way, that he just takes up the actual as he finds it, and sorts it and names it in his own fashion, and as it leads him. Or he says, God is the Wesen, and God is a Spirit; and matter, &c., as made by him, can be called just his other. He is thought; but as having made matter, this also is his—that is, it is just his other. But materiality is in itself just the other of spirituality: the one outer, the other inner; the one extense, the other intense, &c. &c.: in fact, there are the Two.

This view not without consolation. The superior actual is certainly thought, which uses up matter as mere aliment, and
converts it into its own element. Such is the process, the transformation of the Natural into the Spiritual. Death of the Natural is a matter of course, then; but that involves—as always—a step higher, and there is no destruction. Again matter is itself thought. The nearest actual is, after all, the subjective moment of thought. The element of despair lies in the inessentiality of the particular, of the singular subject. Still the singular subject—in himself—is the Objective, &c. The sheet-anchor of hope is thought.

The immortality probably no concern of Hegel's; he is above all doubt or anxiety or thought in that respect with his views of Matter, Thought, Spirit, the Absolute generally. His God, then, is le Dieu Absolu, that which is, but that is Thought, Spirit: moi, je suis l'Absolu; toi, tu es l'Absolu; Lui, il est l'Absolu: il faut que nous nous prosternions devant l'Absolu, ce qui est notre mystère, notre vie essentielle, notre vrai nous-mêmes, l'Universel, ce qui est, le vrai, le tout, le seul! (The reversion to French here involuntary somehow!)

E. 2.

There is a certain justification for the Hegelian God-man historically, not only in the outward Christ, but in the fact that, whereas formerly one's God was foreign and external to oneself in a priest, &c., and to be propitiated externally by a sacrifice, by rites, &c., the mind (reason) is now a law—in conscience—unto its own self, that it obeys God in obeying itself. This, in short, is the identification of man's essential reason with the Divine nature. Thus, then, God is no longer an outer, an other, but within, and Us. Hegel must have largely in view this historical alteration of the historical standpoint. How finely he says: No proof would ever, or could ever, have been offered of God's existence, had our knowledge of and belief in such existence been obliged to wait for the proof.

REMARK.

The preceding Notes, though not to be regarded as expressive of definitive conclusions in any reference, will, nevertheless, assist such; and so justify of themselves, we hope, their respite from fire. They are not, we are disposed to believe, hard to understand; and a reader who has any interest in the subject may be expected, we shall say, to read them pretty well through. But this effected,
there will result, surely, some amount of familiarity with a variety of the leading notions and peculiar terms involved; a familiarity which must somewhat mitigate the shock of the abrupt steepness, the strangeness and the difficulty of the access, which Hegel himself accords. The rôle to be assigned to thought as thought, for example—the metaphysic of a beginning, the nature of abstract being, the special significations to be attached to abstraction, understanding, reason, &c.—all this, and other such matter, must, as regards intelligibility and currency, very much gain to the reader as his consideration proceeds. A slight glimpse, too, of the genetic history of the subject may not be wanting. One or two of the summaries, again—that is, if long separation from them may allow me to speak as a stranger in their regard—will be found, perhaps, so far as they go, not without spirit and not without accuracy, nor yet failing, it may be, in something of that dialectic nexus without which Hegel can but yield up the ghost, leaving the structure he has raised to tumble all abroad into the thousand disconnected clauses of a mere etymological discursus.

To such readers as approach Hegel with prejudice and preconceived aversion, even the objections and vituperations which we have unsparingly—but possibly quite gratuitously—expended in his regard, may prove, on a sort of homœopathic principle, not only congenial, but remedial. The 'charlatan' of Schopenhauer is, perhaps, the ugliest of all the missiles which have ever yet been flung at Hegel; but others quite as ugly will be found under C. and D. of the present chapter, and it is only the peculiarity of their place, together with the hope of service, which can excuse us for exhibiting them.

On this head, it may be worth while remarking that it is quite possible that Rosenkranz, who chronicles this reproach of Schopenhauer, is himself not without a certain complacency in view of the same. Not improbably, even as he chronicles it, though with rejection of course, he feels at the same time that there exists in Hegel a side where it is at least intelligible. It was an age of systems, and Hegel produced his. Nor did he feel, the while, under any obligation to explain it, or account for it, or, in any way, make it down. To him, it was enough that he had produced it; there it was; let the reader make what he could of it! But just here lay the difficulty! With the others—with Kant, with Fichte, with Schelling—there was a perceived and received beginning; there was an understood method,—above all, there was a univer-
sally intelligible speech. But, Hegel!—Hegel had changed all that. The ball he flung down to us showed no clue; the principles that underlay the winding of it, were undiscoverable; and what professed to be the explication was a tongue unknown; not the less unknown, indeed, but the more exasperating, that it was couched, for the most part, in the oldest and commonest of terms. Yet still—all previous great ones looking small and inferior when dressed in its forms—it was seen, indirectly in this and directly in other respects, to involve claims and pretensions of a dominant and even domineering supremacy. Nay, though at once the necessity and the hopelessness of investigation were felt (necessity,—in that there could be no security till a competent jury had sat on that laborious rope of the Hegelian categories, and, after due inspection, pronounced its sufficiency;—hopelessness, in that the very nature of the case seemed somehow to postpone the possibility of this inquiry into an indefinite future)—the very paramountcy of the pretensions, the very inextricability of the proof, had, with a public so prepared as then, strange power to dazzle, seduce, or overawe into acquiescence.

Nor was this hid from Hegel himself; so that there necessarily arose on his part, as well as on that of his hearers, such secret consciousness as gradually infected and undermined whatever frankness the mutual relation might have originally contained. To be obliged to speak, as to be obliged to hear, what is felt to be only half understood, is to be very peculiarly placed, and the development, in such circumstances, of a certain bias, of a certain disingenuousness, will, in hearer as well as speaker, be hardly prevented. Distrust grows in both; distrust, which assertion in the one, as acceptance in the other, strives vainly to overbid. You, on the one side, show possession of what is taken for a mystery of price; why blow away, then, you feel, this mystery, and consequently this price, by any indiscreet simplicity of speech? You, on the other side, again, are credited with understanding the same; and the feathers of everyone concerned are flattered the right way when you smile the smile of the initiated—not but that all the while, to be sure, the very fibres of your midriff are cramped to agony with your unavailing efforts to discern.

But there is no necessity to go so far as this in either case. The bias to both, consequent on an equivocal claim, made on the one hand, and granted on the other, suffices. The relations in such a case are unsound, the common-ground largely factitious, and frank—
ness there can be none. What results is a readiness to fall into loudness and—let us say here—effrontingness, over which hangs ever an air of fraudulence.

Again, scholars, men of letters, are, for the most part, by original constitution, and acquired habits—the latter from seclusion mainly—that is, both in temperament and temper, keen, intense, single-sighted, and precipitate; naturally prone, therefore, to exhibit a certain unsparingness, a certain inconsiderate thoroughness, a certain unwitting procacy, as well as demonstrating the failures of others as the successes of themselves. Now this element has decided place in Hegel. This it is that prompts the unnecessary bitterness of his antagonistic criticism, as in the case of Kant, where, from the good, honest, sincere, moderate, and modest soul that fronted him, provocation was impossible, and where, indeed, grace, if not gratitude, should have reduced him to respectfulness as in the presence of the quarry of his own whole wealth.

There is a side in Hegel, then, where the ‘charlatan’ of Schopenhauer may have at least appeared intelligible even to Rosenkranz. Nay, Rosenkranz himself, in telling us (first words of his Wissenschaft der logischen Idee) that, in his case, the study of Hegel has been ‘the devotion of a life, alternately attracted and repelled,’ virtually admits that a taint of doubt will penetrate even to the simplest faith and the most righteous inclination. On the whole, the conclusion may be considered legitimate then, that, from the circumstances explained, there is apt to fall on Hegel a certain air as it were of an adventurer, which it takes all his own native force, all his own genuine weight, all his own indisputable fulness to support and carry off, even in the eyes of those who, in his regard, cannot be considered superficial students.

There is that in the above which may suggest, that it is not the spirit of the partisan which is to be anticipated here; where, indeed, the whole object is neither condemnation, nor vindication, but simply presentation, or re-presentation. To Hegel, that is, we would hold ourselves nakedly suscipient, as to the reader nakedly reflectent. And this is the nearest need at present, for Hegel hitherto has been but scantly understood anywhere; receiving judgments, consequently, not only premature but stupid. This reminds me to say, what is hardly necessary, however, that the objectionable and vituperations which occur in this chapter are not judgments: they are but the student’s travail cries. Again, it is to be noted that, if we judge not against, neither do we judge here
for, Hegel. There has been too much difficulty to understand, to think as yet of judging; this will follow of itself, however, as soon as that has been effected. There is no seeking in all this to speak apologetically of Hegel; such impertinent worldly squeamishness, did it exist, were what alone required apology. Hegel wants none. He is the greatest abstract thinker of Christianity, and closes the modern world as Aristotle the ancient. Nor can it be doubted but that much of what he has got to tell us is precisely that which is adapted 'to bring peace' in our times,—peace to the unquiet hearts of men,—peace to the unquiet hearts of nations.

The preceding Notes, then, will, it is hoped, prove useful, and constitute, on the whole, no ineffective introduction. In the succeeding chapters, the approach to Hegel becomes considerably closer, to end, as we believe, at last in arrival.
CHAPTER III.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED: THE SECRET OF HEGEL.

A.

The paper, from which the present chapter principally derives, superscribed 'The Secret of Hegel,' and signalised by formality of date, &c., has the tone of the contemporaneous record of some just-made discovery. This discovery, if not quite complete—not yet 'the secret' definitively home—has certainly still its value, especially to the advancing learner; but the tone is too spontaneous and extemporary to be pleasant now, and would, of itself, necessitate—did no interest of the learner interfere—considerable rescission, if not total suppression. Nevertheless, the interest of the learner shall be considered paramount, and the tone shall not be allowed to pretermit the paper itself: only, to avoid respective suicide, we shall give such turn to its statements as shall break the edge of what egoism the solitary student may exhibit to himself on emerging into the new horizon which, crowning his own efforts, the new height has suddenly opened to him.

'This morning,' it is thus the paper a little grandiloquently opens, 'the secret of Hegel has at length risen clear and distinct before me, as a planet in the blue;' glimpses, previous glimpses, with inference to the whole, it admits; but it returns immediately again to 'this morning' when 'the secret genesis of Hegel stood suddenly before me.'

'Hegel,' the paper continues, 'makes the remark that he who perfectly reproduces to himself any system, is already beyond it; and precisely this is what he himself accomplished and experienced with reference to Kant.' Now this is to be applied to the writer of the paper itself, who seems to think that he too has reproduced Kant, and that, accordingly, he has been 'lifted on this reproduction into sight of Hegel.' But the pretension of the position does not escape him. Surely, he goes on to soliloquise,
he cannot consider himself the first, surely he cannot consider himself the only one who has reached this vision, surely he cannot have the hardihood to say that Rosenkranz and Schwegler, for example, do not understand the very master in the study and exposition of whom they have employed their lives! No, he cannot say that,—that would be too much; such men must be held to understand Hegel, and even infinitely better than at this moment he, who has still so much of the details to conquer. Still, it appears, he cannot help believing that there is a certain truth on his side, and that, even as regards these eminent Hegelians, so far as he has read them, he himself is the first who has discovered the whole secret of Hegel, and this because he is the first, perhaps, to see quite clearly and distinctly into the origin and genesis of his entire system—from Kant.

The manner in which these writers (we allow the manuscript to go on pretty much in its own way now), and others the like, work is not satisfactory as regards the reproduction of a system, which shall not only be correct and complete in itself, but which shall have the life and truth and actual breath in it that it had to its own author. Their position as regards Hegel, for example, is so that, while to him his system was a growth and alive, to them it is only a fabrication and dead. They take it to pieces and put it up again like so much machinery, so that it has always the artificial look of manufacture at will. They are Professors in short, and they study philosophy and expound philosophy as so much business. All that they say is academical and professional;—we hear only, as it were, the cold externality of division and classification for the instruction of boys. Such reproductions as theirs hang piecemeal on the most visible and unsatisfactory wires. They are not reproductions in fact; they are but artificial and arbitrary re-assemblages. But to re-assemble the limbs and organs of the dead body of any life, is not to re-create that life, and only such re-creation is it that can enable us to understand any system of the past. In the core-hitting words of Hegel himself, ‘instead of occupying itself with the business in hand, such an industry is ever over it and out of it; instead of abiding in it and forgetting itself in it, such thinking grasps ever after something else and other, and remains rather by its own self than that it is by the business in hand, or surrenders itself to it.’

That these men, and others the like, have very fairly studied Hegel, and very fairly mastered Hegel, both in whole and detail,
we doubt not at all; neither do we at all doubt that many of them very fairly discern the general relations, though they are inclined to underrate, perhaps, the particular obligations, of Hegel to Kant. Still there is something—knowing all this, and admitting all this, and acknowledging, moreover, that no claim had probably ever yet a more equivocal look, we feel still as if we must—in short, the claim of discovery is repeated.

For that there is a secret of Hegel, and that there is a key necessary to this secret, we verily believe Rosenkranz and Schwegler would themselves admit; thereby, at all events, leaving vacant space for us to occupy, if we can, and granting, on the whole, the unsatisfactoriness which we have already imputed to the statements or keys offered by themselves. Yes, there is a secret, and every man feels it, and every man asks for the key to it—every man who approaches even so near as to look at this mysterious and inexplicable labyrinth of Hegel. Where does it begin, we ask, and how did it get this beginning, and what unheard of thing is this which is offered us as the clue with which we are to guide ourselves? And what extraordinary yawning chasms gape there where we are told to walk as on a broad smooth bridge connecting what to us is unconnected and incapable of connexion! There is no air in this strange region; we gasp for breath; and, as Hegel himself allows us to say, we feel as if we were upside down, as if we were standing on our heads. What then is all this? and where did it come from? and where does it take to? We cannot get a beginning to it; it will not join on to anything else that we have either seen or heard; and, when we throw ourselves into it, it is an element so strange and foreign to us that we are at once rejected and flung out—out to our mother earth again, like so much rubbish that can neither assimilate nor be assimilated.

Yes, something very strange and inexplicable it remains for the whole world; and yet excites so vast an interest, so intense a curiosity that Academies offer rewards for explanations of it, and even pay the reward, though they get no more satisfactory response than that 'the curtain is the picture.' How is this? When, as it were, deputations are sent to them for the purpose, how is it that his own countrymen cannot give such an intelligible account of Hegel as shall enable Frenchmen and Englishmen to understand what it is he really means to say? Yet the strange inconsistency of human nature! Though this be an admitted fact
now, we have heard, years ago, from his Chair, a Paris Professor (Saisset) declare his conscientious hatred of Hegel, and his resolution to combat him to the death, and this too in the interest of spiritualism? Why the hatred, and why this resolution, if Hegel were not understood? And why treat as the enemy of spiritualism a man whose first word and whose last is Spirit, and only for the establishment of the existence of Spirit? And in England, too, we are not less inconsequent. Sir William Hamilton, even years ago, was reputed to have entertained the notion that he had refuted Hegel, and yet Sir William Hamilton, at that time, knew so little of the position of Hegel, with whom his pretensions, nevertheless, claimed evidently the most intimate relations, that he classes him with Oken—as a disciple of Schelling!

Sir William Hamilton, however, is not alone here: there are others of his countrymen who at least do not willingly remain behind him in precipitate procacy and pretentious levity. A knowledge of Kant, for example, that is adequate to the distinction of speculative and regulative! feels itself still strong enough to refute Hegel, having melted for itself his words into meaning at length—by distilling them! Another similar example shall tell us that it knows nothing of Hegel, and yet shall immediately proceed, nevertheless, to extend an express report on the Hegelian system; knowing nothing here, and telling us no more, it yet shall crow over Hegel, in the most triumphant and victorious fashion, vouchsafing us in the end the information that Hegel’s works are in twelve volumes! and whispering in our ear the private opinion that Hegelianism is a kind of freemasonry, kept secret by the adepts in their grudge to spare others the labour it cost themselves!

Besides these German scholars who, in England, are situated thus with respect to Hegel, there is another class who, unable to read a word of German, will yet tell you, and really believe they are speaking truth the while, that they know all about Kant and Hegel, and the whole subject of German Philosophy. This class grounds its pretensions on General Literature. They have read certain review articles, and perhaps even certain historical summaries; and, knowing what is there said on such and such subjects, they believe they know these subjects. There never was a greater mistake! To sum up a man, and say he is a Pantheist, is to tell you not one single thing about him. Summaries only propagate ignorance, when used independently, and not merely rela-
tively, as useful synopses and reminders to those who have already thoroughly mastered the whole subject in the entirety of its details.

A large class say, we do not want to go into the bottom of these things, we only want a general idea of them, we only want to be well-informed people. This does not appear unreasonable on the whole, and there are departments of knowledge where general ideas can be given, and where these ideas can be used very legitimately in general conversation. But such general ideas are entirely impracticable as regards the modern philosophical systems. No general idea can convey these; they must be swallowed in whole and in every part—intellectually swallowed. We must pick up every crumb of them, else we shall fare like the Princess in the Arabian story, who is consumed to ashes by her necromantic adversary, because unhappily she had failed to pick up, when in the form of a bird, all the fragments which her enemy, in the course of their contest, had tumbled himself asunder into.

To say Kant’s is the Transcendental or Critical Idealism; Fichte’s, the Subjective Idealism; Schelling’s, the Objective Idealism; and Hegel’s, the Absolute Idealism: this is as nearly as possible to say nothing! And yet people knowing this much and no more will converse, and discourse, and perorate, and decide conclusively upon the whole subject.

No: it is much too soon to shut up these things in formulæ and there leave them. These things must be understood before we can allow ourselves such perfunctoriness; and to be understood, they must first be lived. Indeed, is not this haste of ours nowadays, and yet this glauon and grasp of ours at comprehensiveness, productive of most intolerable evils? For instance, is it not veritable injustice of Emerson to talk of Hume as if his only title to consideration arose from a lucky thought in regard to causality? Does not such an example as this show the evil of our overhasty formulating? He who believes that even Hume has been yet thoroughly understood, formulated, and superseded, will make a mistake that will have very detrimental effects on his own development.

These well-informed men, then, who conceive themselves privileged to talk of Kant and Hegel, because they have read the literary twaddle that exists at this present in their regard, would do well to open their eyes to the utter nothingness of such an acquirement in respect to such subjects. In reference to Hegel, Professor Ferrier sums up very tolerably correctly in the words
already quoted; * 'Who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen,—not any foreigner, seldom even himself, &c.' Different from the rest, Mr Ferrier, like a man of sense, does not proceed, immediately after having uttered such a finding as this, to refute Hegel. When we hear of the worthy old Philister of an Edinburgh Professor, who, regularly as the year came round, at a certain part of his course, announced with the grave alacrity of self-belief in sight of one of its strong points, 'I shall now proceed to refute the doctrines of our late ingenious townsman, Mr David Hume,' we laugh, and it seems quite natural and reasonable now to all of us that we should laugh. But how infinitely more strongly fortified is the position of the old Edinburgh Professor, relatively to Hume, than that of the (so to speak) new Edinburgh Professor (Sir William Hamilton—say), relatively to Hegel? Hume's writing is intelligible to the meanest capacity, so to speak; Hegel's, impenetrable to the highest. We know that the old Professor could understand the man he opposed—so far, at least, as the words are concerned; we know that the new could not understand Hegel, even so far as the words are concerned. We know this, for he admits this; and even asks—'But did Hegel understand himself?'—

Here is the secret of Hegel, or rather a schema to a key to it:

Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Realities.

This, of course, requires explanation. We suppose the reader to have mastered Kant through the preceding reproduction of his system. † Well, if so, he will have little difficulty in realising to himself the fact that what we give as a schema to the secret of Hegel, is a schema of the whole Theoretic system of Kant in its main and substantial position. Quantity stands for the Categories in general, though it is here still looked at specially. Quantity, then, is an intellectual thought or Begriff; it is wholly abstract, it is wholly logical form. But in Time and Space, we have only another form of Quantity; it is the same thought still, though in them in a state of outwardness; the Category is inward Quantity; the Perception is entirely the same thing outwardly. Then

* See Preface, p. xxx.
† The allusion is to a MS.—The reader will necessarily be disappointed with this same schema to a key to the secret; he will necessarily find it very meagre, very abstract. He will think better of it by and by, however, it is hoped; as it is also hoped that after the full discussion of the subject as in relation to Kant, it will appear anything but meagre, and anything but abstract. (I may add now that the Text-Book to Kant represents the mentioned MS. New.)
Empirical Realities, so far as they are Quantities (what is other than Quantity in them has other Categories to correspond to it), are but a further potentiating of the outwardness of the thought Quantity, but a further materialisation, so to speak. Here lies the germ of the thought of Hegel that initiated his whole system. The universe is but a materialisation, but an externalisation, but a heterisation of certain thoughts: these may be named, these thoughts are, the thoughts of God.

To take it so, God has made the world on these thoughts. In them, then, we know the thoughts of God, and, so far, God himself. Probably too, we may suppose Hegel to say, Kant has not discovered all the categories, could I but find others, could I find all of them, I should know then all the thoughts of God that presided at the creation of the universe. But that would just be so far to know God himself, God as he is 'in truth and without veil' ('Hulle,' best translated just hull here), that is, in his inward thought, without wrappage (hull or husk) of outward material form, God as he is in his 'eternal essence before the creation of the world and any finite Spirit.'

These Categories of Kant are general Thoughts. Time and Space are, according to Kant himself, but the ground-multiples, and still à priori, in which these categories repeat or exemplify themselves; and after the fashion of, firstly, these ground-unities (the categories), and, secondly, these à priori ground-multiples of the same (time and space), must, thirdly, all created things manifest themselves. Kant conceived these relations subjectively, or from the point of view of our thought. Hegel conceives them objectively, or from the point of view of all thought. Kant said: We do not know what the things are, or what the things are in themselves (this is what is meant by the thing-in-itself), for they must be received into us through media, and, being so received into us, they, so far as we are concerned, cease, so to speak, to be themselves, and are only affections of our sense, which become further worked up, but unknown to ourselves, in our intellectual region, into a world objective, in that it constitutes what we know and perceive, and what we all know and perceive, and, what, in the intellectual element—being capable there, but not in that of sense, of comparison,—we can all agree upon (the distinctive feature of the only valuable meaning of objective)—but subjective (as dependent simply on the peculiar construction of us) in its whole origin and fundamental nature.
Hegel, for his part, will not view these principles of pure thought and pure sense as only subjective, as attributes that belong to us, and are only in us, as attributes only human: he considers them, on the contrary, as absolutely universal general principles on which, and according to which, the all or whole is formed and fashioned. The universe is one; and the principles of its structure are thoughts exemplifying themselves in pure a priori forms of sense, and, through these again, in empirical objects. These empirical objects, then, are thus but as bodies to thoughts, or, rather, as material schemes and illustrations of intellectual notions. They are thus, then, externalised, materialised, or, better, heterised thoughts, (i.e.) thoughts in another form or mode; that is, they are but the other of thought. Nay, the pure forms of sense, these pure multiples or many, named Space and Time, are, themselves, but thoughts or notions in another form. Time in its succession of parts, and Space in such succession of parts, each is but perceptively what the notion Quantity is intellectually. They, then, too, are but thoughts in another form, and must rank, so far, with the empirical objects. We have thus, then, now the Universe composed only of Thought and its Other: thought meaning all the notions which we find implied in the structure of the world, all the thoughts, as we may express it otherwise, which were in God’s mind when he formed the world, and according to which he formed the world, for God is a Spirit and thinks, and the forms of his thinking must be contained in his work. Nay, as God is a Spirit and thinks, his work can only be thought; as God is a Spirit and thinks, the forms of his thinking must be, can only be That which is. In correct parlance, in rigorous accuracy, only God is. It is absurd to suppose the world other than the thought of God. The world then is thought, and not matter; and, looked at from the proper side, it will show itself as such. But a judicious use of the schema of Kant enables us to do this.

Quantity—Time and Space—Material Forms.

Here is thought simply passing into types, into symbols—that is, only into forms or modes of its own self. Properly viewed, then, the world is a system of thought, here abstract and there concrete. To that extent, this view is pantheistic; for the world is seen as the thought of God, and so God. But, in the same way, all ordinary views are pantheistic; for to each of them, name itself as it may, the world is the work of God, and so God: as the work of God, it is the product of his thought, the product
of himself, and so himself. The pantheism of Hegel, then, is only a purer reverence to God than the pantheism of ordinary views, which, instead of hating Hegel, ought to hate only that materialism with which these ordinary views would seek to confound Hegel, but to which he is the polar opposite, to which he nourishes a holier hatred than they themselves.

Here, then, we have arrived at the general conception of the system of Hegel: but this is, by a long way, not enough. Such general conception is the bridge that connects Hegel to the common ground of History, so that he is no longer insulated and unreachable, but can now be passed to in an easy and satisfactory manner. We see now what he has to say springs from what preceded it; we now know what he is about and what he aims at; and we can thus follow him with intelligence and satisfaction. But it is necessary to know a Hegel close.

Kant had the idea, then, but he did not see all that it contained, and it was quite useless so long as it remained in the limited form of principles of human thought. But Hegel himself, perhaps, could not have universalised or objectivised these principles of Kant, had he not been assisted by Fichte and Schelling. Kant showed that our world was a system of sensuous affection woven into connexion by the understanding, and, principally, by its universal notions, the categories. But Kant conceived these sensuous affections to be produced by the thing-in-itself or things in themselves, which, however, we could not know. Fichte now, seeing that these things in themselves were absolutely bare, naked, and void—mere figments of thought, in fact—conceived they might safely be omitted as suppositious, as not at all necessary to the fact, from which we might just as well begin at once, without feigning something quite unknown and idle as that beginning. All now, then, was a system of thought, and as yet subjective or human thought. For this seemingly baseless and foundationless new world, a fulcrum was found in the nature of self-consciousness.

Till self-consciousness acts, no one can have the notion 'I,'—no one can be an 'I.' In other words, no one knows himself an 'I,' feels himself an 'I,' names himself an 'I,' is an 'I,' until there be an act of self-consciousness. In the very first act of self-consciousness, then, the 'I' emerges, the 'I' is born; and before that it simply was not. But self-consciousness is
just the 'I,' self-consciousness can be set identical with the
'I': the 'I,' therefore, as product of self-consciousness, is product
of the 'I' itself. The 'I' is self-create, then. 'I' start into
existence, come into life, on the very first act of self-conscious-
ness. 'I' then—('I' was not an 'I' before)—am the product
of my own act, of my own self-consciousness. Of course, I am
not to figure my body and concrete personality here, but simply
the fact that without self-consciousness nothing can be an 'I'
to itself, and with the very first act of self-consciousness 'I'
begins. (We may say, too, what is, but is not to itself 'I,' is
as good as is not—which, properly considered, is another clue to
Hegel.) Here, then, is something self-created, and it is placed
as the tortoise under this new world; for it is from this point
that Fichte attempts to deduce, by means of a series of opera-
tions of the thought of this 'I,' the whole concretion of the
universe. Although Fichte attained to a certain generality by
stating his Ego to be the universal and not the individual Ego,
still a certain amphiboly was scarcely to be avoided; and the
system remained airy, limited, and unsatisfactory.

Fichte had developed the outward world from the Ego, as the
inferable contradictory of the latter—that is, as the Non-ego;
but Schelling now saw that the Non-ego was as essential a
member in the whole as the Ego; and he was led thus to place
the two side by side, as equal, and, so to speak, parallel. Thus
he came to the thought, that if from the Ego we can go to the
Non-ego, it will be possible to pass through the same series
reverse-wise, or from the Non-ego back to the Ego. That is,
if we can develop Nature from Thought, we may be able also
to find Thought—the laws and forms of Thought—in Nature
itself. It is evident that Thought and Nature would be thus
but two poles, two complementary poles, the one of Ideality,
the other of Reality. But this conception of two poles neces-
sarily introduced also the notion of a centre in which they
would cohere. This middle-point would thus be the focus, the
supporting centre, from which all would radiate. That is to
say, this middle-point would be the Absolute. But the absolute
so conceived is a neutrum; it is neither ideal nor real, it is
wholly indefinite and indeterminate. No wonder that to Oken,
then, it presented itself as, and was named by him, the Null.
But the general conception of an absolute and neutrum operated
with fertility in another direction. Every 'I' is just an 'I,'
and so we can throw aside the idea of subjectivity, and think of the absolute 'I': but the absolute 'I' is *Reason.* Reason is ascribed to every man as that which constitutes his ego; we can thus conceive *Reason* as *per se,* as independent of this particular subject and that particular subject, and as common to all. We can speak of *Reason,* then, as now not subjective but objective. This new *neutrum,* this new absolute, it could not now cost much difficulty to identify and set equal with the former *neutrum,* or absolute, that was the centre of coherence to ideality and reality. But in Schelling's hands, supposing it to have been originally his own, it remained still wholly indefinite, vacuous, idle: it required, in short, the finishing touch of Hegel.

We can conceive now how Hegel was enabled to get beyond the limited subjective form of Kant's mere system of human knowledge, and convert that system into something universal and objective. The thing-in-itself had disappeared, individuals had disappeared; there remained only an absolute, and this absolute was named *Reason.* But Hegel could see this absolute was a neutrum, this *reason* was a neutrum; they were but names, and not one which better than the thing-in-itself. But were the categories completed, were they co-articulated—were they taken, not subjectively as man's, but objectively as God's, objectively just as *Thought* itself—were this organic and organised whole then substituted for the idle and empty absolute neutrum of Schelling,—the thing would be done; what was wanted would be effected; there would result an absolute not idle and void, not unknown and indefinite, but an absolute identified with truth itself, and with truth in the whole system of its details. The *Neutrum,* the *Reason,* the *Absolute* of Schelling could be rescued from indeterminateness, from vacuity, from the nullity of a mere general notion, by setting in its place the *Categories* of Kant (but completed, &c.) as the *thing,* which before had been the name, *Reason.* You speak of *Reason,* says Hegel to Schelling, but here it actually *is,* here I show you what it is, here I bring it.*

As yet, however, we still see only the general principle of Hegel, and the connexion in which it stands with, or the connexion in which it arose from, the labours of his predecessors. But such mere general principle is quite unsatisfactory. This, in fact, explains why summaries and the mere literature of the subject are

* This is still to be supposed true, though, of course, both Fichte and Schelling had each his own statement of the categories. (New.)
so insufficient: the general principle remains an indefinite word—a name merely—till it gets the core and meaning and life of the particular. Probably the very best summary ever yet given of Kant is that of Schwegler, and it is very useful to him who already knows Kant; but good as it is, it is only literature—(see the vast difference between literary naming, and living, struggling, working thought, by comparing Schwegler's statement of Kant with Hegel's in the Encyclopædia)—it only characterises, it does not reproduce, and it is impossible for any one to learn Kant thence. We must see Hegel's principle closer still, then, if we would thoroughly understand it. We take a fresh departure then:

Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Objects.

I have conceived by this scheme the possibility of presenting the world as a concrete whole so and so constituted, articulated, and rounded. But I have not done this—I have only conceived it: that is, I have not demonstrated my conception; I have not exhibited an actuality to which it corresponds. How set to work to realise this latter necessity, then? The abstract, universal thoughts, which underlie the whole, and on which Kant has struck as categories, are evidently the first thing. I must not content myself with those of Kant; I must satisfy myself as to whether there are not others. In fact, I must discover all the categories. But even should I discover all the categories, would that suffice? Would there be anything vital or dynamical in a mere catalogue? Must I not find a principle to connect them the one with the other—a principle in accordance with which the one shall flow from the other? Kant, by the necessity he has proclaimed of an architectonic principle, has rendered it henceforth for ever impossible for us to go to work rhapsodically, contented with what things come to hand, and as they come to hand. By the same necessity he has demonstrated the insufficiency of his own method of uniting the elements of his matter—the method of ordinary discussion, that is, of what Hegel invariably designates raisonnement. This raisonnement—suppose we translate it reasonment—is by Kant's own indirect showing no longer applicable where strict science, where rigorous deduction is concerned. Mere reasoning good sense, that simply begins, and ends, and marches as it will, limited by nothing but the necessity of being such as will pass current—that is, such as begins from the beginning conventionally thought or accepted by the common mind, and passes on by a like accepted method of ground after ground or reason after reason, which similarly approves
itself to the common mind, almost on the test of tasting,—is no longer enough. There is conviction now only in rigorous deduction from a rigorously established First. No; after the hints of Kant, mere reasonment or intelligent discussion hither and thither, from argument to argument, ungrounded in its beginning, unsecured by necessity in its progress, will no longer answer. We are now bound to start from a ground, a principium, an absolutely first and inderivative. It will not do to start from an absolutely formless, mere abstract conception named—by what would be serene philosophical wisdom, but what is really, with all its affectation, with all its airs of infallibility, mere thin superficiality and barren purism—First Cause, &c.: Reason will not stop there. Should we succeed in tracing the series of conditions up to that, we should not remain contented: the curiosity of what we name our reason would stir still, and set us a-wondering and a-wondering as to what could be the cause, what could be the beginning of the first cause itself. Philosophy, in short, is the universe thought; and the universe will not be fully thought, if the first cause, &c., remain unthought.

To complete philosophy, then, we must not only be able to think man, and the world in which he finds himself, but what we name God also. Only so can we arrive at completion; only so can the all of things be once for all thought, and thus at length philosophy perfected. How are we to think a beginning to God, then? It all lies in our scheme: Quantity—Time and Space—Empirical Objects.

Quantity, standing for the categories in general, though itself but a single and even a subordinate category, is Reason, that but repeats itself in its other, Time and Space, and through these again in Empirical Objects. Reason, then, is the thing of things, the secret and centre of the whole. But Reason can be only fully inventoried, when we have fully inventoried the categories. But when we have done so, is it reasonable to suppose that they will remain an inventory, a catalogue? Is it not likely that, as in their sum they constitute Reason, they will be held together by some mutual bond, and form in themselves, and by themselves, a complete system, an organised unity, with a life and perfection of its own? Nay, even in Kant, even in the meagre discussion of the categories which he supplies, are there not hints that suggest an inward connexion between them? Kant himself deduces Action, Power, Substance, &c., from Causality; and in his discus-
sion of Substance and Accident, do not similar inward connexions manifest themselves? Even in Kant, though he conceives them as merely formal, and as absolutely void till filled by the multiple of, first, perception and then sense, they are seen to be more than formal; they are seen—even in themselves, even abstractly taken—to possess a certain characteristic nature: even thus they seem to manifest the possession of certain properties—the possession, in short, of what Hegel calls Inhalt; a certain contained substance matter, essence; a certain filling of manifestible action, a certain Bestimmung in the sense not only of vocation and destination, but of possessing within themselves the principles which conduct to that end or destiny.

This word Inhalt we shall translate Intent; and this meaning will be found in the end to accord sufficiently with its common one. Gehalt, in like manner, will be translated Content; and we, in starting with Intent and Content in England, are not one whit worse off than Hegel himself was in starting with Inhalt and Gehalt in Germany. Use will make plain. The categories, then, even abstractly and apart from sense, may be supposed to possess a certain natural Intent, a certain natural filling, and so a certain natural life and movement of their own.

Let me, then, we may suppose Hegel to continue, but find the complete catalogue of the categories, and with that the secret principle on which they will rank, range and develop themselves;—let me effect this, and then I shall have perfectly a pure concrete Reason, pure because abstract, in the sense that abstraction is made from all things of sense, and that we are alone here with what is intellectual only, but concrete, in the sense that we have here a mutually co-articulated, a completed, an organic, a living whole—Reason as it is in its own pure self, without a particle of matter, and so, to that extent and considering the source of that Reason, God as he is without hull, before the creation of the world or a single finite intelligence. Nay, why demand more? Why crave a Jenseits, a Beyond, to what we have? Why should not that be the all? Why should we not, realising all that we anticipate by the method suggested—why should we not realise to ourselves the whole universe in its absolute oneness and completeness, and with the whole wealth of its inner mutual interdependent and co-articulated elements? Why not conceive an absolute Now and Here—Eternity—the Idea, the concrete Idea—that which is—the Absolute, the All? We see the universe—we find the eternal
principles of thought on which it rests which constitute it; why then go further? Why feign more—a Jenseits, an unknown, that is simply a Jenseits and an unknown, an unreachable, an nonexistent? No; let us but think the universe truly, and we shall have truly entered into possession of the universal life, and of a world that needs no Indian tortoise for its pedestal and support. Pantheism! you call out. Well, let it be pantheism, if it be pantheism to show and demonstrate that God is all in all—that in him we live, move, and have our being—that he is substance and that he is form, that he is the Absolute and the Infinite!

But conditioned cannot understand the unconditioned, you say; the contingent cannot understand the absolute, finite cannot understand the infinite; and in proof thereof you open certain boys' puzzle-boxes of Time and Space, and impale me on the horns of certain infantile dilemmas. Well, these wonderful difficulties you will come to blush at yourselves, when you shall have seen for yourselves, and shall have simply endeavoured to see what I, Hegel, have given you to see.

But what difficulty is there in the Infinite? Let us go to fact, and not trouble ourselves with fictions and chimeras. Let us have things, and not logical forms (using this last phrase simply as it is now generally understood), and that is the business of philosophy, and this it is that you simply fail to see in my case; that I give you things, namely, and not words; that I conduct you face to face with the world as it is, and ask you to look into it: let us have things, then, and where is the difficulty of the Infinite? Is not the Infinite that which is? Is there any other infinite than that which is? Has not that which is been from all eternity, and will it not be to all eternity? Is not the Infinite, then, that which is? And what are we sent here for? Are we sent here simply to dig coals and drink wine, and get, each of us, the most we can for our own individual vanity and pride, and then rot? What, after all, is the business of man here? To advance in civilisation, you say. Well, is civilisation digging coals and drinking wine, &c.; or is civilisation thought and the progress of thought? Is there anything of any real value in the end but thinking? Even in good feelings, what is the core and central life? Is it not the good thought that is in them? There is no feeling worthy of the name (tickling the soles of the feet, for example, is not worthy of the name) but is as dew around an idea; and it is this idea which glances through it and gives it its whole reality and life. We are
sent here to think, then—that is admitted. But what are we sent to think? Why, what but that which is—and this is infinite! Our business here, then, even to use your own language, is to think the Infinite. And where is the difficulty, if the instrument with which you approach the Infinite—thought—be itself infinite? Is it not thought to thought? Why should not thought be able to put its finger on the pulse of the Infinite, and tell its rhythmus and its movement and its life, as it is, and ever has been, and ever will be?

And the Absolute! It is impossible to reach the Absolute! What, then, is the Absolute? Bring back your eyes from those puzzle-boxes of yours (Space and Time), which should be no puzzle-boxes, if, as you say you do, you understand and accept the teaching of Kant in their very respect; bring back your eyes from those puzzle-boxes—bring them back from looking so hopelessly vacuously into—it is nothing else—your own navel—and just see what is the Absolute? What does thought, in any one case whatever of its exercise, but seek the Absolute? Thought, even in common life, when it asks why the last beer is sour, the new bread bitter, or its best clothes faded, seeks the Absolute. Thought, when it asked why an apple fell, sought the Absolute and found it, at least so far as outer matter is concerned. Thought, when, in Socrates, it interrogated the Particular for the General, many particular valours for the one universal valour, many particular virtues for the one universal virtue, sought the Absolute, and founded that principle of express generalisation and conscious induction which you yourself thankfully accept, though you ascribe it to another. Thought in Hume, when it asked the secret foundation of the reason of our ascription of effects to causes, sought the Absolute; and if he did not find it, he put others, of whom I Hegel am the last, on the way to find it. What since the beginning of time, what in any corner of the earth, has philosophy, has thinking ever considered, but the Absolute? When Thales said water, it was the Absolute he meant. The Absolute is the fire of Anaximenes. The numbers of Pythagoras, the one of Parmenides, the flux of Heraclitus, the νος of Anaxagoras, the substance of Spinoza, the matter of Condillac,—what are all these but names that would designate and denote the Absolute? What does science seek in all her inquiries? Is it not explanation? Is not explanation the assigning of reasons? Are not these reasons in the form of Principles? Is not each principle to all
the particulars it subsumes, the Absolute? And when will explanation be complete, when will all reasons be assigned? When—but when we have seen the ultimate principle?—and the ultimate principle, whether in the parts or in the whole, may surely be named the Absolute. To tell us we cannot reach the Absolute, is to tell us not to think; and we must think, for we are sent to think. To live is to think; and to think is to seek an ultimate principle, and that is the Absolute. Nor have we anything to think but that which is, which is the Infinite. Merely to live, then, is to think the Infinite, and to think the Infinite is to seek the Absolute; for to live is to think. Your Absolute and your Infinite may be, and I doubt not are, quite incomprehensible, for they are the chimeras of your own self-will; whereas I confine myself to the realms of fact and the will of God. So on such points one might conceive Hegel to speak.

Reason, then, and the things of Sense, constitute the universe. But the things of Sense are but types, symbols, metaphors of Reason—are but Reason in another form, are but the other of Reason. We have the same thing twice: here, inward or intellectual; and there, outward or sensuous. By inward and intellectual, however, it is not necessary to mean what pertains to the human subject: the inward and intellectual to which we allude, is an inward and intellectual belonging not specially to human beings as such, but an inward and intellectual in the form of universal principles of reason, which constitute the diamond net into the invisible meshes of which the material universe concretes itself. Reason, then, is evidently the principle of the whole, the Absolute, for it is Itself and the Other. This, then, is the general form of the universal principle—of the pulse that stirs the all of things. That, which being itself and its other, reassumes this other into its own unity. This, the general principle, will also be the particular, and will be found to apply to all and every subsidiary part and detail.

Nay, what is this, after all, but another name for the method of Fichte—that method by which he sought to deduce the all of things from the inherent nature of the universal ego? His method is Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis; or, in Hegel's phraseology—1, Reason; 2, its other; 3, Reason and its other. Now this, though summing up the whole, has a principle of movement in it, when applied, by which all particulars are carried up ever towards the general unity and completeness of the whole.
If we are right in this idea, and if we but find all the categories, we shall find these flowing out of each other on this principle in such wise that we have only to look on in order to see the genesis of organic Reason as a self-supported, self-maintained, self-moved life, which is the all of things, the ultimate principle, the Absolute. Supposing, then, the whole of reason thus to co-articulate and form itself, but independently of Sense, and to that extent abstractly, though in itself an intellectual concrete, it will not be difficult to see that it is only in obedience to the inherent nature, the inherent law, that, raised into entire completion in this abstract form, it now of necessity passes as a whole into its Other, which is Nature. For Nature, as a whole, is but the other of Reason as a whole, and so always they must mutually correlate themselves. It is mere misconstruction and misapprehension to ask how the one passes into the other—to ask for the transition of the one into the other. What we have before us here is not a mundane succession of cause and effect (such mundane successions have elsewhere their demonstrated position and connexion), but it is the Absolute, that which is, and just so do we find that which is, constituted. That which is, is at once Reason and Nature, but so that the latter is but the other of the former.

If, then, we have correlated and co-articulated into a whole, the subordinate members or moments of Reason, it is evident that the completed system of Reason, now as a whole, as a one, will just similarly comport itself to its other, which is Nature. In like manner, too, as we found Reason per se to constitute a system, an organised whole of co-articulated notions, so we shall find Nature also to be a correspondent whole—correspondent, that is, to Reason as a whole, and correspondent in its constitutive parts or moments to the constitutive parts or moments of Reason. The system of Nature, too, being completed, it is only in obedience to the general scheme that Reason will resume Nature into its own self, and will manifest itself as the unity, which is Spirit, and which is thus at length the final form and the final appellation of the Absolute: the Absolute is Spirit. And Spirit, too, similarly looked at and watched, will be found similarly to construct and constitute itself, till at last we shall reach the notion of the notion, and be able to realise, in whole and in part, the Idea, that which is, the Absolute.* And, on this height, it

* "From the logical Idea the concrete Idea is distinguished as Spirit, and the absolutely concrete Idea as the absolute Spirit" (Hegel, WW. xvii. 172). (New.)
will be found that it is with perfect intelligence we speak of Reason, of the Idea, thus:

'The single thought which philosophy brings with it to the study of history is simply that of Reason; that it is Reason that rules the world; that, in the history of the world, it is Reason which events obey. This thought, with respect to history, is a presupposition, but not with respect to philosophy. There by Speculative Science is it proved that Reason—and this term shall suffice us on this occasion without any nearer discussion of the reference and relation involved to God—that Reason is the substance as well as the infinite power, the infinite matter as well as the infinite form, of all natural and spiritual life. The substance is it, that, namely, whereby and wherein all Actuality has being and support. The infinite power is it, in that it is not so impotent as to be adequate to an ideal only, to something that only is to be and ought to be—not so impotent as to exist only on the outside of reality, who knows where, as something special and peculiar in the heads of certain men. The infinite matter is it, entire essentiality and truth, the stuff, the material, which it gives to its own activity to work up; for it requires not, like functions of the finite, the conditions of external and material means whence it may supply itself with aliment and objects of activity. So to speak, at its own self it feeds, and it is itself and for itself the material which itself works up. It is its own presupposition and its own absolute end, and for itself it realises this end out of the inner essence into the outer form of the natural and spiritual universe. That this Idea is the True, the Eternal, the absolutely Capable, that it reveals itself in the world, and that nothing reveals itself there but it, its honour and glory; this, as has been said, is what is proved in philosophy, and is here assumed.'

Such, then, we believe to be the secret origin and constitution of the system of Hegel. We do not say, and Hegel does not say, that it is complete, and that no joining gapes. On the contrary, in the execution of the details, there will be much that will give pause. Still in this execution—we may say as much as this on our own account—all the great interests of mankind have been kindled into new lights by the touch of this master-hand; and surely the general idea is one of the hugest that ever curdled in the thought of man. Hegel, indeed, so far as abstract thought is concerned, and so far as one can see at this moment, seems to have closed an era, and has named the all of things in such terms of thought as will, perhaps, remain essentially the same for the next thousand years. To all present outward appearance, at least, what Aristotle was to ancient Greece, Hegel is to modern Europe.

We must see the obligations of Hegel to his predecessors,

* Hegel, Phil. of Hist., 3rd edition, pp. 12, 13.
however, and among these, whatever may be due to Fichte and Schelling, Kant must be named the quarry. Still it is to be remarked that Hegel did not content himself with these, but that he subjected the whole wisdom of the ancients, and the whole history of philosophy, to a most thorough and searching inquest. And not that only: Hegel must not be conceived as a worker among books alone; the actual universe as it is in history and present life was the real object of his study, and, as it manifested itself, his system had also to adapt itself; and never, perhaps, was the all of things submitted to a more resistless understanding.

Still the secret of Kant is the secret of Hegel also: it is the notion and only the notion which realises, that is, which transmutes into meaning and perception, the particulars of sense. That the ego together with the method of Fichte, and the neutrum together with the correlated ideal and real of Schelling, also contributed much, no one can doubt. We can see, too, the corroborative decision he derived from his profound and laborious analysis of the ancients, and indeed of the whole history of philosophy. Still there remains to Hegel in himself such penetration of insight, such forceful and compellative power as stamps him—as yet—the respective master of thought.

**Note 1.**

The transmutation of Kant into Hegel may be presented in yet another manner. Hegel's *Idee* is just Kant's *Apperception*, and the moments in the transformation are these:—*Apperception* is the word for my essential reality and core, and this not only as regards my subject but as regards my object; for it compels this object to conform, or rather transform itself to it. The object, that is, is a concretion of *Apperception* through its forms of space and time and the categories; and empirical matter is but its contingent Other. What is permanent and universal in the object holds of *Apperception*. *Apperception*, however, is not specially mine: it is yours, it is his, it is theirs. There is a universal *Apperception*, then, and it, together with its empirical other, constitutes the universe. But, on the ideal system, the other of *Apperception* (the Thing-in-itself) is also *itself* *Apperception*. *Apperception*, then, is the universe. Hegel now had only to see into what *Apperception* consisted of, and then state it as the
It is presented thus, as all we know and as complete in itself, so that we need not assume an unnecessary and redundant elsewhere—a superfluous other side, or other place. The notion of Beyond or Ulteriority, this very notion itself must be conceived as forming part of our own system of notions. It should not be applied out of that system. We have but—there is but—this here and this now.

**Note 2.**

In thinking God, the necessity for the unity or identity of two contraries is obvious. Jacob Böhme saw into this with great lucidity. Boundless affirmation is a dead, dull, unconscious nonentity. Boundless extension were no universe. Limit is necessary to the realisation even of extension; negation to that of affirmation. If there is to be a product, a thing with articulations and distinctions in it, a system with manifestible properties and qualities, there must be a No as well as a Yes. Negation is quite as real as Affirmation. The mind is the same in the form of memory that it is in judgment: the mind, then, is not a mere Yes, it is a No also. Memory is not judgment; this is not that; but the one opposite does not cancel the other. In all distinction, the element effective of distinction works through negation: this is not that. Without negation, then, there were no distinction, that is, no manifestation, that is, no life. To think God, then, as alive and real, a principle of distinction, of negation must be thought in him—that is, the unity or identity of contraries.

There is a difficulty—(on the Hegelian view)—in connecting myself (as a single separate subject) with the universal object or all. It is difficult to perceive how I am related to it, how I birth from it, or decape into it, &c. &c. But this whole side, perhaps, is only an apparent difficulty. That which lives, and all that lives is thought; I find my ‘I’ to be a constituent moment of that all of thought. It is the subjective moment and absolutely necessary and essential to the life of the whole. In fact, just as when the logical notion (the all of the categories, the intellectual organic principles of the whole) is complete, it breaks through into nature—in other words, when as complete in itself, it must, like every other moment in the system, relate itself to its other, so the subject as other of the object is absolutely necessary, and they are mutually complementary, and so, both essential constituents in the all of things.
This notion of a life which is thought, is the ground on which, presumably, after Hegel, we must rest the notion of the immortality of the soul. We are moments in the great life; we are the great life; we are thought and we are life; and nature and time do not master us who are Spirits, but we them which are but forms and pass.

God again, in accordance with the same views, as related to a world of thought, may be looked at variously—in philosophy, as the Absolute—in religion, as the Father, the Creator, the Preserver, God, the inner verity, the Being whom we are to glorify, adore, obey, love. In the Hegelian system there is no contradiction in all this. The religious moment is as essential as the philosophical or the natural.

Hegel's views can conciliate themselves also admirably with the revelation of the New Testament; for his one object is also reconciliation, the reconciliation of man to God, of the abstract atom which man now is to the Substance of the Universe. Christianity in this way becomes congruent with the necessities of thought. History is a revelation, and in history, Christianity is the revelation. It revealed to a world that sat amid its own ruins, with its garments rent, and its head in ashes, the religion of Vision, of Love, of sweet Submission. The Hegelian system supports and gives effect to every claim of this religion. And this, too, without any necessity to put out the eyes of the mind and abdicate reason; this, too, with perfect acceptance of, and submission to, all the genuine results of criticism, whether French or German, though Hegel deprecates any such industry now, and thinks its purpose has been served.

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel only give definiteness and distinction to the religion of Christ. In Christ the Vision was so utter into the glory and the beauty of the all that it passed into Love, which, in its turn, was so rich and utter that it passed into Submission, also itself the richest and sweetest; and thus Perception, Emotion, Will coalesced and were the same, and the triple thread of man had satisfaction in its every term. Now to all this Vision, and Love, and Submission, Kant and Hegel give only the definiteness of the intellect; that is, they assist at the great espousals of Reason and Faith.

Hegel ascribes to Christ the revelation that God is man or that man is God. Now, there is a side to this truth (touched on already) which has escaped notice. Before Christ, God was
external to man, and worship or obedience to him consisted in external ceremonies. But since Christ, God is inward to man: he is our conscience. We no longer ask the will of God from external oracles, from external signs, &c., but from our own selves: that is, we are now a law unto ourselves, we are to our own selves in the place of God, we are to ourselves God, God and man are identified. All that, indeed, lies in the principle, so dear to the children of the thin Enlightenment even, the right of private judgment. In this way, then, too, as in every way, is Christ the Mediator, the Redeemer, the Saviour.

The teaching of the Hegelian system as to the free-will of man, is decisive in its exhaustive comprehensiveness of view. The life of the All is to make itself for itself that which it is in itself—that is, progressively to manifest itself, to make actual what is virtual,—to show evolved, developed its inner secrets, to make its inner outer,—or, best of all, in the phrase with which we began, to make itself for itself that which it is in itself. Now it is from this that the true nature of the free-will of man flows. So far as it is only as we are in ourselves that we can develop ourselves, there is necessity; but, again, it is we ourselves that develop ourselves, which is freedom: both fall together in the notion of Reason; which, to be free, is necessary.

The following nearer glimpses, though later in date, cohere sufficiently with the preceding to be included in the same chapter. They are distinguished by the letters B, C, &c. for convenience of reference, though not distinguished in themselves by diversity of time.

B.

In every sense, Being is a reflexion from (or as against) Non-being. Assume God, and remain contented with such first, as the self-explained and self-evident punctum saliens, then Creation, when it is, is a reflexion from and against the previous nothing, the nothing before it was. Assume thought (spirit) as the first, that runs through its own cycle from indefinite An-sich (In-itself) to the complete entelecheia of Für-sich (For-itself), then Being (there is, or am) is a reflexion from and against Non-being. Assume a primal, material atom, then it is a reflexion against non-being, and without a background of non-being, unreceived into an element of non-being, progress, development of
any kind, would be impossible. Every way, the first spark of affirmation is from and against an immediately precedent negation. The first ray of consciousness is felt to be developed as against and on occasion of, a realm of nothing. Being and nothing are indissoluble pairs: they are but obverse and reverse of the same thought, of the same fact; and their identity is the secret of the world. Take either, you have the other also; even when hid from you by the abstraction—the abstractive power—of your own understanding, it is not the less there. Try Nothing for a start, and seek thereby to annihilate Being, you will find the attempt in vain; for, ever, even from the sea of Nothing, a corner of Being will pertinaciously emerge. In short, negation implies affirmation, and not less (nor more) the latter, the former. To negate (negation) is as much in rerum natura as to affirm (affirmation). They are ground-factors of the absolute—of that which is, and which is, just because it is, just because it is and must be,—nameable otherwise also thought. Diversity in identity as identity in diversity (but another expression of the one fact, the indissoluble union of affirmation and negation) is the ultimate utterance to which thought can arrive on thinking out the problem of its own existence. This is but an abstraction it may be said. Granted; it is but a formal enunciation; nevertheless, let it be seen still that it names the ultimate substantial fact, and that the state of the case would remain the same—suppose the world then to remain—were every human being destroyed. To be sure, in thinking these thoughts we are always attended by a Vorstellung, we have always the conception something before our imagination and dominating our understanding. We say always, yes, identity in difference, difference in identity certainly; but then there must have been something in which there was the identity in difference, &c. There must have been a substantial something in which that formal and abstract thought was realised—was seen to be true. But this seems self-contradictory. Now how remove this difficulty? How reconcile ourselves to the discrepancy and divarication?

This can be done in no other way than by following out thought in all its directions, each of which will be found to terminate in—it just is so. The primitive and radical constituent fact, or property of the all, of that which is, of the absolute, is just that affirmation and negation, identity and difference, being and nothing, must be taken together as constituting between them but
a single truth. Either alone is but half a truth, either alone is meaningless, unsupported, evanescent, either alone, in fact, is no truth: throughout the whole wide universe, either alone exists not; the vacuum itself is. If we would have truth, things as they are, then we must take them together as a one identical something even in diversity. This, each can illustrate for himself by referring to any one member of the complement of the universe—a stone, a coin, a river, a feeling, a thought. Nothing can be perceived or conceived that has not this double nature, in which negation is not as necessary a moment of its constitution, as affirmation. In short, it is this, because it is not that; that really just is, it is because it is not. Much private reflexion is required to substantiate all this to individual thought. Nevertheless, each faithful individual thinker will find in the end no other conclusion.

What is, then, is thought, whose own ground-constitution is affirmation and negation, identity and difference. It is easy to see that, if we commence, like the materialists, with a material atom and material forces, the conclusion will be the same. The progress disproves the possibility of absolute original identity. Starting with God, too, this result is immediate. God is a Spirit, God is thought. Thought, that is, is the ultimate element of the universe, and on thought does the whole universe sit. Proceeding from thought, the universe is in itself but thought, a concretion of thought if you will, still in itself but thought. But from this we have now a substantial, corresponding to our formal, first. Thought and its other, or God and his universe (a unity), this is the first fact, and affords a substantial support to the formal truth that identity and diversity, affirmation and negation, being and nothing, coalesce, or cohere in a single unity. Now assuming this to be the primal and rudimentary determination, all additional and progressively further such will be found but successive powers, successive involutions (potentiations) of this, and of this in its essential and native simplicity. The truth is not the one or the other, the truth is the one and the other, the truth is both. But this re-union (in the case of Nothing and Being) is not a return to the first identity; the identity which now emerges is the higher one of Becoming. The thought that differentiates Being and Nothing, and then unites them, cannot do so without progress. This elaboration is a new step, and thought finds by its own act that it has arrived at the new and higher fact and thought of
The struggle to Hegel—Chap. III, B.

Becoming, for Becoming is the substantial union of Being and Non-being. No one can show anything in this world that absolutely is, or that absolutely is not; everything that can be shown, neither is, nor is not, but becomes: no man has ever gone twice through the same street. Not only is the unity ever richer, but the very moments which formed it, become, when looked back upon, themselves richer. Being and Nothing formed Becoming; but these re-looked at in Becoming are seen now to be Origin and Decease, and so on. In short, thought is what is, and its own inner nature is to be as itself against its other, while its life or progress is to overtake and overpass this other, and re-identify it with its own self, but ever with a rise or increase. This will be found accurately to express the history of thought: this will be found accurately to express the history of the world.

The pulse of thought, then, the pulse of the universe, is just this: that any whole of affirmation being complete, does not remain as such, but, developing its differences, passes over into its own opposite, a movement which further necessitates re-union in a higher form. Every concrete in rerum natura will prove the actual existence of this process. In the production of the mammifer, according to certain naturalists, animalcule, worm, fish, reptile, bird succeed each other, overthrow each other, so to speak with Hegel, refute each other, but this only by assumption each into its own self of that which it succeeds and supplants, attaining thus a higher form. Bud, flower, fruit, is the illustrative sequence of the Phænomenologie to the same effect. Even so, thought, face to face only with its own abstract self, will be found to take on a succession of ascending phases, which ever as complete develop differences, pass into their opposites, and re-unite into higher unities, till a system results, whole within itself, and consisting of members which accurately correspond with the abstract universals which the ordinary processes of abstraction and generalisation have (hitherto in a miscellaneous, empirical, and unconnected manner—rhapsodically, as Kant would say) pointed out from time to time in what exists around us.

This system, again, now a whole, obeys the same law, and passes into its opposite, Nature, which opposite, becoming itself complete, re-unites with its co-ordinate, abstract thought, the notion, Logic, to the realisation of both in the higher form of Spirit. The three ultimate forms, then, are Notion, Nature, Spirit, each of which is a whole within itself, and all together
unite into the crowning Unity, the Absolute, or the Absolute Spirit, which, as it were, giving the hand to, and placing itself under, the first notion, abstract being, substantiates its abstraction, and conjoins all into the system and light and satisfaction of an explained universe.

This, truly, is the one object of Hegel: to find an ultimate expression in terms of exact thought for the entire universe both as a whole and in detail. It is not as if one took the ball of the world in his hand, and pointing out the clue, should seize it, and unwind all before us: but it certainly is, reverse-wise, as if one took the clue of the unwound ball, and wound it all on again. Or again, we may have observed some one hold a concrete, say a coagulum of blood, under a stream of water, till all colour disappeared from the reticulated tissue, till, as it were, all matter (washed out of the form) disappeared, and left behind only pure form, transparent form. Now this is just what Hegel desires to accomplish by existence. He holds the whole huge concrete under the stream of thought, he neglects no side of it, he leaves no nook of it unvisited; and he holds up at last, as it were, the resultant and explanatory diamond. In short, the philosophy of Hegel is the crystal of the universe: it is the universe thought, or the thought of the universe.

But suppose we resign these pretensions, which may too readily seem extravagant, and take Hegel in a more every-day manner, we can still say this: That all questions which interest humanity have been by him subjected to such thought as, for subtlety, for comprehensive and accurate rigour, challenges what best thought has ever yet been so applied. In brief, in Hegel we have offered us—principles, first principles, those principles which constitute the conscious or unconscious quest of each of us: theoretically—as regards what we can know; practically (or morally)—as regards how we should act; and aesthetically—as regards the legitimate application of feeling: and these three heads, it is plain, (the principles of politics, of course, included) must contain all that interests mankind: these three heads contain a response to the world's one want now;—for the world's one want now is—principles.

C.

When one remains, a common case in the study of Hegel, unintelligent, on the outside, of his dialectic, one feels indeed on the
outside; and the terms take on a very forced and artificial look. One cannot help suspecting then, indeed, externality, labour from the outside, in Hegel also. However laborious (and consequently a serious sincerity in that respect), one gets to fear the presence of cunning in these deductions, of underhand intention, of interested purpose, of mere jesuitry, casuistry, and contrivance. The double edge seems to glitter so plainly all about; this is said, and the opposite has been said, and it appears a matter of mere arbitrary choice whether it is the one or the other that is said and where and when, both being evidently equally sayable anywhere and anywhen, that conviction revolts,—and the whole industry drops down piecemeal before us, a dead and disenchanted hull, an artificial externality, a mere dream of obliquity and bias, set up by the spasmodic effort and convulsive endeavour of a feverish ambition that, in ultimate analysis, is but vanity and impotent self-will.—So shows Hegel when our own cloud invests him. But the cloud rising, 'lets the sun strike where it clung;' and before us hangs an enchanted universe again, which a vast giant heaves.

Entrance here may be effected thus (the remark concerns the discussion of causality):—

Take causality: how is it to be explained? No explanation has been worth the paper it covered with the exception of—(Hume is most valuable, and an indispensable preliminary)—those of Kant and Hegel. Kant's: a function of judgment original to the mind, involving a unity of an intellectual plurality; a sensuous plurality, in two perceptive forms (space and time),—sensuous, but original to the mind, independent of, and anterior to, any actual impression of sense: these are the elements to be conjoined into the notion of causality. Well, the intellectual unity, which is the function of judgment named Reason and Consequent, is not a unity as such, but is a unity of a multiple, the terms of which are, 1, Reason, and, 2, Consequent. The conjunction involved here of a plurality to a unity is wholly intellectual, and may be called, looking to the form of its process, an intellectual schema. Suppose now another faculty besides judgment to be possessed—originally, and of itself, from the first—of a certain plurality which should be analogous to the plurality contained in the above function of judgment, would not conceivably faculty coincide with faculty, (each being equally in the mind), in such fashion that the plurality of the latter faculty
might undergo the influence of the unitising function of the former faculty (judgment) to the production of another schema which should also be anterior to experience and original to the mind? Productive Imagination, for example, which holds of sense in that it exhibits objects, and of intellect in that it is not necessarily beholden to any direct intervention of an actual act of special sense for these objects but may spontaneously produce them to itself, may be a faculty capable of exposing to the action of the functions of judgment pluralities of a sensuous nature but still such as are anterior to all actual sense. Productive Imagination is, indeed, nameable in general, only reproductive, for the objects it exhibits to itself are—if spontaneously exhibited then, and without any calling in of special sense then—originally—at least for the most part, products of sense; but it may also merit the name productive simply, from this that it may possess in itself objects of its own and anterior to all action of sense whatever. But Imagination is present to Judgment, and the objects of the former are necessarily present to the functions of the latter; there will, consequently, therefore, be conjunct results: one of these is Causality, a result of sensuous multiples (space and time) inherent à priori in Productive Imagination brought under that unitising function of Judgment named Reason and Consequent. Or, to take it more particularly once again: suppose that time and space present sensuous multiples analogous to the preceding intellectual multiple, and suppose these forms, though perceptive and sensuous, to be still independent of special sense, to be à priori, and to attach to the mind itself, to lie ready formed in the productive imaginative faculty of the mind, in fact, then this faculty, being intellectual, can be conceived capable of presenting its stuff, its multiples directly to the action of the various functional unities of judgment. This is conceivable, and it is conceivable also that the intellectual schema of judgment would reproduce itself as an imaginative, and, so far, sensuous schema out of the peculiar multiples, space and time, or that the intellectual schema, unity, notion would receive these (space and time) as stuff or matter in which to sensualise or realise itself. Reason and Consequent, then, which is an original function of judgment, and which represents an intellectual schema, or the intellectual unity of a multiple, being applied to an analogous multiple in productive imagination, which is the sequence of time, a sequence which is given necessary (what is second being incapable of preceding what is first in time,
so far as time is as such concerned), * there may conceivably result an imaginative, and so far sensuous schema, which will only want the filling of actual (special) sense, of actual event, to come forward as cause and effect, which, though manifesting itself only in contingent matter (this amounts to the objection of Hume), will bring with it an element of necessity by reason of its intellectual or \( a \) \( p \) riori \( e \) lements (and this is Kant's special industry, his answer, or his complement to Hume). This is Kant's explanation. Then, Looked at narrowly, it is a chain of definite links, (how much of this chain did he see, who states Kant's Causality to be just a separate and peculiar mental principle?), a system of definite machinery, attributing no new, depending only on old, constituents of the mind; but this chain lies still evidently between two unknown presuppositions. The mind and its constitution constitute the presupposition on the one side; no basis of absolute and necessary connexion is assigned to it; we have still loosely to ascribe it to the act and will of God—that it is namely, and as it is. The other presupposition is absolutely unknown, absolutely blank things in themselves, which act on special sense to the development of effects in us, which effects we confound with the things, and which, as it were, clothing these unknown things in themselves, become to us the vast system of the outward and inward universe. There are thus two unknown things in themselves postulated by the theory of Kant, an outward acting on outer sense to the development of the outer world, and an inner (our absolute ego, but, as known only through media of sense, unknown \( i \) n itself) acting on inner sense to the development of the inner world of feelings, &c. What we know, then, is, the effects on our senses, outward and inward (for Kant holds an inner sense for our own emotional states), of two unknown things in themselves, and the manipulation to which our faculties (as source of form) subject these effects (as stuff, or matter). This is the result of the Theoretical Philosophy of Kant. This result he complements, however, by a certainty gained practically of the existence of God, of Immortality and of Freewill, as expounded in his Practical Philosophy. The Theoretical world

* It seems obligatory here to point to this: If the necessity of the time sequence conditions the necessity of the causal sequence, how account for the necessity, not of sequence, but of co-existence, in the relation of reciprocity, action and reaction? Kant himself names the category of reciprocity even in connexion with that of causality. See here subsequent writings. (New.)
belongs wholly to the Understanding (so far, at least, as all constitutive principles are concerned), and has no traffic (constitutively) but with the Conditioned. The Practical world, on the other hand, belongs wholly to Reason, and is in direct relation with the Unconditioned. The æsthetic world offers itself between these two extremes as belonging to (the only remaining cognitive faculty) Judgment, and as manifesting, at all events, a certain harmony between the Conditioned and the Unconditioned—a certain possibility of relation between them, not indirect as through sense only, but direct also. So constituted are the three great Kritiken which expound the system of Kant; a system which stands largely still in serious want of patiently intimate and comprehensive exposition. Hegel, for his part, has certainly given it the necessary study; but, quite as certainly, he blinds an uninitiated reader, on the whole, to the magistral position of the action of Kant by loudness on the one hand, as by silence on the other.

Now Hegel, and his theory of causality:—

The unknown things in themselves will not content him; he must know them too, and accomplish a system of absolute knowledge. The first look at Causality in Hegel’s hands is very disappointing. Issuing from Substantiality and passing into Reciprocity, as in Kant, what occurs between seems only an abstract description of the phenomena of causality. The description is very accurate certainly—nay, rather, it is an exact reproduction of all the movements of our naked thought, when we explain, or, in general, deal with, any example whatever of concrete cause and effect. Now it strikes us, to describe is not to explain. Kant gives a theory, in which we see an intelligible reason for this, and an intelligible reason for that, till all coheres to a system which would explain and account for precisely that which we wish explained and accounted for. Hegel does no such thing. He simply describes the fact—in wonderfully penetrating abstract language certainly (which, however, it costs an agony of mental effort to follow and understand), but still it is just the fact, and as it presents itself there in experience. What are we to make of this then? Are we to understand that abstract description is explanation? Is an absolute generalisation of causality, in such wise that we have an accurate characterisation which will adapt itself to every concrete example whatever, any accounting for the fact and the notion and the necessity of causality? To be able to answer
this question, is to understand Hegel. It is really so: Hegel's theory of causality is constituted by an abstract description of the absolute universal or general of causality. But just thus it constitutes the notion causality: it gives position and development to the secret system of the movements of thought—thought, in general, your thought, my thought, all thought—in its regard. We see thus, as it were, the very secret maggots of our brain in motion. But this metaphor must not be dwelt on till it mislead. What we have to see here is that, after all, Hegel's description is, so to speak, not his description, nor anybody's description; his description is the notion, and constitutes the notion, the notion causality. The notion here is not something belonging subjectively to Hegel, and subjectively described by him. The description is so that it is not subjective but objective; the description is so that its movements are the movements of the notion itself: in short, it is the notion itself that we have objectively before our minds then (if we have but realised the words), the notion in its own nature, in its own inner life and energy and movement. Again, as we have seen, it is transformed from one notion, and to another, it is but a transformation in a series of such. Now if we trace this series in either direction, we shall find it to consist of objective notions all similar to that of causality, all transformed from and to each other in an element of necessary thought, and this too with a beginning, a middle and an end which round into each other, and constitute together a self-complete system. Now this system is what Hegel names Logic.

The question recurs, however, where is the explanation? Where is the connexion with that which is—with the world of reality? After all, it is just abstract thought—just the various thoughts which actual experience of sense occasions in us. We have derived these thoughts from experience—and where is there any explanation in them of experience and the world of experience? Has not Hegel with his abstract scholasticism but simply returned to Locke (with whom all knowledge was a product of experience alone) And has the world ever seen a more complete case of self-stultification, than this pretending to explain to himself, and this offering to explain to us, the whole mystery of existence, by an infinite series of abstract terms, which it took a lifetime to produce, and which it demands a lifetime in us intelligently to reproduce (the varieties in the form of the reproduction too being commensurate only with the individual readers)—was ever, in short, self-stultifi-
ocation more complete and monstrous? Are not the dicta of Locke and Hegel, though apparently a reversal the one of the other, after all identical? Locke says, Notions are abstractions from Sensations; while, for his part, Hegel says, Sensations are concretions from Notions: where, at bottom, is the difference? Yes, but observe, Hegel's series is the organic system of thought complete—so to speak, alive in itself. It is the thought of sensuous experience; and it would be hard to say what sensuous experience were, apart from, and beside, this thought. It is sensuous experience in itself. Sensuous experience apart from it, does not seem a body even. Sensuous experience can only be called the other of this. This is the pith, the truth, the reality, of sensuous experience, and sensuous experience itself beside it, is but its other. Yes, you object, but it is taken from sensuous experience—it is the ultimate winnowing if you will, the crystal if you will, of sensuous experience—but without preceding sensuous experience it could never have been acquired. Yes, we reply, but what matters that? We do not wish it to be subjective thought; it is objective thought; it is thought really out there, if you will, in that incrustation that is named world. It, this world and all outer objects, are but sensuous congeries, sensuous incrustations of these thoughts. Did a human subject not exist, it is conceivable that this congeries and incrustation would still exist; and it would exist still a congeries and incrustation of objective thought. The universe, in fact, is but matter modelled on thought. Thought is a system, and this system is the universe, and the element of sense, or what we conceive as that element, is nothing as against this system, and can only be named with propriety the Other.

But now, if all this be conceived as the Absolute, as simply that which is, is any other explanation required? Thought is once for all as it is, and as it is, it has been developed before you in a necessary system. In this system causality has its own place. To demonstrate this necessary system of thought, and to demonstrate the place there of causality, is to account for and explain causality. Such is Hegel's work: he does not move by reasons for this, and by reasons for that; he rejects what he designates raisonement, reasonment: he believes himself to have explained the universe, when he has demonstrated the notion and the necessary system of notions. To tell what is—truly to tell what is—this it is to Hegel to philosophise: and Hegel never seeks to transcend what is. That which is, is the Absolute; and it will be enough if,
sufficiently fortunate to find the clue, we should be able to unwind that which is, out before our eyes, into its whole system of necessary moments with a necessary first and a necessary last that necessarily connect and cohere together.

Thus Hegel: Thought is the real contents of the universe: in Nature, it is but as other, and in a system as other: in Spirit, it returns from Nature, its other, into its own self, is by its own self, and is its own energy. The Absolute Spirit, then, God, is the first and last, and the universe is but his difference and system of differences, in which individual subjectivities have but their part and place. Subjectivity, however, is the principle of central energy and life: it is the Absolute Form. The thought of subjectivity again, that is, the thought it thinks, just amounts to the whole system of objective notions which are the absolute contents. Thus is man, as participant in the absolute form and the absolute matter, raised to that likeness with God of which the Bible speaks, but God himself is not detracted from or rendered superfluous. Pantheism is true of Hegel's system, just as it is true of all others, Christianity and Materialism included; and there is nothing in the system to disprove or discountenance a personal God,—but on the contrary.

D.

Think the Universal, that is, Pure Being, or what is All in general and not any one Particular—and such thought is a necessity, we must sum up the universe in one, we must think Pure Being, we must think the Universal: it is all, but it has no bound, no mark, no line, no point, whether within or without it—there is no within, there is no without, there is no spot in it, of colour, or light, or opacity, there is not a checker anywhere describable, it is signless, it is noteless, it is nothing, it is all and it is nothing, it is everywhere and it is nowhere; it has identically the same character as nothing, or the same characterlessness. Try nothing: it yields the same result; it is everywhere and nowhere, it is nothing and it is all, for existence as such follows necessarily such an assignment as even that of nothing. Now—here is the great difficulty—how is the universal to become the particular, or how is the particular to get to the universal? Only, one would say, by the addition of another. But this other—any other—contradicts the former universal. If there be this other, then the former was not
the universal. Such must be the case—unless the other be even in its otherness identical with the universal. But how is this conceivable? The same, yet not the same! Identity, yet non-identity! How can such opposites be implicated into formal unity, and difference annulled? Nay, were such process accomplished, how from formal unity, an absolute simple, an absolute one, could plurality, multiplicity, variety be extricated and deduced? Such simple, such one, must remain for ever simple, for ever one. Nay, 'remain,' and 'for ever,' are determinations inapplicable. What is attempted to be described, to be said, to be spoken, to be thought, is simply indescribable, unsayable, unspeakable, unthinkable. The proposition, then, is simply a non-ens, an impossibility. Its conception is a conception simply, but as a conception that is inconceivable, it must be named a mere arbitrary supposition of my own, a mere arbitrary position (attitude) of my own self, and which cannot be persisted in, mere Meynang, δόξα, opinio, mine-ing, my-ing, or me-ing. But it cannot in reality be my'd or me'd: the universal must involve the particular, for it is othered,—there is this diversified universe.

The actual universal, then, is one which involves the particular. What is, then, is at once simple unal universal, and composite plural particular. This is the Infinite, the Eternal, the Never-ending, and the Nowhere-ending; and just so is it the Eternal, that it is itself and its other. Were it itself only, and not also its other, it were bounded, limited, finite; it were obstructed, cabin'd, cribbed, confined by this other; it were itself metamorphosed into another by this other; its infinity and universality were negated and denied, and we were forced to look further, to look beyond it for a truer universal that should, by embracing at once it and its other, restore the universal equilibrium and balance.

But have we more here than a mere necessity of our own thought? No doubt, it is a primary antithesis, contrariety, even contradiction, for the other to the universal seems not only contrary but contradictory to—seems to negate, to render nugatory, null, and impossible, any such universal; but is not this an affair of thought simply?

Or are we to suppose it in rerum natura, the foundation-stone, the elephant and tortoise, the cross-beams, the fork, the intersection, the crux of the universe? (In more senses than one probably a crux.) Do we see a universal in rerum natura, that is at once universal and particular? See is an inadequate, an
inapplicable word: it would not follow that though we did not see such, we might not know such. Seeing is but a province, but a part; surely we cannot consign the Absolute to its keeping, surely we cannot agree to admit its finding as final. But, even a wider province than seeing being allowed us, we are met at once by an objection which seems fatal: a universal, or the universal, never can be known to us: we are such that we never can know a universal: *what is other than ourselves, is known as other, that is, as necessarily particular.* Sense can bring no outer to us that is not particular; sense can bring no inner to us that is not particular: knowledge of a universal is impossible to us. But is knowledge limited to the revelations of sense, and to these revelations as received by sense? In this question we have come to one of the most important turning-points that exist: there is here veritably a most critical parting of the ways, which, as taken, decides on a man's whole future.

To take the facts of sense as the facts of sense, to keep them separate each in its oneness and independence, and live among them thus would be—what? Consider well! Would it not be exactly the life of a lower animal, the life of a beast? Look at the cows grazing! They receive the facts of sense as the facts of sense, and in their entire isolatedness and sunderedness. They hunger, they crop the grass, they stumble over a stone, they are stung by a gadfly, they are driven by a man, by a dog, by a stick; they are excited by a red rag, &c. &c.: may not the cows be represented as stumbling from particular to particular, as knowing no better, and as knowing no other? And in what respect would man differ did he stop by the isolated and individual fact of sense? There are certainly men who might be readily characterised as differing from the lower animals only in the relatively greater number and variety of the sensuous facts received: men who rise and eat and drink and plod or idle, and apparently think not. But can this phase of humanity be considered the *true* phase of humanity? Can these men be said to know truly? Can these men be said to live truly? Or rather, be it as it may with these men, does not Humanity as Humanity, now and from the beginning, comport itself quite otherwise? Is there not one word which describes, accurately describes, exhaustively describes, the conjunct action of universal mankind from the time that was to the time that is and to the time, we may safely add, that will be: the one word, generalisation? In every department of
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human industry this will be found the case: it and it alone —the process represented by the word generalisation (what we called elsewhere the seeking of the Absolute)—has altered, and alters daily, man's whole universe for him, from the heaven above him, and sun and moon and stars, to the very dust of his footing. This is the plastic force that has moulded universal history. Religions rise at its coming, and at its going fall. Politics are its playthings; science, its creature. Cities grow, grow, grow—without stop or stay—grow to its bidding. The whole universe of man is in perpetual transformation, in perpetual flux, in perpetual rise beneath it. It is the loom, the ever-changing, ever-growing loom in which the vestments of humanity—vestments of religion, poetry, philosophy, science—vestments of institutions, governments, customs, manners—vestments of head or neck, or foot or hand or body—are from day to day wrought for him. It in fact actually is: 'The roaring loom of time which weaves for God the garment we see him by.'

Generalisation attains its summit in universalisation: it would seem, then, that the life of man, the final cause of man, is—to seek the universal. But how does this seeking comport itself with the facts of sense? Does it receive them as they are, and leave them as they are, or does it further manipulate and utterly transform them? Has man, then, been wrongly employed all this time, and ought he to have remained fixed by the facts of sense, and inquired no further? What long vistas of thought and of truth and of instruction, such questions open to us! No; plainly man has not rested by the facts of sense, and as plainly he could not rest by them. But there is system and a purpose in this universe, and of this universe man is indisputably the highest term, the consummate outcome; what has proved itself his ultimate activity, then, must be allowed the highest place in this system and in this purpose. Generalisation, then, is a necessary moment in the business of the universe, and the effecting of generalisation is the special vocation and destination of man. We have not to stand by the particular of sense, then,—on the contrary, it belongs to us to rise to the universal of reason; and great already has this rise been. Read Pliny, and consider what a new heaven and a new earth the generalisation of 1800 years has effected! Few things are more striking than the second book of Pliny: the creed of ultimate thought 1800 years ago! All that was then the best effort of intelligence; all that was then the likeliest account;
that then was, the universe thought! Every step in this rise too has been a transformation, often a contradiction, of sense. The earth is not a plane, the heavens do not turn round over it, the sun does not get up in the east and go down in the west, &c. Theoretically, then, the business of man has been to transcend sense, to leave to sense its own truth, but to transmute it into a higher. Morally, also, man has displayed a like progress—against sense and towards reason, let Comte-ites say what they will.

The truth is not attained by the senses, then: before such attainment, the intervention of the intellect is required, the intervention of thought, and that is inevitably the elevation of the particular into the general. Things, then, must be thought as well as felt and perceived, and so only does knowledge result. In searching for the universal, then, in rerum natura, we are not limited to our senses but have a right to add to them, nay, we are irresistibly called upon to add to them, as instruments of inquiry, the faculties of the intellect also. That this is so, the very men whom we have instanced as taking their stand by sense, can be adduced to prove. They do think and they must generalise, for they cannot use the rudest language spoken without in the very word (as Hegel points out), river, bread, tree, whatever it may be, rising to a general. Nay, the very beasts of the field that stumble from particular to particular, are not absolutely without thought, for each of their dull feelings, each of their dim perceptions is at bottom, thought, thought in itself: these feelings, these perceptions, are impossible without thought; are, so far, modes of thought, not thought as thought, but thought in itself.

Is there, then, in rerum natura the universal or a universal, or is such only an affair of thought? For only an affair of thought, as Hegel remarks, may be something very worthless, as also something very valuable. Chimeras and hobgoblins and what not are only affairs of thought, but they are utterly worthless. The reason of this is, that they are only of thought, that is, that they are that abstract, formal universal merely which has not its other, its particular, as identical with it; or, if you will, they are such abstract, formal particular as is identical with its own self only, and has no universal to which to unite itself. So far as thought, then, is to be of avail in the inquiry, it must not be subjective thought engaged with its own bubbles, but objective thought that has before it a veritable ens, and holding consequently both of
the particular and the universal. Does thought, does sense, or both, or either, possess such ens—an ens, then, that is in rerum natura?

What at once are space and time? Why, at once, both are matters concretely of perception and, so far, of sense. Neither, indeed, is taken in expressly by any sense—we do not smell them, or taste them, or hear them, nor properly do we touch them, or see them—still what is smelt, tasted, heard, touched, seen, is smelt, tasted, heard, touched, seen, as in both. We cannot touch, see, &c., without touching, seeing, &c., extension and motion in extension with consequent lapse of duration; and there is here what amounts to both space and time. Space and time, at all events, are more than thoughts; whencesoever derived, and howsoever otherwise constituted, they are both objects not of thought only but of perception also. They are really both perceived, through the intervention of Other, it may be, in the first instance, but still they are both perceived. Now of what nature are space and time? Is either finite? Has either a limit, whether anywhere, or anywhen? The question, of course, is strictly absurd; for the one is all and anywhere, and the other is all and anywhen. Nay, there is that, not only in the phrases all and anywhen, all and anywhere, but in the simple words where, when, which might have suggested the due train of reflexion here, and prevented time and space from being used as puzzle-boxes to the gravelling of mere reason. These puzzles, in fact, result only from this that time and space are true universals—such universals as are identical with their particular. The question of a limit to a where and a when, then, which, from the very necessity of thought, or, what is the same thing, from the very necessity of their own nature, are at once everywhere and anywhere, everywhen and anywhen, is strictly absurd. Still, we can put the question by way of experiment; and the answer from everyone is precisely what we have shown the simple ideas, where and when, of themselves suggest. None is the answer; there is no limit to either space or time: in their very notion, they are simply pure quantities. There is an objection, however, if not to the infinitude of space and time, at all events to our knowing of that infinitude. To know the infinitude of either, would require us to pass through this infinitude. We can only vouch for what we know, and our knowledge of either must be limited: we can neither traverse infinite space, nor endure through infinite time. Therefore, it is
said, the conclusion is, they may be finite or they may be infinite, but, so far as we know them, they must be finite. This is but a puerility, a puerility of that fussy, bustling, unmisgiving pretentiousness, which we know to root in shallowness itself, but to which human nature tends silently, weakly, to yield just because of the unmisgivingness, and consequent pertinacity. The solution, of course, is easy, and has been already given in several forms. The one true form is just this, however: Time and space are simple Quantities, pure Quantities. For the exhibition of the puzzles, we have so often alluded to, we are not confined to space and time; let us but take quantity simply, just the notion quantity, and we shall find them all to emerge thence: but quantity is a notion absolutely necessary; we are it, and it is us, just as surely as thought itself. Or to speak more palpably to current conception: time and space are given infinite, we know them infinite, we even perceive them infinite, or, at all events, know that, put us where you may or when you may to perceive either, we shall perceive no end to it. They are given infinite, they are known infinite, they are perceived infinite, they are infinite.

In rerum natura, then, there are infinities, there are universals: space and time, at least, are two such. But are they of the class we seek—universals at once themselves and their particular? We have said yes already, but we may now more particularly see the reason. Infinite space has many finite spaces; infinite time has many finite times. Or universal space has many particular spaces; universal time has many particular times.

From these very examples, then, out of rerum natura, it is intelligible that there is a universal which is particular, and becomes realised into singularity again by reflexion into identity, by reference of difference in itself back into identity with itself. Such universal is a true universal. For the universal as such and no more, the particular as such and no more, the singular as such and no more: these are but creatures of subjective thought, and exist not in rerum natura. The truth of all the three is their union, and each is what it is, through, and by reason of, the others. This is what is named the Antithesis, and it repeats itself at every turn.

The lesson here, then, is, not to take things in isolation, and separation, and individualisation, but together. The mainspring separated from the watch, is but an insignificant bit of metal, useless, without the vestige of a notion, which even a child flings
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speedily away. To remain standing by the particular to the exclusion of the universal, or by the universal to the exclusion of the particular—in general, to remain standing by the one to the exclusion of the other, is but an affair of abstract understanding, is but the conversion of an item of a concrete into an abstract whole, is but, as Hegel names it, an abstraction of the understanding—Understanding as opposed to reason, which latter, reversing the work of the former, resumes difference into identity. The truth is not infinite or finite, but infinite and finite, not liberty or necessity, but liberty and necessity, not right or wrong, but right and wrong, not this side or that side, up or down, but this side and that side, up and down—in short, the truth is, not the universal or the particular, but the universal and the particular.

The intolerant should take this lesson—those nervous, peracute individuals who perpetually peremptorily prescribe their right to their fellows—who en revanche have fire (pain) in their bellies to burn up the wrong of everybody else—who would reform, reform, reform, but who, in the end, would only petrify into their own painful thin rigidity the foison of the world!

E.

Hegel is in earnest with Kant's idea. Kant held the mind, by its notions, to determine—that is, give unity of form, system, intellectual meaning to—outward multiples or manifolds which corresponded sensuously to the inward, or intellectual, multiples or manifolds, involved, comprehended, or embraced in the respective unities of the concrete notions themselves. Kant's notions, however, are few and disjunct. They form no system whether as regards complete compass, or thoroughly interconnected details. They rise not, neither, to their own universal. They give us only, and in an unconnected manner, an explanation of how it is that we give to the contingent manifold of sense the necessary determinations: one, some, all; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality, reciprocity; possibility, actuality, necessity. Hegel firstly completes and universalises the system of notions thus begun by Kant. Secondly, he gives this system unity of origin and of interconnexion. Thirdly, he exhibits each notion in its own pure proper nature without admixture of foreign elements of any kind. Fourthly, he demonstrates this system to be Logic, the Idea, the all of thought that is in the universe, and
that conditions the universe, and that creates, regulates, and moves the universe. Fifthly, he demonstrates Nature to be only this connected. All of thought, not, however, as before, only inwardly to intellect, but now outwardly to sense; that is, he uncloses Kant's imperfect and cramped *schematism of judgment* into the expanse of Nature as explained by the 'philosophy' of the same; and here he leaves no corner unvisited, but demonstrates the presence of the notion in the most crass, refractory, extreme externality—demonstrates all to be but a concretion of the notion.

Thus it is Hegel is in earnest with the idea of Kant, which was, that outward objects arrange themselves around subjective but universal notions of our own; which subjective notions, then, present themselves to us objectively as part and parcel, and very largely part and parcel, of every externality of sense that can come before us. Hegel, indeed, is so complete, that he leaves existential reality at the last as a mere abstraction, as nothing when opposed to the work of the notion. Thus it is intelligible, too—in Hegelian language—that it is the understanding which, coming to objects as an outer to an outer, and taking them as they are, believing them as they are, subjects them to a mere formal external process of reflection, to which the distinctions it finds remain fixed and incommunicable, and which results only in classified arrangement according to its own unexamined and disjunct notions—which are only taken for granted—of cause and effect, substantiality, reality, reciprocity, &c. &c. To this mere position, attitude, and operation of the understanding which is thus separate from the object and separate from the all and has before it only a pedantically classified chaos of fixed and incommunicable separates or particulars, Hegel opposes Reason, which, according to the inner constitution of the notion, advances at once to the perfect characterisation of every particular, and, at the same time, its identification with, and involution into, the one entity or syllogism, which is at once all, and some, and one. Before the wand of this compulsive conjurer, we see the vast universe stir, shake, move, contract itself, down, down, closer, closer, till the extremest member is withdrawn—the ultimate tip, the last fragment disappears, and the whole is licked up into the pure negativity. Forth from this absolutely negative point, as from an invisible but magic atom, we can see the whole huge universe shaken out again.
F.  

Extricate (the reference is to *In itself, For itself, &c.*) the Hegelian double-entendre. If God has created the heaven and the earth—if the thought of God as a Spirit has created the heaven and the earth—that is, simply, if thought is what is, then Seyn, what is (these outward things we see, say), is (are) thought *in itself.* These outward things as products of thought, rather as individuals, as members, as component parts (and as *necessarily* such, for we cannot conceive God or thought to *act* on caprice) in the totality which makes up that which is,—these outward things are (so viewed, and the totality being thought, thought *in itself*) in the sense that this Seyn, these existences constitute *what* it (*the totality, thought*) is. What is this up-coiled ball? Unravel it—these individuals that sprawl out are *what* the ball is *in itself.* The particularities into which the ball can be unclosed, are what the ball is *in itself.* The illustration is easily applied to the universe, to thought, or to any totality in general. But now if the universe be thought, then the particulars of the universe will be just thought *in itself.* The universe is thought, and whatever is in the universe is thought, and the particulars in the universe just go to make up what thought is *in itself.* Hegel certainly means this by *in itself*; and in that case, it is an external Seyn which the *in itself* refers to. But Hegel also means that the particulars are only particulars,—that they are not the universal, not thought as thought, but thought only as particularised—thought then *in itself,* thought not in its proper form as thought. In this sense, however, it is evident that the *In itself* refers now to something inward.

In the sensuous singulars, then, let us say, into which thought runs out, it sees what it is *in itself.* By reflexion in regard to these, thought becomes *for itself.* It develops, that is, a variety of reflexions in regard to an inner and an outer, a phenomenal phasis and a noumenal principle, substance and accident, cause and effect, &c., by which it explains to itself these particulars and singulars, and so becomes as for itself, as thought to thought. Now, the whole sphere of this reflexion may be named Wesen, or essential inner substance and principle, and consists of reflexes that, as it were, ply between the Seyn or outer, and the Wesen or inner. This Wesen, then, is the *An sich,* the *In itself* now; and the irrepressible presence of dialectic is seen here. The external Seyn
was thought in itself; but this in itself has passed now into the sense of inner. The Seyn has become Wesen: we ask what is it in itself? Then, again, this In itself becomes For itself, because the In itself of a thing is what it really is,—is itself, its centre, its For itself, while its outer show is only what is for another—for you and me, or anything other that comes to it externally. Expressions, thoughts themselves seem drunken then, as much under movement as the outer flux which never is but always becomes. In itself has no sooner been accepted as an outer, than it is seen, in the turning of a hand, to have become its own opposite, the innermost inner. But thought in these reflexions being for itself, further perceives that these are thoughts; it is then now led up to the consideration of thought as thought; that is, it is now In and For itself, it is thought in thought and thought for thought. But this result is just the Idea, or the unity of an Objective and a Subjective; and this, again, amounts to Absolute Idealism, or a system in which the Notion is at once pulse and substance. The movement of the notion, then, is to make itself for itself what it is in itself; and this is its life and existence and purpose as the Absolute, the one monad, the all that is, which life and existence and purpose may all be viewed as identical with the honour and glory of God. God thus characterised, may be considered as determined. But this is not pantheism. Pantheism is some unreasoning dull belief, that just what we see, and as we see it, is all that is—is God. But here Hegel strikes the mass till it collapse to Deity—a person, a life, a reality, a spirit, an infinity!

Hegel says, 'The finitude of things consists in this,—that their existence and their universal, their body and their soul, are indeed united—else they were nothing—but they are separable and are mutually independent.' Now it is very difficult to see into this, but here is a sort of a meaning. Water is water, a certain particular; but water is H₂O, or hydrogen and oxygen, and H₂O can be viewed as relatively its universal. Water is thus finite, its universal being thus other than itself, united to but separable from itself. Hegel’s idea, however, probably is, that the finite things are other than thought, which is their true soul, their true universal. With man it is otherwise: he is thought; particular
and universal fall together in him. As finite things are—there—say before us, they are different from their notion.

H.

If God is the affirmation of all that is, he is likewise, and even so, the negation of all that is: all that is disappears into the very breath that bears it; or, in what it appears, it disappears. This is an excellent example of the dialectic that is, and must be.*

* Let the reader be reminded that we are still in the 'Struggle.' Technical terms come to be directly considered later.
CHAPTER IV.

THE NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED.

A.

It is vexatious on the part of Haym, in the manner of a rhetorical expedient familiar to most, to name some of the early categories with a and so on, to describe the series of these as a long string, to assert their production by an illusory reference every now and then to the world of fact, and so to pronounce them worthless. This action of Haym’s is quite beside the point. This, in fact, is just to miss the categories, and their true nature. What if they should derive from reference to the concrete actual world as it is? What if they did come thence? If Haym does not like to see them derived thence, whence else, even in the name of common sense, would he wish them? Is there something more veracious and veridic than nature, then—something more real than reality itself?

Is Hegel, then, likely to be very fell on this reproach of Haym’s, that he has taken his categories from nature, from reality (which is here the sense of nature)? Ah, but Haym will say, the categories profess to be self-derived! Well, if in one sense the categories do profess this, still Hegel has again and again pointed out that the substantiating result for all, the most abstract as the most concrete, is—empirical fact, actual fact of nature veritably offered and presented to us. This, in truth, is the secret of Hegel’s greatness,—that he has no traffic with any necromantic products of mere thought, but—even in his highest, even in his furthest, even in his most abstruse, recondite, and hard to understand—has ever the solid ground beneath his feet. So it is here: the categories really are in nature and the substantial quarry of actual fact. True also is it, however, that, considered in a generalised form, freed from application in the concrete—considered, as it were, in the element of thought alone, absolutely
abstractly for and by themselves (and this just describes the everyday action of thought on any and every object, and why then should thought be ordered to suspend its ordinary procedure here?) —true it is that these categories are seen to constitute a system by themselves. But, a system, what does that imply, unless that they are all in mutual connexion, and with means of communication from the one to the other in such wise that if you shall truly think any one, you cannot help truly arriving at all the rest? Do you suppose that all that concrete, which you call natural universe, came there without thought, and without thoughts? Do you suppose that the constitution of each separate atom of that concrete does not involve thought and several thoughts? And then, the interconnexion of these atoms to this whole huge universe, is it all an affair without thought, then; or is there not rather an immense congeries of thoughts involved and implied in all these innumerable interconnexions? You seem to think that there is no necessity to take it so; you seem to think that it is enough just to take it as you find it. And how do you find it? Just a basis of so much soil, dirt, earth, out there around us, down there beneath us! You have found it so; it has so come to you, and so you take it, and you would put no questions to it!—Questions! you say; what do you mean? Why question the common mud? What thought or thoughts can be involved in mere mud? But just this is it: the categories are the thoughts of this mud—the thoughts it implies, the thoughts, so to speak, that presided at its creation, the thoughts that constituted and constitute it, the thoughts that are it.—What necessity for all that? you seem to say again. There it just is! If asked how it came there,—Why, we must just say—God!

Now, what do you mean here? Is it not just this: I live, I see, I feel, I think; and there is an innumerable plurality and variety in what I live, in what I see, in what I feel, in what I think. Now, I cannot live, &c., this innumerable plurality, without thinking it all up into a First and One. Is not this very much what you mean when you come to think what you mean? Has any man since the world began ever found it otherwise? Is not God the word, the key-word, for the clearing up to us, up and out of the way, of this innumerable variety? Prove the being of God—proof of the being of God; what absurdity! Prove the breath I breathe—prove the thought I think? That is it—prove the thought I think! I must think, must I not? But to think is—
to think is—just in so many words—God! That is the ultimate and extreme goal; or it is the ultimate and all-including centre—
the one punctum of stability, the one punctum of certainty in which all thought coils itself to satisfaction and rest. To the
central fire and light of reality which is named consciousness, you acknowledge the presence of the one in, and the countless out:
now as absolutely certain as their presence, is the presence to the same centre, of a first and one that is the reason of both—God.
To think is God.

God, then, is a word standing for the explanation of the variety that is. But, standing so, there is no explanation assigned, there
is only one indicated. Standing so, there is indicated a being named God; but there is no beingness assigned. Now, let us be
in earnest with this natural fact—and it is a natural fact—as we are with all other natural facts; let us not simply name it, and
know that it is there, and so leave it. Let us turn to it rather, and look at it. Once, when we heard thunder and saw lightning,
we cried, God! God! and ran into our caves to hide ourselves; but by-and-by we took courage, and stood our ground, and waited
for thunder and lightning, till now we have made them, as it were, even our domestic servants. So was a natural fact, so is it.
As in this case, so in a thousand others, God was the exclamation that summed to us variety; and as in it, so in them, it was not
allowed to remain a mere exclamation, a mere word, but had to transmute itself from word to thing, or, better, had to transform
itself from the Vorstellung, the crude figurate conception, into the Begriff, the intellectually seen notion. Now, such varieties as
these of thunder and lightning were but examples of variety in general, were but examples of the main fact, the variety of this
universe; and again, it is not as regards any particular variety, but as regards the universal variety, that the word God is used
nowadays for the First and One: this is what we have now to consider. (Of course, Religion is a concrete of certain doctrines,
and God, as the centre of these, is a word having many meanings—a word designative of a thought subject of many predicates
besides First and One. It is only the natural fact that man must think God, and must think God as First and One, and not the
developed predication of Religion, which is sought to be considered here.)

The cry that rises spontaneously to the lips on sight of this living variety, is God; and the necessity of the cry is, a First and
One, a meaning to the All! Now this First and One, which we must think, let us take courage and stand to see. But, let us observe well, it is as yet just a First and One,—not some vast Grandeur—some huge, formed, or unformed, Awe of the imagination, which we merely mean, but know not; it is just a First and One, the fact before thought, not the phantom before imagination: in a word, it is the Begriff, and not the Vorstellung, which we seek to take courage before, and stand to see.

So far as thought is concerned, then, the word God for us as yet indicates a First and One, or an explanation of the variety. Explanation, indeed, is preferable to First and One—for it implies not only a First and One, but also a transition to the many, to the variety, from the First and One. Let us take it so, then. God, in what the word indicates as yet to thought, amounts to no more than the explanation. God is the explanation. But how must an explanation, or the explanation, be thought? For this explanation must belong to an element of necessity; it can be no matter of contingency and chance; it must be something in its nature absolutely fixed and certain. How, then, must it be thought? for very certainly only in one way can it be thought. This is the question of questions; this is the beginning of thought; this is the first of Hegel; this is Alpha: how must we think the explanation? Can we, for example, think the explanation a thing, a stone perhaps? Can we think it water, or fire, or earth, or air?* Can we think the explanation the sun or the moon? Can we think it space? Can we think it time? To all we shake the head. But we have science now, and great groups of things have received explanations of their own: can any of these explanations be extended to the case before us?

Is magnetism an explanation for us? Can we think the First and One, that has power of transition to the Many, electricity? Can we think a first of electricity, and a succession out of its identity of all? Can electricity make an opaque atom? You have read the 'Vestiges,' and you have very great confidence in the electric brush. That the brush should become a nebula is quite conceivable to you; nor less conceivable is it that the nebula should opacify in foci, and so give birth to an opaque atom. To the question, Can electricity make an opaque atom, you answer then, Perhaps!—Can this atom take life?

* It is thus, as we see from the ancients, that abstract thought begins: so after mythology (the mythological explanation) philosophy arises.
electric brush is still powerful within you, and you answer again, Perhaps!—Can this life develop and develop, and rise and rise? you still say, Perhaps. Can this life become in the end man and thought? you still say, Perhaps. Now this is the present material theory of creation; this is the explanation, this is the First and One with transition to the Many, this is the God of the materialists. The materialists are to themselves practical men; they depreciate the imagination, and they cry up the understanding: it is a remarkable fact, however, that the bulk of self-named practical men are the slaves of phantasy merely. Consider how it is here! Electricity, as yet, is but a name used as indicating the common principle of certain separate facts. The facts remain still of an interrupted, scattered, ill-connected nature, and the common principle, in its vagueness, remoteness, shadowiness, is as unsatisfactory as the facts: neither the One nor the Many cohere well to each other; neither the One nor the Many cohere well to themselves, or, in other words, the relative science is yet very imperfect. Electricity, thus, being something unknown, and, as we say, mysterious, is in famous fettle for the use of Imagination, who can easily apply it, in her dreaming way, in explanation of anything unknown, seeing that just as being unknown, it is capable of all. It is imagination, then, and not understanding, which, in the case before us, takes up electricity as a phantom which is dreamed a First and One with transition, &c., but which is no known One and of no known series. But an idol of the phantasy, where explanation is the quest, is empty and inapplicable. A mere name will not suffice here. If you want my conviction, you must get me to understand electricity as a First and One; you must somehow contrive to place it before me in transition to the Many. Has electricity as yet really effected a single transition? Electricity is the power of the water-drop, you say. But even as you take it, electricity is not the water-drop: no, even according to you, it is Hydrogen and Oxygen that are the water-drop. You make experiments, you demonstrate the power of electricity in the water-drop to be equal to I know not what immensity of horse-power. But what is that to HO? What does your electricity do there? Why is it necessary? Your explanation has infinitely complicated the explanation, infinitely deepened the mystery. Besides, is it so sure that this power is actually in the water-drop? Your experiment was a process, your experiment was not the water-drop. The
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electricity was a product—a product of your energy, of your operation, of your process, of your experiment. The water-drop was left on one side. Is it not possibly to be suspected that chemistry now-a-days may be synthetic where it is thought analytic, multiplicative where it is thought divisive, involvative where it is thought evolvative? Show me a single transition of electricity from A to B, where B is richer and more various than A, yet still A. Show me a single opaque atom which is electricity and only electricity. Show this single atom becoming another. Show me this atom taking life. Show me this life becoming another, becoming a higher. Show me life becoming thought. To suppose electricity thus augmenting itself, is it not mere superfetation of imagination, mere poverty of thought? In practical men, too, to whom spades are spades! Can the understanding be ever asked to look on at such a process—at electricity as the unal first, that passes into another, an atom, an infinity of atoms, an infinite variety of atoms—that passes again into another, life and an infinity of lives—that passes yet again into another, thought and an infinity of thoughts? But suppose this: electricity made matter, matter organisation, organisation thought! What all this while have you been doing with space and time? Has electricity made these also? If not, then it is not a first and one. The God of the materialist, then, has had a God before him who made space and time;—rather, perhaps, the materialist was so lost in his evolution of electricity, that he forgot all about space and time. But let us suppose electricity adequate to space and time also—what is the result then? Why, then we have—certainly what is wanted—a First and One with power of transition to the Many, a single material principle whose own duplication and reduplication have produced the All. But what is this? A simple—in a manner, unsensuous, too, as invisible, intangible, &c., in itself—that holds virtually in it—that holds virtually within its own unity and simplicity—Matter and Time and Space, and Man and Thought and the Universe,—why this is—Idealism! Between the electricity of the materialist and the thought of the idealist, where is the difference? Each is a simple that virtually is the congeries, a unity that virtually is the many. Ex hypothesi, electricity in its very first germ involved the capacity to become all the rest, that is, virtually was all the rest—that is, all the rest is virtually, that is, ideally, in it. The rest, in the first instance, was not actually, but only virtually or ideally in it. The
materialist must, then, to this extent admit himself an idealist, and that there is no difference between himself and his former opposite save in the first principle. The one says thought, the other electricity, but both mean the First and One which contains all the rest, which implies all the rest;—the First and One in which all the rest ideally are or were. We have only now to consider the principles; and if any preference can be detected in either, it will be sound reasoning to adopt the preferable. In this way, either the materialist must, seeing its superiority, adopt thought and become wholly an idealist; or the idealist must, seeing its superiority, adopt electricity and become partially a materialist, that is, so far as his first principle is concerned. But the first principle which is to contain all the rest, being supposed material and outward, evidently presupposes space and time. It must be granted, then, that electricity, if adequate to all the rest, is inadequate to space and time, and leaves them there absolutely unexplained, absolutely foreign to its own self. Here, then, the advantage is with the other principle, thought, which is not outward, but inward—which is independent of space and time, which involves space and time. You can never pack space and time into an outward, but you may, and very readily, into an inward. Thought has an advantage over electricity here, then. Again, a second advantage possessed by the former over the latter is, that an inward is still nearer to me—certainly to myself, the centre of all certainty—than any outward. Again, an inward is liker myself, is more homogeneous than an outward. And again, let it be said at last, thought, as an infinitely more powerful principle than electricity, is also an infinitely preferable one. But you object here—Thought is conditional on man, electricity is independent. The answer is easy: It is quite certain that thought is as independently present in the universe as electricity. The world is but a congeries of means to ends, and every example of such involves a thought. The wing that beats the air is a thought; an eye that sees, a sense that feels, an articulation that moves, a pipe that runs, a scale that protects,—all these, and myriads such—and they are thoughts—are as independent in nature as electricity. There is not an atom of dust but exhibits quantity and quality; electricity itself exhibits power, force, causality—and these are thoughts. The idealist may now say to the materialist, then,—idealism in the end, being common to both, and my rationale of the same being infinitely preferable to yours,
you are bound, on all laws of good reasoning, to abandon your own and adopt mine.

How must the explanation be thought? We name—and even the materialist will not say no—the explanation God, and, as we have seen, these predicates must be thought in his regard: that he is First, that he is One, and that in him is transition to the Many. Now, it is by necessity of thought that we attach these predicates and the question is, does not the necessity of thought go further? We say, it will be observed, transition, and not creation; and the reason is, that creation is an hypothesis of imagination, and not a necessity of thought as thought. Creation is but a clumsy rationale: it is what Kant would call a synthetic addition; it is a mere addition of a pictured something to a pictured nothing; it is a metaphor of imagination, and not a thought of thought proper: in a word, it is a Vorstellung, not a Begriff; a crude, current, figurate conception, and not a notion. Creation is but the metaphor of transition; the former is the Vorstellung, the latter is the notion. The predicates we have hitherto found are certain, then: they must be allowed. We think, and to think is that. To think is to seek an explanation, and an explanation is a First and One with capability of transition to all actual examples of the Many. But this principle evidently of First and One becomes the many, and becomes the various, even by virtue of its capability of transition. As many, as various, it is endless, it is unlimited; it is now, was, and ever will be; and, however various, it is still at bottom one and the same. This is to be granted: the materialist calling it a principle, the spiritualist and the idealist calling it God, a Spirit, Thought, agree in this, that the principle (call it as you will) must be thought as One, as First, as capable of transition (say creation, if you will), as unlimited whether in time or space, and yet as at bottom always self-identical. But a self-identity that can become other, both in number and in kind, is an identity with itself that becomes different from itself. The principle (the principium) contains in it, involves, implies both identity and difference. This is plain: granted identity alone, and you have identity, identity—perdrix, toujours perdrix—till the end of time, which is never. For progress, then, for a single step, it is absolutely necessary that your receipt should contain not identity alone, but difference also. Have paper and the colour of paper only, and all the painting in the world will never make a mark. To suppose God creator of this universe by act of his will,
alters not the matter one jot: in that case, he has thought difference, he has willed difference, he has made difference. The difference is still derived from his identity. Without his identity, the poised universe of difference shakes, sinks, vanishes, disappears like smoke. In short, God as thought, and not merely imagined, involves a coexistence of identity and difference, of unity and plurality, of first and last.

The predicates which we have at this moment in characterisation of the principle or principium are: Firstness, unity, plurality, identity, difference, limitation, and limitation. Why, here are quite a succession of categories from a single necessary thought. All of these are themselves necessary thoughts. No thinker that lives and thinks, but must think one and many, identity and difference, limitation and illimitation, &c. The misfortune is, indeed, that while he must think both of the members of each of these pairs, he conceives it his duty somehow to think only one, and that to think both would be self-stultification, and a contradiction of the laws of thought themselves. He will see—at least he ought to see—now, however, that he has been practising a cheat on himself, and that he must think both.

Now these are thoughts, and absolutely necessary thoughts, for these thoughts are actually in the universe, and on them the universe actually is made. Even were there no man in the world, and were the world supposed still to exist, there would be in the world unity and plurality, and difference and identity, and limitation, &c. Nay, there are single things that are at once all these. Space is unity, and space is plurality; space is identity, and space is difference; space is limitation, and space is illimitation. And as it is with space, so it is with time. But neither space nor time, nor both, can be the principle, the principium themselves: let them exist for ever and everywhere, let them coexist for ever and everywhere, still they are barren—still from such clasps as theirs not one atom of thought shall spring, not one atom of matter shall drop.

There are categories, then; and, like water from a sponge, they exude from the very nature of things. It is no objection, then, this of Haym’s, that we have Nature at our back when we state these categories. That such is the case, is beyond a doubt. Still, these categories, exuding from the concrete, do come together into a common element or system, and they are the thoughts which the nature of things involves, whether there be a human thinker
or not, and which are capable of being discerned directly a human
or any other thinker comes upon the scene.

The first thought, of course, is simply that of First. Before there
was a first—if that be possible—there was the thought of it. The
first is the first, and that is the thought even prior to the thing.
Suppose it was a grain of sand that was first, why that grain of
sand involves thought: it is there in quantity and quality, it is
alone, it virtually contains all, &c. All these are thoughts, and
first itself is a thought. But what is first? Why, just God, the
principle, just what is. What is, is the first that is. But what
is, is. What is involves Being. Ah, there we have it: Being is
the absolutely first, the absolutely universal predicate in thinking
this universe, figure the subject of predication as you may. Being,
that what is, is, this is the first, and this also is the immediate or
the inderivative. It is what is, and we do not ask for anything
higher as producer of it; it is what is, and it is consequently the
first. Now, as Being is the necessary first, it will suffice for the
present to assert that what Haym calls the long string of the cate-
gories just necessarily ravel out of it, and simply assures itself of
its own truth by that occasional glimpse at the concrete actual to
which Haym would wholly attribute it. And such we think a
legitimate mode of illustrating the possible or probable incubant
thoughts of Hegel.

Hegel's general undertaking, indeed, seems to be, to restore the
evolution immanent to thought itself (which evolution has only
presented itself concretely and chronologically in the particular
thinkers preserved in history)—to restore this evolution to uni-
versal consciousness, in abstract purity, and in such wise that the
whole movement and every moment of the movement should
be understood as each veritably is, with Idealism, or rather the
Idée-Monade, as the result, and thereby infinitude retrieved for
man in union and communion with God—what we may call,
'Recovered Paradise to all mankind.'

It is no mere process of the generalisation of particular historical
facts, however, that we are to see in Hegel. History, no doubt,
lies paradigmatically behind the system, but the connexion
between them is probably of a subtler nature than the usual
generalisation. We are not to suppose that Hegel has taken the
exact concrete facts of the history of philosophical thought as
it has manifested itself in time, and so to speak, broken, and trod,
and pressed them down into an ultimate lymph which is thought
itself in its own nature and in its own life—not to suppose that he has grasped the solid masses themselves, and compressed and kneaded them till they became the transparent and plastic essence which is his Logic,—but rather that, along the long range of solid rocks from Thales to Kant—at the foot of these—he has laid himself down as the pure and harmonising mirror into which their pure reflexions fall. Till the reader, then, has acquired a certain ease of traffic, as it were, not with the bodies, but with the souls of facts, the reference to history in Hegel may as readily—to use a foreign expression—disorient as orient him.

B.

Hegel acts on the dictum of Aristotle, ἢ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας ἐκρησίς ἔστω, in the sense that (the finding of the knot is the loosening of it) for we may name a main object with him to be the elimination of the antithesis by demonstration of the antithesis; which said antithesis is at first Being, and Non-being and at last the absolute Subject-Object, the Spirit, that which is in itself and by itself and for itself, the Absolute, the concrete reciprocal of all reciprocals. It is also to be seen that this reciprocity or reciprocation is in its nature notional, is identical with that which Kant discovered to constitute perception, which to him was, shortly,—and simply Hegel's Notion!—the subsumption of the particular under the universal to the development of the conjunctive singular. Kant, too, perceived that sensation and perception were but externally what thought, or the categories, were internally. Kant, however, did not bring his thoughts together. This was done by Hegel to the production—and by no other means—of the Hegelian system. He saw, first of all, in a perfection of consciousness which Kant lacked, this reciprocity of inner and outer, of thought and sense. He saw also that these elements related themselves to each other as universal and particular; and, seeing as much as that at the same time that the whole reach of Kant's theory of perception was clear before him, a theory in which all the three moments of the notion have place, it was not difficult for him to complement and complete them by the addition of the singular. Quite generally, then, he was able to state to himself that the ultimate truth of the universe was just this: Notional reciprocation pervades the whole, and is the whole; and, more particularly, in this movement the ultimate point of repose is the
production of the singular by its subsuming the particular (which is as \textit{matter}, that is, negation, or simply difference) under the universal (which is \textit{form}, or affirmation, or identity).

Seeing this, the next step or question would be, how put together all the details in completeness and perfection—how interconnect, how systematise them? Having come to that which is most general as the ground unit, or rather as the ground form, it would be natural to make it the first, and endeavour to find a transition from it to the rest. Hegel's first step, then, in this light, would be, in the first instance, to exclude sense and perception as the mere other or copy of the more important intellect. In such restriction, his element evidently would be the purely logical. Now, the categories lying before him, he had in them logical elements not due to the merely subjective movement of notion, judgment, and syllogism; and he could not possibly escape the thought of an objective logic as a necessary addition to the usual subjective one.

Now, how begin? What category was the most general objective one? It was manifestly not Relation nor Modality; for both Relation and Modality concern a foregone conclusion—presuppose, that is, their own substrate. It must either be Quantity or Quality. But the latter is evidently prior to the former. The quantity of any what is a secondary consideration to the what itself; and we see Kant himself succumbing to the necessity of this priority in his 'Kritik of Judgment.' Let us begin with Quality, then. But what is the most universal quality, so far as all particular qualities are abstracted from, and there is question only of quality as it is thought, question only of the thought of quality? Why, Being! Being is a qualitative thought, and it is, at the same time, the most abstract, the most universal of all thoughts. But should we commence with this thought, transition from it, movement is no longer possible by process of logical generalisation: such possibility can be attained only through the reverse process of logical determination or specification. But a specification, beginning with such first, would, if ended, especially if ended in a circle of return—be a complete system; and a specification, again, can be effected only through the addition of the necessary differentiae. But just such power possessed the formula derived from Kant: For the genus was the same as Kant's general notion, the difference the same as his particular notion (we may call it so, for, though to Kant it was only materials of sense, we know now that even so it is
only the other of thought, it still is in itself thought), and the species stood to the genus and differentia just as the singular stood to the universal and the particular.

Seyn, being, would be a beginning, then; but how find a differentia by which to convert it into a species, which species, too, should be the absolute species proxima? We have found the universal genus, but how find the universal differentia? Why, if the one is being, if the one is the universal identity—and manifestly the ultimate genus must be the universal identity, and, looking at it in that way, being is easily seen to be just that—the other must be, as already named indeed, the universal difference, the universal source of distinction and separation, which just is negation, not, or nothing. The universal difference, then, is but the contrary of the universal genus; and our very first step has brought us to the antithesis at its sheerest and abruptest.

But, subsuming not or nought under being, which is precisely what we have to do in a process of logical specification or determination, what species results? To subsume not under being, or to incorporate not with being, is to give not the character of being—is, so to speak, to being-ate not—is to give being to not: and what does that amount to but a becoming? Nought passing into being (being passing into nought, if you will) is surely becoming. Now, this as first reciprocation is type of all the rest. Take Hegel’s widest or most general division of Logic, Nature, Spirit: the last subsumes the second under the first; spirit logices nature; spirit is the conjunctive singular of the universal (logic), and of the particular (nature); spirit is the concrete One of identity and difference. Again, spirit is the ultimate sublimation or concretion of the form becoming, as logic is of being (identity) and nature of non-being (difference).

Of other Hegelian divisions, Begriff subsumes Wesen under Seyn, or Begriff, notion, gives being to what is called Wesen, or essential principle; Maass subsumes Quantity under Quality, or Measure qualifies Quantity. Fürsichseyn, singular being, subjective being, subsumes Daseyn, particular being, objective being, natural being, under Seyn, universal being, subjective and objective Being, logical Being, &c., &c. In the Philosophy of Nature, as in that of Spirit, the triplicity is certainly not so formally exact as it is in these examples; but it still aims at the same pattern, and throughout the Logic it remains almost always perfectly true.

* It is Kant’s theory of perception that underlies this.
to itself. This is obvious in such examples, for instance, as Daseyn, Quality, Something; Identity, Difference, Ground; Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c.; where the third member is the product of the subsumption of the second under the first, or results, so to speak, by infecting the second with the nature of the first. In fact, the object is to be serious with the notion of reciprocity and its resolution in a relation. The antithesis constituted by reciprocity is taken in its abstractest form as Being and Nothing, and it is gradually raised to its ultimate concretion of subject and object. The first resolutive relation, too, Becoming, is contained in the last, the Absolute Spirit. We are to suppose the threads of the antithesis gradually thickening from the lowest to the highest, and the relation, or the crossing of the threads, gradually thickening likewise. Throughout, then, we have but the antithesis in its series of stages.

This explication goes pretty deep into the nature of the Hegelian industry; but Hegelian writing is not thereby at once made current, readable at sight. No; Hegelian difficulty largely remains: not that it is because, as Goethe thought, Hegel wanted lightness, or because, as Humboldt thought, speech had never come to a thorough 'breaking-through' with him. No: the reason of the difficulty lies partly in the fact that Hegel will give no sign of the origin of his system, nor of the concretes that lie under his abstract characterisation; partly in the fact, too, that this characterisation is abstract, and the most abstract that has ever yet been exemplified on the whole perhaps: partly again in this, that he has sought to make the abstract evolution of his Logic parallel with the concrete evolution of philosophical thought in history; and partly, finally, that each sphere demands for its characterisation its own words, which words remain ever afterwards intelligible only when referred to the sphere where they, as it were naturally, took birth and presented themselves. No reader, however intelligent, will ever be at ease with Hegel till he has gone through the whole system of Logic with such diligence and completeness as to have ever all the technical words present to his consciousness in the exact sense in which they were employed by Hegel. Even so, Hegel himself is often in such an agony of difficulty with the refractoriness of his own materials, and what he sees is so hard to be learned from the abstraction of the language, that there is little hope of ready reading in such an element ever for anyone.

One other source of difficulty lies in the artificiality and for-
malism which are everywhere present in the construction. With each new product a new differentia is necessitated to be derived from this product, which reunited to the product gives rise to a third and higher. Such a method entails outside effort, and the appearance of artificial straining. Still, Hegel is to be considered as genuine. He might certainly have made himself perfectly easy to be understood, had he explained his connexion to Kant, and described what he would be at both in principle, method, and result; and so far suspicion and a grudge will always follow him. Nevertheless, Hegel is the historical continuator of Kant, and he has really carried forward the interest of philosophy as received from the hands of Kant. Nay, with all its artifice, his method is the true one—that is, if Kant was right, and a science of Metaphysic is now founded and begun—and the elevation of the antithesis must henceforth be the business of philosophy, as it is of experience probably, and life itself.

C.

Few things more tantalising, after all, than Hegel’s constant reference to the Notion, the Begriff. What, of course, is meant, is the logical notion, or the notion as notion. It will not do, however, to have recourse here to merely technical logic, to merely technical definition, and content ourselves with a mere phrase, a mere abstract expression. Any mere technicality of any mere book is something very different from what Hegel aims at. The Notion, in fact, is the concrete notion; the notion is the notion that was taken up by Kant, and which, passing through the hands of Fichte and Schelling, reached finally those of Hegel himself. The Notion, then, is simply Kant’s notion; and the transformation of Kant’s notion into Hegel’s Idea, is the one business of the Hegelian Logic. The Notion, in short, is Reciprocity. For this is the true name for the purpose that impelled Kant in a similar direction in Metaphysic to that of Copernicus in Astronomy. Kant sought to invert the relation; sought rather more than this—to reciprocate the relation—to prove objects not only affecting, but affected; that is, not only influencing us, but influenced by us. The notion, then, passing from Hume to Kant in the form of Causality, was converted by the latter—virtually—into that of Reciprocity. Reciprocity—this is the ultimate abstraction for, the ultimate generalisation of, the work of Kant; this is that work’s
true appellation. Most wonderful is the penetrating, rending, irresistible force of Hegel. Thought becomes reduced before him to its ultimate nerve: the volumes of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, are transformed to sentences in a paragraph; and the vast Kant has become a single word. Substance becomes Causality; Causality becomes Reciprocity, and Reciprocity becomes the Notion. In Kant, however, it was only the notion an sich, the notion in itself; it had the immediacy, the identity, the instinctivity, the unconsciousness of nature. In Kant it only appeared, but it knew not its own self in him; or Kant was quite unconscious that the one notion which moved in his whole industry was Reciprocity. From Kant and the stage of immediacy, it soon passed, however, to Fichte and Schelling, or the stage of reflexion, the stage of the difference, the stage of negation, the stage of particularisation, and as soon, finally, to Hegel, or the stage of complete and total reconciliation and insight—the stage of singularisation, which is the stage also of the restoration of immediacy by the sublation of mediacy (the negation of the negation, or, what is the same thing, commediation with self). Reciprocity on this last stage, being developed to its issues, is now the Idea, which one word expresses the resolution of objectivity in reciprocity with subjectivity and of subjectivity in reciprocity with objectivity into the concrete reciprocity of the notion, the logical notion, the notion as notion, which is itself a reciprocity, and the ultimate reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity. All this, of course, is very hard to realise to understanding; but, after a due analysis both of Kant and Hegel, the desired 'light' will always 'go up' to honest labour.

All this can be said differently; it is all capable of being expressed in the Aristotelian formula that relates to Form, Matter, and perfect Actualisation. The δύναμις, ὅλη, and ἐντελέχεια* of Aristotle amount precisely to the Begriff, Urtheil, and Schluss of Hegel. In fact, all that is said in Hegel is but the single principle involved in this formula, in one or other of its innumerable forms: always and everywhere with him and in him we have to do wholly and solely with the resultant unity of a triple reciprocity. And in this, it may be, Hegel has hit an essential, or the essential secret of the universe. 'Omnes trinum

* Dr Thomas Brown was talking of the 'mystic Entelecheia' of Aristotle as something unfathomable at a time when it had been familiar to Hegel at least for some years.
perfectum rotundum; all good things are three: three is the sacred number, the fundamental figure, the foot that scans the rhythmus of the Universe.' This is the ultimate cell, the multiplication and accumulation of which has built the All. The universal becomes particular, and both are resolved or combined into singularity, which, indeed, only realises each. Any cell in its material, structure, and function, will be found to illustrate this. Such, indeed, is the inner nature, the inner movement, the rhythm of self-consciousness itself; and self-consciousness is the primum of all. It is the first and centre, and all else are but reduplications, inspissations, crassations of it outwards. This simplicity constitutes a great difficulty in Hegel; for with whatever he may be occupied, he can always only see in it the same form, and speak of it in the same dialect. Hegel's so frequent utterance in regard to immediacy which has made itself such by resolution of mediacy attaches itself to the same principle. It agrees with this, too, that what is to explain, account for, or act as ground in any reference, is always with Hegel the stage which is named Schluss, Entelechya, Singularisation, Reconciliation, &c., the nature of which just is that it is an Immediate resultant from Mediacy, the inner nerve being always reciprocity.

Hegel just modified and developed the stand-point of Kant. In his hands, for example, the categories must become the category or the notion; and this again, freed from subjectivity, and looked at objectively as what is, must become the Absolute or the Idea in its first, or simplest, or most abstract form or principle. When, indeed, 'the light went up' to him from Kant, his object would be to complete these categories, these substantial creative notions, —to complete them, to found them, and to derive them from a principle—from a something first, simple, and certain. But, with such abstract generalised notions or universals before him, the inquest or request would naturally be the abstract generalised universal notion as notion. From this he could begin: this should be the life of all the other generalised notions (as being their universal), and through them of all existence generally. What is this ultimate notion, then? What is the notion as such? Where find it?—how conceive it? These presumably were Hegel's first thoughts, and we are here certainly on his real trail, which Haym, with all his laborious investigation of the Hegelian steps in the writings themselves both published and manuscript of Hegel, has unquestionably missed. This, indeed, could only
manifest itself to one who stood at last on an exhaustive analysis of
the 'deduction of the categories.' From such coigne of vantage
there is a sudden glimpse at last into the initial secret of Hegel,
his junction to the world of his predecessors, the one broad
bridge that at once made him and them, a one and identical
common country.

With all effort, Hegel could not expect to attain what he
sought immediately. But as regards where he ought to search, he
would find himself naturally referred to logic. But what is logic?
what is the foundation of logic? How came logic to birth?
What is so named, is seen at first sight to imply, at all events,
that all other concretes are left out of view, presumably, perhaps,
as considered to their ultimate, and that thought abstractly,
thought as thought, is what is now examined. Historically, then,
all objective elements and interests are behind logic; or,
historically, so situated is the genesis of logic. In other words,
logic is the historical outcome of the investigation of all particular
concretes which present themselves. So is it that logic becomes,
as it were, the biographic ghost of history in its element of
abstract or generalised thought. Nay, the steps of generalisation
which present themselves, so to speak, historically in the life of
the public individual, may be seen to repeat themselves—in the
progress from instinct to reason, from brutality to morality, &c.
&c.—biographically in the life of the private individual. In this
manner there is the glimpse of a concrete logic obtained. But
Hegel must be conceived as returning from such general view to
the particular question, What is the notion as notion? And in
the answer to this question it is that the origin, the principle, the
form, and even, in a certain light, the matter of the Hegelian
system lie. But we may come to the same point from other
directions.

There is in the brain of Hegel a dominant metaphor. This
metaphor relates to a peculiar evolution which is characterised
thus: It begins, of course, with a first; but this first is presently
seen to imply its opposite, which opposite, developed in its turn,
coalesces with the former to the production of a third, a new form,
constituted by and containing, but only implicitly, the two former
as moments. This third, this new form, develops itself now up to
the full of its unity, and is presently seen to imply its opposite—
with the same results. Now, we have to conceive this process
repeated again and again till an end is reached; which end, we
have further to conceive, passes back into the first, and thus the whole movement constitutes a simple circle. Each link in this circular chain, too, is seen to be a kind of triple unity. Ever, indeed, there seems somehow a flight of three, the last of which is always a return to the first, but changed, as if it were richer, heavier, more complete—more completely developed, in fact. Each of the three terms concerned must be conceived to begin, to fill, to reach its full; and when full, to show, as it were, the germ of its opposite, which rising up into its full, seeks union and coalescence with its former to a new production. This is the one metaphor of the thought of Hegel; and even here we can see that we have never moved from the spot; for this metaphor is but another way of expressing the one movement or principle already characterised in so many ways as δύναμις, ὁλη, ἐντελέχεια; Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; universality, particularity, singularity; thesis, antithesis, synthesis; being, essence, notion, &c. &c. Wherever we are in Hegel indeed, we have ever the same triplet before us in one or other of its innumerable forms. Always there are the two opposites or reciprocals which coalesce like acid and alkali to a base—a base in which they still implicitly are, but only as moments. This base, again, if the result of its moments, is really their base, their ground, their foundation, their Grundlage. If they found it, it founds them. It is the mother-liquor into which they have passed: it is a living base out of which they can arise and show themselves, and into which they can again disappearingly return. This is the Hegelian metaphor: a ground, a base, from which arise members, which again withdraw themselves—a differentiated Common or One. And what is this but the disjunctive or reciprocal whole of Kant, suggested to him by the disjunctive judgment, and discussed by him at so much length, and with such fresh, new, and creative vigour? A sphere of reciprocity: this is the whole. This is the Hegelian Idée-Monade. The reciprocity still must be understood as notional reciprocity—the triple reciprocity of universal, particular, and singular, each of which, as reciprocal of the others, holds the others in its own way, and is in fact the others. It is identity gone into its differences indeed, but still even in these identical with itself. Differentiated identity, or identified difference, constitutes the one reciprocal sphere of Hegel—a sphere which is the whole universe—a sphere which is each and every atom in the universe—a sphere which, as self-consciousness, or rather as the Notion (self-consciousness in its
simplest statement), is the one soul, the one spirit—which is life, vitality itself—and the only life, the only vitality. Thus it is—which is so curiously characteristic of the Hegelian philosophy—that every attempt to understand or explain any the least considerable of its terms becomes a flight into the system itself. So, for particular example, is it that the third is always the base and the truth of the first and second. We see this corroborated by fact; for it is simply the progress of thought to give itself the new as the reason or explanation or ground of the old, or of what preceded it. Thus it is that the modern world is the truth of the ancient, Spinoza the truth of Descartes, Hume the truth of Locke, and Kant the truth of Hume, as Hegel is of Kant. On this last particular ground, and in harmony with the whole system, Begriff is third where Seyn and Wesen are first and second. The Hegelian Logic even outwardly presents these three stadia, and the reason lies in the Hegelian notion, or is just another side of the Hegelian metaphor. There is opposed to perception this world of outer images: these constitute the Seyn, the immediacy. But now understanding takes what perception offers—will not content itself with what perception offers as it is offered, will treat this in its way, and insists on demanding the inner nature of this outer nature, the inner being of this outer being; it insists on satisfaction to its own Reflexion, and demands the Wesen of this Seyn, the inner essentity of this outer appearance, the Noumenon of the Phenomenon. But all this can be said in the two words, Begriff and Urtheil. The act of perception may be named the immediate Begriff, the Begriff in itself: in itself as being yet only virtual, that is, existent and factual, but object of consciousness as yet neither to itself nor anything else; in itself, too, as really in itself for every particular into which the whole sphere (or notion) goes asunder, constitutes, each with each, just what the sphere or notion is in itself; and in itself as really in itself in this sense, that to whatever yet it may develop itself, that development depends on, is conditioned by, the first natural germ as it was in itself when first manifested. In particular explanation of the third or last phase, it may be stated that self-will is the notion in itself of the whole developed notion of morality. At the same time, it will be as well to enter a caveat against this statement being supposed to favour what is called the selfish system. Self-will is the notion of morality in itself; but it is only through its negative of humilia-
tion and submission that it reaches its own consummation; and this can hardly be a dogma of the Selfish System.

But if the act of perception be the notion in itself, the act of understanding is the notion for itself. Perception is content to hold its matter just as it is, and asks no further. Understanding is not so content; understanding will not so hold its matter, understanding must peep and pry and spy into, understanding must separate, its matter—separate it for its own passage into it: understanding, too, having once effected this separation, keeps it up; it regards this separation as the truth; it holds each part to be in its truth only when separated from the whole, and in isolation by itself: understanding, that is, puts faith only in its own abstractions. Perception holds what we may call its matter—perception itself being only relatively as form—immediately; whereas understanding will hold and must hold this matter (the same matter) only mediately. But the object or matter immediately is the object or matter in itself; and the object or matter mediately is just the object or matter for itself. Understanding, then, will not have the object otherwise than as it is mediately, as it is in reflexion, as it is for itself. Understanding, that is, scouts outer nature, and will have inner nature. Though it has it there as in perception, it still asks what is it? It demands the Wesen of this Seyn. Seyn, then, is the intent, ingest, or matter of all perception; and Wesen is the intent, ingest, or matter of all understanding: and this matter in perception is only unmittelbar or an sich, while in understanding it is mittelbar or fur sich. In perception, that is, it is just the undeveloped Begriff, just what is apprehended or grasped in its first direct unity; but in understanding it is the judgment—(a judgment has been passed on the matter in regard to what it is)—and the judgment is the Ur-theil, the primal or primitive parting, the dis-cernment. But now is the opportunity of the third branch of logic, of reason, to reunite in the Schluss (the shut, the close), what has been separated by understanding in the Urtheil, and restore it to the unity of perception in the higher form of reason: in which form it is the notion, the logical notion, the true and complete notion, and Seyn and Wesen are now complemented by their third.

But here now, then, we have a new triad for the principle of Hegel: Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning! The three stadia of common logic are, after all, representative of what Hegel would be at! The three stadia of common logic constitute
but a stage of the Hegelian evolution—constitute between them but the Hegelian notion—and in very perfect form! Hegel too, then, has seen into the depths of the meaning of the common logic; and he co-operates with Kant to restore it from death and insanity to life and wealth. How striking this placing parallel with each other the forms—Perception and Simple Apprehension; and the matters—Seyn and Begriff! What vision this of Understanding as that which separates and remains fixed by what it separates—the judgment, the Urtheil, which is the primitive parting! What new truth in the function of Reason as reconciliant speculation, which restores the notion, the first product as it came to us, but now in its very truth! What wonderful sagacity to regard all—Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss—as but the turns of a single movement, which movement is the one essential secret of all that is!

But this—the psychological triad of Perception, Understanding, and Reason, or the logical one of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning—is capable of being applied both historically and biographically. Historically—Seyn, the intent of Perception, sufficed the earliest men. The Notion, the Begriff, what was simply grasped and begriped of Simple Apprehension, was enough for them. They asked no questions, they simply lived; it was an era of Faith. How many times the Notion, meaning thereby the whole logical movement—and that is tantamount to the whole vital movement—has passed through its own phases historically, cannot be said. There seems good reason for supposing the philosophy of Aristotle to have been in some sort an Absolute Idealism; and in that case, the Greeks at all events represent one complete cycle of the Notion. We see the stage of Perception and Seyn, or of Simple Apprehension and Begriff, the age of faith, in Homer. Then the first appearance of the Urtheil, of the separating and dis-cerning Understanding, the first appearance of the Negation, is the turning of such thinkers as Thales and the other Ionics on the Seyn, outer being, and the questioning of it, the demanding the Wesen, the inner principle of it, the resolution of it by reflexion into its differences, water, fire, earth, and what not. Then the separation, the reflexion, the abstraction, the generalisation so begun—a beginning of Idealism it is, for even Water when proposed as the principle by Thales is, as Hegel tells us, but a beginning of Idealism; if it is the principle, it is a unity which ideally holds, which ideally is, the total variety—
waxed more and more perfect, more and more pure, in the succeeding philosophers. We have Pythagoras, for example, seeking an explanation in the numerical difference, which is so far an abstracting from outer solidity. Then we have the first absolutely abstract thought, the Eleatic being. In fact, Heraclitus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, can be all used as types of certain stages of the movement of the notion and applied in explanation of the system of Hegel. Of this movement, we may conceive the modern world to constitute another cycle. In the Middle Ages, there was simple apprehension—the reign of Faith. Then came Reflexion to break into this unity, and set up the differences as principles. This Reflexion, as in Greece so here, culminated in an age of Aufklärung. People conceived themselves fully enlightened as to their ancient folly, and hastened to rid themselves of it at the shortest—in some cases, as Carlyle has it, by setting fire to it. But, looking at this Reflexion, only in the philosophical element, and omitting Descartes, Spinoza, and the rest, we remark that the Aufklärung culminated in David Hume, and passing from him to Kant, received from this latter its first turn into the final form, completed by Hegel, of the universal reconciliant Idea or Schluss of Speculation and Reason. This last form is what we have now to welcome: the doubts, despair, despondencies of mere reflexion are ended; we have to quit the penal fire of the negative, and emerge into the sunshine of the new and higher positive—of the positive which restores to us, and in richer form, all that understanding, all that reflexion, all that scepticism and the enlightenment of the eighteenth century had bereft us of. Thus does the Notion describe its cycles; and it may be remarked of these, that each, though full, is a rise on its predecessor. The Greek, though a complete cycle, is still, as it were, in the form of the first moment, Seyn; it is a cycle an sich. The modern world again is dominated by Wesen, and may be named a cycle fur sich. To believe the analogy, we shall be followed then by a cycle an und fur sich, in which Reason shall predominate! How strangely this coheres with prophecy and the utterances of Scripture!

7. What is said historically, may be said biographically: Seyn, Wesen, Begriff, or Begriff; Urtheil, Schluss, are the three stages in the life of every thinker.

Why the Notion, Begriff, is third to Being and Essence, will have now made itself apparent in a variety of ways. The directest
is simply that of what is: Seyn is the first form, Wesen the second, and Begriff the third. This explains itself at once by reference to the faith of the religious era, the unrest of the reflective era (Hume), and the restored repose of the rational era effected by the Notion (Begriff) of Kant and Hegel. The third form can be easily seen, too, though preceded by the others, to be at the same time the ground, Grundlage, or containing base of these. We may remark here, too, that we have now the necessary light whereby to place and appreciate Comte. The constitution of the notion really gives him a show of truth as regards an age of Religion and an age of Metaphysic; but it is a fatal error to suppose them past only, and not still operant, now and always: Comte, too, knows nothing of the how or why, or real nature of his ages, and it is amusing to compare his third and final one (the Aufklärung) with that (Reason, Faith) of Kant and Hegel. Comte, with the smirking, self-complacent sufficiency of the shallow, orders us to return to Seyn (Perception), Phenomena; and knows not, that he brings to the examination of the same, all the categories of reflexion, full-formed, and in that he drifts a prey to these categories, thinks himself by their means (whose nature is hid from him) master of the Phenomena!

D.

The third paragraph of the opening of the third volume of the Logic of Hegel, entitled 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen,' may be translated thus:—

'Objective Logic, which considers Being (Seyn) and Inbeing or Essentity (Wesen), constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the Notion. More particularly, Substance is the real Inbeing, or Inbeing so far as it is united with Outbeing (Seyn) and gone over into Actuality. The Notion has, therefore, Substance as its immediate presupposition; or Substance is that in itself which the Notion is as in manifestation. The dialectic movement of Substance through Causality and Reciprocity onwards, is therefore the immediate genesis of the Notion, and by this genesis its Becoming is represented. But its Becoming, like Becoming everywhere, implies that it (the Becoming) is the reflexion of what becomes into its Ground, and that the next presentant other into which the former (that which is engaged becoming) has passed, constitutes the truth of this former. Thus the Notion is the truth of Substance; and while the particular mode of relation in Substance is Necessity, Freedom manifests itself as the truth of Necessity, and as the mode of relation in the Notion.'

It was in reading this passage that the historic 'light went up
to us' as to what the Begriff really meant. Of course, it was known, we may say, all along previously, that, as stated by Schwegler and Haym, it was a tenet of Hegel that the history of philosophy was, in outward concretion and contingency, what the development of the notion was in the inward concretion and necessity of logic. But still, on the whole, the tenet was looked loosely at, in the manner of Haym and Schwegler themselves, as a mere analogy and ideal, as a mere Regulative, and not by any means as a Constitutive. Schwegler expresses this thus:—

'History is no sum in arithmetic to be exactly cast up. Nor anywhere in the history of philosophy, either, can there be talk of an à priori construction; what is factual cannot be applied as the illustrative exemplification of a ready-made notional schema: but the data of experience, so far as capable of a critical inquest, are to be taken as ready-furnished to us, and their rational connexion is to be analytically exposed; only for the arrangement and scientific articulation of this historical material can the Speculative idea supply a Regulative.' As said, however, in reading the above passage from Hegel, 'a light went up,' and Hegel was seen to be much more in earnest with his peculiar tenet than it seemed to have occurred to anyone even to surmise. It was seen, in fact, that the Notion was Kant's notion, and that its genesis lay in the thinking of the philosophers who had preceded him,—in the thinking, that is, of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, to whom Substance really presented itself—though each named it otherwise, perhaps—as what was the whole object of inquiry and research. Concrete facts do undoubtedly lie behind the abstraction of Hegel; and if this abstraction can, on one side, be viewed as the development of thought as thought, apart from any other consideration, it can also be viewed, on the other side, as being but the counterpart of the actual particular facts of history. To him, indeed, who is well read in history in general, and in that of philosophy in particular, the light now offered will shine into meaning many tracts of Hegel which might have appeared previously quite impervious.

In further reference to the exposition of Substance being the genesis of the Notion, we remark, that what is in and for itself, is to itself at once its own ground and its own manifestation, its own identity and its own difference, its own affirmation and its own negation, &c. &c. Now Substance is all this: the notion conveyed by this word is just that it is its own Wesen and its own Seyn, its
own Inbeing and its own Outbeing, its own ground and its own manifestation, &c. It is evident that the sort of movement involved here in this species of play between inside and outside, ground and manifestation, identity and difference, may be appropriately termed reflexion: for neither factor is, in itself, absolute, independent, isolated, &c.; neither factor has an independent existence—both have only a relative existence, either is quite as much in its other as in itself. The ground is ground just because of the manifestation, and the manifestation is manifestation just because of the ground. Thus they are reciprocals, and reciprocals in unity. Again, the Notion—that is, our notion, Kant’s notion, or rather now Hegel’s notion—is the unity of Being and Reflexion, or Seyn and Wesen. The categories, or their universal, the category, let us say, is as much outward as inward; it is what is, whether we look outwards or inwards; that is, it is Seyn, Being. And again, inasmuch as in it we can look both outwards and inwards, it involves or is Reflexion; that is, the Notion is the Unity of Being and Reflexion. In fact, all that is wished to be said here (beginning of fourth paragraph of ‘Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen’), is that the movement of Substance is manifestation of what it is in itself, and this manifestation is identical with what it is in itself, and Substance and Manifestation are just identical together and in general: further, that this movement of Substance is evidently identical with the movement of the Notion, and the former constitutes thus the genesis of the latter. In other words, the evolution of Substance through Causality, Reciprocity, &c., in the heads of Spinoza, Hume, and Kant terminated in the genesis of the Idea in the brain of Hegel. In short, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, &c., are simply abstracted from, and the development which these and others gave to Substance (for the object then was an inner principle or truth that should explain phenomena—and such is Substance) may be considered as the development of Substance itself, or as the dialectic movement of the plastic All of thought which was then in the form of Substance.

Substance unites in its own self both of the correlative sides: it is that which as Inbeing is also Outbeing; it is both inner ground and outer manifestation; that is, it is Actuality, or what actually is. There can be no doubt but the thoughts of Descartes, and the rest, circled around the poles which these simple ideas represent. ‘Substance is that in itself which the Notion is in manifestation.’ This means, Kant’s Notion which is now in actual manifestation—
is but a development from Substance; and Substance, therefore, was *in itself* what Kant has actually developed it into. The dialectic movement of Substance through Causality and Reciprocity onwards is therefore the immediate *genesis* of the *Notion*; and by this *genesis* its *Becoming* is represented. It is well to know this literal truth to history on the part of Hegel, especially as concerns the characteristic tenets both of Kant and himself. Categories, Dialectic, Method, have all been regarded hitherto as appurtenances of the system, and of nothing but the system: close literal generalisation, though in ultimate abstraction, of actual outer facts has not been thought of; and Hegel's claim on actual history has simply given rise—so far as precise fact was concerned—to incredulous shakings of the head. The truth in general, however, is what was said a short way back, of Hegel being a pure mirror into which fell the pure reflexions of the long line from Thales to Kant; and in particular the truth is, that the text of the Logic may in this place be regarded as a direct *anallegory* of the actual origin of the Idea of Hegel in his studies of his immediate predecessors, especially Kant.

Hegel does not stop at reciprocity, and it may appear wrong, therefore, to assert that the notion is reciprocity. It is to be admitted that the notion is beyond and more than simple reciprocity: still it preserves the colour and lineaments of its parent; and the notion is a reciprocity, the notion, in fact, is the notional reciprocity represented by any one of the many triads we have already seen. This, we may just point out in passing, has escaped Rosenkranz, who mistakes the genesis of the notion so much, that he proposes a reform of the Hegelian Logic, the main item of which is—untruth to history—the insertion of Teleology *between* Reciprocity and the Notion. It wants but a very slight glance at the system to discern that it is a triple sphere of triple spheres endlessly within one another almost in the fashion of a Chinese toy, and that the essential principle of each triplicity is reciprocity. Compare Logic and Nature, for example, as they appear in the system: is it not as if there were an inner congeries hanging down side by side with an outer congeries, without direct transition from the one to the other, but each perfectly parallel to the other—parallel, that is, in reciprocity? Is not the Hegelian method but an evolution or development—an expansion through all that is, of the notion? Is it not simply an exhibition or demonstration of the notion *in* all that is in existence, or an arrangement of all that
is in existence on the notion? What is the precise meaning, for example, now, of Hegel's rejection of what he calls raisonnement? Why, raisonnement is the method that existed while causality was the notion; but that method it is proper to withdraw and change, now that reciprocity (in a notional form certainly) is the notion. This is a true insight into the most characteristic and obscure of all the very extraordinary procédés of Hegel. While causality reigned, explanation consisted in assigning a reason for a consequent; that is, raisonnement was the method. Now, however, that reciprocity reigns, it is reciprocity that must guide, and constitute henceforth (till a new principle) the method of all theorising, and of all explanation. And this is simply what Hegel has performed: instead of accounting for this universe by a series of causes and effects, or reasons and consequents, he has simply carried his notional reciprocity, orderingly, arraigningly, into it, and presented it to us as a sphere of spheres, all of which follow notional reciprocity as their law and principle.

What is said in regard to the relativity, or mode of relation which obtains in Substance as opposed to that which obtains in the Notion, is very important, and displays a most deep and unmistakable historical dye. On the stage of Substance, man, as his thought could only then show to him, was under Necessity; and Necessity constituted then the great subject of discussion: but here, on the stage of notional reciprocity, the prius of which exhibits itself as subjective or of the nature of thought, we are in an element of Freedom, that element being thought or reason, which is but our inmost selves, and which to obey, then, is but to obey ourselves—is but Self-obedience, and that is Liberty. It is historical also, that he who first announced the notion of reciprocity, and in its subjective or notional form, was the same Kant who was the first to demonstrate, as if by exact proof, this fact of our Moral Liberty or Freedom. Is it not wonderful concentration on the part of Hegel, then, to shut up such enormous masses as the discussions of Kant in single and brief phrases?

Still, there is difficulty enough: this (the fourth paragraph of 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen') is, on the whole, one of those hopeless passages which so often bring the reader of Hegel into the gall of vexation and the bitterness of despair. In the Egyptian fog of the first sentence of this paragraph, how is it possible for any man to see? How hopeless must the British student of Hegel find himself in such a quandary as this! Of course, he is at a full
stop. If he has not yet tried the second book of the objective Logic, winged by hope from the reference, he tries it now, but speedily shuts it again to begin at the first which is but too evidently the preliminary necessity. The first, however, is no less obdurate than the others; and the baffled reader finds himself impotent, imbecile, flushed, on the outside of a vast block, inaccessible, impenetrable, hopeless as the flank of Atlas. But is Hegel always then to remain this intemperate height? Not so: the historical and other clues which we are here engaged on will be found, in the end (as we have largely seen already), adequate to a successful ascent here and everywhere.

Philosophy has reached in Kant an entire new position. Kant may be named that position an sich; Fichte and Schelling, the same fur sich; and Hegel is its an und fur sich—the absolute power, the pure negativity, that, as absolute power, reconnects itself with itself, and so is an und fur sich. Hegel thus indicates that he has consummated the whole task of the ages by bringing the All to the last orb and drop and point of unity in the negative fur sich, that is, the All both in the one whole and the infinite details; and this, too, for itself or consciously, the fully objectivised or filled subjectivity, and the fully subjectivised or vitalised objectivity—which latter result indicates a life that, as it were, eats up all objects into its own self, into its own unity, so that all that is remains at last the reine Negativität; negative in that it has negated all into itself; but negative, too, in that it can negate itself into All, the One into the Many as well as the Many into One, Unity into Variety as well as Variety into Unity, Identity into Difference as well as Difference into Identity.

But just this is the Notion, or the Notion is just the pure negativity that negates its One (the Universal) into Many (the Particular), and negates this Many again into the One which is the concrete Singular and Unity of both. This is but the general expression of the notion; but no notion is different. No object in the outer world even but is so constituted: a grain of sand even is a universal which has passed into a particular, and has again cohered into a singular. Nay, apart from this constitution, what is the sand? Can any one tell this? Is it sayable? Anything else, in truth, is but abstract reference to itself, and is what the Germans call a Gemeintes—a thing meant, a thing opined merely. In fact, we are to track and trace the notion everywhere. Everything runs through its moments. These moments constitute the
universal movement. Consider these moments in the form of the three historical periods, of the three psychological acts, or best of all, of the three logical functions! As Seyn (Simple Apprehension), for example, we have the first reflexion of the Notion, as Nichts (Judgment) the second, and as Werden (Reason) the third, which last is the negation of the negation, or the restoration of the first in higher form.

Hegel, then, completed Kant by ascending to the category of the categories—the category as such, the notion. This, without doubt, he was enabled to effect by a careful analysis of the source from which Kant himself had supplied himself—Formal Logic. The result of this analysis was discernment of the notion, and consequently of the fact, that all Philosophy (Ontology included) had gone into Logic, which fact he henceforth proclaimed. He saw, moreover, that the entire of philosophic thought which had preceded the new position inaugurated by Kant, constituted what might be named an Objective Logic. The realisation of this Objective Logic, he was gradually enabled to accomplish by a profound study of the history of philosophy, but always in the company of the Kantian categories and his own generalisation of the same. He found, for example, that a beginning was almost indifferent (the beginning of all philosophy that preceded Kant viewed as an Objective Logic, which is the true beginning, being unconsidered), inasmuch as what was everywhere, and repeated itself everywhere, was simply the Notion. Quantity, for instance (as seen in Kant), formally expresses the notion in universality, particularity, and singularity. Nay, Quantity in its notion is but the Notion. Quality is equally so, for its third member, Limitation, is very inadequately represented by this word. Relation exhibits the same nature. Other assonances, but essentially of the same character, present themselves. Thus, Immediate is the unparticularised Universal, Reflexion is the Particular, and the commodiated result or notion is the Singular. In short, these and other triads represent the Notion. With this mode of viewing all things, it is not difficult to see that Seyn is just the beginning that would occur to thought; and the history of philosophy demonstrates it to have so occurred, and as such. It is the universality as such, the ultimate generality or abstraction; it is the Immediate—it is formal, it is identical; as it was the first stage of historical thought, so it is the first stage of biographical thought—it is the absolutely first and simple, that is, it is the first of everything and the base of everything. How else can one
begin than by saying it is? The is must be simply accepted; what we have to do is to understand it. It is stupid abstraction to seek to start before is, is. The beginning as beginning is just it is; till you can say that, you can say nothing; and it is the first thing you can say: indeed, should you go back into an ultimate analysis of what is, it is the first thing you must just simply say. It is just the beginning of Descartes (in a way) generalised from I am to it is, or simply is, or simply to-be or being. In fact, it is to say no more than this—to say, with eighteenth-century enlightenment, God is: for the three letters there are (as used) a bare word, and wholly undetermined. The beginning of Fichte, the ego, so also the identity of Schelling: these are at bottom just the same thought as being.

It is, besides, the fundamental base: every particular feels—granting it power to feel—that being is its first and centre and secret and life. Nay, it is the one absolutely inextinguishable entity. Conceive all life withdrawn—endeavour to conceive the annihilation of even space and time; still you will find you cannot get rid of Being, of the notion is. Do all you can to reduce the universe to nothing, to conceive that it is an accident that there should be existence at all; endeavour your utmost to conceive that all this is superfluous, and that there might just be nothing; do this and endeavour this, and you will find even nothing turns up, ever somehow, the thought is, the thought there is—the thought of being, of existence. That there should be nothing at all is an inconceivable empty abstraction. We are bound, then, to admit a centre of existence, of being, independent even of space and time; and what is this but Idealism? Where can this centre be, which will be, even if you destroy space, where but in thought? He that will in his solitary walks occupy himself earnestly with such reflexions, will at last find ‘a light go up’ to him, a light in which he will see space shrinking into disappearance, and yet being, existence, solid and immovable as the centre and the core of thought itself. We cannot annihilate being, we must just begin with it and say, there is. But this being is a notion, and will take on the forms of the notion. It comes to us in the first form of the notion, which is the universal, the affirmative, the immediate, the identical, the formal, the abstract, the ansich. But just because it is a notion, a true notion its universal will part into the particular, its affirmative pass into the negative, its ansich free itself through opposition to fursich, &c., &c.; and in similar terms the third step
to concreter unity may also be described. Thus, then, the whole progress will be a flight ever of three stages, each new flight being always stronger and stronger, till, by guidance of the notion itself and its own native rhythm, we exhaust the universe, and reach the totality—articulated into itself—absolute truth, the absolute.

Hegel had convinced himself well that this was the method, by historical study, by biographical thought, and by reference to outward nature and the concrete everywhere. Deep examination of Kant gave him the notion, the form, while universal study, of a more or less exhaustive and penetrative character, gave him the material.
CHAPTER V.

NOTES OF THE STRUGGLE CONCLUDED.

A.

The beginning is Kant, whose notion was that objects adapted themselves to the subject. This is his Copernican notion—his notion in its simplest form. Its particularisation is, the Categories as functions of Apperception, and in possession of a complex or manifold, in the shape of the sensuous but à priori forms, Space and Time. This particularisation constituted to Kant an à priori subjective machinery—form—by which our sensations (matter—à posteriori, in that they are excited by causes external to ourselves, but subjective, quite as much as the à priori elements, in that they are simply our own states) are taken up and converted or projected into the connected world of experience or of perceptive objects. In this way, each of us inhabits a universe of his own subjective sensational states (still nameable inner or outer) reticulated into nexus, law, and system by his own subjective intellectual functions. The sensational elements, further, being incapable of comparison as between subject and subject, are thus—in the more important derivative moral sense of the word—strictly subjective; while the intellectual elements, on the contrary, being capable of demonstration, through comparison, as the same in each of us and common to us all, are thus—in the more important sense the word derived from its use in reference to morals—objective; objective, that is, in their validity and evidence, though subjective in their constitution and place as of the mind and belonging to the mind.*

* These two senses of the words subjective and objective ought to be well understood and well discriminated by every student of Philosophy. After a careful and protracted analysis, we cannot find Sir William Hamilton, from the manner in which he understands the words, whether using them himself or quoting them from others, to have had any glimpse of their second, derivative, and more peculiarly German and important sense. Yet this is the sense in which the words are principally used.
Further, this world which Kant would have us inhabit is, theoretically (that is, so far as direct knowledge is concerned), phenomenal only. All that we know, every actual object of our knowledge, is indebted for its matter (form merely is inadequate to the constitution of any object of knowledge) to sense, either outer or inner: but sense, being a medium, conveys no knowledge of what the thing which affects sense is, but only of what or how it appears. Still, though all that we know—even our own ego—is phenomenal, there are legitimate inferences to the noumena of things-in-themselves without us, of God above us, and of our own ego as a free and immortal spirit within us. The sensational elements, to which we owe the matter or manifold or simply many of knowledge, are à posteriori, then; and the intellectual elements, to which we owe the form or nexus or unities and unity of knowledge, are à priori: the latter, that is, are part and parcel of our original structure and constitution, while the former are, so far as their occasions are concerned, derivative from elsewhere, or, as we name it, from experience, for which we have in this reference to wait. But the two terms (things), what is à priori and what is à posteriori, are too heterogeneous to clasp and weld together at once and without more ado. There is an intermediate element in and through which they cohere with each other. This is the provision of a formal manifold, a perceptive manifold (space and time), which, being at once, as perceptive, sensational, and, as formal and à priori, intellectual, constitutes a medium in which the matter of affection (sensations) and the form of function (categories, notions) coalesce to the production of this whole formed universe, outer and inner. Shortly, then, the many of affection are mediated into the one of function through the intellectual and à priori-placed, but sensational and à posteriori-presentant, perceptive forms of space and time; which are thus, as limitlessly projected spectra or cones of illumination, subjective as but within us, but objective as appearing with everything from without as from without. In this way, then, we see that sensation undergoes the manipulation of intellect.

But in this notion of Kant, that which was the spark to Hegel by Hegel, who may be even found speaking slightly of the other sense as the common one; and as for Kant, in his 'Streit der Facultaten,' there occur even prominently these formally defining words:—'Welche zwar subjective Wichtigkeit (fur mich), aber keine objective (fur Jedermann geltende) enthielten.' The chapter in the K. of P. R. on Mein, Wissen und Glauben is a very easy one, and being in the practical interest, uses the distinction passum, as do the practical works generally.
lay here: the category—as quantity, quality, relation, &c.—though a unity, was a unity of a multiple, which multiple Kant named the intellectual schema. Now—and here properly is the spark—time and space are found to possess sensuous multiples, to constitute sensuous schemata, which accurately correspond with these intellectual multiples of the categories are internally; nay, special sense itself is but the same multiple, only placed in degree more externally still. That is, there is the centre, the unit self-consciousness; then immediately by this centre lies the multiple of the category: next to the multiple of the category (or categories), again, lies that of time; the multiple of space is external to that of time; lastly, on the absolute outside there lie the multiples of special sense, or our actual sensations. Here are just, as it were, three degrees (counting time and space together) of the externalisation of central self-consciousness—three forms of the same unit. To Hegel—to whom, further, the things-in-themselves (generally expressed in the singular as the thing-in-itself) that Kant figured as causes of our special sensations, were manifestly mere unnecessary assumptions, mere abstractions of reflexion, and supererogatory additions, to the sensations themselves—the subjectivo-objective nature of the whole world sprung up clear at once. That the world of sense is but a repetition externally of the internal category—here at once is the idea both of his Objective Logic and of his Philosophy of Nature. In this way, what we call Hegel's Idée-Monade must arise to him—an absolute, a sum of all, a one and only reality that was at once the subject and the object in absolute concrete unity and identity.

But, having got this notion of Kant, which now in him and for him had grown or become the Idea, how did he proceed to realise his conception in actual execution? The first step could be no other than to complete the categories, which were now seen to be the secret of the world; for as they themselves were the whole inner, it was but an externalisation of themselves that constituted the whole outer.

This was the first act, and beyond doubt Hegel was most active and industrious, and indeed wholly unwearied, in studying Kant in their regard; and not only Kant, but all other philosophers, ancient and modern: and not only philosophers and books merely,
but nature without him, and mind within him, and history as record and preservative solution of both.

This study would conceivably result in a collection; of which collection, as we see still from the mere outside, that of Kant—not only as regards the Categories proper, but also the Notions of Reflexion, the Ideas, &c.—constitutes the bulk still, and still infinitely the best. But even on the principles of Kant, Hegel could not content himself with a mere collection. All in Kant disposes itself architectonically (Kant's own word) on, and derives itself architectonically from, a single principle. After Kant, in fact, an architectonically-principled system is a necessity, and indispensable. How find a new architectonic principle, then? Categories have manifested themselves to be the whole truth; but categories are notions—notions relatively abstract, if in themselves concrete—ultimate generalisations: all that is necessary is simply to generalise them, and so obtain their universal, or the notion as notion. But what is the notion as notion? It will be no formal identity either: it also will probably contain a multiple like the rest. In this multiple, too, probably there will lie the means of transition; which being carried out, may terminate in ultimate instance by leaving the categories an organic system.

Here now, again, Hegel just simply follows the lead of Kant. As Kant went to formal logic for his judgment, or category, Hegel betakes himself thither also in search of his notion. Nay, little hesitation was left him as to where specially to look for his notion; for Kant having already used up Judgment for his Categories, and Reasoning for his Ideas, formal Logic had now only Simple Apprehension to offer; and simple apprehension was, besides, the precise rubric to which the nature of the case referred him (Hegel) in any question of notions, or a notion. As Kant found the forms of the Judgment to be Quantitative, Qualitative, &c., so quite as readily Hegel finds the forms of the Notion to be Universal, Particular, and Singular. These three forms constitute the multiple of the notion as notion. But the idea of an architectonic principle could not let these forms again merely fall out of each other: it demanded nexus for them, too, and union in a common whole. Here it is that Hegel manifests great subtlety of insight. Indeed, in this whole matter, Hegel presents vast industry, vast labour, vast thought; the result of which was—to say it in sum—his modification of the Aristotelian Logic, or his Subjective Logic, for
which, nevertheless, it is right to add, abundant materials already
lay in the works of Kant.

But here, as especially regards an architectonic principle, and
the forms of the notion itself, Hegel again directly follows the
hint of Kant. Kant transformed the classifications of the Judgment—under the rubric of technical logic, so named—into actual
functions of the thinking subject—into actual functions of apperception or self-consciousness. Hegel similarly vitalised and
subjectivised the technical forms of the notion. Hegel, following
the abstract notion into its abstract movements of life in the
actual thought of the subject, saw that that movement was the
universal (in the sense of the all-common, the common whole,
the one, the monade, the absolute—for this movement is the move-
ment of the notion in absolute generality), determining itself to a
particular, from which it returns again to itself, but as Singular.
This, certainly, is the ultimate nerve of thought. We certainly,
for our parts, ordinary persons in this ordinary material world,
separate independent subjects beside separate independent objects,
conceive ourselves to be determined by these objects, and to
return to ourselves from them or their examination with, so to
speak, a mere colouring—knowledge. But the position of idealism
is once for all held by Hegel, and the (universal) subject accord-
ingly is, in his eyes, self-determined; so that the absolute universal
of the subject’s innermost or most characteristic movement, is the
universal (himself), determining himself to the particular (his
state as object), and returning to himself from the same as
singular (the notion, the knowledge gained, the reunion of the
particular—the other, the negative of the universal—with itself
or with this universal). This is the nerve of self-consciousness;
and self-consciousness is the absolute—the dimensionless point
that, though point and dimensionless, is the Universe. Self-
consciousness is the universal, the all-common (as in German), or
the common whole that is: but it thinks itself; and itself in being
thought is to itself its object, its negative, its particular, which so
is just the particular of the universal. But so long as itself is to
itself in the form of object, or other, which it considers, it has not
completed the act of thought: that act is completed when it
returns, as knowledge, to itself as singular,—that is, from the
particular back into the universal. This is the single secret of
Hegel; and his obscurest writing is but an abstract, and so almost
mystifying description of all this.
SPECIAL ORIGIN, ETC., OF THE HEGELIAN PRINCIPLE. 161

But let us open our eyes to the step we have just taken. Self-consciousness was, to us, a short way back, the centre, and all the rest was as the circumference external to it. But in this mode of looking, the centre is simply a dead identity, a mere abstract formless unity. Now, however, we have given a multiple, a life, a movement to the centre itself; for we have found that it is just the notion as notion, the category of categories, the universal into which these are generalised. Self-consciousness, in short, is now identified with the notion, and all now is in living nexus from the inmost centre out to the extremest verge. But let us open our eyes a little wider, and ask how stands it now with the concrete universe, and what sort of a philosophical or religious creed must we now entertain? Well, we must now suppose self-consciousness the absolute. There is no difficulty in this word absolute, electricity, for example, is the absolute of the materialists: it is to them the first, the all, and the only, which gradually condenses (or gyrates, it may be) into an opaque atom and all atoms, which again gradually organise themselves into the functions of life and thought, &c. Electricity, capable of all this, were very intelligibly an absolute. True, as we have seen, it would still be a defective absolute, and so no absolute, for it assumes space and time as quite independent of itself: still, what we are required to conceive under the word absolute will be easier to us from this reference to the industry of the materialists. Well, we are now to suppose self-consciousness the absolute. Self-consciousness necessarily, and of its own self; is, and is What is. Self-consciousness is its own foundation of support, and its own prius of origination. Self-consciousness, being but thought, requires evidently no foundation to support it: it is independent, indeed, not only of considerations of space, but also of those of time. Space and time belong to it, not it to them; and notions, consequently, of a foundation on which to support it, or of a prius to which to attach it, are manifestly inapplicable to it. It is the necessity. Since there is a universe, something must have been necessary. Now this something is just self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is the necessity to be. It is in the nature of self-consciousness that it should be its own cause, and its own necessity, and its own world. Thought is a necessity and the only necessity, and thought is self-consciousness. But should we be satisfied with self-consciousness as the one, how account for the many, the
variety of this formed universe? Self-consciousness is no formal identity, no abstract unit: it involves a multiple, it is a movement. It is to the evolution of this multiple, to the continuation of this movement, and on its own necessity—the necessity of thought as thought—that we are to attribute the whole. But all this is very difficult to realise in conception. On the one hand, this primary vesicle, or atom, or call it what you may, of thought, which grows into the universe, though named thought, seems to differ but little from any supposed primary atom of matter to whose development the universe might be ascribed. In fact, idealism in this way is just a sort of materialism. This evolution of an absolute necessity seems as mechanical, cold, cheerless, and unsatisfactory under the one name as under the other. Whether, so to speak, it is seed-thought or seed-matter which grows into the universe, seems to us to make no difference, and the whole affair becomes not even pantheism, but simply materialism—idealistic materialism if you will, without question of a God at all. On the other hand, and looking at it in another way, where am I to conceive self-consciousness unless in myself? Am I the absolute? Am I God, then? There is that in the very question which confutes the supposition. I, with my aches and my pains, with my birth and my death, am too manifestly in involution with nature—am too manifestly in subordination to the powers of nature, to the very vermin of nature—ever to entertain any such absurd notion. Nay, it is this very involution with nature which gives countenance to the counter opinion as maintained by the materialists. My birth and my death are processes which differ in no essential respect from those exhibited in the birth and death of the vilest rat that ever crawled. I am an animal even as the rat is. His death is but the cessation of so much machinery: no soul glides by that whitened tongue as he gnaws the trap that stifles him; no one can believe in any soul there; no one can believe in any exhalation thence. The rat and his birth and his death are but affairs of matter plainly, mere gross matter, despite an anatomical organism and physiological processes as wonderful as our own. How in our case, then, believe in the unproved, in the unevidenced allegation of a soul separable from our bodies, which allegation has been got up by some of the weaker brethren in support of their own vanity? Assuredly, when we consider mere nature alone, the creed of the materialist brings with it a weight of conviction which sets absolutely at nought any such dream as an absolute
self-consciousness in mere humanity. How, then, are we at all
to conceive this self-consciousness of Kant and Hegel, which is to
be supposed the one truth of which all else that is constitutes
but forms? Well, in the first place, Hegel might answer, You
are only asked to look at the fact; make it conceivable after-
wards to yourself, or not, as you may. The fact just is, that all
that is (and every item of all that is) exhibits in its deepest base
the type of self-consciousness, the type of thought; and even
thus far you are secured from the materialist and his mere
suggestion of what we named seed-matter. Nay, as we have
shown already, a single seed-matter which was, however infinitely
extended in space or prolonged in time, yet at one certain time
and in one certain space, virtually or impliciter this whole
formed variety of organisation, thought, &c., would amount to
a principle, not materialistic, but idealistic. Fancy electricity
at one time all and alone! Well, it is something invisible, im-
ponderable, &c. &c., and it is a single entity, yet it contains in it
the possibility of becoming absolutely all that we see and think
now; that is, electricity, so characterised in itself, was then
virtually all that is now; what is this but idealism? Even thus
your seed-matter shows itself identical with seed-thought—only
that seed-thought contains time and space, which seed-matter
does not. But you have no warrant to suppose seed-thought at
all from our doctrine, if by seed-thought we are to suppose a
principle impersonal and brute. Thought or self-consciousness
cannot be impersonal: thought or self-consciousness, however
dowed with power of development and evolution, always implies
a subject. Now, it was to this subject that your last and most
serious difficulty related. But why should this subject appear to
you so difficult, and why should you hesitate to name it God?
The self-consciousness of the universe is the divine self-conscious-
ness, and not the human: why should this seem difficult on the
Hegelian notion? Perhaps the difficulty lies here—that we see
no provision as yet for more than one self-consciousness, and that
we cannot understand the transition from the one divine self-
consciousness into the many human. It is to be said, however,
that Hegel demonstrates number and quantity to be a necessity
of the notion; that he exhibits the notion, or rather the idea,
externalising itself into nature, to which field man, so far as he
is animal, certainly belongs; and that he afterwards delineates
the development of spirit, in which sphere also man, in that he
thinks, &c., has place. Perhaps you are not satisfied yet, however, and the Absolute Spirit, into which as into a subjective focus Hegel would fain direct all, looms out very vague and hazy to you; perhaps the personality both of God and man seems to you to be suddenly extinguished again in what you named already seed-thought; perhaps the whole result may seem to you but an indefinite pantheism, in which if the individual human subject is not himself the absolute, it is difficult or impossible to say what he is. But why should it be impossible to conceive the divine idea as externalising itself, and man holding of God both in nature and in spirit? The self-reflecting pool of a pool was mentioned, some chapter or two back, when an attempt was made to illustrate these thoughts: and why should a reflected but self-reflecting droplet of a self-reflecting drop be impossible on the Hegelian system? Hegel has demonstrated the subordination—the nothingness of nature as against spirit. He has thereby saved you—who are thought and a spirit—from nature. Now, you are once for all in the universe, you are no waif of chance, you are an outcome of the necessity to be—and this not only in the externalisation of nature, like the rat, but in the original and primitive substantivity of thought—why not conceive yourself, by continuation of the same necessity, then, spirit still in communion with the Spirit of God, when the death of the body shall have given birth to Spirit? What is there in the Hegelian system to render such conception more difficult now than it had seemed previously? Does God, conceived as creating nature, and as creating man the probationer of nature, that is to inherit an immortality of heaven or hell according to the events of his probation—is this conception, taken just so, in any respect easier than the probable conception of Hegel? Cannot we, at all events, rise from Hegel with a clearer, firmer conviction of the existence of an infinite principle in this universe—with a clearer, firmer conviction of this infinite principle being thought, spirit—and with a clearer, firmer conviction that man partakes of this infinite principle, and that consequently he is immortal, free, and in communion with God? For, if confess it all comes to this, and that philosophy is useless if inadequate to this. A philosophy, in fact, whose purpose and effect are not to countenance and support all the great interests of religion, is no philosophy, but a material for the fire only. But, it may be objected here, if the end of philosophy is only religion, philosophy will be superfluous, should
its end be attainable independently of itself; there is revealed religion, and it brings its own evidence, and why should this cumbersome and vague and unsatisfactory interposition of philosophy be foisted in at all? This, the gravest of questions, deserves the gravest and sincerest of answers.

The answer lies in the necessity of history; and, in the case before us, this necessity of history is named Aufklärung. This single word, in fact, constitutes the answer to the question considered. Eighteenth-century enlightenment, which is the Aufklärung alluded to, cannot now be regarded as a temporary and accidental outbreak of infidelity principally French; it has now taken its place as an historical movement, and must now be acknowledged as a necessary member of the appointments of providence. The French criticism, English criticism, German criticism, which belonged to that movement, cannot any longer be ignored: on the contrary, all the ascertained and approved results of these must now be admitted into that common stock of the possessions of humanity which is named truth or knowledge. But the position of revealed religion does not remain unmoved the while. For one thing, revealed religion must henceforth consent to place its documents on the ordinary and common basis of evidence, historical and other; and, indeed, it is precisely the nature of this evidence which renders desirable any appeal to philosophy. The humble pious Christian who performs his probation of earth in full consciousness of the eye of heaven, is certainly independent of philosophy, and has, to that extent, no call to seek its aid. In fact, it is to consult the interests of truth as truth, to admit here that in the bliss of conviction the humble pious Christian who may never have heard of philosophy, is probably preferably situated to the greatest philosopher that ever lived. It follows not from this, however, that there is not that in philosophy which even to the humble pious Christian would constitute a gain. In the singleness of his view, in the singleness of his endeavour, he who would be religious merely becomes narrow and thin and rigid. The warmth that should foster becomes with him the fire that shrivels; while the light, the mild light that should guide, becomes constricted in his strait heart into the fierce flash that misleads. Humanity wells from him; he becomes a terror and an edge from which even his children flee. To give the due breadth, then, to this too keen edge, it may have been that the Aufklärung, in the purposes of providence, appeared; and just such function does
philosophy possess for all, for the fierce in faith as for the no less fierce in the so-called reason still arrogated to themselves by the fragments of the *Illumination*. Man must not rigidly restrict himself to a single duty, but must unclose himself into the largeness of his entire humanity. It is good to know all things—the stars of heaven and the shells of earth, and not less the wondrous entities which philosophy discloses in the bodiless region of thought as thought. The humble pious Christian, then, independent of philosophy as regards his faith, may still profitably resort to the same for the *pasture* of his *humanity*. But religion is not confined to the humble only; and never was there a time in the history of humanity when the proud heart longed more ardentely than now to lay itself down in peace and trust within the sanctuary of religion, an offering to God. Now for these latter is it that religion—since the Aufklärung—must appeal to philosophy. And just to fulfil this function was it that Kant and Hegel specially came. The former, breathing ever the sincerest reverence for Christianity, had no object during his long life but the demonstration to himself and others of the existence of God, the freedom of the Will, and the immortality of the Soul. The latter followed in the same cause, and, in addition to the reconstruction of the truths of natural religion, sought to reconcile to philosophy Christianity itself.

This, then, as regards Hegel is ever to be borne in mind, whatever doubts and difficulties may afflict the student, that his one object is the reconstruction of religion, both natural and revealed, and on the higher basis which the Aufklärung, so far as it has approved itself true to the essential interests of humanity, demands. Very obscure, certainly, in many respects is the system of Hegel, and in none, perhaps, obscurer than in how we are to conceive God as a subjective spirit, and man as a subjective spirit, and God and man as in mutual relation. Beyond all doubt, however, Hegel really attempts this and believes himself to fulfil this. It is to be said, too, that the contradiction which is objected to the *thought* of Hegel may be equally objected to the *fact* of the universe. Finite and infinite, conditioned and absolute, both are; and of this *fact*, the dialectic of Hegel may be the true *thought*. Confiding in such hope, let us proceed and see to the bottom the true nature of this immeasurable Hegelian claim.

Hegel, then, converted the simple apprehension of the technical logician into a vital function, the notion *qua* notion, self-conscious-
ness in its ultimate nerve—self-consciousness, so to speak, in its ultimate throb. But he has carried the same lesson of Kant into other fields. Technical logic in its technical forms corresponds with actual vital functions; but so it is everywhere—the history of thought itself, if vitally resumed, will be found to correspond with facts of individual consciousness. The various philosophers are but thought itself on its various stages; and instead of reading this movement as the outer thing which history usually appears to us, we ought to read it as the organic movement of thought as thought. Spinoza, for example, thinking substance, is but the notion as substance developing itself; and abstracting from Spinoza, we can quite easily conceive the process, and consider the process as a plastic movement in and by itself. Passing to Hume, substance becomes causality, or the notion, leaving the form of substance, assumes that of causality. Abstract now from Hume, then, and observe the plastic movement itself, which speedily transforms causality into reciprocity, and through reciprocity (in the brain of Kant—for it is not only that reciprocity follows causality and causality substance in the tables of Kant, but Kant performed the act of reciprocity, he altered the relative position of subject and object, or through him this position became indifferent) into the notion. But, the notion!—what notion? Why, just Kant's notion—for Kant's notion is virtually identical with the notion qua notion of Hegel, or Kant's notion just is this notion but in itself. Hegel's notion, in fact, is the absolute universal of thought, the primal or ultimate nerve, which is both the primitive and original form, and the primitive and original matter of all that is; and Kant's notion is at bottom nothing else, for Kant's notion is that objects adapt themselves to the subject, that things obey or adapt themselves to notions, that the categories are multiples which repeat themselves externally—in a word, that the notion (the category is a notion) is the original and only vitality. Nay, Kant, though he knew it not himself, really named the notion, and in its ultimate abstraction, when he asked, 'Why are synthetic judgments, a priori, possible?' This is what Hegel means when he says the notion; and if anyone will take the trouble to read 'Of the notion in general,' with which the Subjective Logic opens, or 'the Absolute Idea' with which it closes, he will probably be able to perceive that Hegel himself, both esoterically and exoterically, though even in the latter case grudgingly and enigmatically as it were, confirms the statement. In very truth,
the abstraction of Hegel is often of a quasi-allegorical nature; and the origin, history, and progress of the Kantian Philosophy are very much the matter of the same in the sections alluded to.

Hegel, then, despite his enigmatic disclosures, has well kept his own secret; but the instant one applies the keys which have now been given, the whole flies asunder into ease and light.

The movement of the abstract notion, (it is relatively always abstract, though inherently also always concrete,) for example, has three steps. In the first, it is the universal, that is, it is in itself, as it were, passively shut together into its own identity, virtually the all and each but undeveloped; in the second, it is the particular, or it is for itself, that is, it surveys itself, has given itself an object, and so has differentiated itself into subject and object; and in the third, it is the singular, or subject and object have coalesced again, or just it has gone together with its own self again, that is, it is in and for itself, or rather, in, for, and by itself. But these are the three parts also of the one organic logical movement, which one organic movement of thought may just, indeed, be named the notion: the first step is simple apprehension, the second is judgment, and the third is reason or reasoning. The connexion, perhaps, is best seen in the German words for the objects of these three departments (which together constitute the whole) of Technical Logic,—Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss. The Begriff is the notion yet in its entirety, in its unity, in its identity, as begrasped, begriped, or begrasped together. The Urtheil is the Ur-theil (ordeal in English—compare theil, deal, and the French tailler), the primitive or first parting, the judgment which is a dis-cernment, that is, both a separation and an elevation into special notice of a part. The Schluss is the shut, the close, the return of the movement to unity. As Begriff, then, there is but unity, self-identity, a mere formal oneness; but as whole, common whole, universal, which we have taken it to be, it yet virtually contains all in itself—all variety, that is, or all particulars; it is only not yet stated, or expressed, in this form, not yet this form in position (Gesetz): it, therefore, virtually all these, but not yet 'set'—gesetzt, or formally stated—as all these, is as yet in itself; or its own substantial variety is as yet only virtual, only in itself. The Begriff-stage of the notion is, therefore, only the notion an sich, or in itself. This is the ἀνατιμήσις of Aristotle. But this state of the case is changed in the Urtheil. A process of sundering has taken place—a movement
of reflexion; the Notion is aware of something (itself still, and so is the movement reflexion) which is the object, the particular. But, on the ideal basis, object being but subject, we may say that the Begriff, which as Begriff is only in itself, is now as Ur-theil, for itself: that is, it has an object, or there is something for it, which something again being but itself, it itself may just be said to be for itself. As Schluss, or singular, again, the notion has returned to itself, and is in and for itself. But on this stage, it is again a unity, a self-immediate, and in a higher form than it was at first, because it has returned to itself enriched by the particular which it discerned—or into which it dis-cerned, in the judgment. This new unity, as a unity, and as self-immediate, may again be considered as in the form of Begriff, that is, as in itself, and again as passing into the form of judgment for itself, and returning into a new Schluss as in and for itself.

Now this is the whole of Hegel, and this is his ultimate secret. These are the steps: An sich, Fur sich, An und fur sich. They have analogues in Aristotle and elsewhere; but unless they be regarded simply in their derivation from Kant, they will be misunderstood.

One can see that with this principle the idealist has a great advantage over the materialist, so far as a consistent cosmogony is concerned. In the first place, were the theory of the materialist to prove satisfactory, his conclusion would, by its own dialectic, strike round from materialism into idealism; for an invisible, im-palpable, imponderable, and so already very immaterial and ideal something, like electricity, which in itself or virtually were all that is, would be, and could be, nothing but idealism. And in the second place, the theory of the materialist is very unsatisfactory: for a single material simple, even if able to add to its size by its own duplication, could never even by an eternity of duplication add anything but itself to itself, it could never add another than itself; again, whatever may be asserted, or plausibly theorised, no transition of matter to thought, to organisation, to multiplicity, even to a single other, has ever been proved; and, lastly, could a material one vary itself into a many, not only material but spiritual, and not only so material, but also otherwise material, and had such process been actually proved, time and space would remain unaccounted for on the outside still. How different it is with the ideal principle! It is at once not only a one, but a many; it is at once evidently, a principle of transition
in itself, and it is proved such; it is at once adequate to matter (its other) and to thought; moreover, it is adequate to time and space: lastly, in addition, it is the nearest verity to, the most vital fact in, each of us, and it requires neither an elephant of support nor a tortoise of origination—it is causa sui and principium sui.

But let us apply what we have found in direct explication of the system of Hegel as it stands. The notion as notion, as organic whole of the movements we have seen, is to be the architectonic principle which is to be beginning, middle, method, and result to the whole of philosophy. How begin, then? Why, just the notion is. Is is a verity; so that there must be is a verity, and it is the notion that just must be and is. The notion is, and the notion firstly is in itself. Now the notion in itself is the stage of the Begriff or of simple apprehension, and the object here on the great scale is nature. Nature is the notion yet begrasped together, the notion as before simple apprehension, or perception and sensation. It is in nature that the notion is as yet only latent, only virtual, only potential, only implicit, only an sich. Nature will afterwards appear as the notion also Ausser sich: the two ideas are at bottom not incompatible, but identical; such is the dialectic of thought and speech; and this is no prejudice to us here regarding nature as the notion an sich. But if it is in nature that the notion is an sich, it is in spirit, or in feeling, willing intelligence, that the notion becomes für sich, or consciously looked at; and again it is in the realm of abstraction from both these concretes, from the concrete of a subject as well as from the concrete of an object—it is in logic that the notion is in and for itself. But thought is the prius of all; therefore it is, that in the universal rubric, the ordinary order is reversed, and what is last as in phenomenal evolution is first as in noumenal fact. In this way, then, we can see into the first inscriptions found in the Hegelian writings—Logic, Nature, Spirit. Still, there are reflexions possible in an opposite sense which, on the principles of Hegel, would justify the same triad, and in the same order: it is possible to look at logic as if it were the notion an sich, at nature as if it were the notion für sich, and at spirit as if it were the notion an und für sich; and it is quite possible that Hegel, though he directly styles logic 'the science of the idea in and for itself,' did regard, and did arrive at, his general division in this latter manner: it is certain he places logic relatively to nature and
spirit as on a stage of An sich, and that he regards spirit as the highest form of the idea. The result of logic, to be sure, is the idea in and for itself; but even thus the result can be regarded as a new Begriff, as a new unity in itself, and again developed into a new in and for itself, or spirit.

But, however this be, let us take each of these grand forms, one after the other, and apply the same formula. Let us take logic, and confine ourselves to the notion as in the element of the same. Now in this element what is the most immediate or an sich form of the notion? Why, that What is, is just What is or Being. What now in the same element is it for itself? Here we have to consider that we are in a moment of reflexion; that we seek a mediate, not an immediate; that we say to ourselves, what is What is?—that is, what is it in its essence, its principle, its true inner nature, its true self; what is the in-being of that out-being, or what is being as for itself? The answer plainly is Wesen. Lastly, what is it that unites these?—what is it that is in and for itself? The notion as notion (the Begriff) is what is in and for itself, and unites in itself both Seyn and Wesen.

In these three forms, now, we have the three moments of thought as they have manifested themselves in outer history. The last stage, the Begriff, refers to the Begriff of Kant, and is the stage of the development of the Kantian philosophy; though Begriff, it is a stage of reason, a stage of Schluss. Wesen is the stage of reflexion, and has reference to the period of the Aufklärung, where an inner explanation is demanded of everything; that is, where the movement is reflexion, where what is direct and immediate is not accepted as such, but its principle is demanded. This is called also the stage of understanding proper, as faculty which seeks, and maintains for its own sake, distinctions, which are at bottom, however, but separations and isolations. That this is the stage of Urtheil or judgment is also well seen. Seyn precedes reflexion; it is the stage of instinctive natural belief, that takes what is as it is there at first hand before it. We may conceive reflexion to be an affair of the modern world, and to cover the whole field from Bacon to Kant. Seyn precedes Bacon, and reason is subsequent to Kant.

Taking now Seyn apart from Wesen and Begriff, and applying our formula, what is the result? Now here the notion is in the element of being; there is no reference to inner principle or to notion: there is no appeal either to reason or understanding, but
simply to sensuous perception. We are in presence only of what is sensuously before us: but still it is that as thought, as logically thought. What is being as logically thought in itself? What is—to wit, what, so to speak, superficially is, as logically thought in itself, is plainly Quality. Quality is what is directly perceived as constituting What is in itself. For itself now is quality gone into its differences, the negative moment of quality; but that is—a little consideration is certainly necessary here—quantity. In quantity, what superficially is, is for itself; for it is an out-of-one-another, a mere externality. Measure, again, is evidently the union of both quality and quantity. The correctness of quality and quantity to the formula becomes beyond a doubt on referring to the mode in which Hegel regards both. In the triad Seyn, Daseyn, Fürsichseyn, the same principles will be seen. Being is just the moment of simple Apprehension, the stage of the Begriff, the undifferentiated universal. Daseyn, again, is the universal gone into its difference, gone into its particularity, and the union of both is the singularity of Fürsichseyn. Seyn, Nichts, Werden, being, nothing, becoming, constitute again a triad of the same nature. Nichts is the negative moment, the judgment, while Werden is the moment of reason which re-unites the two preceding moments into a new third. Under Daseyn, again, we have Daseyn as such, Finitude and Infinitude: and here the An sich or simple formal identity, the Für sich, or the Urteil, or the difference, and the An und für sich, or concrete identity, or Schluss, are all apparent. Then under Daseyn as such, there is Daseyn in general, Quality as its difference, and Something as the conjunctive Schluss. Under all the divisions of Daseyn, in fact, will be found the attempt to begin with formal abstract identity as the universal or common whole, and pass through the difference and particular to the new or concrete singular whole. The same thing is mirrored in Quantity, Quantum, Degree, and repeated in all the sub-forms, as will be seen if these are properly analysed, to an extraordinary degree of closeness. The formula of identity, difference, and reconciliation of both are seen in Wesen, Erscheinung, and Wirklichkeit also. Certainly, the matter occasionally proves refractory; but the formula is never let go, but is ever the principle of transition in every discussion. In fact, the movement of the notion as notion, which may be described as the reciprocity of a disjunctive sphere, is attempted to be imitated
everywhere. Let us just set down a few more of these Hegelian rubrics by way of additional examples.

Subjectivity, objectivity, idea, might almost be used as names for the movement itself. Then positive, negative, and infinite judgments; categoric, hypothetic, and disjunctive (the last as specially viewed by Kant and Hegel refers to a concrete sphere); assertoric, problematic, apodictic. Under judgment we do in one or two cases, indeed, find, not a triplicity, but a quadruplicity; but under 'the Absolute Idea' in the conclusion of the Logic will be found some reasonings which, without being directly applied by Hegel to these particular instances, very well explain how the triplicity may be stated as a quadruplicity.

The formula again manifests itself in Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology, and also in the subordinate divisions under each of these heads. Logic and its sub-forms stand not alone either, but under Nature and Spirit the same principle can be everywhere traced. In short, the beginning is always with the form in which the notion is naturally direct or immediate to us; it is the notion as it presents itself in its undeveloped virtual in itself, in its formal identity or selfness, in its unbroken universality. This is a stage which is subjectively the stage of sensation passing into perception. Logically, it is the stage of simple apprehension and the Begriff. Then the middle is the stage of reflexion: the universal, self-identical unit passes now into its differences, into its particularities; and its particularities are just its differences, for relatively to the genus, the species is particular, and a genus in its species is just in its differences, or the species are just the differences of the genus. This is a negative stage, a stage of separating and discriminating understanding only. Humanity on this stage is in a period of Aufklärung, and sharp emphatic division and distinction is peremptorily accentuated on all subjects and interests. The negative is after all pain, however; and this stage is always one of finitude, unhappiness, discontent: it is now that Hegel's Unglückliches Bewusstseyn reigns. The last stage is the stage of reason, of re-union and reconciliation. Historically, it is a period when the wounds of the Aufklärung are healed.

From this scheme, a thousand utterances of Hegel, unintelligible else, will spring at once into meaning. It does not follow, however, that Hegel will henceforth be quite easy to read. No; Hegel's dialect remains as abstract as ever: the dialectic of the transition
is often in such refractory matter, that it is laboured to insupportable pain, or subtle to evanescence; and in brief, Hegel will never be easy reading. A useful hint here will be, that Hegel often uses words so in their directly derivative sense, that this sense and the usual sense, as it were, coquet with each other into a third sense. The reader must always look narrowly at the composition and analytic sense of the words used. Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss, are alone sufficient to exemplify both the analytic signification and the coquetry. The Urtheil, for example, even as the Ur-theil, or primitive parting, is still the Judgment, &c.

This, then, is the special origin and peculiar nature of the Hegelian method—a method which claims to be a form identical with the matter: and the claim must be allowed; for what is concerned, is thought in essential form, and so also in essential matter. Still, however, the system, even in that it is developed on a formula, has the formalism and artificial look which attend such, in a sort, mechanical aids everywhere else; and after all, it is the matter, or what may be specially discussed, that in the end—despite the discovery and application of an absolute, or the absolute form—will assign the relative value of the total industry. Perhaps, what is really good in the system, would be quite as good if disencumbered of the stiffness of the form, and freed from the stubborn foreignness of the language. This we have yet to see.*

B.

The central ego is externalised into the category—that into time, that into space, that into sensation. In ultimate generalisation, again, the form of the category is universality, particularity, and singularity. In that ultimate form, moreover—of the notion as notion—the category is scarcely any longer to be named externalisation, but rather simply expression of the ego; for the form indicated by the category is the form of the ego as the ego. The ego is, firstly, the universal; it is identity, it is immediacy, it is An sich. The ego, secondly, surveys itself; that is, it gives itself, or becomes to itself, the particular, the difference, the discernment, the reflexion: it is Fur sich (and Anders-seyn and Seyn für Anderes are evidently just identical with Fur sich, the moment the ego is the all). The ego, thirdly, returns from survey of itself with increase of knowledge; that is, returning into itself

* The form, as absolute form, can never cease to have value.
(the universal) from or with the particular, it does not just re-
assume its old identity, but is now the singular, which is identity
in diversity, immediacy in reflexion, the universal in the par-
ticular, or it is An und für sich.

The multiple of the category as category, or of the notion as
notion, will constitute at once the beginning, middle, and end of
the organic whole. But this multiple is the common form of all
the particular multiples presented in the several categories; and
that common form, or the ultimate generalisation of the function
of the categories, is the conjunction of a many into a one. But
this just amounts to the union of Particularity and Universality
into Singularity. This, again, is precisely the movement of
Apperception itself. The reduction of the manifold, under the
category, to or in apperception—this is the singularisation of a
particular through a universal; and this is just the form and
movement of self-consciousness, as self-consciousness, of the ego
as ego. Nay, the same terms constitute an exact abstract expres-
sion of the movement we call Perception, and Kant’s philosophy
amounts to a new theory of this concrete act.

The example of the restoration of external dead forms (the pro-
positions, syllogisms, &c. of technical Logic) into internal living
functions was, as was his habit, generalised by Hegel. The
Begriff, the notion, the ultimate generality or universality, in
complete abstraction from all and every subject, substantiated as
the objective all of existence—this is not the only result in the
hands of Hegel of an extension of the principle of Kant. The
same principle was applied to a variety of other, if not to all
other concrete fields. There are fields, indeed, where this
principle seems instinctively applied by common consent.
Textile Manufacture, Ceramic Art, and a hundred other similar
industries, are always objectively conceived and spoken of by us:
we look at them as distinct objects in themselves, and that
develop themselves, and we do not refer to the successive subjects
that manipulated them. Now, what we do in such cases, Hegel
did in the case of abstract thought. He abstracted from the
historical subjects of philosophy, and placed philosophy itself as a
plastic object forming itself before him. Hegel has stated this
openly himself, but he has not been rightly taken at his own
word; and this most important step for the interpretation of his
writings has, as it were, been taken short, to the production of a
stumble.
By history itself, Hegel has repeated the same process; but perhaps this process is more remarkable in its application to religion. Religion is a concrete sphere of man's world, actually, vitally there, and manifesting itself on various stages of development and evolution even like the rest. People talk of the proof for the existence of God who is the object of religion, as if we could not know this object, nor have religion without this proof. But, as Hegel points out, if we had been obliged to wait for the proof in order to have religion and a knowledge of God, neither religion, nor such knowledge, would be now in the world. Religion is a fact of man and man's world, manifesting itself in successive phases like every other of his concrete surroundings. Hegel then took the series of its phases, as the successive developmental movements of a plastic object, and exhibited it to us so, in complete abstraction or separation from its complicating and encumbering subjectivities. Now this step of Hegel is precisely the step required to be taken by many well-meaning men now-a-days, to whom the letter of religion seems to cause so much difficulty and uneasiness that they desire to see it still proceed against in the manner of the Aufklärung. The letter of religion, however, ought to be seen to be but a subjectivity, but an external and transitory form, and the plastic object itself which is now, was always, and ever will be, is what alone ought to be looked at. It is but the thought of an infant which in these days finds itself arrested by arithmetical questions in regard to the Israelites, or by astronomical, geological, or other difficulties, in regard to the Bible generally. Hegel is not further behind in his arithmetic than others, probably; yet it was by force of absolute and eternal truth that he regarded the Christian religion as the revealed religion, and it was with consistent conviction that he bore himself throughout life as a sincere adherent to the Lutheran faith. To him, it was clear that the Aufklärung had accomplished its work, that to attempt to continue that work was a blunder and an anachronism, and that, on the contrary, it was the business of the new day, assimilating into itself the truth of its predecessor, yet to atone for the damages wrought by that predecessor, and restore the rights of that higher faith and reason to which, in its subjection to the understanding merely, it—this same predecessor, the Aufklärung—had done so much injustice. How superfluous, then, how retrograde, how simply silly all your Feuerbachs and Strausses (to say nothing of
Bishop Colenso, and 'Essays and Reviews’) would have appeared to him! So far as happiness was concerned, Hegel knew well that the humble pious Christian who had never heard of discrepancy, difficulty, or doubt, was even infinitely superior to the profoundest philosopher in existence; and he would have considered it a very thin sincerity, a very painful conscience, a very mistaken conscience, which, in the interests of theoretic truth, should insist on damaging the practical (moral and religious) truth of a soul so blessed. To Hegel the repose of such souls was sacred. No doubt, he felt that their enlargement theoretically, or so far as knowledge (insight) is concerned, was desirable, but practically they were at present well, and disturbance in behalf of theory (knowledge) might advantageously be postponed till the work of the understanding should be fairly seen into, and the reign of reason established. Disturbances there had already been enow; our souls were miserable, and the world was reeling asunder into a selfish atomism under the influence of the Aufklärung: it was time to stop all that, it was time to bring the Aufklärung itself to the bar and demonstrate its insufficiency: it was time, in short, to complement, and atone for understanding by reason, in the keeping of which latter was the higher and highest weal of man—religion, God, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and all the blessings of the Evangile of Christ.*

The philosophy of Hegel, then, is simply this substantive or objective history of philosophy: it is philosophy as plastic object unfolding itself in entire freedom from every external subjective, from every external chronological, concomitant or ingredient. With special reference to Hegel himself, we see philosophy, in the relative development, passing from the Begriff of Kant into the

* Had Bishop Colenso and the Essayists and Reviewers, then, understood their age, instead of thrusting the negative on faith, they would have demonstrated to understanding its mere blindness to the affirmative, and would thus consequently, instead of bringing misery to the happy, have brought happiness to the miserable. It is the business of no man now-a-days to continue the Aufklärung. We acknowledge what it has done for us, but we go our own way the while. No negative criticism of the letter shall longer bind us to the affirmative of the spirit. If Christianity, so far as external history is concerned, must submit to the ordinary imperfection, of empirical form, it can still irrefutably rest its authority on the inspiration of its matter, and strengthen itself into safety and security by a conjunctive reference to the supernatural and revelatory character of history in particular and the world in general, as well as the demonstration of reason in the new philosophy. It is the business of to-day to bind up our still-dripping wounds, and not to continue piercing us with the cold point of Eighteenth-century enlightenment.
Idea of Hegel. This point, however, has probably been pretty well missed. Men saw, indeed, that Hegel characterised philosophy as that in abstraction which its own history is in concretion; but they hardly believed him in earnest. They saw here and there some analogy between certain of the categories in abstract logic, and certain of the actual doctrines of the historic philosophers, Ionic, Italic, Eleatic, &c.; but they never supposed that the logical progress was to be considered as strictly parallel with the historical progress; still less did they suppose that the conception was continued into modern philosophy; and least of all that that peculiar Logic of Hegel contained a demonstration of its own derivation from the philosophy of Kant. They believed, on the contrary, that the former was a system *sui generis*, an edifice apart—a system and edifice independent of all other systems and edifices, whether of Kant or others. One feels that this allegation must expect opposition. The connexion of the Hegelian system with the history of philosophy has not been ignored by subsequent German students and critics, but again and again formally maintained. Haym, for example, in the very second paragraph of his book avers, 'as it (the philosophy of Hegel) is the history of philosophy *in nuce*, so it is philosophy *in nuce*.' It is impossible for words to say in any more direct fashion that the philosophy of Hegel is the history of philosophy. Still, it is to be asserted here that the connexion of the system of Hegel with history is understood in a very different sense by Haym from that which we suppose ourselves at present to entertain. Haym, after all, has not attained to the truth as regards Hegel. Haym represents the system of Hegel as something quite arbitrary and artificial, which has arisen in obedience to a desire to make the Real harmonise with the Ideal, and according to conceptions of Grecian symmetry. This, the result of Haym, is a complete and total mistake: Haym makes Hegel act on an external motive, whereas Hegel really acted on one internal; Haym makes Hegel to labour consciously towards an ideal object, whereas Hegel worked consciously towards a real object. Hegel, in fact, takes philosophy, actual philosophy, as it comes to him from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, and remoulds it onwards on its own objective principles, and not on his own subjective ones—just as Kant receiving philosophy from Hume, attempted honestly to mould it onwards thence.

The proof of the truth of what lies here will consist in this,—that, after all explanations, Hegel has remained obscure and
unintelligible; whereas now—as we hope, that is—the Hegelian system will be found at least open. It is a curious thing, this contrast between words and the meaning of words. Haym’s words are perfect; they seem to state the case quite as directly as those of Hegel: yet Haym, in all probability, never said to himself: why, that abstract characterisation means Kant, this again Fichte and Schelling, and that other Hegel himself; in fact, it just expresses the development of the Begriff; there it is An sich with Kant, here Fur sich with Fichte and Schelling, and there, finally, it is An und fur sich with Hegel: that so abstract paragraph, in short, is the history in nuce of philosophy in Germany!! Now here the key was complete, and a realisation effected of the words of Hegel in a field and with a literality of which Haym had never dreamed.

In this there lies a correction for those who are perpetually finding the historical views of the great masters perfectly anticipated in crumbs of their predecessors: for in the light of a subsequent idea words may readily seem to convey that of which, as written and when written, they had not the remotest glimpse. The industry that would attribute the merit of the new light to the preceding perfectly dark words is mean: it is false and fraudulent to the great historical name in its injustice; and it is false and fraudulent in that it seeks to procure for itself the credit of research and the glory of originality. Thus, here, words may be found in many writers directly enunciative of the connexion of Hegel’s philosophy with the history of philosophy—such words are perfectly direct there in his own works—at the same time that these writers themselves had no perception of the close and literal application which really obtained.

How striking the course of thought: Substance, Causality, Reciprocity, Begriff, Idee! Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, are all there. The reciprocity lay in Kant, who altered the relative positions of subject and object, and thus was the notion, the notion of reciprocity, an sich. In Fichte and Schelling, the notion of reciprocity passes into its differences of subjectivity and objectivity, and becomes fur sich. Kant is the notion in immediate or universal form; Fichte and Schelling, the notion in particular form. But it is Hegel who takes the notion of reciprocity as such, who converts it into the an und fur sich, the concrete singular, and exhibits it.
everywhere as the substantial, original creative cell, and as the substantial, original, universal system of cells—the Idee.

C.

The opening determinations of the system present themselves so abruptly, that one is apt to ask: How did Hegel come upon them? Cannot they be connected in some ordinary way with ordinary thought? Is there no means of bridging over the chasm between ourselves here and Hegel there? Hegel very rightly asserts that all this is discoverable just in what the notion of a beginning brings with it, and it may be recommended to everyone to think out the matter from this point of view for himself: still, what the above questions indicate as the want of the inexperienced reader is to be found in the genesis of Hegel from Kant, and in the successive notions which arose to the former in the progress of that genesis.

The categories in Kant had a burthen, a manifold, an ingest, a matter of their own. They and this matter, though subjective in origin, though in us, projected themselves out there into the objects, and came back to us (in sensation) with the objects and in the objects, forming in fact, though unconsciously to us, a most important, or the most important, portion of the objects. This is the first thought that, conceivably, rose to Hegel in the genesis in question; and he may be supposed to express it to himself thus: The object is formed by me, wholly by me; for the thing-in-itself which has been left as an unknown noumenon by Kant, is but an abstraction, and exists not. What is, is my Sensation, in my Space and Time, in my Categories, and in my Ego. But each Ego as Ego is identical with my Ego as Ego. What substantially is, then, what necessarily is, what universally is—what, apart from all consideration of particular Subjects or Egos, objectively is, is—Sensation in the net of Space and Time, ganglionised into the Categories. All is ideal, then; but this ideal element (the common element that remains to every subject on elimination of the individual subject) can only be named an objective one. Now in this objective element there are two parts—one capable of being described as sensuous, and the other as intellectual. But these two parts are not wholly discrepant and heterogeneous. The sensuous part, for example, is but a copy, but an externalisation of the intellectual part. The former is but the other of the latter.
The latter, then, is the more important, and contains all that, essentially and substantially, its other is. In such relation, indeed, its other is to it as nothing. Neglecting the other, or the copy, then, let us confine our attention to the categories, to the intellectual part, to the inner part, of which the other is but the other, or, what is the same thing, a repetition sensuously and outwardly.

Well, these categories declare themselves at once as objective thoughts. So far as there is an out, they are out there objectively in the world; or the world is made on these categories, on these thoughts. This, then, is the first Hegelian thought: the category is objective, is in the object or forms the object. To know all the categories, then, would be to know all the thoughts which formed the universe—to know all the thoughts, indeed, which are the universe. But such knowledge, concerning as it does the thoughts of God, would be tantamount to a knowledge of God himself.

From this scheme it will be evident, how completely all that is peculiarly Hegelian lay already in the findings of Kant.

But to look more closely, we may say that directly this 'light went up' to Hegel, it would naturally and necessarily be the categories that would engross all his attention—the categories of Kant. What were they? Where had Kant got them? How had Kant manipulated them? Could nothing more be made of them? Here, surely, was a most promising field for an aspirant to the honours of philosophy; and most thoroughly, it must be said, was it ransacked, and turned over, and re-modelled, and re-made, and re-presented by Hegel. Re-presented indeed, so that even any trace of the original, would scarcely with any readiness suggest itself. The same work, however, which established Hegel, serves also to discover him; and this is the thorough investigation of that which is the essential part, the essential and central secret indeed of the whole system, of Kant—the Deduction of the Categories.

It is curious to watch the manoeuvres of Hegel here, the manner in which, when led to the subject, he speaks of these categories of Kant. By way of example, let us refer to a very remarkable Note which occurs in the 'Allgemeine Eintheilung' of his Logic (Berlin, 1833, pp. 52, 53). The correlative text runs thus:

'Kant has, in latter times, set opposite to what has been usually named logic, another logic, a transcendental logic namely. That which has been here named objective logic would correspond in part to that which with him is the
transcendental logic. He distinguishes it from what he names universal logic in
such wise that it (a) considers the notions which refer themselves à priori to
objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole matter of objective
knowledge, or that it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object, and
(b) at the same time relates to the origin of our perception so far as it (our
perception) cannot be ascribed to the objects. It is to this second side that
the philosophical interest of Kant is exclusively directed. His main thought
is, to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness, as the subjective ego. In
consequence of the direction thus imposed, the view remains standing fast
within consciousness and its antithesis [of an object and subject, to wit]; and
besides the empirical element given by sensation and perception, it has some-
thing else left over which is not entailed and determined by thinking self-
consciousness, a thing-in-itself, a something foreign and external to thought;
though it is easy to see that such an abstractum, as thing-in-itself, is itself only
a product of thought, and that, too, only abstracting thought.'

The Note itself runs thus:—

'I may mention that I take frequent notice in this work of the Kantian
philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous), because this philosophy—
its more particular character as well as the individual parts of the execution
may be considered as they may in this work or elsewhere—constitutes the
base and starting point of later German Philosophy, and this its merit remains
undetected from by what may be excepted to in its regard. In the objective
logic frequent reference requires to be made to it for this reason also, that it
enters into particular consideration of important, more special sides of the
logical element, while later discussions of philosophy have, on the contrary,
paid little heed to this (the logical element), have partly indeed exhibited in
its regard often only a barbarous—but not unrevealed—contempt. The
philosophising which is the most widely extended among us, passes not
beyond the Kantian results, that reason can come to know no true material
content, and as regards absolute truth that we are to be directed to Belief.
In this philosophising, however, the beginning is immediately made with
that which in Kant is the result, and consequently the preceding executive
development, which is itself a philosophical cognition, and from which the
result issues, is cut off beforehand. The Kantian philosophy serves thus as a
boiler for indolence of thought, which comforts itself with this, that all is
already proved and done with. For actual knowledge, and a definite real
something of thought which is not to be found in such sterile and arid self-
comfort, recourse ought, therefore, to be had to the mentioned preceding
executive development.'

Now, in the passage from the text, the Hegelian objective
logic is said to correspond partly to the Kantian transcendental logic.

This, then, in one point of view, may be considered as an
admission of the one system being partly derived from the other.
The remark, however, is casual and general, and, taking into its
scope, as it does, the whole of the transcendental logic without
restriction to the deduction of the categories, it really gives no hint that would lead anyone to put any stress on the connexion, or expect anything further from its development than what lay on the surface, viz., that the categories of Hegel included, among others, those of Kant. The two points which are stated in characterisation of the position of Kant, are in reality identical. They are given quite in the language of Kant, and not a trace of that turn which made them Hegel’s can be found in them. Hegel passes lightly over them, indeed, to state that Kant’s leading thought is to vindicate the categories for the subjective ego (that is, as functions of the subjective ego), and he concludes by alluding to the defective and inconsistent nature of the Kantian theory. No one from such writing could believe that Hegel was aware that any particular advantage had accrued to him from the Kantian system; and when one reads the unrespecting criticism with which we find Kant perpetually assailed throughout the whole course of Hegel’s unabridged Logic, the very last idea that would occur to anyone would be that the system of Hegel is contained all but ready-formed in the system of Kant—that it emerged, indeed, from the same almost at a scratch of the nail. Nay, it is Kant’s treatment of these very categories that Hegel, nevertheless, censures the oftenest and the most unexceptively. A page further on than the last just quoted, for example, we find Hegel expressing himself as follows:—

‘Inasmuch now as the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so-called transcendentalty of the categories, the result of their treatment issued void; what they are in themselves, without the abstract relation to Ego common to all, what their nature as against and their relation as towards one another, that has not been made an object of consideration; the knowledge of their nature, therefore, has not found itself in the smallest furthered by this philosophy; what alone is interesting in this connexion presents itself in the critique of the Ideas.’

How very misleading all this writing is! We know that the Ideas are universally considered less satisfactory than the Categories; yet Hegel, when blaming the latter, can bestow a word of praise on the former! Impossible to think, then, that Hegel lies so very completely in these very categories! Again, Hegel is perpetually telling us that all his divisions into Books, Sections, Chapters, &c, are only something external, something added as mere convenient rubric for reference after the system itself has of itself run through all its own moments. Who can think other-
wise, then, than that this system is a peculiar life, a life of its
own, and a life apart? Who for a single moment would be
tempted to suspect that in Kant, too, lay the principle and
principles of these divisions, which must have all presented them-
selves to Hegel not after the system, but wholly beforehand? But let us look at the Note now.

Here he acknowledges the philosophy of Kant to be the basis
and the starting-point of the later German philosophy. But cela
va sans dire—who does not know that? Is it not common-place
that Fichte rose out of Kant, and so on? Does the acknowledg-
ment lead in the slightest to a perception of the peculiar obliga-
tions of Hegel to Kant? Not by any means: he apologises for
his frequent notice of Kant, 'which may appear to many quite super-
fuous,' and the award he extends to the philosophy of Kant is
made magnanimous by allusion to the defects of its execution and
particular details! In fact, not any particular derivation of Hegel
from Kant, but just the trivially current derivation of Fichte and
of German philosophy in vague generality from Kant, is what
Hegel's words would naturally call up to any reader here. Again,
he admits that Kant enters more particularly into the considera-
tion of logic than later philosophers. But we recollect that
transcendental logic is on the very outside of the book of Kant;
the admission, too, is quite slight and general; and so Hegel's
observation here passes as one quite superfluous and of no impor-
tance. He points out then, that later philosophers have begun
with the Kantian result—which result again is summed up so far
truly but inadequately, and as in terms of censure so far mislead-
ingly—and have dispensed with any knowledge of the preceding
execution. But this execution is philosophical cognition, and the
advantage of a return to it is hinted. There is nothing in all this
to prompt any inference of the particular truth of the case
relatively to Hegel. Observe, however, the three words which
are isolated from the rest by dashes,—'but not unrevened;'—
they refer to the contempt of later German philosophers with
respect to logic. It is not logic in general that is in Hegel's head
at this moment, however. No; what is really there is the deduc-
tion of the categories, and 'not unrevened' is a chuckle aside
over what he (Hegel) has gained and they (Fichte and Schelling)
have lost in that regard. This seems very clear as soon as the
real nature of the relation subsisting between Kant and Hegel is
seen into. But none of these words, whether in the text or the
Note, would have given the slightest intimation of their home meaning to anyone as yet ignorant of that relation: and much less would they have revealed that relation. They are of such a nature, however, that they seem to shelter Hegel from the possible charge of injustice to Kant, and of having meanly concealed the true nature of his vast obligations to Kant—when these obligations shall have otherwise become known. They certainly contain the truth implicitly; they are very far, however, from expressing the truth explicitly; and Hegel must for ever bear the brand of having grudged the light. These words, it is true, are not the only ones used by Hegel when he has his own relation to Kant in his mind: there occur here and there others—especially in 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen'—which, like these, amount to admissions, but act the part neither of revelation nor acknowledgment till he who reads them has contrived to obtain for himself the necessary light from elsewhere.

The scheme of the Kantian categories we have already presented in such form, that no one who has any knowledge of Hegel can possibly help exclaiming, Why, Hegel is all there! Hegel certainly owes to Kant his main principles in every way, and his leading views in general. Hegel, to be sure, is an intellect of irresistible force, and, in the course of his exposition, there occur infinite originalities, infinite new lights, which are of the greatest import to the development of thought and even perhaps history. The looking at apperception, the categories, the intellectual manifold of these and the sensuous one of space and time, sensation, free-will, the antinomies, the ideas, the notions of reflexion—the looking at these and other such, the materials of the inexhaustibly rich Kant, in an objective manner, was a most happy 'light' that 'went up' to Hegel, and quite comparable to that light which went up to Kant out of the materials of Hume. And how interesting these lights are!* The light that went up to Hume out of Locke, is as historically visible as those two others; and the true nature of philosophy and the history of philosophy will never be understood as it is, by the student of philosophy, till these lights go up to him in the same way they went up to their first possessors. As regards Hegel, too, some rays of the light that rose up to him apparently all out of Kant, must be attributed, as we have said already, to Fichte and Schelling. The objectivising of the cate-

* Dem ersten, der, etc., ... dem ging ein Licht auf, ... so ging allen Naturforschern ein Licht auf. (Kant, K. of P. R., Pref.).—New.
gories and their system constituted probably, in the main, the light that made Hegel. Such implicit admissions, as we have seen, then, cannot screen Hegel from the reproach at least of ingratitude to Kant, or from the macula of peculiarly equivocal concealment—a macula not one whit lightened or lessened by this, that the concealment was calculated to become, if need were, a grudging and equivocal revealment. That utter insulation of Hegel, that absolute inaccessibility which has remained so long obdurate, that impenetrable hardness of form and speech—we may regard all this—though a peculiar dialect was inevitable—as to some extent matter of intention. It is certain Hegel saw that he was not understood; and it is now equally certain that, with a word about his derivation from Kant, he might have made all easy at once. He was surprised by sudden death, however, at a time of life when he might reasonably have expected to have lived, say, at least some ten years longer; and it is quite possible that, had he been spared, he might have condescended to explain the enigma and have kindly vouchsafed us some mitigation of the hardness of his forms and dialect.

It is not to be unconsidered, either, that the German polemical tone is of a ruder nature generally than would be tolerable in England. Hegel, in one of his papers and in so many words, calls some one a liar! Hegel, indeed, is, in this respect, always consistent with himself, and Kant and the individual just alluded to are by no means exceptions. Hegel’s polemical tone everywhere is always of the hardest, of the most unsparing—always, if we may say so, of the most unmincing and butt-end description. One has but to think of all occasions on which his biographer allows us to see Hegel in conflict, to become aware of a general bearing quite correspondent to the burden of what has been already said. We hear of him, for example, apropos of one of his most friendly fellow-professors, who, in the programme of the session, had presumed to recommend to his students—out of love—a work of Hegel: we hear of him when in conflict with a Roman Catholic priest who had taken umbrage at the manner in which Hegel, in his public lectures, had expressed himself in respect to a mouse which was supposed to have nibbled the Host: we hear of him in his literary or philosophic societies: and on all such occasions, we cannot help getting to think of Hegel as of a man of an audacious stomach—as of a man of a bold and unhesitating self-will. His attitude to Schelling bears this well out also. We saw already, how he broke
ground, when his time had come, by writing to Schelling—in what calculated manner, and with what probable views. Well, once in Jena, we have to see him a declared Schellingian. He starts forward at once to the front, indeed, as the most zealous and pugnacious of disciples, and he fights for his master with all the unhesitating brass of an advocate by special retainer. In a few years, however, when Hegel can dispense with prominence on another man’s height, the manner in which he ‘says’ himself ‘loose’ from Schelling is as cruel and determined as is well conceivable. This is to be seen in the preface to the Phaenomenologie, a work which, previous to its publication, Schelling told its author he looked forward to as the deepest work of the age! That hard heart of Hegel, that relented not, at such words, to mitigate his preface! and to Schelling what bitter commentary on his own expectations that preface must have seemed! It is to be borne in mind, too, that when Hegel was exhibiting open zeal for Schelling, and demonstrating with an air of perfect conviction the advance which Schelling’s position constituted, as compared not only with that of Fichte, but with that of Kant also—at that very moment he had in his desk the first sketch of his own system, a system that lay directly in that of Kant, a system that proved the contempt entertained by Schelling for the execution and details of Kant, and for logic in general, to have been, as we have seen, ‘not unrevenged.’ It lay in the nature of the Hegelian iron, then, to kick out of sight the ladders of his rise, to provide for self, to take measures afar off, and to set deep plans for the realisation and particularisation of self. His attitude in later years to Government coheres with the same view. It certainly lay in the nature of his philosophy to profess constitutional conservatism and per- horresce the usually inconsiderate and shallow innovator of prejudice and passion; but to connect himself so closely, as he did, with the Ministers of the day, and to become, as it were, their fee’d and recognised fighting-man, their retained gladiator, their staunch bull-dog of philosophy on hire—it was in the nature of his own self-seeking that this lay. Let us study and appreciate Hegel, indeed, as long and deeply as we may, a tone will cling to him that still brings somehow involuntarily to the palate ‘savour of poisonous brass.’*

The insulation of Hegel, then, the rubbing out of his own footsteps, the removal of all preliminary and auxiliary scaffolding,

* Certainly that ‘poisonous brass’ here is quite all too much! (New.)
the concealment generally—despite a certain equivocal revealment —of his relation to Kant, must be pronounced, in great part at least, an operation of prepense calculation and intentional design. This operation it is our present business here to render abortive; and the means to this lie in a statement of the general nature of the Kantian Categories, of the special light that went up to Hegel in their regard, and of his probable steps and mode of transit from this light to his complete system. It was with this statement we were engaged, when called off to animadvert on the blame which, dashed somewhat by certain considerations must attach to Hegel, of an interested disownment of Kant and concealment of the first steps of his own operations.

What they were—where they had been got—these categories, then,—this was not difficult to perceive. They were derived from the various classes of propositions, as these propositions presented themselves in the ordinary text-books of technical or Aristotelian Logic. The various kinds of propositions (or judgments) Kant conceived must relate to the various kinds of the act of the faculty of Judgment itself, or to the various functions of this faculty. The functions of this faculty, then, in such case, were either Quantitative, Qualitative, Relative, or Modal. As Quantitative, again, they were either Universal, Particular, or Singular; as Qualitative, either Affirmative, Negative, or Limitative; as Relative, either Categoric, Hypothetic, or Disjunctive; and as Modal, either Problematic, Assertoric, or Apodictic. Further here, it is sufficient to state now that Kant transformed the technical classes of propositions into functions of judgment, and into certain à priori ground-notions of synthesis, correspondent to these functions, and resultant from them. Here, then, we see what the categories are and where they were got.

But Kant similarly transformed the technical classes of Syllogisms into certain à priori ground-notions of Synthesis which he named the Ideas. The function of these Ideas was only Regulative, whereas that of the Categories was Constitutive. But, what is the important point for us at present, the former are a vitalisation of Reason, while the latter perform the same service for Judgment. It was, plainly, to technical or formal logic, then, that Hegel was referred, when he sought to investigate the categories, and endeavour, by the completion of their system, to complete the system also of ground-thoughts, which not only permeated and arranged the universe, but which actually con-
stituted and created it, all that held of Sense being but a copy and repetition of all that held of Intellect.

In this search Hegel found himself, even as regards the Categories and Ideas, to make many modifications. Still in Judgment and Reason he had, on the whole, been forestalled by Kant. There was one division of logic, however, which still lay virgin and untouched by Kant, the first namely, or that which has been inscribed Simple Apprehension. Well, as Kant had been so successful with Judgment and Reason, it was at least possible that a like success might attend an investigation of Simple Apprehension also, if conducted on the same principles and directed by the same view. But Kant’s categories were notions and, as notions, ought to belong to simple apprehension. There was thus a connexion between Simple Apprehension and Judgment; they were not wholly isolated and incommunicable; the forms of the one might pass into the forms of the other; the one, indeed, might be but a gradation of the other. Here we have in perfection one of the most special and peculiar of all the Hegelian levers. Kant himself blindly expressed this in relating the categories to Apperception or Self-consciousness: he failed to perceive that, as notions, they might have been set down as ground-acts of Apprehension, and that Apprehension then might be set identical with Apperception or Self-consciousness. Had Kant seen this, he would probably have utilised in his peculiar way, and adopted into his system, the whole body of Technical Logic.

But again, the categories are generalisations, and the question in that light is spontaneous: Can they not be generalised further? As the original functions of Apperception itself, this at first sight seems impossible, and they themselves ultimate. Still they are notions, and the universal of them is the Notion. But the Notion as the Notion is just the Faculty as the Faculty, Apprehension as Apprehension, or Apperception as Apperception. Here is another example of gradation in the same matter, another coalescence of differences into identity: the faculty and the function were both seen to constitute, so to speak, the same stuff and to possess the same life. There is involved here another of the great Hegelian levers—the elimination, that is, of faculties; the elimination, indeed, of all substrata of functions, qualities, thoughts, &c.—the reduction of all to Gesetztseyn, which we may translate, perhaps, reflexion, or adjecitiousness.

Again, the one function of all the categories is, the conversion
of the Universal, through the Particular, into the Singular. Such is the absolutely generalised function of the categories as they are understood by Kant. This, then, is the Notion, and this is the inner movement of the Notion. Nay, such is the inner movement of Apprehension, such is the inner movement of Apperception itself. This is the pulse of Self-consciousness; this is the nerve of the Ego. This movement, this pulse, this nerve, is what is ultimate—rather what is first—in the constitution of this universe. This is the First and One (throb) which has expanded into the All: this is Vitality: this is the Infinite Form and the Infinite Matter; this is the Absolute; this is What is.*

The conception of the notion as notion, then, was not for Hegel far to seek; and this notion, with such views, and so instructed by Kant, he could not very well have missed. The categories were but generalisations; it was but natural to demand a generalisation of them. This was imposed on him, too, by his very necessity to attain a First and One. Nay, consideration of Kant's Apperception itself would lead him to Simple Apprehension, and to the same thought. He was in search of a principle by which he might obtain a beginning, secure a method of progression, and complete a system: such quest as this lay at once to hand, the instant he perceived the reach of the notion of Kant as expressed in the categories, especially when these were objectivised. Hegel knew from Kant that in every notion there was matter and form; and it was not difficult for him to perceive that what Kant called the intellectual schema, was the multiple contained in the notion and tantamount to its matter. In regard to the Notion as Notion, it would be with joy he would perceive that there Matter and Form—as was a particular want of Schelling—coalesced and were identical; that the movement which constituted the Form of the Notion, constituted also its Matter. Kant himself defines a pure notion to be such as arises out of the understanding, 'auch dem Inhalte nach' (also as regards matter). Logik in Kant's Works, p. 270.

At page 271 of the same work, these words might have proved suggestive to Hegel:—'The Idea does not admit of being obtained by Composition (Aggregation); for the Whole is here sooner than the part.' At all events, this is a main tenet of Hegel on the question of the original tortoise of the universe. There cannot be a doubt that Hegel had examined with great attention the Logic

* This, we may add also, is how à priori Synthetic Judgments are possible, or the Notion is the à priori Synthetic Judgment.
of Kant; and there is much matter there capable of proving richly suggestive. At page 274, we have the following, after an admirable account of Abstraction in general which we can recognise as the source of Hegel's incessant word abstract:—'The abstractest notion is that which has with none that is different from it anything in common. This is the notion of Something; for what is different from it is Nothing, and has therefore with Something nothing in common.' Again, from page 279, these words might be very significant for Hegel:—'By means of continued logical abstraction there arise always higher, as, on the contrary, by means of continued logical determination always lower notions. The greatest possible abstraction yields the highest or abstractest notion—that from which there cannot be any further predicate (or significate) thought-off. The highest completed determination would yield a thoroughly determinate notion, or such a one that no further significate could be thought to it.'

Altogether, it was not difficult for Hegel, once possessed of that glimpse by which Ego was seen to be externalised by the Category, the Category by Time and Space, and these by Sensation, to perceive that Apprehension itself (or Apperception or the Ego) perfectly generally expressed, would constitute the Notion, and that a thorough completion and articulation of a system of Categories from the Notion would constitute, in the strictest language, a consummate philosophy, or the entirety of those universal principles according to which the universe was organised, and of which the whole outward was but a repetition. As regards his method, too, it was plain that if he was to begin with what was most general, he must proceed to what was most particular (the Singular), and thus his progress would be, not a generalisation, but a specification or individualisation—logical determination, in short. The passages just cited from the Logic of Kant, then, may perhaps not be without bearing on the beginning, progress, and termination of Hegel. For his beginning is that which is abstractest of all, his progress logical determination, and his termination that which is concretest of all. In this, what is last supports and is ground to all that precedes; for it is verily that which is; and all that has been done, has been to begin with the simplest link of the complicated chain that constitutes the interior of the ultimate principle, and to let all manifest itself in development towards this ultimate concrete whole. This whole,
again, is with Hegel 'sooner than the part;' the Seyn is just the Seyn, or What is, is; and Hegel conceived that, as a philosopher, he had nought to do but demonstrate this Seyn in its intellectual principles and constitution;—and thus Hegel was an empiricist.

Hegel has clung very closely to Kant, then, and his special guide seems to have been frequently the latter's special Logic itself. There are additional proofs of this. The work in question begins thus:—'Everything in Nature, as well as in the lifeless as in the living world, takes place according to rules.' Now, one may say that Hegel's single industry has been to carry out this into all and every: his one idea has been to exhibit all as an organism, and every as a necessary member of the same. Then, again, Kant follows this up by observing that at the bottom of the crude, unconscious concrete that, in the first instance, every and each human interest is seen to constitute, there lies an intellectual pure system which acts, as it were, as the supporting skeleton and as more. For instance, under Speech, which, as it first shows, is so very crude a concrete, something so very unconscious and uninvestigated, there lies a very decided pure intellectual system, on and round which all the rest gathers as so many motes on and round a system of pure rays—Grammar (a Grammatik).

'Thus,' says Kant, 'for example, Universal Grammar is the form of language in general: some, however, speak, without knowing grammar; and he who speaks without knowing it, really has a grammar and speaks according to rules, of which, however, he is unconscious.' . . . 'Just as all our faculties in general, understanding in especial, is in its acts astray to rules, which may be investigated by us. Understanding, indeed, is to be regarded as the source and as the faculty of rules. . . . It is eager to seek rules, and satisfied when it has found them. The question occurs, then, as understanding is the source of rules, on what rules does it itself proceed? . . . These rules we may think for themselves, that is, in abstracto, or without their application [which is accurately the moment of understanding, judgment, Ur-theil, abstraction, or für sich in Hegel]. . . . If we now, however, set aside all ingredients of knowledge [it would be more intelligible to an Englishman or a Frenchman to say perception, which derive only from the objects, and reflect solely on the operation of understanding in general, we discover those rules which in every respect, and quite irrespective of any and every particular object of thought, are absolutely necessary, just because without them we should not be able to think or perceive] at all. These rules, therefore, can be seen, and seen into, a priori, that is, independently of all experience, because they concern merely the conditions of the operation of understanding in general, be it pure or empirical, without distinction, indeed, of the objects at all. . . . Thus the science which consists of these universal and necessary rules, is merely a science of the Form of our cognition through understanding,
or of thought. And we may form for ourselves, therefore, an idea of the possibility of such a science, in the same way as of a universal Grammatik (or Grammar), which shall regard nothing further than the mere form of Speech in general, apart from words, which constitute only the matter of speech. This science of the necessary laws of understanding and reason in general, or—what is the same thing—of the mere form of thought in general, is called Logic. Thus as a science which considers all thought in general, irrespective of the objects, which are only as the matter of thought, Logic will constitute the foundation of all the other sciences, and must necessarily be regarded as the Proopodeutic of all exercise of the understanding.'

Most readers read such sentences without realising the thought of their writer; they seem to them to allude only to what is called formal Logic, which, everybody knows, abstracts from all matter of thought; and they pass on without any consideration further. Not so Hegel: he enters into the very mind of Kant, and sees what he sees. But what Kant sees is not the Aristotelian Logic, but a pure Form, which, subjective in that it is of intellectual or mental origin, is yet veritably objective, a pure objective shape, to which every actual material object must congrue. Kant sees, in fact, a diamond net of intellect—pure form—which the matter of special sense (as it were, falling and condensing on the net) classifies into actual outer objects. This is in rude outline Kant's new theory of perception, and Hegel, whether he called it perception or not, saw perfectly well what it was, and spent his life in the realisation of it. He saw Kant's notion here—which he could afterwards identify with the notion as notion—he saw that of which Kant said 'we might form an Idea,' and of this he just—by infinite labour—formed (or realised) the Idea: Hegel's Idea is nothing but Kant's Idea (but, as here in Kant, the Idea is but notion, but an such) of the possible science suggested. Kant ideates an à priori diamond objective net of perception: Hegel realises the same as a systematic articulately-detailed whole—his Logic; which, viewed as an objective whole, he names (probably with reference to the word as used here by Kant)—the Idea. Kant's transcendental Idea, then, is now to be conceived as simply developed into the Logical Idea of Hegel. Or, to say it otherwise, the Logic of Hegel is intended to be in absolute truth all that Kant pictures; it would be the diaphanous skeleton, the inner, necessary, pure, abstract system, pure as a Grammatik, pure as a Mathematic, pure as an Algebra—pure as an ultimate, perfectly generalised Calculus—on and round which the innumerable opaque motes of outer matter should gather, group, and dispose themselves into the concrete world of thought and
sense. Hegel set himself in earnest to realise the idea of Kant, and sought to find a pure *Noetic* of Knowledge (Logic) as others seek to find the pure Grammatik of Speech (Grammar). If Hegel’s Logic, indeed, is not this, it is nothing. But it is this—perhaps not perfectly—it is this, and has discovered those pure essentities of thought which are the spring and levers of the whole. For example, a whole universe of concrete sorrow, whole lifetimes of concrete anxiety, concentrate themselves in those simple essentities *Finite* and *Infinite*—concentrate themselves, and demonstrate themselves, and answer themselves, resolving and clearing themselves into insight and peace. Our most earnest English writers now-a-days—to confine ourselves to writers—may be conceived as just staggering blindly back at present caught in the last draught of the receding Aufklärung. ‘To be blown about the desert dust,’ or ‘sealed within the iron hills,’ a particle of matter: this they ponder, all of them. To them, ‘time has become a maniac scattering dust,’ ‘life a fury slinging flame,’ ‘and men but flies, that sting, lay eggs, and die.’ The great bulk of earnest men, now-a-days, in short, longing for Religion, yearning for God and Immortality, weeping towards Christ, longing, yearning, weeping towards all those essential truths of humanity which the light of the understanding, brought to the fierce focus of the Aufklärung, has shrivelled into ashes within their hearts—such men may all be conceived as at certain seasons sitting hour after hour in gloom and silence pondering these things, and rising at length with a sigh, and the mournful refrain, No hope, no hope! But these two words, *Finite* and *Infinite*, being discussed in ultimate abstraction (which is their truth), in Logic proper—at once the knot resolves itself and the cloud lifts.

Kant, in the same sense, characterises this conceived Logic as the ‘Universal art of Reason, the *Canonica Epicuri,*’ and that, as such, ‘it borrows no principles from any other science.’ And again, he says—‘In Psychology we consider how thought is seen and known usually to proceed, not how it must or ought to proceed;’ but ‘in Logic we do not want to know how the understanding is, and how it thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking—but how in thinking it must and ought to proceed: Logic is to teach us the correct use of the understanding, that is, that use of understanding that agrees with its own self.’ And here we are not to deceive ourselves that the burthen of the ordinary definition of Logic, the right use of Reason, is what is aimed at. No; what is aimed at is something very different:
it is the intellectual objectivity of knowledge as opposed to the
sensuous objectivity of the same; for even of the latter, the
former is the essential antecedent, or there is no sensuous
objectivity in which the intellectual elements do not constitute
the essence. How very earnest Hegel has been with all this,
and how completely he has assimilated it, is, on accurate acquaint-
ance, very plain. 'The question,' says Kant, 'is not what and
how much does understanding know, or how far does that know-
ledge extend; but in Logic the question is only, how will the
understanding know its own self,' that is, its own pure form, and
forms, that lie in abstracto under the crass and opaque concrete.
Again, he defines his transcendental Logic to be that 'in which
the object itself is conceived as an object of mere understanding,'
which surely is tantamount to calling said Logic an objective
Logic. And he winds up with the following express definition
in small capitals:—'Logic is a rational science not as regards
mere form only, but as regards matter also, a science à priori
of the necessary laws of thought, but not in respect of any
particular objects, but in respect of all objects in general;—a
science, therefore, of the correct exercise of understanding and
reason in general, but not subjectively, that is, not with reference
to empirical (psychological) principles as the understanding does
think, but objectively, that is, with reference to à priori principles
as it must and should think.' What study Hegel has made of
all this, his Logic demonstrates. Here, again, Hegel's idea is
well seen:—'Technical or Scientific Logic is a science of the
necessary and universal rules of thought, which can and must
be known à priori, independently of the natural exercise of under-
standing and reason in concreto, although they can be first of
all discovered only by means of the observation of said natural
exercise.' Here, too, is something very Hegelian:—In this Logic
'not the smallest regard is to be entertained whether of the
objects or of the subject of thought.' This is accurately the
Hegelian Logical Idea, which is (though in abstracto) the concrete
thought of all that is, elimination being made of all reference to
any actual empirical object or any actual empirical subject.*

Kant, to be sure, declares that Logic 'can be no science of
speculative understanding,' for so it were an 'organon' for dis-
covery, acquisition, and addition, and no mere 'Propædeutic'
or 'canon' for regulation and 'dijudication;' while Hegel, on

* For perfect light on this Idea, see p. 96, Note—New.
his side, seems to have converted Logic just into this speculative organon. Nevertheless, this very act of Hegel may be not unconnected with this very remark of Kant. As regards method, again, Kant says:—'By Method is to be understood the mode and manner in which a certain object, to whose cognition this method is to be applied, may be rendered capable of being completely understood: it must be taken from the nature of the science itself, and, as a necessary order of thought thereby determined, it does not admit of alteration.' Again, he accurately distinguishes Philosophy from Mathematic, and points out the absurdity of applying the method of the latter to the former. Many passages, both in the Kritik of Pure Reason and in the Logic, can easily be found to prove this, and we need not quote. In reference to philosophy, he says there belongs to it, 'firstly, an adequate complement of rational facts; secondly, a systematic articulation of these facts, or a synthesis of the same in the Idea of a whole.' Again:—'Every philosophical thinker builds, so to speak, his own work on the ruins of another; none has ever been realised, that was complete in all its parts.' Then we have much about wisdom as opposed to knowledge, which repeats itself in the practical sections of Hegel ('Misologie,' found here too in the Logic of Kant—but that is Plato's), and then there occurs this eminently Hegelian sentence: 'Philosophy is the only science which is capable of procuring us this inner satisfaction [of wisdom, that is, in act as well as knowledge]; for it closes, as it were, the scientific circle, and through it then only do the other sciences first acquire order and connexion.' Hegel's historical idea seems here too: 'He who would learn philosophy, must regard all the systems of philosophy only as the history of Reason in its exercise,'—of Reason, that is, as it has historically manifested itself in actual operation. Schelling also has this thought at full in the 'Transcendental Idealism;' yet it is to be observed that though Kant's words, or Schelling's words, name now the Hegelian Idea, neither Kant nor Schelling saw the Hegelian Idea then.

We are not to lose sight, meantime, of the bearing which Logical Determination has on the method and system of Hegel. The common secret of all these philosophisings, Kantian, Fichtian, Schellingian, was generalisation or abstraction. It lay at hand then, that the most abstract notion would, in a system, be the natural commencement. But, this accomplished, the question would then arise, how are we to proceed, in what manner advance
from this beginning? It cannot be by further abstraction or generalisation, for we suppose ourselves at the abstractest and most general already: determination, then, specification, is the only principle of transition left us. But, supposing this to be the method we must adopt, how put it into operation, and where end it? are the next questions. As regards putting it into operation, that is possible by finding for every genus the differentia by addition of which it (the genus) will be transformed into the immediately subordinate species; and as regards an end, that will take place, when we have reached the most concrete conception that belongs to this universe. The beginning, then, will probably not be difficult, inasmuch as it is just the genus summum, or the last product of abstraction: neither presumably will the end be difficult, as, if we find the true method, it will come of itself. The whole difficulty now, then, relates to this method: how, being in possession of a genus, can we find, without addition of any other element, the differentia which will convert it into its first species? This seems impossible; for logic holds that the genus is the common element, while the differentia is that which is peculiar to the species,—just that, in short, which distinguishes the species from the genus. We are at once at a stop here, then; and it seems that even if we had the beginning, the summum genus, any advance from it would be impossible, as it is a differentia that is the necessary instrument of movement, and a differentia lies not in the genus, least of all in the summum genus, but is to be found only in the species. Now, in what has been said lies the germ and motive of all Hegel's reasoning as regards a beginning, and of that principle as well which is named the Hegelian principle κατ' εξοχήν, and which has always been objected to Hegel as his absurd contradiction of all the laws of logic, of thought, and of common sense—objected to him, too, invariably with that shallow exultation and exaltation peculiar to the opponent who is utterly ignorant of the man he fights, as if the mere objection were an absolutely unanswerable and utterly annihilative refutation and reply. But that Hegel is right, there is the universe for proof: God himself could not have created the world, had the summum genus been only summum genus, and had a differentia required to be waited for, from an elsewhere that existed not. It all lies there. The beginning and the movement of Hegel ought to be now perfectly intelligible, and so far, likewise, reasonable. There are truths absolute—incapable of being changed even by absolute
power, and this is one of them: the three angles of a triangle are not more absolutely equal to two right angles than the unity of difference and identity is absolutely true—since the world is. Logically expressed, what has been said amounts to this: logical determination is only possible if the genus really contains and implies the differentia of the immediately following species. Now let us try this in actual working; let us find the summum genus, and let us see whether the differentia be not held in it at least implicit. But here we are just again saying, though in another form, what we have already so often repeated. The Genus is the Begriff, the Differentia is the Ur-theil, and the Species is the Schluss: we have not yet got beyond An sich, Für sich, and An und für sich! The same movement, the same form press ever in upon us; and they are those of the Notion. But to apply.

Seyn, Being, is the most abstract notion of all. Everyone will find this the case on trial: Kant directly states this both in the conclusion of his Transcendental Analytic, and in his Logic; and Hegel repeatedly points out that it is equivalent to the sum of all realities. Seyn is the beginning, then—Seyn is the summum genus: does it contain implicit the Differentia? Or Being is the Begriff, what is the first Ur-theil both as parting and judgment? But this was identified but lately as the moment of abstraction or für sich: what, then, is Being in absolute abstraction, or für sich? Why, Nothing. At first glance, then, it seems wholly hopeless to search for any differentia here, where all is vague and indeterminate, and Being itself has but the value of Nothing. But what is to come after? or what is the first species under Being? Why, in Being as Being, there is as yet nothing; it is a sea from which not a scale of distinction can be landed. The first step in such a sea towards a distinction must be a Becoming. Becoming, then, is more particular than Being: by what is it more particular? Being implies that there is; but Becoming implies both that there is, and that there is not. Is not, then, or simply not, is what it contains more than Being. But if, by any means, we could have found this not first of all, though implicitly, in Being we should have found the differentia necessary for its conversion into the species Becoming. But we found this: absolutely abstract Being was just at the same time Nothing; Being as Being was predicateless, &c. &c.

The same process applied to Becoming will detect there, implicitly contained, the differentia that converts it into Daseyn;
and Daseyn conveys that there not only is, but that there is actually there, or here, or now. Quality is found impliciter in Daseyn, and Daseyn is thereby converted into Etwas, Something. This, in short, seems the course of the march of Hegel from beginning to end.

Of course, it is easy for us, with Hegel’s scheme before us, to state the examples; while for Hegel the construction of his scheme, with all that he had to assist him in the general conception of Determination through the addition of differentiae, would prove very difficult. Still, though he must have had great trouble, the receipt being so very plain, the accomplishment of the process would plainly be very possible to patient trial.

It is to be understood that Hegel did not look at the process as altogether external, artificial, technical form. He had come upon it, doubtless, when endeavouring to accomplish for the matter of Simple Apprehension what Kant had accomplished for that of Judgment and Reason, &c. No doubt, Hegel vitalised logical determination into the process of the concrete; and, no doubt, Hegel was perfectly correct in this. The concrete, and the ultimate principle of the concrete—let us even name it God—must contain identity, and it must also contain diversity. Progress is possible only from this to that; but these very words imply other and others, diversity. But God is not to be viewed as twofold—in God’s unity, then, identity and diversity must both cohere, without prejudice the one to the other. This is a deep subject: Hegel, however, has probably thought it out; his result being that difference is as essential to the Absolute—that is, to this universe and the principle and principles of this universe—as identity itself. So long, indeed, as we remain by identity, by that which is always self-identical, and nothing but self-identical, march there is none; but in that God created the world, he demonstrated that self-identity was not alone what constituted him. Negation is as necessary as affirmation, then;—nay, Spinoza asserts omnis determinatio to be negatio, implying thereby that the particular arises only by particularisation, that is, by differentiating by differencing the conceived original identity. In all philosophy, then, negativity is an essential constituent, as it is an essential constituent of the eternal frame of things. Kant had his negative in the form of a Thing-in-itself, and Fichte could not move without the same principle, but rarified into the Anoes, the appulse or reflecting plane of impact. Hegel, for his part, like the royal thinker he was, resolves these negatives into the ultimate negative,
of nothing, nought, or not, negation as such. In fact, the ultimate principle is to him the pure Negativity; and even such is Ego as Ego, or Self-consciousness as Self-consciousness: even such is the Notion; for, like Ego, on the one side in every case it negates all difference into its own identity; while, on the other side (like ego also in the case of idealism, or as God), it negates its own identity into all difference. Here is a glance into the very depths of being. Hegel, very probably, made progress easy to himself by the ready formula, Find your differentia (always implicit in the genus), and add it explicit to the genus for the formation of the species: still, he had in his mind concrete truth in the shape of the necessity of difference to identity and of all the consequences of the same. The Ur-theil, the difference, is quite as necessary as the Begriff, the identity. What is in itself must become for itself; and unity stepping asunder into differentia, that is Ur-theil, that is dis-cernment. We are not content with the immediate identity of sense, for example; we demand the mediacy, the explanation of understanding, which is a movement between differentia. Hegel's principle, then, is more than mere formula: what, in fact, we here refer to under the series genus, differentia, and species, is identical with that expression of his principle which Hegel generally uses—namely, That everything passes into its opposite, but again resumes the same to production of a higher form: for what else in logical language is this, but just that the genus contains the differentia, and, by manifesting and resuming the same, it passes into the species? This logical language, then, is no mere dead formula not a mere form in a book; it is a form that pervades and animates the universe itself. The identity of the seed passes into its differences and becomes the tree. As Hegel's own illustration has it, bud, blossom, fruit, follow each other, refute each other; yet the last still contains the others, and it is only identity which has passed into its differences. Hegel, face to face with nature, saw that this principle was true; face to face with history, he found it true; face to face with thought in his own soul, it still showed true; and face to face with the history of philosophy, it was no less true. Everywhere he tried it, and everywhere the answer was the same. Still, it is to be understood that even a Hegel cannot escape the appearance of formalism and mechanism which the application of a formula always entails. There is a certain formal mechanism in the very initial questions, What is the absolutely abstract genus? what is the absolutely abstract differentia? and in
the answers, The absolutely abstract genus is the absolutely abstract identity—the absolutely abstract sum of all realities, which is just Being as Being; the absolutely abstract difference can only be Nothing; the absolutely abstract species, from the addition of such difference to such identity, can only be the absolutely abstract Becoming. These, perhaps, are the bottom thoughts; but absolutely abstract thoughts look very formal beside these material things, sky and earth and air, and bird and beast and man. It is but formalism, it is but a dry gulp to us to take down Logic as creating principle of this Nature—yet still what help?

Thus, then, at all events, tracing Hegel from Kant, we have gone deep into the former, and have well-nigh surprised, perhaps, his whole secret. We can throw yet another light, however, which of course coheres with what has been already said. Hegel consistently sought in the history of philosophy for the thought which had immediately preceded his own, in the belief that the nexus between them would prove the differentia of the latter. Or we may say this otherwise.

The results reached can be conceived as accruing to Hegel from an examination of the subjective side, as it were, of the industry of Kant. There is yet another side of the same industry, the objective. It, doubtless, occurred to Hegel spontaneously, that differentiation was the principle of the objective and historical progress of thought in outward manifestation as a succession of thinkers. Still this also, so far as the expression is concerned, lies in Kant. We have seen already the sentence, 'He who would learn philosophy must regard all the systems of philosophy only as the history of the exercise of Reason,'—that is, the systems of philosophy are the history of Reason itself. Schelling also has the same thought, and, we may add, that thought also which Hegel realised in the 'Phaenomenologie.' Both thoughts cohere, indeed, and belong to the same fact. Indeed, the vitalisation of logic was itself sufficient to suggest such historical expectations, for it showed that these dead linguistic formulae had formerly been alive in actual historical thought.

Objectively, then, the thought of Hegel was preceded by that of Kant, as that of Kant was preceded by those of Hume, Locke, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Descartes. That is to say, the thought of Substance was the objective thought that immediately preceded the thought of Kant; and, more closely still, it was Substance gone into Causality which was the immediate forerunner of the Notion of
Kant. Now, Kant, so far as Substance was concerned, had completed the series appertaining to the relation involved by adding Reciprocity. Reciprocity, indeed, is the name that not inaptly describes the peculiar view with which Kant followed up the suggestions of Hume. Kant, for example, referred all to the reciprocity of Noumena. What constituted knowledge was Phænomena derived from the reciprocal action of the Noumenon within and the Noumenon without. Rather, Kant inverted the previous relative positions of these two Noumena by subordinating the object (which had previously been the principal) to the subject (which had previously been secondary), and thus by such inversion generated a certain virtual reciprocity. At all events, from reciprocity the Notion of Hegel directly takes life: it is just with reciprocity that Hegel has seriously occupied himself. He has concentrated his attention on the peculiar manner in which Kant derives this notion of reciprocity from the logical function of the disjunctive judgment, and has thus gradually created his own Notion or Idea, which just is, that What is, is a concrete unity, the life of which lies in the principle of reciprocity, and more particularly in the notional form of that principle as it exhibits itself even in Kant himself. For in Kant, we find the singular to be but a sort of reciprocal result from the reciprocal interaction of the particular and the universal. This is best seen in the Kantian rationale of a perceptive act. This (any) concrete unity (perceived), the disjunctive sphere—a single cell, say—is to be conceived possessed of the reflex life of consciousness. An illustration suggests itself.

In a letter written to a literary veteran, some twenty years ago, by a stricken youth,—in one of those intrusions which are, to budding letters, in the light of love, so natural, but to budded letters, in the light of experience, so unendurable,—there occurs the following passage:—'I lie in the centre of this me, this dew-drop, round which the rays of Deity, interpenetrating and passing through it, paint the spectrum of the universe.' This may be allowed to be a fair symbol for idealism in general; and the same youth, separated by many years from any knowledge of German, stumbled in his thoughts on what may perhaps be allowed to be a fair symbol for the phase of idealism which now occupies us. It is this: Conceive a magician, a man of mighty power, a Prospero, so to place before the eyes of a Miranda a scale of fish, a plume of bird, a tooth of beast, a
leaf of branch, a pebble from the rock, a grain of sand, &c., so, and so strangely, that they should liquidly collapse somehow before her eyes—taking her with them—into the aforesaid dew-drop! Now this is a Vorstellung of the Begriff of Hegel,—or better, perhaps, of his Idea. The All, What is, is, so far as Logic is concerned, the Idea. Now, this Idea is but a dew-drop which, by a triplicity of reciprocity in itself, develops itself, or rather at any time can develop itself, into the universe. As it is, in the first instance—that is, as simple unity or identity, knowledge (or particularity), there can be none in it: it is just What is an sich, in itself. But let it, by virtue of its own inner negativity, negate, isolate a single point of its yet undisturbed periphery, and there result immediately a particular and a universal which collapse into a singular. The dew-drop, the lucid vesicle, is conceived capable of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness as act may be conceived as the form, the embracing element, the prehens; while the object of self-consciousness may be conceived as the matter, the Inhalt, the intent or ingest, or the prehensum: lastly, the realisation of the prehensum to the prehens may be conceived as a singular act of knowledge, a union of Form and Matter, an Entelecheia. The applicability of several of the Hegelian triplets must at once suggest itself: the moments of the movement, for example, are all respectively susceptible of the names, Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; Immediacy, Mediacy, and Both; Identity, Difference, restoration of Identity, &c. &c.

Again, in further explanation, it is to be considered that the ‘Phaenomenologie’ precedes the ‘Logic,’ and that the latter work consists, in a measure, but of the abstract conclusions of the former work; which conclusions being placed together, are seen to form a system apart by themselves.

There is possible yet another glimpse of the industry of Kant which will greatly assist to an adequate conception of the industry of Hegel. Looked at in a large and generalised fashion, the industry of Kant was, in ultimate instance, to reduce all the concreter interests of man to the three cognitive faculties. The result of the ‘Kritik of Pure Reason,’ for example, is to reduce the whole theoretic world, the whole world of knowledge (for the thing-in-itself = 0) to Understanding (= Simple Apprehension here); the result, again, of the ‘Kritik of Judgment’ is to reduce the whole aesthetic world, the world of feeling or emotion, under Judgment; and, lastly, the ‘Kritik of Practical Reason’ refers
the Practical world, the world of Will, to Reason. This is sufficiently singular in itself; and, no doubt, it was sufficiently singular to attract the special attention of Hegel. What a light it must have proved to this latter indeed! The whole universe brought back into cognition, just as if all the light ever shed by the sun were arrested, and compressed, and brought back into his single focus! That the thing thought was but the faculty thinking, or that known and knowing were one! That the forms of thought, which collectively might be named logic, were the real secrets and souls of the whole immeasurable external chaos! Such thoughts as these might entrance anyone; such thoughts as these even spring to meet us from this side of Kant as from others; and such thoughts as these are the main and master thoughts of Hegel. Of the realisation of such thoughts, indeed, it is that his whole laborious work and works consist. If Kant reduced all to the three cognitive faculties, Hegel but performed the same feat under another form when he reduced all to the Notion; for the three cognitive faculties are but the three moments of the Notion. One can readily see now how it is that considerations of logic dominate everywhere in Hegel; and one can now readily understand, also, his contempt of nature as something no more real than our ordinary trains of ideas that float at random. One can now understand, too, how it is that there is a greater difficulty in Hegel, and that is the transition to God. In the meantime, we may quiet ourselves by remembering that Hegel enters on the consideration of God on a much higher sphere, where it is not Logic, but the concreter interest of Religion, that is concerned.

In this way, probably, we may have accomplished something not altogether unsatisfactory towards some explanation of the origin, principle, form, and matter—generally—of Hegel.

D.

A short but luminous formula for Hegel—perhaps as good as any that can be devised—is this:

\[
\begin{aligned}
&\text{The Substantive is What is;} \\
&\text{But the Adjective is the Substantive;} \\
&\text{Therefore, the Adjective is What is.} \\
&\text{Or the Whole is Adjectivo-substantive.}
\end{aligned}
\]

If it be objected that these are but objective moments, and
that the subjective moment is absent, the latter may be added by considering the adjective as now pronominally, as it were, reflected into the verb.

Thus the Notion manifests itself in Grammar also. It is strange, this pertinacity of the Notion! How striking as regards Christianity, the Religion of Truth, that its moments correspond accurately, as we have seen, to those of the Notion! It is the religion of Vision (as through the lily into the inner glory, the glory of God), of Love, of Submission; and these correspond to the trefoil of man, Cognition, Emotion, Volition, and so to the trefoil of the Notion.

E.

The last word of the secret of Hegel that is probably now required, is contained in the last paragraph of 'Reciprocity,' and constitutes the conclusion of the objective and the commencement of the subjective Logic. This last word is the Begriff of the Begriff; a phrase often enough used by followers of Hegel, in the sense of totality, probably, but it is doubtful if ever by any of them in the sense meant by Hegel himself, who, however, has, in his own way, explained his meaning—tolerably exoterically, too, to him who has the true nature of the industry of Kant fairly before his mind—in the sections 'Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen,' and 'Die Absolute Idee.' The original German must here be thoroughly studied, for an English translation would be so uncouth as absolutely to repulse approach. Some notion of what is intended may perhaps be caught from this: Conceive the particular—and that just amounts to, Take the organic series of particulars as the middle—then the negative reflexion of these as to themselves collectively as an organic whole, is the universal; while this same negative reflexion of themselves to themselves as a unit, is the moment of singularity. Conceive your thirty-two teeth negatively reflected into themselves as a case, and also negatively reflected into themselves as a bite (their own functional act), and, through the rough Vorstellung, something of the Begriff may shine! This conception being properly understood—at the same time that it is borne in mind that the whole and all is self-conscious thought—universality and singularity are thus seen to be identical, while the particular is also identical with each, and is held between them as in a transparent distinction, so that all three coalesce—and the result is a triune transparent distinction.
Why is it after Reciprocity? Because such is the truth of actual history: it came to birth so—after Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity—or after Spinoza, Hume, and Kant. Its relation to reciprocity appears in this—that, as it comes forward here (in the Logik), it is in the form of Schluss, and—in Seyn and Wesen respectively—has already been Begriff and Urtheil: though itself the Begriff, then, it, as in the form of Schluss, resumes the others and completes the reciprocity. Here in the form of Schluss, it constituted elsewhere in the form of Begriff the beginning of the whole. Under Seyn, then, where the Begriff was im Begriffe, or as Begriff, all was An sich,—all the distinctions also. Hence the particular form there of other to other. In the same way we perceive that, the Begriff under Wesen being im Urtheile, the form becomes that of separation into Reflexions. We have now to understand that the Begriff being im Schluss, has reached the perfection of its form and terminates in the Idea. The special movement under each division is always the same, however: 1, Simple Apprehension; 2, Judgment; 3, Reason;—for Hegel is always in earnest with the realisation of the living pulse of Logic. Matter, indeed, cannot be his business here. That business is—not surely with a first artificer, and what he made and how he made it—but with thought and the demonstration of thought as the absolute organ or organism, and the organic all or absolute. Thus it is that he always bears it with him, that thought, though it is itself the object—looks on this object as another, in such wise that its knowledge of the same is of a negative nature intelligible, perhaps, from this illustration—that, in the movement of the sun, what is seen, is just the negative of what is. Hegel would convert the new principle into Science; but such science—of the Notion—can only be Logic.

Verständige Vernunft, or vernünftiger Verstand, we may remark here, amounts to plurality in unity, or unity in plurality; just what Kant meant—but only as it were An sich, or implicitly and virtually—by his Einheit and Mannigfaltiges; and this is the reciprocity which Hegel has in view. Verstand here is taken so that its strict etymology falls into and modifies its ordinary meaning. There is an idiomatic use of Verstehen which illustrates the Hegelian sense: Verstehen, that is, sometimes means, to become stale, to be injured by long standing, as it were to stand itself away. The relation this meaning bears to the fixed isolation, the sundered identity, which Hegel would have us perceive to be
implied by understanding, is tolerably obvious. Hegel always regards the particle Ver as equivalent to trans, and as referent to a process of transition or transformation the nature of which is characterised by the root. So Allgemein, Besonder, and all the Hegelian terms. Kant's phrase Anschauender Verstand is equivalent to the Hegelian Verständige Vernunft. In Bestimmen, too, see the etymological look—it is a giving voice (Stimme) to What is; or Logical Determination (Bestimmung), the whole process of Hegel is but a sort of naming of Adam. Geist, similarly, is an excellent word for the ultimate, absolute, and positive Unity: the living Spirit of the moment is always the co-including and realising point of the All.

As regards both Understanding and Reason (in its dialectic part), it is not difficult to understand the word negative as applied to their function. We may just say generally, indeed, that thought has no purpose and no act but to negate Seyn taken as what sensuously is. But, more particularly, Understanding negates the unal self—thus effecting an intercern or interpart. Reason negates the negation, not into nothing, but into the restored unal self. Here we see: 1, Unal Self—Simple Apprehension, or Begriff; 2, Intercern—Judgment, or Ur-theil; 3, Resolution of Difference into a Unal Self of differs—Reason and Schluss. Everywhere the Notion is a Negativität: the Particular is negative—part negating part, i.e., the Universal, as negating the parts, is negative; and the Singular, as negating all into the absolutely self-identical unit of Self, is eminently negative and eminently the reine Negativität. In fact, what we have everywhere is division in the indivisible, separation in the inseparable, difference in the identical; so that identity is abstraction and the form of abstraction.

Such sentences as the following will be now intelligible, and may prove illustrative: 'This spiritual movement, which in its unity [i.e. im Begriff] gives itself its characteristicity [i.e. its determinate and determining variety, as im Urtheil], and in its characteristicity its equality with itself [resumption of Allgemeines and Be-sonderes, into Ein-zelnes im Schluss], which is thus the immanent evolution of the Notion, is the absolute method of cognition, and, at the same time, the immanent soul of the import itself'—import here amounting to that which the All, both substantially and formally, is. 'The nature, the peculiar inner being, the veritably eternal and substantial element in the
multiplicity and contingency of the phenomenal and passing outward, is the notion.’ ‘Only in its notion has anything actuality; so far as it is diverse from its notion, it ceases to be actual, and is null; the side of tangibility, palpability (Handgreiflichkeit), and of sensuous out-of-selfness (Aussersichseyn) belongs to this null side.’ The sensuous never is, but always is not; the notion, then, is its truth; what it is apart from that notion is evidently a nothing: take the page before us, for example. In illustration of the life of the Notion, we must bear in mind the progress of history, in all departments, from, 1, Instinctive life, through, 2, Requirements of Reflexion into, 3, Reason. This, in the concrete, is not to be looked for in the exactitude of a formula: often we see retrogressions of the individual, a fall-back from understanding to sense, as in Reid. On the whole, in the Begriff of the Begriff we see that Hegel has returned to substantiality, fact, life, while Kant, in his categories, was still in distinctions of mere formal logic. Kant thus may be said to have had only a regulative, while Hegel has a constitutive, force. Before such merits one relents to conceive Hegel as absorbed in creation, and never sufficiently on his own outside, as it were, to explain his origin from Kant. But this origin and the debt to Kant are not to be forgotten.

Thus, then, we see plainly how actual fact of life and history coheres with general logic. Being, Nothing, Becoming, through all the intermediate steps, are just finally hammered into, and correspond respectively to, the closing triunity—Logic, Nature, Spirit. Legends of all peoples exemplify the same. Eden is but Simple Apprehension passing into Judgment. Then the Good Principle is Being, the Bad, the Negative. Faust, again, is the latter stage of the era of Judgment, the stage named by Hegel, ‘Das unglückliche Bewusstseyn;’ the Understanding has done its work, Reason has not yet begun, and all around is but empty abstraction, without a single rest for Faith (or Hope) of any kind; and the result is but a precipitation into the senses; more commonly now-a-days the end is but vague despair and an impotent sighing for all that has been lost.

The categories we may conceive as an internal web invisible to us, and of which, so long as they are uninvestigated, we are but the prey. Still, to most individuals, certain categories become enlarged—isolated thickenings occur in our inner web—which as thickened come before consciousness—and from which as ganglia
our single spirit issues. In this manner, we may conceive ourselves enabled to analyse and pass judgment on the characters of men—by exhibiting, that is, their ganglionised or hypertrophied and ossified categories, of which they were the slavés. [The thin man acts from a single category; the rich man is a rich spirit resultant from many categories mutually related in a healthy common system.] Cromwell, though so inarticulate, drew breath from a vast bulk of categories; and from the weight of the universal it was that he possessed his irresistible mass and moment; nor was the universal that led him, in the slightest hollowed out, as is so common everywhere at present, by the wind of the vanity of the singular. The bad effects of such wind are very apparent in Napoleon. Wellington is otherwise; but his universal was simply the red tape of England.

Hegel's work is this: the spider of thought—a point—spinning its web of thought around itself: the bombyx of eternity, the cocoon of eternity, and their unity in eternity itself! Hegel takes Kant's notion as the secret, the key, of the universe. It is at once the absolute form and the absolute import. And it is this form and this import which only involve themselves throughout the whole system, from the lowest, simplest, and abstractest of abstractions up to the highest, most complex, and concretist of concretes. Once possessed of the Kantian notion, his way was successively to discharge its concretion till it reached an ultimate tenuity, and thence to let it remake itself again. Or we may say that Hegel lies in a consideration of the absolute adversatives—negation, position, &c. He saw that thought was but as a football from inner to outer, and from outer to inner, &c.; and he resolved to make shuttle what had previously been but shuttlecock; that is, he wove together into indissoluble unity by relation what hitherto had been irreconcilably disunited by this very same relation. This is another synonym for his work, as that of reason, repairing and restoring what had been injured and destroyed by the eighteenth century, in the work of understanding. If the reflexion of Spinoza and Hume has unfixed and unsettled all, the reflexion of Kant and Hegel will again restore all to place and to peace. Hegel's one object, indeed, has been a demonstration of the absolute intussusception. The result is a crystal sphere—perfectly transparent—but covered with infinite tracery of intussusceptive lines—opaque, yet transparent—which appear and disappear in the own movement of the sphere's own inner.
A tempting way to state the main notion of Hegel is this: What is, says Spinoza, is Thought and Extension, which again are but modifications (even as attributes they amount to this) of one and the same—God. Hegel says of this that there is no transition in it, no deduction, no mutual connexion. Now Hegel's secret is just to add the missing element; or it is the introduction of intermediation and connexion into the divided and disunited trinity of Spinoza. This, of course, is said roughly and generally to give a general and rough idea; for in reality the Nature of Hegel is not derived and is something very different from the Extension of Spinoza: at all to compare, indeed, such vast organic wholes as the Logic, Nature, and Spirit of Hegel with the mere phraseologies of Spinoza in reference to Thought, Extension, and God, is possible only in a wide manner on the mere outside. Still, to assist us to an understanding of Hegel, let us say that what he did was to introduce nexus and connexus into the three of Spinoza. Following this out, then (but as mere illustration), Hegel says, Extension, that is the Particular; Thought, that is the negative reflexion of this Particular into itself as the Universal; God, that is the negative reflexion of this same Particular into itself as the Singular, which is thus seen to be a union of both, and each, indeed, is but the other. Now this revolts; for God, at first sight, is in this way lost to us. God in this way appears a mere creation of our own thought—in its barest form, indeed, a mere human reflexion. This conclusion is not quite legitimate, however. We assign to God a variety of attributes; or God cannot be conceived without a variety of attributes: in a word, then, there is God's unity, and there is God's variety. Now, if we can suppose Extension adequately to collect and represent all God's variety, then assuredly we shall not be very far wrong if we assume God's unity to be the negative reflexion into itself of God's variety, that is, of Extension. This reflexion, moreover, does not belong to us; it must be conceived as objective fact independent of us. Besides, we are not at all occupied at present with the truth, but only with the fact of Hegel. This huge box has long lain shut—we open it—we lay out the contents: this is our work. By and by probably,—a separate work,—the appraiser will follow with his work, and tell us the value. One thing, it is absurd to think of God as an entity somewhere in space, visible and
palpable, could we but get there. 'I have swept space with my telescope,' says Lalande, 'and found no God.' The absurdity of the atheist is seen in that, but there is no less also reflected in it the absurdity of crude theism which as yet has not reached thought proper, but only figurate conception (Vorstellung). But since Hegel, however it be with the God of Hegel, we must certainly always substitute now Begriff for Vorstellung, intellectually thought notion for sensuously seen image. God is no longer to be pictured in space; he is not locally, topically in nature; God is a Spirit, and can be only in the spiritual world, only in the absolute world, which is thought.

Logic has always appeared under the three rubrics of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. In this respect, Hegel's Logic does not differ from any other, or, if it differs, it differs only in being truer to the rubric. Hegel's Logic is, from first to last, in matter and method, in form and substance, in book and chapter, in section and paragraph, in sentence and even word, nothing but Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, this itself is but one of the sacred names,—just one of the synonyms of the whole. Judgment is but the negative reflexion of Simple Apprehension into itself, and Reason is but the negative reflexion that sums both. Nay, each is so much the other, all is so dialectic, that, it may be, Hegel himself sometimes mistakes the cue and places as Particular what is Universal, &c. This is but the Notion;—that is, in one of its forms. Everywhere in Hegel we have before us only the Notion. Being, Nothing, Becoming: Being is but Simple Apprehension (Perception, if you will) at its abstractest; Nothing is the act of Judgment on Being; it is the negative reflexion of pure Being into itself; Becoming is the act of Reason on Being, and is both Being and Nothing in concrete unity, the truth of both, the Singular that is. It is just as if we said: Everything that is, is; Everything that is, is not; Everything that is, is Both—that is, it becomes. Each of these averments, too, is true—only the last is the concrete truth, the others are but abstractly true. Reason, in fact, is always to be assumed as the concrete moment that is base or mother-liquor to the two abstract moments of Simple Apprehension and Judgment. How natural is all this in the circumstances! The Idealist can only look to Logic when in search of those principles which are the prius of all: the Idealist, too, as in the moment of Reason, is but the natural third, and the concrete truth, to the
Perceptive animal whose object is Seyn, and the abstracting Critic (or Judge) whose object is Wesen.

We are to understand, then, that Hegel, from first to last, is but touching or tapping, into its various successive forms, the primitive or original cell of the Notion—or the triune Reflexion. There is the crystal sphere—tap it—lines of reflexion glance in it by which there are seen two in one or a triple unity, Becoming, in which both Being and Nothing nestle. Another touch and Becoming is Become—Here-being, There-being, or So-being. Again, a tap, and reflexions glance of Reality and Negation which collapse to Something, and thence again expand into Being-for-other and Being-in-self. These collapse, in their turn, to Determination. Determination sunders into the duplicity of Beschaffenheit and shuts again into the Unity of Limit. Limit, sundersing into the duplicity of the spurious Infinite, clasps together again in the unity of the genuine Infinite, and so on. Perhaps, in the above statement, from Being-for-other and Being-in-self onwards, the movement of the series appears in simpler and more consistent general form. Now, all these changes take place, so to speak, without moving from the spot: Hegel never abandons the notion with which he starts, and all change is from reflexion on it, or, rather, in it.

Even when, in the true Infinite, he has reached the verge of Being, and has passed into Quantity, Hegel has not yet moved from the spot: Quantity but resumes what precedes, though in another, that is, as another sphere. Again, Quantity returns to Quality, and both collapse into Measure. In this way, through an extraordinary alternation of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, repeated in an extraordinary alternation of their own forms, we reach, at last, the Absolute Spirit. Now Hegel's hypothetical addition to Spinoza, taken as described above, gives the general nature of this Absolute Spirit at the shortest. The Particular, Nature, is negatively reflected into the Begriff (Thought, Logic), which is the Universal, and, through this also, into the Singular of the Spirit. In the very statement, there glitters the hem of truth in such a variety of directions, that it seems to bring with it its own authentication. When the objection—it is only human reflexion—occurs, let it occur, also, that human reflexion is thought. Let it occur, too, that it is to be conceived as an objective reflexion, not something formal, but something intensely concrete. If it is but a reflexion, it is a reflexion from, and contains the absolute wealth of, both thought as thought
and nature as nature. It is not the mere abstraction of Spinoza; it is, on the contrary, the concrete of concretes. In fact, it cannot be otherwise; Nature, Thought, each alone, both together, necessitate the reflexion of God; God is their truth, and, though a necessity of formal thought, is also a necessity of concrete existence.

But, perhaps, it will be objected again, is it not very general this, very thin, abstract, and bodiless—this outcome of a universal spirit, the highest expression of which is not as in you and me, but in societies, institutions, literatures, arts, philosophies, &c.? Is this abstract and generalised result of the human race as human race all that we are to get as God? Call it idealism if you will, what is it better than materialism? Is that abstract result— institutions, laws, arts, &c.—aught better than a matter into which, even as we form it, we perish, as the coral insect lives only that he may die into the coral rock? Is this, then, the end of all the hopes of man? God is but an abstract generalisation of thought! and for the carrying forward of this abstract generalisation is it only that we emerge!—emerge but to cease! This we are to call our true selves, and to this we are to sacrifice ourselves! It is but natural to think thus. It is one-sided, however, to speak of the result of thought as an abstraction and generalisation; there is neither abstraction nor generalisation—as usually understood—here present; what we have here is a life. What we have here is the organised universe and its organised outcome. Spirit is the word. Hegel has always meaning in his words, and by spirit he means not a ghost, not an airy vaporous body, but the essential concrete of all, which is a Spirit. In what Spirit do you live, and think, and act? Ever, in every age, the essential, organic, vital drop of the whole is its Spirit; and with each new age, the Spirit is ever richer—intellectually, morally, emotionally. Nature, then, and Man—Nature and Thought—all that is here, just taken together as an organised body—what can the soul of this body be but even such a Spirit as is here indicated? Such Spirit is the Thought, the Emotion, the Will of such a body—such Spirit is the Spirit of God. Leave Vorstellung, pass to Begriff—shut not only your Byron and open your Goethe (in every way a very finite step)—but take the infinite step even from poetry as poetry—call it genius—to philosophy as philosophy.

In such abstractions, you say, there is no hope for you! But why so? Are not man and nature and all things thought, and
where is thought, if not in you, who are to yourself the Ego, the I, in which all meet? You are but Modus—not the Absolute; finite—not the Infinite: you must perish! Consult Hegel and see the necessity of the Modus. And what is perishing? What is Death? Where are these, when, What is, is Thought? Modus—finite!—is it not true that you at the same time are? What is, is Thought: and are not you Thought? Absurd that you should be continued! Why so? On the contrary, it is no more absurd that you should be continued than that you are. That you are is the guarantee of your necessity. God is a concrete Spirit—God is the living Universal—not an abstract unit—why should not the death of the body be the birth of Spirit?—and why should not you continue united to the Universal Spirit then, even as you are so united here, in natural form, now and what is the relation to that Universal Spirit?—is not the One Many, and the Many One?—But all this is premature! As yet we only seek to understand and express: as yet we have not attempted to think and judge: as yet we have had enough to do to find our way; as yet we have not had time to think.

The general conclusion, thus far, is that the Secret of Hegel is the tautological reciprocity of the Logical Notion, which is a concrete in itself; and this is to be found expressed in the last paragraph of the Section ‘Reciprocity.’

REMARK.

These Notes of the Struggle to Hegel are now concluded. Their general nature and burthen are—effort to understand and express Hegel; and a certain adoption of the side of Hegel will be granted as allowable to the effort to express for the sake even of efficiency, especially in the case of a student only speaking to himself in preparation for the public. The state of the fact is accurately depicted here.

These Notes it was proposed to follow up by a general chapter on the Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter of the System, which should methodically bring to a focus all the findings in these respects which are, in a necessarily irregular and imperfect manner, indicated in the Notes themselves. This chapter, however, is reserved for the present, as its composition is likely to be more efficient later.*

* The function of this contemplated chapter, however, will be found to a certain extent fulfilled by the answers to the four general questions with which the Interpretation ‘III’ almost opens,
Remark.

Meantime, we may say this: The Principle is the Notion as expressed at the end of 'Reciprocity'; the Form (or Method) is the movement of this Notion; and the Matter is the development, or simply the introduction, of this Notion into the entire wealth of the outer and inner Universe. As regards Origin again, that lies in Kant; and in this respect we may name six special references: There is the light derived from—1, The externalisation of the Categories; 2, The generalisation of the same; 3, The utilisation of the branch of Logic (S. Apprehension) left vacant by Kant; 4, The realisation of Logic in general; 5, The Kantian theory of Perception; and, 6, The reduction of what we may call the concrete faculties of man, Cognition, Emotion, Will, under his abstract ones, as named in Logic, S. Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason. Lastly, as regards Kant, not only did he breathe the precise tendency, exhibited and perhaps perfected by Hegel, towards a philosophy which should be a complete and co-articulated system in explanation of the All, but there lie scattered over the whole field of his labours a thousand hints, which must have proved of the greatest service to Hegel. Some of these we have already seen; but there lie a multitude more both for the seeing and the seeking. By way of example, here is a small one:—

Metaphysic has, as the special aim of its inquiry, only three Ideas: God, Freedom, and Immortality; and so that the second united with the first shall lead to the third as a necessary conclusion (Schlusssatz).

Indeed, we may quote further:—

All else, with which this science is occupied, serves merely as means to attain to these Ideas and their reality. These Ideas are not required in aid of natural science but to transcend nature. The attainment of them would render Theology, Morals, and, through the union of both, Religion, consequently the highest ends of our existence, dependent on speculative Reason alone and on nothing else. In a systematic exposition of these Ideas, the order given, would, as the synthetic, be the most appropriate; but in the labours, which must necessarily precede any such exposition, the analytic, or reverse, arrangement will be better adapted to the end proposed: for here, in fulfilment of our great design, we proceed from what experience offers us immediately to hand—psychology, to cosmology, and thence to the cognition of God.*

Particular points of derivation as regards both Fichte and Schelling have been already alluded to. But, on the whole, whatever suggestions may have proceeded from others, Kant, the

original quarry, was alone adequate to stimulate Hegel to the accomplishment of what he did accomplish; and these two writers 

* It was said, p. 178: 'Hegel takes philosophy, actual philosophy, as it comes to him from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling; and remodels it onwards on its own objective principles, and not on his own subjective ones,—just as Kant, receiving philosophy from Hume, attempted honestly to mould it onwards thence.' This, in wide generality, is the literal state of the case; and it may seem super-ingenious, super-exhibitive of memory, super-laborious, painfully to collect, as possibly suggestive to Hegel, all these mere sporadic crumbs from Kant. Now, no doubt, Hegel knew perfectly well all the works up to his own date both of Fichte and Schelling; and, no doubt also, both preceded him. Of all this there is no want of acknowledgment in Hegel himself." Still there, in what is the immediate reference for either, at all sensibly—neither appears. If for Fichte it is dialectic that is spoken of, then it is to be said that Hegel's dialectic is his own, that no man shares it with him, and that it is even opposed to that of Fichte, and, again, if Naturwissenschaft be the word in Schelling's regard, then this, too, must be said that even here the principle at work with Hegel is not that at work with Schelling, but one that has not been as much as surmised by the latter. That is, it is perfectly just to affirm that it was Kant Hegel studied—studied to his depths—that it is to Kant Hegel owes infinitely the burden, and that it is from Kant he comes.

As regards Fichte, for example, there is the declaration of Hegel that Fichte was the first man in this world who ever set Reason on evolviug from itself its own constitutive involvug—see Hegel, WW. xv. 308, 310, 328, and iii. 32. Named in the others, it is still Fichte that is meant in the last, where also Schelling comes to be meant, and if here, on a particular point, with a negative, there is no lack of general acknowledgments elsewhere. (New Notes.)
II.

A TRANSLATION FROM THE COMPLETE LOGIC OF THE WHOLE FIRST SECTION, QUALITY.

FIRST SECTION.

DETERMINATENESS OR DEFINITENESS (Quality).

*Being* is the indefinite *Immediate*; it is devoid of definiteness as in reference to *Essentivity* [i.e., any inner principle to which it were to be supposed due], as also of any which it might possibly have within itself. This reflexion-less *Being* is *Being* directly as it is only in its own self.

As it is indefinite, it is quality-less being; but, *in itself*, the character of indefiniteness attaches to it, only as in contraposition to the definite, to the qualitative. Definite being as such, then, contraposing itself to being in general, the very indefiniteness of the latter constitutes its Quality. It will be found, therefore, that *First* being is *in itself* definite, and consequently,

*Secondly*, that it goes over into *There-being*, is *There-being* [*Daseyn*—particular existency]; but that this latter as finite being sublates itself, and goes over into the infinite reference of being to its own self, *i.e.***,

*Thirdly*, into *Being-for-self* [individuality, singularity; and so we are to have Being successively Universal, Particular, and Singular].
CHAPTER I.

BEING.

A.

BEING, pure BEING,—without any further definition. In its indefinite immediacy, it is only equal to itself, and neither is it unequal as regards other; it has no diversity within itself, and none in any reference outwards. Should any determination or intent [Form or Matter] be supposed in its regard, which might be distinguished in it, or by which it might be distinguished from another, it would not be held fast in its purity. It is pure indefiniteness and vacancy. There is nothing to be perceived in it,—so far as it is at all allowable to speak of perceiving at present,—or it is only this pure void perceiving itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this void thought, this void thinking. BEING, the indefinite immediate, is, in fact, Nothing, and neither more nor less than Nothing.

B.

NOTHING.

NOTHING, pure NOTHING; it is simple equality with itself, perfect vacancy, determination-lessness and intent-lessness [form-lessness and matter-lessness]; undistinguishedness in itself. So far as it is allowable to mention perception or thought here, the distinction [we may remark] is admitted, of whether something or nothing is perceived or thought. The perceiving or the thinking nothing has therefore a meaning; both [perceiving nothing and perceiving something] are distinguished, thus Nothing is (exists) in our perception or thought; or rather it is empty perception and thought themselves; and the same empty perception or thought as pure BEING. Nothing, therefore, is the same form, or rather
formlessness, — and so in general the same, — as what pure Being is.

C.

BECOMING.

1. Unity of Being and Nothing.

*Pure Being and pure Nothing is, therefore, the same.* What is the truth, is neither Being nor Nothing, but that Being,—does not pass over,—but has passed over into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. But the truth is just as much not their undistinguishedness, but that they are *not the same,* that they are absolutely distinguished, but still, nevertheless, unseparated and inseparable, and *either immediately disappears in its opposite.* Their truth is, therefore, this *movement* of the immediate disappearance of the one in the other; *Becoming*; a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a distinction which has equally immediately resolved itself.

**Remark 1.**

_The Antithesis of Being and Nothing in common conception._

*Nothing* is usually opposed to *Something*; Something, however, is already a definite *Beent* *Existent*, which distinguishes itself from *[an]*other Something; and so also, therefore, the Nothing opposed to the Something, is the Nothing of a given Something,—a definite Nothing. Here, however, Nothing is to be taken in its simple indefiniteness. Should it be considered more accurate that Non-being, instead of Nothing, be opposed to Being, there were nothing to object to this as respects the result, for in *Non-being* the reference to *being* is implied; both, being and the negation of being, are enunciated in *one*, Nothing, as it is in *Becoming*. But we are concerned here, first of all, not with the *form* of the opposition (form, also, at the same time, of the co-reference), but with the abstract, immediate negation, nothing purely for itself, referenceless negation,—what might be expressed also, were it wished, by the mere word *not*.

The Eleatics first of all, especially Parmenides, enunciated the simple thought of *pure being* as the absolute, and as the one truth: *only Being is, and Nothing is altogether not,*—enunciated this (in
the fragments of Parmenides which remain) with the pure intoxication of thought when for the first time it has apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction. In the Oriental systems, in Buddhism essentially, Nothing, as is well known, the Void, is the Absolute Principle. The deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward, against the former simple and one-sided abstraction, the higher total notion of Becoming, and said: Being is as little as Nothing is, or all flows, that is, all is Becoming. The popular, particularly Oriental proverbs, that all that is has the germ of its death even in its birth, while death, on the other hand, is entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of Being and Nothing. But these expressions have a substrate, on, or in, or by which the transition takes place; Being and Nothing are held asunder in time, are represented as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction, and therefore not so that they are in, by, and for themselves the same.

Ex nihilo nihil fit—is one of the positions to which in metaphysic great importance was ascribed. There is to be seen in it either only the empty tautology, Nothing is Nothing; or if the Becoming (fit) is to have actual meaning in it, then, inasmuch as only nothing comes out of nothing, there is rather in fact no Becoming present in it, for Nothing remains in it Nothing. Becoming implies, that Nothing does not remain Nothing, but passes over into its other, into Being. If later, especially Christian, metaphysic rejected the position, From nothing comes nothing, it maintained necessarily a transition from nothing into being: however synthetically or merely conceptively it took this position, still there is, even in the most imperfect union, a point in which Being and Nothing coincide, and their distinguishedness disappears. The proposition, From nothing comes nothing, nothing is just nothing, has its special significance in its contrariety to Becoming in general, and consequently also to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who, waxing even wrathful in its defence, maintain the position nothing is just nothing, are unaware that they thereby express adhesion to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics; essentially, too, to that of Spinoza. The philosophical opinion which holds, Being is only Being, Nothing is only Nothing, as valid principle, merits the name of Identitätssystem: this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism.

If the result, that Being and Nothing are the same, seems startling or paradoxical in itself, there is just nothing further to
be said; it were more reasonable to wonder at this wondering, which shows itself so new in philosophy, and forgets that there present themselves in this science quite other determinations than in ordinary consciousness and in the so-called Common Sense of mankind, which is not just exactly sound sense or sound understanding, but understanding grown up and hardened into abstractions, and in the belief or rather the superstition of abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing, in every example, in everything actual, in every thought. What was said above of Immediacy and Mediacy (which latter implies a reference to another, and so Negation), the same thing must be said of Being and Nothing, That nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything that in itself contains not both, Being and Nothing. As, in such reference, truly, the question is of a certain actual Something, those elements are in it no longer in the perfect untruth, in which they are as Being and Nothing, but in a further developed form, and have become (conceived, for example, as Positive and Negative), the former posited, reflected Being— the latter posited, reflected Nothing; but Positive and Negative imply, the one Being and the other Nothing as their abstract ground-principle. Thus in God himself, Quality (Energy, Creation, Power, &c.), involves essentially the element of negativity,—these are a bringing into existence of an other. But an empirical illustration by means of examples of the position maintained would be here quite superfluous. As now, indeed, this unity of Being and Nothing lies once for all established as first truth and basis, and constitutes the element of all that follows, all further logical determinations—There-being, Quality, in general all notions of philosophy—are examples of this unity quite as much as Becoming. But so-called common (or sound) sense may be invited, so far as it rejects the undividedness of Being and Nothing, to try to discover a single example where the one is separated from the other (Something from Limitation, or the Infinite, God, as has been just mentioned, from energy in act). Only these empty things of thought, Being and Nothing, themselves, are such separated things, and it is they which by said common sense are preferred to the truth, the undividedness of both, which is everywhere before us.

We cannot be supposed to seek to meet on all sides the perplexities into which an ordinary consciousness, in the case of such a logical proposition, misleads itself, for they are inexhaustible.
It is possible only to mention a few of them. One source of such perplexity, among others, is that such a consciousness brings with it to the consideration of such abstract logical position, conceptions of a concrete *Something*, and forgets that there is no question of any such here, but only of the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing, and that it is these alone which are to be held fast.

Being and Non-being are the same thing; it is, *therefore*, the same thing, whether I am or am not, whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are or are not in my possession. Such inference or such application of the proposition alters its sense completely. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of Being and Nothing; the application, on the other hand, makes of these a *determinate* Being and *determinate* Nothing. But, as has been said, the question here is not of *determinate* being. A *determinate*, a *finite* being (entity), is such as connects itself with others; it is a complex which stands in the relation of necessity with many other such, with the whole world. As regards the reciprocating system of the whole, metaphysic might advance the—at bottom tautological—allegation, that were a single dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse. In the instances opposed to the position in question, something appears as not indifferent, whether it is or is not, not for the sake of being or non-being, but for the sake of its concrete relations, which relations connect it with others such. If a determinate complex, any determinate object be presupposed, this object because it is determinate, is in manifold relation to other objects; it is not indifferent to it, then, whether a certain other object, with which it stands in relation, is or is not; for only through such relation is it essentially that which it is. The same thing is the case with conception (non-being being taken in the more determinate sense of conception as against actuality), in the context of which the being or non-being of an object, which is conceived as determinately in relation with some other, is not indifferent.

This consideration involves what constitutes a main moment in the Kantian criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God, which is regarded here, however, only in reference to the distinction of Being and Nothing in general and of determinate being or non-being, which there presents itself. There was presupposed, as is well known in said so-called proof or argument, the notion of a Being, to whom all realities accrue, and conse-
quenty also existence, which was likewise assumed as one of the realities. The Kantian criticism took stand specially by this, that existence or being (these taken as synonymous) is no quality, or no real predicate; that is, it is not a notion of something which can be added to the notion of a thing.* Kant means to say here, that, being is no element of comprehension. Thus, he proceeds, the possible contains no more than the actual; a hundred actual dollars contain not in the least more than a hundred possible ones; that is, the former have no other logical comprehension than the latter. For this comprehension, considered as isolated, it is in fact indifferent to be or not to be; there lies in it no difference of being or non-being—this difference on the whole affects it not at all; the hundred dollars become no less if they are not, and no more if they are. A difference must come only from elsewhere. ‘On the other hand,’ suggests Kant, ‘there is more in my means in the case of a hundred actual dollars, than in that of the mere notion of the same, or their possibility. For the object in the case of actuality is not merely analytically contained in my notion, but adds itself synthetically to my notion (which is a determination of my condition), without these said hundred dollars themselves being in the least increased by this existence besides my notion.’

There are presupposed here two kinds of conditions, to use the Kantian expressions (which are not without confusion and awkwardness): the one, which Kant names notion, but by which ordinary conception is to be understood; and another, the state of means. For the one as for the other, for one’s means as for one’s conception, a hundred dollars are a complex of comprehension, or, as Kant expresses himself, ‘they add themselves synthetically thereto;’ I as possessor of a hundred dollars, or as non-possessor of the same, or again, I as conceiving a hundred dollars, or not conceiving them,—here, certainly, are cases of a different comprehension. Stated more generally: The abstractions of Being and Nothing cease both to be abstractions, when they receive a determinate comprehension (or import): Being is then reality, the determinate being of a hundred dollars; Nothing, negation, the determinate negation of the same. This element of comprehension itself, the hundred dollars, when taken abstractly by itself, is in the one unchanged, the same that it is in the other. But now that Being further is taken as state of one’s means, the

* Kant’s Kritik of P. R., 2nd edn., p. 628 sqq.
hundred dollars come into relation to a state; and for this state, the determinatum which they are is not indifferent: their being or non-being is only Alteration [of state]; they are transferred to the sphere of existence. When, therefore, it is urged against the unity of Being and Nothing, that it is nevertheless not indifferent, whether this and that (the hundred dollars) be or be not, it is a mistake to transfer to mere being and non-being the difference of whether I have or have not the hundred dollars—a mistake which, as has been shown, rests on the one-sided abstraction which leaves out of view the determinate existence present in such examples, and holds fast mere being and non-being; as, on the other hand, it (the mistake) transforms the abstract Being and Nothing, that [here, in this Logic] should alone be apprehended, into a determinate Being and Nothing—into a There-being [a finite existence]. Only There-being contains the real difference of Being and Nothing, namely, a Something and an Other. This real difference, instead of abstract Being and pure Nothing and their only opined difference, is what floats before conception.

As Kant expresses himself, there comes 'through the fact of existence something into the context of collective experience;' 'we obtain thereby an additional object of perception, but our notion of the object is thereby not increased.' That, as appears from the preceding illustration, is as much as this—through the fact of existence, essentially just because something is a determinate existence, it is in connexion with others, and among such also with a perceiving agent. 'The notion of the hundred dollars,' says Kant, 'is not increased by perception.' The notion here is the already-noticed isolatedly-conceived hundred dollars. In this isolated form, they are indeed an empirical matter, but cut off, without connexion and determinateness towards other (others): the form of identity with themselves takes from them the reference to another, and makes them indifferent whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called notion of a hundred dollars is a false notion: the form of simple reference to self [as in a notion strictly such] does not belong to such limited, finite matter; it is a form put on it and lent to it by subjective understanding: a hundred dollars are not referent of self to self, but changeable and perishable.

The thought or conception, before which only a determinate being, existence, floats, is to be referred to the previously-mentioned beginning of science made by Parmenides, who purified and
elevated his own conception, and thereby that of all following times, into the pure thought. Being as such, and in that manner created the element of science. That which is first in science has of necessity to show itself historically as first. And we have to regard the Eleatic One or Being as the first hint of the (true) thought. Water and such material principles are hypothetically to be considered to be, or would be the universal [or All-common] principle; but they are as material things not pure thoughts: Numbers are neither the first simple unal thought, nor that which is permanent in itself, but the thought which [as a thought] is quite external to itself.

The reference back from particular finite being to being as such in its completely abstract universality, is to be regarded not only as the very first theoretical, but as even also the very first practical postulate. When, for example, there is a cry raised,—as about the hundred dollars, that it makes a difference in the state of my means, whether I have them or not, or that it makes a still greater difference to me whether I am or not, whether an other be or not,—the reminder may be held up—without mentioning that there doubtless are actual means, to which such possession of a hundred dollars is indifferent—that Man, in his moral thought, ought to raise himself to such abstract universality as would render it in truth indifferent to him whether the hundred dollars, let them have whatever quantitative relation they may to the actual state of his means, are or whether they are not—indifferent to him even whether he himself be or not (in finite life, that is, for a state, determinate being is meant), &c.—even 'si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae,' was the utterance of a Roman, and much more the Christian ought to find himself in this indifference.

There is still to be noticed the immediate connexion in which the elevation over the hundred dollars, and all finite things in general, stands with the ontological proof and the said Kantian criticism of the same. This criticism has by its popular example made itself universally plausible: who does not know that a hundred actual dollars are different from a hundred merely possible ones—that they make a sensible difference in my state of means? Because, therefore, in the case of the hundred dollars this difference manifests itself, the notion—that is, the determinatum of comprehension as mere possibility—and the being are different from each other: and so, therefore, also God's Notion is
different from his Being; and just as little as I can educe from the possibility of a hundred dollars the fact of their actuality, so little can I 'claw out' of the notion of God his existence: and the ontological proof is nothing but this 'clawing out' of the existence of God from his notion. Now, if certainly it is not without its own truth that Notion is different from Being, God is still more different from the hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the Definition of Finite Things, that in them notion and being are different, notion and reality, soul and body are separable, and they themselves consequently perishable and mortal: the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is just this—that his Notion and his Being are unseparated and inseparable. The true criticism of the Categories and of Reason is exactly this—to give thought an understanding of this difference, and to prevent it from applying to God the distinguishing characters and relations of the Finite.

Remark 2.

Defects of the Expression Unity, Identity, of Being and Nothing.

There is another reason to be mentioned contributive to the repugnance against the proposition relative to Being and Nothing: this reason is, that the expression of the result, furnished by the consideration of Being and Nothing, in the proposition, Being and Nothing is one and the same, is incomplete. The accent is laid mainly on their being one and the same, as is the case in the proposition of a judgment in general, where the predicate it is, which alone enunciates what the subject is. The sense seems, therefore, to be, that the difference is denied—which difference, at the same time, nevertheless, is immediately presentant in the proposition; for it names both terms, Being and Nothing, and implies them as things different. It cannot, however, be meant that abstraction is to be made from them, and only their unity is to be held fast. This sense would of itself manifest its own one-sidedness, inasmuch as that from which abstraction is to be made, is, nevertheless, actually present and expressly named in the proposition. So far now as the proposition, Being and Nothing is the same, enunciates the identity of these terms, but in effect just as much implies their difference, it contradicts itself in itself and eliminates itself. Looking at this still closer, we have here a proposition, which, considered strictly, involves the movement to disappear through
its own self. But just thus there happens in its own self that which is to constitute its special purport—namely, Becoming.

The proposition contains thus the result—it is that in itself. The point, however, which is to be noticed here, is the difficulty, that the result is not itself expressed in the proposition; it is an external reflexion which discerns it in it. Here, then, in the beginning this universal remark must at once be made, that a proposition, in the form of a judgment, is not competent to express speculative truths: a knowledge of this circumstance is sufficient to obviate much misunderstanding of speculative truths. A judgment is an identical reference between subject and predicate: abstraction is made thereby from this, that the subject has still more characters than those of the predicate; as well as from this, that the predicate has more extension than the subject. Now, if the matter in hand is speculative, the non-identity of subject and predicate is also an essential moment; but in a judgment this is not expressed. The paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of later philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought, arises frequently from the form of the simple judgment, when applied in expression of speculative results.

In order to express the speculative truth, the difficulty may, in the first place, be attempted to be met by the addition of the contrary proposition, as above, Being and Nothing is not the same. But thus the further difficulty arises that these propositions are then unconnected, and so exhibit the matter in hand only in the state of antinomy, while it (this matter) refers only to a one and same thing. The terms, too, which are expressed in the two propositions are to be supposed directly in union, at the same time that this union can be expressed only as a movement, an unrest of incompatibles. The most common injustice which is done to speculative matter, is to make it one-sided—to hold up, namely, only one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot, then, be denied that this allegation is held to—As true as is the statement, so false it is; for if ever the one proposition of a speculative nature be taken, the other must, at least, be equally considered and assigned. There is here yet to be specially mentioned that, to say so, unfortunate word unity. Unity designates still more than identity a subjective reflexion; it is especially taken as the relation which arises from comparison, from external reflexion. So far as such reflexion finds the same thing in two different objects, there is a unity present to it in such
wise that there is presupposed, as regards this unity, the perfect
indifference of the objects themselves which are compared, so that
this comparing and unity nowise concern these objects themselves,
and are a finding and determining external to them. Unity
expresses, therefore, the quite abstract self-sameness, and sounds
the harder and the harsher, the more those things of which it is
enunciates show themselves to be directly different. For unity
it would be, therefore, so far, better to say only, unseparatedness
or inseparableness: but thus, again, the affirmative of the relation
of the whole were not expressed.

Thus the whole veritable result which has here yielded itself is
Becoming. And this is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity
of Being and Nothing; but this movement implies: that pure
Being is directly and simply such; that it is, therefore, equally pure
Nothing; that the difference of these is, but just as much that it
eliminates itself and is not. The result, then, really asserts quite
as much the difference of Being and of Nothing, but only as
meant, supposed.

We think that Being is rather something quite other than what
Nothing is; that there is nothing clearer than their absolute
difference; and that there seems nothing easier than to show it.
It is, however, just as easy to convince oneself that this is im-
possible, that it is unsayable. Those who would persist in the
difference of Being and Nothing, let them challenge themselves to
assign in what it consists. Had Being and Nothing each any
determinateness by which they might be distinguished the one
from the other, they would be, as has been observed, determinate
Being and determinate Nothing—not pure Being and pure Nothing,
as they still are here. Their difference, therefore, is entirely
blank; each of the two is in the same way indeterminate: the
difference, therefore, lies not in them, but in a tertium quid, in a
mere supposition. But supposition is a mere subjective state
which does not belong to this course of exposition. The tertium
quid, however, in which Being and Nothing have their support,
must also present itself here, and it has already so presented
itself: it is Becoming. In it they are as different; Becoming is
only so far as they are different. This tertium quid is another
than they: they consist only in another; that is to say as well,
they consist (or subsist) not independently each. Becoming is the
maintenance or maintaining medium of Being as well as of Non-
being; or their maintenance is only their being in a one;
precisely this their maintenance it is that equally eliminates their difference.

The challenge to assign the difference of Being and Nothing includes this other also, to say, what then is Being and what is Nothing? Let those who strive against perceiving that the one as well as the other is only a transition, the one into the other—and who maintain of Being and of Nothing this and that—just say what it is they speak of, that is, produce a definition of Being and Nothing, and demonstrate that it is correct. Without having complied with this first requisition of ancient science, the logical rules of which they accept and apply in other cases, all that they maintain in regard to Being and Nothing are but assertions, scientific nullities. Should it be said, Existence, so far as, in the first place, existence can be held synonymous with Being, is the complement to possibility, then we have thus another character presupposed, possibility, and Being is not enunciated in its immediacy, not just as simple per se, but as conditioned. For being which is mediated, a result, we shall reserve the expression existence. But one represents to oneself Being—perhaps under the figure of pure light, as the clearness of untroubled seeing—Nothing again as absolute night, and one illustrates their distinction by this well-known empirical difference. In truth, however, if one will realise to oneself more exactly this very seeing, one will easily perceive that there will be seen in absolute light just as much and as little as in the absolute dark; that the one seeing as much as the other is pure seeing—seeing of Nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same. Only in determinate light—and light becomes determinate through darkness—in troubled light, therefore, just as only in determinate darkness—and darkness becomes determinate by light—in illuminated darkness, can anything be distinguished, because only troubled light and illuminated darkness possess in themselves distinction, and are thereby determinate Being—There-being, or So-being [Daseyn—particular existence].

Remark 3.

The Isolating of the Abstractions, Being and Nothing.

The unity, whose moments are Being and Nothing as inseparable the one from the other, is itself, at the same time, different from them, and thus to them a third something, which in its own
most strictly proper form is \textit{Becoming}. \textit{Transition} is the same as \textit{Becoming}; only that in the former, the two, from the one of which to the other of which the movement is made, have more the appearance of being independently apart from each other, and the movement is rather conceived as taken place \textit{between} them. Wherever and however \textit{Being} or \textit{Nothing} is in question, there this third \textit{something} must be present also; for these subsist not by themselves, but \textit{are} only in \textit{Becoming}, in this, so to speak, third. This third, indeed, has numerous empirical forms; but these are put out of view by abstraction, in order to hold fast these its own products, \textit{Being} and \textit{Nothing}, each \textit{per se}, and show them independent of movement. In reply to such simple procedure of abstraction, we have merely just equally simply, to point to the empirical existence in which said abstraction itself is only something, has a Daseyn. Through whatever reflexional forms, indeed, the separation of the inseparable is sought to be attained, there is independently present in every such attempt the opposite of its own self, and so, without recurring or appealing to the nature of the facts themselves, we may always confound every such attempt out of its own self, just by taking it as it gives itself, and demonstrating in it its own other. It would be lost trouble to seek, as it were, to arrest all the sallies and windings of reflexion and its reasonment, in order to cut off and render impossible to it all the shifts and shuffles by which it conceals its own contradiction from its own self. For this reason, also, I refrain from noticing numerous self-called refutations and objections which have been brought forward against the doctrine that neither \textit{Being} nor \textit{Nothing} is anything true, and that only \textit{Becoming} is their truth; the mental training calculated to give insight into the nullity of such refutations—or rather, quite to banish all such weak suggestions from oneself—is to be effected only by a critical knowledge of the forms of the understanding; but those who are the most fertile in such objections fall on at once with their reflexions against the very first propositions, without—by an enlarged study of logic—helping or having helped themselves to a consciousness of the \textit{nature} of these crude reflexions.

We shall consider, however, a few of the results which manifest themselves when \textit{Being} and \textit{Nothing} are isolated from each other, and the one placed out of touch with the other, so that their transition is negated.

Parmenides held fast by \textit{Being}, and was but consistent with
himself, in affirming at the same time of Nothing, that it in nowise is; only Being is. Being, thus complete by itself, is indeterminate, and has, therefore, no reference to any other: it seems, therefore, that from this beginning there can be no further progress made—from it itself, that is—and any progress can only be accomplished by the joining on to it of something alien, something from without and elsewhere. The step forward, that Being is the same as Nothing, appears, then, as a second absolute beginning—a transition that is für sich (per se), and adds itself externally to Being. Being would be not at all possibly the absolute beginning, if it had a determinateness; it would then depend on another, and would not be immediate, would not be the beginning. If it be, however, indeterminate, and so a true beginning, neither has it anything by which to lead itself over into another; it is at once the end. There can just as little anything break or dawn out of it, as anything break or dawn into it; in Parmenides, as in Spinoza, there is no transition from Being or Substance to the Negative, the Finite. But if transition nevertheless is to be made—which, as has been remarked, in the case of reference-less and so progress-less Being, can only take place in an external fashion,—such transition or progress were a second, a new beginning. Thus Fichte's absolutely first, unconditioned axiom, A=A, is position, Thesis; the second is opposition, Antithesis; this latter is now to be considered partly conditioned, partly unconditioned (and so contradiction in itself). Now this is a progress of outer reflexion, which just as well again negates what it started with as an absolute,—the opposition, the antithesis is negation of the first identity,—as it, at the same time, immediately, expressly reduces its second unconditioned to a conditioned. If, however, on the whole, there were any right to proceed, i.e. to sublate the first beginning, such right must have been of this nature, that it lay in this first itself that another could connect itself with it; that is, the first must have been determinate. But the Being [of Parmenides]—or, again, the Substance [of Spinoza] does not enunciate itself as such. On the contrary, it is the immediate, the still absolutely indeterminate such.

The most eloquent, perhaps forgotten, delineations of the impossibility to come from an abstract to a further and to a union of both are made by Jacobi in the interest of his polemic against the Kantian synthesis à priori of self-consciousness, in his Essay on the attempt of Criticismus to bring Reason to Understanding
(Jac. Works, iii. vol.) He states (p. 113) the problem thus: That there be demonstrated the occurrence or the production of a synthesis in a pure [blank unity], whether of consciousness, of space, or of time. 'Space is one, Time is one, Consciousness is one;'—tell me now, how any one of these three ones shall—purely—multiply itself in itself: each is only one, and no other; an identical one sort, a the-this-that selfsameness! without the-ness, this-ness, that-ness; for these slumer with the the, this, that, still in the infinite = o of the indeterminateness, from which each and every determinate has yet to expect its birth. What brings into these three infinitudes, finitude; what impregnates space and time à priori with number and measure, and converts them into a pure multiple; what brings the pure spontaneity (I) into oscillation? How gets its pure vowel to a consonant—or rather, its soundless uninterrupted sounding—how, interrupting itself, breaks it off, in order at least to gain a sort of self-sound [literally vowel], an accent? One sees from this that Jacobi has very sharply recognised the non-ens of abstraction, whether a so-called absolute (i.e., only abstract) space, or a so-characterised pure consciousness, ego; he takes stand immovably in it for the purpose of maintaining the impossibility of a transition to an other, the condition of a synthesis, and to a synthesis itself. The synthesis, which is meant, must not be taken as a conjunction of characters already there externally; the question is partly of the genesis of a second to a first, of a determinate to a beginning indeterminate,—partly, again, of immanent synthesis, synthesis à priori, a unity of differents that is absolutely (or that in and for itself is). Becoming is such immanent synthesis of Being and Nothing; but because synthesis mostly suggests the sense of an external bringing together of things full-formed, ready-present, externally confronting each other, the name synthesis (synthetic unity) has been justly left out of use. Jacobi asks, how does the pure vowel of the ego get to its consonant, what brings determinateness into indeterminateness? The what were easily answered, and in his own fashion has been already answered by Kant; but the question of how amounts to, in what mode and manner, in what relation, and so on, and demands thus the statement of a particular category; but of mode and manner, of categories of the understanding, there cannot be any question here. The question of how belongs itself to the erroneous ways of reflexion, which demands comprehensibleness, but at the same
time presupposes its own fixed categories, and consequently feels itself armed in advance against the reply to its own question. Neither has it with Jacobi the higher sense of a question concerning the necessity of synthesis; for he remains, as has been said, fixed in the abstractions, in order to maintain the impossibility of a synthesis. He describes (p. 147) with particular vivacity the procedure in order to reach the abstraction of space. 'I must for so long strive clean to forget that I ever saw, heard, touched, or handled anything at all, my own self expressly not excepted. Clean, clean, clean must I forget all motion; and precisely this forgetting, because it is hardest, I must make my greatest concern. I must get everything in general, as I have got it thought away—also completely and entirely shot away, and leave nothing whatever over but only the forcibly kept perception of infinite immutable space. I may not therefore again think into it my own self as something distinct from it, but at the same time connected with it; I may not allow myself to be simply surrounded and pervaded by it: but I must wholly pass over into it, become one with it, transmute myself into it; I must leave nothing over of myself, but this my perception itself, in order to contemplate it as a veritably self-subsistent, independent, single and sole manifestation.'

In this quite abstract purity of continuity,—that is, indefiniteness and void of conception,—it is indifferent to name this abstraction space, or pure perception, pure thought;—it is quite the same thing as what the Indian names Brahma, when, externally motionless and no less internally emotionless, looking years long only to the tip of his own nose, he says within himself just Om, Om, Om, or perhaps just nothing at all. This dull, void consciousness, conceived as consciousness, is Being (das Seyn).

In this vacuum, says Jacobi further, he experiences the opposite of what he is assured by Kant he ought to experience: he finds himself, not as a plurality and manifold, but rather as a unit without any plurality and variety; nay, 'I am the very impossibility, am the annihilation of all variety and plurality,—can, out of my pure, absolutely simple, unalterable nature, restore again, or "spook" into myself, not the smallest atom of any such;—thus all out-of and near-one-another-ness, all thereon founded variety and plurality, reveals itself in this purity as purely impossible.'

This impossibility is nothing else than the tautology—I hold fast by the abstract unity, and exclude all plurality and variety;
hold myself in the difference-less and indeterminate, and look away from all that is distinguished and determinate. The Kantian synthesis à priori of self-consciousness—that is, the function of this unity to sunder itself, and in this diremption or sundering to maintain itself—is attenuated by Jacobi into the same abstraction. This ‘synthesis in itself; the ‘original ordeal’,* is one-sidedly reduced by him into ‘the copula in itself;—an Is, Is, Is, without beginning and end, and without What, Who, and Which; this repetition of the repetition continued ad infinitum is the sole business, function, and production of the all-purest synthesis; it itself is the mere, pure, absolute repetition itself.’ Or, indeed, we might say, rather, as there is in it no remission,—that is, no negation, distinction,—it is not a repetition, but only undistinguished simple being. But is it then still synthesis, when Jacobi omits precisely that by which the unity is synthetic unity?

In the first place, when Jacobi plants himself thus fast in the absolute (i.e., abstract) space, time, and consciousness,—it is to be said that he, in this manner, misplaces himself into, and holds himself fast in, something empirically false; there empirically exist no space and time, which were not limited, not in their continuity filled with variously-limited existence and vicissitude, so that these limits and alterations belong unseparated and inseparably to space and time: in like manner, consciousness is filled with determinate sensation, conception, desire, &c.; it does not exist separated from a particular matter of some sort. The empirical transition, moreover, is self-evident: consciousness can make, indeed, void space, void time, and void consciousness itself, or pure being, its object and matter; but it remains not with such, it presses forward out of such void to a better,—i.e., in some manner or other, a more concrete matter, and however bad such a matter may be otherwise, it is so far better and truer: just any such matter is a synthetic one in general; synthetic taken in the more universal sense. Thus Parmenides with his illusion and his opinion must consent to own an opposite of being and of truth; as, similarly situated, is Spinoza with his attributes, modes, extension, motion, understanding, will, &c. The synthesis involves and shows the untruth of those abstractions; in it they are in unity with their other—not, therefore, as self-subsistent—not as absolute, but directly as relative.

* Das ‘ursprüngliche Urteilen’—at once the ‘original judging’ and the ‘original dispersing.’ (New note.)
QUALITY TRANSLATED.

The demonstration of the empirical nullity of empty space, &c., is not, however, that with which we have to do. Consciousness certainly can abstract, can fill itself with the indeterminate also; and the abstractions it then holds fast are the thoughts of pure space, time, pure consciousness, pure being. Now, it is the thought of pure space, &c.—i.e., pure space, &c.—which is in itself to be demonstrated as null: i.e., that it as such is already its own contrary; that as it is there in its self, its contrary has already penetrated into it; it is already of itself gone forward out of itself—is determinateness.

But this manifests itself immediately in their regard [that is, as regards pure space, time, &c.]. They are, as Jacobi profusely describes them, results of abstraction; they are expressly determined as undetermined; and this—to go back to its simplest form, amounts to being—is being. Just this indeterminateness of being, however, is what constitutes its determinateness; for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness: it is itself consequently, as so opposed, the determinate or negative, and the pure, quite abstract negative. This indefiniteness or abstract negation, which Being in this manner has in its own self, is what outer as well as inner reflexion enunciates when it takes it as equal to nothing, and declares it an empty thing of thought, Nothing. Or it may be expressed thus: Since Being is determinationless, it is not the (affirmative) determinateness, which it is, not Being but Nothing.

In the pure reflexion of the Beginning, as it has been taken in this Logic with Being as such, transition is still concealed: since Being is taken only as immediate, Nothing breaks by it only immediately forth. But all following findings, as at once Daseyn, are more concrete; in it, that is already explicit which involves and produces the contradiction of those abstractions, and therefore their transition. With respect to Being as said simple, immediate, the recollection that it is the result of perfect abstraction, and so for that very reason but abstract negativity, Nothing, becomes lost from view behind the science which within its own self, expressly from Essence onwards, will present said one-sided immediate as a mediate, in which Being is explicated as Existence, and the mediating agency of this Being as the Ground.

In the light of said recollection, the transition from Being into Nothing may be represented (or, as the phrase goes, explained and made intelligible) as something even light and trivial. It may be said for example, that without doubt Being which has been made
the beginning of the science (and of science) is Nothing; for we
can abstract from everything; and when one has abstracted from
everything, there remains, of course, nothing over. But, it may
be continued, the beginning is thus not an affirmative, not Being,
but just Nothing; and Nothing is then also the end, at least as
much so as immediate Being, and even still more. The shortest
way is to let such reasoning take its own course, and look on to see
how the results it vaunts are characterised. Taking it for granted,
then, that Nothing were the result of said *raisonnement*, and that
now, consequently, the Beginning must be made with Nothing (as
in Chinese philosophy), there were no necessity on that account to
stir a hand; for before one could stir a hand, this Nothing would
have just as much converted itself into Being (see above, B.,
Nothing). But, further, said abstraction from all and everything
(which *all* then, nevertheless, is) being presupposed, it is still to be
more exactly understood; the result of the abstraction from all
that is, is first of all abstract being, being in general; as in the
cosmological proof of the existence of God from the contingent
being of the world (over which being the ascent or advance con-
tained in the proof is made), being is still brought up along with
us, being is determined as Infinite Being. But abstraction can
certainly again be made from this pure being also; Being, too,
can be thrown into the all from which abstraction has been
already made; then there remains Nothing. It is still possible
for us, would we but forget the *thinking* of Nothing—*i.e.*, its
striking round into Being—or did we know nothing of this, to
continue in the style of *one may this, one may that*: we may, for
example (God be praised!), abstract also from the Nothing (as, for
that part, the creation of the world itself is but an abstraction
from nothing), and then there remains not Nothing, for it is just
from it we have abstracted, and we are once more landed in
Being. This *one can, one may*, gives an external play of abstrac-
tion, in which the abstracting itself is only the one-sided activity
of the negative. Directly at hand, it lies in this very *one can, one
may*, itself, that to it Being is as indifferent as Nothing, and that
just as much as each of the two disappears, each of them equally
also arises: again, it is equally indifferent whether we start from
the act of the Nothing, or from the Nothing; the act of Nothing
—*i.e.*, the mere abstracting—is no more and no less anything true
than the mere Nothing.

The dialectic, according to which Plato handles the *One* in the
Parmenides, is also to be regarded rather as a dialectic of external reflexion. Being and the One are both Eleatic forms, which are the same thing. But they are also capable of being distinguished: it is thus Plato takes them in the dialogue mentioned. Having removed from the One the various characters of whole and parts—of being in itself, of being in another, &c.—of figure, time, &c.,—the result is that Being does not belong to the One, for only in one or other of these modes does Being attach to any one Something (p. 141, E.). Plato then proceeds to handle the position, the One is; and we have to see how, from this proposition, the transition to the Non-is of the One is accomplished. It takes place by comparing the two members of the proposition advanced, the One is. This proposition contains the One and Being; and the One is contains more than when we say only, the One. In this that they are different, then, is demonstrated the moment of negation which the proposition holds within it. It is obvious that this path (method) has a presupposition, and is an external reflexion.

In like manner as the One is here placed in connexion with Being, may that Being which is supposed capable of being held fast abstractly by itself, be demonstrated—in the simplest fashion, without calling in thought at all—to be in a union which implies the contrary of that which is supposed to be maintained. Being, taken as it is immediately, belongs to a subject, is a thing enunciated, has an empirical being, and stands, therefore, on the level of limitation and the negative. In whatever phrases or flexions the understanding may express itself, when it sets itself against the unity of Being and Nothing, and appeals to what is immediately before us, it will find just in this very experience nothing but determined being, defined being, Being with a limit or negation [a term, an end],—that very unity which it rejects. The maintaining of immediate being reduces itself thus to an empirical existence, the holding up of which cannot be rejected, and just because it is to an immediacy outside of thought, that its own appeal is made.

The case is the same with Nothing, only reversewise, and this reflexion is familiarly known and has often enough been made in its regard. Nothing, taking in its immediacy, shows itself as Be-ing or Be-ent (as a thing that is); for it is in its nature the same as Being. Nothing is thought, nothing is mentally conceived, it is spoken of; it is therefore. Nothing has in thought, mind, speech, &c., its Being. This Being again is, furthermore as
well, distinguished from it: it is therefore said, that nothing is indeed in thought, mind; but that on that account not it is, not to it as such does being attach, that only thought or mental conception is this Being. Notwithstanding this distinction, it is just as much not to be denied that nothing stands in connexion with a being, but in connexion, though it implies difference also, there is a unity with being. In whatever manner nothing may be enunciated or exhibited, still it shows itself in conjunction, or if you will contact, with a being, unseparated from a being, or just in a Daseyn.

But in that nothing is thus demonstrated in a Daseyn, usually still this distinction of it from being (Seyn) is wont to float before the mind,—namely, that the Daseyn of nothing [its actual existence] is entirely nothing appertinent to it itself; that it does not possess being for and by its own self, that it is not being as such. Nothing is only absence of being, as darkness is only absence of light, cold only absence of heat, &c. Darkness [the strain continues] has only meaning in reference to the eye, in external comparison with the positive, light; and just so is cold only something in our sensation. On the other hand, light, heat, like being, are per se, are themselves, the objective, the real, the actuose, of absolutely quite another quality and dignity than those negatives—than nothing. We find it frequently adduced as a very weighty reflexion and important cognition, that darkness is only absence of light, cold only absence of heat. But in this field of empirical matters it may be empirically remarked, in reference to said acute reflexion, that in light darkness certainly shows itself actuose, inasmuch as it determines it to colour, and only thereby imparts to it visibility indeed; for, as formerly observed, in pure light vision is just as little possible as in pure darkness. But visibility is actuality in the eye, and in that actuality the negative has just as much share as the light itself, which passes for the real and positive. In like manner, cold makes itself perceivable enough in water, in our sensation, &c. &c.; and when we refuse to it a so-called objective reality, we have with that won altogether nothing as against it. But it might further be objected, that here too, as above, it is a negative of definite import that is spoken of, and that we have not steadily remained by nothing itself, to which being is, as regards empty abstraction, not inferior—nor, indeed, superior. But it were well to take by themselves cold, darkness, and the like definite negations, in order
to see what is involved in this common constitution which they exhibit. They are not then to be considered as nothing in general, but as the nothing of light, heat, &c.—of something definite, of an import, a content [an actuality]: they are thus determinate, and, if we may say so, intaining nothings. But a definedness, determinedness, is, as comes again further on, itself a negation: they are thus negative nothings. But a negative nothing is something affirmative. The striking round of nothing, by reason of its definiteness (which definiteness manifested itself a little while ago as a Daseyn—a particular state of being—in a subject, in water, or whatever else), into an affirmative, appears to a consciousness which remains fixed in the abstraction of the understanding as the greatest of paradoxes, however simple it is to perceive that the negation of a negation is a positive. To be sure, on the other hand, the perception of this simple truth may appear to a like consciousness—and just because of its simplicity—as something trivial, on which therefore high and mighty understanding need bestow no attention. The matter meanwhile has, with all this, its own correctness: nay, not only has this correctness, but possesses, because of the universality of such forms or determinations, an infinite extension and universal application. It were not amiss, as regards these things, then, to pay a little attention after all. [Original curiously tangled: see p. 105, WW., vol. iii, ed. 1833.]

It may be still remarked, as regards the transition of Being and Nothing into one another, that it ought to be taken up into the mind—just so—without any further operation of reflexion. It is immediate and quite abstract because of the abstraction of the transient moments; i.e., because in either of these moments the determinateness of the other moment is not yet set (manifested as implied), and so as means by which the transition were to be effected. Nothing is not yet set (manifested as implied) in Being, though certainly Being is essentially [in itself] Nothing, and vice versa. It is, therefore, inadmissible to bring in here what are further determinations, and to treat Being and Nothing as in any relation: said transition is not yet a relation. It is, therefore, not allowable to say, Nothing is the ground of Being; or, Being is the ground of Nothing; Nothing cause of Being, &c.; or, transition is possible into Nothing only under the condition that something is, or into Being only under the condition of Non-being. The sort of inter-reference between them cannot be further defined, unless the
co-referred sides themselves were at the same time further determined. The connexion of Ground and Consequent, &c., has no longer mere Being and Nothing as the sides which it unites, but expressly Being which is Ground and a something—something which, to be sure, is only a reflex, and not self-subsistent, but still not the abstract Nothing.

Remark 4.

Incomprehensibleness of the Beginning.

We may perceive from the preceding, what is the nature of the dialectic against a beginning of the world, and also its end, by which the eternity of matter should be supposed proved; i.e., of the dialectic against becoming, origin or decease, in general. The Kantian antinomy respecting the finitude or infinitude of the world in space and time receives more particular consideration further on, under the notion of quantitative infinitude. Said simple ordinary dialectic rests on the holding fast of the antithesis of being and nothing. It is proved in the following manner, that there is no beginning of the world, or of anything else, possible:

There cannot anything begin, neither so far as it is, nor so far as it is not: for so far as it is, it does not just begin; and so far as it is not, neither does it begin. Should the world or anything else be supposed to have begun, it must have begun in nothing. But nothing is no beginning, or there is no beginning in nothing: for a beginning includes in it a being; but nothing contains no being. Nothing is only nothing. In a ground, cause, &c., when the nothing is so determined or defined, an affirmation, being, is contained. For the same reason there cannot anything cease. For in that case being would require to contain nothing. But being is only being, not the contrary of itself.

It is obvious that there is nothing brought forward here against Becoming, or beginning and ending, this unity of Being and Nothing, but their assertoric denial and the ascription of truth to Being and Nothing, each in division from the other. This dialectic is, nevertheless, at least more consistent than reflective conception. To this latter, that Being and Nothing are only in separation, passes for perfect truth; but, on the other hand, it holds beginning and ending as equally true characterisations: in these latter,
however, it de facto assumes the undividedness of Being and Nothing.

On the presupposition of the absolute partedness of Being from Nothing, the beginning—as we so often hear—or Becoming, is certainly something incomprehensible; for we make a presupposition which sublates the beginning or the becoming, which nevertheless we again grant; and this contradiction, which we produce ourselves, and whose resolution we make impossible, is what is incomprehensible.

What has been stated is also the same dialectic which understanding uses against the notion contained in the higher analysis of infinitesimal magnitudes. This notion is treated more in detail further on. These magnitudes have been defined as such, that they are in their disappearance, not before their disappearance, for they were then finite magnitudes;—not after their disappearance, for they were then nothing. Against this pure notion it has been objected, and perpetually repeated, that such magnitudes are either something or nothing; that there is no middle state (state is an inappropriate, barbarous expression) between being and non-being. There is here, too, assumed the absolute separation of being and nothing. But, on the other hand, it has been shown, that being and nothing are in effect the same, or, to speak the above dialect, that there is nothing whatever which is not a middle state between being and nothing. Mathematic has to thank the adoption of said notion, which understanding resists, for its most brilliant results.

The adduced raisonnement, which arrives at the false assumption of the absolute separatedness of being and non-being, and remains fixed in it, is to be named, not dialectic, but sophistry. For sophistry is raisonnement from a groundless presupposition, which is accepted without examination and inconsiderately; but we call dialectic the higher rational movement, in which such seemingly absolutely separated things pass over into one another—through themselves—through that which they are—and the presupposition negates itself. It is the dialectic immanent nature of Being and Nothing themselves to manifest their unity—Becoming—as their truth.

2. Moments of Becoming.

Becoming, Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be, is the unseparatedness of Being and Nothing; not the unity which abstracts from Being and Nothing; but as unity of Being and Nothing, it is this
definite, determinate [concrete] unity, that in which as well Being as Nothing is. But thus as each is, only unseparated from its other, each also is not. They are, therefore, in this unity, but as evanescent, but as sublated. They sink down from their previously-conceived self-subsistency into moments, distinguished and distinguishable, but at the same time resolved.

Considered as in reference to their distinguishedness, each is in it as unity with the other. Becoming, then, contains Being and Nothing as two unities such that each of them is itself unity of Being and Nothing. The one is Being as immediate and as reference to Nothing; the other, Nothing as immediate and as reference to Being: the moments are in disparate determination in these unities.

Becoming is thus in a double form. In the one, Nothing is as immediate: this form is as beginning from Nothing which refers itself to Being, or, what is the same thing, passes over into Being. In the other, Being is as immediate: this form is as beginning from Being which passes over into Nothing. The former is Origin or Coming-to-be; the latter, Decease, Ceasing, or Ceasing-to-be.

Both are the same, Becoming, but, as these so diverse directions, they mutually interpenetrate and paralyse themselves. The one is Ceasing-to-be; Being passes over into Nothing, but Nothing is equally the contrary of itself, a passing over into Being, Coming-to-be. This Coming-to-be is the other direction; Nothing passes over into Being, but Being equally sublates itself, and is a passing over into Nothing, Ceasing-to-be. They sublate not themselves antagonistically, not the one the other externally; but each sublates itself in itself, and is in its own self the contrary of itself.

3. Sublation (resolution) of Becoming.

The equilibrium into which Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be reflect themselves, is, at first hand, Becoming itself. But Becoming equally goes together into peaceful unity. Being and Nothing are in it only as disappearing; but Becoming as such is only through their distinguishedness. Their disappearing, therefore, is the disappearing of Becoming, or the disappearing of the disappearing itself. Becoming is an untenable unrest, which sinks together into a peaceful result.

Or it might be expressed thus: Becoming is the disappearing of Being in Nothing and of Nothing in Being, and the disappearing
of Being and Nothing generally; but it rests, at the same time, on the distinguishedness of these. It contradicts itself, therefore, within itself, because it unites such within itself as is opposed to its own self, but such a union destroys itself.

This result is a disappearedness, but not as Nothing;—as Nothing it were only a relapse into one of the distinctions already sublated, not a result of Nothing and of Being. It is the unity of Being and Nothing which has settled into unbroken oneness. But unbroken oneness is Being,—nevertheless, even so, no longer as individually a whole, but as form of the whole.

Becoming, thus as transition into the unity of Being and Nothing, which unity is as been (existent), or has the form of the one-sided immediate unity of these moments, is Daseyn [actual finite, definite existence, taken quite generally].

**Remark.**

*The expression, Sublation.*

Aufheben und das Aufgehebene (das Ideelle), sublation and what is sublated (and so only idellement, not réellement is), this is one of the most important notions of philosophy, a ground-form which repeats itself always and everywhere, the sense of which is to be exactly apprehended and particularly distinguished from the Nothing (negation). What sublates itself, does not, on that account, become nothing. Nothing is the immediate [directly present to us]; what is sublated, on the other hand, is a mediate, it is a non-been—but as result—which set out from a being: it has, therefore, the definite particularity from which it derives still in itself [impliciter; what anything has in itself, it implies or involves]. Aufheben, To sublate, has two senses, now signifying as much as to preserve, maintain, and again as much as to cause to cease, to make an end of. Even preserving includes the negative in it—this negative, that something, in order to be conserved is removed or withdrawn from its immediacy, from an existency open to external influences. What is sublated or resolved is thus, at the same time, preserved; it has only lost its immediacy, but it is not on that account annihilated. The two characters of sublation just stated, may be described lexikalisch as two significations of the word. It is striking to find language using the same word for two contradictory predicables. To speculative thought,
it is gratifying to find words which have a speculative meaning in themselves. The German language has a considerable number of these. The double meaning of the Latin \textit{tollere} (which the Ciceronian wit—\textit{tollendum esse Octavium}—has made notorious) is more circumscribed, its affirmative character amounting only to a lifting-up. A thing is sublated, resolved, only so far as it has gone into unity with its opposite; in this more particular sense, as what is reflected, it may be fitly named moment. Weight, and distance from a point, are called, with reference to the Lever, its mechanical moments, because of the identity of their effect, notwithstanding their diversity otherwise; the one being, as it were, the real of a weight, and the other the ideal or ideel of a line, a mere character of space (S. Encycl. Hegel, 3d edn., § 261, Rem). The remark must often occur to be made, that philosophy uses Latin expressions for reflected characters, either because the mother-tongue has not such as are required, or if having them, as here, because they remind more of what is immediate, while the foreign tongue suggests rather what is reflected.

The more particular sense and expression which—now that they are moments—Being and Nothing receive, come out in the discussion of Daseyn, the unity in which they are \textit{kept} or \textit{put by}. Being is Being, and Nothing is Nothing, only as contradistinguished from each other; in their truth again, in their unity, they have disappeared as these characters, and are now something else. Being and Nothing are the same; therefore, because they are the same, they are no longer being and nothing, and possess now a different significance: in Becoming, they were origin and decease; in Daseyn, as a differently-determined unity, they are again differently-determined moments. This unity remains now their base [the ground, the mother-liquor that holds them], from which they do not again issue in the abstract sense of Being and Nothing.
CHAPTER II.

There-being (Daseyn*).

There-being is definite, determinate Being; its determinateness, definiteness, is beent determinateness, beent definiteness, Quality. Through its quality, is it, that Something is,—and as in opposition to an Other. Through its quality, likewise, is it alterable and finite. Through its quality is it negatively determined; and not only so as opposed to an Other, but directly in itself. This its negation as, primarily, opposed to the Finite Something, is the Infinite; the abstract antithesis in which these distinctions [Finite and Infinite] appear, resolves itself into the Infinitude which is without antithesis, into Being-for-self—(Fürsichseyn).

The discussion of There-being has thus the three divisions—
A. There-being as such;
B. Something and Other, Finitude;
C. Qualitative Infinitude.

A.

There-being as such.

In There-being
a. as such, its determinateness, first of all, is
b. to be distinguished as Quality. This (quality), however, is to be taken as well in the one as in the other moment of There-being,—as Reality and as Negation. But so determined, There-being is at the same time reflected within itself; and set as such, it is

c. Something, There-beént-ity.

* Whereness and ubiety being in the dictionary, perhaps it might be allowable to coin Thereeness and ubiety. There-being, though the literal rendering of Da-Seyn, is so irredeemably ugly, and Daseyn itself must now be so well understood, that perhaps the latter term may be the preferable one to use generally.—N.
a. There-being in general.

There-being issues from Becoming. There-being is the simple oneness of Being and Nothing. Because of this simplicity (singleness), it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, Becoming, lies behind it; it (this mediating process) has fixed itself; and There-being therefore appears as a prime from which one might begin. It is at first hand in the one-sided character (determination) of Being; the other character which is also in it, Nothing, will likewise manifest itself in it as in contraposition to the former.

It is not mere Being, but There-being; etymologically taken, Being in a certain place; but the idea of space is not relevant here. According to its Becoming, There-being is, in general, Being with a Non-being, in such wise that this Non-being is taken up into simple unity with [the other moment] Being. Non-being taken up into Being in such wise that the concrete [resultant] whole is in the form of Being, of Immediacy, constitutes Determinateness as such [i.e., definiteness, particularity, peculiarity, speciality, specific force, virtue, vitality, value,—say specificity].

The Whole is likewise in the form, i.e., determinateness of Being, for Being has in Becoming shown itself likewise to be only a moment,—a sublated, negatively-determined one. It is such as yet, however, only for us in our reflection; it is not yet thus evolved in its own self. But the determinateness as such (the specificity) of There-being will be the evolved and overt one, which is also implied in the expression There-being (Da-seyn). The two distinctions are always to be kept well in view; only what is evolved, explicit (set) in a notion, belongs in the course of its development to its content; while any determinateness that is not yet evolved in its own self belongs to our reflection, whether employed on the nature of the notion itself, or only on external comparison. To call attention to a determinateness of the latter sort can only serve to illustrate or pre-indicate the course which will exhibit itself in the evolution. That the Whole, the oneness of Being and Nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of Being, is an external reflection; but in the Negation, in Something and Other, &c., it will come to be posited, evolved, set. To notice the distinction referred to was in place here; but to review all the observations which reflection may allow itself, would lead
to the unnecessary anticipation of what must yield itself in the matter in hand. Such reflexions may, perhaps, serve to facilitate a collective view and understanding generally; but they are attended by the disadvantage of being possibly regarded as unauthorised statements, grounds, and ground-layings for the further development. They are to be taken, therefore, for no more than they really are, and must be distinctly separated from what is a moment in the progress of the thing itself.

There-being corresponds to the Being of the previous sphere. Being, however, is the Indefinite; there present themselves on this account no significates in it. But There-being is a definite being, a concrete; there manifest themselves, therefore, directly in its regard a number of significates, distinguishable relations of its moments.

b. Quality.

Because of the immediacy in which in There-being, Being and Nothing are one, they do not exceed each other, they do not go beyond each other; as far as There-being is Being, so far is it Non-being, so far is it determined, defined. Being is not the genus, determinateness not the species. The determinateness has not yet detached itself from the being; indeed, it will not again detach itself from it; for the truth which is now established as ground and base is the unity of Non-being with Being; on it as ground appear all further determinations. But the reference, in which determinateness stands here to being, is the immediate unity of both, so that there is no distinction of them as yet set.

Determinateness thus isolated to itself, as beent determinateness, is Quality;—a determination wholly single and direct. (Determinateness in general is the more universal term; it may be Quantitative as well [as Qualitative], and also still further determined.) Because of this simplicity (and singleness) there is nothing further to be said of Quality as such.

But There-being, in which Nothing quite as well as Being is contained, is itself the standard for the one-sidedness of Quality as only immediate or beent determinateness. Quality is to be exhibited quite as much in the character of Nothing, in which case then the immediate or beent determinateness appears as one such distinguished against other such, and so as a reflected one: Nothing thus as the determinate of a determinateness, is equally
a something reflected, it is a negation. Quality distinguished as 
beent is Reality; Quality as fraught with a negative, is Negation 
generally, also a Quality, but which has the value of a restriction, 
and which further on is determined as Limit, Limitation. 
Both are a There-being, but in the Reality as Quality with the 
accent that it is a Beent, it is concealed that it contains deter- 
minateness, therefore also negation: the Reality passes therefore 
only for something positive, from which negation, limitation, 
restriction, is excluded. The negation taken as mere restriction 
would be what nothing is; but it is a There-being, a Quality only 
determined with a Non-being.

Remark.

Reality may seem a word of much ambiguity, because it is used 
of various and even opposed interests. In a philosophical sense, 
we may speak, perhaps, of merely empirical reality as a worthless 
existency. But when it is said of thoughts, notions, theories, they 
have no reality, this means that no actuality attaches to them: in 
itself or in the notion, the idea of a Platonic Republic, for 
example, may very well be true. Its worth is here not denied to 
the idea, and it is allowed to keep its place, as it were, beside 
Reality. But opposed to so-called mere ideas, mere notions, the 
real has the value of the alone true. The sense in which in the 
one case the decision as regards the truth of a matter is assigned 
to external existency, is just as one-sided as when the idea, the 
essential principle, or even the inner feeling, is represented as 
indifferent towards outer fact, or is, perhaps, considered indeed 
just so much the more excellent, the further it is removed from 
reality.

In reference to the expression Reality, we may make mention 
of the former metaphysical notion of God which, in especial, 
constituted the basis of the so-called ontological proof of the 
existence of God. God was defined as the sum of all realities; 
and of this sum it was said that it included no contradiction, that 
the realities neutralised not the one the other; for a Reality is to 
be taken only as a perfection, as an affirmative that contains no 
negation. The realities are thus not opposed to each other, do 
not contradict each other.

It is assumed in the case of this notion of reality, that this 
latter still remains when all negation is thought out of it; but
just thus all its determinateness were cancelled. Reality is Quality, There-being; on that account, it implies the moment of the negative, and by it only is it the determinate which it is. In the so-called eminent sense, or as—in the usual understanding—finite (and so, namely, it is expected of us to take it), it (reality) is extended into the indefinite, and loses its meaning. God’s goodness is not to be goodness in the usual, but in the eminent sense; not different from his justice, but tempered by it (a Leibnitzian term of accommodation, reconciliation); just as, on the other hand, his Justice is to be tempered by his goodness: thus neither goodness is any longer goodness, nor justice any longer justice. Power is to be tempered by wisdom; but in this way it would not be power as such, for it were in subjection to the other: Wisdom is to be enlarged to power, but in this manner it disappears as the end and means determining wisdom. The true notion of the Infinite and its absolute unity, which will present itself later, is not to be conceived as a tempering, mutual limitation or mixture, which is but a superficial relation, held, too, in an indeterminate mist, with which only notionless conception can content itself. Reality, which in the above definition of God is taken as determinate quality, when extended beyond its determinateness ceases to be reality; it is converted into, or has gone back to, abstract Being; God as pure reality in all reality, or as sum of all realities, is the same formlessness and matterlessness as the empty absolute in which all is one.

Again, Reality being taken in its determinateness, then, as it, reality, includes essentially the moment of the negative, the sum of all realities becomes just as much a sum of all negations—the sum, then, of all contradictions, directly, as it were, the absolute power in which all that is determinate is absorbed. But as this absolute all-absorbing power is itself only so far as there still remains opposed to it a not yet absorbed, it becomes, when thought as extended into realised, unlimited power, only the abstract nothing. Said reality in all reality, the being in all There-being, which is to express the notion of God, is nothing else than abstract Being, the same thing as Nothing.

Determinateness is Negation put affirmatively; Omnis determinatio est negatio—this is the proposition of Spinoza. It is a proposition of infinite importance; only the negation as such is formless abstraction; it is not, however, to be imputed to speculative philosophy, that it views negation, or nothing, as an ultimum:
Negation is such to speculative philosophy just as little as reality [as such] is to it truth.

Of this proposition, that determinateness is negation, the unity of the Spinozistic Substance, or that there is only one Substance, is—the necessary consequence. Thought and Being (or Extension), the two attributes, namely, which Spinoza has before him, he could not but, in this unity [of substance] consider one, for as determinate realities they are negations, the infinitude of which is their unity: according to Spinoza's definition, of which more again, the infinitude of anything is its affirmation. He took them, therefore, as attributes—that is, as such that they have not an individuality proper, an independent being of their own, but are only as in another, as moments; or rather they are to him not even moments, for his substance is what is quite determinationless in its own self, and the attributes are, as the modi are, distinctions which an external understanding forms. In like manner, the substantiality of individuals cannot subsist in the face of said proposition. The individual is reference to himself by this, that he sets limits to everything else; but these limits are just so limits to himself also, references to all else— he has his being not in himself [alone]. The individual is certainly more than only what is on all sides limited; but this more belongs to another sphere of the Notion: in the Metaphysic of Being it is a directly determinate; and that what is such, that the Finite as such should in and of itself be—against this, determinateness asserts itself essentially as negation, and drags it [the individual, the finite] into the same negative movement of the understanding, which makes all disappear into abstract unity, into Substance.

Negation stands immediately opposed to Reality: further on, in the special sphere of the reflected determinations, it becomes opposed to the Positive, which is a reality reflecting to Negation,— a reality, in which the negative seems (shines, shows),—the negative, i.e., which is as yet concealed in reality as such.

Quality is then specially property, when in an external reference it manifests itself as immanent determination. By properties of herbs, for example, we understand determinations [manifested powers] which are not only proper to a Something, but imply also that it by them, in reference to others, maintains itself in a peculiar manner [its own proper], and allows not the foreign influences set in it to take their own course, but makes good its own determinations in these,—although, indeed, it excludes them
not. The more quiescent definitenesses, as figure, shape, are, on
on the other hand, not always called properties, possibly not even
qualities, inasmuch and so far as they are conceived as alterable,
not identical with the Being or Beingness itself.

The Qualirung or Inqualirung (the agonising or inagonising,
inward pain-ing, pang-ing, throe-ing),—an expression of Jacob
Böhme—of a philosophy that goes into the deep, but a troubled
deep,—signifies the movement of a quality (the sour, bitter, fiery,
&c.) in its own self, so far as it in its negative nature (in its Qual,
its pang) expresses and affirms itself through another—signifies in
general the Unrest of the Quality in itself, by which it produces
and maintains itself only in conflict.

c. Something.

In There-being, its determinateness has been distinguished as
Quality; in Quality as there-beent is distinction—of the reality
and of the negation. By as much now as these distinctions are
present in There-being, by so much are they also null and
withdrawn. The reality contains itself negation; it is There-
being—not indeterminate, abstract Being. No less is Negation
There-being—not the nothing that is to be supposed abstract, but
express here as it is in itself, as beënt, as constitutively in There-
being. Quality in general is thus not divided from There-being,
which is only definite, determinate, qualitative Being.

This sublation of the distinction is more than a mere withdrawal
and external leaving out again of the same, or than a simple
turning back to the simple beginning, to There-being as such.
The distinction cannot be left out; for it is. The factum—what
is present—therefore, is There-being, distinction in it, and resolu-
tion of this distinction; There-being not distinctionless, as in the
beginning, but as again equal to itself through resolution of the
distinction, the simplicity (unality) of There-being mediated through
this resolution. This sublatedness of the distinction is the deter-
minateness proper of There-being [as it were, its special speci-
ficity]; it is thus Insichseyn, Being-within-self: There-being is
There-Beënt-ity—a Something.

The Something is the first negation of the negation, as simple
beënt reference to self. There-being, or living, thinking, and so
further, determines itself essentially [that is, in and from its own
nature] as a There being-one, a living-one, thinking-one (Ego), &c.
This determination is of the highest importance, in order not to stop by There-being, living, thinking, &c., as generalities—for the same reason, not by the Godhead instead of God. Something rightly passes with conception for a Real. Nevertheless, Something is still a very superficial determination; just as Reality and Negation, There-being and its Determinateness, though no longer the blank Being and Nothing, remain, all the same, quite abstract determinations. For this reason they are also the most current expressions, and the understanding, that is philosophically unformed, uses them most, casts its distinctions in their mould, and opines to possess thus something veritably good, and firmly fixed and definite. The Negative of the Negative is as Something only the beginning of the Subject;—the Being-within-self only first of all quite indefinite. It determines itself further on first as Beent-for-self and so on, till only first in the notion it attains the concrete intensity of the Subject. As basis of all these determinations, there lies at bottom the negative unity with self. But therewithal the negation as first negation, as negation in general, is to be firmly distinguished from the second, the negation of the negation, which is the concrete absolute negativity, just as the first, on the contrary, is only the abstract negativity.

Something is Beent as the negation of the negation; for this negation is the restoring again of the simple reference to self;—but just thus is Something withal the mediation of itself with itself. Here in the Simple of Something, then still more definitely in Being-for-self, in the Subject, &c., is there present—mediation of self with self; even already in Becoming is mediation present, but only the quite abstract mediation; Mediation with self has reached position (is set, express) in Something, so far as Something is determined as a simple Identical (Einfaches). Attention may be directed to the presence of mediation in general, as opposed to the principle of the asserted mere immediacy of knowledge from which (according to it) mediacy is to be excluded; but no particular attention need be called to this moment of mediacy in the sequel, for it is to be found throughout, and everywhere, in every notion.

This mediation with itself which Something is in itself, taken only as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations as its sides; so it collapses into the simple unity which Being is. Something is, and is also a There-beent; it is in itself further also Becoming, which, however, has no longer only Being and Nothing as its moments. The one of these, Being, is now There-being, and,
further, a There-beënt. The second is equally a There-beënt, but determined as negative of the Something—an Other. The Something as Becoming is a transition, whose moments are themselves Somethings, and which itself, therefore, is alteration;—a Becoming already become concrete. Something, however, alters (others) itself first of all only in its notion; it is not yet in position (express) as thus mediating and mediated; it is set, first of all, only as simply (unally) maintaining itself in its reference to self, and its negative is set as equally qualitative, as only an Other in general.

B.

FINITUDE.

a. Something and Other; they are, first of all, indifferent as regards each other; an Other is also an immediately There-beënt, a Something; the negation falls thus outside of both. Something is in itself as against its Being-for-other [its relativity to all else]. But the determinateness [the specificity] belongs also to its In-itself, and

b. its qualification, determination (purpose) which equally passes into So-constitutedness, Talification, which, identical with the former, constitutes the immanent and, at the same time, negated Being-for-other [relativity], the Limit of the Something, which is

c. the immanent determination of the Something itself, and this latter is thus finite.

In the first division, in which There-being in general was considered, this had, as first taken up, the character of Beënt. The moments of its development, Quality and Something, are, therefore, equally of affirmative nature. In this division, on the other hand, there develops itself the negative element which lies in There-being, which there (in the first division) was only first of all negation, first negation, but now has determined (or developed) itself up to the point of the Being-within-itself of the Something, to the negation of the negation.

a. Something and an Other.

1. Something and Other are both, in the first place, There-beënt, or Something.

Secondly, each is equally an Other. It is indifferent which is
first named Something; and just because it is first named is it Something (in Latin, when they present themselves both in one proposition, they are both called aliud, or the one the other, alius alium; in the case of a mutual reciprocity, the expression alter alterum is analogous). If we call one There-being A, and the other B, B is, in the first instance, determined as the Other. But A is just as much the other of B. Both are, in the same manner, Others. The expression This serves to fix the distinction and the Something which is to be taken as affirmative. But This just expresses that this distinguishing and picking out of the one Something is a subjective designating falling without the Something itself. Into this external monstration falls the entire determinateness; even the expression This contains no distinction; all Somethings are just as much These as they are also Others. One opines or means by This to express Something perfectly determined: it escapes notice that Speech, as work of understanding, enunciates only what is general, except in the name of a single object: the individual name, however, is meaningless in the sense, that it does not express a universal, and seems, therefore, as merely posititious and arbitrary, for the same reason, single names can also be arbitrarily assumed, given, or also changed.

Thus, then, otherwiseness appears as a determination foreign to the There-being that is so distinguished, or the Other appears out of the single There-being; partly, because a There-being is determined as Other, only through the comparing of a Third [you or me]; partly, because it is other only by reason of the Other that is out of it,—but is not as of or for itself so determined. At the same time, as has been remarked, even for conception, every There-being is distinguishable as an other There-being, and there remains not any one There-being that were distinguishable only as a There-being, that were not without or on the outside of a There-being, and, therefore, that were not itself an Other.

Both are equally determined as Something and as Other, consequently as the same thing, and there is so far no distinction of them. This self-sameness of the determinations, however, falls only into outer reflexion, into the comparing of both; but as the Other is at present determined, it is per se the Other, in reference indeed to the Something, but it is per se the Other also outside of, apart from the Something.

Thirdly, therefore, the Other may be taken as isolated, in reference to its own self; abstractly as the Other; the τὸ ἄτερον
of Plato, who opposes it to the One as one of the moments of totality, and in this manner ascribes to the Other a special nature. But thus the Other taken as such is not the Other of Something, but the Other in itself, that is, the Other of itself. Such Other in its own determination is Physical Nature; it is the Other of the Spirit: this its definition is thus at first a mere relativity, by which there is expressed, not a quality of nature itself, but only a reference external to it. But in that the Spirit is the true Something, and Nature therefore in itself is only what it is as against (Gegen) the Spirit, its quality, so far as it (nature) is taken per se, is just this,—to be the Other in itself, the out-of-itself-be-entity (in the forms of space, of time, of matter).

The Other by itself is the Other in itself, so the Other of itself, so again the Other of the Other; so, therefore, that which within itself is unequal simpliciter, that which negates itself, that which alters itself. But just thus it remains identical with itself, for that into which it alters itself is the Other, which any further has no determination else; what alters itself is, in no different way but in the same, determined as an Other: in this latter, therefore, it goes together only with its own self. It is thus posited as reflected into self with sublation of the Otherness; as self-identical Something from which, consequently, the Otherness, which is at the same time moment of it, is merely a distinguishedness, not as something itself which is appertinent to it.

2. Something maintains itself in its non-there-being; it is essentially one with it, and essentially not one with it. It stands, therefore, as though referring to its Otherwiseness; it is not purely its Otherwiseness. Otherwiseness is at once contained in it, and separated from it; it is Being-for-other.

There-being as such is immediate, reference-less; or it is in the determination of Being. But There-being as containing within itself Non-being, is determine Being, Being negated within itself, and then nextly Other,—but because at the same time it also maintains itself in its negation, only Being-for-other.

It maintains itself in its non-there-being, and is Being; but not Being in general, but as reference to self opposed to its reference to Other, as equality with itself opposed to its inequality. Such Being is Being-in-itself.

Being-for-other and Being-in-itself constitute the two moments of the Something. There are two pairs of determinations present here: 1, Something and Other; 2, Being-for-other and Being-in-
itself. The former pair contain the referencelessness of their determinateness; Something and other fall asunder from each other. But their truth is their co-reference; the Being-for-other and the Being-in-self are, therefore, the former determinations express as moments of one and the same,—as determinations, which are co-references, and in their unity remain in the unity of There-being. Each of them itself, therefore, contains in it at the same time also its other moment, the moment that is distinguished from it.

Being and Nothing in their unity, which is There-being, are no longer as Being and Nothing;—they are this only out of their unity. Thus, too, in their fluent unity, in Becoming, they are Origin and Decease.—Being in the Something is Being-in-self. Being, the reference to self, the equality with self, is now no longer immediate, but reference to self only as Non-being of the Otherwiseness (as There-being reflected within itself). Just so Non-being as moment of the Something is, in this unity of Being and Non-being, not non-there-being as such, but Other, and, more determinately, viewed at the same time in reference to the distinguishing of Being from it, reference to its non-there-being, Being-for-other.

Thus Being-in-self is firstly negative reference to the non-there-being; it has the otherwiseness out of it, and is opposed to it: so far as something is in itself, it is withdrawn from otherwiseness and from Being-for-other. But, secondly, it has non-being itself also in it; for it is itself the Non-being of the Being-for-other.

The Being-for-other, again, is firstly negation of the simple reference of the Being to itself which is to be first of all There-being and Something; so far as Something is in another or for another is it without its own Being. But, secondly, it is not the non-There-being as pure Nothing; it is non-There-being that points or refers to its Being-in-self, as to its Being reflected within its own self, just as on the other hand the Being-in-self points or refers to the Being-for-other.

3. Both moments are determinations of that which is one and the same, namely, the Something. Something is in itself, so far as it is returned into its own self out of the Being-for-other. Something has again also a determination or circumstance in itself (the accent falls here on in) or in it, so far as this circumstance is outwardly in it, a Being-for-other.
This leads to a further determination. Being-in-self and Being-for-other are in the first place different; but that Something has \textit{in it} the same thing which it is \textit{in itself}; and contrariwise what it is as Being-for-other, the same thing is it also \textit{in itself}—this is the identity of the Being-in-self and the Being-for-other, in accordance with the determination, that the Something itself is one and the same of both moments, and therefore they are in it undivided. This identity yields itself formally, as we see, in the sphere of There-being, but more expressly in the consideration of Essententity, and then of the relation of Inwardness and Outwardness, and in the precisest degree in the consideration of the Idea as the unity of the Notion and of Actuality. One opines to say something lofty with the \textit{In-itself}, as with the \textit{Inner}; but what Something is \textit{only in itself}, that also is \textit{only in it}; \textit{in itself} is only an abstract, and so even external determination. The expressions, there is nothing \textit{in it}, or there is something \textit{in that}, imply, though somewhat obscurely, that that which is \textit{in one}, belongs also to one's Being-in-self, to one's inner genuine worth.

It may be observed, that the sense of the Thing-in-itself yields itself here, which is a very simple abstraction, but which for long was a very important determination, something \textit{distinguished} as it were, just as the proposition, that we do not know what the things are in themselves, was a much-importing wisdom. Things are \textit{in themselves} so far as all Being-for-other is abstracted from, that is as much as to say in general, so far as they are thought without any determination whatever; as nothings. In this sense truly one cannot know what the thing \textit{in itself} is. For the question what requires that \textit{determinations} be assigned; inasmuch, however, as the things, of which they are to be assigned, are to be at the same time \textit{things in themselves}—that is to say, just without determination—there is thoughtless-wise introduced into the question the impossibility of an answer, or there is made only an absurd answer. The thing \textit{in itself} is the same as that absolute, of which nothing is known but that all is one in it. One knows then perfectly well what is in these things in themselves; they are as such nothing but truthless, empty abstractions. What, however, the thing \textit{in itself} is in truth, what is truly \textit{in itself}, of this (or that) Logic is the exposition, in which, however, something better is understood by \textit{In itself} than an abstraction—namely, what something is in its Notion: this latter, however, is concrete
in itself, comprehensible (notion-able, knowable) as notion in general, and cognisable as determined within itself and as connected system of its determinations within itself.

Being-in-self has at nearest the Being-for-other as its counterstanding moment; but there is also opposed to it—Positedness or Explicitness (Gesetztseyn); in this expression there lies also the Being-for-other, indeed, but it implies markedly the alreadyaccomplished bending back (reflexion) of that which is not in itself into that which is its Being-for-self, into that in which it is positively. The Being-in-self is usually to be taken as an abstract manner of expressing the notion; Position (Setzen) falls specially only into the sphere of Essentivity, of objective reflexion; the Ground (ratio) posits (setzt—exinvolves, eximplies) that which is grounded by it; the Cause still more brings an Effect forth, a There-being (a Daseyn, an entity) whose self-subsistence is immediately negated, and which has the sense in it, to have its affair, its Being in another. In the sphere of Being, There-being comes only forward from Becoming, or there is implied with the Something, an Other, with the Finite the Infinite; but the Finite produces not the Infinite, posits, sets the Infinite not. In the sphere of Being, the self-determining of the notion is only first of all in itself; thus is it only transition—a passing over; even the reflecting determinations of Being, as Something and Other, or the Finite and Infinite, though they essentially refer to each other, or are as Being-for-other, have the value of what is qualitative and subsistent per se; the Other is, the Finite, like the Infinite, appears equally as immediately beënt, and standing firm per se; their sense seems complete even without the other. The Positive and Negative, on the other hand, Cause and Effect, however much they are also taken as isolatedly beënt, have at the same time no meaning without the one the other; there is in themselves their seeming (showing) the one into the other, the seeming of its other in each. In the various spheres of determination, and especially in the progress of the exposition, or more accurately, in the progress of the notion to its exposition, it is a main matter always well to distinguish this, what is yet in itself and what is posited (gesetzt—set, realised), likewise the determinations as in the notion and as posited, Beënt-for-other. This is a distinction which belongs only to the dialectic development, and which the metaphysical philosophy, as also the critical, knows not; the definitions of [former] metaphysic, as its presuppositions,
distinguishing, and concludings, seek only to maintain and produce what is Beënt—and that, too, Beënt-in-itself.

The Being-for-other is, in the unity of the Something with itself, identical with its In-itself; the Being-for-other is thus in the Something. The determinateness thus reflected into itself is by this again simply beënt, and so again a quality—the Determination, the Qualification.

b. Qualification, Talification, and Limit.

The In-itself into which the Something is reflected out of its Being-for-other into itself is no longer abstract In-itself, but as negation of its Being-for-other it is mediated through the latter, which is thus its moment. It is not only the immediate identity of the Something with itself, but the identity through which the Something is what it is in itself also in it; the Being-for-other is in it, because the In-itself is the sublation of the same, is out of the same into itself; but quite as much also, be it observed, because it is abstract, and therefore essentially affected with negation, with Being-for-other. There is here present not only Quality and Reality, beent determinateness, but determinateness that is beent in itself; and the development is to posit it [set, state, exhibit, express it] as this determinateness reflected into itself.

1. The quality which the In-itself in the simple Something essentially in unity with its other moment, the Being-in-it, is, can be named its Determination (qualification), so far as this word in exact signification is distinguished from determinateness in general. The Determination (qualification) is the affirmative determinateness, as the Being-in-itself, with which the Something in its There-being remains congruous against its involution with other by which it might be determined—remains congruous, maintains itself in its equality with itself, and makes it good (its equality) in its Being-for-other. It fulfils its determination (qualification, vocation) so far as the further determinateness, which manifoldly grows through its relation to Other, becomes—in subjection to, or agreement with, its Being-in-itself—its filling. The Determination implies this, that what Something is in itself, is also in it.

The Determination of Man is thinking reason: Thought in general is his simple Determinateness, by it he is distinguished from the lower animals. He is thought in himself (an sich), so
far as it (thought) is at the same time distinguished from his Being-for-other, his special naturality and sensuous nature by which it is that he is immediately connected with Other. But thought is also in him; Man himself is thought, he is there as thinking, it is his existence and actuality; and further in that it is in his There-being (There-ness) and his There-ness (Existence) is in thought, it is concrete, it is to be taken with Implement and Complement, it is thinking reason, and thus is it Determination of Man. But this determination is again only in itself (only as in-sich) as an Is-to-be (a Sollen, a Devoir); that is, it, together with the complement, which is incorporated into its In-itself, is in the form of In-itself in general against the There-being not incorporated into it, which complement is thus at the same time still as externally opposing, immediate sense and nature.

2. The filling of the Being-in-itself [the In-itself simply] with determinateness is also distinguished from the determinateness which is only Being-for-other and remains out of the determination. For, in the field of the Qualitative, there remains to the differences or distinctions even in their sublation [alluding to the various moments of the Daseyn or the Etwas] immediate qualitative being as opposed the one to the other. What the Something has in it divides, then, and is, on this side, external There-being of the Something, which is also its There-being, but belongs not to its In-itself. The Determinateness is thus Talification [So-constitutedness, and that amounts to Property, or, indeed, Accident].

So or otherwise constituted is Something as engaged in external influence and relations. This external reference on which the Talification depends, and the becoming determined by another, appears as something contingent. But it is quality of the Something to be given over to this externality, and to have a Talification.

So far as Something alters itself, the alteration falls into the Talification; it is that in the Something which becomes another. It [Something] itself maintains itself in the alteration which touches only this unsteady superficies of its Otherwise-being, not its Determination (definition, qualification).

Qualification and Talification are thus distinguished from each other; Something is in its qualification indifferent to its talification. What, however, the Something has in it, is the middle term of this syllogism that connects both. The being in the Something, rather, showed itself to fall into these two extremes. The simple
middle is the determinateness as such; to its identity belongs as well qualification as talification. But the qualification passes over per se into talification, and the latter into the former. This lies in the preceding; the connexion is more particularly this: So far as what Something is in itself, is also in it, it is affected with Being-for-other; the qualification is thus as such open to the relation to Other. The determinateness is at the same time moment, but contains at the same time the qualitative distinction to be different from the In-itself; to be the negative of the Something, or to be another There-being. The determinateness, which thus includes within itself the other, being united with the In-itself brings Otherwise-being into the In-itself, or into the qualification, which is thereby reduced to talification. Contrariwise, the Being-for-other, isolated as talification and taken per se, is in it the same thing as what the Other as such is, the Other in itself, that is, of itself; but thus it is self-to-self-referent There-being, thus Being-in-itself with a determinateness, and therefore Qualification. Thus, so far as both are to be held apart from each other, on the qualification depends the talification, which appears grounded in what is external, in another in general, and the foreign determining is determined also at the same time by the special immanent qualification of the Something. But further, the talification belongs to what the Something is in itself: with its talification Something alters itself.

This alteration of the Something is no longer the first alteration of the Something merely as regards its Being-for-other; this first one was only the alteration appertinent to the inner notion, was the in-itself-being one; the alteration now is alteration posited (set) in the Something. The Something itself is further determined, and the negation appears as immanent to it, as its developed Being-within-itself.

In the first place, the transition of the qualification and the talification into one another is the sublation of their difference; but thus is There-being or Something in general replaced; and, inasmuch as it is a result out of that difference, which still comprehends in itself the qualitative Otherwise-being, there are two Somethings, but not only as others opposed to one another in general, in such wise that this negation were still abstract and fell into the comparison only, but it is now rather as immanent to the Somethings. They are as there-been indifferent to each other; but this their affirmation is no longer immediate, each refers itself to
itself by means of the sublation of the Otherwise-being, which in the qualification is reflected into the In-itself.

Something relates itself thus out of its own self to the Other, because Otherwise-being is contained within it as its own moment; its Being-within-self comprehends negation within itself—the negation by means of which in any case it has now its affirmative There-being. But from this (its affirmative There-being) the other is also qualitatively distinguished; it is thus set down as out of the Something. The negation of its other is only the quality of Something, for as this sublation of its other is it Something. Therewith does the Other first properly oppose itself to a There-being itself: to the first Something, then, the Other is only externally opposed; or again as they, in effect, directly cohere, that is, in their notion, their connexion is this, that There-being has gone over into Otherwise-being, Something into another—Something, as much as the Other, is another. So far now as the Being-within-self is the Non-being of the Otherwise-being which is contained in it, but at the same time distinguished as beënt, the Something itself is, the negation, the ceasing of another in it; it is determined as comporting itself negatively against it, and as at the same time maintaining itself thereby;—this Other, the Being-within-itself of the Something as Negation of the Negation, is its In-itself, and this sublation is at the same time in it as simple negation, namely, as its negation of the other Something external to it. There is one determinateness of these negations or Somethings which is as well identical with the Being-within-itself of the Somethings, as Negation of the Negation, as it also, in that these Negations are as other Somethings mutually opposed, joins them together out of themselves and equally disjoins them from one another (the one negating the other)—the Limit.*

3. Being-for-Other is indefinite, affirmative community of Something with its Other; in Limit, the Non-being-for-Other comes forward, the qualitative negation of the Other, which latter is thereby excluded from the Something reflected into its own self. The development of this notion is to be observed, which manifests itself, however, rather as inv development and contradiction. This contradictory character shows at once in this, that the Limit as negation of the Something, negation reflected into itself, contains ideally in it the moments of the Something and of the Other, and

* The power of A on B means as well the power of B on A—that power is the limit.—N.
these are at the same time, as distinguished moments in the sphere of There-being, set down as really, qualitatively diverse.

a. Something, then, is immediate, self-to-self-referent There-being, and has a limit in the first instance as against Other. The Limit is the non-being of the Other, not of the Something itself; the Something limits in its limit its Other. But the Other is itself a Something; the Limit, then, which the Something has against the Other, is likewise Limit of the Other as a Something—Limit of this latter so that by it it excludes from itself the first Something as its Other,—or is a non-being of said Something. The Limit, thus, is not only non-being of the Other, but non-being as well of the one as of the other Something—non-being, consequently, of the Something as such.

But Limit is essentially the non-being of the Other—Something at the same time, then, is through its Limit. Something, in that it is limiting, must submit to be limited; but its Limit, as a ceasing of the Other in it, is at the same time itself only the being of the Something; this latter is through it that which it is, has in it its quality. This relation is the external manifestation of the fact that the Limit is simple, or the first, negation, at the same time also that it is the other relation, the negation of the negation, the Within-itself of the Something.

Something, therefore, is, as immediate There-being, Limit to other Something; but it has this Limit in it, itself, and is Something through agency of it, which is just as much its non-being. Limit is the mediating means or agency, the medium, whereby Something and Other each as well is as is not.

β. So far now as Something in its Limit is and is not, and these moments are immediately, qualitatively separated, the non-There-being and the There-being of the Something fall asunder, apart from each other. Something has its There-being (its existence) out from (or as it is otherwise also conceived in from) its Limit; but just so the Other also, because it is Something, is outside of its Limit. It (the Limit) is the middle between both, and in it they cease. They have their There-being on the other side, the one from the other, of their Limit; the Limit as the non-being of each is the Other of both.

It is in respect to this diversity of Something from its Limit, that the Line appears as Line only outside of its limit, the Point; the Plane as Plane outside of the Line; the Body as Body only outside of its limiting Plane. This is how the Limit specially is
for conception, which is out-of-its-selfness of notion,—and hence its manifestation by preference in things of space.

γ. But, further, Something, as it is outside of the Limit, is unlimited Something,—only There-being as such. Thus, then, it is not distinguished from its Other; it is only There-being, has therefore the same determination as its Other—each is only Something as such, or each is Other; both are thus the same thing. But, again, this their directly immediate There-being implies the determinateness as Limit, in which both are what they are, distinguishably from each other. But this determinateness as Limit is equally their common distinguishableness, at once their unity and diversity—unity and diversity of the same things, just like There-being. This double identity of both (There-being and Limit) contains this, that the Something has its There-being only in the Limit, and that, inasmuch also as the Limit and the immediate There-being are at the same time each the negative, the one of the other, the Something, which is established as only in its Limit, just as much sunders itself from itself, and points away over and beyond itself to its non-being, pronouncing this its being, and so passing over into the same. To apply this to the preceding example, and as regards the finding that Something is what it is only in its Limit,—the Point is not limit of the Line, only in such wise that the latter just ends in the former, and is as existent outside of the former; neither is the Line similarly limit of the Plane, nor the Plane similarly limit of the Solid—with line and plane similarly so ending; but in the Point the Line also begins; the Point is the absolute beginning of the Line; even when it (the line) is conceived as on both sides unlimited, or, as it is called, infinitely produced, the point still constitutes the element of the line, as the line of the plane, and the plane of the solid. These limits are the principles (principia) of that which they limit; just as unity, for example, as the hundredth, is the limit indeed, but also the element of the whole hundred.

The other finding is the unrest of the Something in its Limit, in which, nevertheless, it is immanent—its restlessness as the contradiction which impels it out beyond its own self. Thus the point is this dialectic of its own self—to become line, the line the dialectic to become plane, the plane universal space. Of these there occurs the other definition, that the line originates in the motion of the point, the plane in that of the line, &c. This movement, however, is considered then as something incidental, or as
something just so thought. This consideration, however, is annulled specially by this, that the determinations from which the Line, &c., should be supposed to originate are, as regards the Line, &c., their elements and principles, and at the same time also nothing but their Limits: accordingly the origin cannot be considered as incidental, or only so-conceived. That point, line, surface, per se, contradicting themselves, are beginnings, which repel themselves from themselves, that the Point, for its part, passes over through its notion out of itself into the Line, moves itself in its own self, and gives origin to the Line, &c. &c.—this lies in the notion of limit as immanent in the something. The application itself, however, belongs to the consideration of space; but to indicate it here—it is thus that the point is the absolutely abstract limit, but in an existent entity; this latter (a there-ness) is taken still quite indefinitely, it is the so-called absolute, i.e. abstract space, the absolutely continuous Out-of-one-another-ness [succession]. From this, that the limit is not abstract negation, but is in this there-ness, is spatial determinateness, it results that the point occupies space, has space, is spatial, is the contradiction, that is, which unites in itself at once abstract negation and continuity, and so is the going-over and the gone-over into the Line, &c., just as also for the same reason it results that there is no such thing as a Point, or a Line, or a Surface.

Something, with its immanent Limit, established as the contradiction of its ownself, by which contradiction it is directed and impelled beyond itself, is the Finite as such.

c. Finitude.

There-being is determinate; Something has a Quality, and is in it not only determined, but limited; its quality is its limit, possessing which, it remains at first hand affirmative quiescent There-being. But this negation developed—in such wise that the antithesis of its There-being and of Negation as its immanent Limit is itself the Within-itself of the Something, and this latter consequently is in itself only Becoming—constitutes its Finitude.

When we say of things, they are finite, we understand by that, that they not only have a determinateness, Quality not only as Reality and beent-in-self distinctive nature, that they are not merely limited—for as such they have still There-being without
their limit—but rather that non-being constitutes their nature, their being. Finite things are, but their reference to self is, that they refer themselves to themselves negatively, even in this reference to themselves dispatch themselves beyond themselves, beyond their being. They are, but the truth of this Being is their End. The finite thing alters itself not only like Something in general, but it passes away and it is not merely possible for it to pass away—as if it could be without passing away: but the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of their passing away as their Within; the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.

a. The Immediacy of Finitude.

The thought of the finitude of things brings this sadness with it, because it is the qualitative negation pushed to its point; in the singleness of such determination, there is no longer left them an affirmative being distinguished from their destination to perish. Finitude is, because of this qualitative simple directness of negation (which has gone back to the abstract antithesis of nothing and ceasing to be as opposed to being), the most stiff-necked category of understanding; negation as such, tality, limit, reconcile themselves with their Other, the There-being; even the abstract nothing, per se, is given up as an abstraction; but finitude is negation as in itself fixed, and stands therefore up abrupt over against its affirmative. What is finite admits readily indeed of being brought to flux—it is itself this, to be determined to its end, but only to its end; it is the unwillingness rather to let itself be affirmatively brought to its affirmative, the Infinite, to let itself be united with it; it is given as inseparable from its nothing, and all reconciliation with its other, the affirmative, is thereby truncated. The destination of finite things is not further than their end. Understanding remains immovable in this hopelessness of Finitude, in that, regarding non-being as the true nature of things, it makes it at the same time imperishable and absolute. Only in their other, the affirmative, were it possible for their perishableness to perish; but thus their finitude would divorce itself from them, and it is, on the contrary, their unalterable Quality, i.e. their Quality that passes not over into its other, into its affirmative; it is thus eternal.

This is a very important consideration; that, however, the Finite is absolute—this stand-point truly will not readily be taken
to itself by any philosophy, or opinion, or by understanding (common Sense). The opposite rather is expressly present in the maintaining of the finite; the Finite is the limited, the transitory; the finite is only the finite, not the intransient; this lies immediately in its definition and expression. But the question is, whether in the mode of looking, the being of finitude is stuck by, whether the perishableness remains, or whether the perishableness and the perishing perishes, whether the passing-away passes away? That this latter, however, is not the case, is the fact even in that view of the finite which regards] the perishing or passing-away as the ultimum of the finite. It is the express averment that the finite is irreconcilable and inconsistent with the infinite, that the finite is absolutely opposed to the infinite. To the infinite, being, absolute being is ascribed; the finite thus remains opposite it, held fast as its negative; incapable of union with the infinite, it remains absolute on its own side; affirmation could come to it only from the affirmative, the infinite, and it would perish so; but a union with the infinite is that which is declared impossible. If it is not to remain opposed to the infinite, but to pass or perish, then, as has been already said, just its passing is the ultimum, not the affirmative, which would be only the passing of the passing. If, however, the finite is not to pass away in the affirmative, but its end is to be conceived as the nothing, then we are again back to that first abstract nothing which is long since passed.

In the case of this nothing, however, which is to be only nothing, and to which at the same time an existence is attributed in thought, conception, or speech, there presents itself the same contradiction as has just been signalised in the case of the Finite, only that it only presents itself there, while in Finitude it expressly is. There it appears as subjective, here it is maintained—the Finite stands opposed in perpetuity to the Infinite, what is in itself null is, and it is as in itself null. This is to be brought intelligibly to consciousness; and the development of the finite shows that it in it (suo Marte), as this contradiction, falls together in itself, and actually resolves this contradiction by this—not that it is only perishable and perishes, but that the perishing, the passing, the nothing, is not the last, the ultimum, but that it perishes and passes.
\[ \text{THE SECRET OF HEGEL.} \]

\[ \beta. \text{To-be-to, or Obligation-to, and Limitation.} \]

This contradiction, indeed, is directly abstractly present in this, that the Something is finite, or that the finite is. But Something or Being is no longer abstract, but reflected into self, and developed as Being-within-self which has in it a Qualification and a Talification, and still more definitely, a Limit, which as what is Immanent in the Something, and constitutive of the quality of its Being-within-self, is finitude. We have now to see what moments are contained in this notion of the finite Something.

Qualification and Talification manifested themselves as sides for external reflexion; the first, indeed, itself implied Otherwise-being as belonging to the In-itself of the Something; the externality of the Otherwise-being is on one side in the proper internality of the Something, on the other side, it remains as externality distinguished therefrom—it is still externality as such, but in the Something. But in that, further, the Otherwise-being is determined as Limit, or just as negation of the negation, the Otherwise-being immanent to the Something is demonstrated or is stated as the reference of the two sides, and the unity with itself of the Something now (to which Something as well the Qualification as the Talification attaches) is its reference as turned to its ownself, the reference of its beënt-in-self Qualification to its immanent Limit, which reference at the same time negates in it this its immanent Limit. The self-identical Within-Itself refers itself thus to itself as its own non-being, but as negation of the negation, as negating the same thing in it which at the same time preserves in it There-being, for that is the Quality of its Within-Itself. The proper limit of the Something taken thus by it as a negative, that at the same is essential and intrinsic, is not only Limit as such, but Limitation. But the Limitation here is not alone what is expressed as negated (not alone the-as-negated-posted); the negation is double-edged, seeing that what is the posited negated is the limit; for this (Limit) in general is what is common to the Something and the Other, and also determinateness of the Being-in-self-ness of the qualification or determination as such. This Being-in-self, as the negative reference to its Limit (this latter being at the same time distinguishable from it), is thus to itself as Limitation—the To-be-to, or Obligation-to (Devoir, Sollen).

That the limit, which is in the Something, prove itself as only
Limitation, the Something must at the same time within its own self transcend it (the Limit), must refer itself in itself to it as to a non-being. The There-being of the Something lies quiescently indifferent, as it were beside its limit. Something, however, transcends its limit, only so far as it is its sublatedness, the In-itself which is negative to it (the limit). And in that it (the limit) is in the determination [manifestible peculiar nature] itself as Limitation, Something transcends so its own self.

The To-be-to (Sollen) contains therefore the double distinction, now determination as beent-in-self determination against the negation, and again determination as a non-being that is distinguished as limitation from it, but at the same time that is beent-in-self determination.

The Finite thing has thus determined itself as the reference of its determination to its limit; the former is in this reference To-be-to (Sollen), the latter is Limitation. Both are thus moments of the Finite—both consequently themselves finite, as well the To-be-to as the Limitation. But only the Limitation is expressed as the Finite; the To-be-to is only limited in itself, or for us. Through its reference to its own immanent limit, has it limitation; but this its be-limitation is concealed in the in-itself, for in its There-being, that is, in its determinateness as against limitation, it is expressed as the in-itself.

What is to be, or is under obligation to be, is and at the same time is not. If it were, it were not merely to be. The To-be-to has therefore essentially a limitation. This limitation is not something foreign; that which only is to be, is the determination (destination) which is now expressed as it is in fact, namely, at the same time only a determinateness.

The Being-in-itself of the Something remits itself in its determination therefore into the Is-to-be, or the Ought-to-be, in this way, that the same thing which constitutes its Being-in-itself is in one and the same respect as non-being; and that, too, in this wise, that in the Being-within-self, the negation of the negation, said Being-in-itself is as the one negation (the negating one) unity with the other, which is at the same time as the qualitatively other, limit, through which said unity is as reference to it (limit). The Limitation of the finite is not something external, but its own determination is also its limitation; and this (limitation) is as well its own self, as also the To-be-to; it is what is common to both, or rather that in which both are identical.
As To-be-to, now again further, the finite thing passes beyond its limitation; the same determinateness which is its negation, is also sublated, and is thus its Being-in-itself; its limit is also not its limit.

As To-be-to, consequently, Something is raised above its limitation, again contrariwise only as To-be-to has it its limitation. Both are inseparable. Something has a limitation, so far as in its determination or destination it has the negation, and the determination or destination is also the sublatedness of the Limitation.

**Remark.**

The Ought-to, Is-to, Obligation-to, the To-have-to, or To-be-to, (Sollen, Devoir), has played recently un grand rôle in philosophy, especially in reference to morality, and likewise metaphysically as the last and absolute notion of the identity of the Being-in-self, or of the reference to self, and of the determinateness or limit.

You can, for you ought—this expression, which was supposed to say a great deal, lies in the notion of the To-be-to. For the To-be-to is the being beyond the limitation; limit is sublated in it, the Being-in-itself of the To-be-to is thus identical reference to self, and so the abstraction of the being able to. But, conversely, it is equally true, you can not just because you ought. For in the To-be-to there equally lies the limitation as a limitation; said formalism of the possibility to has in it a reality, a qualitative Otherwise-being, over against itself, and the mutual reference of both is the contradiction, consequently the not being able to, or rather the impossibility-to.

In the To-be-to, begins the transcendence of Finitude, Infinitude. The To-be-to is what, further on in the development, exhibits itself, with reference to said Impossibility-to, as the Progressus in infinitum.

As regards the Form of the To-be-to and the Limitation, two prejudices may be more particularly animadverted on. In the first place, great stress is usually laid on the limitations of thought, of reason, &c., and it is maintained that the limitation cannot be gone beyond. There lies in this averment the failure to see that just in the very determining of Something as limitation, the limitation is already left. For a determinateness, limit, is only determined as limitation in antithesis to its other, or as
against its unlimitated part; the other of a limitation is just the beyond of the same. The stone, the metal, is not beyond its limitation, just because the latter is not limitation for it. If, however, as regards such general propositions of mere understanding, that the limitation cannot be transcended, thought will not take the trouble to endeavour to see what lies in the notion, attention may be directed to the actuality, where such positions will be found to manifest themselves as what is most unactual. Just by this, too, that thought is-to-be something higher than the actual, is to keep itself apart from it in higher regions— that is, in that it is itself determined as a To-be-to— on one side it reaches not as far as to the notion, and, on the other side, it is its lot to comport itself just as untruly towards the actual as towards the notion. Because the stone thinks not, not even feels, its limitatedness is not limitation for it, that is, is not in it a negation for the thought, feeling, &c., which it does not possess. But even the stone is as Something distinguished into its determination or in-itself and into its There-being, and to that extent even it transcends its limitation; the notion which it is in itself implies identity with its other. If it is an acidifiable base, it is oxidisable, neutralisable, &c. In the oxidation, neutralisation, &c., its limitation to be only as base sublates itself; it transcends its limitation, just as the acid sublates its limitation to be as acid; and the To-be-to, the obligation to transcend its limitation, is (in the acid as well as in the caustic base) so much present, that it is only by dint of force that these can be kept fixed as— waterless, that is, purely non-neutral— acid and caustic base.

Should an existence, however, contain the notion, not merely as abstract In-itselfness, but as beent-for-self totality, as instinct, as life, feeling, conception, &c., it effects out of itself this— to be, and to pass out, over and beyond the limitation. The plant transcends the limitation to be as germ, and just as much the limitation to be as blossom, as fruit, as leaf; the germ becomes a developed plant, the blossom fades away into, &c. &c. A sentient existence in the limitation of hunger, of thirst, &c., is the impulse to pass out beyond this limitation, and it effects this transcendence. It feels pain, and the privilege of sentient nature is to feel pain; there is a negation in its self, and this negation is determined in its feeling as a limitation, just because Sentient existence has the feeling of its self, which self is the totality that is out and beyond said determinateness (of hunger). Were it not out and beyond it, it
would not feel it as its negation, and would have no pain. But it is reason, thought, which we are required to suppose incapable of transcending limitation—reason, which is the universal, which, per se, is out and beyond the, i.e. all particularity, which is nothing but transcendence of limitation. It is true that not every going-beyond or being-beyond the limitation is a veritable emancipation from this latter, a genuine affirmation; the To-be-to itself is already such imperfect transcendence, and wholly an abstraction. But the pointing to the wholly abstract universal suffices as against the equally abstract assurance that the limitation cannot be transcended, or, indeed, the pointing to the infinite in general against the assurance, that the finite cannot be transcended.

A seemingly ingenious fancy of Leibnitz may here be mentioned: if a magnet had consciousness, it would regard its direction to the north as a determination of its own will, a law of its freedom. Rather, if it had consciousness, and so will and free choice, it would possess thought, and so space would be for it as universal space, implying all directions, and thus the one direction to the north would be rather as a limitation of its freedom, just as it would be a limitation to be kept fixed in one spot, for man, but not for a plant.

The To-be-to on the other side is transcendence of the limitation, but only a finite transcendence. It has therefore its place and its value in the field of the finite, where it holds fast its Being-in-itselfness as opposed to its limitedness, and maintains it (the Ansich-seyn) as the rule and the essential, opposed to what, in comparison, is the null. Duty is a To-be-to, an obligation-to, directed against the particular will, against self-seeking greed and self-willed interest; it is enjoined as a To-be-to, an obligation-to, on the will so far as it, in its capability of movement, can deviate from the true. Those who estimate the To-be-to of morals so high, and opine that morality is to be destroyed, if the To-be-to is not recognised as ultimum and as truth, just as the raisonneurs, whose understanding gives itself the endless satisfaction to be able to adduce a To-be-to, an Ought-to, and so a knowing better, against everything that presently is—who therefore will as little allow themselves to be deprived of the ought-to—perceive not that for the finitude of their circle, the ought-to is perfectly recognised. But in actuality itself it stands not so hopeless with reason and law, that they only ought to be,—it is only the abstractum of the Being-in-itself that maintains this—just as little
so, as that the ought-to is in itself perennial, and, what is the
same thing, the finite absolute. The Kantian and Fichtian
philosophy assigns the ought-to, the to-be-to, as the highest point
of the solution of the contradictions of reason; it is, however, rather
only the stand-point of fixture in finitude, and so in contradiction.

γ. Transition of the Finite into the Infinite.

The Ought-to, per se, implies the Limitation, and the Limitation
the Ought-to. Their reference to each other is the Finite entity
itself, which contains them both in its Being-within-itself. These
moments of its determination are qualitatively opposed to each
other; the Limitation is determined as the negative of the Ought-
to, and the Ought-to equally as the negative of the Limitation.
The Finite entity is thus the contradiction of itself within itself; it
sublates itself, passes away. But this its result, the negative in
general, is (a) its very determination [Qualification or its In-itself];
for it (the result) is the negative of the negative. The Finite is
thus in passing away not passed away; it has in the first instance
become only another Finite, which however is equally a passing
away as transition into another Finite, and so on ad infinitum.
But (β) this result being considered closer, the Finite has in its
passing away, this negation of itself, attained its Being-in-itself; it
has gone together with itself in it. Each of its moments contains
just this result: the Ought-to passes over the Limitation, i.e., over
its own self; but over it, or as its other, there is only the Limitation
itself. The Limitation, however, points immediately out over
itself to its other, which is the Ought-to; but this again is the
same disunion of Being in itself (Ansichseyn) and of Being there
(Daseyn) as the Limitation, that is, it is the same thing; out over
itself then it goes together equally only with its own self. This
identity with itself, the negation of the negation, is affirmative
being, and so the other of the Finite—the Finite as that which is
to have the First negation as its determinateness—that other is the
Infinite.

The Infinite.

The Infinite in its simple notion may in the first instance be
regarded as a new definition of the absolute; it is as the deter-
minationless reference to self, put as Being and Becoming. The forms of There-being fail or fall out in the series of the determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, because the forms of its sphere are, per se, immediately expressed or put only as determinatenesses, as finite in general. The Infinite, however, appears directly as absolute, being expressly determined as negation of the Finite, and thus there is reference expressly made in the Infinite to the limitedness of which Being and Becoming (though in themselves neither showing nor having any limitedness) might yet, perhaps, be not unsusceptible—and any such limitedness is negated in it's, the Infinite's, regard.

Even thus, however, the Infinite is not yet in effect excepted from limitedness and finitude; the main point is to distinguish the true notion of the Infinite from the bastard or spurious Infinite, the Infinite of Reason from the Infinite of Understanding. The latter, indeed, is the finitised Infinite, and it will be found that just in the attempt to keep the Infinite pure and apart from the Finite, the former is only finitised.

The Infinite is

a. *in simple determination* the affirmative as negation of the Finite.

b. it is thus, however, in *alternating* determination with the Finite, and is the abstract, one-sided Infinite:

c. the self-sublation of this Infinite with that of the Finite as a *single process*—is the veritable Infinite.

a. *The Infinite in general.*

The Infinite is the negation of the negation, the affirmative, the being, which out of the limitedness has again restored itself. The Infinite is, and in a more intense sense than the first immediate Being; it is the veritable Being, the rising out over the Limitation. At the name of the Infinite there arises to spirit its own light, for spirit is not herein only abstractly with itself, but raises itself to its own self, to the light of its thinking, of its universality, of its freedom.

First of all as regards the notion of the Infinite, it has been found that There-being (Daseyn) in its Being-in-itself (Ansichseyn) determines itself as Finite (Endliches), and transcends the Limitation (Schranke). It is the nature of the Finite itself, to transcend its own self, to negate its negation, and to become infinite. The Infinite thus does not stand as something ready-made and com-
plete, *per se*, over the Finite, in such wise that the Finite shall have and shall hold its permanence *out of* or *under* the former. Nor do we only as a subjective reason pass over the Finite into the Infinite. As, for instance, when it is said that the Infinite is the notion of reason, and through reason we raise ourselves over the things of time, this takes place nevertheless without prejudice to the finite, which is nowise concerned in said elevation—an elevation which remains external to it. So far, however, as the Finite itself is raised into the Infinite, it is just as little any foreign force which effects this on it, but its nature is this,—to refer itself to itself as limitation, limitation as such, and also as *To-be-to*, and to transcend the same (limitation), or rather as reference to self to have negated it and to be beyond it. Not in the sublation of the Finite is it that there arises the Infinite, but the Finite is only this, through its very nature to become (rise) to the Infinite. Infinitude is its *affirmative determination*, that which *in itself* it truly is.

Thus the Finite has disappeared in the Infinite, and what is, is only the *Infinite*.

b. *Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite.*

The Infinite is, in this immediacy it is at the same time the negation of another, the Finite. Thus as *beient*, and at the same time as non-being of another, it has fallen back into the category of the Something as a determinate in general,—or more accurately, because it is There-being reflected into self and resulting through sublation of the determinateness *expressed* or *set* consequently as There-being that is distinguished from its determinateness, it has fallen back into the category of Something with a Limit. The Finite in view of this determinateness stands opposed to the Infinite, as *real There-being*; they stand thus in qualitative reference as constant or permanent out of each other; the immediate being of the Infinite awakes the being of its negation, the Finite again, which primarily seemed lost in the Infinite.

But the Infinite and Finite are not in these categories of reference only; both sides are further determined as merely *others* mutually. That is to say, the finite is the limitation expressed as the limitation, it is There-being with the determination (nature) to go over into its Being-in-itself, or infinitely to *become*. Infinitude is the nothing of the Finite, its *Being-in-itself*
(Ansichseyn) and its To-be-to, but this at the same time as reflected into self, the To-be-to carried out, or only self-to-self-referent quite affirmative being. In Infinitude there is the satisfaction present that all determinateness, change, all limitation, and with it the To-be-to itself, have disappeared—determinateness is expressed as sublated, the nothing of the finite. As this negation of the finite is the Being-in-self determined, which (Being-in-self) thus as negation of the negation is affirmatively within itself. This affirmation, however, is as qualitative immediate reference to self, Being; and thus the Infinite is reduced to the category that it has the Finite as another opposed to it; its negative nature is expressed as the been, and so first and immediate, negation. The Infinite is in this manner burdened with the antithesis to the Finite, which, as Other, remains at the same time determinate real There-being, though it is expressed as—in its Being-in-itself, the Infinite—at the same time sublated; this (Infinite) is the non-finite; a being in the determinateness (form) of negation. Opposed to the finite, the sphere of beënt determinatenesses, of realities, is the Infinite, the indeterminate void, the other side (the beyond) of the Finite, which (Finite) has its Being-in-self not in its There-being, which (There-being) is a determinate one.

The Infinite counter the Finite thus expressed or put in qualitative reference of other to each other, is to be named the spurious Infinite, the Infinite of the Understanding, to which it has the value of the highest, of absolute truth; to bring understanding to a consciousness of this, that, in that it opines to have reached its satisfaction in the reconciliation of the truth, it, on the contrary, is landed in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction—this must be effected by the contradictions into which it falls on all sides, as soon as it attempts application and explication of these its categories.

This contradiction is immediately present in this, that the Finite as There-being remains counter the Infinite; there are thus two determinatenesses; there are two worlds to hand, one infinite and one finite; and in their reference the Infinite is only limit of the Finite, and is thus only a determinate, even finite Infinite.

This contradiction develops its intent into more express forms. The Finite is the real There-being which thus dialectically remains, even in that transition is made to its non-being, the Infinite;—this latter has, as has been shown, only the first, immediate negation as its determinateness counter the Finite, just as the Finite as
regards said negation has, as negated, only the value of an Other, and therefore is still Something. When, consequently, understanding, elevating itself out of this finite world, mounts to its highest, the Infinite, this finite world remains stationary for it as a this side, so that the Infinite appears only beyond the Finite, separated from the Finite, and just thus the Finite separated from the Infinite; both assigned distinct places,—the Finite as There-being, Being on this side, and the Infinite again, the In-itself indeed of the Finite, but a Yonder away into the dim, inaccessible distance, out of which the Finite finds itself and remains here.

Sundered thus, they are just as essentially referred to each other by the very negation which separates them. This negation, co-referent of them, the self-reflected Somethings, is the mutual limit of the one counter the other; and that, too, in such wise that each of them has in it the limit not merely counter the other, but the negation is their Being-in-self; each has thus the limit, even per se or independently in it, in its separation from the other. The limit, however, is as the first negation; both are thus limited, finite in themselves. Still, each is also as affirmatively referent of self to self the negation of its limit; it thus immediately repels it from itself as its non-being, and, qualitatively separated therefrom, it sets it as another being apart from itself, the Finite its Non-being as this Infinite, this latter just so the Finite. That from the Finite to the Infinite necessarily, i.e. through the determination of the Finite, transition must be made, and the Finite raised as into its Being-in-self, is easily granted, seeing that the Infinite is determined, as persistent There-being indeed, but, at the same time, also as what is in itself null, and therefore what in its own determination (nature) resolves itself; while the Infinite again is indeed determined as attended by negation and limit; but, at the same time also as what is beënt in itself in such wise that this abstraction of the self to self referent affirmation constitutes its determination, and with such determination consequently the Finite There-being lies not in it. But it has been shown that the Infinite itself reaches its affirmative Being as result only by means of the negation, as negation of the negation, and that this its affirmation taken as only simple, qualitative Being, brings down the negation it contains to simple immediate negation, and so consequently to determinateness and limit, and this [qualitative being again] then as in the same way contradictory to its Being-in-itself is excluded from it as not its, rather is put as what is opposed to its
Being-in-itself, the Finite. In that thus each, just in it and from its own determination, is implication of its other, they are inseparable. But this their unity is concealed in their qualitative otherness; it is the internal one, which only lies at bottom.

Hereby is the manner of the manifestation of this unity determined; expressed in the There-being it is as a striking round or transition of the Finite into the Infinite, and vice versa; so that the Infinite only stands forward in or by the Finite, and the Finite in or by the Infinite, the other in or by the other, that is to say, each is an own proper immediate existence in or by the other, and their reference is only an external one.

The process of their transition takes the following complete shape. Transcendence is made beyond the Finite into the Infinite. This transcendence appears as an external act. In this void beyond the Finite what arises? What is the positive element therein? Because of the inseparableness of the Infinite and Finite (or because this Infinite, thus standing on its own side, is itself limited), Limit arises; the Infinite has disappeared—its other, the Finite, has put itself in place. But this on the part of the Finite appears as an event external to the Infinite, and the new limit as such a one as arises not out of the Infinite itself, but, still, is just there. There is thus present a relapse into the previous determination which has been sublated to no purpose. But this new limit is itself only such as is to be sublated, or transcended. So there has thus again arisen the void, the nothing, in which, just in the same manner, again determinateness, a new limit, is met with—and so on, ad infinitum.

There is present the alternation of the Finite and the Infinite; the Finite is finite only in reference to the To-be-to or the Infinite, and the Infinite is only infinite in reference to the Finite. They are inseparable, and at the same time absolutely others to one another; each has itself the other of it in it; thus each is unity of it and of its other, and is in its determinateness There-being—There-being not to be that which it itself is, and which its other is.

It is this reciprocal determination which, negating its own self and its own negation, presents itself as the Progressus ad Infinitum, which in so many forms and applications has the value of an ultimate, beyond which there cannot be any further transition, but thought, arrived at this, And so on, ad infinitum, supposes itself to have reached its end. This Progress appears always when relative
determinations are pushed to their antithesis, so that they are in inseparable unity, and yet to each counter the other a self-subsistent There-being is ascribed. This Progress is therefore the contradiction which is not resolved, but is always only enunciated as present.

There is an abstract transcendence present, which remains imperfect, in that this transcendence is not itself transcended. The Infinite is there before us; it is, to be sure, transcended, for a new limit is assumed, but just thus rather we are only back in the Finite. This bastard Infinite is in itself the same thing as the perpetual To-be-to; it is indeed the negation of the Finite, but it cannot in truth free itself therefrom; this comes forward in itself again as its other, because this Infinite only is as in reference to the Finite which is other to it. The Progress in infinitum is therefore only the self-repeating sameness, one and the same wearisome alternation of this Finite and Infinite.

The Infinitude of the infinite Progress remains burdened with the Finite as such, is limited thereby and itself finite. But thus, consequently, it were assumed in effect as Unity of the Finite and Infinite. But this unity is not reflected on. This unity, however, is that alone which in the Finite evokes the Infinite, and in the Infinite the Finite: it is, so to speak, the mainspring of the Infinite Progress. This Progress is the externale of said Unity and Conception remains standing by this externale—by the perpetual repetition of one and the same reciprocation, an empty unrest to advance further out over the limit into the Infinite, which advance finds in this Infinite a new limit, by which, however, it is just as little able to call a halt as in the Infinite. This Infinite has the fixed determination of a Further side which cannot be reached, just for this very reason, that it is not to be reached,—just because there is no leaving off from the determining of it, as the Further side, as the been negation. In consequence of this its nature, it has the Finite as a Hither side opposed to it, which can as little raise itself into the Infinite, just for this reason, that it has this determination of a There-being generative of Another, generative consequently of a perpetual repetition—generative of itself in its beyond itself again, and yet, at the same time, as different therefrom.
c. The Affirmative Infinite.

In this hither and thither of an alternating conclusion, now of the Finite, and again of the Infinite, the truth of these is already in itself present, and all that is necessary is simply to take up what is present. This movement hither and thither constitutes the external realisation of the notion; what the notion contains impliciter is expliciter, formally expressed, in this (outer realisation), but externally, as falling asunder; the comparison of these diverse moments is all that is required to yield the unity which gives the notion itself;—the unity of the Infinite and Finite is, as has been often remarked already, and as deserves now specially to be remembered, a one-sided expression for this unity as it is in truth; but the elimination of this one-sided statement must also lie in the externalisation of the notion which is now before us.

Taken in its first, simply immediate statement, the Infinite is only as transcendence of the Finite; it is in its determination [definition, express nature] the negation of the Finite; thus the Finite, as only that which is to be transcended, is the negation of itself just in it—just that negation which the Infinite is. There lies thus in each, the determinateness of the other,—yet, according to the infinite Progress, they are to be mutually excluded, and only reciprocally to follow each other; neither can be stated and comprehended without the other, the Infinite not without the Finite, the Finite not without the Infinite. When what the Infinite is, is said, the negation, namely, of the Finite, the Finite itself, is co-enunciated; for the definition or determination of the Infinite, it cannot be dispensed with. People require only to know what they say to find the Finite in the Infinite. Of the Finite, for its part, it is at once granted, that it is what is null, but just its nullity is the Infinitude, from which it is thus inseparable. In this way of regarding them, they may seem to be taken with reference to their other [or only in their reference]. Now should they be supposed reference-less, in such wise that they are connected only by an And, they will stand as if mutually opposed, self-subsistent, each only in itself. Let us see now, how in such shape they are constituted. So placed, the Infinite is one of the two; but as only one of the two it is itself finite—it is not the whole, but only one side; it has in its Opposite its limit; it is thus the finite Infinite. Or there are only two Finites before us. Just in this, that it is thus placed as sundered from the Finite,
and therefore as one-sided, lies its Finitude, and therefore its unity with the Finite. The Finite, for its part, placed as per se apart from the Infinite, is this reference to self, in which its relativity, dependency, its passingness is removed; it is the same self-substantiality and affirmation of itself which the Infinite is taken to be.

Both modes of consideration, though seeming at first to have a different determinate for their start—so far as the former is supposed to view them only as reference of the Infinite and Finite to each other, of each to its other; and the latter is supposed to hold them apart from each other in their complete isolation,—give one and the same result; the Infinite and Finite, viewed according to the reference of both to one another, which reference were to be external to them, but which is essential to them, neither being what it is without it, contain thus each its other in its own determination, just as much as each taken per se, regarded in itself, has its other lying in it as its own moment.

This yields, then, the—decried—unity of the Finite and Infinite—the unity, which is itself the Infinite, which comprehends in itself its own self and the Finite—and therefore is the Infinite in another sense than in that, according to which the Finite is separated from it and placed on the other side. In that they must be as well distinguished, each, as already shown, is also itself in it the unity of both; and thus there are two such unities. The common element, the unity of both determinates, as unity, expresses both in the first place as negated, seeing that each is supposed to be that which it is in their distinguishedness; in their unity they lose, therefore, their qualitative nature;—an important reflection against conception, which will not emancipate itself from this—to hold fast, in the unity of the Infinite and Finite, these according to the quality which they are supposed to have as taken apart, and therefore to see in said unity only the contradiction, not also the resolution of the same by the negation of the qualitative determinateness of both; thus the directly simple all-common unity of the Infinite and Finite is falsified.

But further, in that now also they are to be taken as different, the unity of the Infinite, which each of these moments is, is differently determined in each of them. The Infinite, so determined, has in it the Finitude which is distinguished from it; the former is in this unity the In-itself, and the latter is only determinateness, limit in it; but it is a limit which is the directly
other of it (the Infinite), its antithesis; its determination, which is the In-itself as such, becomes by the falsifying addition of a quality of such a nature vitiated; it is thus a finitised Infinite. In like manner, in that the Finite as such is only the Non-In-itself, but by reason of the unity in question has likewise its opposite in it, it becomes raised above its value, and that too, so to speak, infinitely; it is expressed (set) as the Infinitised Finite.

In the same manner, as previously the simple, is the double unity of the Infinite and Finite falsified by understanding. This takes place here also by this, that in the one of the two unities the Infinite is taken as not negated, rather as the In-itself, in which therefore there is not to be determinateness and limitation; the In-itself were by this depreciated and vitiated. Contrariwise, the Finite is likewise held fast as the non-negated, though in itself null, so that in its connexion with the Infinite it is raised to that which it is not, and is thereby—not disappearing but rather perpetually continuing—unfinitised against its own distinctive determination.

The falsification, which, with the Finite and the Infinite, understanding commits in holding fast their mutual reference as qualitative diversity, in maintaining them as in their nature separated and indeed absolutely separated, is occasioned by forgetting that which for understanding itself the notion of these moments is. According to this notion, the unity of the Finite and Infinite is not an external bringing together of them, nor a combination alien and repugnant to their distinctive nature, in which combination there would be conjoined what were in themselves separated and opposed, mutually self-substantial and existent, and consequently incompatible; but each is just in it this unity, and that only as sublation of itself, in which neither shall have any advantage over the other as regards In-itself-ness and affirmative There-being. As already shown, the Finite is only as transcendence of itself; there is contained therefore in it, the Infinite, the other of itself. Just so is the Infinite only as transcendence of the Finite; it implies, therefore, essentially its other, and is, consequently, in it the other of itself. The Finite is not sublated by the Infinite as by an independent power existing apart from it; but it is its Infinitude, to sublate itself.

This sublation is, consequently, not alteration or otherness in general, not sublation of Something. That in which the Finite sublates itself, is the Infinite as the negating of the Finite; but
this latter is long ago itself only There-being determined as a Non-being. It is, therefore, only the negation which in the negation sublates itself. Thus for its part Infinitude is determined as the negative of Finitude, and, consequently, of determinateness in general, as the void Further side; its self-sublation in the Finite is a turning back from empty flight, a negation of the Further side, which Further side is a negative in itself.

What is present, then, is in both the same negation of the negation. But this is in itself reference to itself, affirmation but as return to itself, i.e. through the mediation, which the negation of the negation is. These determinations are what is to be essentially kept in view: the second point, however, is, that they are also express in the infinite progress, but, as they are so in it, not yet in their ultimate truth.

In the first place, in it, both, as well the Infinite as the Finite, are negated—both are, and in the same manner, transcended; secondly, they are expressed as distinct and different, each after the other, as per se positive. We take thus these two determinations comparingly apart, as in the comparison, an outer comparison, we have separated the two modes of consideration, that of the Finite and Infinite in their reference, and that of the same each taken per se. But the Infinite Progress expresses more; there is present in it, also, the connexion of what is likewise distinguished, directly nevertheless only as transition and alternation. Let us see now in a simple reflexion what in effect is present.

First, the negation of the Finite and Infinite, which is expressed in the infinite Progress, may be taken as simple, consequently as separate, and only successive. Starting with the Finite, the Limit is transcended, the Finite is negated. Now, then, we have the Further side, the beyond of the same, the Infinite: but in this latter the Limit again arises, and thus we have the transcendence of the Infinite. This twofold sublation nevertheless is expressed partly in general only as an external traffic and alternation of the moments, partly not yet as a unity; each of these transcending is a special apposition, a new act, so that they fall thus asunder from one another. There is, however, also further present in the infinite progress their reference. There is, firstly, the Finite; then it is transcended — this negative or beyond of the Finite is the Infinite; thirdly, this negation is again transcended—there arises a new Limit, again a Finite. This is the complete, self-closing movement, which has arrived at that which constituted
the beginning; the same thing from which we started arises, i.e. the Finite is restored; the same thing has therefore gone together with itself, has in its beyond only found itself again.

The same is the case as regards the Infinite. In the Infinite, the beyond of the limit, there arises only a new limit, which has the same fate, as Finite to be necessarily negated. What we have thus again is the same Infinite, which disappeared previously in the new limit: the Infinite, therefore, through its sublation, across through the new limit, is not farther advanced, neither has it been removed from the Finite, for this latter is only this, to go over into the Infinite,—nor from itself, for it has arrived by itself.

Thus both, the Finite and the Infinite, are this movement, to return to themselves through their negation; they are only as mediation within themselves, and the affirmative of both contains the negation of both, and is the negation of the negation. They are thus result, and not, consequently, what they are in the determination of their beginning;—not the Finite, a There-being on its side, and the Infinite, a There-being or In-itself-being beyond the There-being, i.e. beyond that which was determined as finite. The unity of the Finite and Infinite is so very repugnant to understanding only on this account, that it presupposes as perennial or persistent the Limitation and the Finite as well as the In-itself; thus it fails to see the negation of both, which is factually present in the infinite Progress, as well as that they therein only present themselves as Moments of a Whole, and that they arise only by means of their contrary, but essentially also just as much by means of the sublation of their contrary.

If, in the first instance, the return to self was regarded as the return as well of the Finite as of the Infinite to itself, there manifests itself now in this result an incorrectness which is connected with the one-sidedness just commented on; now the Finite and now the Infinite is taken as starting-point, and by this only is it that there arise two results. But it is absolutely indifferent which is taken as beginning; and so the difference which produced the duplicity of the results, disappears of itself. This is likewise expressed in the both ways unlimited line of the infinite Progress, wherein each of the moments appears with like alternate presentation, and it is quite external, where we catch on, and with what begin. They are in it distinguished, but in like manner the one as only moment of the other. In that both of them, the Finite and the Infinite, are themselves moments of the
process, they are, in community, the Finite; and in that they are equally also in community negated in it and in the result, this result as negation of said Finitude of both is with truth regarded as the Infinite. Their distinction is thus the double sense which both have. The Finite has the double sense firstly to be only the Finite counter the Infinite, that stands opposed to it; and, secondly, to be at once the Finite and its opposing Infinite. The Infinite also has the double sense, to be one of said two moments —when it is the spurious Infinite—and then to be the Infinite in which said both, it itself and its other, are only moments. How, therefore, the Infinite is in effect before us, is, to be the process, in which it submits to be only one of its determinations counter the Finite, and so only one of the Finites, and to sublate this difference of itself from itself into the affirmation of itself, and to be through this mediation as true Infinite.

This distinctive determination of the true Infinite cannot be contained in the formula, already animadverted on, of a unity of the Finite and Infinite; unity is abstract motionless equality with self, and the moments are just thus as unmoved beënts: the Infinite, however, is, like both of its moments, rather essentially only as Becoming, but becoming now further determined in its moments. Becoming has first abstract being and nothing for its determinations; next, as Alteration, it has There-beënts,—Something and Other; now, as the Infinite, it has Finite and Infinite, themselves as Becoments.

This Infinite, as a returned-ness into self, reference of itself to itself, is Being, but not Determination-less, abstract Being, for it is formally set as negating the negation; it is consequently also There-being, for it contains the negation in general, and consequently Determinateness. It is and is there, present, now. Only the spurious Infinite is the Beyond, because it is only the negation of the Finite that is given as Real,—thus it is the abstract, first Negation; only as negatively determined, it has not the affirmation of There-being in it; held fast as only negative, it is supposed to be even not there, it is to be supposed unreachable. But this unreachableness is not its worth, but its want, which has its ultimate ground in this, that the Finite as such is held fast as beënt. The Untrue is the Unreachable; and it must be seen, that such Infinite is the Untrue. The image of the Progressus ad infinitum is the straight line, only in the two limits of which is the Infinite, and always only where the line—and it is There-being—is not,
and which (line) proceeds out beyond to this its non-There-being, *i.e.* to the Indeterminate; as true Infinitude, bent back into itself, the image is the circle, the line which has reached itself, which is closed and completely present, without beginning and end.

The true Infinite thus as There-being, which is put as affirmatively counter the abstract negation, is reality in a higher sense than the former one, which was determined as simple reality; it has here obtained a concrete intent. The Finite is not the real, but the Infinite. Thus, too, reality becomes further on determined as Essentity, Notion, Idea, &c. It is superfluous, however, to repeat such earlier, abstracter, categories, as reality, on occasion of the concreter, and to apply them in the place of determinations more concrete than they are in themselves. Such repetition, as to say that the Essentity or that the Idea is the Real, has its occasion in this, that to unformed thought, the abstractest categories, as Being, There-being, Reality, Finitude, are the currentest.

The recalling of the category of Reality has here its preciser occasion, in that the negation, against which it is the affirmative, is here the negation of the negation, and so it (Reality itself) is put as opposed to that Reality, which finite There-being is.—The negation is thus determined as identity; the Ideël * is the Finite as it is in the true Infinite,—that is, as a determination, intent, which is distinguished, but not self-subsistently been, only as moment. Ideality has this concreter sense, which by a negation of finite There-being is not completely expressed. As regards reality and ideality, however, the antithesis of finite and infinite is understood so that the finite passes for the real; the infinite, on the other hand, for the ideël: in the same way as further on the notion is regarded as an ideël, and as only ideël, There-being on the contrary as the real. Thus it avails nothing to have the special expression of the ideël for the assigned concrete determination of the negation; in said antithesis, the one-sidedness of

* The Ideal has a preciser meaning (of the Beautiful and what bears on it) than the Ideël; the former has not yet any application here; for this reason the expression Ideal is here used. As regards Reality there is no such distinction; the Real and the Real are well-nigh synonymous; the shading of the two expressions, as it were, counter each other, has no interest.

(This is Hegel's note, and valuable for the meaning of 'Ideël' as against 'Ideal.' The latter is of aesthetic application only: the former of metaphysical; it means what is, but what has *gone in*, what is taken up, what is only *held* (as in solution), what is *aufgehoben*, sublated, withdrawn, put past. This may countenance the suggestion that formal may be regarded as rather metaphorical, while formel is quite literal—in accentuation of form.)—New.
the abstract negative which attaches to the spurious Infinite is returned to, and the affirmative There-being of the Finite persisted in.

**Transition.**

Ideality may be named the Quality of Infinitude; but it is essentially the Process of Becoming, and consequently a transition (as was that of Becoming into There-being), which is now to be assigned. As sublation of Finitude, i.e. of Finitude as such, and just as much of its only opposing, only negative Infinitude, this return into self is *reference to its own self*—Being. As in this Being there is negation, it is There-being; but as this negation is further essentially negation of the negation, self to self-referent negation, it is that There-being which is named *Being-for-self*.

**Remark 1.**

The Infinite—in the usual sense of the spurious Infinite—and the Progress into the Infinite, like the To-be-to, are the expression of a *contradiction*, which gives itself out as *resolution* and as ultimum. This Infinite is a first elevation of sensuous conception over the Finite into the thought, which, however, has only the *intent* of nothing, of that which is *expressly* given and taken as non-beent—a flight beyond the limited, which flight collects itself not into itself, and knows not how to bring back the negative into the positive. This *uncompleted reflexion* has both of the determinations of the true Infinite—the antithesis of the Finite and Infinite, and the *unity* of the Finite and Infinite—perfectly before it, but brings not these *two thoughts* together; the one conveys along with it the other inseparably, but it (the reflexion) lets them only *alternate*. The fact of this alternation, the infinite progress, is always then present whenever the contradiction of the *unity* of two determinations and of their *antithesis* is persisted in. The Finite is the sublation of itself; it includes in itself its negation, Infinitude,—the *unity of both*; Process is made out *beyond* over the Finite to the Infinite as its Further side,—*separation of both*; but beyond the Infinite there is another Finite—the beyond, the Infinite, contains the Finite,—*unity of both*; but this Finite is also a negative of the Infinite,—*separation of both*, and so on. Thus in the relation of causality, cause and effect are inseparable; a cause which should have no effect is not a cause, as an effect
which should have no cause were no longer an effect. This relation gives therefore the infinite progress of causes and effects; something is determined as cause, but it has, as a finite (—and it is finite just specially because of its separation from the effect) itself, a cause, i.e. it is also effect; consequently, the same thing which was determined as cause, is also determined as effect—unity of cause and effect;—what is now determined as effect has again a cause, i.e. the cause is to be separated from its effect and taken as a different something;—this new cause is again itself only an effect—unity of cause and effect;—it has another for its cause—separation of both determinations, and so on ad infinitum.

A more special form can be given the progressus in this way; it is asserted that the Finite and the Infinite are one unity; this false assertion requires now to be corrected by the opposite one, that they are directly different and mutually opposed; this again is to be corrected, into the assertion that they are inseparable, that the one determination lies in the other, through the averment of their unity, and so on ad infinitum. In order to understand the nature of the Infinite, it is no difficult request, that we should have a consciousness that the infinite progress, the developed infinite of understanding, is so constituted as to be the alternation of the two determinations, of the unity and of the separation of both moments, and then again that we should also have a consciousness, that this unity and this separation are themselves inseparable.

The resolution of this contradiction is not the recognition of the equal correctness and of the equal incorrectness of the two statements;—this were only another form of the persistent contradiction; but the Ideality of the two, as in which they, in their difference as mutual negations, are only moments; said monotonous alternation is factually as well the negation of their unity as of their separation. In it (the Ideality) is just as factually present what has been shown above, that the Finite passes beyond itself into the Infinite, but just so beyond the same again it finds itself spring up anew, and consequently therein it only goes together with its own self, as the Infinite similarly; so that the same negation of the negation becomes the affirmative result, which result demonstrates itself consequently as their truth and their prime. In this Being consequently as the Ideality of both of the characters distinguished, the contradiction is not abstractly vanished, but resolved and reconciled, and the thoughts are not only complete, but they are also brought together. The nature of
speculative thought shows itself in this detailed example in its special form, it consists alone in the taking up of the opposed moments in their unity. In that each shows itself factually to have in it its contrary as such, and in it to go together with itself, the affirmative truth is this unity that gives movement to itself within itself, the taking together of both thoughts, their infinity,—the reference to self—not the immediate, but the infinite one.

The test of philosophy, by such as are already in some degree familiarised with thought, has been frequently placed in the problem,—to answer, *How the Infinite comes out of itself, and into Finitude?* This, it is usually supposed, cannot possibly be made comprehensible. The Infinite, by the notion of which we have arrived, will in progress of the present development further determine itself, and show in it, in all the multiplicity of the forms, what is here demanded, or *How it*, if we are to express ourselves thus, *comes to Finitude.* At present we consider this question only in its immediacy, and in regard to the previously considered sense which the Infinite is wont to have.

On the answering of this question it is supposed in general to depend *whether a philosophy exist*; and in that people give out that they will be content to let it rest on this, they believe themselves to possess in the question itself, a sort of *questio vexata*, an unconquerable Talisman, through which they are firmly secured against any answer, and consequently against philosophy and the establishment of philosophy. But even in other objects a certain *education* is presupposed, in order to understand *how to put questions*, and still more in philosophical objects is such education to be presupposed necessary in order to attain a better answer than only that the question is worth nothing. As regards such questions, it is usually fair to point out, that the matter does not depend on the words, but that it is intelligible from one or other of the phrases of the expression, what it is it depends on? Expressions of sensuous conception as *going* and *coming out*, and the like, which are used in the question concerned, awake the suspicion, that it (the question) belongs to the position of ordinary conception, and that for. the answer also there are expected just such sensuous conceptions, as are current in common life and have the shape of a sensuous similitude or metaphor.

When, instead of the Infinite, *Being* in general is taken, then the *determining* of Being, that is, a negation or finitude in it,
seems more readily intelligible. Being, to be sure, is itself the undetermined, but it is not immediately expressed in it that it is the contrary of the determined. Whereas the Infinite has this expressed; it is the non-Finite. The unity of the Finite and Infinite seems thus immediately excluded; it is on this account that uncompleted reflexion is at its stubbornest against this unity.

It has been shown, however, and, without entering further into the determination of the Finite and Infinite, it is immediately evident, that the Infinite in the sense in which it is taken by the reflexion alluded to,—that is, as contraposed to the Finite,—has in it its other, just because it is contraposed to it, and is therefore already limited, and even finite, the spurious Infinite. The answer to the question, How the Infinite becomes Finite, is consequently this, that there is no such thing as an Infinite that is first of all Infinite and which is afterwards under a necessity to become finite, to go out into the Finite; but that it is per se—by and for its own self—already just as much finite as infinite. In that the question assumes that the Infinite is on one side per se, and that the Finite—which has gone out into separation from it, or which may have come whencesoever it may—is, separated from it, truly real: here rather it were to be said, that this separation is incomprehensible. Neither such Finite nor such Infinite has truth; the untrue, however, is unintelligible. But it must just as much be said, they are intelligible; the consideration of them, even as they are in conception, that in the one the distinctive nature of the other lies—to have simple insight into this their inseparable-
ness, is to comprehend them; this inseparableness is their notion. In the self-substantiality of said Infinite and Finite, on the other hand, said question sets up an untrue Intent, and implies at once an untrue reference of the same. On this account it is not to be answered, but rather are the false presuppositions it implies,—i.e., the question itself—to be negated. Through the questioning of the truth of said Infinite and Finite, the position is altered, and this alteration retaliates on the first question the perplexity which it sought to inflict; this question of ours is to the reflexion from which the first question issues, new, as such reflexion possesses not the speculative interest which, by and for its own self, and before it co-refers determinations, seeks to ascertain whether these same determinations are, in the manner in which they are presupposed, anywise true. So far, however, as the untruth of said abstract Infinite, and of the similar Finite which is to remain
standing on its side, is recognised, there is to be said as regards the exit of the Finite out of the Finite, that the Infinite goes out into the Finite, just because, in the manner in which it is taken as abstract unity, it has no truth, and no principle of subsistence or consistence in it; and conversely, for the same reason of its nullity, the Finite goes in into the Infinite. Or rather it is to be said, that the Infinite is eternally gone out into the Finite, that, no more than pure Being, is it absolutely alone per se, without having its other in it itself.

Said question, How the Infinite goes out into the Finite, may mean the still further presupposition, that the Infinite in itself includes the Finite, and consequently is in itself the unity of itself and of its other, so that the difficulty refers itself essentially to the separating, which as such is opposed to the presupposed unity of both. In this presupposition, the antithesis which is held fast, has only another form; the unity and the distinction are separated and isolated from each other. Said unity, however, being taken not as the abstract indeterminate unity, but as the determinate unity of the Finite and Infinite, as it already is in said presupposition, the distinction also of both is already present in it,—a distinction which, at the same time, is not a letting-loose of these into separated self-dependency, but retains them in the unity as ideel. This unity of the Infinite and Finite and their distinction are the same inseparabîle as Finitude and Infinitude themselves.

**Remark 2.**

The position, that the Finite is ideel, constitutes Idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognising the Finite as not a veritable Beînt. All philosophy is essentially Idealism, or at least possesses it as its principle, and the question is only how far has it carried out this principle? Philosophy is this as much as religion; for religion just as little recognises the Finite as a veritable Being, as an ultimate, absolute, or as non-posititious, uncreated, eternal. The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore without import. A philosophy which should ascribe to the finite There-being as such, genuine, ultimate, absolute Being, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of earlier or of later philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms, are thoughts, universals, ideëls, not things, as they directly find themselves before us, i.e., in sensuous singleness;
even the Thaletic water is not such thing, for, though certainly empirical water is meant, it is also conceived at the same time as the In-itsel or Essenceity of all the other things; and these are not self-substantial entities, grounded in themselves, but they are expressed (resultant) from (of) another [the Water], i.e., they are ideel. The principle, the universal, being named the ideel,—(as still more the notion, the idea, the spirit, are to be named ideel), and then again single sensuous things being to be conceived as sublated, as ideel in the principle, in the notion, or still more, in the spirit,—attention may be directed, in passing, to the same double side, which showed itself in the Infinite; that is to say, that at one time, the Ideel is the concrete, the veritably Beht, but at another time again, just as much its moments are what is ideel, namely what is sublated in it,—in effect, there is only the One concrete Whole, from which the moments are inseparable.

By the Ideel, as commonly opined, is especially meant the form of conception; and what is in my conception in general, or what is in the notion, the idea, in the imagination, &c., is called ideel, so that ideel applies even to fancies—conceptions, which are not only diverse from the real, but are to be supposed essentially not real. In effect the Spirit is the Idealist proper; in it, as it is when feeling, conceiving, still more when thinking and comprehending, the intent or object is not as the so-called real There-being; in the singleness of the ego, such external Being is only sublated—it is for me, it is ideel in me. This subjective idealism, be it the un-witting idealism of consciousness in general, or be it consciously enunciated and upheld as principle, regards only the concepive form according to which an intent (an object) is mine; this form is upheld in systematic subjective idealism, as the only true one, to the exclusion of the form of objectivity or reality, or of the external There-being of the intent. Such an idealism is formell, inasmuch as in its attention to the form it neglects the content of conception or thought, which—whether conceived or thought—may still remain quite in its finitude. With such idealism, there is nothing lost, as well because the reality of such finite matter—There-being and its finite complement—is retained, as because (inasmuch as it is abstracted from) said matter is to be regarded as of no consequence in itself; and again there is nothing won with it, just because there is nothing lost, for the ego, the conception, the spirit, remains filled with the same finite matter. The antithesis of the form of subjectivity and objectivity is certainly
one of the *Finities*; but the *matter*, how it appears in sensation, perception, or even in the more abstract element of conception, of thought itself, contains finities in abundance, which (finities), by exclusion of the single mode of finitude alluded to, the form, namely, of subjective and objective, are not yet by any means got rid of, and have still less disappeared of themselves.
CHAPTER III.

Being-for-self.

In Being-for-self qualitative Being is completed; it is infinite Being. The Being of the beginning is determination-less. There-being is sublated (negated), but only immediately sublated (negated) Being; it thus, in the first case, contains only the first, just immediate negation; Being is indeed equally retained, and in There-being both are united in simple unity; but just on that account they are in themselves mutually unequal; their unity is not yet in position. There-being is, therefore, the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of finitude. The determinateness is determinateness as such—a relative, not absolute determinateness. In Being-for-self, the difference between the being and the determinateness or the negation is posited and equated; Quality, Otherwise-ness, Limit, as also Reality, Being-in-itself, To-be-to, &c., are the imperfect infigurations of the negation into the Being, so that in them the difference of both still lies at bottom. In that in the Finitude, nevertheless, the negation has gone over into the Infinitude, into the posited negation of the negation, it (the negation) is simple reference to self, and, therefore, in itself the equation with the Being, absolute determinate Being.

Being-for-self, is, firstly, immediate Being-for-self-ity, One.

Secondly, the One goes over into the plurality (many) of Ones,—Repulsion; which otherwise-ness of the One resolves itself in the ideality of the same, Attraction.

Thirdly, the reciprocal determination of Repulsion and Attraction, in which they sink together (collapse) into equilibrium, passes over (and so also Quality, which in Being-for-self reached its point) into Quantity.
A.

BEING-FOR-SELF AS SUCH.

The total notion of Being-for-self has yielded itself. It were only now necessary to point out that the conception corresponds to the notion,—the conception which we attach to the expression, Being-for-self,—in order to be authorised to use said expression for said notion. And so, indeed, it seems; we say that something is for itself, so far as it negates the otherwiseness, its reference to and communion with other, so far as it has repelled these, abstracted from them. The other is in it only as sublated, as its moment; Being-for-self consists in this, that it has so gone beyond the limitation, its otherwiseness, that, as this negation, it is the infinite return into itself. Consciousness contains as such in itself the determination of Being-for-self, in that it represents to itself an object which it feels, perceives, &c., that is, in that it has within it the intent of this object, which intent is thus in the manner of an ideël; consciousness is, in its very perception, in general in its involution with its negative, with its other, by its own self. Being-for-self is the polemical negative attitude towards the limiting Other, and through this negation of it, it is a being reflected within itself; although too beside this return of consciousness into itself and the ideality of the object, the reality of this latter is also preserved in that it is, at the same time, known as an external object. Consciousness is thus appearant,* or it is the Dualism on one side to know of an object outer and other to it, and on the other side to be for itself, to have the object ideal in it—to be not only by such other, but in it also by its own self. Self-consciousness, on the other hand, is Being-for-self as completed and set; the side of reference to another, an outer object, is eliminated. Self-consciousness is thus the nearest example of the presence of infinitude,—always of an infinitude abstract, truly, but which, at the same time, nevertheless, is of a quite other concrete nature than Being-for-self in general, the infinitude of which latter has still only a quite qualitative determinateness.

* That 'consciousness is thus erscheinend' surely can only mean that it is thus consciousness (not self-consciousness) presents itself as an object to itself.—(New.)
a. There-being and Being-for-self.

Being-for-self, as already intimated, is Infinitude sunk together into simple Being; it is There-being (has existency), so far as the negative nature of infinitude, which is the negation of the negation, in the now, once for all, explicit form of the immediacy of Being, is only as negation in general, as simple qualitative determinateness. Being, in a determinateness such that it is There-being, is, however, directly also diverse from Being-for-self, which is only Being-for-self so far as its determinateness is said infinite one; still There-being is, at the same time, moment of the Being-for-self; for this latter contains certainly also Being that has been subjected to negation. Thus the determinateness, which in There-being as such is another, and Being-for-other, is bent back into the infinite unity of the Being-for-self, and in Being-for-self the moment of There-being is present as—Being-for-One (or just Being-for-α).

b. Being-for-One.

This moment expresses how the Finite is in its unity with the Infinite, or as Ideel. The Being-for-self has not negation in it as a determinateness or limit, and not therefore as reference to a There-being other from it. Though this moment has been designated as Being-for-One, there is still not yet anything present for which it were,—the One not, whose moment it were. In effect such is not yet fixed in Being-for-self; that for which Something (—and there is here no Something—) were, what the other side should at all be, is in like manner moment, just only Being-for-One, not yet One. There is thus as yet an indistinguishableness of the two sides, which two sides may flit before the mind in the Being-for-One; there is only a Being-for-Other, and because it is only a Being-for-Other, this Being-for-Other is also only Being-for-One; there is only the one ideality—of that for which or in which there should be a determination as moment—and of that which should be moment in it. Thus Being-for-one and Being-for-self form no veritable determinatenesses counter each other. So far as the difference is assumed for a moment and a Being-for-self-ity is spoken of here, this latter is the Being-for-self-ity as sublatedness of the Otherwiseness, and this (Being-for-self-ity) again refers itself to itself as to the sublated other, and is therefore for-one (for α); it refers itself in its other
only to itself. The Ideël is necessarily for-one, but it is not for another; the one (the α), for which it is, is only itself.—Ego, therefore, the Spirit, or God, are Ideëls, because they are infinite; but they are not ideël, as beënts-for-self, diverse from that that is for-one (for α). For so they were only immediate, or, nearer, There-being and a Being-for-other; because that which were for them, were not themselves but another, if the moment of being for-one attached not to them. God is therefore for himself, so far as he is himself that that is for him.

Being-for-Self and Being-for-One are therefore not different imports of Ideality, but are essential, inseparable moments of it.

**Remark.**

_The Expression Was fur eines?_

The apparently, at first sight, singular expression of our language for the question of quality, what for a thing (was für ein Ding) something is, gives prominence, in its reflexion-into-self, to the moment considered here. This expression is in its origin idealistic, seeing that it asks not, what this thing A is for another thing B, not what this man is for another man;—but what this is for a thing, for a man? so that this Being-for-one [say for a, or for a one] has, at the same time, come back into this thing itself, into this man himself; that that which is and that for which it is, is one and the same thing,—an identity, such as the ideality must also be considered to be.

The ideality attaches in the first instance to the sublated determinations, as diverse from that in which they are sublated, which again may be taken as the Real. In this way, however, the Ideël is again one of the moments and the Real the other; but the Ideality is this, that both determinations are equally only for-one, and pass valid only for-one, which one ideality is just thus undistinguished Reality. In this sense, Self-consciousness, the Spirit, God, is the Ideël, as infinite reference purely to self,—Ego is for Ego, both are the same thing; Ego is twice named, but of such a two, each is only for-one, ideël; the Spirit is only for the Spirit, God only for God, and only this unity is God, God as Spirit. Self-consciousness, however, as consciousness passes into the difference of itself and of another, or of its ideality in which it is perceptive, and of its reality in that its perception has a deter-
minate intent, which intent has still the side to be known as the unresolved negative, as There-being (an object). Nevertheless, to call Thought, Spirit, God, only an Ideel, presupposes the position on which finite There-being passes for the Real, and the Ideël or the Being-for-one has only a one-sided sense.

In assigning the principle of Idealism, in a preceding Remark, it was said that the decisive question in the case of any philosophy was, how far has this principle been carried out in it? As regards the mode of carrying this out, a further remark may be made in connexion with the category by which we stand. On this point the question is,—whether, beside the Being-for-self, finite existence is not still left independently standing,—moreover, again, whether there be set in the Infinite itself the moment for-one, a bearing of the ideël to its own self as ideël. Thus the Elastic Being, or the Spinozistic Substance, is only the abstract negation of all determinateness, without ideality being set in it itself;—with Spinoza, as will be considered again further on, infinitude is only the absolute affirmation of a thing, and thus only unmoved unity; his substance, therefore, comes not even to the determination of Being-for-self, much less to that of subject and Spirit. The Idealism of the pure and lofty Malebranche is in itself more explicit; it contains the following ground-thoughts:—As God comprehends within himself all the eternal verities, the Ideas, and Perfections of all things, in such wise that they are only his, we for our part see them only in him; God awakes in us our sensations of objects through an action which has nothing sensuous in it, in consequence of which we imagine that we obtain not only the idea of the object, which idea represents its truth, but the sensation also of its existence (‘De la recherche de la Vérité, Eclairc. sur la nature des idées,’ &c.). As then the eternal verities and ideas (essentities) of things are in God, so also is their Daseyn in God, ideël, and not an actual Daseyn; though as our objects, they are only for-one. This moment of explicit and concrete idealism, which is wanting in Spinozism, is present here, inasmuch as the absolute ideality is determined as knowing. However deep and pure this idealism is, nevertheless the above relations partly contain much that is indeterminate for thought, while, again, their intent (the matter they concern) is partly quite immediately concrete (Sin, Redemption, &c., appear in them just directly so); the logical character of infinitude, which should of necessity be its basal element is not completely carried out, and
so this lofty and genuine idealism, though certainly the product of a pure speculative spirit, is not yet that of a pure speculative, or veritably foundation-seeing and seeking, thought.

The Leibnitzian Idealism lies more within the limit of the abstract notion. The Leibnitzian ideating principle, the Monad, is essentially ideël. Ideation is a Being-for-self in which the determinatenesses are not limits, and consequently not a There-being, but only moments. Ideation is also, indeed, a more concrete determination [Vorstellen comprehends in it Perception, &c.], but has here no wider meaning than that of Ideality; for with Leibnitz even what is without any consciousness is a concipient, a percipient. In this system, then, otherwise-ness is eliminated; spirit and body, or the monads in general, are not others for one another, they limit not each other, have no influence on one another; all relations in general fall away, which depend on a Daseyn as ground and source. Any plurality in it is only an ideël and inner one; the monad in it (the plurality) remains referred only to its own self; the particulars develop themselves within it, and are no references of it to others. What on the real side is taken as there-beënt reference of the monads to one another, is an independent only simultaneous Becoming, shut in to the inner being of each of them. That there is a plurality of monads, that consequently they are also designated as others, nowise affects the monads themselves; this is the reflexion of a third (party) that falls outside of them; they are not in themselves others to one another; the Being-for-self [the In-being] is kept pure, without the side-by-side-there of a There-being [an Out-being, a finite existence]. But just here lies the uncompletedness of this system. The Monads are such concipients only in themselves (an sich), or in God as the Monad of Monads, or just in the System. Otherwiseness is still present; let it fall into what it likes, into the ideation (the reflexion) itself, or however the third be characterised, which considers them as others, as a plurality. Their plurality as existences is only excluded, and that only for the moment, the monads are only set by abstraction as such that they are non-others. If it is a third party that sets their otherness, it is also a third party that withdraws the same; this whole movement, indeed, which makes them ideël, falls on the outside of them. Should one remind us that this movement of thought falls nevertheless itself only within an ideating monad, one must be reminded as well that the very intent of such thought is
within its own self external to itself. Transition is made from the
unity of the absolute ideality (the monad of monads) immediately,
without understanding how (—through the figurate conception
of creation) to the category of the abstract (reference-less) plurality
of a finite existency, and from this equally abstractly back again
to the same unity. The ideality, the ideation in general, remains
something formell, as much so, even when elevated into or as
consciousness. As in the already adduced fancy of Leibnitz about
the magnetic needle, if it had consciousness, considering its
direction to the north as a determination of its own free will,
consciousness is only thought as one-sided form, which is indifferent
to its determination and intent, so the ideality in the monads is
a form that remains external to the plurality. Ideality is to be
immanent to them, their nature is to be ideation; but their
relation is on one side their harmony, which falls not into their
existence itself, and so is a pre-appointed one (a pre-established
one); on the other side, this their Daseyn is not conceived as
Seyn-für-Anderes, nor further as ideality, but is determined only
as abstract plurality; the ideality of the plurality, and the further
determination of the units into harmony, is not immanent and
proper to this plurality itself.

Other idealism, as, for example, the Kantian and Fichtian, gets
not further than the To-be-to (Sollen) or the infinite progress, and
remains in the dualism of There-being and Being-for-self. In
these systems the thing-in-itself, or the infinite appulse, enters
immediately indeed into the Ego, and becomes only a for-it; but still
departure is thus made from a free other-wise-ness, which perpetually
abides elsewhere as a negative Ansichseyn [as what is independent
in itself and negative to it (the Ego)]. The Ego, therefore, may be
characterised as Ideēl, as Beēnt-for-self, as infinite reference to
self; but the Being-for-one is not completed to the disappearance
of said unknown whereabouts of a thing-in-itself, or of said direction
towards such unknown.

c. One.

Being-for-self is the simple unity of itself and of its moment,
the Being-for-one. There is only one determination present, the
reference-to-itself of the sublation. The moments of Being-for-self
have collapsed into indistinguishableness, which is immediacy or
being, but an immediacy which founds itself on the negating
which is set or posited as its determination. The Being-for-self is thus Being-for-self-ity; and in that in this immediacy its inner import disappears, it is the quite abstract limit of itself.—One, or the One.

We may remark beforehand on the difficulty which lies in the following exposition of the development of the One, and on the reason of it. The moments which constitute the notion of the One as Being-for-self go asunder in it; they are, 1, Negation in general; 2, two negations; 3, and so of a Two that are the same thing; 4, that are directly opposed; 5, reference to self, identity as such; 6, negative reference and yet to self. These moments go asunder here by this, that the form of Immediacy, of Being, comes in in the case of Being-for-self as Being-for-self-ity; through this immediacy, each moment becomes set as a special beent determination; and nevertheless they are equally inseparable. Of each determination thus its contrary must be equally said; it is this contradiction which, by the abstract tality of the moments, constitutes the difficulty.

B.

ONE AND MANY.

The One is the simple reference of Being-for-self to itself, in which reference its moments have collapsed into themselves, in which therefore it has the form of immediacy, and its moments therefore are now There-beënts.

As reference of the negative to itself the One is a Determining, —and as reference to itself it is infinite Self-determining. But because of the immediacy now again present, these differences are no longer only as moments of one and the same self-determination, but they are set at the same time as beënt. The Ideality of the Being-for-self as totality thus strikes round, firstly, into Reality, and that, too, into the most fixed and abstract, as One. Being-for-self is in the One the set unity of Being and There-being, as the absolute union of the reference to other and of the reference to self; but now there enters also the determinateness of Being counter the determination of the infinite negation, counter the Self-determination, so that, what One is in itself, it is now only in it, and consequently the negative is another as distinguished from it. What shows itself as there before it distinct from it, is its own Self-determining; its unity with itself thus as distinguished from itself
has sunk into Reference, and as negative unity is negation of itself as of another, exclusion of the One as of another from itself, the One.

a. The One in its own self.

In its own self is the One on the whole; this its Being is no There-being, no determinateness as reference to other, not talification; it is this, that it has negated this circle of categories. The One is consequently incapable of any becoming-otherwise; it is un-otherable, unalterable.

It is undetermined, no longer so, however, as Being is so; its indeterminateness is the determinateness which reference to itself is, an absolute determined-being, or absolute determinedness; set (settled) Being-within-self. As from its notion self-to-self-referent negation it has the difference within it,—a direction from itself away out to other, which direction, however, is immediately turned round, because from the moment of Self-determining there is no other to which to go, and so has gone back into itself.

In this simple immediation, the mediation of There-being and Idenity even has disappeared, and so consequently also all diversity and multiplicity. There is nothing in it (within it); this nothing, the abstraction of the reference to self, is here distinguished from the Being-within-self itself, it is a set issue (an eximicatum), because this Being-within-self is no longer the Simple (unit) of the Something, but has the determination, that, as mediation, it is concrete; as abstract, however, it is indeed identical with One, but diverse from its determination (qualification). This nothing so-determined and as in a one (in one or just in a) is the nothing as vacuum, as void. The void is thus the Quality of the One in its immediacy.

b. The One and the Void.

The One is the Void as the abstract reference of the negation to itself. But from the simple immediacy, the affirmative Being of the One which is still present, the void as the Nothing is directly different, and in that they stand in one reference, of the One itself namely, their difference is express or explicit; but different from what is Beënt (the Beënt), the nothing as void is out of (outside of) the beënt One.

The Being-for-self, in that in this manner it determines itself as the One and the Void, has again reached a state of There-being
(existency). The One and the Empty have, as their common simple basis, the negative reference to self. The moments of the Being-for-self come out of this unity, become mutually external; in that the quality of Being comes in through the simple unity of the moments, it [this quality of Being] sets itself to one side, and so down to There-being [mere finite existency], and therein its other quality, the negation in general, places itself opposite, similarly as There-being [an existency] of the Nothing, as the Void.

Remark.

The One in this form of There-being is the stage of the category, which with the Ancients presented itself as the Atomistic principle, according to which the Essentity of Things is, the Atom and the Void (τὰ ἀτομα καὶ τὸ ἄνω). Abstraction, advanced to this form, has acquired a greater determinateness than the Being of Parmenides and the Becoming of Heraclitus. However high it places itself in that it makes this simple determinateness of the One and the Void the principle of all things, reduces the infinite variety of the world to this simple antithesis, and makes bold out of this latter to know the former, no less easy is it for crude figurate conception to set up for itself, in its reflexion, here Atoms, and there, just alongside, an Empty. It is no wonder, therefore, that the atomistic principle has at all times maintained itself; the equally trivial and external relation of Composition, that requires to be added in order to attain the semblance of a Concrete and of a variety, is equally popular with the atoms themselves and the void. The One and the Void is Being-for-self, the highest qualitative Being-within-self, fallen into complete externality; the immediacy or the being of the One, because it is the negation of all otherwiseness, is set as no longer determinable and alterable; in view of its absolute reserve and repulsiveness, therefore, all determination, variety, connexion, remains for it but a directly external reference.

The atomistic principle nevertheless, remained not in this externality with its first thinkers, but besides its abstraction it had also a speculative burden in this, that the vacuum was recognised as the source of motion; which is quite another relation of the atom and the void than the mere side by side of these, and their indifference mutually. That the void is the source of movement, has not the unimportant sense that some-
thing can only move itself in a void and not in a space already filled, as in this latter there would be found no more place; in which sense the void would be only the presupposition or condition, not the ground (ratio) of motion; just as here also movement itself is presupposed as already existent, and the essential, a ground of it, is forgotten. The view, that the void is the ground of motion, contains the deeper thought that in the negative generally there lies the ground of the Becoming, of the unrest of self-movement; in which sense, however, the negative is to be taken as the veritable negativity of the infinite. The void is ground of movement only as the negative reference of the One to its negative, to the One, i.e., to its own self, which, nevertheless, is set as a There-beën (as a Daseyn).

In other respects, however, further determinations of the ancients respecting the shape and position of the atoms, the direction of their movement, are arbitrary and external enough, and stand withal in direct contradiction to the fundamental determination of the atom. With the atom, this principle of the highest externality, and consequently also of the highest notionlessness, physical science suffers [is at fault] in its molecules, its particles; as is also the case with that political science which starts from the single will of the individuals.

c. Many Ones.

Repulsion.

The One and the Void constitutes Being-for-self in its nearest or first There-being. Each of these moments has negation for its determination, and is at the same time set as a There-being. As regards the former, the one and the void is the reference of the negation to the negation as of another to its other; the one is the negation in the form of Being, the empty the negation in the form of non-being. But the one is essentially only reference to itself as referent negation, i.e., is itself what the empty out of it is supposed to be. Both, however, are also set as an affirmative There-being, the one as the Being-for-self as such, the other as indeterminate There-being generally, and each as referent to the other as to another There-being. The Being-for-self of the One is, nevertheless, essentially the Ideality of the There-being and of the Other; it refers itself not as to another, but only to itself. But in that the Being-for-self is fixed as One (an a), as a Beent for
self, as immediately existent, its negative reference to self is at the same time reference to a Beent; and as this reference is at the same time negative, that, to which it refers itself, remains determined as a There-being and another; as essentially reference to its own self, the other is not the indeterminate negation as a void, but is similarly one. The One is thus a Becoming of (rather to) a plurality of Ones.

Properly, however, this is not quite a Becoming; for Becoming is a going over from Being into Nothing; One, here on the contrary, becomes only One. One, as referred, implies the negative as reference, has the negative therefore itself in it. Instead of Becoming, there is therefore, firstly, present the proper immanent reference of the One; and, secondly, so far as this reference is negative and the One at the same time beent, it is itself that the one drives off from itself. The negative reference of the One to itself is Repulsion.

This Repulsion, thus as position of a plurality of Ones but through One itself, is the special coming out of itself of the One, but to such ones out of it as are themselves only One. This is the repulsion in accordance with the notion, that repulsion which is in itself. The second repulsion is different from this one, and is that which floats, in the first instance, before the conception of outer reflexion, as not the production of the Ones, but only as a mutual distance of presupposed Ones already there. It is to be seen now, then, how said in-itself-beent repulsion determines itself into the second, the external one.

First of all, we have to fix for certain, what characters the many Ones as such possess. The Becoming to the Many, or the becoming-produced of the Many, disappears immediately, as a becoming-set (implied); the produced Ones are Ones, not for other, but refer themselves infinitely to themselves. The one repels only itself from itself, therefore becomes not, but already is; what is conceived as the repelled one is likewise a One, a Beent; repelling and being-repelled attaches in the same manner to both, and constitutes no difference.

The Ones are thus prae-set (presupposed) as counter one another; —set (implied) through the repulsion of the One from itself; prae (of the pre-supposed), set as not set; their being-set is sublated, they are Beents counter one another, as referent of themselves only to themselves.

The plurality appears thus not as an Otherwiseness, but as a
determination perfectly external to the One. One, in that it repels itself, remains reference to itself; as so also that one that is taken at first as repelled. That the Ones are other counter each other, are held together in the determinateness of plurality, nowise concerns, therefore, the Ones. If the plurality were a reference of the Ones themselves to one another, they would limit each other, and would have a Being-for-other affirmatively in them. Their reference—and this they have through their virtual unity—as it is here set, is determined as none; it is again the previously-determined Void. This void is their limit, but a limit external to them, in which they are not to be for one another: The limit is that in which what are limited as well are as are not; but the void is determined as the pure non-being, and only this constitutes their limit.

The repulsion of the One from itself is the Explication of that which—in itself—the One is; but Infinitude, as laid asunder (out-of-one-another, explicated) is here Infinitude come out of itself, but it is come out of itself through the immediate of the Infinite, of the One. This Infinitude is quite as much a simple reference of the One to One, as rather the absolute referencelessness of the One; the former as according to the simple affirmative reference of the One to itself, the latter as according to the same reference as negative. Or the plurality of the One is the own proper setting of the One; the One is nothing but the negative reference of the One to itself, and this reference, therefore the One itself, is the Many Ones. But just thus the plurality is directly external to the One; for the One is just the sublation of the Otherwiseness, the repulsion is its reference to self, and simple equality with itself. The plurality of the Ones is Infinitude as unconcerned, self-producent Contradiction.

Remark.

The Leibnitzian Idealism has been already noticed. We may add here, that, from the ideating monad onwards, which monad is determined as beënt-for-self, it advanced only to Repulsion as just considered, and indeed only to plurality as such that in it the ones are each only for itself, indifferent to the There-being and Being-for-self of any others, or as such that in it in general others are not in any way for the one. The monad is per se the completely isolated world; it requires none of the others; but this
inner variety which it has in its ideation alters nothing in its
determination as beënt only for itself. The Leibnitzian idealism
takes up plurality immediately as one given, and comprehends it
not as a repulsion of the monad; it has plurality, therefore, only
on the side of its abstract externality. The atomistic has not the
notion of ideality; it takes the one not as such that it comprehends
within itself both moments, the Being-for-self and the Being-for-it, not therefore as an ideël, but only as simple, dry Being-for-self-ity. But it goes beyond the mere indifferent plurality; the atoms come into further mutual determination, though properly only in an inconsequent manner; whereas, on the contrary, in the indifferent independency of the monads, plurality remains as fixed and immovable ground-determination, so that their reference falls only into the Monad of Monads, or into the reflecting Philosopher.

C.

REPULSION AND ATTRACTION.

a. Exclusion of the One.

The many ones are beents; their There-being or reference to one
another is non-reference, it is external to them;—the abstract
void. But they themselves are now this negative reference to
themselves (to one another), as to beent others;—the exhibited
contradiction, infinitude set (expressed) in immediacy of being.
Thus now the repulsion finds that immediately before it, which is
repelled by it. It is in this determination Exclusion; the one
repels from itself the many ones only as unproduced by it, as non-
set by it. This repelling is, reciprocally and universally, relatively
limited by the Being of the Ones.

The plurality is in the first instance not set otherwiseness
(not expressly so determined); the limit is only the void,
only that in which the ones are not. But they also are in the
limit; they are in the void, or their Repulsion is their common
Reference.

This reciprocal repulsion is the set (express) There-being of the
many ones; it is not their Being-for-self, so that they were only
distinguished in a third something as a many or a much, but it is
their own distinguishing, and preservative of them. They negate
themselves (each other) mutually, set one another as such that
they are only for-one. But they negate just as much, at the same time, this, that they are only for-one; they repel this their ideality and are. Thus the moments are sundered, which are directly united in the ideality. The one is in its Being-for-self also for-one, but this one, for which it is, is itself; its distinction from itself is immediately sublated. But in the plurality the distinguished one has a being; the Being-for-One, as it is determined in the exclusion, is therefore a Being-for-other. Each becomes thus repelled by another, sublated and made a one that is not for itself, but for-one, and that another one.

The Being-for-self of the many ones shows itself, therefore, as their self-preservation, through the mediation of their mutual repulsion, in which they mutually sublate themselves, and set the others as a mere Being-for-other; but, at the same time, this self-preservation consists in this, to repel this ideality, and to set the ones not to be for another. This self-preservation of the ones through their negative reference to one another is, however, rather their dissolution.

The ones not only are, but they conserve themselves through their reciprocal exclusion. Firstly, now, that by which they should keep firm hold of their diversity counter their becoming negated is their Being, and that, too, their Being-in-self counter their reference to other; this Being-in-self is, that they are ones. But all are this; they are in their Being-in-self the same thing, instead of having therein the fixed point of their diversity. Secondly, their There-being and their mutual relation, i.e., their setting themselves as ones, is a reciprocal negating; this, however, is likewise one and the same determination of them all, through which then they rather set themselves as identical; as by this, that they are in themselves the same thing, their ideality which was to be as resultant through others is their own, and they therefore just as little repel it. They are thus in their being and in their setting only one affirmative unity.

This consideration of the ones—that (in both of their determinations, as well so far as they are, as so far as they mutually refer), they show themselves as only one and the same thing and indistinguishable—is our comparison. It is, however, to be seen what, in their mutual reference itself, is set (express) in them. They are, this is in this reference presupposed,—and are only so far as they mutually negate themselves, and repel at the same time from themselves this their ideality, their negatedness, i.e., so far as they
negate this mutual negating. But they are only so far as they negate, and so, in that this their negating is negated, their being is negated. It is true, in that they are, they were not negated by this negating, it is only an externality for them; this negating of the other rebounds off from them and reaches only touchingly their surface. But again only through the negating of the others do they turn back into themselves; they are only as this mediation, this their return is their self-preservation and their Being-for-self. In that again their negating effectuates nothing, through the resistance which these beents, as such or as negating, offer, they return not back into themselves, maintain themselves not and are not.

The consideration was previously made that the ones are the same thing; that each of them is one, just like the other. This is not only our reference, an external bringing together, but the repulsion is itself reference, the one excluding the ones refers itself to them, the ones, i.e., to its own self. The negative relation of the ones to one another is thus only a going together with self. This identity into which their repulsion goes over is the sublation of their diversity and externality, which, as excludents, they were rather mutually to maintain.

This setting of themselves on the part of the many ones into a single One is Attraction.

Remark.

The Unity of the One and the Many.

Self-dependency pushed to the point of the beent-for-self unit is that abstract formell self-dependence which is self-destructive; the extremest, stubbornest error which takes itself for the most perfect truth; — appearant in concreter forms as abstract freewill, as pure Ego, and then further as the Bad. It is that freewill which so misunderstands itself, as to set its substantial being in this abstraction, and in this Being-by-self flatters itself purely to win itself. This self-dependency is more definitely the error to regard that as negative, and to maintain oneself against that as negative, which on the contrary is one’s very being. It is thus the negative bearing to one’s own self which, in that it would win its own very being, destroys the same, and this its act is only the manifestation of the nullity of this act. Reconciliation is the recognition of
that against which the negative bearing goes as rather one's true being, and is only as a leaving-off from the negativity of one's Being-for-self instead of persisting in it.

It is an ancient saying, that the One is Many, and in especial that the Many is One. As regards this the observation may be repeated, that the truth of the One and the Many expressed in propositions appears in an inadequate form, that this truth is to be understood and expressed only as a Becoming, as a process, repulsion and attraction, not as Being, in the way in which in a proposition it is set as quiescent unity. The dialectic of Plato in the Parmenides concerning the deduction of the Many from the One, namely from the proposition, One is, has been already noticed and remarked upon. The inner dialectic of the notion has been assigned; the easiest way is to take the dialectic of the proposition, that the Many is One, as external reflexion; and external it may well be here, seeing that the object also, the Many, is what is mutually external. This comparison of the Many with one another gives at once the fact that the one is absolutely characterised just as the other is; each is one, each is one of the many, is excluding the others;—so that they are absolutely only the same thing, or absolutely there is only one determination present. This is the fact, and there needs only to take up this simple fact. The obstinacy of the understanding stubborns itself against taking this up, because before it, and rightly too, there flits also the difference; but this difference is as little excluded because of said fact, as certainly said fact despite said difference exists. One might, as it were, console understanding as regards its simple apprehension of the fact of the difference by assuring it that the difference will presently come in again.

b. The one One of Attraction.

Repulsion is the self-severing of the One firstly into Many, the negative bearing of which is powerless, because they mutually presuppose one another as Beênts: it (Repulsion) is only the To-be-to (Sollen) of Ideality: this latter, however, is realised in Attraction. Repulsion goes over into Attraction, the many Ones into one One. Both, repulsion and attraction, are at first hand different, the former as the reality of the Ones, the latter as their set ideality. Attraction refers itself thus to repulsion, so that it has this latter as its presupposition. Repulsion furnishes the
material for attraction. Were there no Ones, there would be nothing to attract; the conception of lasting attraction, of the consumption of the Ones, presupposes an equally lasting production of the Ones; the sensuous conception of attraction in space holds the stream of the attracted Ones to last; in place of the atoms which disappear in the attracting punctum, there comes forward another Many out of the void, and on, if it is desired, ad infinitum. If attraction were conceived as accomplished, i.e., the Many brought to the point of a single One, there would only be an inert One, there would no longer be any attraction present. The ideality there-beënt in attraction has still in it the character of the negation of itself—the many Ones to which it is the reference, and attraction is inseparable from repulsion.

Attraction attaches, in the first instance, equally to each of the many Ones as immediately present Ones; none has a preference over the other: there seems thus an equilibrium in the attraction present, properly an equilibrium of attraction and of repulsion, and a dull repose without there-beënt ideality. But there can be no speaking here of a preference of any such one over another, which would be to presuppose a determinate difference between them—the attraction rather is the setting of a present indistinguishableness of the Ones. Only attraction itself is the setting of a One different from the rest; they are only the immediate Ones which through repulsion are to conserve themselves; but through their set negation there arises the One of attraction which therefore is determined as the mediated One; the One that is set as One. The first Ones, as immediate Ones, turn not in their ideality back into themselves, but have this (ideality) in another.

The one One, however, is the realised ideality that is set in the One; it is attractive through the mediation of repulsion; it implies this mediation within itself as its determination. It absorbs thus the attracted Ones not into itself as into a point, i.e., it does not abstractly sublate them. In that it implies repulsion in its determination, this latter retains the Ones as Many at the same time in it; it brings, so to speak, by its attracting, something for (before) itself, it gains an extension or a filling. There is thus in it unity of repulsion and attraction in general.
c. The reference (relation) of Repulsion and Attraction.

The difference of One and Many has determined itself as the difference of their mutual Reference, which has divided itself into two references, Repulsion and Attraction, of which each, in the first instance, stands self-dependently out of the other, still so that they essentially cohere. The as yet indeterminate unity of these has to yield itself more closely.

Repulsion, as the ground-determination of the One, appears first, and as immediate, like its Ones which, produced by it, are still at the same time set as immediate. The repulsion appears, thus, indifferent to the attraction, which adds itself externally to it as thus presupposed. On the other hand, attraction is not presupposed by repulsion; so that in the setting and being of this latter the former appears to have no share, i.e., so that repulsion is not already in it the negation of itself, the Ones are not already in them negated. In this way, we have repulsion abstractly per se; as similarly attraction has, counter the Ones as Beënts, the side of an immediate There-being, and comes to them quite as another.

If we take accordingly bare repulsion thus per se, it is the dissipation of the many ones into the indefinite, beyond the sphere of repulsion itself; for it is this, to negate the reference of the many to one another; referencelessness is their—they being abstractly taken—determination. Repulsion, however, is not simply the Void; the Ones as referenceless are not repellent, not excludent, as their determination requires. Repulsion is, though negative, still essentially reference; the mutual repulsion and flight is not the freeing from that which is repelled and fled from, the excludent stands still in connexion with that which is excluded by it. This moment of reference, however, is attraction, and so consequently in repulsion itself; it is the negating of that abstract repulsion according to which the Ones were only self-to-self referent Beënts, non-excludent.

In that, however, departure is taken from the repulsion of the there-beënt Ones, and so also attraction is set as coming externally to them, both are—with their inseparableness—still kept asunder as diverse determinations; it has yielded itself, however, that not merely repulsion is presupposed by attraction, but just as much also there takes place the counterreference (coup) of repulsion to
attraction, and the former has just as much its presupposition in the latter.

By this determination they are inseparable, and at the same time they are determined as To-be-to and Limitation, each counter the other. Their To-be-to is their abstract determinateness as of Beents-in-themselves, which determinateness, however, is withal positively directed beyond itself, and refers itself to the other determinateness, and thus by means of the other as other each is; their self-dependency consists in this, that in this mediacy of being they are set as another determining for one another: Repulsion as setting of the Many, Attraction as setting of the One, the latter at the same time as negation of the Many, and the former as negation of their ideality in the One, so that only by means of repulsion attraction is attraction; and only by means of attraction, repulsion is repulsion. That therein, however, the mediation with self through other is rather in effect negated, and each of these determinations is mediation of itself with itself, this yields itself from their nearer consideration, and takes them back to the unity of their notion.

In the first place, that each presupposes itself, refers itself in its presupposition only to itself, this is already present in the mutual bearing of Repulsion and Attraction while still only relative.

The relative repulsion is the reciprocal repulsion of the many ones which are conceived as finding themselves immediate, and already in existence there. But that there are many ones, is repulsion itself; the presupposition which it was supposed to have is only its own setting. Further, the determination of being which, in addition to their being set, was supposed to attach to the Ones —by which they were prae or there beforehand—belongs likewise to the repulsion. The repelling is that whereby the ones manifest and maintain themselves as ones, whereby they as such are. Their being is the repulsion itself; it is thus not a There-being relative to another, but relates itself entirely only to its own self.

The attraction is the setting of the One as such, of the real One, against which the many in There-being are determined as only ideël and disappearant. Attraction thus at once presupposes itself—sets itself as out before—to be ideellement in the form, that is, of the other ones, which otherwise are to be Beënt-for-Self and Repellent-for-Others, and so also therefore for an attracting something. Against this determination of repulsion they attain ideality not only through relation to attraction, but it is presupposed, it is
the \textit{in-itself}-beent ideality of the Ones, in that they as Ones—that conceived as attracting included—are one and the same thing and undistinguished from one another.

This its-own-self-prae-Setting (its own presupposition) of both elements, each \textit{per se}, is further this, that each contains in itself the other as moment. The Self-presupposing generally is \textit{in one} the setting itself as the \textit{negative} of itself;—Repulsion, and what is so presupposed is the \textit{same thing} as what presupposes—Attraction. That each \textit{in itself} is only moment, is the transition of each out of itself into the other, is to negate itself in itself, and to set itself as the other of itself. In that the One as such is the coming-asunder-from-itself, it is itself only this, to set itself as its other, as the Many, and the Many are only equally this, to fall together into themselves and to set themselves as their other, as the One, and just in it only to refer themselves to themselves, each in its other just to continue itself—there are thus also present, but virtually and unseparated, the coming-asunder-from-self (Repulsion) and the setting-of-self-as-one (Attraction). It is \textit{set}, however, in respect of the relative repulsion and attraction, \textit{i.e.}, those whereby immediate \textit{there-beent} ones are presupposed, that each itself is this negation of it \textit{in it}, and so also consequently the continuity of it into its other. The repulsion of there-beent Ones is the self-conservation of the one by means of the mutual repulsion of the others, so that (1) the other ones are negated \textit{in it}, the side of its There-being or of its Being-for-other, but this side is just thus attraction as the Ideality of the Ones—and that (2) the One is \textit{in itself} without reference to the Others; but not only is the \textit{In-itself} as such long since gone over into the Being-for-self, but \textit{in itself}, by very determination, the one is said Becoming of Many. The Attraction of there-beent Ones is the ideality of the same and the setting of the One, in which thus it (attraction), as negation and as production of the One, sublates itself—as setting of the one is \textit{in it} the negative of itself, Repulsion.

With this the evolution of Being-for-self is completed, and arrived at its result. The One as referring itself \textit{infinitely}, \textit{i.e.}, as set negation of the negation to \textit{its own self}, is the mediation or process, that it repels from itself itself as its absolute (\textit{i.e.}, abstract) otherwiseness (the Many), and, in that it refers itself to this its non-being, negatively, as sublating it, is just therein only the reference to its own self; and One is only this Becoming, or such that in it the determination—that it \textit{begins}, \textit{i.e.}, that it is set as
Immediate, as Beēnt—and that likewise as result it has restored itself as One, i.e., the equally immediate, excludent One: this determination has disappeared; the process which it [the One] is, sets and implies it always only as a thing sublated. The sublating, determined at first only as relative sublating, reference to other There-beēnt-ity, which reference is thus itself a different repulsion and attraction, demonstrates itself just thus to go over into the infinite reference of mediation through negation of the external references of Immediates and There-beēnts, and to have as result just that Becoming which in the retentionlessness of its moments is the collapse, or rather the going together with itself into simple immediacy. This Being, in the form which it has now attained, is Quantity.

To review shortly the moments of this Transition of Quality into Quantity: The Qualitative has for its ground-determination being and immediacy, in which immediacy the limit and the determinateness is so identical with the being of the something that the something itself with its alteration (that of the determinateness) disappears; thus set it is determined as finity. Because of the immediacy of this unity, in which the difference has disappeared, which difference, however, is still in itself there (in the unity of Being and Nothing), this difference falls as otherwiseness in general out of said unity. This reference to other contradicts the immediacy in which the qualitative determinateness is reference to self. This otherwiseness sublates itself in the infinitude of Being-for-self, which realises the difference (which, in the negation of the negation, it has in it and within itself) as one and many and as their references, and has raised the Qualitative into its veritable unity, i.e., into the unity that is set as no longer immediate but as self-commending unity.

This unity is thus (α) Being, only as affirmative, i.e., immediacy mediated with itself through the negation of the negation, Being is set as the unity that interpenetrates and pervades its own Determinatenesses, Limit, &c., which are set as sublated in it: (β) There-being; it is in this determination negation or determinateness as moment of the affirmative Being, no longer immediate, nevertheless, but reflected into itself, referent of self, not to other, but to self; what is simpliciter—what is determined in itself—the One; the otherwiseness as such is itself Being-for-self: (γ) Being-for-self, as that Being that continues itself all through the determinateness, and in which the One and In-itself-determined-
ness is itself set as sublated. The One is at the same time as
gone out beyond itself and determined as *Unity*, the One conse-
quently, the directly determined Limit, set as the Limit, which is
none, which is in or by Being, but to which Being is indifferent,
or which is indifferent to Being.

**Remark.**

The Kantian construction of matter by means of forces attracting and repelling.

Attraction and Repulsion, as is well known, are usually regarded
as *forces*. It will be proper to compare this definition of them,
and the dependent relations, with the notions which have come
out in their regard. In the conception alluded to (of forces) they
are considered as self-dependent, so that they refer themselves not
through their nature to each other; *i.e.*, that each is not to be
considered only a moment *transient* into its contrary, but as
immovably and persistently opposed to the other. They are
further conceived as coalescing in a Third, Matter; so, however,
that this Becoming into One [the coalescence] is not considered as
their truth, but each is rather a *First* [a prime], and a *Beent-in-and-
for-self* [a self-dependent], while matter or affections of it are set
and produced by them. When it is said, that Matter has *within*
*itself* the forces, there is understood by this unity of them a con-
nexion, but such that in it still they are at the same time presup-
posed as existent in themselves and free from each other.

Kant, as is known, *constructed* matter out of the repulsive and
attractive forces, or at least, as he expresses himself, brought forward
the metaphysical elements of this construction. It will not be
without interest to view this construction more closely. This *metaphysical* exposition of an object which seemed not only itself,
but in its properties to belong only to experience, is for one part
worthy of notice in this, that it, as an essay of (experiment with)
the Notion, has at least given the impulse to the more recent
philosophy of Nature,—that philosophy which makes Nature its
scientific ground, not as it is only sensibly *given* to be seen, but
which construes its principles from the absolute Notion; for another
part also because stand has been frequently taken by said Kantian
construction, and it has been considered a philosophical begin-
ning and foundation of physics.

Such an existence as sensuous matter, is, indeed, no object of
logic, just as little so as space and the forms of space. But there underlie the repulsive and attractive forces, so far as they are regarded as forces of sensuous matter, these same pure determinations of the One and the Many and their mutual references, which have been just considered, and which I have named Repulsion and Attraction because these names present themselves at nearest.

Kant's procedure in the deduction of matter from these forces, named by him a construction, deserves not, when considered close, this name, unless every kind of reflexion, even the analytic, be nameable construction, as indeed for that matter later Nature-philosophers have given the name of construction to the most rapid raisonnement and the most groundless mélange of an arbitrary imagination and a thought-less reflexion,—which specially employed and everywhere applied the so-called Factors of Attraction and Repulsion.

Kant's procedure is at bottom analytic, and not constructive. He presupposes the conception of matter, and then asks what forces are necessary to produce its presupposed properties. Thus, therefore, on one side, he requires an Attractive force, because through Repulsion alone without Attraction no matter could properly exist. ('Anfangsgr. der Naturwissensch,' S. 53, f.) On the other side he derives Repulsion equally from matter, and alleges as ground of this, because we conceive of matter as impenetrable, and this because matter presents itself to the sense of touch, through which sense it manifests itself to us, in such a determination. Repulsion therefore is, further, at once thought in the very notion of matter, because it is just immediately given with it; but Attraction, on the contrary, is annexed to it through inferences. There underlies these inferences, however, what has just been said, namely, that a matter which had only repulsive force would not exhaust what we conceive by matter. This, as is plain, is the procedure of a cognition, reflective of experience,—a procedure which first of all perceives peculiarities in the phenomena, places these as basis, and for the so-called explanation of them, assumes correspondent elements or forces which are to be supposed to produce said peculiarities of the phenomena.

In regard to the difference spoken of as to how the repulsive force and as to how the attractive force is found by cognition in matter, Kant observes, further, that the attractive force belongs quite as much to the notion of Matter although it is not contained in it. Kant italicises this last expression. It is impossible to see, however, what is the distinction which is intended to be
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conveyed here; for what belongs to the notion of a thing must veritably be contained in this thing.

What makes the difficulty, and gives occasion to this empty expedient, consists in this, that Kant one-sidedly, and quite beforehand, reckons in the notion of matter only that property of Impenetrability, which we are supposed to perceive by feeling, on which account the repulsive force, as the holding-off of another from itself, is to be supposed as immediately given. But again, if matter is to be considered as incapable of being there, of existing, without attraction, the ground for the assertion of this must be a conception of matter derived from sensible experience; attraction, therefore, must equally be findable in such experience. It is indeed easy to perceive that Matter, besides its Being-for-self, which sublates the Being-for-other (offers resistance), has also a connectedness of what is for itself [of its parts, that is, identified with itself], extension and retention in space—in solidity a very fast retention. Explanatory physical science demands for the tearing asunder, &c., of a body a force which shall be stronger than the mutual attraction of its particles. From this fact, reflexion may quite as directly deduce the force of attraction, or assume it to be given, as it did in the case of repulsion. In effect, when the Kantian reasonings from which attraction is to be deduced are looked at ('The proof of the theorem that the possibility of matter requires a force of attraction as second fundamental force,' loc. cit.), they are found to contain nothing but that, with mere Repulsion, matter would not exist in space. Matter being presupposed as occupying space, continuity is ascribed to it, as ground of which continuity there is assumed an attracting force.

Granting now, then, to such so-called construction of matter, at most an analytic merit—detracted from, nevertheless, by the imperfect exposition—the fundamental thought is still highly to be prized—the cognising of matter out of these two opposed characters as its producing forces. Kant’s special industry here is the banishment of the vulgar mechanical mode of conception, which takes its stand by the single character, the impenetrability, the Beënt-for-self punctuality, and reduces the opposed character, the connexion of matter within itself, or of several matters mutually (these again being regarded as particular ones), to something merely external;—the mode of conception which, as Kant says, will not admit any moving forces but by Pressure and Push, i.e., but by influence from without. This externality of cognition
always presupposes motion as already externally existent in matter, and has no thought of considering it something internal, and of comprehending it itself in matter, which latter is just thus assumed *per se* as motionless and inert. This position has only before it common mechanics, and not immanent and free motion. Although Kant removes this externality in that he converts attraction, the mutual reference of material parts, so far as these are taken as mutually separated, or just of matter generally in its Out-of-its-self-ness, into a *force of matter itself*, still on the other side his two fundamental forces, within matter, remain external and self-dependent, each *per se opposite* the other.

However null was the independent difference of these two forces attributed to them from this standpoint of cognition, equally null must every other difference show itself, which in regard to their specific nature is taken as something which is to pass for firmness and solidity, because they, when regarded in their truth as above, are only moments which go over into one another. I shall consider these further differentiations as Kant states them.

He defines, for example, attraction as a pervading force by which one matter is enabled to affect the particles of another even beyond the surface of contact—*immediately*; repulsion, on the contrary, as a surface-force by which matters are enabled to affect each other only in the plane of contact common to them. The reason adduced for the latter being only a surface-force is as follows:—‘The parts in mutual contact limit the sphere of influence the one of the other, and the repelling force can affect no remoter part, unless through those that lie between; an immediate influence of one matter on another, that should be supposed to go right through the parts or particles in consequence of an extensive force (so is the repulsive force called here) is impossible.’ (‘S. ebendas. Erklär. u. Zusätze;’ S. 67.)

It occurs at once to remark that, *nearer* or *remoter* particles of matter being assumed, there must arise, in the case of attraction also, the *distinction* that one atom would, indeed, act on another, but a *third* remoter one, between which and the *first*, or the attracting one, the *second* should be placed, would enter directly, and in the first instance, the sphere of the interposed one next to it, and the first consequently could not exercise an *immediate* simple influence on the *third* one; and thus we have a *mediated* influence as much for attraction as for repulsion. It is seen, further, that the *true penetration* of an attracting force must consist in this alone, that all the
particles of matter in and for themselves should attract, and not that a certain number should be passive while only one were active. As regards repulsion, it is to be remarked, that in the adduced passage, particles are represented in mutual contact, that is, we have at once the solidity and continuity of a ready-made matter which allows not any repulsion to take place through it. This solidity of matter, however, in which particles touch each other, that is, are no longer separated by any vacuum, already presupposes the remotion of repulsion; particles in mutual contact are, following the sensuous conception of repulsion that is dominant here, to be taken as such that they do not repel each other. It follows quite tautologically, then, that there where the non-being of repulsion is assumed, there cannot be repulsion. But this yields no additional descriptive character as regards the repulsive force. If it be reflected on, however, that particles touching each other touch only so far as they still keep themselves out of each other, the repulsive force will be seen necessarily to exist, not merely on the surface of matter, but within the sphere which is to be supposed a sphere of attraction only.

Further, Kant assumes that 'through attraction matter only occupies a space without filling it' (loc. cit.); 'because matter does not by its attraction fill space, this attraction is able to act through the empty space, as no matter intervenes to set bounds to it.' This conclusion is about of the same nature as that which supposed above something to belong to the notion of a thing, but not to be contained in the thing itself: only so can matter occupy yet not fill a space. Then it was through repulsion, as it was first considered, that the ones mutually repelled each other, and mutually referred to one another only negatively—that is, just through an empty space. But here it is attraction which preserves space empty; through its connecting of the atoms it does not fill space, that is as much as to say, it maintains the atoms in a negative reference to one another. We see that Kant unconsciously encounters here what lies in the nature of the thing—that he ascribes to attraction precisely the same thing that he, at the first view, ascribed to repulsion. In the very effort to establish and make fixed the difference of the two forces, it had already occurred, that the one was gone over into the other. Thus through repulsion matter was to fill a space, and consequently through it the empty space to disappear which attraction leaves. In effect, in that it eliminates empty space, it eliminates the negative reference of the
atoms or ones, *i.e.*, their repulsion; *i.e.*, repulsion is determined as the contrary of itself.

To this obliteration of the differences there adds itself, still further, the confusion that, as was remarked in the beginning, the Kantian exposition of the opposed forces is analytic, and throughout the whole investigation, matter, which was to have been derived only from these its elements, appears from the first ready-formed and fully constituted. In the definition of the surface-force and of the pervading force, both are assumed as moving forces, whereby *matters* are to be supposed capable of acting the one way or the other. They are enunciated thus, then, as forces not such that only through them should matter exist, but such that through them matter, already formed, should only be moved. So far, however, as there is question of forces by means of which various matters might act on each other and impart movement, this is quite another thing than the determination and connexion which they should have as the moments of matter as such.

The same antithesis, as here between Repulsion and Attraction, presents itself further on as regards the centripetal and centrifugal forces. These seem to display an essential difference, in that in their sphere there stands fast a one, a centre, towards which the other ones comport themselves as not bent-for-self; the difference of the forces, therefore, can be supported on or by this presupposed difference of a central one and of others as, relatively to it, not self-subsistent. So far, however, as they are applied in explanation—for which purpose, as in the case also of repulsion and attraction, they are assumed in an opposed quantitative relation, so that the one increases as the other decreases—it is the movement which they are to explain, and it is its inequality which they are to account for. One has only to take up, however, any ordinary relative explanation—as of the unequal velocity of a planet in its course round its primary—to discern the confusion which prevails in it and the impossibility of keeping the quantities distinct; and so the one, which in the explanation is taken as decreasing, may be always equally taken as increasing, and *vice versa*. To make this evident, however, would require a more detailed exposition than can be here given; all the necessary particulars, nevertheless, are to be found again in the discussion of the *Inverted Relation*. 
III.

THE SECTION, QUALITY, AS TRANSLATED IN II,
HERE COMMENTED AND INTERPRETED.

DEFINITENESS (QUALITY).

The language he has encountered must appear very strange to the uninitiated English reader, and, perhaps, he may be inclined to attribute the circumstance to imperfection of translation. Let him be assured, however, that in German, and to the German student who approaches Hegel for the first time, the strangeness of the initiatory reception is hardly less repulsive than it has but even now proved to himself. There is no valid reason for despair, then, as regards intelligence here, because it is a translation that is before one, and not the original. To due endeavour, the Hegelian thought will gather round these English terms quite as perfectly, or nearly so, as round their German equivalents. Comment nevertheless is wanted, and will facilitate progress.

Bestimmen and its immediate derivatives constitute much the largest portion of the speech of Hegel. The reader, indeed, feels for long that with Bestimmung and Bestimmung he is bestimmt (or verstimmt) into Unbestimmtheit; and even finds himself, perhaps, actually execrating this said Bestimmung of Hegel as heartily as ever Aristotle denounced or renounced the Idea of Plato. Stimme means voice, and the action of Bestimmen is to supply voice to what previously had none. As already said, then, Hegel’s Bestimmung is a sort of naming of Adam: it is a process of logical determination—a process in which concrete determinateness, or determinate concretion, grows and grows in organised complexity up from absolute abstract indeterminateness or from absolutely indeterminate abstraction to a consummate absolute. To Hegel what is,
is thought; and the life of thought can only be logical determination, or the distinguishing (differentiating) of indefinite abstraction (the beginning of thought) into ultimate concrete definiteness (the end of thought) by means of the operation of the faculties of thought (Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason), to the resolution of the Begriff (the An sich, the indefinite Universal) through the Ur-theil (the Für sich, the separation into Particulars, into Many, as against One), and the production of the Schluss (the concrete Singular), which is the All of Thought, Thought elevated into its ultimate and complete concretion as the absolute Subject (which again is the ultimate An und für sich).—This is a very complete expression for the industry of Hegel.—Bestimmen, then, is to develop in abstract thought all its own constitutive, consecutive, and co-articulated members, or elements, or principles. Bestimmen attaches or develops a Bestimmung, and produces Bestimmtheit. Bestimmen is to be-voice, to vocify, voculate, render articulate, to define, determine, or distinguish into the implied constitutive variety: even to accentuate will be seen to involve the same function; or we may say modulate, then modify—that is, discern into modi—the native constituent modi. Bestimmen is the reverse of generalisation; instead of evolving a sumnum genus, it involves a species infima, or rather an individuum—not indeed infimum, but sumnum. Generalisation throws out differentia, Bestimmung (specification, particularisation) adds them. The one abstracts from difference and holds by identity; the other abstracts from identity and holds by difference. Bestimmen, then, is to produce, not logical extension, but logical comprehension (Inhalt), logical determination; it adds differentiae or significates; it means to specify, to differentiate, to distinguish, to qualify, characterise, &c., or more generally, just to define or determine. Bestimmtheit has the sense in it of the past participle: it is a differentia-tum, specificatum, qualificatum—a determinate, a definite in general, or the quality of determinateness and definiteness; hence the meanings attached by Hegel himself to it of form, product, &c., and of element when that word signifies not a constituting, but a constituted element. Bestimmung may refer to the process as a whole, but it generally applies to a resultant member of this process: it is what corresponds to a predicate; it is a signifycate, a specificate, a differentia, &c.; it is an attribute, a property, a peculiarity, a speciality, a particularity, a quality; it is a principle, a sign, an exponent, a constituent, and, in that
sense, an element also. It may be translated character, characteristic, article, member, modus, determination, definition, trait, feature. Then looking to the use of the trait, the senses vocation, destination, &c., are brought in. Qualification is another very useful word for it, and so likewise are form, function, factor, term, specification, expression, value, even affection, state. Bestimmtheit, then, here (in the text before us), is determinateness, the characteristic, the specificity, the definitivity of a thing, the one single vis or virtue that makes it what it is—and that is always due to Quality.

Being, Seyn,—to understand this word, abstract from all particular being, and think of being in general, or of the absolute generality of being. There must be no sense of personality attached to it, as is so common in England; nor, indeed, any sense of anything positive. The common element in the whole infinite chaos of all and everything that is, is being. Seyn, in Germany, often in Hegel himself, means the abstraction of sensuous Isness: but here it is more general than that; it is the quality of Isness pur et simple; it brings with it a sense of comprehensive universality. Carlyle (‘Frederick the Great,’ vol. iii. p. 408) says, “Without Being,” as my friend Oliver was wont to say, “Well-being” is not possible.”’ Cromwell had soldiers and other concretc materiel in his eye, when he said being here; still put as being, these are abstractly put. In like manner, we have here to put, not soldiers, &c. only, but all that is, abstractly as being. It refers, in fact, to the absolutely abstract, to the absolutely generalised thought of being. In short, being as being must be seen to be a solid simple without inside or outside, centre or sides: it is simply to be taken an ihm selber, absolutely abstractly; it is the unit into which all variety, being reflected, has disappeared: it is the an sich of such variety.

The meaning of Immediate, Unmittelbar, will be got by practice: what is abstractly, directly present. Anything seen, felt, &c., is immediate. Being, then, is simply what is indefinitely immediate to us. It (the term immediate) is derived from the logical use of it as in Immediate Inferences, i.e., inferences without intermediate proposition. Essentiy or Essence, Wesen, is inner or true, or noumenal being as opposed to outer, apparent, sensuous, or phenomenal being. It is the principle of what is or shows. It may be translated also inbeeing, or principal being. By practice, however, the Hegelian Wesen will attach itself even to Essence
once the thought is seen. It is evident that, the thought of pure or abstract Seyn being realised, there is no call for any reference to the thought of Wesen. Absolutely abstract being seems self-substantial, and awakens no question of a whence or what; it is thus free from any determination which it might receive by being related to Essence: in this absolute generalisation, indeed, Seyn and Wesen have coalesced and become indistinguishable. But it is as opposed to Wesen that Seyn acquires the sensuous shade already spoken of. In that contraposition, Seyn is phenomenal show; it is the Seyn of Wesen, and so outer, and very outer—a palpable crust, as it were, which very tangibly is. As yet, as we have said, our Seyn is the abstraction from all that is, and so the common element of all that is. It is to be said and seen, also, that the two shades of Seyn tend to run together, for, after all, each at last only implies immediacy to consciousness.

In itself (An sich), italicised, means in itself as virtually, implicit, or potentially in itself: it is the ἐνυαμύς of Aristotle. At the end of the first paragraph, we have also an ‘in its own self’ which is not italicised: this is a translation of the peculiarly Hegelian German, an ihm selber,—an innovation on his own tongue to which Hegel was compelled in order to distinguish another and current shade of meaning which might confuse the sense he wished to attach to an sich. An ihm selber, in fact, implies, not the mere latent potentiality of an sich, but a certain overt potentiality, a certain manifestation, a certain propria persona actuality, formal presence, a certain assouance to the Aristotelian ἐντελέχεια. Hegel intimates, as we saw above (pp. 256-7), that an sich, with the accent not on sich, but on an, may be viewed as equivalent to an ihm. But an sich, on the whole, in the passage referred to, has taken on a shade of meaning quite peculiar to the place (Lk. i. pp. 126-7). In this latter case what is an ihm is to be regarded as Seyn-für-Anderes, and so outwardly an ihm (in it). Hegel illustrates the meaning here by the common expressions, there is nothing in him or in it, or there is something in that, and seems to see implied in these a certain parallelism or identity between what is latent in itself, and what is overt in it. The addition of the selbst or selber introduces another shade, and renders the task of a translation still more difficult; for in English an ihm selber is in itself quite as much as an sich. To separate the words, as in the first German phrase, and say in it self, would be hardly allowable. Perhaps the plan actually adopted is as good as any:
that is, to italicise in itself when it stands for an sich, and to leave it without such distinction, or write it, as here, ‘in its own self’ (also without italics), when it represents an ihm selbst or selber. What is intended to be conveyed by the text Seyn an ihm selber, Being in its own self, is not hard to make out: it means being as (when abstractly thought) it is there before us overtly in its own self, and without reference to another or any other. An sich, then, implies potential latency; An ihm selber, irrespective selfness, or irrespective, self-dependent overtness; and An ihm, such overtness connected with and equivalent to such latency. Again, these terms will occur in Hegel, not always in their technical senses, but sometimes with various shades, and very much as they occur in other writers. It must be confessed, indeed, that it is these little phrases which constitute the torment of everyone who attempts to translate Hegel. An, for example, in the phrase an ihm, is often best rendered by the preposition by. An, in fact, is not always coincident with the English in. An denotes proximity, and is often best translated by at or by: nay, in all of the three phrases above, the substitution of at or by for in will help to illustrate the contained meaning. Consider the phrase ‘Das Seyn scheint am Wesen,’ which we may translate, the phenomenon shows in the noumenon; would not the sense seem to be more accurately conveyed by, the phenomenon shows by the noumenon, or even by, the phenomenon shows at the noumenon? When an refers to overtness or manifestation, then, we may translate it by.*

There-being or Here-being is the translation of Daseyn, and is an unfortunate necessity. Existence might have answered here; but Existence, being reserved by Hegel to name a much later finding, is taken out of our hands. What a German means by Daseyn is, this mortal sojourn, this sublunary life, this being here below; and what Hegel means by it, is the scientific abstract thought implied in such phrases. It is thus mortal state, or the quality of sublunarity; it is existential definiteness, or definite existentiality, and implies reference thus to another or others. It is determinate being.—Here-being. There-being, Now-being, or, best perhaps, So-being or That-being; it is the quasi-permanent moment of being that manifests itself between Coming to be, and Ceasing to be; it is the to-be (Seyn) common to both phrases: and

* It is to be borne in mind, too, that the An sich of a thing is the special inner being of it, the essential truth of it.—N.
This constitutes the perfectly correct abstract description, or thought (the notion), of every single Daseyn or Here-being, or So-being, and consequently of Daseyn, Here-being, So-being, as such.*

Being-for-self is the literal rendering of Fursichseyn; which, indeed, cannot be translated otherwise. It means the reference of all the constituents of an individuality, of a personality, of a self, to the punctual unity of that individuality, or personality, or self: it is the focus in the draught of the whole huge whirlpool— that whereby its Many are One. For, however, does not completely render Fur. The German, when much intruded on, exclaims, 'One can never be Fur, sich here!' Vowels also are described as letters which fur sich sound, consonants not so. Fur sich, then, is the Latin per se and a little more: it expresses not only independence of others, but occupation for oneself. Were a Voter, when asked, 'Whom are you for?' to reply, 'For myself,' he would convey the German fur mich. That is fur sich which is on its own account. By Fürsichseyn, Being-for-self, then, we are to understand a being by one's own self and for one's own self.

Generally, in reading Hegel, let us bear both the current and the etymological meanings in mind. That finite, for example, is literally ended or limited, infinite unended or unlimited, must not be lost sight of. Finally, I will add this, that almost all the technical terms of Hegel appear in Kant also, especially in his 'Logic,' where much light is thrown upon them as used, not by the latter only, but by the former as well.

* When your servant announces to you, The Postman ist da, that is Da-Seyn. This environment of miscellaneousness is Daseyn; and every item of it is a Daseyendes—your pen, ink, chair, table, &c. These are all finites—items of finite existence, Daseyn. Schelling (WW, i. 300) has thus: 'It is sufficiently striking that the language has so exactly distinguished between the Daseyendes (that is in space and time) and the Seyenden (that is independent of any such condition'). A Da-seyendes—what is un-mediated, as though by direct sense, face to face with us—is also an immediate.

I may add here what has its cue, p. 385. To call the categories 'functions of apperception' is quite common; but then Ego to Kant is only a logical point and wholly empty, where is there room for functions? But again, if (ii. 738 n.) dieses Vermigen ist der Verstand selbst, and understanding is judgment, &c. ! Kant, in the Deduction of the Categories, if even with no thought of functions, certainly gives an objective role to apperception.—N.
CHAPTER I.

BEING.

A. Pure Being.—B. Nothing.—C. Becoming: 1. Unity of Being and Nothing.

The explanation of terms already given seems sufficient for the above sections also; and we may now apply ourselves to some interpretation of the particular matter, confining our attention for the present to what of text precedes Remark 1. We shall rely upon the reader perusing and re-perusing, and making himself thoroughly familiar with all he finds written in the paragraphs indicated.

All that they present has remained hitherto a universal stumbling-block, and a matter of hissing, we may say at once, to the whole world. Probably, indeed, no student has ever entered here without finding himself spell-bound and bewildered, spell-bound and bewildered at once, spell-bound and bewildered—if he has had the pertinacity to keep at them and hold by them—perhaps for years. When the bewilderment yields, however, he will find himself, it is most likely, we shall say, putting some such questions as the following:—1. What has led Hegel to begin thus? 2. What does he mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements? 3. What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming? 4. What does the whole thing amount to; or what is the value of the whole business? These questions being satisfactorily answered, perhaps Hegel will at last be found accessible.

1. What has led Hegel to begin thus?—To this question, the answer is brief and certain: Hegel was led to begin as he did in consequence of a profound consideration of all that was implied in the Categories, and other relative portions of the philosophy, of
Kant. But in order to awaken intelligence and carry conviction here, it is obviously incumbent upon us to do what we can to reproduce the probable course of Hegel's thinking when engaged in the consideration alluded to. No doubt, for a full explanation, there were necessary some preliminary exposition of the industry of Kant; but, simply assuming such, we hope still to be able to describe at present Hegel's operations, so far as Kant is concerned, not unintelligibly.*

The speculations peculiar to Hume generally, and more especially those which bear on Causality, constitute the Grundlage, the fundament, the mother-matter of the products of Kant. Now in this relation (of Causality) there are two terms or factors, the one antecedent and the other consequent; the former the cause, and the latter the effect. But if we take any cause by itself and examine it d'\textit{a priori}, we shall not find any hint in it of its corresponding effect: let us consider it ever so long, it remains self-identical only, and any mean of transition to another—to aught else—is undiscoverable. But again, we are no wiser, should we investigate the matter \textit{\textit{d} posteriori}: that the effect follows the cause, we see; but why it follows—the reason of the following—the precise mean of the nexus—the exact and single copula—this we see not at all. The source of the nexus being thus undiscoverable, then, whether \textit{\textit{a priori} or \textit{d} posteriori}, it is evident that causality is on the same level as what are called Matters of Fact, and that it cannot pretend to the same authority as what again are called Relations of Ideas. Did it belong to these latter—examples of which are the axioms and other determinations of Mathematic—it would be both necessary and intelligibly necessary; but as it belongs only to the former class, the weight of its testimony—its validity—can amount to probability only. That a straight line is the shortest possible from any \textit{here} to any \textit{there}, I see to be universally and necessarily true—from Relations of Ideas; but that wood burns and ice melts, I see to be true only as—Matters of Fact, which are so, but might, so far as any reason for the state of the fact is concerned, be otherwise: they are, in truth, just matters of fact, and relations of ideas do not exist in them. Matters of Fact, then, are probable; but Relations of Ideas are apodictic, at once necessary and universal. Causality now belonging to the former, it is evident that the nexus between the fire and the burn-

* The \textit{Text-Book to Kant} has been already referred to as realising a contemplated preliminary exposition.—N.
ing of wood (say) is but of a probable nature. The fire burns the
wood, I perceive; but it might not: the affair concerns contingent
matter only, and no examination of the relation, either à priori or
à posteriori, can detect any reason of necessity. Causality, then,
as presenting itself always in matters of fact, and as exhibiting
neither à priori nor à posteriori any relation of ideas, cannot claim
any authority of necessity. Why, then, when I see a cause, do I
always anticipate the effect; and why, when I see an effect, do I
always refer to a cause? Shut out, for an answer here, from the
relations of ideas, and restricted to matters of fact, I can find,
after the longest and best consideration, no ground for my antici-
patation but custom, habit, or the association (on what is called the
law of the Association of Ideas) of things in expectation which I
have found once or oftener associated in fact; for so habitual
becomes the association, that even once may be found at times to
suffice.—Thus far Hume.

But now Kant—who has been much struck by the curious new
views so ingeniously signalised by Hume, and who will look into
the matter and not shut his eyes, nor exclaim (as simply Reid did,
in the panic of an alarmed, though very worthy and intelligent,
divine), 'God has just put all that into our souls, so be off with
your sceptical perplexings and perplexities.'—(Neither will he
pragmatically assert, like Brown, Causality is a relation of an
invariable antecedent and an invariable consequent, and absurdly
think that by the use and not the explanation of this term invari-
able, which is the whole problem, he has satisfactorily settled all!)
—now Kant, who is neither a Reid nor a Brown, but a man as
able as Hume himself, steps in and says, this nexus suggested by
you (Hume) between a cause and its effect, is of a subjective
nature only; that is, it is a nexus in me, and not in them (the
cause and the effect); but such nexus is inadequate to the facts.
That this unsupported paper falls to the ground—the reason of that
is not in me surely, but in the objects themselves; and the reason
of my expectation to find the same connexion of events (as between
unsupported paper and the ground) is not due to something I find
in myself, but to something I find in them. I cannot intercalate
any custom or habit of my own as the reason of that connexion.
True, as you say, neither à priori nor à posteriori can I detect the
objective copula; and true, it is also that we have before us only
contingent matter or Matters of Fact: nevertheless, the nexus is
such that mere custom is inadequate to explain it. The nexus is
such, indeed, that (as Brown saw *) it introduces an element of invariability, and custom evidently cannot reach as far as that; so that the question remains, why are the objects invariably connected in our expectation—why, in short, is the relation of causality as necessary and as universal in its validity as any axiom of Mathematic, as any one of those very Relations of Ideas from which it has but this moment been expressly excluded? Every change (effect) has its cause: this is a truth of no probable nature, we say, we see that cork floats, but it might not; but we cannot say we see that change has its cause, but it might not: on the contrary, we feel, we know, that change must—and always—have its cause. Now, the source of this Necessity and Universality—that is the question, and lie where it may, it very plainly cannot be an effect of any mere subjective condition of ourselves, of any mere anticipation through habit. Hume certainly has shut us out—though very oddly he himself (in custom) had recourse to such—from all à posteriori sources; for whatever is known à posteriori, or by experience, is but a Matter of Fact, and therefore probable only, or contingent only. But, if the source cannot be à posteriori, it must be à priori. Hume, to be sure, talks of an à priori consideration in this very reference (causality); but there must be another and truer à priori than the à priori of Hume. Now, first of all, what is it that we name the à posteriori? That is à posteriori, the knowledge of which is due to experience alone; and the organ of experience is perception, sensation, inner or outer; inner for affections from within, and outer for affections from without. But Locke traces all our knowledge to affection either of outer or of inner sense, therefore all our knowledge must be à posteriori. But this is manifestly erroneous; for in that case, there could be no apodictic, no necessary and universal knowledge at all: but there is such knowledge—universally admitted, too—in what are called relations of ideas; and causality seems itself—though with a difference—another instance of the same kind. This latter knowledge, then (the apodictic), cannot be à posteriori, and, consequently, it must be à priori. But besides sensuous affection, we possess only intel-

* It is sufficiently curious, in the end, to perceive that Brown, when he said 'invariable connexion is Causality, and we know all the cases of such connexion by the will of the Divine Being,' fancied himself to be saying something against Reid, or something for or against Hume—or just fancied himself to be philosophising indeed!
lectual function: if the former be the source and seat of the à posteriori, then the latter may be the source and seat of the à priori. But that being so, the necessity of causality must still have its seat in the mind, in us; or, in other words, its source must be subjective—and we have just declared a subjective source impossible! Again, we have just said also that causality concerns contingent matter: change itself is only known à posteriori or by experience! Here seem great difficulties. How can what is only à posteriori obey what can only be à priori? And how can an à priori or necessary truth have a subjective source, or belong to the mind only? As has been seen already also and just said, this necessity of causality is not the only truth that cannot be à posteriori; we are led to enlarge the problem to the admission of the whole sphere named Relations of Ideas. Relations of Ideas! The phrase belongs to Hume himself, and he admits the necessity involved: did Hume, then, never ask whence are they? and did he unthinkingly fancy that, though Ideas themselves—as but derivative from Matters of Fact—were contingent and probable, the Relations that subsisted among them might be apodictic and necessary? Had Hume stumbled on such considerations as these, he would have been led into a new inquiry; he would have been forced to abandon his theory of all our knowledge being limited to Impressions of Sense and resultant Ideas of Reflexion; he would have been forced to see that, as there are apodictic truths, there must be a source of knowledge à priori as well as à posteriori, and that all our ideas are not necessarily copies of our impressions. Stimulated by the example of causality, too, he might have been led to see that the element of necessity did not restrict itself to Relations of Ideas only, but associated itself with contingent matter, with Matters of Fact as well; and might have asked, therefore, are there not, besides causality, other such examples of an apodictic force in à posteriori or contingent matter?—what is the whole sphere of necessary knowledge, as well pure as mixed?—and what is the peculiar source of all such knowledge? In this way, he might have been led to perceive that apodictic matter, impossibly à posteriori, must be à priori, and an à priori which had attained new reaches. He had talked, for example, of examining a cause à priori in search of its effect, as has been already remarked: but, after all, this à priori is à priori only as regards the effect; after all, any knowledge gained by the examination would be of an à posteriori
nature. The true \textit{à priori}, then, must be anterior, not to this and that experience, but to all experience; it must concern a knowledge that is not empirical, that reaches us not from elsewhere through a channel of sense. Plainly, then, it must be an element confined to the mind itself; and plainly also, lie where it may, it must lie elsewhere than in sensation. Now, it is this \textit{elsewhere than in sensation} that gives the cue and clue to the possibility of an element of necessity \textit{subjective} as \textit{in us}, but of an \textit{objective validity} and of an \textit{objective rôle}. Sensation being excluded, there remains for us the understanding only; and it is not so difficult to surmise that principles of the understanding—a faculty that concerns insight, discernment, evidence—may bring with them their own authority. The contributions of sensation, for example, are wholly subjective in this sense, that they are mine only, or yours only, or his only—that they are incapable of communication, and, consequently, incapable likewise of comparison. An odour, a savour, a touch, a sound, a colour, affects me, affects you, affects him; but the affection of each is peculiar and proper to himself; we cannot show each other our affections; that is, they are incommunicable and incapable of comparison. But it is different with the contributions of understanding: these bring their own evidence; this evidence is the same to all of us; it can be universally communicated, and universally compared. Now, a validity of this nature may be correctly named \textit{objective}, for it is \textit{independent of every subject}. An \textit{objective rôle}, again, implies that the possessor of such rôle presents itself \textit{with} and \textit{in} objects. \textit{A priori} principles, then, will be principles peculiar to the understanding only; \textit{subjective} in that they have their source \textit{in the mind, in us}, but \textit{objective} in that they possess \textit{a universal and necessary validity independent of every subject}; and \textit{objective}, perhaps, also in this, that though \textit{subjective in origin}, they present themselves \textit{with} and \textit{in} objects \textit{in every event of actual experience}. In this manner, we can see the possibility of an apodictic element both pure and mixed. In fact, we see that the whole business was opened, when we opposed sensuous affection to intellectual function, and assigned the \textit{à posteriori} to the one and the \textit{à priori} to the other. This very sentence, indeed, is \textit{the} key to German Philosophy; it is a single general expression for the operations as well of Hegel as of Kant. German Philosophy, as we all know, begins with the question: How are Synthetic Judgments \textit{à priori} possible? Now to this question, the answer of Kant—and the answer is his
system—is, Intellectual Function with the *à priori* sensuous forms, or sensuous *species*—Space and Time; while the answer of Hegel—implying in his case a system also—is Intellectual Function alone.

But to apply this to Causality—how find in the mind a principle correspondent to something so very outward and *à posteriori*, and yet so apodictic and necessary? Now the intellect, or the understanding, is just Judgment; and Judgment has functions, of which functions the various classes of propositions (which are but decisions or judgments of Judgment) are the correspondent Acts. Now the hypothetical class of propositions points to a function of Judgment which we may name Reason and Consequent. Evidently at once here is a function of Judgment, the sequence of the elements of which is exactly analogous to the sequence of the elements of Causality. The state of the case, however, is not yet free from great difficulty. Assuming the function of Reason and Consequent to be the mental archetype of Causality, how are we to connect it with contingent matter, and reduce it into a relation which—within us as Reason and Consequent—comes to us actually from without in the shape of innumerable real causes and innumerable real effects? This very important portion—so suggestive as it proved to Hegel—of Kant’s industry is wholly unknown in England, and seems to have been universally neglected (unless by Hegel) in Germany. If the reader will take the trouble to turn up the works of Sir William Hamilton, he will find Kant’s theory relegated to that class which names Causality only a special and peculiar mental principle, and nothing more. Of the deduction of the principle—and in a System of such—from the very structure of the mind itself, and of the laborious succession of links whereby it is demonstrated to add itself to outward facts and come back to us with the same, there is not one word in Hamilton. He knows only that Kant opines Causality to be a peculiar mental principle! In short, no Ahnung, not even a boding of the true state of the case, seems ever

* The antithesis of *matters of fact and relations of ideas* is virtually identical with that of *sensuous affection and intellectual function*. Unnamed, it underlies the whole thing. Hume shut himself out from relations of ideas by erroneously seeing (in Causality, &c.) matters of fact only. Kant was driven by the evidence or peculiar *validity* of causality to what was *in effect* relations of ideas. Hegel, *in effect*, has only cleared relations of ideas into their *system*—that crystal skeleton which, the whole *truth* of the concrete, of sensuous affection, of matters of fact, underlies and supports the same. Of this, so to speak, invisible skeleton Causality is but one of the bones.—The above answer put to Kant is to Hegel the ‘What’ that is asked for by Jacobi—see back, p. 232.—N.
to have dawned on this great German scholar, who knew the Germans just so well and intimately that he annihilated them all! It is amusing to observe the self-assured Sir William fooling himself to the top of his bent with his sharp distinctions and well-poised divisions about Kant violating the law of parsimony, postulating a new and express principle, while he, for his own vast part, on the contrary, &c. &c.!!! Hamilton, however, introduces into his own theory (!) a certain relativity of time; and relativity of time—but with something of a claim to coherency and sense, the while—belongs the theory of Kant also.—Now, one can believe that Hamilton was at least an ardent manipulator of the leaves of books.

Time it was that became in the hands of Kant the medium of effecting the reduction in question, or that connexion between the inner and the outer which was manifestly so necessary. It will not be required of us at present, however, to track the probable heuristic course of Kant any further in this direction. Suffice it to say, that the desire to incorporate an inner law with outer bodies—especially in such a reference as Causality—necessarily led Kant to a consideration of Space and Time. The result of this consideration was, that space and time, though perceptive objects and so far sensuous, were à priori and so far intellectual, so far appertinent to the mind itself. In this way, there was à priori or native to the mind, not only function, but affection: both being side by side in the mind, then, function had affection in its clutch, or Unity had a Many on which it might exercise its energy. A schema, an à priori schema was thus formed, into which matter from without—that is, empirical or à posteriori matter—had to fit itself—to the eventual production of the formed, of the rational, of the ruled and regulated—universal context of Experience.

Indeed, thought Kant, how can it be otherwise? The à posteriori is but affection: we are, of course, acted on from without, but we know only the resultant affections set up. These are within us: they have no system in themselves, they are wholly contingent: this system which they so much require, they can only obtain within us, and the understanding alone is what is adequate to the want. In the end, the affections of sense were found to be construed into the formed universe, through the à priori perceptive spectra, Space and Time, and under the synthetic energy of the various functions of Apperception.* Lastly, the various synthes

* See Note, p. 327 at end.
of these functions were named Categories.—Causality, then, is but a function of Apperception, externalised into, and coming back to us from, or with, actual outer objects, through the media, sensuous but à priori, or à priori but sensuous, of Space and Time. Now, observe what the world has become! It is now wholly in us; but we to it are quite formal; we are but the subjectivity that actualises it, as it were, into life; it is function and affection—it is the matter within us: abstracting from ourselves then, that matter of function and affection remains, and the world is this: There are intellectual Syntheses (Categories), there are Space and Time, there are Empirical Affections. But, narrowly looked at—and this is a consequence of Kant's own industry, though it never occurred to Kant—empirical affections, as well as space and time, are but externalisations of the categories, are but outwardly what the categories are inwardly. The categories, then, are truly what is; the categories are the true essence of the universe: in the categories we have to look for the ultimate principles, and the ultimate principle of everything that is. This is what occurred to Hegel; and it is here that he receives the torch from the hands of Kant, and proceeds to carry it further. Intellectual Function is the secret, then: almost it would seem as if the work of Kant and Hegel were but a new analysis of the human mind, a new statement of its constituent elements, an identification of this mind and these elements with, an enlargement of this mind and these elements to, the mind and elements of God—and all so that creation should be seen to be but the other of this mind and these elements—to be but the external counterpart of these, its internal archetype and archetypes. Now this is probably the shortest and clearest general view we have yet attained to; but we cannot stop here—the uninitiated reader must be carried more deeply into the details still, before he can be dismissed as competently informed. Nevertheless, it will always be of use to bear in mind that the ultimate proposition of Hegel seems to be this: To know all the Functions which Affections obey, and to demonstrate the presence of the former everywhere in the latter, would be at once to know the Absolute, and to complete Philosophy.

Let us look well at these categories, then, says Hegel, and consider them in their own absolute truth. First of all, then, there are the four capital Titles, as Kant names them, Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Now, of these the first three are evidently objective and material, while the last is only subjective
and formal: the first three concern the constitution and construction of objects themselves, the last only their relation to us. But to the development of the absolute world, we abstract from ourselves, and it would seem, therefore, as if we must abstract also from this modality of Kant. Things exist in Quantity, Quality, and Relation; and this division seems complete in itself. As for Subjectivity—and it is subjectivity that modality involves—it is a sphere apart; Subjectivity, in short, implies Things and something more. Things have their own laws; but Subjectivity appears in an element which, while implying laws of its own, involves subjection to those of things also. Subjectivity, then, appears a higher stage, and it seems necessary to complete things or objectivity first.

The first glance of Hegel, then, eliminates for the nonce modality, and we have to see him now employed on Quantity, Quality, and Relation. Now, are these the most universal of all objective categories, and are they complete? Again, this being so, are they deducible the one from the other, and all from a common principle which is obviously the First and the Fundament? The categories being the Absolute, being to say What is, it is evident that their completion—and in a system—would constitute, at last, Philosophy. They cannot, then, be left standing as we receive them from Kant. Notwithstanding that Kant derives them from the functions of Judgment, actual analysis fails; they have not in him the architectonic oneness and fullness which he himself desiderates, but rather that rhapsodic appearance of undeducedness and incompleteness which he himself abhors. They look meagre, disconnected, arbitrary: we instinctively refuse to accept them as the inner and genetic archetypes of all that is. We must be better satisfied in their regard: they must be larger and fuller somehow: we must trace them both up to their necessary source, and down into all the ramifications of their completed system. In this way, we shall have the crystal of the universe, the diamond net into which the whole is wrought, God and the thoughts of God before the birth of time or a single finite intelligence, or even entity. Idealism thus would be finished and complete. Thought would constitute the universe: the universe would simply be thought, thought in its two reciprocal sides, thought inner and thought outer. The proper name for Philosophy in this case would be Logic; for, indeed, the all of things would simply be reduced to
Logic. Nay, Logic would be the Absolute—Logic would supplant and replace Theology itself. The chaos of this universe, in fact, that stands before ordinary intelligence, would shapingly collapse into the law and order and unity of a single life—a life which we should understand—a life which each of us should participate—modally. The Substance, Attribute, and Modus of Spinoza would thus be realised, would thus have flesh on their bones, and be alive and actual. These are grand thoughts, suggestive of a close at last to the inquest of man: we must complete them: we must take up the lead that Kant has given us: we must strike boldly through the gate which he—led up to it by Hume—has been the first to open to us! Let us look well to what he has done, then; let us follow all his steps; above all, let us look again into all the materials he has collected as categories. What we have to do is to complete their Many, and to find their One: what we have to do is to demonstrate the All, and in co-articulation with the Principium—with that which is first and one and inderivative!

As regards their One, that in Kant is Apperception, Judgment;* but Judgment is only a single moment of Logic: there remain two others—Simple Apprehension and Reason. The last, certainly, Kant has drawn into consideration, but perhaps imperfectly; and, as regards the second (the first in the rubric), he has not thought of it at all. But, if Logic is to be considered the principle of the whole—(and why should not Logic constitute the principle of the whole?—what God has created must be but an emanation of his own thought, of his own nature; and do we not know that man, so far as he is a Spirit, is created in the likeness of God?—why, then, should not Logic, which is the crystal of man’s thought, be the crystal also of God’s thought, and the crystal as well of God’s universe—of that universe which, as God’s universe, must be but the realisation, the other side, of God’s thought?)—if Logic, then, is to be the principle of the whole, we must be serious with Logic, and take it together in all its parts. Simple Apprehension, then, is a moment no more to be omitted than any of the rest.

But, possessing the light of system and unity which Kant’s demand for an architectonic principle has kindled in us, we cannot be content with Logic itself in these mere chapters and

* Kant (WW. ii. 69, 70, 79, 788) identifies consciousness with understanding, understanding with judgment, and judgment with thought or thinking itself. See also Text-Book to Kant, p. 389.—New.
headings, in this mere side-by-side of Simple Apprehension Judgment, and Reason: they, too, must be organically fused into a concrete unit, which unit were evidently the ultimate or basal unit, the absolutely primordial cell—in other words, the Absolute itself. But is this possible?—can we view these as but elements of a single pulse, moments of a single movement? Yet, again, what we are contemplating is a principle too subjective for our objects as yet, and we seem to be tending too much to the standpoint of Kant. Kant held by Apperception and a subjective idealism: Kant postulated an elsewhere which, received into our organs, only so and so affected us, only so and so appeared to us in consequence of the constitution peculiar, not to it (the elsewhere, the thing-in-itself), but to them (the organs). In this way, knowledge could only be phenomenal and provisional. But it is not so that we would view the problem: we eliminate subjectivity in the first instance; we stretch out the threads of the categories as the primordial and essential filaments; on these we lay the particularised universe of things;—and then we say, Behold the world, behold what is! With such design before us, then, we cannot begin with Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason: these, as named, concern subjectivity; and even if they are the ultimate moments of the All, we must have them in another form before we can lay them down as objective categories of foundation and support. We can talk of Quantity, Quality, and Relation, for these are objective, and all things submit to their forms. But the moments of Logic in the form of the moments of Logic are too subjective to serve a similar purpose: in such form, they seem alien to things. The moments of Logic in such form, then, will not answer as a beginning, however much they may constitute the true rhythm of all things. In other words, the Logical movement is the ultimate principle—but we do not find it in the beginning in that form; it has a preliminary path to describe before reaching the same.—But let us look again at the categories as we find them in Kant.

Well, we look at them—and it is to be seen, without difficulty, that they are but results of generalisation. The question occurs, then, has this process reached completion, or is it susceptible of being carried further? Again, in the latter event, might not, in ultimate generalisation, a category be anticipated which should be the category of categories, or the notion of notions; for Kant himself calls the categories notions, Stamm-
begriffe, root-notions. The notion of notions!—well, but we have just seen that the logical movement must be the fundamental principle; if, in another way, therefore, a notion of notions is to emerge with a claim to the like authority and place, the two results must coincide and be identical. In other words, this ultimate generalisation, this last abstraction, which is the notion of notions, will constitute the first form of the logical pulse—and, in general, just the beginning that we want. This logical pulse, too, being coincident with the ultimate category or notion of notions, is capable of being regarded as κατ’ ἑκόμην the Notion.

But the categories are, so to speak, concrete abstractions: they possess a filling, content, matter, an implement, a complement, an ingest, an intent, a tenor, a purport, an import (Inhalt): Quantity possesses universality, particularity, singularity; Quality, affirmation, negation, limit; Relation, substance, causality, reciprocity. The ultimate Category, or the Notion, then, being also a concrete abstraction like the rest, will possess a filling of its own; and this filling or matter must be the universal of all these fillings or matters. Each of these matters, again, must be but a particular of it (the matter of the notion), as universal. They, then, thus particulars of the same universal, must be mutually related and affiliated as congruent differences of the same identity.—But in this last phrase we have a hint given us as to how we should regard the matter of the notion. These words identity and difference can be used in description of the first two moments of the matter of all the Titles. Under Quantity, Universality, not only in its notion, but in its very name, points to unity or identity; while Particularity, again, is but difference—the particulars are but the differences of the universal, the species but the differences of the genus. Under Quality, Affirmation is plainly identity—but the identity, so to speak, of common concurrence; and as plainly Negation is difference, for it implies a No to a Yes, or difference is at twain, and two contain difference. Under Relation, Substance is but the supporting identity of the All of things, while Causality is but the difference in this identity—implying, as it does always, the first and the second, the one and the other. The fourth Title of Kant we have eliminated for the present as it refers to subjectivity: nevertheless, the fourth title is equally illustrative of the same facts—Nay, in the Titles themselves, let alone their moments, cannot a like relation be detected? Is not the Quality of anything just its own identity?—and is not
Quantity just anything's own difference? Increase or decrease of Quantity (within limits) does not alter Quality (you and I would be much the same were we some pounds heavier: the cabbage is its own identity (and this lies in its quality), but its growth from day to day (Quantity) constitutes its difference)—And this is a lesson to us—Kant is wrong to place Quantity before Quality—now that attention is called to this, we seem to see, just in a general way indeed, that Quality ought to precede Quantity: Quality is indeed the inner reality or identity, while Quantity is but the outer difference.—In identity and difference, then, we seem to have obtained wider universals for the two first moments of all the Kantian triads. But they are triads; what, then, of a third moment in this our own new triad?—may we hope to find a similar wider universal for it also? Now this will not be difficult, if we observe in each triad the relation which the third term or moment bears to the first and second. The third moment, in fact, always seems to participate in both of those which precede;—we can see it, in a manner, to conjoin and sum these. The singular, for example, contains in it both the universal and the particular; limitation implies both affirmation and negation; while, in the last place, reciprocity or community seems to contain in its one virtue both that of substantiality and that of causality. But these triads of Kant have been derived from certain Logical triads which also manifest the same property. To convince himself of this, let the reader but glance at the Table in Kant that sums the various judgments: Disjunctive, for example, does it not involve a virtue at once Categoric and Hypothetic? Nay, does not the third Title, Relation (we have eliminated the fourth), manifest itself as but, in a manner, a uniting medium of both Quantity and Quality—though, to be sure, it is a relation—proportion of quantity, with quality as a result—rather than Relation in general, which accurately accomplishes this? (By-the-bye, let us not forget this exact new third just discovered for Quantity and Quality—Proportion, Measure, Maass!)

But if the third moment is always related to the first and second, they, too, probably will be mutually related?—It really is so. This, indeed, we have already said: in every case, it is the relation of identity and difference. On looking quite close, indeed, the second moment (difference) is seen to be just the opposite, the contrary, the negative of the first (identity). Negation is the opposite of affirmation; particularity is the opposite of
universality; and the same relation does in fact obtain between substantiality and causality, for the latter involves reference to dependence or derivation, and that is the opposite of substantiality. Now, looking to the Titles themselves, there is virtually the same relation between Quality and Quantity; for if the one is inner, the other is outer.

The three moments, then, are always interconnected, as Yes, No, and Both. This is sufficiently singular, and suggests very clearly the possibility of ranging all in a common system. The movement plainly is one of identity, opposition, and reconciliation of both in a new identity. This movement, accordingly, name it as we may (in the terms of Aristotle as formerly, if it is thought fit), is the notion of notions, or the notion. This movement will be the logical movement also. Yes; the same relation but repeats itself in the triad Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason (Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss): Judgment always says no to the awards of Sense, and Reason reconciles them in a new and higher truth. Such is but the history of the world!—What we see everywhere is but the logical movement repeating itself in a variety of forms and under a variety of names. We have certainly discovered the principle, then, and the proper pulse of this principle: but how are we to set it in action to the production of a system? The categories have presented themselves as triads, the moments of which collapse, in the case of each triad, into a trinity (tri-unity). Now, let us but find the first trinity, and the sequence of trinities ought to flow of itself, according to the movement, up to the ultimate trinity, which is the consummation of the whole: in this way, the thing would be done—our aim accomplished!

The course of Hegel's thoughts and the nature of his whole industry—dialectic and all—can now have no difficulty to any reader. A glance at the contents of the 'Logik' or 'Encyclopaedie' will—from the mere outside—amply suffice to confirm all. Consider this one point: it occurred to ourselves, a moment ago, that it was difficult to find and name a proper third to identity and difference as identity and difference; and we were tempted to say, community or reciprocity itself. On turning to the contents of the works named (the 'Logik' and the 'Encyclopaedie'), we found Hegel had experienced the same difficulty; for in the one work, the third to identity and difference is the Contradiction, while in the other it is the Ground. This last term approaches, it will be
observed, the one which had occurred to ourselves, Community; for the Ground is the Community of the Differences.

Hegel now, then, has realised Logic. He has discovered the principle of the Categories, and of their concatenation as well—a principle which is true in fact, and which is capable of being made the principle of the universe. What he has to do now, then, is to complete the categorical trinities, and, at the same time, conduct them all up to, or derive them all down from, a similar simple multiple, or multiple simple, which were the First and indervative. But to this he possesses a clue in perceiving that the process is one of logical determination, where, necessarily, the first is the absolute abstraction, and the last the absolute concretion. Again, both of these will be but forms of the absolute principle, which is the notion; and the notion—quantitatively named, but with a qualitative force—is the reciprocal unity, or the tautological reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity. Here, in fact, is the type of the system itself: the absolute universal will be the First, while the absolute singular will be the Last, and the absolute particular—or the ultimate categories which represent all the ground-thoughts descriptive and constructive of the universe—will be the Middle, or the matter comprehended between the first and last. For a First, then, Hegel sees that he must find the most abstract universal, or the most universal abstract; or that he must find that trinity which shall exhibit the notion in its most abstract or universal form. In a word, he must find the most abstract universal identity (the genus), the most abstract universal difference (the differentia), and the most abstract universal community of identity and difference (the species), or however else we may name—and the names are legion—the several constituent moments of the notion. But Hegel has actually before him other categories and many remarks of Kant for his express guidance and direction in this whole industry. Some of these, as in relation to Something and Nothing, &c., we have seen already; and here, from the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' are a few more, which the reader will now see must have contained much matter eminently suggestive to Hegel:—

It is to be observed that the Categories, as the true Stammbegriffe (root-notions) of pure understanding, possess their equally pure derivatives, which can by no means be omitted in a complete system of Transcendental Philosophy, but with whose mere mention I may be content in a mere critical preliminary inquest.
Hegel, then, could see what he had to do for the construction of a system. Poor Kant, like a hen that had hatched ducks, was never done with cluck-clucks of consternation over the mad fashion in which his rash brood—Fichte and the rest—dashed into the bottomless water of speculation,—never done with cluck-clucks of consternation and of fervid warning to return to the solid land of kritical procedure, for which he pathetically assured them their excellent ‘Darstellungsgabe’ (say style) could do so much. It is questionable if he could have recognised in Hegel that return to his own results which he so ardently longed for and so unwearyedly called for. It is quite certain now, however, that the whole work of Hegel was simply to furnish that ‘complete system of the Transcendental Philosophy’ indicated by Kant.

Let me be permitted (the veteran proceeds) to name these pure but derivative notions, the predicables of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). If we have the original and primitive notions, the derivative and subaltern may be easily added, and the family-tree of pure understanding completely delineated. As I have here to do, not with the completion of the system, but only with that of the principles towards it, I may be allowed to postpone the addition of such a complement to another work. This object, however, may be pretty correctly reached, if any one but take in hand the ordinary ontological text-books, and set, for example, under the category of Causality, the predicables of power, action, passion, &c.; under Reciprocity, those of the present, resistance, &c.; and under Modality, origin, disease, &c. &c. The categories combined with the modi of pure sense [Time and Space], or with one another, furnish a great number of derivative a priori notions, &c.

Hegel was thus directly referred to the very manner in which he should set about his task; and his task was comparatively easy, for, as Kant himself points out—

The great compartments (Fächer) are once for all there—it is only necessary to fill them up; and a systematic Topik, like the present, does not readily permit us to miss the places to which each notion properly belongs, at the same time that it causes us readily to remark those which are still empty.*

Kant proceeds:

As regards the Table of the Categories, some curious remarks may be made which may have, perhaps, advantageous results as respects the scientific form of all rational truths. For that this Table, in the theoretic part of philosophy, is uncommonly serviceable, nay indispensable, in order completely to project

* The above quotations are from the K. of P. R. § 10; those that follow, from
a plan towards the Whole of a Science, so far as this science is to rest on a priori notions, as well as mathematically to distribute the same according to definite principles, appears directly of itself from this, that said Table contains at full all the elementary notions of understanding, and even the form of a system of the same in the human understanding, and consequently furnishes direction and guidance to all the moments of any contemplated speculative science, and even to their order, as indeed I have already given elsewhere an example in proof (s. 'Metaphys. Anfangsgr. der Naturwissensch'). Here now are some of these remarks:—

The first is. that this Table, which contains four classes of Categories, parts first of all into two Divisions, the first of which is directed to objects of Perception (pure as well as empirical); the second, again, to the Existence of these objects (whether as referred to one another or to the understanding) [Quantity 'pure,' Quality 'empirical,' Relation 'mutual reference,' Modality 'reference to the understanding'].

The first class I would name that of the mathematical, the second that of the dynamical, Categories. The first class, as is evident, has no correlates, which are found only in the second. This difference must have its reason [as Hegel has well investigated] in the nature of the understanding.

2nd Remark.—That in every case there is a like number—three—of the categories of every class, which summons to reflection [and Hegel reflected and pondered this to some effect], as all a priori distribution elsewhere through notions is necessarily a Dichotomy [Black or not-Black, &c.]. Moreover, that the third category in every case [Hegel is all here] arises from the union of the second with the first of its class.

Thus Allness (Totality) is nothing else than Plurality [a Many] considered as Unity; Limitation is nothing else than Reality united to Negation; Community is one Substance Causally determining another Reciprocally; lastly, Necessity is nothing else than Existence given by Possibility itself. Let it not be thought, however, that the third category is for this reason a merely derivative one, and not a root- notion of pure understanding. For the union of the first and second in order to produce the third notion demands a special act of understanding, which is not identical with that which is exerted in the case of the first and second. Thus the notion of a Number (which belongs to the category of Totality) is not always possible where there are the notions of Plurality and Unity (as, for example, in the conception of the Infinite), nor out of this, that I unite the notion of a cause and that of a substance, is Influence—that is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance—directly and without more ado to be understood. From this it is obvious that a special act of understanding is necessary to this; and so as regards the rest.

3rd Remark.—In the case of a single category, that, namely, of Community, which occurs under the third Title, is the agreement with the corresponding form in the Table of the Logical Functions (here the disjunctive judgment) not so self-evident as in that of the others.

In order to assure oneself of this agreement, it is to be observed: that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the Many of all that is contained under the judgment) is conceived as a whole distributed into parts (the subordinate notions), and, as these parts cannot be contained the one under the other,
they are thought as mutually co-ordinated, not subordinated, in such wise that they, act on each other, not one-sidely as in a series, but reciprocally as in an aggregate (if one member of the distribution is established, all the rest are excluded, and vice versa).

Now what we have to think is a similar conjunction in a Whole of Things, where the one is not subordinated as effect to the other as cause, but co-ordinated as at the same time and reciprocally cause in reference to the other (for example, the case of a body, the parts of which at once reciprocally attract and resist each other), which is quite another sort of conjunction than that met with in the simple relation of the cause to the effect (of reason to consequent), in which the consequent does not reciprocally in its turn determine the antecedent, and does not therefore constitute a whole with it (like the Creator with the world). The same process which understanding observes when it represents to itself the sphere of a distributed notion, it observes also when it thinks a thing as capable of distribution; and as the members of distribution in the former mutually exclude each other, and nevertheless are united together in a single sphere, so it conceives the parts of the latter as such that existence attaches to each of them as substances independently of the rest, and yet that they are united together in a single whole.

In these remarks the reader will readily observe many germs which it was the business of Hegel only to mature. That, under each class, the third category, for example, should be a concrete of the two former—this an sich, virtually, is the dialectic of Hegel. Once, indeed, that Hegel had observed this peculiarity, and that he had also generalised the categories into the category, his system, we may say, and in all its possibilities, was fairly born. Kant observes,* 'that there are two stocks or stems of human knowledge, which arise perhaps from a single common root, as yet unknown to us, namely, 'Sense and Understanding, through the former of which objects are given, and through the latter thought.' Now, to see that this bringing together of sensation and intellect amounted to the perciipient Understanding (intuitus originarius, intellectuelle Anschauung, anschauender Verstand) of Kant—to see moreover that Kant's own industry had no other tendency than to realise such reduction and identification,—this also may be named the beginning of Hegel; for, in a word, Hegel's system is a demonstration that Sensation and Understanding are virtually one, the former being but outwardly what the other is inwardly, and each the necessary reciprocal counterpart of the other. This, too, is evidently the effect of the speculations of Kant in reference to the Categories and the Schemata resultant from the conjunction of these with Time and Space. To co-ordinate and reduce to one,

* K. of P. R., Introduction, sub finem.
Sense and Intellect, or Sensations and Ideas (Notions), this is another of those curt statements of the whole which may conduce not only to the understanding, but to the judging, of the Hegelian system. Hegel himself has remarked, that to reproduce a system is the true way critically to judge it: he intimates even that he who faithfully reproduces a system is already beyond it. Now, no doubt, these curt statements are calculated to bring one’s knowledge up to the very apex of insight; but they only mislead, deceive, ruin, when they themselves are taken as knowledge, and when it escapes notice that their function is not to constitute knowledge, but only to give focus to knowledge. A general statement is but gas—and of a very dangerous kind—in the mouth of him who is empty of the particulars. In these curt words, tending though they do to carry us beyond what they concern, there is this danger, then, to all parties in humanity; and there is yet in them another danger to a single party. To the Materialist, for example, such words as above are so glaringly absurd, and the enterprise they indicate so glaringly stupid, that he feels justified, from the mere outside, to neglect and reject all industries (as those of Kant and Hegel) which are capable of being characterised by them. It is the former danger which is the important one, however, and the latter we may neglect, for, as the idealist views man as Spirit, the materialist views him only as Animal, however acute he (the materialist) may be, then, as regards mundane commodity, he is wholly opaque to what alone is human—Religion, Philosophy, and even Poetry—and is manifestly of no account to men who can interest themselves in such subjects as the present.

To possess a curt formula for the whole of Hegel, does not dispense us from the labour of the particular, then; and we have yet much of this to achieve.

It is now to be seen, nevertheless, that a complete answer to our first question as to what led Hegel to begin as he did, is rapidly rising on us. We see what was the One of his system, and how he found it; we see also what his Many are to be, and how he is to find them. Of a clue to the First of his Many we have also some perception now, though this First itself has not yet exactly announced itself. Suppose Hegel, in quest of this First, &c., to adopt the hint of Kant and take the text-books of Ontology in his hand, or suppose him to inspect the derivative categories—all the categories, indeed,—mentioned by Kant him-
But if pure being be the first, according to the law of the notion, its own opposite, or non-being, must be the second, and the third must be a new simple that concretely contains both; or the third must be a species of which the first is the genus, and the second the differentia: but this here is just Werden; every becoming at once is and is not, or is at once being and non-being. Here, then, is
the absolutely first triad, the absolutely first form of the always, tri-une notion; or here is the absolutely germinal cell: it is impossible to go further back than to the absolute indefiniteness that at once is and is not, but becomes. It is an error on our part to have a difficulty here, and to stultify ourselves with the Vorstellung of a substrate, of a something that was this indefiniteness. In one sense that is not requisite, as it is here Logic that we have before us—as it is here with thoughts only, and not with things that we have to do. But if we want a substrate, that we possess in thought. Thought is and thought is all that is (or the notion), and the first form was indefiniteness, but an indefiniteness that still was. Or take it otherwise, there actually is, there really is, there can be no doubt of that; there really is this variegated universe—Jupiters, and belts of Saturn, and double stars, and the sun and the earth; Barclay's porter, Hook's patent coffee-roaster, and what not: well, the beginning of all that—if ever there was a beginning—must have been in an indefinite One, the only name for which could be pure being. Let any one turn and twist it as he may, he will find no other issue. Hegel's beginning, then, is true, not only to the principles of Kant, not only to the requirements of Logic, or to those of this new logical notion generalised by Hegel out of Kant, but it is true also to the nature of facts such as we see and know them.

Surely, this was an immense success for Hegel. Having realised Logic, and seen it to be the essential all—having discovered the notion itself—to have also discovered the absolutely initial form, not only of that notion, but just of the facts around us as any peasant may see them!

Being, Non-being, Becoming! Here is the trinity as it must have been—in its beginning!

Again, from the realisation of Logic, it followed that Logic would be the vital pulse in every sphere—that every sphere, in short, would be but a form, but a metaphor, but a Vorstellung of Logic: but, this being so, history itself would have to submit to the same truth, history itself would present in its process only a development of Logic. But limiting ourselves in history to the history of Logic itself, we should expect to find even this special history following the same laws. The first special logicians, then, would in this case be found historically to be engaged with Seyn, Nichtseyn, Werden, &c. On inquiry, Hegel found all this true to fact: all this is represented in the Greek thinkers that precede
Socrates. Nay, all this is true up to the present instant: for the notion itself only emerged an sich (the moment of Simple Apprehension) in Kant, became fur sich or agnised into its differences (the moment of Ur-theil) in Fichte and Schelling, and transformed itself to an und fur sich (the moment of Schluss) in Hegel. This is another reason why, though the notion was the bottom truth, no beginning could be made with it in that form: to have attempted this, would have been to stultify history. It is in history that we have series which demand beginnings; and as regards Logic, it is in history that we must find its beginning also. Thus is it that Hegel was driven to a profound study of thought as it has historically appeared, and the result of this study was to confirm him in the sequence of the logical series which he contemplated.

We may safely hold now, then, that the first question—How it was that Hegel was led to begin as he did—is fairly answered. We see at once the nature of his one—the nature of his many—the nature of his first—and where and how he got them.

2. What does Hegel mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements?—This presents now no difficulty. So much of the answer, however, has passed into what precedes, or must be reserved for what follows, that very little is left us to say under the present head.

The indefinite immediate seems a strange phrase; but what else can be said of pure being, but that it is the indefinite immediate? There is an immediate to us—we are—there is something present to us: now, if we take no note of any particularity in this that is present to us, but generalise all particularities into their common one)—what we reach is indefinite, but it is still immediate. Being is not annihilated by the abstraction, there still is; and what is, when we absolutely abstract from all particularity, is just the indefinite immediate. The result of such abstraction is but the void self-identical faculty; or it is just thought gone into its own indefinite blank where it will see none and have none of its own constituent distinctions. But anything like a personal reference—any thought of any individual's special faculty—destroys the abstraction. Being is what is when everything is abstracted from—the absolute universal of all particulars: and being surely, is simply that one thing in which all particulars concur. Whatever is, is, or is being; that is, being is common to everything. In this abstraction, it is evident that we are quite freed from any question
of an inner principle whence this being might arise. Indefinite being brings with it no such want; or indefinite being, as the *materia communis*, is felt to be this principle itself. Being is simply indefinitely What is; and, as we know that there is a—definitely What is,—we know that what indefinitely is, is just the *fundament* and *tout-ensemble* of all that definitely is. All that requires to be understood in the paragraph that regards Seyn will now be perfectly intelligible. Other terms not as yet noticed, have their places elsewhere.

We may add only that *An sich* is perhaps the best term for the initial identity, the initial indefinite potentiality, which, if a beginning is required at all, must be attached as beginning to the notion. The notion as indefinite identity is in the moment of simple apprehension; though simple apprehension, as form, is itself much later in the series of developments; and as indefinite identity the notion may be correctly described as simply *an sich*, simply *in itself*, simply virtual, or potential, or impliciter. But this is just pure Seyn: pure being is nothing more and nothing less than simply the notion *an sich*, or, if you like, the notion of *an sich*. But, in obedience to the laws of What is, *identity* must pass into *difference*, Simple Apprehension must become Judgment, the *Begriff* must sunder its be-griped-ness into the *part-ing* which is the Urtheil; the *An sich* must awake into *Für sich*. Thus is it that we see how Für sich becomes applicable to the second step: Für sich refers to a certain amount of consciousness; recognition is implied; and recognition is a result of *distinction*, of *difference*—Against this appropriation of Für sich for the second moment of the universal pulse, we know that many objections may be urged from the usage of Hegel himself. Even in the table of contents, for example, we see Fürsichseyn placed as the resuming moment of Reason. Nor is it an affair of *place* only; for we know that Fürsichseyn denotes the collapse of *all* particularity into singularity. Neither is this the only example of a similar usage. Nevertheless, we believe that we are right in the main, and that even the exceptions will give little pause to the student who is anything *instruit*. The very chapter in Hegel which is specially entitled Fürsichseyn is devoted to the evolution of the One and the Many with a view to the transition of Quality into Quantity.*

* So far as the Ur-theil gives unity to its own *difference*, it has the action of *Fürsich*; but to give that name to the moment of Unterschied is, as a matter of mere naming, of no moment.—N
The third step now is readily intelligible as the stage of an and fur sich.

3. What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming?—Well now, there is, after all, no great difficulty here. Suppose we define Nothing, how otherwise can we define it than as the absence of all distinguishableness, that is, of every discriminé whatever? But the absence of every recognisable discriminé whatever is just the absence of all particularity, and the absence of all particularity is but the abstraction from all particularity—pure being! Pure being and pure nothing, then, are therefore identical. Pure Seyn can be no otherwise defined than pure Nichts: Seyn like Nichts, and Nichts like Seyn—each is the absence of all distinguishableness, or of every recognisable discriminé whatever. Did you take up anything, and call it pure Seyn, and yet point to a discriminé in it, you would only be deceiving yourself, and speaking erroneously; for in pure Seyn there can be no discriminé. Seyn must be universal, and any discriminé would at once particularise it. Thus, then, Pure Being and Pure Nothing are absolutely identical—they are absolutely indistinguishable. It is useless to say nothing is nothing, but being is something: being is not more something than nothing is. We admit Nothing to exist; nothing is an intelligible distinction; we talk of thinking nothing and of perceiving nothing: in other words, nothing is the abstraction from every discriminé or particularity. But an abstraction from every discriminé, does not involve the destruction of every or any discriminé: all discriminés still exist; in nothing we have simply withdrawn into indefiniteness. This nothing, then, of ours still implies the formed or definite world. Precisely this is the value of Pure Being: when we have realised the notion pure being, we have simply retired into the abstraction from all discriminés, but these—for all our abstraction and retirement—still are. Pure Being and Pure Nothing, then, point each to the absolutely same abstraction, the absolutely same retirement. In both, in fact, thought, for the nonce, has turned its back on all its own discriminé; for thought is all that is, and all discriminés are but its own. In fact, both being and nothing are abstractions, void abstractions, and the voidest of all abstractions, for they are just the ultimate abstractions. Neither is a concrete; neither is, if we may say so, a reale. What, then, is—What actu is—in point of fact is—is neither the one nor the other;
but everything that is, is a σύνολον, a composite, of both. This is remarkable—that the formed world should hang between the hooks of two invisible abstractions, and, at the same time, that every item of the formed world should be but a σύνολον of these two invisible abstractions. We cannot handle being here and nothing there, as we might this stone or that wood; yet both stone and wood are composites of being and nothing: they both are and are not—and this in more senses than one. They are—that is, they participate in being. They are distinguishable, they involve difference; difference implies negation: that is, they participate in non-being. The stone is not the wood, the wood is not the stone: each, therefore, if it is, also is not. Again, neither the one nor the other is, any two consecutive moments, the same; each is but a Werden, but a Becoming. A day will come when both the one and the other, both this wood and that stone, will have disappeared: their existence was a process, then—every instant of their existence was a change, and it took the sum of these changes to accomplish their disappearance. All here is mortal—nothing is twice the same—no man ever passed twice through the same street. This, then, is the truth of being and nothing: neither is; what is, is only their union—and that is becoming; for becoming is nothing passing into being, or being passing into nothing. This will probably suffice to guide the student who can and will think, in the proper direction to gain his own repose as regards these seemingly silly transitions.

One word may still be added advantageously, however, in reference to the difference of Being and Nothing; for, absolutely identical, they are still absolutely different: in them, indeed, the two sides which obtain throughout the universe have reached their absolute and direct antithesis. In Being, thought is, willingly—in Nothing, thought is, unwillingly—in abstraction from all particularity. Being is the tub that sees itself just emptied; Nothing is the same tub that would now see itself refilled. Thought is well pleased to find itself in being; but in indefiniteness (nothing) it is uneasy; it has a want, it craves—craves, in short, to have definiteness, particularity, difference,—craves to know and to see itself—to know and to see its own distinctions, its own discrimina: and this evolution of thought's own self to thought's own self, what is it but the universe? Thus is it that thought is the pure negativity, and sets its own negative—which is the object. Thus is it that thought does not remain indefinite
but presses forward, according to its own rhythm, on to the revelations of history and existence. This is another curt formula for what Hegel would: it corresponds exactly to his phrase in regard to Reason making itself für sich that which it is an sich. It is well worthy of observation, too, that the second moment of the one throb, the one pulse, that which corresponds to the Ur-theil is one of pain. The Ur-theil, which is a breaking asunder into the differences, is but as a throe of labour: the evolution of Existence is but the absolute in travail. Daseyn is but a continual birth—and birth is pain. So it is that he errs mightily who seeks in life as life repose: life as life is monstrosion and probation—movement—difference; repose is reachable only in elevation over the finite particulars which emerge—or rather only in the reference of these to that Affirmation of which they are but the Negative. That there should be pain in Nothing, then, and that this pain should be the fount of movement, we can now understand. The difference between Being and Nothing, in fact, is but that being is the implication of all particularity, and Nothing the abstraction from all particularity. It is obvious, then, that though, so to speak, the middle is always the same (and the middle is the matter held, which here is in both cases indefiniteness, and precisely the same indefiniteness, for implication of all particularity is the same Inhalt as abstraction from all particularity), the extremes differ; or, that though Being and Nothing are statements of precisely the same thing, the one is an affirmative statement while the other is a negative one. In fact, we can conceive both Being and Nothing as possessing two sides. There is a side in Being in which it is Nothing; and again there is a side—definite existence being always involved—where it is Being. So it is with Nothing: even as Nothing, definite existence is still involved; and so it has precisely the same two sides as Being. In short, each constitutes the middle and the extremes of which we have just spoken; and their difference lies in this—that in the one, the one extreme is accentuated, and in the other, the other.

4. What does the whole thing amount to—or what is the value of the whole business?—Under the three previous questions, we have already had to deal with some considerations which tend to throw light on this question also. It represents nevertheless, perhaps, the very greatest difficulty which everyone feels on his first introduction to the system of Hegel. What is all this to do for me?—what is it intended to explain?—in what way is the general
mystery rendered any less by it? Such questions occur to everyone. All these abstract terms are mere formalities, one feels, and one is tempted to exclaim, What influence can be allowed any such formalities in questions that concern the origin of this so solid, real, and substantial universe? It is to be said at once, that the light of the whole can never be seen at the first step: how can one link, and that the first one, give insight into the entire reach of that which issues as an immense organic whole? Such vast consummation can never be expected to be intelligible in the beginning, in the same way as in the end. It is this consideration which seems to actuate Hegel; who, in general, vouchsafes abundantly scornful, dry, abstract allusion, but never one word of plain, straightforward, concrete explanation. Information in Hegel is, for the most part, but a disdainful abstruse railing of us. We, however—from what we know already of his proctollog hitherto, and of his aims generally,—can luckily help ourselves.

We have seen, then, from accurate insight into the categories of Kant, that the probability is, that all that is, is but a form of the one movement of thought, of the one logical throb, which is the notion. This is much. The substantiality of the outer world ought not to be allowed to come in, as it were, as a stumbling-block here. The outer world is but outer, the inner but inner: they are equally ideal. Thought is the organic whole of its own discrimina: these are in spheres; outer and inner are two such: outer and inner, in short, exist in mutual reciprocity, and the one is no less substantial than the other, or they are consubstantial. But what do we mean by substantiality as we ordinarily object it? It refers to matter, to solidity, to thingity; substantiality means a basis of somewhat, &c. &c. If we will but look close, however, we shall find that all this means only individualisation or self-reference: to thought its own discrimina are; this is self-reference—self-reference is Being. If thought distinguishes its own discrimina from itself, and gives them self-reference, then they are: but when they also outwardly are, then the discrimination becomes more absolute, then the distinction becomes a chasm—then the self-reference has grown substantial, and one seems to have before one only isolated, self-complete, self-substantial immediates. Not a whit on that account, however, are they more substantial than the inner. Nay, the inner is their truth, the inner is the genuine substantiality; and they themselves are but transitory forms, a prey to the contingency of the notion in externality to its own self.
The notion, then, is the real substantiality of the universe; and its first forms, however formal they may seem, are the actual First, the actual beginning. You think of sand, and earth, and mud, and clay; but you have no business to think of sand, and earth, and mud, and clay here. Where thought as thought is concerned, it is absurd to apply the category of natural causality; and with a little patience you may find sand, and earth, and mud, and clay themselves actually reduced to the notion, and held thereof. Natural causality itself is but the notion—the notion, however, in a peculiar sphere: instead of the notion, then, being submiss to causality, it is causality that must submit to the notion, from which, indeed, it derives all its own virtue.

Once for all, the triad, Being, Non-being, Becoming, is the tortoise of the universe, and the elephant of the same may rest secure on it: that triad is the abstractest form, and so the most rudimentary form, of the living concrete notion, which is the soul and centre of the all. Thought is, and we can go no further back than to, we can begin no sooner than with, its own absolutely indefinite identity, which is pure Being. But thought that apprehends itself as Being, judges itself Nothing, and reasons itself into Becoming. (Reason is the Ver-nunft, from ver-nahmen=transsumere.) The earliest Begriff (Seyn) parts into the earliest Urtheil (Nichts), and resumes itself in the new one of the earliest Schluss (Werden). This will be found to be even historically correct. There is nothing unusually strange in this: consider that you yourself are, that existence is, and you will see a strangeness—just in this, that there should be such a state of the case at all—to be matter of fact, which is at least not in any respect less striking than that of the Hegelian procedure. To subjective thought, being is an absolutely necessary idea; and to objective thought it is equally necessary, for before our existence could be—and our existence is—being must have been thought. But in either case, the further process of transition to nothing and to becoming is also necessary. A primordial slime in a primordial time and space is the very anility or infantility—extremes meet—of thought: it is but the crude Vorstellung of a crude babe. Thought is the prior of all; and these, being, non-being, &c., are the absolutely necessary categories that underlie existence.

It will be seen now, then, that the error of the reader in regard to the simple paragraphs of our text, is that he thinks too much, rather than too little. He comes to them with a mind that teems-
with prejudices, presuppositions, crude figurate conceptions (Vorstellungen), what are called formed opinions, and so forth; and he is not at all prepared to see the beginning taken in what seems to him so cavalier a fashion—not nothing, without more ado, set down as being—and thus by the Jesuitical jugggle of a logical presto, as it were, genesis asserted and the world begun. What is here, however, is not genesis in that sense; what is here is abstraction, generalisation; what is here is logical; there is no attempt to create a single dust-atom. The reader, moreover, has no business to speculate, to guess and guess, to conjecture and conjecture; he has no business to sweat himself into a supposed meaning, by the earnest attempt to see through a mill-stone of his own devising: he has no business, in short, but simply to take up—what is there before him.

There is a subjective Logic in which we learn about terms, propositions, syllogisms, &c.; but there ought also to be an objective Logic in which we shall learn about the secret criteria which we apply to objects, the levers by which we grasp them, and characterise them, and make them familiar to us. For there are such criteria, there are such levers; and the truth in their regard is, that we at present know them not; that they are not the tools of us, but we rather are the tools of them. A complex or complement of some kind, for example, is brought for our examination. At first it is but an unintelligible mass; but at length we understand it. Now, to understand it, what have we done? We have simply beset it, or transfixed it, or supplied it with categories. Rather, what it was, it is no longer; what it was, has disappeared; it is now a simple system—a simple congeries of categories. The stuff has entirely vanished; the whole mass and matter has been converted into thought. What then is valuable—what then is true in the object, is these levers and criteria—not of its judgment only, but actually of its conversion and transformation. There is nothing left in it which is not thought; for the other, which appears, or which we opine in it, is nothing as against thought—against the thought, that is, into which it has been transformed. Cause, effect, relation, principle, essence, true nature, quality, action, reaction, force, influence, &c. &c.—such are the secret criteria, or tools, or levers we apply. Now, simply to discover and explain all these, this is the business of the Logic of Hegel; and it is thus very plain how that Logic, if a complete, co-articulated system of these, must, no less, in simple truth, be the crystal
of the universe. Being, nothing, becoming, then, are but three of these levers; and is it not a truth that we characterise, and determine, and finish off whole columns of facts with such predicates as these? But have we ever looked at these predicates themselves? have we ever inquired into their own nature, or into their relative connexion? have we ever satisfied ourselves of the conditions of their authority? The Materialist is a man that will have no nonsense, see you; he will look at facts only; even when he has stuck each fact, like a pin-cushion, so full of the needles and pins of his own brain that nothing but these any longer shows, he actually believes himself to be still contemplating the fact. The Materialist, in fact, is but the prey of a thousand little imps within him, whom he sees not. Unknown to himself, in truth, the Logic of Hegel is all there within his skull. The difference between him and Hegel is this: from Hegel it issues pure, and in system, and as it is; from the Materialist it issues in that miscellaneous mass or mess (Gebrau), named by Hegel rasonnement, blindly, irregularly, rhapsodically, not as it is, but as it is opined—about causes, and conditions, and essential, and accidental, &c. &c.

But the Materialist is, in this respect, no worse than the great body of mankind at present. We all fancy, being, nothing, one, many, &c., so plain in their meanings, that there is no need of investigating them. Everybody, we say, knows perfectly what nothing is, perfectly what it is to be, and perfectly what it is to become. Or again, we may conceive the most of us to say, if we did not know what they are, in what respect have the paragraphs of the text improved our knowledge? Are we to swallow such statements for information seriously meant. Do you really ask us to believe that being is nothing; or that because being is nothing, or nothing being, there is anything become? Why, the singing of the tea-kettle is something infinitely more substantial, something infinitely more instructive than any such barren nonsense of empty verbiage, call it philosophy, metaphysic, logic, or by whatever other fine name you will! Nay, why should we accompany you further? With such a foundation, what are we to expect? If, indeed, we grant you that being is nothing, what can we expect? Can such demand on our credulity be aught else than a preparation for sophistry, legerdemain, imposture, falsehood?

Such objections, in fact, at first hand, cannot be taken amiss. Hegel receives them, in general, with his peculiar and terrible
sneer, and, on the whole, simply allows the System itself to answer them. For our part, we trust that a sufficient answer will be found in what precedes. One turn more, however, and we have done with Being and Nothing, and this whole matter of a beginning.

In dealing with objects, I certainly use sundry inner distinctions; objects, in fact, obey these distinctions: it were well, then, if we knew these distinctions and the system of them, if there be a system of them. In regard to every object that presents itself, we say, for example, it is. The pen is, the paper is, the thought is, the feeling is: now the pen is the pen, the paper is the paper, the thought is the thought, the feeling is the feeling; but what is the is? By this is, we determine them; they obey it. It is a somewhat, therefore, and surely we may allowably spend a moment in looking at it for itself. In general, we look at it only for the others—the pen, the paper, &c.; but suppose we look at it now for itself. Is—whatever first was, that surely was the first of the first: whatever came first—fire, or earth, or water, or chaos, or thought—is was the first of it; with is, it began, and till there is, there can be no beginning. Everyone will admit that What is, is. Now, let him give any meaning he likes to this what; let him conceive it as mind, or as matter, or as space, or as time; he will admit without difficulty that he can equally withdraw this meaning—mind, matter, space, time. Let him try, however, to withdraw the Is, and he will find it impossible. We withdraw mind; still there is matter, there is space, there is time. We withdraw matter; still there is space, still there is time. We withdraw space; still there is time. We withdraw time, and still there is. That is not meant arithmetically—that if I begin with six words, and withdraw four of them, two remain. This withdrawal is meant to be performed by the mind in earnest thought, and earnestly occupied with its thought. It is very easy not to do this, it is very easy to refuse to do this, and it is very easy to sneer rather than do this; but he who will do this—there are some few, perhaps, who cannot do this—will be obliged to admit that, let him abstract and abstract from what he may, he cannot get rid of the notion, Being. It is impossible to realise to thought that there can possibly be, or that there could possibly be an absolute void, or rather the absolute void of a void; for even a void itself would have to be withdrawn, did we desire to effect an absolute non-is. There is, is, or isness, is an absolutely
necessary thought, then,—necessary and universal—a category—the first category.

Now, there is no wish here to go out of Logic. It is with being, or isness, as a thought only that we concern ourselves. And surely in signifying this abstractest of all possible thoughts—this, then, in that respect, first thought—we are not untruly, not fraudulently employed.

Well, now, this is a beginning of objective Logic; this principle of determination, Is or Being, is a thought—an absolutely necessary, universal thought—and it forms a necessary ingredient in thought, and in all characterisation by thought. Of everything in this universe we must say that it is: yes, but of everything in this universe we must say also that it is not. This is a penny, it is not a ha'penny; it is copper, it is not silver; it is round, it is not square, &c. &c. That it is not is as essential a principle of determination in regard to everything in this universe, as that it is. In our apprehension of an object, affirmation possesses not one whit more truth, not one whit more reality, not one whit more necessity, than negation. An object, to be apprehended as an object, requires to be precisely apprehended; and precision is the deed of negation. Non-is, then, and is are necessary correlatives, are necessary conjuncts, never separate, absolutely inseparable in every act of determination of any kind; and determination constitutes the nature of the operation of every function we possess—sense, understanding, imagination, &c.

Being and Nothing, then, are thus inseparably present in every concrete; and here in utter abstraction they are inseparable also: rather, here in utter abstraction they unite and are the same. View either separately, and before your very view—even as you view—it passes into the other. Nothing will not remain Nothing, it will not fix itself as Nothing, it grows of itself into there is. Nothing involves Being, or Nothing cannot be thought without the thought of Being. Being, again, absolutely abstract is an absolutely necessary thought; but it is characterless, it is Nothing. Think abstract Nothing, it introduces Being; think Being, it introduces Nothing. But Nothing passing into Being is origination; Being passing into Nothing is decease; and both are Becoming. Becoming, then, is that in which both Being and Nothing are contained in unity. Or such is the constitution of the absolutely general thought Becoming; and there can be
pointed out no single actual case of Becoming in which this constitution does not accurately display itself. These three abstract thoughts, each equally necessary and universal, are also necessarily and universally bound together, therefore. There is no finite object whatever which has not received the determination of each of these three thoughts. Every finite object whatever truly is, every finite object whatever truly is not, every finite object whatever truly becomes, and becomes in one or other of the modes of its double form. Nor does any object receive such determination from us; it possesses such determination in its own self; it has received such determination from God, it has been so thought by God, it has been created by God on and according to these thoughts, Being, Nothing, and Becoming. These thoughts are out there—without us—in the universe, and in here—within us—in the universe: they are objective thoughts in obedience to which the whole is disposed. They are necessary pressures or compressures moulding the all of things. They are three of God's thoughts in the making of the universe.

There is no necessity, then, to give these thoughts the peculiar dialectic look of the peculiar abstraction of Hegel. They can be approached and examined in the same analytic way in which we approach and examine all the other denizens of the universe which may be submitted to us. Still, the more the reader thinks and the more he looks at them, the more will he find himself convinced that the brief paragraphs of the text actually contain the whole matter, and really perfectly determine it: nor are we now without the means of explaining all the Hegelian peculiarities in or with which this whole matter appears. From the light we now abundantly possess, for example, we must expect in what is named Being, simply the elementary form of the Begriff, or—the Begriff an sich. What is an sich just is—abstractly is—that and as yet no more. Now, what is it that most abstractly is, or what is it that is in the most eminent manner an sich? Why, simply the first thought that can arise. But in its first natural form—and we know no other first—such thought arises on sensation. This is in every way the first. We have no business with any world but the world we know. What is, is thought. This is the absolute. But it is no absolute vacuum. It is an absolute—distinguished in itself. This we know; and, therefore also, that the indefinite implies the definite, as the latter the former. Our field, then, is this Here of thought; in which Here Sensation is the phenomenal
First—or Sensation is what is most eminently an sich. The Notion as in Sensation, then, is the first part of Logic, or—Simple Apprehension—just as it has always been.

But the first thought in sensation can abstract nothing but the wholly indefinite sense (rather than thought) of Being, Is, Am. The reflexion on which abstraction can only be that it is—as there is simply no distinction in it—the simple Nothing. But this result is the consequence of a reflexion on the first thought, Being. But such second act is not an act of sensation, of simple apprehension. It is a doubling back on such act; it is a thinking of the act of simple apprehension, a seeking to discriminate in it. But to discriminate is to distinguish this as against that,—that is, to negate, to develop differences in what was previously self-identical. This new act—reflexion—is an act of understanding, an act of judgment. The Nothing, then, is a result of judgment. In other words, the Begriff of Simple Apprehension, which was Being, has passed into the Ur-theil of Judgment, which is Nothing. And this is sufficiently curious and significant, for it is the universal formula: On the Being—the satisfaction, fullness, and faith—of Simple Apprehension, there follows always the Nothing—the dissatisfaction, the emptiness, the doubt—of Understanding (Judgment): Under the Or-deal, the Ur-theil, the Begriff breaks up and sunders from its substantiality—into the strife of the differences.

In these two moments, we may recognise also the Kantian elements of a Perception, the objectivo-subjective of Sensation, and the subjectivo-objective of a Judgment—or Affection receiving its meaning, its sense, its objectivity from Function. Only, in Hegel, the question is not of sensation as sensation, but of the thought involved. Again, Simple Apprehension is positive, while Judgment is negative. The former, too, seems passive, while the latter is active. The negative, lastly, may be held to have more relation to the subject, and so far to have a greater claim to be named the subjective moment: the first is only an sich, the second is fur sich. This, however, depends rather on the point of view: function seems more subjective, since it is an act, though the result is objective evidence; but, again, affection is more subjective, as feeling, as yielding only subjective evidence. There is a certain duplicity indicated here, as regards the use of the word subjective, which should be borne in mind.

But neither has Nothing any distinction in it. Thought before
(in presence of) Nothing can abstract from it only Being. Thus Being and Nothing are the same. Being and Nothing are inseparable: wherever there is thought, there is distinction; and wherever there is distinction, there is and there is not. And it is remarkable, that even in having recourse to Being as Being, it is only Nothing we encounter. Nothing is the fruitful womb in which all is: it is Nothing (the Negative round which we build, or on which we hang, our Positive) which is the important element, the very soul and life of what is. (Something of the necessary dialectic shows here, however.)

But this third reflexion, that Nothing is returned to Being, implies, like the former, also its own gain. Nothing gone into Being is Becoming.—It is not meant here to say that this is a theory of generation. What we have here are thoughts only. The consideration of material things does not belong to Logic as Logic. Matter as Matter is apart from Logic. What is here said is, that Being gone into Nothing, or Nothing gone into Being—a transition which here takes place—expresses in two or three words what we express also by the one word Becoming.—Again, what is the nature of this third reflexion? As the former ones were Simple Apprehension and Judgment, this is Reason. What were separated are here brought together in a Schluss. Judgment stated a difference; but Reason has here reconciled identity and difference into a new identity. Reason, then, has ended in a new Begriff, in a renewed act of Simple Apprehension, on which Judgment again acting, develops the differences Origin and Decease, which Reason again reconciles into the quasi-fixed moment (between both) of Daseyn.

But we have outstripped our text, and must now return. We have now to see in the 'Remarks' what Hegel himself thinks proper to extend to us by way of explanation. Perhaps we ought to have translated, and included among these Remarks, the dissertation on 'Wherewith must the beginning, &c. be made,' which precedes the opening of the detailed Logic; but much of the matter it contains has already oozed out in another form. Besides, Hegel's explanations are seldom of any use to the uninitiated, and are calculated as much to mislead as to guide. In the dissertation in question, for example, Hegel's beginning seems to have been conditioned by wholly absolute considerations—at which we—knowing the relativity of the beginning to Kant—can only shake our heads—not, however, as doubting their truth, but as in-
timating only that Hegel, had he liked, might have led us to the house by a much straighter and easier path. What an incubus of labour might not Hegel have spared us, had he but let us see him starting from Kant—had he but named his consequent realisation of Logic into its one vital tri-une pulse! But this philosophical Wolsey could not stomach the confession of his debts. Instead of that, while the reader is again and again misled by even loud and apparently unexceptional reprobation of the doctrines of Kant, the merits of the same are effectually concealed from him by the very manner in which they are expressly mentioned. It is only after long initiation that one comes to detect twinkles of a confession in Hegel, as in that allusion 'not unrevenged,' when speaking of his predecessors (since Kant) neglecting Logic, &c. In his explanations, indeed, Hegel is but too often only indirect; he seems to seek abstract points of connexion, and to avoid the concrete truth: in fact, we have a general sense of being rather abstrusely sneered into light than kindly and directly led. One feels, indeed, almost savagely indignant with Hegel, when one thinks of the world of labour, of the almost superhuman labour, which the peculiarity of his statement has involved. Had he but told us, one thinks to oneself,—I was simply serious with the general scope of Kant—with his endeavour to reduce the whole human concrete under the cognitive faculties, to demonstrate objectivity to be contained in the categories, and to exhibit the world of sense as but an externalisation and Vereinzelung of the same: serious with these thoughts, it was not difficult to systematise and complete the categories; it was not difficult to place nature as that same system of categories—in outward form; it was not difficult, in obedience to the general pulse, to set spirit as resuming in itself both nature and the categories (the logical idea); and it was not difficult, whether by generalising the categories, or by fusing the cognitive faculties—simple apprehension (sensation) judgment, reason—into a concrete vitality, to find that general pulse which should be the basis and principle and motive power of the whole, and which Kant himself actually named when he said, a priori synthetic judgment. Had Hegel but told us this—and why did he not tell us this?—of what advantage has his reticence been to any man—even to himself? But let us turn now to
Remark 1.

And let us, first of all, consider any technical terms which may seem in want of a word of explanation. Beënt is a translation of Seyendes, and found unavoidable. The reader will have remarked the quite Hegelian subtlety, that opposition implies relation, reference, connexion, conjunction, even in that it is opposition. Wesentlich (essentially) implies always a reference to the Hegelian Wesen; it may be translated—as concerns the essential constitutive principle. Substrate—the substrate here regards change; it means the subject of the change, the something that undergoes the change. There now is, and again there is not: but there is a substrate conceived under this transition: it appears just two different states of the same something; these states are merely held asunder in time. This conception of a substrate completely subverts the abstraction which Hegel would have us think. Synthetisch and Vorstellend, synthetically and conceptively—these words deserve particular notice. Conceptively relates to one of the most important points in Hegel,—to his use, that is, of the word Vorstellung, and its cognate forms. In Locke the word idea is used just for a, or any state or fact of consciousness in general. In sensation, it is the feeling present in the mind which is the idea; in perception and imagination, the object—outward in the one case, inward in the other—is the idea; then in memory, the idea is whatever is remembered, and in thought whatever is thought. Now, Vorstellung, in current German, in Kant for one, is exactly this Lockeian idea. Hegel, however, opposes Vorstellung as the crude, almost sensuous, pictorial image or conception of common thought, to Begriff as the Notion of rigorously logical, rigorously scientific thought. To Hegel the thoughts of most of us, when we say, Heaven, Hell, God, Justice, Morality, Law—even perhaps Being and Here-being—are but crude figurate conceptions, Vorstellungen, and require to be purified into Notions, Begriffe, if we would think aright our own thoughts. The Vorstellungen are but ‘Metaphors’ (as Hegel says)—externalisations, as it were, of the Begriffe, and to be really understood and seen into, require to have what is metaphoric, pictorial, sensuous, external—we had almost said crustaceous—stripped off them. Conception, then, is to be understood in the translations here as representing Vorstellung, and Notion Begriff. This for many reasons. Conception derivatively is certainly the Begriff
—a taking together, or a being taken together; but then the Latin Notio has already been reserved by Kant (he uses conceptus, also, in his Logic *), and the rest as the strict equivalent of Begriff, while conception, perhaps, in general usage, is fully looser than notion. The custom of both Kant and Hegel is such that it was impossible to employ idee for Vorstellung. In general, and where accuracy is necessary, Idea translates Idee, Notion Begriff, and Conception Vorstellung. In translating Kant, it is better to substitute for Vorstellung, the precise mental state which is referred to at the moment. In translating Hegel, we often convey Vorstellung by the phrase figurate conception. We know now what is Hegel’s Begriff, and so are in a condition to understand what is said of a false Begriff as opposed to a true one. Our mere subjective thoughts, or mere products of ordinary generalisation, are not necessarily Begriffe: these are always forms of the Begriff, are self-referent, and objectively true.†

Synthetically contains an allusion here to an expression of Kant’s (see page 223 above, and, for additional illustration of synthesis, pp. 232, 233, 234, as also 372 further on) about existence adding itself synthetically to the notion of the hundred dollars! It is not difficult to illustrate what Hegel means by these merely concriptive and synthetic elements, in the ordinary form in which creation stands before the mind. ‘God might have thrown into Space a single Germ-cell from which all that we see now might have developed itself.’ Observe the synthesis here—the mere outward adding of one thing to another, as a mason puts stone to stone, a joiner wood to wood, or as a gardener drops an acorn into the earth, and a whole oak rises. God drops the Germ-cell into Space. Each is complete by itself, and each is just mechanically, synthetically annexed to the other: God is added on complete at once; and so of the others,—the germ-cell, moreover,

* The pure Begriff is always to Kant notio—see K. P. R., p. 258, and Logik, p. 272 (edn., Rosen).—N.

† I have been at some pains with these technical terms, both as here, and as in ‘Protoplasma.’ I have seen Begriff rendered by conception rather than by notion. I fancy the notion in the way is the American one! Read Hegel’s Latin, and notio is the word. The Latin of Kant and Schelling, and even that of Cicero, is to the same effect; while the English of Bacon and the philosophers after him, stamps notion as the only relative coin possible. As an Oxonian shudders at a false quantity, so I too shudder at conception for ‘notion.’ I confess that I cannot help thinking of sciolism a little then. For technical terms, I may add that, when Hume ‘divides all the perceptions of the mind into two classes,’ we have in ‘perception’ (as there) another rendering for Vorstellung.—N.
constituting but an outward synthesis to the notion in God's mind. But observe the Vorstellung, the conception, the scenic representation, the picture! Three units, out of each other, are here side by side,—God, the Germ-cell, Space: each is entire, complete, and independent in itself; there is no transition from the one to the other; each—and this is true even of the Germ-cell—has the character of a First, an Immediate. In short, all here is synthetic and conceptive: we see Space—just an absolute universal void—we see an indefinite giant suddenly show therein, or come to the edge thereof, and drop into the vacancy down, down, a germ-cell! Now this has seemed thinking to a writer who believes himself in advance, as it is called, and who may be in such advance. Yet it is to thinking precisely what the writing of the Chinese is to that of Europeans, precisely what discourse by hieroglyphics is to discourse by alphabets. The exact truth of the matter is, that a thinker of the order indicated, however worthy otherwise, is to a Hegel but a little boy as yet in his picture-books. Thinking, to be thorough, must be thought out. This will illustrate much. Hegel intimates, then, that creation, as usually thought, is the appearance of something in nothing at the will of another something, and that this process is merely synthetic and the whole thing a picture, a Vorstellung. The point of union he alludes to, where being and nothing coincide, may be named the limit, or the beginning, or the will in act, for each of these involves an is and a non-is.

Negation and negative: it is subtle perception on the part of Hegel to have discerned that wherever there is question of one and another, there is negation, and that thus God's energy even as affirmative, is negative.

Gesetz, posited: this brings up probably the greatest difficulty in Hegel, viz., what he means by ein Gesetztes?—what by Gesetzt-seyn? As usual, we shall find the Hegelian sense to have a very strict connexion with the ordinary one. Now, what is the ordinary one? The ordinary one is to be found in the discussion of hypothetical syllogisms as contained in the common text-books of Logic. Setzend, in fact, is the equivalent of the Latin participle ponens in the phrase modus ponens. 'If perfect justice exists, the hardened sinner will be punished: but perfect justice does exist; therefore the hardened sinner will be punished:' this is a hypothetical syllogism in the modus ponens. Now, the two parts of which the Major consists here are called the antecedent and the consequent, and in the modus ponens the former ponit, setzt, sets, posit,
or infers the latter. In the example before us, the existence of perfect justice is the antecedent, and it posits the punishment of the hardened sinner, which is the consequent. If the word posit were a vernacular English word parallel to the German setzen both in its logical and in its ordinary senses, we should have no difficulty in the respective translation; but it is not so, and we are constantly in perplexity in consequence of being unable properly to render the various shades and secondary meanings which setzen and its derivatives acquire in the hands of Hegel. For instance, an antecedent may be considered as only in itself or potential, until the consequent is assigned, and then it is the antecedent which seems posited. Posited in this case seems to refer to statement or explication; and this sense is very common in Hegel. Here, then, it is gesetzt means, it is developed into its proper explication, statement, expression, enunciation, exhibition, &c. Again a Gesetztes, as not self-referent, is but lunar, satellitic, parasitic, secondary, derivative, dependent, reflexional, posititious, &c. Then on the part of that which posits, something of arbitrary attribution may enter. Altogether, Gesetztseyn alludes to reflexion, relativity, mutual illativity, &c. Setzen has the senses, to put in the place of, to depute, and also duly to set out the members of a whole or set; and allusions to these senses also are to be found in Hegel. In short, such senses as the following will sometimes be found in place in this connexion: vicarious, representative, attributive, adjetitious, &c. &c. To eximply or eximplicate often conveys the meaning of setzen, as also the simple assign. See further Hegel himself on the word above at p. 255; see also pretty well passim from p. 384 to long Note last but one. In Kant and Fichte, setzen means, to lay down as granted, to take for granted, to establish, to affirm, to assert, to assume, &c.; and this meaning is, at bottom identical with the Hegelian.*

Inhalt means here, logical comprehension, or the complement of significates which attach to a notion: Inhalt is to Hegel the import of something, and the import is not always mere contained matter, but implies that matter as formed or assimilated.

Opined, Gemeint.—Meinung is the óôé of the Greeks; it implies crude, instinctive, uninvestigated, unreasoned, subjective, or personal opinion,—mein-ing, as if it were a mine-ing, or my-ing—

* A dictionary meaning of set is to 'cause to be.' Darwin (Life, etc., iii. 260) writes: 'This (flower) never sets seeds, whereas the small blue Lobelna is visited by bees and does set seeds.'—New.
something purely mine—something purely subjective and instinctive.

The Remark itself is sufficiently miscellaneous; its general object, however, is to illustrate what has just been said, and repel the most usual objection. This objection concerns the identification of being with nothing, and probably requires now but small notice at our hands, seeing that so much has been already done to insure a correct understanding of what is meant by each of the terms, and of how they are to be identified. The whole error of the objection lies in opposing to nothing, not abstract, but concrete being; in which case, the nothing itself ceases to be abstract. As nothing and being are the same, it seems to be inferred that we say it is the same thing whether we have food or not, whether we have clothes or not, whether we have money or not, &c.: but this reasoning is very bad. Nothing when it is concreted into no-food is hunger; in the same way, as no-clothes, it is cold, and as no-money, it is poverty. Now we have been speaking of nothing as nothing, and not of hunger, cold, and poverty. Again, we have been speaking of being as being, and not of corporeal or animal being. When you oppose, then, these definite nothings to this definite being, it is absurd to suppose that the results will be identical with those which issue from the opposition of abstract being and abstract nothing. Nothing, when abstract being is concerned, is the abstraction from everything definite and particular, and abstract being itself is the same abstraction; but the nothing of light is darkness, and it cannot be said that the eye is indifferent whether it be the one or the other: definite being is a complex of infinite rapports. But where is the use of your abstraction, then, may be urged in reply? Why, this ultimate generalisation being—we are bound to make it, and it has always been considered a determination of the greatest consequence—surely, then, it is worth while pointing out that this being is identical with the abstract nothing, that they are both abstractions, and that their truth is Werden. These are great poles of thought, subjective and objective; and it is important to know them, as they are, and in their relations. The incidental references illustrate this: the philosophy of Parmenides, for example, was centred in the thought abstract being, while that of Heraclitus related simply to becoming, and we see what vast effects may be produced by the contemplation of abstract nothing in the case of Buddhism. Being is the first abstract thought,
indeed, and, with the Eleatics, we find it as such in history; for the material principles and the numbers which preceded it are not pure thoughts.

The importance of our findings, too, is well shown in the impossibility of a creation and in the pantheism, which result from the absolute separation of being and nothing exhibited in the common dictum Ex nihilo nihil fit. A creation is impossible without the community of nothing and being; and if all that is, is just being, or if all that is, is just substance, then there results only the abstract pantheism of Parmenides or of Spinoza. We may remark, however, that—as used—the dictum is safe from the animadversion of Hegel; for so, it is nothing else than the law of causality in another form; what it means is simply the à priori synthetic judgment of Kant—there is no change without a cause. It is this sense which prevents the reader from altogether sympathising with Hegel here. What Hegel wishes to hold up, however, is the essential importance in this universe of the distinction, nothing: in effect, negativity, in the sense of distinctivity, is the creative power; and there is nowhere anything which does not confess its influence. As yet, too, the category cause is not in view.

The errors of Kant in reference to the ontological argument spring from bluntness to the distinctions we signalise, and thus demonstrate the value of the latter: Kant, in fact, exhibits a similar confusion of the finite and the infinite, as well as a very imperfect perception of the nature and relations of being, non-being, and so-being (Daseyn).

The objections to the relative teaching of Hegel, then, arise from the untutored attitude of common sense, which means ever the blind instinctive employment of stereotyped abstractions of one’s own, whence or how derived one knows not, asks not, cares not: in the case before us, for example, common-sense insists that its abstraction, a differentiated nothing, is our abstraction, reference-less nothing. We may add, that the practical lesson is to perceive that it is our duty, in view of the infinite affirmation in which we participate, to entertain complete tranquillity in the presence of any finite particular that may emerge.

Remark 2.

There seems nothing very hard here; the chief object is to
point out the difficulty of giving a true expression to speculative propositions, which are always dialectic. The form of the judgment is shown to be inadequate. Identity, unity, inseparability, are all imperfect expressions of the relation that subsists between being and nothing. The concluding illustration in regard to light and darkness speaks for itself.

Of terms, we may notice two—Abstract and Unterschied. Abstract is one of the commonest words in Hegel, and is often used in such a manner as perplexes: it always implies that something is viewed in its absolute self-identity, and absolutely apart from all its concrete references. As regards Unterschied, it is worth while observing that it means inter-shed, or inter-part: the Unterschied of Seyn and Nichts may be profitably regarded as just a sort of abstract water-shed.

Remark 3.

This is the most important of all the Remarks in this place, and the reader ought to make a point of dwelling by it long, and studying it thoroughly. The rigour of thought in regard to a First, a Second, the transition between them, and the principles of progress in general, ought to improve the powers of every faculty which has been privileged to experience it. What is said in regard to crude reflexion and the means of helping it, is also striking and suggestive. Then we are taught what a true synthesis is, and what a false one. Again, we learn that it is the abstractions which are unreal, while their concrete union is fact. In truth, the general gist of the remark is, it is absurd to remain in abstract self-identity, and say movement, progress, is impossible to you; for synthesis must be possible, and is necessary just for this reason, that synthesis is—that is, there is this variegated empirical universe.—The observations in regard to determinate nothings are very important, as well as those that bear on the necessity of our keeping strictly to the precise stage we have reached, without applying in its description or explanation characters which belong to later stages. The incidental notice of the Parmenides of Plato is exceedingly terse, full, and satisfactory.

Hegel remarks of Plato's critique of the Eleatic One: 'It is obvious that this path (method) has a presupposition, and is an external reflexion.' A co-operative reader, and every reader should
be co-operative, ought to ask himself, where is 'the presupposition?' and where is the 'external reflexion?' Again, in the first Remark, the reader ought not to leave without understanding: 'Metaphysic might tautologically maintain, that were a dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse.' Let the reader go back here, and study both for himself. The presupposition is, that variety is incompatible with unity: the external reflexion is, that the two forms are just externally counted: Hegel's universe is such, that the whole is not more each part than each part is the whole—to destroy a part and destroy the whole are thus tautological; what is concerned, moreover, is but an axiom in physics.

There is also expressed here such respect for the empirical world as helps us to see that the system of Hegel is no chimera of abstraction, no cobweb of the brain, but that what it endeavours is simply to think this universe, as it manifests itself around us, into its ultimate and universal principles.

As regards terms, we may remark that Beziehung implies more than mere reference; it implies, as it were, connective reference: it is used pretty much, in fact, in its strict etymological meaning. Synthesis, as alluded to in a previous note, will be found fully explained here: the unphilosophical synthesis thinks it enough just to put together full-formed individuals from elsewhere, as God, a germ-cell, and space (say); while philosophical synthesis is immanent, and points to a transition of necessity with concrete union of different. The allusion to 'ursprüngliche Urtheilen' leads one to think of Kant as the source of all that Hegel seems peculiarly to teach as regards the Ur-theil; at all events—leaving apperception and the categories out of sight—Kant's transcendental doctrine of Urtheilskraft is wholly employed on the commodiation of the inner unities with the outer multiples, and contains a great variety of matter which must have proved eminently suggestive in regard to the main positions assumed by Hegel.

**Remark 4.**

This remark is still occupied with the Unity of Being and Nothing; but it is exceedingly terse, clear, and illustrative. The dialectic against the beginning or ending of the world is very happily shown to rest wholly on the separation of being and nothing; and the hit to ordinary understanding which believes—against this dialectic—a beginning and ending...
of the world, and yet accepts—with this dialectic—the dividedness of being and nothing, is a very sore one. The mode in which incomprehensibility is explained to be produced is excellent, and genuinely Hegelian. The illustration afforded by infinitesimals is also exceedingly satisfactory, as are also the definitions of sophistry and dialectic.—Something that is in its disappearance was eminently adapted to attract a Hegel, whose own object is always something very similar; that is, it is, like infinitesimals, very much of a ratio—the one of a double. In fact reciprocity very well answers to the bottom thought of Hegel,—the notion itself is—in one way of looking—but a form of reciprocity. So we have neither being nor nothing, but a sort of outcome of their reciprocal reflexions, where the one is very much the other—and in consequence of the other. Hegel seems to contemplate the intussusception of the infinite universe into a geometrical punctum: the world is the oscillating coloration of a partridge's eye; it is but a vibrating point—an ideal throb. The method is infinite referential inferentiality, or relative illativity of object and subject; but the object is the subject's, and the subject itself is the veritable absolute. There is a Chinese toy or puzzle which appears as a hollow sphere with innumerable contained successively smaller spheres, movable, and successively within one another: conceive this expanded into the infinitude of space, extended into the infinitude of time, and occupied by all the interests of the universe and man, sphere under sphere, but so that all, perfectly transparent, perfectly permeable, are mutually intussusceptient, and collapse punctually into a single eye-glance;—conceive this, and you have the Vorstellung, the figure, the metaphor of the System of Hegel. But is not this a mere intellectual jeu d'esprit? Outside effort and intentional production, in such a scheme, and with only human faculty to carry it out, must be expected; but this must also be said, that, in the progress of the work, there is no great interest of the world, which does not require to be touched; and this touch we find always to be that of a very master of thought. Again, it is not only an objective system that is concerned; it is also a subjective organon: he, indeed, who has passed through such a Calendar finds himself—always in the ratio of his original force, of course—a power of rare elasticity and vigour, and with a range of the most gratifying compass—a Hegel himself is keen to the last point, strong to the last weight, and wide as the universe. Lastly, if we bear in mind that Kant and
Hegel have at length introduced objective principles into philosophy, and thus lifted it bodily to the platform of science, e.g., the categories, the notion, &c.—one will see good reason to consider the system of Hegel (and the same may be said for that of Kant) an essential and indispensable element in the culture of all who would present themselves in the arena now-a-days, and work for the public—whether in science or in art, in statecraft or the professions, in literature, or the mere business of the schoolmaster.


We may spend a word, first of all, on the terms Zunächst, Unmittelbar, Daseyn, Moment, Ideel, and Grundlage.—Zunächst remains for long something troublesome to the student of Hegel. It means at nearest in the direction in which you are going. If you are generalising, then it will mean the next step towards the genus summum; and nearer (näher) will mean, nearer to universal extension. But if, like Hegel's, your process is one of determination, and towards ultimate comprehension or singularisation, then you must look on the opposite side of the line, and nearer and nearer must mean, greater and greater comprehension, or more and more complex, more and more particularised, more and more individualised. Zunächst, then, may be translated primarily, in the first instance, in the first place, at first hand, primâ facie, &c.; and sometimes also, at closest, or at strictest:—first of all is also a convenient phrase; shortly, properly, &c., will sometimes be found to render it. Das nahere means the particular, the details, and this manifests the process to be one towards increased precision and definiteness: the nearness involved regards the particular object concerned.

Unmittelbar: Direct will be found best to translate this word in paragraph 2 of No. 2; so also at end of No. 3: as it is used in the Remark opposed to das Aufgehobene, one gets a vivid glance of the direct beingness which immediacy amounts to.

Daseyn: an English equivalent for this word is difficult to find; but this is no reason why we should make any difficulty of the notion. Being, Seyn, is easily understood to be being in general, the universal or general fact of existence, of being at all: but Daseyn refers to a definitely-recognised being; it is that which constitutes the recognisableness of every and any member of this actual existence. Seyn applies to the whole; it is the universal indistinguishable mush: but Daseyn has thrown the checker down, and Seyn has become a whole of distinguishable individuals.
Distinguishableness, in fact, is the quality of Daseyn; or, in truth, considering what we imply by the termination ness, I know not but what we might say ness amounts to Seyn, ness declares the fact that there just is; but then nessness would denote the quality whereby a thing is, and distinguishably is. Daseyn is the nessness of anything that is; that, as it were, that I can metaphorically rub and feel between the thumb and finger. Now this Daseyn, Nessness, is accurately composed of being and nothing, and the latter is not one whit less essential than the former.

Grundlage is here the constitutive One of separable individuals; it is the base, in the sense of a chemical base that goes accurately asunder into its constituents, and eclipses these into its unity again; a mother-liquor which we can figure as this moment disappearing into its dry elements, and the next reappearance resolving these into its liquid unity again.

Ideel and Moment we can take together, as they both refer to the one process of Aufhebung. Now that process is what has been described as producing a Grundlage. Water is hydrogen and oxygen; in it they are aufgehoben, and become ideel; it is their Grundlage, they are its Moments. In this way, one can see how hydrogen and oxygen are in water withdrawn, each from its own immediacy. The moments of Spirit are Nature and the Logical Idea; in it they are Ideel as in their Grundlage. Υγη and μορφή are aufgehoben in the ἐνέλεξεια. I drop this gold into that aqua regia, and it disappears; it is aufgehoben, but it is not destroyed—it still ideellement is, it is now a moment. In Hegel, however, the moments are more than synthetic different collaping to a simple one; each is very much the other, and in consequence of the other, or each, while itself reflected into the other, holds the other reflected into itself, and so is the other. The moments in reference to the lever are very illustrative. All through Hegel, indeed, this reciprocation or mutuation of the moments is the great fact: ‘each sublates itself in itself, and is in itself the contrary of itself’ Sublation, resolution, elimination, &c. will be now intelligible as translations of Aufhebung.

If it be considered that the one moment has the nature of matter in it, and the other that of form (one sees that the Aristotelian characterisation of the moments is about the most general of all), it will be easily understood that the one, as in the case of the lever, is always relatively real and the other relatively ideal.

As regards interpretation here, it is difficult to see that any
words can be used more light-giving than those of Hegel himself. In fact, nothing can surpass the accuracy of eye with which he sees, or the distinctness of lip with which he names. No doubt, what is here must appear very strange to a beginner; but, after all, it is employed on what is around us, and is an attempt to observe and (in a way) generalise ultimate facts. What we mean by being, if we will but look closely enough, is only indefinite immediacy, as nothing in the same way is immediate indefiniteness. Being and nothing are thus the same; or being has gone into nothing, and nothing has gone into being. But such movement is a process, and is named becoming. This process unites both distinctions, but so that they are alternately direct and indirect, and in such fashion that the one has concreted or thickened itself into origin, and the other similarly into decease: but these again, as but different directions of the same process, arrest themselves and sist process into proceed or product; or being and nothing, now origin and decease, as but opposing directions of becoming, arrest themselves, and sist becoming into become—and that is Daseyn, Here-being, There-being, So-being.

In the directest fashion, this is but the generalisation of what is before our eyes and between our fingers: in other words, this is the thinking of the same; these are the thoughts which the commonest things involve: this, then, is Logic; why, then, should we not be content to take it thus? The generalisation of Aristotle, in regard to the abstract ultimates of ordinary reasoning, was not, we should say, one whit less strange, or one whit more satisfactory, when it emerged, than is now the generalisation of Hegel in regard to the ultimates of things. Things, in truth, have ultimate forms, as well as thoughts, and it is good to know them all; nor is it to be supposed that less good will result from the ultimate thinking of things than from the ultimate thinking of thoughts. Nay, observe, in both cases, it is ultimate thinking; and as thoughts and things are all, this ultimate thinking will not constitute only all ultimate thinking, but it may go together systematically as a whole, and so constitute the ultimate and essential truth of the universe, or—philosophy at length! Again, Hegel is no less qualified for this abstraction here, than Aristotle was for that abstraction there; and these laconic paragraphs in regard to nothing, being, becoming, and their process, may at once be held up in proof thereof. In every particular, the characterisation is consummate—the identification
of the distinction we use as Being with the distinction we use as Nothing, the exhibition of each as process, the pointing out that process as becoming, the demonstrating becoming to unite the distinctions at once as identical and as different in the opposing forms of origin and decease, and lastly, the precipitation of becoming—by its own contradiction—into become—all is masterly, and there is present a dialectic which, as mere process, must wonderfully sharpen our wits. But it is not for a moment to be thought that it is alone as subjective discipline, and not also as objective thinking, that this dialectic is valuable: on the contrary, the thoughts themselves must be seen to be the ultimate and essential thoughts that found, or ground, or beground the universe. Or so only can a beginning be thought; and so only, therefore, can a beginning be constituted.

A beginning, in truth, or the beginning, is what constitutes the bottom consideration here. To Hegel it is, no doubt, evident that it is utterly impossible to start with a single unit and conditions. Such a start were in its own crude presuppositions its own refutation. No material unit is competent to a material many; while to presuppose conditions for the production of this many, is just to presuppose this many itself. Before trying to find a beginning, we should have asked, what is a beginning? What is the category? This is the first question. It is absurd to talk of conditions before we know what conditions are. It is futile to explain the beginning, unless we have first of all fairly seen into all that the category, beginning, implies. An outward of any kind, for example, and a beginning will be found absolutely incommensurable. In this way, as regards the object of our quest, we are shut in to the inward—we are shut in to thought as thought, and the only possible conclusion is, that the thought of the beginning is just the beginning of thought. To postulate a single substance exposed to a variety of conditions in a ready-made time and space, is simply to take things as we see them—simply to trip over crude figurate conceptions of the bottom categories, identity and difference, which should have been examined first. To talk of a primitive matter and conditions in explanation of transition, is to stultify oneself—is to begin with the very variety which requires to be explained.

Again, it seems very difficult to think of a beginning as only inward; we cannot think an inward without an outward as substrate and basis. We cannot conceive of thought as in the first instance merely in the air.
This is perfectly just. Thought is not thought literally like so much water, held somewhere in the bag of the universe: thought implies a thinking subject. It may be that this subject is not at first in εντελέχεια, or even in ενέργεια or μορφή; it may be that, at first, it is only in the stage δίναμις, or that it is only potentially. Beginning, in fact, applied to such subject must find it only potentially there, or only as indefinite immediacy, that is, the subject itself, in the beginning, must find itself only in indefinite immediacy. Being is the first dim thought, which, when sought to be looked at closer, is only nothing; but from this nothing there is a return again to the sense of being, which now, increased by the reflexion nothing, can be conceived very intelligibly to contain the thoughts becoming and become. But this become is so far definite, it definitely is, and it becomes the something of reflexion, and so on. In short, the whole process of the Logical Idea can have the universal Subject assigned to it as substrate. The reader is likely to find all this strange; but it is not a whit more strange than that pebble from the brook, or this pen in my hand: we cannot blink the fact that there is existence, and that man’s life has been to understand it. Very truly also that pebble from the brook is not an object just because it is a material something: all that constitutes what it essentially is to me, are categories, and what it is apart from these categories is as nothing: no object, even the most material, but is in very truth a congeries of thoughts. There is no absurdity, then, in the thought of the beginning as the beginning; for we must have confidence in thoughts and know them as the only verities when opposed to things.

It is on such universal and absolute considerations, then, that Hegel would rest his beginning and all his other procédés; and he does not for a moment think it necessary to allude to the manner in which he gradually worked himself into light on the standpoint and with the materials of Kant. One word in reference to that the actual and concrete origin will not be out of place, if only to reassure ourselves of the mundane connexions and really external nature of Hegel’s operations, however esoteric be their issue, and however absolute their truth. It is hardly necessary, probably, to remind the reader that Hegel, adopting the hint of Kant, and taking in his hands both the ontological manuals and Kant’s own materials, could hardly fail to observe that Seyn was the genus summum, Nichts the differentia summa, and Werden the species summa. As little reason either is there for reminder that
Hegel, realising Logic, recognised in the three steps named but three forms of the three moments of the single logical heart-beat common to the universe, or that, vitalising history, his attention was specially directed to that notion of reciprocity which connected him with Kant. Let us point out in passing, however, that the three numbers under Werden refer to the same considerations. Thus, No. 1 is 'the unity of being and nothing,' which is the Begriff, or the moment of simple apprehension; No. 2 is 'the moments of becoming'—or manifestly the Ur-theil; and No. 3, the 'Sublation of Becoming,' is a movement of Schluss or an act of Reason. The reciprocity of opposing moments with mutual eclipse in a common sphere (in analogy with Kant's mode of viewing the disjunctive judgment) is also obvious. We are not for a moment to suppose, then, that the logical series of Hegel, whatever it involves, really rests for its start on absolute considerations, or really flows alone and absolutely from nothing but an internal pulse: the veritably genetic considerations and pulse of Hegel are certainly, for the most part, relative and external. I know not whether the problem ever presented itself to Hegel in the brief *propos*, We have to identify Affection with Function; but what that phrase implies lies not obscurely at the centre of his whole industry. If the reader will but take the trouble to reflect on the problem as thus expressed, he will realise to himself the nature and course of the necessarily first thoughts of Hegel. His first difficulty, for example, will be the *formality* of the problem as announced, and the necessity for *matter*. What is Function—what is Affection? Thinking is function—yes—and feeling is affection; but how get them together—where shall we begin—how shall we begin? The logical movement is function; but simple apprehension and the rest are quite formal—how are we to realise them? There seems no possibility of a transition from the one to the other. In the midst of such thoughts as these, it certainly would be a relief to recur to the Categories, and to observe in these a sort of middle-ground between affection and function—media, as it were, which united both; for the categories involve an intellectual schema, which schema, in that it possesses matter, is to a certain extent sensuous. To complete these categories, then, from the confines of the object up to those of the subject, would seem a very hopeful portion of work towards solution of the general problem. But before the categories presented themselves thus to Hegel, I think there is evidence that he had
attempted the question from another side: to name it at once, I think the 'Phaenomenologie' proves Hegel to have been led to begin first of all with Affection, in the hope of being able to work up to Function. In this work, as is seen at a glance, he starts with crude sensation, passes on to intelligent perception, and again to understanding, &c.; and the general object throughout is to resolve these forms into notions, or into forms of reason. All is sought to be pointed out as an affair of reflexion; ever there is reflexion behind reflexion. Under perception, for example, observe how in every such act he points out a variety of moments which are necessarily notional, and not perceptual at all:—

In that the qualities (the reference is to a thing and its qualities) are expressed in the simple oneness of the universal [as the common unity—the thing itself], they refer themselves to themselves, are indifferent to one another; each is on its own account, free from the rest. The simple, self equal universality itself again is distinct and free from these its determinatenesses; it is pure reference of self to self, or the medium in which these determinatenesses all are, and interpenetrate each other therefore in it as in a simple unit without touching each other; for just through their participation in this universality, are they indifferently per se. This abstract universal medium, which may be named Thingness in general or the pure Essentity, is nothing else than the Here and Now (which were the results of crude Sensation) as they have exhibited themselves, namely as a Simple Together of Many; but the Many are in their determinateness themselves simply Universal. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time plural; it is white and also sharp, cubical also, and also of a certain weight, and so on. All these many qualities are in a simple Here, in which therefore they interpenetrate and pervade each other; none has another Here than the other, but each is everywhere in the same Here in which the others are; and at the same time, without being separated by separate Heres, they do not in this interpenetration affect each other: the white does not affect or alter the cubical, neither of them nor both together the sharp, and so on; but as each is itself simple reference of self to self, it lets the others alone, and refers itself to them only through the neutral or indifferent Also. This Also is therefore the pure Universal itself, or the Medium, the Thingness which thus holds them together.

That in this way perception is attempted to be exhibited as an affair of thought, is plain; and certainly the statement has its own subtlety of analytic and metaphysical truth: it may prove, indeed, a useful illustration of the manner of Hegel. In the celebrated preface to this work, the industry, an example of which we have just seen, is expressly referred to:—

By this in general, that, as was expressed above, substance is in itself subject, is every object (Inhalt, literally, implex, or whole of comprehension)
its own reflexion into itself. The subsisting, or the substance of a finite object, is its equality with its own self; for its inequality with itself were its dissolution. But self-equality, or equality with self, is pure abstraction; and this is thought. When I say Quality, I say the simple determinateness: by quality is one object distinguished from another, or by quality is it an object; it is for its own self, or it consists through this simplicity with itself. But by this is it essentially thought. Herein is it understood, that das Seyn (being) is thought, &c. . . . Thought is the immanent Self of the Object, &c.*

By these quotations, it will be intelligible that Hegel in his earlier stages was employed in an endeavour to lead the notion directly into the object by an analysis of the successive phases of this latter, or of the successive faculties to which it was submitted. That is, Hegel at first sought to reduce Affection to Function by an analysis of the former. Transition from the one to the other, however, is not in this manner perfectly satisfactory, and Hegel was enabled to perceive later that to complete one side first, and to allow it, when completed, to pass over bodily, as it were, into its other in obedience to the general rhythm, would constitute, on the whole (ridiculed as it has been universally, and by Schelling particularly), a much more satisfactory transition. In short, it occurred in time to Hegel to identify the first form of the notion with the most abstract category, to develop category after category risingly towards the notion itself, to exhibit it itself, describing its own subjective forms, passing over into the notion of the object and terminating in the Idea, and thus to complete Logic, or the whole of those inner forms which were the souls of everything without. Logic completed, or the Logical Idea appearing summed and full-formed as an organic whole, he exhibited the same as passing over, and falling asunder now into externality and particularity—as Nature. The next step was the conjunction of both into Spirit. But enough has now been said by way of reminder of the external operations of Hegel: we return now to our commentary of the text where necessary.

* Pref. Phaenom., pp. 41, 42; Berlin, 1841. The preceding, op. cit. p. 84.
CHAPTER II.

There-being.

And, first of all, we have to see the moment of the Begriff, or of Simple Apprehension, in

A.

There-being as such.

The general distributions or divisions which precede 'a. There-being in general,' though to be perused, need not be allowed to arrest the reader for their full understanding, which, indeed, is impossible in the first instance. Nowhere, in truth, can any reader hope to read with the same perfect intelligence and open sense with which Hegel wrote, till after a repeated return from the united whole to the separated parts.

As moment of simple apprehension, with but identity before us, the identity of There-being as such, or of There-being in general, there is not much to be said here. Accordingly, what is said is more of the nature of general remark. The construction or constitution of every There-being is accurately named, however; and that is the main point. Everything that definitely is, is product of becoming, and as such it is a σύνολον, a composite—but in perfect unity singleness, and simpleness—of being and nothing. Now, everything that is, definitely is: we have, therefore, in the characterisations here reached, the principles of the universal structure of the all of things. The distinction is certainly subtle and difficult to realise; still it is very certain that it is a not which gives the qualifying force—the edge of individuality and self-identity to being itself. Without that not, being itself indeed is not, or nought; for it is an absolute abstraction, and there shows not a sign in it. In the value assigned to Daseyn, then, there is more than mere thought: we cannot say, only, according to these thoughts all things are; but we can say also, according to this very constitution all things are. When
the ingredients of certain medicinal juleps, &c., are sent dry, they are called the species of these medicaments. Now, similarly, we may say, that Daseyn is the universal species of everything that is. It is not necessary, then, that we should call up before us the idea of the originating subject in order to put ourselves at home with the meaning of Daseyn; this assignation is sufficient by itself; we see at once its truth and value as the basal form. Again, it is important to know that being and nothing are not, each apart and by itself, anywhere denizens of this universe. What is, is an inseparable one of both; neither being as being, nor nothing as nothing, anywhere actually is. Both are abstractions, and utterly void abstractions. It is saying very little for God, then, to say He is pure Being, or, what is the same thing, the Sum of all Realities; yet no mode of characterising God is thought—very generally, at least—more appropriate or solemn. As Hegel points out, there is the same warrant for, and the same honour in, the designation for God of Sum of all Negations.

The caution as regards the intercalations of reflexion is of value in its general scope, but its particular relevancy is not clear. Daseyn, There-being, is a simple one, therefore in the form of immediacy, therefore also in the form of being: this seems result of the objective evolution, and not of the reader's subjective reflexion. Neither is it to this that Hegel's remark applies, but to our seeing, also, that it is only one-sidedly in the determination of Being, and that in point of fact the other determination, Nothing, is present also. Now it is this part that has been anticipated by reflexion, and not yet expressly evolved. The first sentence of the relative paragraph exhibits a peculiar grammatical construction. Up to the semicolon there are three clauses, of which the second is separated from the first by a comma, and the third by a comma and a dash from the second: now the function of this dash is to connect the third clause (ein aufgeehobenes, negativ-bestimmtes) as well to the nominative (Das Ganze) of the first clause as to that (das Seyn) of the second. The peculiarity has been attempted to be conveyed in the translation. Such longe-referent, multi-referent construction is not unusual in Hegel, and brings its own difficulties.*

* There may be something of fancy in this same longe reference here; but, taking nothing from, it perhaps even improves, the sense. Aufgeehobenes, Negativ-bestimmtes: printed so as substantives, these words are right: they are adjectives in the text, and wrong—as such directly agreeing only with 'Moment.' My first translation may be fully the better one!—N.
As regards the terms, there is not much occasion to add any remark. For Daseyn, perhaps, There-ness, So-ness, as well as Ness-ness would be more eligible than There-being, &c. For setzen we have used the term evolution; but we shall have a better opportunity for the further discussion of this word. Vermittlung is an awkward term to convey in English: it is that process, mediation, or intervention of means, which brings about a result; in fact, it is always a bringing about. Inhalt, as usual, is a complexus notarum, a complement of the significates of logical comprehension.

b. Quality.

The difficulty here is to conceive—picture—negation as There-being, or Thereness, and Quality: it is hard to inspissate Nothing with Substance; we must fix our eye, however, on the substantial negation in all quality as steadily as we can. The moment of objective reflexion must be well looked at here. The one element is distinguished from the other, and so, therefore, it is now a reflected entity, or it contains a reflexion from the other in it, at the same time that, by distinction, it is in a manner shed off or reflected on to its own self. The effect of the bestimmen of being by nothing may be illustrated. 'Daseyn ist bestimmtes Seyn:' one might almost translate this, There-being is curdled being; or There-ness is curdled-ness. Something of a real negation may be so seen.—Again, throw into that clear air so much cold, and it is opacified, curdled into a cloud. In these examples, one might figure that negation had been added to the being that was, and so this opaque, curdled, determined There-being resulted. Being, in short, is determined; there is a terminus put to it, a negation; and so it is There-being, so much there-ness.

Remark.

Reality and Negation.

This observation is full of the most excellent matter, and opens striking vistas into several very unexpected directions. This applies to the sum of all realities, to that of all Negations—to the notions of God's Goodness, Justice, Wisdom, Power—to that of Absolute Power, &c. &c. The allusion to Böhme is very interesting; and as regards Spinoza, the critique of Hegel is always
absolutely irresistible and masterly. There is a hint, too, very well worth observing, that though the individual belongs to other spheres than that of Seyn, he must, so far as he holds of Seyn, submit to the characterisations of Seyn. The writing here is so exoteric, that comment is unnecessary. As regards terms, in the beginning of the Remark, as we see, Hegel himself sets an sich as equal to im Begriffe. For the hopelessness of solution which some may feel in regard to Goodness, Power, &c., let me suggest that vital reciprocity which is the root of the whole: right is right only because there is a left; up, up, only because there is a down; and each is quite as much in the other—or simply other—as it is in itself, or itself.

With a general remark or two, we shall pass on. If we suppose what Daseyn is, to have been thought before Daseyn was, we shall come to see, on due consideration, that it could not have been thought otherwise than Hegel indicates. It is to this strict thinking of Hegel that we are to refer his tendency to keep in view the etymological meaning of his terms. In fact, this alone ought to be a guarantee of his sincerity, and earnestness, and good faith with us. He is not contented with a vague sign; he does not move in tropes; he must have a word that accurately and precisely and exactly cuts out his thought; and he never uses a word without distinctly seeing what it amounts to, or perfectly satisfying himself that it is adequate to his purpose. This, however, makes the difficulty of Hegel; because in him, if we attempt, as the sensuous modern literature has taught us, to float on with words in their ordinary and current sense, we find ourselves presently lost. It is a severe task, then, to him who would follow Hegel, to keep by the thought of Hegel, and, in spite of the cloud of current sense, recognise distinctly in each word, and even in each fraction of a word, what that precisely is which Hegel means it to convey. Take the word endlich, finite, for example: if we commit ourselves to the vague and phantasy-exciting signification in common use, we shall never see into the notion; while, on the contrary, how different, how clear it becomes when we tame phantasy into thought, and correct loose opinion by etymology! That is finite which is ended or endable in space, in time, or in thought; that is infinite which is neither ended or endable in space, in time, or in thought: rather, anything in time and space is superfluous, everything in these being limited by other, and thought with the pure forms of sense themselves is alone what is infinite. Consider Ego, for example: it is wholly infinite—unended, unendable.
It is this same close restricting of himself to reality which has procured Hegel the reproach of Haym, that perception is always behind him. The reproach is a compliment: Hegel would deal with facts of existence, and not with fictions of conception. It does not follow, indeed, that thought is less pure thought because perception is behind it; rather, in an opposite supposition, thought would be but empty idle subjectivity: function and affection are necessary complementary reciprocals. Still the development from Seyn to Daseyn which we have witnessed, though true to perception, has always found its materials within its own self. (The divisions are, of course, from their very nature, anticipations.)

What is said of a category is always to be understood by reference to the world of facts; but this is the point which must not be overlooked, that it is also universally and necessarily true and applicable in that world. In reading Daseyn, for example, it just gains in sense and truth, the more real and energetic and entire the reference is which we make to the concrete: the thing is, that the characterisation is unexceptive. Besides, we have not to occupy ourselves with the concomitant reflexions in such manner as to hide from ourselves the progressively extricated differentiae which are again re-incorporated to increase and progress.

The homogeneousness with which being and nothing are one in There-being is the important consideration. We have not being here, and nothing there: they are perfectly incorporated into a one. Light and darkness are, as it were, perfectly commingled into the resultant colour. Again, the colour is directly a light, as There-being is directly being; but the other moment, darkness, nothing, is equally there, and will manifest itself on its own side. Colour is not partly light, and partly dark; it is a uniform simple immediate: still it is the Grundlage, the neutral base, in which light and darkness both are—idéellement, that is—ideally—moments, but sublated. The illustration corresponds not inexactlly. The definiteness, then, seems mainly due to the negative element: it is the dark gives colour and distinction in colour. Not very different is it in the case of a flavour; the peculiarity of it, the difference of it, is the edge, and seems apart from the body of the flavour: when it is all peculiarity or edge, it is thin, worthless, or passes into nothing. (One meets characters who are all edge, distinction, emphasis, accent; they cut, but they do not move: the fair union makes the great man, as Homer, Sophocles, Epaminondas, Cervantes, &c.). Sound is much the
same; it is determination by silence that produces musical notes: possibly, varying proportions of vibration and non-vibration constitute much of the difference in sounds. Colour, in like manner, may result, not, as in the coarse theory of Goethe, from a mechanical mixture of light and darkness, but from variety in the alternation of vibration and non-vibration (undulation offers no difference to make a difficulty). It is remarkable, too, that there are seven musical notes and seven colours; and if the latter be really reducible to three, is such reduction applicable to the former? Are colours but music to the eye—music but colours to the ear? Perhaps, variety in odours and flavours similarly arises, and all difference is but alternation of vibration and non-vibration. Thus, too, may neutral effects be accounted for, as the black of the union of iron and gallic acid in ink. Non-being, then, is the seat of determination, the edge of difference—how else is edge conceivable but as cessation? Edge here, too, is but another word for the smack, the pitch, the feel. In this way we can see difference in identity almost as a matter of fact. We can conceive what is as the one identical, infinitesimal spore whose vibration is its difference—and that is the all of thought as exhibited. Hegel's general view must be capable of being so stated. What is the universe to him, if not the one absolute vox inflecting itself into its involved voculations? Bestimmung is but articulation, and the absolute Bestimmung is but the absolute articulation of the absolute one—and that one is just thought: Thought's own native articulations constitute the all of things.—The above remarks, it is to be understood, however, are not to be regarded materially, or in themselves, but only formally and relatively, as illustrative of the union of being and nothing in every There-being.

c. Something.

The reader ought to pay particular attention to this section, for it is the most important we have yet seen, both in itself and as illustrative of the thinking peculiar to Hegel.—We may notice, in the first place, what is spoken of as the Unterschied, the inter-shed, the distinction, the difference, which in There-being appears as reality and negation. It is the same difference which was first named being and nothing, then origin and decease, and now as here. Being and nothing collapsed, or were eclipsed, into the concrete neutral base, becoming; There-being assumed a like rela-
tion to origin and decease; and now we see Something similarly to resume reality and negation. Thus, then, we see logical determination verily in process: the moments have successively thickened themselves, and the base (which is just also a moment) has likewise successively thickened itself. Now, the means productive of this thickening has been simply reflexion, or indeed just—thinking: the one moment of the single logical rhythmus passes into its opposite, and with it collapses into a higher third: this is Hegel's dialectic; but it is also simple apprehension, judgment, and reason; or it is Begriff, Urtheil, Schluss; or, again, it is οὐ, μορφή, ἐνέλεξεν, an sich, für sich, &c. &c.*

What we have to see here, however, is, that the difference exists, and that it is always, in whatever form, still the difference,—an antithesis and at the same time synthesis of two such, that the one is only because the other is, and both collapse into a third. The reader must bear in mind the inter-shed, then, as the primordial, but ever-present and vital, duresis or diaphora of the world: Yes—No—Both!

The single pivot of this section, however, finds itself in the phrases first and second negation, the negation of the negation, the concrete absolute negation, resolution of difference, sublation of distinction, the negative reference of self to self, the negative unity of self with self, the Mediation of self with self, Being-within Self, &c.; all of which just mean the same thing, and that is, the negation of the constituting variety, or many into the constituted unit or one, or the absorption of the parts into the whole, said whole being further regarded as simply singular. In Something, in short, There-being sublates its own difference, or it returns to itself from its own difference, and is thus gone into itself. If any one will consider what a Subject is, he will readily understand this: an Ego or I is the unity of an infinitude of details, but as Ego it is wholly negative, as Ego all its details have disappeared; Ego is, therefore, the negative unity of itself with itself, or the mediation of itself with itself; and thus is it the negation of the negation, for its details are in the first instance as negative to it (the abstract negative is here involved, productive of variety or difference), but it as return to itself is the negation of

* Perhaps it is confusing to call this movement Reflexion, as Hegel is known—at least in strictness at first—usually to reserve that term for only one of its contained moments—that of the separating and abstracting understanding or judgment: an instance of this occurs in thus very paragraph, in an allusion to unformed Reflexion.
the negation, and the resumption of concrete unity. The two negatives or negations are thus, then, very clear; and Something as negation of the negation is seen to be the beginning of the Subject. The words in the text, 'There-being in general, distinction in it, and resolution of this distinction,' contain the whole business. In these words, too, the moments come completely to the surface: 'There-being in general' is the immediacy of the Begriff, the An sich, or the moment of simple apprehension; 'distinction in it' is the immediacy of the Ur-theil, or the moment of judgment; and 'resolution of this distinction' is, as Schluss or resuming totality, the moment of reason. In him who shall understand this section, the lesson of Hegel has fairly begun. Every way the thinking here is admirable: consider the pointing out, though that is an anticipation, and Something has first of all to other itself in itself,—that Something, as in itself Becoming, goes asunder into the concrete Werden that has Something and Other as its sides, both of which are Somethings.

The reader will get a glimpse of the negative reference to self, if he will conceive his finger running questioningly over an unknown surface, and suddenly returning from the edge of the same back, as it were, to its centre with the word wood, or stone, or glass, &c., as the case may be. Let him suppose himself to be blindfolded, and successive surfaces to be tentatively offered to one finger, and he will find that he is in contact for some time simply with an unknown blur of difference, which blur suddenly collapses to a unity—and to a unity of self-reference—when what it is—and that is its notion—suddenly strikes him. Then only when it attains self-reference is the blur—Something. Hegel's metaphysic of Something, then,—and it is perfect, for no Something in the universe but will be found to be accurately constituted so,—is but a concrete act of perception as perception was determined by Kant. Consider what an unknown blur the Santa Maria must have proved to the Indians who watched with appalled astonishment those bright shapes, Columbus and the harnessed Spaniards, descending from it; and consider, again, the easy unity of self-reference in which it would have all gone together as 'ship' to the eyes of any European sailor, had any such, by shipwreck or otherwise, found himself among them! All this refers to Kant's theory of perception—a theory which, as stated at full elsewhere* in its own place, shall only be alluded to here. This theory, we

* (In the Text-Book to Kant.)
may observe, Hegel has undoubtedly made his own. In Kant's
type of Perception, then, there are three moments: there is,
first, the manifold of Sense; second, the synthetic unity of the
Category; and third, the Apperception of the individual subject.
This, again, is but the Notion of Hegel: the Category is the
Universal; the Manifold, the Particular; and subjective Apper-
ception, the Singular. Now, we have seen manifolds united into
the self-referent Singles, wood, stone, glass, ship, &c., and it appears
as if this self-reference were the result of the single category
Something. But this is not the case: in an act of perception
there are generally a vast number of categories involved. The
Indians who saw the Santa Maria, though they had no form
'ship' to apply, were, nevertheless, not idle with their categories,
but had soon stuck it full with many characterisations of their
own. It was a thing, and had qualities; it was a force; perhaps
it was an animal and had life: it was certainly there in Quantity
and Quality; it was something, it had definite being, it involved
becoming, it implied pure being. This is to try and convey to the
reader that all perceptions—that is, all objects—are but congeries
of categories, of notions. Take any object you like, and throw
out of it one after the other the categories you have thought into
it (Kant), or which are in it (Hegel)—then ask yourself what
remains? To the common mind what remains is still the object,
the wood, stone, glass, ship, in absolute, isolated, free independence,
after as before. To Kant what remains is the manifold of sense—
affection set up in us by the unknown thing in itself or things in
themselves without us, disposed into the really internal, but
apparently external, forms of space and time: this, then, is what
remains to Kant—an unperceived, incoherent manifold of affection.
To Hegel, again, what remains must be otherwise characterised.
For him, the Kantian Thing-in-itself, as a mere void characterless
assumption, exists not. To him, again, the sensuous element,
affection, as but the externalisation or mere other of the intel-
lectual element, function, exists only in this latter. To Hegel,
consequently, withdrawal of the categories is the total eclipse at
once of an inner and an outer; or sense, as but the reflexion of
thought, must disappear with thought. If you discharge, indeed,
all categories from any object—a stone, say—what is there then
that does remain? Can you name it? can you find in it a single
character whereby you can say it? No; it is unsayable, an
Unsagbares, a characterless void, like the Kantian Thing-in-itself!
At least, it is as nothing to the other element, which has just been discharged, or at best it is only the other of that element. To Hegel, then, the object of thought is thought, and anything else opined in it is but its other as other. But Hegel is not satisfied with saying as much; he wishes to show as much, and he exhibits the object of thought—just the object—in gradual growth from the nothing of pure being up to the All and the One of the Absolute Spirit. The Logic of Hegel, then, is but the genetic exposition of the true Thing-in-itself as opposed to the inane Thing-in-itself of Kant. Nay, the reader must feel this himself now—after the metaphysic of Something. Has not 'a light gone up' to him thence? Has he not felt that the solidity of every Something was, after all, thought? Has he not been made to see that even his ordinary perceptions imply thoughts, are impossible without thoughts, and that these thoughts constitute the all-important moments of these perceptions? Even to him, then, now, in this Logic, is it not the formation of the Thing-in-itself he sees before him? If we refer now to a passage quoted from the 'Phaenomenologe,' a little way back, we shall see how much the 'Logik' is a rise as regards the same. What was to Hegel in the one work the vague, inarticulate, as it were dreaming, Sichselbstglauehkeit, or equality with self, is here the precise, fully-developed, perfectly self-conscious negative reference to self. Kant is, in every way, the materia of Hegel; but if any one will realise to himself what thinking lay in Hegel between those determinations of the 'Phaenomenologe' and these of the 'Logik,' he will get a glimpse into—well—profundity. Hegel is a royal thinker, tenacious, deeply-incisive, long-breathed.

The necessity of the one of a notion to the many of sense before we can even perceive: this, a determination of Kant, is another way of exhibiting the germ-cell of Hegel. Hegel saw this to be necessarily, in every case, a negative reference to self; and so he made it his object to find all the cases, and in their sequence and system. How much, then, deep consideration of what constitutes Kant's theory of perception, and also the Thing-in-itself, had to do with the origin of the system of Hegel, ought now to be tolerably clear, and we may conclude here with a word on two or three of the terms.

Real and Reality must always be understood by reference to the place in the development where the latter word emerges; indeed, this is a remark universally applicable as regards the terms of Hegel: to understand them we have only to refer to the
moment out of which their notion rose. Opine, as usual, concerns crude subjective mein-ung, as it were the mere mine-ing, my-ing, or me-ing of thought. Being-within-self, or Insichseyn: the effect of In here, as contradistinguished from An, must be seen into; it is attempted to be conveyed by within. In Something, indeed, a within begins.

‘In Something Mediation with Self has reached position:' these last three words translate ist gesetzt. The meaning plainly is, that, in the one notion, the other is explicit or fairly overt, and expressed, that is, it is in logical position. This setzen, especially in its derivatives Gesetztseyn and Gesetztes, is always particularly troublesome to an English translator. What it means here, however, is happily particularly plain.

The would-be abstract nothing, of course, refers to the common understanding, and its ‘it is the same thing, therefore, whether I have a house or nothing, a hundred dollars or nothing, &c.’ This nothing plainly would be abstract, or is supposed to be abstract; but, on the contrary, it is evidently concrete, as it refers to a concrete—house, dollars, &c.

That the most abstract determinations ‘are also the most current expressions of unformed reflexion,’ (and it is hoped the manner, ‘the reflexion,’ &c., will not prove too foreign here,) might have been suggested to Hegel by a remark of Kant’s at page 280 of the Logic in his collected works, which points out that abstract notions are ‘sehr brauchbar,’ very useful and useable, ‘as they may be applied to many things.’ Some forty-three pages further on, Hegel says the same thing again thus: ‘to unformed thought, the abstractest categories, being, there-being, reality, finitude, &c., are the most current.’ Hegel’s own thought is evidently here, even were it on occasion of Kant, which, however,—the whole matter is of little moment,—is not certain. Nevertheless, one cannot read the Logic of Kant—seemingly meagre as it is—without thinking perpetually how much this and that must have done for Hegel. Here is a passage which well illustrates the Vorstellung of Hegel, as well as the production of a pure universal ‘Logik’ as parallel to a pure universal ‘Grammatik:’—

Knowledge of the universal in abstracto is speculative knowledge; knowledge of the universal in concreto, common knowledge. Philosophical knowledge is speculative knowledge of reason, and it begins therefore there where the common exercise of reason commences to make attempts in the cognition of the universal in abstracto.
From this determination of the difference between the common and the speculative use of reason, we may infer what people the beginning of philosophising must date from. Of all nations the Greeks, then, first began to philosophise. For they first attempted to cultivate cognitions of reason, not by aid of the leading-string of images (figures, pictures), but in abstracto; while other nations, on the contrary, sought to make notions intelligible to themselves always only by means of images in concreto. Thus even at the present day there are nations, as the Chinese and certain Indians, who treat indeed of things which are derived solely from reason, as of God, the Immortality of the Soul, &c., but seek not, nevertheless, to explore the nature of these objects according to notions and rules in abstracto.*

Kant goes on to say, that what philosophy appears among Persians and Arabians comes from Aristotle, that the Zendavesta displays no trace of the same, and that the ‘gepriesene’ Egyptian wisdom was, in comparison with Greek philosophy, mere child’s-play. The antithesis of the Hegelian conception to the Hegelian notion is precisely that of an image in concreto and a thought in abstracto. It is as images or pictures, one sees, that conceptions are just representations of notions. The hint to Hegel’s whole process is also plain. Here from the ‘Soul’s Tragedy’ of that wonderfully analytic and subtle character-reproducing poet, Browning, is a passage which may illustrate the same subject of conceptions and notions:—

As when a child comes in breathlessly and relates a strange story, you try to conjecture from the very falsities in it, what the reality was,—do not conclude that he saw nothing in the sky, because he assuredly did not see a flying horse there, as he says,—so, through the contradictory expression, do you see, men should look painfully for, and trust to arrive eventually at, what you call the true principle at bottom.

This suggests another Hegelian characteristic: we, like dupes, are led daily, and blindfolded, by ‘what you call the true principle at bottom,’ without the slightest notion of what it is; but he, for his part, must see and know and settle it all as Wesen.

B.

FINITUDE.

The reader will find elements of difficulty here. Let him remember, first of all, the exact point of the development at which he has arrived. He has seen There-being sublate its own deter-

minateness, distinction, or difference by reflexion into its own self as a Something. The sublation has not destroyed the difference, however, which still, as it were, remains outside the reflexion into self, and thus distinguished from the self of the Something is, in that relation, Other. The reader must see that the other is not imported from elsewhere, but that the Something others itself in itself. This is the first point to be observed, and it is one of the greatest importance: we must never part company with what we have before us, and always see clearly whither we are arrived. At present we have reached Something and Other, which, as such, have, in the first instance, the air of being indifferent in regard to each other. Now, it is important to see that, each being equally a Something and only other because of the other, the element of negation is not in them themselves, but falls out or outside of both. But this involves a reflexion the one from the other, with the result that Something is in itself against its Being-for-Other. To understand this, we must see that we have not introduced a foreign other, that the other spoken of is the other which reflected itself in the Something itself, and which still is the Something, but so that the Something there is as Other, or is its own Being-as-Other. This is the true development of the notion implied in the Hegelian Seyn-für-Anderes. The reflexion by which the negation was identified with There-being, and restored to, or incorporated with, the reality—and these were the moments of There-being—gave birth to the Something, which Something again, as negative reflexion into self, involved another from which the reflexion took place. But this other was still its own; and it is the peculiar constitution of every Something in this universe, that it involves, or implies, or contains its own other. There, however, in this region of other, the Something is as Being-as-other, or, as Hegel prefers it, Being-for-other. The peculiar force of the German fur, as already seen in the illustrations relative to für mich and für sich, is here to be recalled and reconsidered. We say in English, it passes for genuine, it passes for gold, &c.: this is the same for as that in the Being-for-other. Something in the determination so designated, is every way other; it is there where it is as other, and there where it is in every direction for other.

Now this the region of otherness, is the region also of recognisability, determinateness. And again the determinateness is the Something's own. But the Something's determinateness reflected into the Something, becomes that Something's qualification or
precise determination; meaning thereby its vocation, destination, purpose, chief end, or how else you may name its one manifestible peculiar nature. Then, again, the peculiar manifestible nature passes plainly into the peculiar manifested nature; and that is Beschaffenheit, or so-constitutedness, which we may translate, in opposition to qualification (from qualis) by talification (from talis). Talification, then, alludes to Something being constituted such, that when involved with Other it asserts itself thus and thus; or talis (such sort) is just the answer to qualis (what sort).

Now this actual manifestation, identical also (as we have seen) with the potential manifestibility, must, without difficulty, be perceived to constitute, as Hegel says, the immanent and, at the same time, negated Being-for-other, or the Limit of the Something. That it is the immanent Being-for-other is plain; and that, manifesting itself only as or when involved with other, it is also negated, is likewise plain. Not less easy is it to see that its assertion against or on other is its Limit; or that where it at once affirmatively or immanently and negatedly or with other is, there is its Limit, or there is it in its Limit.

But just such constitution (of assertion with or against other) as characterises Limit, is what we name the immanent determination, proper nature, of any Something.

Lastly, if Limit (End) is the proper nature of Something, Something is evidently the Finite, or that which is of an ended nature—ended and endable, inasmuch as there is reference in it to a negating Other.

The remark that follows is prompted by this—that Hegel in the second chapter has passed into the moment of the Ur-theil, and he excuses the affirmative nature of the findings under the first division A—affirmative though the moment is negative—by pointing out that, if in the first instance we had a positive verdict, and the Urtheil almost in the form of the Begriff, we shall now, under the second division, find all as negative as can be wished, and the Urheil fairly as Urtheil.

Terms here are thus explained. Bestimmung emerging from the development as the Qualification or what sort which it is, is accurately defined; and Beschaffenheit no less so. Immanent is in every English dictionary.

a. Something and an Other.

This is certainly very difficult thinking; but it is, at the same
time, singularly deep, penetrating, and comprehensive. Under the first moment, marked 1, there are three sub-moments: Firstly, to Simple Apprehension, both (Something and Other) are Something; secondly, to Judgment, both are Other; thirdly, to Reason, the Other is the Other for itself, and just so also is it, at the same time, Something, or the Something. That both are Something, and that both are relatively Other, we may take this as quite plain, without more explanation; but the Other isolated and for itself is more difficult. Yet this is not so very difficult when the true point of view is attained to. The Other belongs not to the Somethings themselves; it is quite external to them; it is something else than they, then; something independent, sur generis, and on its own account: it may be isolated, then, and considered for itself, and so on. Then the Other as Other must just be this externality as such of Nature: it is always to Spirit its Other, and nothing but its Other, at the same time that it is in its own nature simply the Other as such. Then this other by self-reflexion sublates itself, and otherness remains simply a distinguishedness—a relativity, not a substantiality and positivity.—These are great thoughts: they are the truth of Idealism, or, rather, they are that idealistic Realism which is the only true, and which extends to each moment of the antithesis its own rights, in such manner that each is seen to be, but the necessary complementary reciprocal of the other.

Under number 2, we are to expect a moment of distinction; and that it proves to be, for the poles of the single antithesis, which were at first being and nothing, are now distinguished as Being-in-self and Being-for-other. So far as words are concerned, Hegel's own seem sufficient; but we may point out in passing, that a firm view of Non-there-being may be procured by considering the constitution of There-being, in which the element of negation, which was still, however, There-being, is what is now referred to as the Non-there-being. Again, we may remark that we have all our materials still before us, and need not move from the spot, neither to please Haym, who will have it that we do move, nor Rosenkranz, who certainly, in all conscience, moves enough, and never thinks, indeed, of staying by the spot. The phrase 'their truth is their reference,' or 'their reference is their truth,' is understood at once when the Something is thought as othering itself in itself; for the other and the reflexion to self are very plainly mutual complements, true only in their sum. Again,
it is well worthy the reader's deepest consideration, how it is that
being is just reference to self: there is a little corner in these
paragraphs whence there is a good glimpse into this. Certainly,
we are not limited to our own materials, but the findings will be
found true for all materials: it is true, for instance, of all Some-
things, and of all Others, that their truth is their reference.

Under number 3, as is natural to expect now, we shall find the
moments which have been but just disjoined re-united again.
There is no difficulty here, indeed, to those who have followed
what precedes; the most of the space, in fact, is taken up with
certain explanations. What we see first is, that the Other is still in
the Something, though this latter has gone into itself. Circumstance
has been chosen expressly to translate Umstand, which is here the
Being-for-other. The sense of In-itself is made very plain here.
We have spoken of it as implying latent potentiality; but this we
see now is a secondary nuance. The In-itself is, first of all, just
the counter-reflexion to Being-for-other; but then, In-itself
without Being-for-other is only abstract—is only potential. The
Being-for-other, in fact, as regards the constitution of any Some-
thing, is in the In-itself, or just is in it, and is truly the Some-
thing, is truly the In-itself, or is just truly it. This is all amply
illustrated in the text;—especially striking is it that In-itself as a
characterisation simply abstract is simply also external. There is
no allowance to be made, then, for what we are in ourselves,
unless in relation to what we are—or have manifested ourselves
—for others.

The Thing-in-itself is here made plain; and the simple trick
reflexion plays itself in such distinctions is very simply and
happily exposed. The true In-itself is the notion, whether as
totality or individual detail: this, however, we see, requires Setzen,
requires position; for the an sich is just at first the abstract
Begriff. That suggests the special meaning of Gesetztseyn, which
is so difficult to render in English. We are here in Seyn, being;
but being is the reference to self, and each of its moments, there-
fore, will be as beënt or self-referent. A character of self-
substantiality will attach to each, and movement among them
will be but a passing from one to the other. But the result of
self-reference is Being-in-self, or the In-itself; and so it is that
being is so much or so wholly Ansichseyn. The moments, then
here are rather set or posited, than that they set or posit each
other; which latter movement is that peculiar to Wesen or
Essence. This Hegel illustrates by examples from both spheres. If it is difficult to translate, we are not allowed, then, nevertheless, to fail to understand. Under Being, the action of Setzen is to explicate, or to make the implicit explicit. This is a process of evolution, expression, realisation, statement, and it is usually named **logical position.** Under Essence or Wesen, the moments of evolution become overtly reciprocal, or the one posits, sets, or stakes the other. As we have seen, right sets left, left right, &c. Anything thus set, then, is not independent and self-subsistent; it is derivative, representative, vicarious, subdititious, surrogative, pronominal; it is a reaction, a recoil, a rebound or redound, a replication, a reflexion, a reciprocation,—it is an exinvolute, an eximplicate, an occasionate. In this way, one can see the meaning of ein Gesetztes. Again, Gesetztsseyn just expresses the abstract quality of all this: it is posititiousness, adjectitiousness, ascriptitiousness, attributiveness, assertiveness, &c. &c. In short, we are to see the universal presence of reflexion and reciprocation, of relativity and correlativity, or of the relative inference already spoken of. No doubt, Hegel sees in Setzen, to set, or stake, or put in place of, and from this the rest derives. In reference to the Metaphysical methods that preceded his own, he has good right to say that this element of mutuation and reflexion never entered, and that the whole effort was to maintain something positive. We may fancy Hegel teasing out substantial unity into a whole world of reflexion; and then, in that case, one might say, What is, is Gesetztsseyn, mere reflexion, mutuation, mutuatusitiousness.

b. Qualification, Talification, and Limit.

We have seen the Being-for-other declared in the Something, in it, rather than in its in-itself. This is a dredging or deepening of abstract In-itself, into a capability of the Being-for-other. Or the Being-for-other being reflected into the In-itself, thus In-itself is now be-mediated (concretely furnished) thereby. It is no longer abstract latent potentiality which is before us as the In-itself; the Being-for-other seems now reflected into its depths, and to lie within it, mediating it, or giving it a concrete interior. Nevertheless, the In-itself is still abstract in that it holds in it a mere reflexion of the Being-for-other, and is still provided with negation or with Being-for-other. But what is mirrored here is
just inner qualification, inner determination proper, or peculiar inner nature. One can understand this, and how the notion of capacity or capability is brought about; and one can see also that this is a determinateness not only beent, but an sich beent, or beent in itself. From In-itself to In it, there is a rise of manifestation, still the abstractness of the In-itself is a necessary moment; without abstractness, the inner nature would simply be Being-for-Other, which it is not. There is a peculiarity of grammar in the phrase 'into which it is reflected into itself:' it is Hegel's, however, and intentional.

That to which the Something is adequate, is evidently the force of Bestimmung here, which is thus, as it were, equal to the definition, and more than the differentia.

No. 1 further illustrates this sense of Bestimmung; and the reader has simply to see that this sense has fairly risen, as well as that nothing has been taken in from elsewhere. Well considered, what is said about 'determinateness manifoldly growing through involution with Other;' &c., does not impugn this statement: we are still in presence only of our original materials.

The next paragraph contains excellent illustration, but is difficult, and requires intimate initiation before one can find oneself at home in it.

In the first place, we must understand Reason to be Vernunft (Ver-nommenes); and that implies what is taken together and trans, which again is the concrete All and the resuming One, or simply the living Totality that is. In this light, then, Man is the thinking totality of all that is, or of the universe. This is his determination, but thought as such is his determinateness; or the one is his qualification, the other his qualifiedness. Then, again, all that Man is, even what in him has not the form of thought (as the element of nature or of sense), is in itself thought. But Man is thought not only in himself, but in him; that is, we cannot say 'there is nothing in him,' but we must say there is thought in him: it is recognised as his manifestable peculiar nature—as his Bestimmung, and throughout his whole actuality and existence. Thought is thus concrete, not the abstract form as which we generally regard it, but endowed with the Inhalt and Erfüllung, the implement and complement of actual objectivity and life. Such is man's nature, life, or living purpose; but this nature is only in itself; it is not a completed realisation and statement, not actu full explication and expansion; it—together with this filling which is
namely in it—is in the form of In-itself in general—it is only an is-to-be—its filling appears as external to it, as over-against it, as what still is to be brought into it. In this way, this paragraph will be found intelligible. I have attempted to help a little the last sentence in the translation. The construction of this sentence is peculiar; for the last die in it, referring to the Erfüllung, has awkwardly to skip clauses to make good its reference. Implement is used in its etymological sense for filling, &c.

No. 2 has seven paragraphs, and we shall remark on them separately. The first is easy in itself, but is received with hesitation and suspicion by the reader. Hegel appears here to play so very clearly fast and loose just as it suits him, that the hocus-pocus of the whole business must just be held patent. It is to be said, however, that the nature of the case really is so; that, for all appearances to the contrary, we have still before us the original one or fundamen, and the original two or momenta; and that it is not our fault, nor, indeed, virtue, if reflexion now on this side and now on that, or now in this moment and now in that, should seem double and contradictory. This doubleness is in truth not ours, but that of the thing itself, of what is. It is quite fair, then, to return to the Being-for-other, and the result of its independence now: in fact, we must see that its independence now, or outside of the determination as the determination, can only be what Hegel calls it—the Beschaffenheit;—for the Beschaffenheit of anything is just that Being-for-other in it which remains apart from its function proper, its defining and characterising business as such.

The next paragraph is explanatory, and its general reference outwards is perfectly allowable. It is to be seen as a result of its very metaphysical or logical constitution, too, that Something is a prey to influence from without: Something has negation, other, in it.

Change in Something (i.e., anything) will be found to be seated, not where the Something is in itself, but where it is indifferent outer other, or where it is indifferent outer Being-for-other; and that, as apart from the determination (or qualification) as such, is the region of what we name Talification. Change, too, is legitimately introduced, for change is implied in being 'a prey to influence from without.'

The fourth paragraph contains the reciprocal transition of Qualification into Talification, and of the latter into the former, and is of some length and difficulty. The burden is this: Qualifi-
cation arises from the reflexion of the Being-for-other of the Something into the In-itself of the same, and is analogous to what we name special function. But though the reflexion has sublated the
Being-for-other, it has not cancelled it—the constitutive moments of the Something still remain other to other. But the Being-for-other that remains outside of the Qualification (special function) is Talification—concomitant, collateral, secondary, or, as it were, contingent function. The Qualification seems indifferent, then, to the Talification; yet as regards the Something both are in it, or both belong to the one determinateness of the Something, or both, then, by implication pass into one another mutually. What Something is in itself is also in it; but that implies a Being-for-other—or just another to which the qualification is open: but qualification in involution with other is talification. Or the determinateness as such implies a negative, and thus introduces an element of otherness into the qualification which is thus again talification.

These steps are certainly difficult, and the original is not easy. Perhaps it is after the words 'the connexion is more particularly this,' that the reader finds the longest pause; for the copula of thought that unites the immediately next sentence, relating to the 'qualification as such being open to the relation to other,' with the sentence which follows, bearing on the 'determinateness being at the same time moment,' is, we should say, very hard to hit. Indeed, what the precise 'determinateness' alluded to is, is not at all readily seen. The sentence or two of comment immediately above declare the determinateness in question to be the first and original determinateness as such, while they make the one sentence (of the two whose copula is difficult to see), though corroborative, yet independent of the other. The former of them may also be conceived as preliminarily demonstrating the 'openness to other;' but that, as the comment holds, amounts at once to talification. In short, the differentia is at bottom a proprium; and a proprium is always a possible differentia.

The conversion of Talification into Qualification occurs thus: the element of talification is that by which the Something is open to the accidentality of involution with other. Now, this element per se is just what was called the Other as such. It is thus the other of itself, and so again self-referent There-being: but that is just an In-itself together with a determinateness or—qualification. Thus, talification which appeared outer is identified with the inner, and thus the determining of the other is met by the
immanent determining of the Something itself. To illustrate—the Something is a chair, the Bestimmung or qualification is human support in a certain posture, its Being-for-other is solidity, its determinateness is wood, its Beschaffenheit or talification is inflammability. This Being-for-other of wood expressed by its inflammability does not concern that which is reflected into the Something as chair (solidity) and fulfils the Bestimmung support; they seem indifferent to each other: it is the solidity in the wood, and not its inflammability, which concerns the chair in its function as chair. Nevertheless, the inflammability as regards the chair is in it; and this involves a Being-for-other, or another to which the special function of the chair is open and exposed. Or the determinateness, wood, is at the same time moment, and contains at the same time the qualitative difference, to be different from the In-itself, to be the negative of the Something (the chair), or another There-being, another There-ness, Soness, Nessness, or just entity than the chair. In this way, it is evident that the function special of the chair is involved with whatever Being-for-other (quality) the determinateness, the wood, possesses, and is thus talification. The inflammability of the chair is held over, and in terrorem of, the qualification or function of the chair. Another Being-for-other of the chair that remains outside of its qualification or special function is, that the wood is food to a certain tick or worm; this Being-for-other is thus talification; and how dependent the function proper or the qualification is on this talification is too obvious to require extension of the chair, in short, may fall into powder, and qualification vanish into talification.

Again, the Being-for-other which does not enter into the qualification of the chair, but is separated from it as talification, evidently per se just amounts to what has been named the Other as such. Take it as the inflammability of wood—that is other to its solidity; in the chair, it is just the other as such, the other of itself, so self to self-referent There-being, or a self to self-referent entity—inflammable wood. It is so, too, we see that the talification belongs to what the Something is in itself, or that the Something alters with the talification. The chair falls to powder under its eatableness, or into charcoal under its inflammability. For the determinateness of the chair, the wood, is at once the chair and the other of the chair. Here we can see how the other of the something is the other per se, the other in itself, the other of itself, the other of the other, &c.; for the wood as other of the
chair is the other of itself, and so an entity referent of self to self, or wood as such. Any number of similar illustrations will not now be difficult to the reader, and the passage of qualification into talification, or of quality into tality, and vice versa, as well as how it is true that Something always involves an Other which is itself Something, will not now probably be hard to see. We are not confined either to such finite things as chairs, &c., for examples,—we may similarly use men. The quality of Napoleon was to lead armies, and to reach thus his zenith; but it was his tality to be vulgarly ambitious, to seek aristocratic connexions, and to reach thus his nadir and extinction. It was the quality of Burns to sing; but it was his tality to be greedy of the moment: as high, then, as he rose by quality, so low did he sink by tality.—The theme is new and endless; but surely it is enough to show the vein, without exhausting it,—by an easy process of rhetoric or simple prosiness which will, perhaps, prove irresistible to others.—It is important to see that the Something always still expresses its own inner self in the tality, and that it is with the tality that Something alters itself. This is well seen in all the illustrations—chair, Napoleon, Burns.

The fifth paragraph tells us, what we see perfectly, that the change now alluded to is not that which concerned the traffic in its own self of the Something with the Other brought to it by its own Determinateness, but a change fairly expressed and overtly explicated as regards the Something. The first change was wholly of the nature of In-itself; but this is one determined: it also appears to be connected with a development of the potential interior or within-itself of the Something. Or, we may say, the first othering of Something was implicit, while the present is, on the contrary, explicit: negation is now explicitly determined as immanent to Something, or as its evolved within-itself, whereas previously negation was discerned in Something only by implication.

The identification of quality and tality replaces the Something. Still, in view of the qualitative difference subsisting between qualification and talification there appear two Somethings. These two Somethings, then, are in the one Something; they are not separated by mere abstract difference, by difference as such, a difference having place in their comparison only; their difference is now rather immanent to them, inherent in them. The affirmation of neither is direct, the affirmation of both is indirect; it is a result of the elimination of the otherness
introduced by the quality or qualification, whether of the one or of the other, into the common In-itself. This can be illustrated by the chair and the wood, which are two Somethings in their qualitative difference, and one only after sublation of the same. Or we may say, water is Something; its quality is that it is the universal menstruum that flows, or just, par excellence, the Vehicle; its tality is capability of becoming ice. Well, H O is in each (the water and the ice), or each is H O. This is the one something, but they themselves again are two. Yet the negation, or difference between them, is an inherent one; it belongs to the within-itself of the H O. Each, too, affirmatively is, not directly as either water or ice, but—indirectly through elimination of all determined difference—as H O. As water and ice, nevertheless, they are mutually indifferent.

'Something relates itself thus out of its own self to the other: it is important here to see the etymological force of verhalt sich. Ver, as we have seen, implies transition to and with, or both trans and cum: the Something relates itself to the other, then, in the sense that it holds itself away (transformingly) to and with the other. This we see (as in the relation of water to ice) to occur, too, out of its own self. The ice is set in the water as its own moment, and the ice is here the otherwise-being. The Being-within-self, or just the within of the water, includes in it this negation, this ice, and it is by means of it that the water continues to have its affirmative being. The ice is just the developed within-itself of the water. But ice and water are qualitatively different, the ice is apart from or out of the water: this must be allowed, for Something is Something only by negation or sublation of the other. (This we saw when engaged on Something and Other as such.) Only by such sublation is it that the Something presents itself as over-against the Other, which here for the first time is itself a There-being, or a separate entity; it is thus external to it, or, seeing that they still cohere in their notion, it is otherness in general that results—each is something and each is other. Of the Somethings we have here, then, though coherent in their notion (H O), the one (the water) is qualitatively distinct from the other (the ice). But, inasmuch as the Being-within-itself (of the water) is the non-being of the otherwise-being (the ice) which is implied in it (the water), but at the same time distinguished or dis-cerned as beënt, the Something itself (the water) is the negation, the ceasing of another in it; it is explicitly put—it is in position—it
is set as negatively preserving itself against the other, and as maintaining itself by the other.\textsuperscript{\gray{1}} The ice is at once the negation and the affirmation of the water. The within-itself of the water is the negation of the negation (the ice)—or this is its \textit{in-itself}, or what it is \textit{in itself}. But negation of the ice is as simple negation \textit{in it}. But this amounts to Limit: the negations are at once mutually excluded and mutually implied.

As regards technical terms, almost all has been already said that is required. It is not difficult to see that the Ansich becomes \textit{vermittelt} (be-muddled, be-mediated), and no longer \textit{abstract} when the Seyn-für-Anderes is reflected into it. Still it remains relatively abstract; the \textit{chair} regarded as the reflexion into itself is relatively abstract as regards its determinateness, its Being-for-other, the wood, &c. The eye as the eye is a reflexion into itself, and relatively abstract compared with its coats, &c. Further on, \textit{abstract} is seen in the sense of formal self-identity as regards the difference of the Somethings when involved in \textit{alteration}, or change. \textit{Concrete} is seen to imply \textit{implement}, or filling. \textit{Sollen} will come to be explained again: it always refers to a \textit{being to be}, or an owing (or \textit{ought-ing}) to be. If the reader looks deeply at the phrase ‘the other of itself,’ he will see that this is an exact expression of the constitution of \textit{Something}, as it is found developed in its own place.

We have now achieved a most important stage in the study of Hegel. This matter of qualification, &c., and the transition into Limit, I have always regarded as the \textit{pons asinorum} over which most students have hitherto been unable to cross. (That it has been \textit{passed, I know.}) The present writer, for his part, must confess that he lay in leaguer here \textit{for years}, and that the paragraph in especial in which the transition to Limit formally occurs was a thousand times abandoned as utterly and wholly hopeless. As regards this particular paragraph, what is said in allusion to the \textit{first Something} is an endless stumbling-block till the true point of view is obtained; and then, indeed, it is suddenly seen to be very simple. The opposition relating here ‘first properly to a There-being itself’ demonstrates the \textit{first Something} to be the first of the two considered \textit{here}, and not the \textit{first} something as treated in the book itself. But future students will never know what they owe to those who have preceded them. The point of view, however, that removes the great difficulty of the paragraph will be got, perhaps, from the following: if, as regards the Something and the Other of Change, the student insist on seeing
in his conception the Other only as immanent in, and not—as other—separated from, the Something, he will never succeed in realising Limit: let him eject it as other (simple negation) and then negate it as other (negation of the negation), and limit is at once visible. Water and ice are qualitatively other—separation; they are at bottom the same—communion: limit is between both and both; as negation of the negation, it unites both, as negation simply it divides both. The Something first claims and then denies—first drags in and then ejects—and this is the function of the character in question (Limit). In short, assumption of the other, rejection of the other—these are the fulcrum of the movement from Beschaffenheit to Grenze.

It will not have escaped the reader, probably, that the portion of Hegel’s Logic which we have just discussed concerns that matter which mainly appears in Ancient Logic as the Predicables: the Genus, the Species, the Differentia, or Differentia specifica, διαφορὰ εἰδοποιοῦ, the Proprium, the Accident, the Definitio, &c., have all place here. It will be sufficient to indicate this; the extension of it by the reader himself will usefully familiarise him with the various materials. It belongs to the worth of Hegel that he has, as it were, re-vitalised these—otherwise—mere grammatical vocables, and exhibited them in their living connexion with the absolute. (This last word, however unintelligible, just amounts to the very well-known and familiar rerum natura.) In fact it is always to be kept in view that, so far as Hegel is concerned, the reflexions are always vital, are such as have occurred in the development and formation of the thought of all of us—of thought as thought.

In number 3, now, we have the very important and striking evolution of the notion of Limit. It is not easy to get into the mood of mind, the recueillement, the peculiar Vertiefung, which is necessary to the realisation and proper intelligence of the determinations which present themselves here. There is a mode of reading the pertinent sentences, and of looking at the occulted distinctions, which ends in a result so flat and shallow and trivial, that really one feels tempted to say, if we are to consider this the veritable outcome, then assuredly Hegel might have spared himself all his pains both of thought and writing.

The Pyrenees are just as much Spain’s limit on the side of France, as France’s on the side of Spain; the Channel just as much limits off France from England, as England from France; the Rhine which divides Alsace from
Baden, equally divides Baden from Alsace, &c. . . . In passing from French to Spanish soil, we say, There France ends, here Spain begins; contrariwise, in passing from Spanish to French soil, we say of the same sod which in the first instance was designated as beginning of Spain, that it is the termination of Spain; and what was regarded before as the termination of France, converts itself into its commencement.*

It is in the same neighbourhood that we find Rosenkranz philosophising in the following form:—

To destine a man for the vocation of the artist, who possessed not any original capacity for such a function, were in vain. The eye has the destination to see, because in light it has its quality; IT IS LIGHT-GREEDY.

That is, the eye sees because it sees! But it is something quite else that we must endeavour to recognise here in Hegel—the primordial thoughts, namely, which contain the universe, or—the same thing from another side—those thoughts which, acquired in latency, now latently constitute in all of us the soul and substance of everything we see or feel. At pp. 249, 250, 251 above, we shall find a useful comment of Hegel's own on what now occupies us. There we are told that the individual, as but a sum of references to other, has his being not in himself. There we hear also of herbs remaining equal to themselves when involved with other, or of making themselves good in said other and through said other. Lastly, we hear of the pang attributed by Jacob Böhme to qualities, the bitter, the fiery, the sour, &c., in that they maintain and produce themselves only in the stress of conflict. In beginning the discussion of Limit, it is with such considerations as these that we are to prepare our minds. In short, we are to carry vividly with us our findings in regard to tality, for tality is the region—and it is a vital one—in which lies the limit that at once unites and separates Something and Other. We are to see assertion and negation meet in limit—we are to see that this one line of aqua fortis, Limit, sums and contains in it the virtue of Something on this side, and of Other on that; that it is the Something, and that it is the Other. Of a truth, it is a very genuine, very exquisite, very penetrating and comprehensive metaphysic, which γ here exhibits to us. To a man who has a turn that way, indeed, the delight in the successive steps and in the result may prove no less

* Rosenkranz: Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee; Konigsberg, 1858; Part I., pp. 140, 141. (It is to be acknowledged that these are still illustrations of Limit, and that Rosenkranz might still have had veritable metaphysical depth in mind. One has to confess inability to grasp that philosophical 'light-greediness' which follows.—New.)
entrancing than that which was experienced by Pythagoras on the
squearing of his triangle, or that of Keats on first looking into
Homer. Something and Other are to be conceived in potential
mutual grips, then, and not side-by-side indifferents; each is in
the line of contact, and each is negated—or is not—in the same.
Now, we are still to conceive ourselves in presence of our original
materials: we have still before us the original Something and the
original Other, though thickened mutually by mutual reflexions—
Being-in-self, Being-for-other, Being-in-it, qualification, talifica-
tion, &c.—till now the evolution has reached a point at which it
seeks to replace both by the single characterisation, Limit. For
instance, chair was an example of the original Something, the
Other of which was wood. Now, the wood introduces inflam-
mableness into the chair; but still the chair, as a chair, sets
bounds to this action on it of its own other. The chair does not
succumb at once; the chair remains a chair for so long; the chair,
by its very size, &c., may negate the inflammableness. Even here
there is a Limit. Much more is there a Limit where the Quality
of the Burns, the Napoleon, meets and potentially engages the
Tality of the same. Certainly, more closely-illustrative examples
are supplied by the collapse of light and darkness into colour, of
acid and alkali into salt, &c.; but still it is right to see that we
are not obliged to turn our backs on what we set out with, and
that this is really such as to imply the matter of the new illustra-
tions as well. Of these, colour, as between light and darkness,
will probably suffice to assist the reader throughout the whole
dialectic here.

The discussion immediately before us embraces a preliminary
paragraph, and three statements of moments, respectively design-
nated by the grammata—α, β, γ. We shall bestow a remark or
two on these in their order.

Being-for-other is indeterminate, affirmative community of
Something with its Other:’ this applies to the relation of the
original Something to its Other, as well as to that Something
engaged in change and so involved with other—which is the point
that we have reached at present, and the point, therefore, that we
have specially to bear in mind. Change, too, as we saw, was
fairly introduced, and we have thereby acquired for ourselves the
right of a wider externality, and of an influence from without in
general. The Limit appears at first the direct antithesis of the
Being-for-other, or the Non-being-for-other. The fulcrum of the
dialectic movement are at once indicated by the opposing of ideally to really.

Under a, we see, firstly, that Limit, as Non-being as well of the Something as of the Other, is just Non-being of Something in general; and secondly, that Limit, as Non-being of the Other, is Being of the Something. Something, then, has the Limit in it, and is Something through that which is also its Non-being. Thus, through Limit, Something at once is and is not, and Other at once is and is not.

Under β, we find that on the one side as well as on the other of the Limit, Something exists out from its limit. Darkness and light exist equally out from colour. As regards Hegel's own examples, though they illustrate well the relation of the Something being out from the limit, it is difficult to see where we should place their Other. 'It is the middle between both, and in it they cease:' how apply this to the line, or the plane, or the solid? The line is on one side of the Limit, the Point; but what are we to conceive as the Other, on the other side? We may ask the same question as regards plane and solid. I suppose there is no answer, but that the line, plane, solid, &c., in the other direction is the Other. It requires a good deal of reflexion, however, before we retire satisfied here.* Limit is spoken of as presenting itself to conception first of all spatially, or, so to speak, in the terms of space: we are told, too, that the conception is but the out-of-its-self-ness of the notion,—as it were, the trope, the symbol, the metaphor of the latter.

The concluding moment (γ) deserves and requires the very closest attention. It may be named the metaphysic—and also the essence—of distinguishableness; and due Vertiefung, or a due deepening of ourselves into the matter concerned—and it would delight a Hegel to observe this involuntary dialectical identification of a deepening into ourselves with a deepening into the thing itself—ought to bring with it a vivid conviction of the substantial existence of an element of reflexion in the very crassest of the things of sense.

Out from or without the Limit, Something is necessarily unlimited. Unlimited Something is simply Nessness quite generally—unlimited So-ness (There-being). But the Other is situated precisely similarly: it, too, is simply So-ness, simply Nessness, and without end. Either can be called Something, either can be called Other; but they possess not a single distinction, the one from the

* The point and the line are the two: limit, properly, is between both.—New.
other: each is simply Nessness—that and nothing else. They are both, therefore, the same thing.

But now each is Daseyn (There-being, &c.), or each is Seyn (Being) with a Bestimmtheit (a determinateness). Now, this determinateness, in which each is what it is distinguishably from the other, may still be regarded as the Limit between them. But into this Limit the determinateness of each enters: this Limit is their common distinguishableness. But the distinguishableness of each falling into the one Limit, this one Limit is at once their unity and diversity; and, again, unity and diversity of the same things, this just expresses the constitution of There-being as it manifested itself in its place. There-being and Limit, each then is found to be identical as well with Something as with Other, or we have a double identity of both. Now this implies that Something has Nessness (There-being) only in the Limit, while, again, the immediate, direct entity of the Something being at the same time the negative of the Limit, the Something—which has but just been placed in the Limit—'just as much sunders itself from itself, and points away over and beyond itself to its non-being, pronouncing this its being, and so passing over into the same.' The latter part of this description refers to Something being out from its Limit, while its Limit is its true Self.

The illustrations that follow in the text commend themselves. Sometimes the German is more graphic than the English here: for instance, the eye itself seems to be considered in such phrases as 'in the point, the line as well fängt an as hort auf,' almost as if it were, in the point, the line as well catches on as leaves off, as well kindles up as dies out. The unrest of the Something in its Limit, as of the Line in the Point, usually represented as arbitrary conception, but now characterised as natural dialectic, is very striking. No less striking is the demonstration of the dimensions of the point in consequence of its having place only in a There-being or There-ness, which There-ness, as quite indefinite There-ness, can only be space. Limit and There-being have been so identified and distinguished, that the perfectly abstract limit, the point, having its There-being in its limit and yet beyond it, must set itself infinitely beside itself, and give rise to the perfectly abstract There-being or There-ness, space; and such is this There-being or There-ness in which it is. Altogether here, under Limit, one 'sups full' of dialectic—dialectic not more startling either than it is fertile, and, we' hope we may add, convincing.
The angle, the pivot, the hinge of this dialectic lies pretty much in this—That the development of the contradictions of Limit leads to the bringing together of Something and Other as each just There-being, and finally to the crumpling of all up into Limit as the inner of both Something and Other, and the inner just of Nessness at all. Entity, we may remark, has also been used here as another synonym of There-being; indeed, the word aught, or aughtness, if always alone used, would, we doubt not, come very well, in the end, to represent and convey the Hegelian Daseyn: when Hegel began, Daseyn was as far from meaning what it means now, as to an Englishman aught or aughtness is at present.

We may remark, that illustrations from geometrical lines and points occur in the ancient philosophical Commentators, with whom, as we shall have occasion to see elsewhere, Hegel has many points of contact, and whom doubtless he earnestly studied. In the Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides, for example, we find ‘a line’ spoken of as ‘the first continuous and divisible nature amongst magnitudes; hence, it participates of an indivisible, that is, of a point; and this point, though it is allotted a superlinear condition, and is indivisible, yet it subsists in the line, is something belonging to it, and is the summit of the line.’ Thomas Taylor adds, as commentary to this (which is his own translation), that ‘points, in a line have a linear, in a superficies a superficial, and in a solid a solid subsistence; or, in other words, that in a line, superficies, and solid, they are respectively affected with the nature of line, superficies, and solid, at the same time that they still retain in each their non-quantitive nature;—hence,’—and this is the Neo-Platonic moral—we may see as in images how incorporeal natures, when they become profoundly connected with bodies, are affected indeed with a corporeal nature, but still retain an incorporeal subsistence!'

c. Finitude.

From the first paragraph we see that mere limit, or endedness, is not what alone constitutes the finite, but the negation of a developing within-itself, which is simply perpetual process or becoming.

Non-being is thus the nature of what is finite: it perpetually is not—even in that it is. Finite things possess a self-reference that is only negative; for they are only through their negation—
their developed negation, if you will; where, indeed, the development is but a despatching of themselves beyond, a sending of themselves out, over, the being they at any moment have. They are been, then, but the truth (at any time) of their being is their end. This is specially profound, and merits a long reflexion. To pass away, this is their very within, or within-self. The hour of the birth—of the manifestation—of any finite entity is the hour of its death—its disappearance. There is a double meaning in the word end: it means both termination and purpose.

There is an anecdote told of Hegel, that, being somewhere at table where the dishes were long of coming, he should have expressed himself, as if it were, Let them just come (‘Wir wollen ihnen ihr Schicksal schon anthun’), we will soon achieve for them their destiny. He must have had his own finite things so vividly before his mind’s eye in this expression, that it will probably contain illustration for the reader here.

a. The Immediacy of Finitude.

This, as the title directly announces, is a moment of simple apprehension, where from its very nature little is to be said: accordingly, it will be found that Hegel is apt under such moments to occupy space with mere exoteric remark; here it is the mournfulness of the finite which he takes for his subject, and the first paragraph sets vividly before us the one abstract side which understanding insists on alone regarding, that is, the eternal destination of finite things to their end. In the next paragraph, even in explaining how understanding views the finite as eternal, the dialectic breaks out which is to demonstrate the impossibility of such eternity. This dialectic is more overtly stated in the third paragraph.

β. To-be-to, or Obligation-to, and Limitation.

The usual difficulty of translating Hegel comes to the surface very glaringly in this section. The words Bestimmung, Grenze, Schranke, Sollen, Ansichseyn, Insichseyn appearing in English as qualification (determination, destination, manifestible peculiar nature, &c.), limit, limitation, To-be-to, Being-in-self (Being-in-itself, In-itself), Being-within-self, &c., &c., suffice to render the translation even in external appearance, so much ‘clotted nonsense,'
so—much chaotic, incoherent insanity. What is here, however, is not at all that, but, however abstruse, recondite, subtle, and profound, the clearest and most lucid intelligence. The translation, too, is correct, and, the technical terms being duly pondered, will readily enough yield meaning, however baroque, however piebald they appear.

'The passing away passes away'—this contradiction is abstract—formally self-identical, absolutely separated and by itself—in the very expression Something is finite, or in that, the finite is. Where we are in the development, however, Something or Being (which here cohere) are no longer abstract, but be-mediated, or concrete. Hegel's remarks on the Platonic treatment of The One is illustrate a contradiction similarly abstractly—or isolatedly and abruptly—present.

That Something has an inner nature, this implies that a capability of being otherwise belongs to the very In-itself, to the very internality of the Something. This otherwise-being refers to an externality, though one that still only is to be. The inner nature of Something now being considered in reference to this externality, gives rise to the metaphysic of the whole notion before us. Nor is this metaphysic to be regarded as metaphysic only; it is actual thought within us, actual thought which we follow and obey, though latently and unconsciously, in every perception and assignment of inner nature, &c., in any particular concrete or sensuous case whatever. These be the very secret maggots of the brain, and as they sprawl or wriggle through one another. The otherwise-being, then, is a certain externality, which is in the Something, and which is identical with the characterisation we have already seen as Limit. Well considered, this otherwise-being can now be set as the whole virtue of the Something, and again it is in its nature a reference—a reference of the inner nature of the Something on its own Limit. The inner nature just is through this Limit to which it negatively refers: its Non-being is its There-being. The limit is thus at once negated and preserved, or it is Limitation, meaning by the word Limit that is passable. But if the inner nature determine Limit as Limitation, that is as passable, it has in that reference the character of a Sollen, a Devoir, a To-be-to; that is, it has not actu passed the Limitation, but it is to do so, and will certainly do so. The double edge of the negation is seen in each of the moments of the one notion. The Finite Thing, in obedience to its inner Sollen, Devoir, or To-be-to,
is over, or superior to, its Limitation; but again it is Sollen, or it is to only because of its Limitation. This will probably suffice to suggest the notion which is followed out in such penetrating and exhaustive detail by Hegel.

REMARK.

The first sentence is an allusion in especial to certain findings, of Kant and Fichte, to each of whom the ultimum was moral progress, moral To-be-to, ad infinitum. Schwegler, epitomising in regard to Kant, says correctly, 'No sensuous nature can be holy, and one that is sensuous-rational can approximate to holiness only as to an ideal in infinite progress;' and similarly in regard to Fichte, 'the final goal of moral action lies in infinitude; it can never be attained, as the ego can never be fully independent of all limitation, so long as it remains an intelligence, a self-conscious ego.' Both the moral and the metaphysical rôles are illustrated in these quotations; the latter will be still clearer, however, from considering the following position of Schelling, also as epitomised by Schwegler (whose epitomes in general, indeed, are so good, that they offer themselves as particularly convenient for an easy and ready reference). The 'brief,' as Hobbes would call it, of Schelling on the point referred to, runs thus:—

Absolutely apprehended, nature is nothing else than infinite activity, infinite productivity; which, should it of itself unhindered realise itself, would in a moment with instant rapidity produce an absolute product, whereby empirical nature were not expressed or explained; if we are to do this, if we are to have finite products, then we must assume that the productive activity of nature is checked by an antagonistic activity, a retarding one, also seated in nature herself: thus there arises a series of finite products: as, however, the absolute productivity of nature seeks an absolute product, these individual products are only phenomenal products beyond each of which again nature immediately proceeds, in order to satisfy the absoluteness of her inner productivity by an infinite series of individual products.

The Sollen and the Schranke are very clearly contained in these quotations. There, however, they are still, so to speak, but in a clotted state; and to be seen as they are, they stand in need of the Socratic midwifery of Hegel. In other words, neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Schelling has attained to a glimpse of the implied import in abstracto; the whole three of them still see it only crassly and uncertainly in concreto, as it were in mass; and it is
left for Hegel to dissect and divellicate and demonstrate the
Begriff, supplanting thus and putting to flight the figurate
conception, the pictorial Vorstellung. And in what masterly
perfection is not this accomplished! The general section on
Finitude is the pertinent exposition; but the whole businesse
sums itself in the single Hegelian expression, 'the Identity of the
Ansichseyn (the Being-in-self) and the Bestimmtheit (the deter-
minateness).’ The In-itself of what is seeks ever to assert itself
by effacement of its own determinateness. This is the Sollen, the
Progressus ad Infinitum; and it is sisted only by the Identity of
Hegel. By such strokes as this is it that Hegel asserts for him-
self his place royal, maugre the vast and indispensable material
he owes to all of his predecessors,—an all from which no single
name of the whole bright series can be excluded—not Parmenides,
nor Heraclitus, nor Socrates, nor Plato, nor Aristotle, nor Plotinus,
nor Proclus, nor Spinoza, nor Leibnitz, nor Fichte, nor Schelling,
though, for amount and importance of contribution, Kant—the
honest, simple, good, the sincere, the inexhaustibly-fertile Kant—
incomparably outweigh them all.

In the determining of Something as Limitation, this Limitation
is already passed: limitation implies in the very subject of the
limitation a reference to what in it is unlimitated; or this very
reference is already beyond the limitation. There again we have
the Hegelian penetrative subtlety and truth! By his allusion to
the actual, Hegel means to say that it is absurd to resist his find-
ings as contradictory, for such things actu are. The caustic irony
of the master breaks out in the expression, that the thought en-
gaged in such objections—a thought that would bear itself as
higher than the actual—attains neither to a true perception of the
notion concerned, nor to a true bearing towards the actual.

'The notion which it is in itself implies identity with its other.'
The stone is virtually more than as it is there: as it is there, or as
its There-being (Daseyn) is, it is under limitation; but as it is in
itself, it is capable of innumerable reactions with other agents;
but as it is in these it is other, and thus in itself, even in its
Daseyn or Limitation, it is identical with its other.

The independence of any been-for-self totality, as instinct, life,
&c., in regard to limitation carries much force with it, and much
light into many difficulties of Hegel. The self of sensibility is
beyond its negation, pain; were it not beyond it, it would not
feel it as negation, and have no pain.
But it is more absurd still to be blind to the independence of limitation on the part of reason. If, however, you simply abstractly assure me that limitation, the particular, cannot be passed, I simply as abstractly point to the universal which has passed. Every universal is an example, but just consider this: the world, for all its constitutive finitude, is infinite.

The necessary relation of space to man's freedom—apropos of Leibnitz and the magnet—is a deep glance.

Hegel is always clear and great as regards the will, as is, indeed, but natural after a Fichte and a Kant, and there is a very luminous little word here. His caustic irony comes down again on the adherents of a perpetual and never-effected ought-to, whether in the field of morals, or among your ordinary crude revolutionists, who always know so much better than everybody else that, in their eyes, just everything in the existent order of things ought-to—be changed: Hegel assures them that in their case, and as regards their finitude, the applicability of their own principle, the ought-to, is to be perfectly recognised!

The gist of what follows is, that we are to place ourselves in the whole notion, and not one-sidedly hold by either of its alternative moments: if the Sollen is a consequence of the Schranke, the Schranke is a consequence of the Sollen; and we are not to lose ourselves in the despairing contemplation of a process which can never be accomplished, at the very moment that we possess all the conditions of its accomplishment. Such despairing contemplation is a result of our occupying only the abstractum of the Ansichseyn. To seek only the inner nature, only the realisation of what is in itself, is to stultify ourselves by an abstraction in which we are blind to the only realisation—that, namely, which lies in the determinateness, the limit, but in its concrete connexion with the in-itself. The only answer to the longing of the in-itself, is its complement, the determinateness; and in mutual reference they have reached completion and repose. So it is that the Sollen, both of Kant and Fichte, is but a perpetuating of mere finitude.

γ. Transition of the Finite into the Infinite.

The text seems quite simple, direct, and intelligible here, and calls for no remark. It is matter of familiar knowledge that, in the school which is named of Hegel, the immortality of the soul remains a quæstio vexata. This alone were decisive evidence
to prove that Hegel as yet has remained unintelligible to the very individuals who arrogate his name; for, did they know him, the question would be set at rest by the instant triumph of one side or the other, seeing that in very truth Hegel's ruling on the point has not wanted, on his part, the most decided expression. One may say, indeed, that from the first word to the last, the Logic, or the System generally, of Hegel is nothing but an argument for the Immortality of the Soul; and this by allowing the living notion of concrete reason to confute at every turn the empty abstractions of our mere opinion. This comes very clearly to the surface in the short section before us,—The Finite in its passing away, this negation of itself, has reached its Being-in-self, it has therein gone together with itself; ' and again, 'out over its own self, it goes together only with its own self': these words concern at bottom the immortality of the soul. Here is a passage from the 'Phaenomenologie' which may illustrate them:—

To analyse a conception into its original elements, is a going back into its moments, which at least have not the form of the conception there before us, but constitute the immediate property of the self (the subject, the ego). This analysis, indeed, comes only to thoughts, which are themselves familiar, fixed, and settled determinations. But an essential moment is this unactual, shared-off thing itself; for only by this, that the concrete shares itself, or separates itself, and reduces itself to an unreality, is it das such Bewegende, has it movement in itself. The action of separation is the craft and business of understanding the greatest and most wonderful, or rather the absolute power. The sphere which remains at rest shut up in itself, and as substance possesses its moments, is the immediate and therefore not the wonderful relation. But that the accidental as such in separation from what embraces it, that what is connected with the rest and only actual in this connexion should gain a peculiar existence and a separate freedom, this is the enormous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure ego. Death, should we so name that unreality, is the fearfulest thing of all, and to keep hold of what is dead is that which demands the greatest power. Powerless Beauty hates Understanding, because it expects this of her, this to which she is incompetent. But not the Life that fears death and would preserve itself from destruction, but the Life that bears it and maintains itself in it, is the Life of the Spirit. The Spirit wins its truth only in that in the absolute destruction it finds itself. It is not this power as the positive which looks away from the negative, as when we say of something, this is nothing or this is false, and so, done with it, turn away from it to something else; but it is this power only in that it looks the negative in the face, and stands to it. This standing to it is the magical might which converts the negative into das Seyn, into Being.

The talismanic word here, then, is abstraction: it is only by abstraction that we give a separate reality to death; there is no
death in the concrete; what passes away, passes away only into its own self. We shall have occasion to see the same thing in other forms again. Hegel probably felt it unworthy of him directly to explain a thing which lay in him so clearly on the surface: it is in no covert way, indeed, that he gives us to understand that he, for his part, saves himself in that other into which he seems to pass. In short, it is the one aim of Hegel to put to flight abstraction, restore the concrete; and that is immortality and a single life.

As regards technical terms, it does not seem that we have any longer much to say. Hegel's general principle of action in regard to such must be now apparent: as they appear, they appear along with their notion, and further explication seems uncalled for. This may be regarded as another merit peculiar to the method of Hegel: the terms come as they are wanted, and with the express meaning which he who uses them seeks. We may add, that this is true even of the nuances, or shades of meaning. The reader must have observed, for example, that the word Bestimmung, determination or qualification, has, of late, very decidedly taken on the sense of destiny or end; but, to be sure, the qualification, quality, inner nature of anything is precisely the function it administers, its mission, vocation, office, purpose, &c. The general sense of Bestimmung is perhaps pretty well got in this way. Suppose (as p. 387) what is a voice: well, there must be distinction in it; and its own native distinctions (differences) are just its Bestimmungen: these are its accents, modulations, or inflexions, then; they are its signs, significates, exponents, modi, &c. Or we might say, this voice, as it is a voice, cannot remain a self-identical One only; as such, it must part into its own constituent Many, into its Variety. Now this variety may be named its system of vocabilities, or each unit of the many of the voice will be a vocability. In reference to this voice, then, its Bestimmungen are its vocabilities; but, again, its Bestimmung is just its vocabulary—vocability is its qualification, function, nature, destiny, end, &c. In this way, we can make obvious the transition from one vocability to vocability in general, or from one Bestimmung to Bestimmung as such. Lastly, looking at Bestimmung as logical determination, as a thing from without, we might translate it, in reference to the voice, by vocabilisation. The identity of outer and inner looms out here: did an external vocabilisation (say here notation) truly enumerate all the vocabilities native to the voice, this external act would be simply identical with the internal act of the voice itself by which
it should give manifestation to its implied vocabilities. We
may point out that the logical moments show themselves very
plainly here. There is first the simple unal self-identity of the
voice, its being as such; in which being, however, it is as yet only
implicit, only in itself, only an sich—the moment of simple appre-
hension, δόνωμι, διά, &c. Then there is the other moment, the
Urtheilen of the voice into its native constituent differences, which
have, each to each, the first or qualitative negation. Lastly, there
is the moment of reason, the negation of the negation, the restora-
tion of the differences to the one self of the one voice. This,
again, is the one fundamental Hegelian notion. Whatever
is must differentiate itself, or it would remain nothing; but
its differentiation, or explication, is the movement of its own
necessity: it is in itself, and it is in its differences, and
it is through its differences into itself. But what is is
thought, and its differences in their own necessity unfold them-
selves, first, unconsciously, and, second, consciously (through
science) in the thinking subject. So we have, first, internal thought
as wholly in itself, Logic, and again external thought, still in itself,
Nature, and, lastly, internal and external thought, re-united into
the higher internality of Spirit, and now wholly für sich. Of this
one notion, every concrete that exists is demonstrably a type:
take, as we have seen Hegel do, a grain of salt, for instance.
Everywhere, we have abstract unity, abstract variety, and—the
only and single truth at bottom—concretely both in one. This
pulse is fairly to be seen—but an sich—in Kant: it is Hegel’s
merit to have made it wholly an-und-für-sich.

Verstand, in its peculiarly Hegelian sense—initiated, but still
an sich, by Kant—occurs in the passage translated from the
‘Phaenomenologie.’ We shall have to note the Ver, and to think
of its function, which is to signify a process of transition, the
agent of which is the root. Verstehen, in the sense of to become
stale, is an example in point. To Hegel, what Verstand (in its
other sense) versteht, it steht ver as regards the rest. That is, in
English, what understanding understands, it stands—not under,
but the German unter—between or asunder from the rest. In
German as in English, separation is involved; in truth, both are
just the Ur-theilen. Unterscheiden, discernment, distinction, are
all pertinent here. As in the passage alluded to, these words con-
cern always the moment of differentiation, which is characterised
as more wonderful than the first moment of self-included, self-
identical substantiality; what is spoken of as 'the accidental as such separated from what embraces it.' This phrase in the text appears literally 'the accidental as such separated from its Umfang' (or logical extension); and we see thus how true Hegel remains to his own principles. The accidental separated from its extension, appears very unintelligible, until we understand the Hegelian notion;—then, however, we see very clearly that the separation in question concerns \textit{extension}, and not \textit{comprehension}.

Of other terms, we saw \textit{Reel} varied by \textit{qualitativ-unterschieden}, qualitatively dis-cerned and dif-ferenced; and this will be seen to cohere well with what has just been said.

The German \textit{Princip} is truer to its Etymology than our convenient but wholly indefinite \textit{principle}. \textit{Vorstellung} has been already spoken of as the Aussersichseyn of the Begriff. Sollen and Schranke—the latter especially—must be seen to have senses here peculiar to Hegel, just as it is not English, but arbitrary on our part, to oppose as we have done \textit{Limitation} to Limit. But the point is to see the notion.

'The Sollen is limited only \textit{an sich}, or \textit{for us}.'

This seems a curious expression to occur unexplained, and may have proved puzzling to many readers. The \textit{in itself}, we think, as undeveloped, is precisely that which is not \textit{for us}. If we reflect, however, we shall see that we are mistaken. To say a thing \textit{is} \textit{so and so} in itself, is to say what the thing itself has not yet developed: who, then, as yet can know this \textit{so and so}, but we only ourselves who find ourselves in a condition to predicate it? 'If the embryo is a man \textit{an sich}, it is not a man \textit{für sich},' says Hegel, in another reference; but we can see, in the present reference, that if the embryo is not a man \textit{für sich}, it is a man \textit{for us}; and so what it is \textit{an sich}, it is \textit{for us}. This is very subtle, and Hegel, as usual, allows us to find it out pretty much for ourselves.†

The reader will do well to observe the different translations which have occurred in reference to the difficult word \textit{Setzen}. Gesetzt ist has been translated \textit{appears, presents itself, is taken}, \textit{stated, established, demonstrated, put, placed, given, set, &c.}, the meaning always being that logical position has been effected in regard to what is spoken of;—what was \textit{implicit} is now \textit{explicit}, or technically \textit{set}. Hegel himself varies the expression by explicirt

* In 5th paragraph under β. † The expression occurs again and again in the 'Phaenomenologie,' as see pp. 19 and 65 there—see also later under 'Schwegler' in the Commentators' here.—New.
ist, and also by exponirt ist, when what is is spoken of as Gesetzteyn, we are to understand that it is illative adjectivity. Ein Gesetztes, again, is an effected evolute, an effected attribute, an effected adjective, a term developed from within and referred out in place. Here, again, we see how inward and outward come together. What is implied or implicated is also explicated; it is in Something, yet it is other than, or out of, the Something. Similarly, what is involved is evolved, what is inferred is ef-fered, what is illated is e-lated, &c. Setzen has thus an advantage over any of these words, for it implies both, or Setzen is just to ex-imply. We can understand now, then, that Gesetzteyn is just implication—as to Englishmen—a system of implication; for such system being thoroughly recognised, just amounts to a system of explication. We are to see that im-position involves ex-position, or that what is, is just position. Or we may say, the three moments of the concrete trinity, in which each is the other, are to implicate, to explicate, and to replicate. Thus, too, one can see that all are but distinctions of self-identical thought, or all is but illative reflexion,—a dialectic in which each member sublates itself in itself, and is in itself the contrary of itself, and the whole seems as a Bacchantic tumult with everyone concerned drunk. After all, we can see, too, that setzen is not different from bestimmen, for both refer to the placing of the differences. Setzen, however, is hardly so wide as bestimmen, and denotes rather a special bestimmen or determination where the reciprocity is peculiarly overt, as in the mutual relation of cause and effect, or in that of positive and negative, &c. Still, to determine will very generally translate setzen, as well as bestimmen.

C.

INFINITUDE.

Here, in the first place, as usual, the general heading maps out the course of the dialectic that is to follow, and names the principal moments. The point to which we have now arrived is this: The finite passes away into its other; but the finite is a passing away: the passing away, then, passes away. Or the finite negates itself; but the finite is negation: the finite, then, negates negation, and affirmatively is. In brief: the Finite goes together with itself, and this is the Infinite. It is difference-less self-reference, at once a being and a becoming. These naturally can be used as
definitions of the absolute; but the whole series of the sphere of particular being (There-being), as subjected to the first or simple negation, is finite, and cannot be so used. The Infinite, too, so used, as expressing in itself negation of the Finite, seems preferable to either Being or Becoming, which do not directly express independence of limitatedness, or definitude. The presence of reference to, and so of an implication of, limitatedness, finiteness, negation, in the Infinite, is at the same time hinted. The two Infinites, the true and the spurious, or that of Reason and that of Understanding, being briefly named and even characterised, the division follows:

a. The Infinite in general.

Here again, as in a moment of simple apprehension, there is a difficulty to know what to say, and what is said may be regarded as the summary of all that follows. Indeed, we may say, that the reference to the Finite still implied in the Infinite is the hinge, or pivot, or key to all that follows.

In the first paragraph, we see the joy with which Hegel hails the Infinite as the name at which our true 'light goes up' to us. This is a very overt indication of Hegel's views in reference to the immortality of the soul.

It is through its reference to its In-itself that There-being determines itself—so far as it is There-being or negated being—as finite. Thus it is the nature of the Finite itself to transcend itself into the Infinite. This must be seen to be its own act, and not result of an external force. Neither must we view it as if—which is quite usual—our subjective reason had simply crossed over the Finite into the Infinite, leaving the former still there. Finite and Infinite are not to be conceived side by side, like—as another German says—cat and dog. What takes place, in short, is a dialectic transition in which both fall together as moments.

b. Alternating determination of the Finite and the Infinite.

In this a moment of judgment the differences are, of course, kept apart, and this constitutes the gist of what we are to see, which, however, is one of the most important of considerations.

The first paragraph shows the Infinite—and let us be serious in thinking the Infinite, and not satisfied with a mere logical term,—
as constituted, to be Something—with determinateness—with a Limit. The Finite has thus the character of determinate or real There-being opposed to the Infinite: they seem permanently apart, then. As the Infinite is immediately or directly constituted, it awakes the Finite; or the being, the what-it-is, or as-it-is of the one directly awakes that of the other.

The intention of the next paragraph is to thicken the contrast between the two moments: they are to be exhibited as mutually other. The Finite is Limitation; its nature is perpetually to seek its In-itself. Infinitude is this In-itself, the To-be-to or Is-to-be of the Limitation, and this, too, as a thing effected. This Infinite is the nothing of that Finite; but this Infinite also, as the accomplished Sollen, the effected and carried-out To-be-to, is reflected into itself, is self-referent affirmative Being. The Infinite, then, is beënt, and it is the negation of the Finite; but as a beent negation it is other to this Finite. The Finite remaining as determinate real There-being, is other to the Infinite. Yet the Finite has also the character of being sublated into the Infinite, which is thus the Non-Finite—a being or beingness, but in the form or sense of negation. The Finite, then, is as the sphere of the definite realities: the Infinite as the void which is beyond all such; but still the Finite has its In-itself not in its definite and determinate There-being.—The dialectic is so double-edged, that the last welches (the last 'which' but one) of the paragraph, though construed with the Finite, might, without embarrassment to the sense, be construed with the Infinite—but perhaps not quite as well.

This Infinite, which has just been developed, is the bastard or spurious Infinite, that which constitutes to mere understanding as the separating and abstracting power, the last word of wisdom. In this, nevertheless, understanding only envelopes itself in contradictions.

The contradiction at once shows in this, that both still are, and an Infinite, limited by another, is only a Finite.

Understanding that would seek its Highest, its Infinite, leaves the Finite still standing: it strives into a far inane which is and is not; while that on which it has turned its back, and only turned its back, also is and is not.

The relation of the one to the other is recognised and acknowledged by understanding; but understanding can see in this relation, not their inseparability and unity, but only their differ-
ence, distinction, separation, and mutual independence. From understanding it is quite concealed that the one is but the burthen of the other, or that the one is through the other. —The reflexion of understanding whereby it enables itself to persist in the mutual independence of each moment is well put; at the same time, the true state of the case is hinted.

Again, the result to understanding is expressed. But this has in it the nature of a process. You pass into the Infinite; but the Infinite is inseparable from the Finite, and the Finite reappearing, the Limit is replaced, which again then is to be transcended, but only necessarily with re-placement of a new limit—and so on ad infinitum! The precision of the text here cannot be surpassed.

The next paragraph is equally precise—is for penetrative speech, quite admirable, indeed, and requires no comment. The definition of sublunary being, of mortal state, 'not to be that, or to be not that, which it itself is, and which its other is,' is a subtlety of the one mint.

The progress in infinitum—what it is generally considered—in what case it appears, and its true definition as considered—the text here is unequivocal. The following paragraph is equally so; and the whole matter is seen to be, not a perpetual variety, but a perpetual self-sameness. In the concluding paragraph of this section, the mechanism of the Infinite Progress is again characterised, and its contradiction declared fixed because the implied unity is not reflected upon.

c. The Affirmative Infinite.

Perhaps, it would suffice now to conjoin under a single general comment all the remaining matter of the Infinite, whether as it appears here under the present section, or as under Remark 1. Still, the space saved would be but little, and a word of comment, paragraph by paragraph, as before, may perhaps prove so far something of a support to the reader. We continue as we have begun, then.

In the unresting alternation of the Infinite Progress the truth lies, but in itself. Such alternation is but an externalisation of the truth; or it contains the true notion, but in outwardness, so that its moments fall out from each other. Unity of these moments, however, will result from their very comparison. At the same time, the term unity is defective, and may expect to find its own
corrective complement also in some step of this movement which constitutes outwardly what the notion before us is inwardly.

The Infinite presents itself directly as transcendence of the Finite, as negation of the Finite. But this being so, the Finite has only the value of a something that is to be transcended; the Finite thus is in itself the negation of itself; and the Infinite is no more than this. The peculiarity of the one, then, is also that of the other; and neither is possible without the other. If it be objected, that this is a result of looking at them only in their reference to one another, let us see how it will be with them, each being regarded apart by itself. The first consequence is, that the Finite being there in its own independence, the Infinite is no longer Infinite; and the second is, that the Finite, just because of this independence, has lost its previous relative and transitory nature, and is all that the Infinite is.—It must be well observed by the reader that this dialectic is not a juggle, but the truth. Sir William Hamilton, for his part, says this: As there is a Finite to limit the Infinite, the latter is inconceivable, &c. &c.; (therefore Human Imbecility, &c. &c.). Now this is a juggle, and a logical juggle; or, being ‘a raisonnement from a groundless presupposition,’ it is ‘sophistry.’ Still Hamilton shall have refuted Hegel! and by the above argument!!—a crumb of Hegel’s own—bastard Infinite!!—The dialectic of Hegel must be closely looked at; and the more closely, the more evident will it be that the iron faculty of Hegel honestly received the whole problem, honestly and strongly turned it on both sides, and equally honestly and strongly solved it. We see already this much at least, that the Finite in its very nature involves and so evolves an Infinite, and that, though there is no room for the spurious Infinite of Hamilton, there is an absolute necessity for the veritable Infinite of Hegel, which is—and only can be Infinite by being—at once itself and its other.

Whether viewed together or apart, then, Finite and Infinite manifest a mutual implication.

It is by regarding each in abstraction from the other, or it is by doing violence to the concrete truth in which both co-here, that both are falsified.

Viewed in this abstraction, the character by which each specially is that which it is, becomes converted into its opposite.

The abstraction of understanding falsifies the double unity of the two characters in the same way as the simple.
Understanding errs by insisting on regarding their mutual reference as qualitative difference; whereas they are, the one by reason of the other,—that is, they are, because each is the other.

The transition of the one to the other must be seen to be not of the nature of change, of one something into another something. The transition is not of that nature, but a going together of the one into the other, into a resultant concrete unity, which is also their presupposition and their truth. The Infinite, as only out of the Finite, is but as an inane that flees; but in that it is through its sublation of the Finite, it has returned, as it were, out of this flight into the inane, and is a solid and concrete Here.

Each, then, is an affirmative as a negation of the negation; but the infinite progress exhibits them not thus in their truth.

In that progress they are compared apart, just as we compared apart the two together, and each by itself—a comparison merely external, and not touching the internal state of the case. But this same progress virtually contains, not only their difference or separation, but their connexion as well.

In simple negation they are apart; but, the nature of the reference considered, even in this movement the Finite is seen to go together with its own self.

The Infinite, in like manner, without being rid of the Finite, arrives ever only by its own self.

Each, then, is itself as negation of the negation; and understanding errs by regarding each only affirmatively, and not with reference to the negation it contains. They are moments of a whole, each through its contrary, and, at the same time, through the sublation of its contrary.

There are the two; each is itself, but the sublation of both is the true Infinite.

The result, not abstract unity, but becoming; so that each of its moments but becomes.

The Infinite, in its return and reference to self, is being, and not abstractly such, but as being—There (Daseyn), positively there or here. Only the bastard infinite is the impalpable retreat into the inane, because it is the simple negation of the finite, taking the same not up into self as negation of the negation: it is this infinite, then, which is unreachable, which is not even there, which is not even palpably existent, which is without Daseyn. Instead of falling in awe before this unreachable infinite, we ought to see that it is not mighty, but meagre—not sublime, but deficient.
The true Infinite is Reality, and reality in a higher sense; for as the development grows, so does reality. But, on the whole, reality is a term which has its place now behind us: only, it is remarkable how apt we are to determine any matter in hand by the abstractest of characters, and so the furthest from the concrete truth.

Reality here, as negation of the negation, is opposed to the former reality of There-being. The result is identity; but the finite is but ideel in the infinite. Ideality has thus an eminently concrete sense; but it avails not to have the term, because opinion adheres to the affirmativeness of the finite, and despises what it calls only the ideal.

Of terms, Diesseits, Jenseits, Aeussere, and Speculativ might require a word; but what they mean is very plain, each in its place. Kant’s speculativ, already given (p. 392 above), may be contrasted with Hegel’s, as also with the mathematical, which last refers to ‘the discovering of Properties and Relations.’ An external consideration must always regard things as outwardly apart, and not as inwardly coherent. Placing ‘the Transition’ last, we take next, and in the same way, paragraph by paragraph,

**Remark 1.**

The mechanism of the spurious infinite is again perfectly characterised. These are happy expressions: a contradiction which comes forward as solution; a beginning of thought over the infinite, but with an intent or import which is taken as nothing; a flight which collects itself not, and knows not how to bring back the negative into the positive; an uncompleted reflection, that brings not the two thoughts together. These expressions are alone sufficient to expose the nullity of Hamilton’s halfness.

We must know that the Progressus is the alternation of the union and of the disunion of the two moments; and, again, we must know that the union and disunion are themselves inseparable.

The alternation is, in point of fact, as well negation of the union as of the disunion; but they are ideally together as moments in the whole. The ideality of the differences, this is the solution. It is here that speculative thought shows itself.

‘How does the infinite come out of itself and into finitude?’ With this question philosophy is generally thought to be at once
tested and posed. Hegel says, that we shall by-and-by see clearer into what the infinite really is: meantime, he is nothing loath to take up the question in its direct form.

The proper putting of a question must be allowed to require some amount of training as well in philosophy as in other matters. Now here, perhaps, the question is so put, that it seems as if only figurate conception asked, and as if the answer was expected to be only in its own dialect.

Determination does not seem quite repugnant to being; though this latter is quite undetermined, because this character is not directly and at first hand expressed in it. But the infinite seems expressly the non-finite, and so their incompatibility is at once taken for granted.

But here the question contains false presuppositions: it assumes a Finite and an Infinite which *are not*. The Finite and Infinite *are* as we have seen them, and not as the question presupposes them. The question, then, deserves no better answer than that the infinite goes out into the finite, in order to be truth, instead of nullity, and so the finite; or that they are both eternally so, the one in the other.

The question, if we suppose it to grant the unity claimed, may proceed to inquire, how about the separation? But the separation lies in the very fact that it is the finite and the infinite which are in the unity, which as unity, then, is only such as ideally comprehends both. The unity and the distinctivity are equally appertinent to, and are inseparable in, the concrete truth.

Kant and Hegel are both difficult writers; but this difficulty being looked into, will be found to arise from opposite causes in the one as compared with the other. He who will look narrowly into Kant will find that it is what Hegel calls his Geschwätzigkeit that constitutes his difficulty. With Hegel, again, apart from the peculiar thought and the peculiar dialect, it is compression which presents itself as the obstacle. Here, however, in this discussion of the infinite, there are impediments in the way of a quite Kantian nature; or the discussion in question is carried out to too great a length. Hegel usually sees what he has got to say, and names what he has got to say, with the instant precision of an instrument of steel: here, however, he introduces us into an intricacy strange for him—the intricacy of breadth, that is, and a breadth produced, not by extension of treatment, but by re-iteration of repetition. The mutual reference of the one to the other is the hinge on which
the dialectic of Finite into Infinite and Infinite into Finite turns; and the whole business ought to have been summed in a less number of phrases than that presented by the pages over which it has been scattered. We shall find, indeed, by-and-by, with reference to the 'Encyclopedie,' that Hegel has really effected such concentration elsewhere. This is an important consideration as regards the art of statement, and the result seems to be that, where a scientific truth is concerned, we ought to satisfy ourselves with one presentation of the same, fearing that any others, especially many others, and just in proportion to their many, might be rather apt to introduce hesitancy for assurance, and obscurity for light.

The discussion above continues that bearing on the immortality of the soul which we have already signalised. Perhaps we should notice here a doubt which may have presented itself to the reader. The passing-away of the finite is a passing-away of the passing-away, and there is still only affirmation present. True! but if what is concerned is only of a maternal nature, the interests of the soul remain unsecured. We admit the eternity of matter, we know that transformation in that kind involves no loss of materials: but still form disappears; and if the soul be form, it is nowise secured from the same consummation.—The answer here is, that Hegel occupies a platform where such objections have no place: the notion is the originative spot, the point and pulse of movement and of life, and we are the notion—that is, the notion, as Socrates says of the soul, is insuscipient of its contrary, death—which latter would amount in such case to utter and universal annihilation, which is absurd, &c.

If we but attentively consider what we mean when we say finite, there will be little difficulty in realising the position which Hegel would maintain. What is finite passes away; but if then what passes away were independent and non-relative, there were nothing; or, we might ask, where would the passing-away pass away to? 'What becomes of the old moons?' as the African king seriously inquires.—The finite alone has evidently a chasm on one side, and demands its complement. In fact, there can be no Finite without an Infinite, and no Infinite without a Finite: they are but the two necessary sides or moments of one and the same concrete truth. What is, is, and determinately is; and this necessarily involves both a first and a second negation, or, what is the same thing, both finitude and infinitude. To take the picture,
the Vorstellung, we have already used—What is, is a Voice; Being is a Voice. Were it abstract only, it were nothing. But it passes into its distinctions; it rings its changes; it undergoes the evolution of its native and constituent notes. Even so it negates these, and is itself; or it is through these into itself. Thus, then, the Infinite (Voice) is through the Finite (Notes); thus, too, the Finite (Notification) is the first Negation of the Infinite (Voice); and thus also, lastly, the Infinite (Voice) is the Negation of the Finite (Notes), or the negation of the negation. Thus the Infinite (Voice) is 'the Process in which it submits to be only one of its moments as opposed to the Finite (Notes), but sublates this difference of itself from itself into the affirmation of itself, and only through this be-mediation is truly as the Infinite (Voice).'

Thus, too, we see that 'the negation is determined as Identity; the Ideel is the Finite as it is in the Infinite (as the Notes are in the Voice),—it is as a determination (the vocabilisation, notification), the matter or implement, which is distinguished, but not self-substantially is, but only as moment (in the voice).'—The Vorstellung sounds better in German if I may venture to express myself in German: Was ist, ist eine Stimme; oder das Seyn ist die unendliche Stimme. Abstract aber ist diese Stimme nichts; oder abstract ist sie nur an sich. Sie muss aber auch fur sich seyn, und um fur sich zu seyn, muss sie sich unterscheiden; d. h. sich die Reihe ihrer Bestimmungen geben. In ihren Bestimmungen ist die Stimme bestimmt; oder die Bestimmungen sind die Bestimmtheiten. Den Bestimmtheiten (oder der Bestimmtheit) gegenüber ist die Stimme das Unendliche. Die Bestimmtheit dagegen der Stimme gegenüber, ist das Endliche. Die Bestimmtheit ist die Negation der Stimme, zugleich aber ist die Stimme die Negation der Bestimmtheit, also die Negation der Negation. Die unendliche Stimme ist nur durch die endlichen Bestimmungen; und diese nur durch jene.

It is a main manifestation of Hegel, that he points ever to the concrete and existent actual. Pointing thus, he intimates to narrow Intellectualism, represented, it may be, by a Jacobi, or by his arriéré pupil Hamilton, 'Rest not in your insoluble abstractions; behold actu what you declare impossible.' Pointing thus, too, he equally intimates to narrow Materialism, that the Real which it would declare the only, is inextricably interwoven with the Ideal which it would deny, or, rather, that the web of this latter is the vital all, into which the former seems to be received
but as dead and inorganic stuff, and against which this stuff, as what cannot be named, or said, or characterised, is veritably as nothing. There is this variegated universe; that is, there is Identity and Variety: either abstract side is self-stultification; there is but the concrete both. There is an analogy thus in the position of Hegel to that of Bishop Butler. The industry of the latter may be expressed thus: ‘You, Deists, &c., find our Christianity not good enough for your high intellectual notions (or, say with Hegel, abstractions); but look to the actual—which you cannot deny—and see how it comports itself with the same!’ In this comparison the advantage, however, is all on the side of the German, whose argument makes appeal to perfection, and not, like Butler’s, to defect, or to what must be admitted at least to appear such. It is this, indeed, which gives an air of special pleading to the argument of Butler, and finally negates it. The employment of German as above, suggests, *apropos* of Languages, an illustration of the Hegelian, or what we may call the Absolute Method. He who would master a living language, let him, Firstly, devour cart-loads of what interests him in it, through interlinear translations. Let him, Secondly, with his own language before his eyes, shout aloud to himself the foreign equivalents, at least four hours daily, and for several months. Thirdly, let him hearken to the foreign language read to him, let him tell in his own words (but in the foreign language) what he has heard read, and let him—in the foreign language, of course—converse generally with the reader. These are the great features of the absolute method by which the modern languages may be more or less perfectly acquired, and any closer discrimina it is at present not necessary to mention. The reader will see that the three moments of this method may be named respectively, Hamiltonian, Ollendorffian, and Robertsonian,—without, however, implying that what is particular to these names perfectly represents the moments in question; at the same time that it is only fair to point out that it is, as usual, the second moment which contains the Arbeit, the labour,—and, in this case, certainly the bulk of the merit. Now these moments are by no means incomplete forms of those of the notion. Simple Apprehension is the first moment—say it is English that will make itself French—it simply takes up or absorbs—the French disappears into the English, and exists there only *an sich*, or *in potentia*. Judgment, dis-cernment, separation, is the second moment—the French is flung out from the English and becomes
für sich; what was at first only potentially implicit in the English, is now gesetzt, explicit, realised to tongue and ear, but still abstractly; —the two first moments, indeed, are, as they ought to be, abstract. But now comes the concrete moment, in which the second moment is reflected into the first to the development of a concrete living actuality; or, as it is here, French is reflected into English, so that the composite is equally both, An English which is at will French, and a French which is at will English—a faculty or power which is an und fur sich.

A similar illustration we pointed out already in the tenets of Comte. Comte himself completes the two first moments of the notion, in the forms of Religion and Metaphysic, by what we may call his Empirical Realism. Empirical Realism, however, is not a moment of Reason, but of the renunciation of Reason; it is a falling back into one of the abstractions—and the coarser one too —into one of the sides of the antithesis of understanding: instead of an advance to the moment of reason, it is a retrogression to a single one of the differences of judgment.—Of course, it is unnecessary to notice that Comte did not, and could not, bring thus together his own expressions, whose origin was but empirical casualty; neither is it necessary to point out that the two former moments do not belong exclusively to past times, but are necessary flexions of the Notion itself in all time. Not Comte, but Hegel, then, shall complete for us the triad by adding to religion and metaphysic his own ideal realism, or real idealism—which very plainly is a moment of reason, and a concluding moment of reason in that sphere.

Excellent illustration to a like effect might be obtained from Political Economy, a branch of science which awaits entire transformation from the introduction into it of the notion. So far as I know, apart the Rechtsphilosophie, there is but one allusion to Political Economy in Hegel, occurring in his contemptuous remark that the English call Staatswirthschaft Philosophy. The subject involving a certain amplitude of detail, is inadmissible at present, however. We may say this, nevertheless, that Political Economy is but one of the moments in the general movement of the Aufklärung, and that, consequently, it must just share the limits and conditions and characterisation in general of that movement. This observation, short as it is, we believe to throw a flood of light on, or rather quite to determine, the particular nature and authority of the branch of science in question. At
present, Political Economy is in its hour of strength, and also in its hour of weakness; that is, it has reached the moment of Judgment and gone asunder into idle abstractions. The whole movement belongs, indeed, to a moment of Judgment historically present; but at its dawn in Hume—for it is absurd to extend isolated and individual expressions into an ex post facto scope beyond their merely contemporary application, and to see this science (viewed strictly as such) rise, whether in the Mercantile system of Colbert, or in the Physiocratic system of Quesnay ('Tableau Economique,' 1758)—at its dawn in Hume (1752), a dawn mainly widened by Adam Smith (1776), a plain, honest, solid, faithful, and excellent faculty, but without the penetrative, fertile, and various originality of Hume—it occupied relatively a sub-moment of simple apprehension, and possessed much more concrete truth than it manifests now in its complete efflorescence of abstraction. Consider, for example, the thin starched ruffles that rise now into the moral sublime over such empty abstractions as 'Demand and Supply,' 'Capital will find its own channels,' &c. &c.!—Is not this enough? The business of National Economy is to secure our material supplies, or to realise stewardship over our material necessities—an indispensably necessary, a first or the first function in every community—well, said ruffles reach the moral sublime here, too, with—This function, the Stewardship of the Nation, must be carefully guarded from the Rational, Universal, or True Will, as it is in the conjunct, and must be as carefully committed to the Irrational, Particular, and Sensuous Will (otherwise named Self-will), as it is in the disjunct: in a word, the Stewardship of the Nation must be saved from Reason and intrusted to Caprice! A very pretty abstraction of Judgment this!—just that abstraction which expressly constitutes what Hegel calls Das Böse, and what we call wrong, evil, sin, crime!—In short, no interest more imperatively demands the moment of Reason—concrete Reason—nowadays; than that of Political Economy, which, through the extreme of abstraction, threatens to fall bodily 'on the other' at present, and dismember universal society. Yet we have come to such a pass with our 'advanced thinkers,' that it is just proper prudence for all of us nowadays to give-in a grave adhesion to Demand and Supply, and all the rest of them, not trusting the enemy with the slightest opening through the very hint of a doubt. I wonder if the Jupiter ever suffered for its indiscretion at the commencement of the cotton dearth, in exclaiming that the law
of supply and demand, though now evidently false in the concrete, was still true in the abstract! Did the Jupiter fail to consider, then, that Political Economy concerning the concrete only, truth in the abstract would be to it but a small set-off against the ruin of the science in its concrete falsehood?—But verily the remnants of the Aufklärung, if we but look at Political Economy, pelt us so unmercifully—as shallowness and conceit always do—with 'igno-

rance,' that, as we said, a proper prudence orders us to cry as loudly as the rest, 'Long live the conqueror!' and we do our best to stifle our laughter even when we see the unique Mr Buckle, without the qualm of the scruple of a doubt, but with ruffled crop well swelled, and outblown cheeks, magnificently advancing to mediate between mind and matter through what he calls the laws, and we the abstractions, of Political Economy! The reader, we hope, will understand, nevertheless, that we believe in a science of Political Economy, that we consider the interest involved to be a primary necessity, and that we call as loudly as any for the emancipation of industry from the fetters of feudalism, rejoicing also as sincerely as any in the immense and splendid success with which that process of emancipation has been already rewarded.

The abstract vacuum that names itself, or mis-names itself, Political Economy, nowadays, is, it is only fair to remark, not without its reply to the above objection to the substitution of individual caprice for general reason in this, or any other interest of humanity. It has been found—this is the burden of the answer—that free individual self-interest is the best steward of the State, and that ordinary provisions of Police suffice to effect the necessary control. If the and which we have italicised be correct, then it is no longer the Particular but the Universal Will with which we have to do; and, again, if the it has been found is correct, then there is an end of any objection whatever. It is to be remarked, however, that belief in sounding abstractions is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the Aufklärung: ever, when at any time self-convicted of a blunder, it recovers itself again by clutching to some big platitude—'a wise man always,'—'a good man never,'—'the vulgar and the ignorant,'—'but a well-regulated understanding,' &c. &c.; just as it is the sublime of wisdom in Dr Hugh Blair to repeat and re-repeat over a thousand pages, 'practise all virtue, avoid all vice—practise all virtue, avoid all vice!' * This it has been found,

* Empedocles (νηστείας κακότητοι) was quite as wise as Blair, to say nothing of the Aureum Carmen and the verse μηδ' ἀλογίστος σαυτόν ἔχων ἐπὶ μηδὲν ἑβίσκει.
we have to fear, then, is but one of these big-sounding abstractions; nay, its own and contains its own refutation. By this and Self-will, is declared to be not perfectly free Self-will, but self-will under control of—a form of—that is, just—Reason! This concedes the whole question; for if you grant the smallest end or part of the wedge Reason, you will find yourself destitute of any power of resistance to my introduction of the whole. You say, for example, not only is Police to be made an affair of the State, but even such interests as those of Education or the mere carrying of our letters are not to be intrusted to individual self-interest, but must be reserved for the assignments of universal will: you say this, and you wish to stop there; but who so wroth as you when certain Theological Expositors assert their own exposition to be the exposition ultimate, the exposition final, the exposition absolute?—and yet these expositors do no more than you yourselves do or propose to do! You see, then, that when you call for individual self-interest, but under edge of the small end of Reason, you have virtually effected at once a complete suppression of self-interest or the Particular Will, and a complete introduction of Reason or the Universal Will;—in other words, Political Economy is an affair of the State, and not of the Individual; or it is not an affair of free individual self-interest as such, but of free individual self-interest in the sense that it is free, or that it has been free'd (from self-will, that is) by the decernments of Reason, of the Universal Will, of the State.

Remark 2.

There is matter in this short note which your common writer could not have kept himself from trouvelling over an entire treatise, perhaps.—The ordinary view, religious or other, of the transitoriness of all finite existence, is with much subtle depth of truth identified with Idealism: even the water of Thales, as principle of all things, had the force of Ideality. On one side, the principle, as sublating the moments, and, on the other, the moments, as sublated in the principle, may be regarded as ideël.

Mental conception, as opposed to external reality, is what is usually regarded as the ideal side or element; and certainly, consciousness, seeing that it sublates or takes up all matter into itself—or, what is the same thing, seeing that all its matter is sublated into it, and only so for it—is the true idealist. This position is
that of subjective idealism, which insists on its own conceiptive form, in opposition to the matter which presents itself in that form. But with such idealism, there is neither loss nor gain—as regards the matter, that is. There is no loss, for, despite the form, there is the matter; and, in a higher sense, there is no loss, for the truth is still supposed to lie in the abstracting from this matter as from that which is not the true In-itself or Principle. Again, there is no gain, just because there is no loss, or because this matter remains there—in me, if you will—just as real, and at the same time just as finite—that is, as unsatisfactory and as unaccounted for—as ever. To remove one finity, that of the antithesis of subject and object, does not remove the other innumerable unreconciled or unresolved finities which attach still to the matter (or object), whatever be its true relation of identity at bottom to the form (or subject). The reader may profitably see here again the greater thinker and the lesser. To Hegel the relation of object and subject is—as regards the true business in hand—but as the veriest particle; to Sir William Hamilton this relation is the whole, totum et rotundum, and he fills his whole world with clamour about the Cosmological Idealist, the Presentative Realist, &c. &c., as if the mode in which the outward is regarded as connected with the inward alone constituted Philosophy, and as if the distinguishing with Greek Predicates of all such modes, actual or possible, were Philosophising!—The nature of the necessity which Hegel sees is indicated here: he would begin with the acknowledged first finity, and proceeding resolunngly through the whole series, at length wind all up together as a whole into the one Infinite, the Absolute Spirit. What a vast difference there lies between this gigantic enterprise and the single question, Is the object I, or is it another than I?—or, rather, how shall we name in Greek the different answers?

It may be worth while in simple summary now to review the ground over which we have just passed.—Well, Being is that which is when all distinction is abstracted from: it is, therefore, that which indefinitely is; it is the indefinite What, the indefinite here and always, the indefinite immediate; or—what all this just amounts to—it is the indefinite First and Simple. But, being indefinite, it is no more nor less than Nothing; for, in an actual definite existence—as the thinker always is—Nothing is no more and no less than that abstraction from all definiteness (distinction, difference) which Being is. In short, Being and Nothing are each
simply the void faculty, and whichever we assume, Being or Nothing, the faculty accompanies it, and cannot be prevented from accompanying it.—This faculty, however, is not to be regarded as specially mine, or yours, or his: it is to be regarded as the absolute faculty, both yours and mine and his, and yet that faculty in relation to which mine or yours or his is but as a meinung, an opinion—but as a tint, a shade, a reflexion: at the same time, nevertheless, tint, shade, reflexion is not without its own necessity. This faculty is the conceived principle and principium of all that is; and in reference to such principle, a beginning only can be effected by abstracting from all its differences, by returning to its own simple abstract identity—and that is Being: but simple abstract identity as distinction-less is Nothing—in fact, in every instance when we say Nothing, it is simply this distinction-less abstract identity we mean.—All this is very striking: it is the nature of thought to demand a principle; but, if it but look at what that must be which it demands, it will find that the principle can be but the abstraction from the difference, or the Identity. This is of universal application. Just so situated is the Beginning; it is abstraction from Difference up to Identity, and there is no further back for it. These few thoughts have that in them to alter all human reflexion, and so all human industry at present.—This abstraction, then, which a Beginning necessitates, is just Being (What is) gone over into Nothing; and this is but a literal expression of the state of the case. But it is equally literally true that it is Nothing which has gone into Being; for in this abstraction it is Nothing now that is. But what does this amount to?—There is a definite existence; of that definite existence there is necessarily an eternal or infinite principle which is, was, and ever will be—no abstraction can destroy it, therefore: in this abstraction, then, which is characterised as Nothing, there is still Being. Well, then, reach this abstraction in reality as an actual beginning, or—what is the same thing—reach it in thought, there is a traffic in actual operation in which Being is seen, so to speak, to beingate Nothing, and Nothing to nothingate Being; but the one result is the formal definition of Origin, and the other of Decease; both are Becoming, and further, Being and Nothing blent, are beënt distinction, Daseyn, Entity or aughtness, sublunariness, mortal state.—Or, to take the abstraction in another manner—in every case, the principle, the faculty is still presupposed: Being, then, the faculty, and Nothing, its contained matter,
or—a view equally true—Nothing, the faculty, and Being, its contained matter—these are identical, but also absolutely distinguished; and the distinction is just that of Form and Filling. We can thus get a glimpse even here of a main Hegelian doctrine—that Form and Filling, or that outer and inner, are the same. What were the Form without the Filling, the Filling without the Form? The Filling is what the Form is; the Form is the Filling. Being and Nothing are thus the crudest example of the negative reference to Self.—But this intermovement is in Seyn; it is Werden—the transition of what is to what is not, and again of what is not to what is.

This process, then, of Being passing into Nothing, and vice versa, is Becoming—a unit in which both Nothing and Being are. Being becoming Nothing is Decease; while Nothing becoming Being is Origin. Becoming thus, between the two directions of origin and decease, is sisted into Become. But what has become is determinate, or it contains at once Reality and Negation, the union of which constitutes what we mean by Something.

But Something is its own negative; even in its very self-reference, or reflexion into Self, it just by that virtually excludes itself—that is, as an other. Or the reference to self is negative of that element named by Kant the manifold, and which we may name the variety—what is self-reference, indeed, if not just sublation, negation, of the variety?—this variety, then, is an other in general to this unity—and thus in its very notion Something of itself alters itself, others itself. Or Something is the negation of its own determinateness, which latter is to it relatively other; or Something as distinguishable Something implies other in it, by which, but also from which, it is distinguished.

Something and Other, then,—each is Something, and each is relatively Other. True, the other is a distinction indifferent to either in its own self; it is external to both, it falls out of both, though it is constituted by the external reference of the one to the other. Belonging, then, to neither, it may be isolated and considered by itself. But, thus considered, it presents itself as the abstract other, the other as other, or evidently the other of itself. Physical Nature is such other; it is the other of Spirit; its nature, then, is a mere relativity, in which, not an inherent quality, but a mere outer relation is expressed. Spirit, then, is the true Something, and Nature is what it is only as opposed to Spirit. The quality of Nature, then, isolated and viewed apart, is
just that it is the other as other—is that which exists externally
to its own self (in space, time, &c.).

The other by itself is the other in itself, the other of itself, and
so evidently the other of the other. It is the absolutely self-disparate, self-discrepant, self-unequal principle—it is the absolute
odd. It is the self-negating or the self-changing principle. But
even in its changes it remains self-identical, for it is other, and
what it changes to is other. Change, then, for this principle is
mere reflexion into its own self with resolution of otherness.

But Something is in itself as counter what it is for other.
Being-in-self and Being-for-other are the two moments that
constitute the Something. The one is, as it were, the con-
mittive, and the other the defining, element. The Being-for-
other is the negating element; it is not for itself, it is for
the production of the other; and yet it is the other, and without
it the other could not be—neither for it nor for itself. This
otherness in the Something—which is not the Something and
which is the Something—one with it and not one with it (I am,
if you lop off a leg)—contained in it and separated from it—is not
so much other to it, then, as rather its Being-for-other. But in
the unity of Something, both are in absolute unity with each
other, or each in its own self involves and implies the other.
Both are of a derivative or dependent nature; for each is constituted
by reflexion from itself to the other, and from the other to itself,
each is itself as not being the other. Or each reflects to the
other, and is constituted by reflexion from the other. But what
Something is for other, that is in the Something; or it is in it to
be so and so for other. What, then, it is thus for other belongs to
its In-itself, to its own genuine intrinsic worth. This considera-
tion points to the true nature of the Kantian and common Thing-
in-itself. To attempt to predicate what a thing in itself is, at the
same time that all predicates (Being-for-other) are to be excluded
from it, is simply the self-stultification of utter thoughtlessness.

As yet the evolution is in itself; or under Seyn (Being) the
members appear, not relative, but independent, the notion, as yet,
being but implicit; in other spheres relation or correlation
increases— but we are here stepping too close for a mere
retrospect.

We have seen, then, the successive and consequent evolution of
Being, Nothing, Becoming, Origin, Decease, Become-ness or Ness-
ness, Reality, Negation, Something, Being-for-self, and Being-for-
other. Now, what Something is for other, being reflected into the
In-itself of the Something, constitutes that Something's Qualification
or appointed nature; while what Something is for other, being
reflected apart from the In-itself, constitutes that Something's
Talification, or its assertion of itself as against other. But in this
assertion, it at once is and is not—a definition which is identical
with that of Limit. But Something in reference to its Limit is a
To-be-to, or its Limit is Limitation. Again, as To-be-to, it is
beyond its Limitation, and passes into Infinitude. Infinitude as
opposed to Finitude is the spurious, as reconciled with Finitude
the true, Infinite; and the true Infinite is that which is by and
for itself, or Being-for-self.

Suppose, now, we repeat this evolution, but expressly accom-
panied by the logical moments which have produced it, it may
stand thus:

The most absolutely abstract object, filling, matter, or intent
(Inhalt) of Simple Apprehension, is Being. To Judgment now—
that would discriminate, differentiate, dis-cern—this Being is
Nothing; while to Reason, on the other hand, both must fall
together into Becoming, as the only truth. What is Becoming
to Reason, is now again to Simple Apprehension the other of it,
or Become. What is Become parts before Judgment into Reality
and Negation. Reason, which reflected Nothing into Being to
the development of Becoming, reflects now Negation into Reality
to the development of Something. The Something of Reason is
to Simple Apprehension the other of it, that is, another, or simply
Other. To Judgment the Other breaks into what it is in itself
and what it is for other. Reason now again reflects the Being-
for-other into the Being-for-self, and the Qualification (in the
sense of characteristic function or quality) arises. Qualification
to Simple Apprehension is the other of it, or it is Talification.
Talification falls asunder before Judgment into—let us say at
once, in order not to stop now—Action and Reaction. Reason
reflects reaction into action, and Limit results. The Limit to
Simple Apprehension is its other, or (say) Faculty. Faculty
separates under Judgment into a To-be-to and a Limitation.
Reason, reflecting the Limitation into the To-be-to, gives birth
to the Infinite. Before Simple Apprehension the Infinite is but
Finite, and the Finite to Judgment becomes the spurious Infinite,
or an irreconcilable antagonism of Finite and Infinite. Reason,
lastly, reflecting Finite unto Infinite, there emerges the true
Infinite, or the Fursichseyn, which is its own other to Simple Apprehension, or the One—and so on.

The reflective reader may see here a good reason for Hegel’s reticence—may come now to understand how it was that, like another Prospero, he broke ‘his staff,’ and, ‘deeper than did ever plummet sound,’ drowned, not ‘his book,’ but the receipt that made it. We allude, of course, to the changes just introduced above into the Hegelian scheme—changes which, in some respects, seem to render the transitions easier and more consistent, and which, if carried out at length in a discussion as full as that of Hegel himself, would necessitate the addition of a great deal of matter.—Hegel, probably, then just feared that this would be the result of a revelation of his formula—that every puny whipster, that is, would introduce his own innovations—and that the world would become disgusted by an endless clamour rung, and he himself just utterly stultified. That Hegel was right, if so fearing he so acted, the immediate result will probably soon prove now!

A remark or two on some of the proposed changes may be here in place. To ask for the abstract object of Simple Apprehension is certainly the directest way in which we can reach pure Being or Seyn; and the reflexion of the second moment into the first, so as to infect, if we may say so, the negation of the one by the beingness of the other, is perhaps the shortest way to the dialectic method. That the object of Reason when transferred to Simple Apprehension should become just its other, is an assignment at least in harmony, not only with the general manner of Hegel, but with the nature of the case, and it certainly seems to bring with it its own recommendations. Hegel’s own transition, for example, to other in his Something and Other, seems quite irregular, and not in obedience to the regular march of the notional moments. In Hegel, too, the extrication of Become from Becoming evidently necessitates on his part an unusual exertion, nor one quite satisfactory either. Again, the section devoted to Qualification, Talification, and Limit is very confused as it stands, and can be justified only by suggesting that now or here in a very intense form we are in a moment of judgment, and the differences all fall out of each other: but surely the consistency, clearness, and ease introduced by the innovation proposed have the advantage by much of any such suggestion. Then, again, the Re-extrication of the moments out of Talification and in higher potentiation, as Action and Reaction, seems to introduce not only formal, but
material advantages. Of course, we do not mean to say that Action and Reaction are the proper names of the moments extricated—these names occur much more consistently further on in the development, and they must be certainly replaced here by others of a much more abstract nature. But a very near peep into the actual operations of Hegel may be obtained by considering what has occurred here. What has occurred here, indeed,—the reader may depend on it,—occurred often to Hegel himself; and he, too, had to hunt often enough for abstract new terms by which to replace the old ones which had in the first instance suggested themselves. *Inherent* and *relative*, for example, must have occurred a thousand times to him, and been a thousand times replaced.—*Faculty*, of course, also, is here only for the nonce, and requires to be set aside for something more abstract. I cannot help thinking, however, that were Talification, Limit, To-be-to, Limitation, Finite, Infinite, &c., entirely re-thought and in subject to the new scheme proposed, there would result very great improvements to the Hegelian Logic. The Hürichsyein of Reason becoming to Simple Apprehension *One*, must prove sufficiently pleasing to any student really interested in Hegel.

That Hegel has really been guided by the moments of the Notion, must, we should think, be patent to every one. In the general system, the Logic is but the whole matter or Intent, the whole object of Simple Apprehension *in abstracto*—and so is it that the Logic really demonstrates and presents before us the Thing-in-itself. Nature is the object of Judgment *in abstracto*, or it is the Notion gone into difference as such, or it is all the moments of the Thing-in-itself fallen into outwardness. Or it is abstractly Difference, the Other, as Logic was abstractly Identity or the Thing-in-itself. The Spirit is the concrete moment of Reason—it is the concrete Totality—in which both of the abstract moments meet and realise themselves, though, at the same time, they are to be regarded as only ideël in it. It—the Spirit—is, absolutely, the only truth. But Logic, though constituting as a whole but the moment of Simple Apprehension, must submit its subdivisions to the entire virtue of the triune notion. Accordingly, it falls firstly into Being, Essentia, and Notion; and a little reflection will show that these are objects respectively of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason; or they are respectively moments of Identity, Difference, and Totality. Being, again, though as a whole very specially a moment of Simple Apprehen-
sion, follows also in its own proper subdivisions the flexions of the
notion; or we have Quality, Quantity, and Measure. Here
Quantity is very eminently mere Difference, or it is but the
externality of Quality, while Measure reunites both. Then the
divisions of Quality are Being, There-being, and Being-for-self, in
which forms the type of the notion is too evident to require
comment. The reader, however, may profitably ask himself, why
do Seyn, Nichts, and Werden absolutely distribute the absolutely
first moment, &c.? The differences will always be found to
stand for the particular; their reflexion into an indefinite all-
constitutes the universal; and their negative reflexion into unity
constitutes also the singular: consider Daseyn, Seyn, and Fürsich-
seyn! Of Seyn as Seyn, is it possible to say more than it is, it is
not, it comes to be, it ceases to be, it always becomes? At all events,
is Seyn ever anything else to Simple Apprehension? Simple
Apprehension is always a moment of indefinite An sich, or to it
the variety is always reflected into an indefinite unity. With
Judgment, the function of understanding proper begins: there is
an attempt to think the object; which being thought, breaks up
into its differences. In this moment, then, the object is no longer
an sich, it is für sich in the sense that it goes before itself in the
state of Anders-seyn, of otherwise-being. As regards the three
moments used distributively under Judgment, we can justify them
by saying that the difference is successively apprehended, judged,
and reasoned. The action of Simple Apprehension is always as
Unmittelbar or immediate, that of Judgment is as Mittelbar or
mediate: so it is that the object of the one has always the virtue
of Seyn, of Beingness, in it, while that of Judgment is as much
led by the virtue of Nichts or Negation.

But these circumstances of form become formalities, empty,
barren, wearisome, when unduly dwelt on; and attention may be
profitably turned in conclusion to the importance of the matter
discussed—quite apart from the form.

The first material lesson of Hegel attaches to the mere words.
We are all apt to use our words vaguely; but Hegel forces us, as
it were, to look into their very bellies. It is unnecessary to quote
examples; all the technical terms of Hegel are such—or we may
say, indeed, that his whole speech is but one long and perfect
example. This is a matter of the most essential importance, and
an indispensable preliminary to all thought proper. Even in this,
Hegel, as a philosopher, has gone boldly to the front, and has
attempted to remove in his own case, and in the whole case generally, the oldest and most tenacious objection which lies against philosophy,—that, namely, which is drawn from the ambiguity of language.

Again, throughout, the reader must find himself exercised in such application at once of abstraction and distinction as must greatly improve his own force. As regards information, surely that is not wanting, when we consider all that has been said in regard to Parmenides, Heraclitus, Buddhism, Spinoza, Kant, Jacobi, the general question of transition, the attributes of God, the necessary involution of the negative, the immense affirmative function of the negative, the conditions of creation, the constitution of Pantheism, the nature of common sense to be fore-thickened and fore-occupied by its own fixed abstractions, the crude figurate conception, certain points of morals, Idealism, &c. These are, for the most part, but incidental topics, yet they involve much and very momentous matter.

But the main thing which we have to see here is—the beginning at length, and the realisation of philosophy. Philosophy, in the Notion, has reached a scientific principle, and must henceforth, consequently, be reputed the most rigorously scientific of all the Sciences. We do not assist here either at the ordinary uncerteriorated, unsecured, miscellaneous process of pro-and-con reasonment, pro-and-con remark; but we sit before a necessary evolution, and—as Kant declared the essence of philosophy—in abstracto, and simply look on. What we see is the notion, and the notion in its own movement, the notion describing by its own necessity the articulated series of its own constitutive forms. The first, the unexplicated notion, the beginning, is being, the indefinite Immediate, but—seeing that we are here—Being that is in itself definite. But the absolutely first indefinite, or indefinite First, is Nothing; and—again seeing that we are here—no other Nothing than this Nothing is even possible. But the notion that reflects again on Being as counter this Nothing, is already Becoming—is already, indeed, Become. This, in truth, constitutes all that a beginning or the beginning can be.

Then, again, determinateness—is not that completely thought out, with the evolution, too, of many surprising results? Determinateness is the affirmative thing it is, very much because of negation. Other is negation; and how could anything be cognisable unless by other in it, or otherwise-being, otherwise-
ness? Identity itself must have Difference, otherwise it were a null. Is Form possible without Matter? What is there, is but an entelecheia of these: these are but its abstract distinctions, its elementary distinctions; and they are those of the Notion, and always the same though in a thousand forms. What is Matter but just Identity—now for itself, or to itself? Matter is but its other—the other of Identity, that is—in which other it is for itself. But identity for itself is just identity in its difference. That Identity by its own very necessity involves Difference, to show by, as it were—is not this a thought, a category, not in me or you, but deep, necessary, universal in the nature of existence itself? And existence—what else is existence but the spectacle, the exhibition of these categories? Immediate must become mediate—that is, no longer in itself, but through another. These are not mere formalities—they are material truths, and the most material. Through them it is that Hegel procures us a glimpse into the very deeps of Being. The same strain is but continued in Qualification and Talification, Finite and Infinite; and the result is really to show us the principles of our own existence, as it were the pillars of the universe. The truth all through is, that opposition is but reference; that 'the one moment does not sublate in an external fashion the other, but that each sublates itself in itself, and is in its own self the contrary of itself.' Identity and Difference, Form and Matter, have just demonstrated themselves so. What we see, then, is that all differences, as but first negations, negate themselves into the one whole that is—and this is the truth, this is the absolute. The first Seyn is in itself determinate, and goes over into Daseyn, finite Being, the series of its own Finities, which returns into its own single constituent Self—and that is the Fürsichseyn. The Universal is the Particular, and the Particular is the Singular. Suppose Water the Absolute: abstracting from the host of outer things—its differences, we have pure Being, the pure Universal; but in itself it is differentiated, and we know it is; it goes over, therefore, into its Particular—all these outward things we see: but they again are it, they are ideel in it; it therefore is the Fürsichseyn, the one concrete Singular. We have used Water here in illustration; but our old figurate conception, the Voice, would apply still better. The Voice abstractly is the Universal, Pure Being, Identity, &c.; but it must pass over into its Particular, its Difference, its Daseyn—and that is its inherent scale or compass, its native or inherent implement of notes; but these again coalesce
and constitute the concrete Singular which is, and that is the Voice.—In all this, the immortality of the subject is really implied. One would think, then, that the matter of what we have seen is certainly not in any respect less than the form.

There is considerable assonance in all this to much that is Neo-Platonic—a matter which, as Hegel himself remarks, might be as appropriately named Neo-Aristotelian. Proclus, for example, says of the Dialectic method, that it is 'connate with things themselves,' that it 'receives its principles from intellect,' that it 'ascends through well-ordered gradations to being itself;' and he continues, 'it also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles, and explores everything by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things' (in Parmenid. lib. i.). In the same work he observes:—

In the first place, it is necessary to despise the senses. . . . After this, it follows that we should dismiss imaginations (Hegel's Vorstellungen), those winged Stymphalidae of the soul, as possessing only a figured intellection of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured form and as impeding pure intellection . . . . In the third place, we must entirely extirpate multi-form opinions (Hegel's Meinungen), and the wandering of the soul about these.

He then goes on to refer to the insufficiency of the DiaNoétic Intellect (Hegel's abstracting Understanding) and terminates the paragraph thus:—

Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the soul: for one of these is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the diaNoétic power; but a life according to intellect is alone inerratic; and this is the mystic port of the soul, into which Homer conducts Ulysses, after an abundant wandering of life.

Again we find him (same work, lib. v.) saying—

Let us now consider what negations are, whether they are better or worse than affirmations. . . . it is not immanifest how Plato, in the Sophist, says that Non-being, by which he means Difference, is related to Being, and that it is not less than Being. . . . Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to such as are ascending from the partial to the total. . . . As the one is the cause of wholes, so negations are the causes of affirmations. . . . So the one, being void of multitude, gives subsistence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure, &c.

In truth, passages containing such assonances to Hegel seem to constitute the stuff of Proclus. Hegel, not far on in his 'Philosophy of History,' says, 'for, like Mercury, leader of souls, the Idea
is in truth the leader of the nations and of the world.’ Not without analogy is that passage of Proclus, where his Philosophy is talked of as ‘moving knowledge,’ ‘unfolding the forms which we essentially contain,’ &c., ‘like that God who leads into light intellectual gifts,’ &c. &c. (Proclus in Eucl. p. 14). The God here alluded to is Mercury, and it is quite possible that the passage of Proclus was in some way or other present to the consciousness of Hegel as his own statement arose.

But this matter is not peculiar to Proclus; it belongs to the whole Neo-Platonic school. Here is a passage from Plotinus in which Hegelian elements may be still readily enough perceived as well within the figures of the original, as across the perhaps somewhat uninitiated pur-blindness of the translation, executed as it is by Thomas Taylor, from whom (his ‘Metaphysics of Aristotle’) we have been borrowing the extracts of Proclus also:—

Let us, then, receive by our dianoetic power this our sensible world, so disposed that every part may remain indeed what it is, but that one thing may mutually reside in another. Let us suppose that all things are collected as much as possible into one, so that each particular object may first present itself to the eyes; as if a sphere should be the exterior boundary, the spectacle of the sun immediately succeeding, and a representation of the other stars, and the earth, the sea, and all animals appearing within, as in a diaphanous globe: and lastly, let us conceive that it is possible to behold all things in each. Let there be then in the soul a lucid imagination of a sphere, containing all things in its transparent receptacle; whether they are agitated or at rest, or partly mutable and partly stable. Now, preserving this sphere, receive another in your soul, removing from this last the extension into bulk, take away likewise place, and banish far from yourself all imagination of matter; at the same time being careful not to conceive this second sphere as something less than the first in bulk, for this must be void of all dimension. After this, invoke that Divinity who is the Author of the Universe, imaged in your phantasy, and earnestly entreat him to approach. Then will he suddenly come, bearing with him his own divine world, with all the gods it contains; then will he come, being at the same time one and all, and bringing with him all things concurring in one. There, indeed, all the gods are various amongst themselves in gradations of power, yet by that one abundant power they are all but one, or rather one is all: for the divinity never fails by which they are all produced. But all the gods abide together, and each is again separate from the other in a certain state unattended with distance, and bearing no form subject to sensible inspection; or one would be situated differently from the other, nor each be in itself all. Nor, again, does any one of these possess parts different from others and from itself; nor is every whole there a divided power, and of a magnitude equal to its measured parts: but it is indeed a universe, and a universal power proceeding to infinity in a power which is the parent of energy.
Taylor ("Met. of Aristotle," pp. 426, 427) also translates as follows from the same book of Plotinus on Intelligible Beauty:—

Divine natures are not at one time wise, and at another time the contrary; but they are perpetually wise, with a tranquil, stable, and pure intellect, understanding all things, and knowing not properly human concerns, but their own—that is, such as are divine, and such as intellect itself perceives. But the gods who inhabit this visible heaven, for they abound in divine leisure, assiduously contemplate, as if it were above them, what the primary and intelligible heaven contains. But those who are stationed in this higher world contemplate its inhabitants possessing the whole of this diviner heaven. For all things there are heaven. There the sea, animals, plants, and men are heaven. Lastly, every portion of this heaven is celestial: the gods likewise who reside there do not disdain men, nor any other of its inhabitants, because everything there is divine; and they comprehend the whole of this intelligible region with the most perfect repose.

Hence the life of these divinities is easy, and truth is their generator and nurse, their essence and nutriment. Hence, too, they perceive all things—not such, indeed, as are subject to generation, but such as abide in essence. They likewise perceive themselves in others: for all things there are perfectly perspicuous. Nothing there is dark, nothing opposing; but everything is conspicuous to all, intrinsically and universally. For light everywhere meets with light. Each thing contains in itself all, and all things are again beheld in another: so that all things are everywhere, and all is truly all. There everywhere is all; there an immense splendour shines; there everything is great, since even what is small is there great. There the sun is all the stars; and every star is a sun, and at the same time all the stars. But one thing excels in each, while in the meantime all things are beheld in each. There motion is perfectly pure: for in its progression it is not confounded by a mover foreign from the motion. Permanency also there is disturbed by no mutation: for it is not mingled with an unstable nature. Besides, beauty there is beauty itself, because it does not subsist in beauty: but everything abides there, not as if placed in some foreign land; for the being of each is its own stable foundation. Nor is its essence different from its seat: for its subject is intellect, and itself is intellect. Just as if any one should conceive this sensible heaven, which is manifest and lucid to the eyes, germinating into stars by its light. In corporeal natures, indeed, one part is not everywhere produced from another, but each part is distinct from the rest. But there each thing is everywhere produced from the whole, and is at the same time particular and the whole. It appears, indeed, as a part; but by him who acutely perceives, it will be beheld as a whole: by him, I mean, who is endued with a sight similar to that of the lynx, the rays of whose eyes are reported to penetrate the depths of the earth. For it appears to me that this fable occultly signifies the perspicacity of supernal eyes. Besides, the vision of these blessed inhabitants is never wearied, and never ceases through a satiety of perceiving. For there is no vacuity in any perceiver, which, when afterwards filled up, can bring perceiving to an end . . . rather by perceiving he more assiduously perceives.

Here (from Plotin. Enn. iii. 8. 3.) is a bit of ancient Idealism,
apposite to the modern, whether subjective or absolute:—Καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μον θεωρήμα ποιεῖ, ὡστερ οἱ γεωμετραὶ θεωροῦντες γράφοντες ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ μή γραφοῦσι, θεωροῦσι δὲ, υφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαί, ὡστερ ἐκπίπτονται. Which translated, as if it were the Absolute spoke, might run thus:—

And my speculating (seeing) creates what is speculated (seen), just as Geometricians speculating draw lines (in thought): but I not drawing lines, but speculating (seeing), there rise up the lineaments of the corporeal objects as if falling in projection out of me.

The nature of the Neo-Platonic teaching, and its analogy to the philosophy of Hegel, may be seen in almost every the usual expression of Thomas Taylor, who so perseveringly kept company with Plotinus, Proclus, and the rest. In the Introduction and Notes to his translation of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, we have the following:—

Wisely, therefore (p. xv.), does Plato assert that the philosopher ought not to descend below species, and that he should be solely employed in the contemplation of wholes and universals. For he who descends below these, descends into Cimmerian realms, and Hades itself—wanders among spectres devoid of mind, and exposes himself to the danger of beholding the real Gorgon, or the dire face of Matter, and of thus becoming petrified by a satiety of stupid passions.

Again (p. xvii.)—

Objects of sense rather resemble the delusions of sleep than the realities of vigilant perception.

Once more (p. 400)—

I shall rejoice if I have been able to add anything of my own which may contribute to elucidate the conceptions of these divine men, and induce the reader to abandon with generous ardour the grovelling contemplation of sensible objects, profoundly dark and incessantly flowing, for the exalted survey of the all-splendid and ever-permanent forms in the world of mind.

Lastly (p. 428)—

Every Idea is not only the paradigm, but likewise the producing cause, of Sensibles: for something else would be requisite by which sensibles are generated and assimilated to ideas, if these divine forms remained sluggish and immovable, and without any efficacious power, similar to impressions in wax: for it is absurd to admit that the reasons in nature possess a certain fabricative energy, but that intelligible forms should be deprived of productive power. Every divine form, therefore, is not only paradigmatic, but paternal, and is by its very essence the generative cause of the Many.

Thomas Taylor lived probably in a thick element of confused
splendour, and is not by any means (who is?) an immaculate translator; but the sufferings, the persecutions, the patient poverty, the dauntless perseverance, the uncheered but assiduous labour of the noble, ardent man, entitle him at least to our respect; and not this only, but the successful outcome of that enormous labour compels the gratitude of every earnest and true Student. Sir William Hamilton errs, as not unusual, then, when he turns his sharp nail on the good Taylor; and (so far as my poor judgment may have any right to speak in the case) we are still much safer with this latter than with his critic, as a translator of Greek philosophy. We will be thankful, then, for what Hamilton calls his 'mere rubbish.'

It would be easy to adduce, both from Aristotle and from Plato, many passages (which we had marked for the purpose, indeed) breathing the same spirit as those already cited from Proclus and Plotinus; but we shall leave this to the reader's own activity. At p. 356 of Franz and Hillert, Hegel will be found translating from Plato thus:—

The empirical manner of thinking found in geometry and the kindred sciences, thou seemest to me to name raisonnement; and, consequently, reasoning (Schliessen, reflectirende Erkennen) finds itself between the νοῦς and what we name διάστασις.—Thou hast apprehended perfectly correctly. In accordance with these four distinctions, I shall name the four relative bearings of the soul: α, νοησία (Begreifen), comprehension, a thinking of what is highest; β, διάνοια, the second; γ, the third, is belief or true opinio (Meinung); δ, and the last, is the Vorstellung or figurate knowledge (das bildliche Wissen): these are the degrees of truth, of clearness.

Hegel, commenting on this, proceeds:—

Plato defines thus the senses as the first mode; as second mode he defines reflexion, so far as it introduces thinking into a consciousness otherwise sensuous. And here, he says, is the place where science makes its appearance; science rests on thought, the determination of general principles, first sources, hypotheses. These hypotheses are not manipulated by the senses themselves, are not sensuous in themselves; they certainly belong to thought. But this still is not genuine science which consists in considering the universal per se, the spiritual universal. Plato has comprehended under the term διάστασις sensuous consciousness, properly sensuous conception, opinio, immediate knowledge. In the middle between opinio and science proper, there lies ratiocinating cognition, inferential reflexion, reflecting cognition, that forms for itself general laws, definite genera. The highest, however, is thought in and for itself, which is directed to the highest.*

* Neither of these two passages appears quite so in Hegel's collected works; the latter, indeed, looks rather like a bringing together in sum; still, if a little mixed in a place or two, they are to be considered quotations as referred.
The reader will have no difficulty, then, in view of such utterances,—(δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἐντελεχεία, κ.τ.λ., will be fresh in his memory as well)—in perceiving the analogy which Hegel bears to the most important Greek philosophers, both early and late.

There is a passage in Reid* which describes the Neo-Platonic philosophers in the usual conventional, vague terms, as mystically adoring and seeking union with the One; still, nevertheless, the description is so couched, that to a student of Hegel there is involuntarily suggested by it, that this mystic One is the Logical Idea. We may suppose said student to be pleasantly surprised with this, and to be still more pleasantly surprised when he afterwards finds Hegel himself saying somewhere precisely the same thing.†

On these grounds, however, should he, or any one else, infer the philosophy of Hegel to have derived from either new or old Platonics, or from either new or old Aristotelians, he will only fall into a very serious mistake. The philosophy of Hegel derives directly only from the generalised categories of Kant in themselves and in their realisation or externalisation in the things of sense: Hegel’s philosophy, in short, in the notion, coils itself in nucem, and the notion, or this nut, came straight to him from Kant. We are to suppose, however, that—once his philosophy was formed—Hegel was nothing loath to make as prominent as might be every analogy whatever which tended to associate him with the great masters of the ancient world: the one longing is almost overt in him, indeed, that he should be placed now as Aristotle was placed then.

It will tend to strengthen the view just expressed to point out that there are descriptions in existence intended to refer exclusively to the philosophy of Plato, which, nevertheless, can be applied almost line by line to the philosophy of Kant—a philosophy which we know and see owed nothing to Plato, but which was the result of a very natural train of inferences—a train

* Reid, p. 264, Hamilton’s edition, says, in reference to the Alexandrians, ‘By a proper purification and abstraction from the objects of sense, we may be in some measure united to the Deity, and, in the eternal light, be enabled to discern the most sublime intellectual truths.’—The italics will strike the key of Hegel.

† ‘If at times the excellence of the philosophy of Plato is placed in his—scientifically valueless—Myths, there are also times, named even times of enthusiasm, when the Aristotelian philosophy is prized because of its speculative depth, and the Parmenides of Plato, certainly the greatest art-work of the Ancient Dialectic, is honoured as the veritable unveiling and the positive expression of the divine life, and even, amid much impurity of that which gave rise to it, the misunderstood Eustasis is in reality nothing else than the Pure Notion.’—Phaenom., ed. 2nd, p. 55.
which we may say we also actually see—from certain main positions of David Hume. Descriptions of this nature will be found at pages 262 and 263 of Hamilton’s Reid, where the describer (Hamilton) has not the slightest thought of Kant at that moment in his mind. The analogy lies very obvious in this, however, that mental forms, which awakened by, mingle with, the contributions of sense, are in reality not one whit more Platonic than that they are Kantian. The verses of Boethius at p. 263 contain distinctive features which might have been copied quite as easily and correctly from Kant as from Plato.*

No doubt, Hegel, by his reference to the ancients, was enabled to bring the determinations he had arrived at in connexion with Kant into more magistral place, as dominant centres, as it were, in definitively vital, absolute, and infinite spheres; no doubt, he was enabled thus to cover, as it were, the whole field: nevertheless, he owed not this to any direct action of either Plato or Aristotle, but rather to a reaction on these through the findings of Kant. Rather, we may express it thus: To Hegel, the light of Kant lit Aristotle; and to the same Hegel, by such reciprocity as he loved, the re-lighting of Aristotle re-lit Kant. Thus, if the findings of modern philosophy have been very much moved into place by the previous findings of the ancient, it must also be said that only through the former were these latter themselves re-found. Indirectly to Kant, directly to Hegel, then, is it that we owe at present that revival of the study of early philosophy which has expanded in Germany to such enormous dimensions,

* These verses are the following:—

* Mens est efficiens magis
Longe causa potentior,
Quam quae materiae modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Precedit tamen excitans
Ac vires animi movens
Vivo in corpore passio,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Tum mentis vigor excitus
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus simes vocans,
Notis applicat externa,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines."

Stuff from without, Form from within,—the whole description may be predicated of the Kantian theory quite as truly as of the Platonic.
which has exhibited itself in no contemptible form in France, and which even in England has been adequate at least to—some first approaches. From Hegel specially is it that we derive the ability now to recognise in Aristotle, not the sensual materialist that controverted, but the absolute idealist that completed Plato. This is much, and the proof of it is certain: to that the single passage from Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysic’ which closes the Encyclopaedia of Hegel would alone suffice; from it we know, as also from elsewhere, that Aristotle, even as much as his mighty modern compeer, concluded—τοῦτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν—καὶ ἐστὶν η νόησις νοητῶς νόησις.

If it be true, then, that it is to Hegel we are indebted for the new thew whereby we have obtained the new power over the old philosophy, and if it be also true that this Hegel himself has hitherto remained like some swart Magus charmed into insoluble opacity by virtue even of his own spells, we may well—when this Hegelian trance shall have been unbound—anticipate for the history of philosophy, and for philosophy itself, progression and advance—realisation beyond a hope.

The Transition.

It is not difficult to see that ideality may be named the quality of infinitude; for is not infinitude just that in which the whole wealth of the finite is ideally held? That the infinite, too, is but a process of becoming, is also plain; for its life and reality is but the evolution of its native differences, the finite, just as the notification or vocabilisation, a process of becoming, is the life of our illustration, the absolute Voice. But as becoming becomes into There-being, so there is transition in the infinite. Sublating the finite, and sublating, in this same act, its own self as an only abstract infinite, it is a return, as it were with both, into its own self, and is thus reference to its own self, being. But this being is no longer abstract; it contains negation, There-being; it is distinguishably and palpably there, or here: but again, as it is in its express nature negation of the negation, or the negation that refers itself to itself, it is that There-being—that definite, palpable existentiality which is properly named Being-for-Self; that is, it is the existentiality which absolutely is, that existentiality which is to and for itself, which is its own inner variety and life, and which has no call for an outer, whether of support or derivation: in short, it is the true Für sich seyn.
CHAPTER III.

BEING-FOR-SELV.

If this (first) paragraph be read in the light of our general illustration, the absolute voice,—and, after all, probably the very best name for thought (especially now that it is viewed as the absolute and only), would be the absolute voice,—the various expressions which constitute it will spring at once into meaning.

'In Being-for-self, qualitative Being is completed:' that is, the voice, the one, having run through its native constituent notes, its variety, its many, has returned into itself as still the voice and the one; and thus completion (oneness and wholeness) is given to its whole qualitative being; in other words, a complete answer has been given to every question of Qualis, what sort, in its regard. This, too, is 'infinite being;' it is unended and unendable; it is entire, totum et rotundum,—the absolute voice.

The being of the voice, before a single finite note, 'the being of the beginning,' was but abstract, 'determination-less.' The notification, which to the voice is as 'There-being' or Thereness (the presence of a definite somewhat) to consciousness, is the sublated and negated voice, the immediately, or directly, and at first hand, sublated and negated voice, just as an object, or the series of objects, is the immediately sublated and negated being—first being of thought or consciousness (say). It is worth while remarking that the sublated voice is quite as much the lifted-up voice as the negated one, and just so we may see that the sublated Being, if negated as to its universality (an other being introduced) and apparently for the moment left out of count, is lifted up, made prominent, eminent, or even, as it were, tilted up into the edge of a single, passing, momentary note, or finite object. In this There-ness, this other of a note (or Object), the voice (Being) 'is still retained;' but still all for the moment seems to have gone into the single edge of this note (or object); there seems nothing but it: the voice and the
note (Being and There-being) are in simple unity, certainly; but still in the first instance the note (or the There-ness) is a usurping one side that seems quite all and other to its own universal. The two sides, then, though in themselves one, ‘are mutually unequal;’ they are ungleich, not level, uneven;—as we said, there is a tilted-up edge; or all this—and the whole truth of the case—can be conveyed in the single expression their unity is not yet mutuated.

We have used for Gesetztseyn Mutuatiousness; but this is the first time we have used mutuated for gesetzt. This is the place, now, however, for the introduction of such new mode of statement. By mutuated, I mean overtly placed by and for an occult. This sense has been growing on us; and in this we are not singular; for we hold it evident that it so grew on Hegel himself. There is something of this in our own word set, and accordingly it has been frequently used for setzen in the present translation and commentary. To set in the sense of to stake, or to set to music, indicates substitution, mutuation; and a setter-dog sets the game. Then a set is a certain more of which one sets the other, and without the other were null. The German setz, however, has in it, like the Latin vice, much more of this reciprocation and exchange than the English set.—Thus, es setzt means there arises; es wird Etwas setzen implies a warning that something (disagreeable) will replace the present state of matters, or this that now is, sets that that also is, though in the future; and Setz-schiffer means a substitute captain, a locum tenens, one, i.e., that is for and by another, and in turn sets or implies this other. Implies seems a good rendering for the word in question, but what is implied is, derivatively and otherwise, rather set in than set out, and it is an explicit implicitness that is wanted, as it were, an eximpliedness or eximpliededness. In fact, the sense of overt statement must be as evident in the word adopted as that of implication. It is easy to see, indeed, that statement, as also expression, exposition, and the like, really conveys what we attribute to this Setzen: it and these are, so to speak, all overt by and for occults. The same thing is to be seen in the logical form, the modus ponens, which probably at least helped to lead Hegel to the term; there we see that the first sets the second, and it is the second which is left overt. We may allude, in passing, to the use of Aufheben in the modus tollens; and the quotation from Cicero, tollendum esse Octavium, in the remark relative to Aufheben, demonstrates the analogy to have been present to Hegel himself. By mutuated,
then, is meant something overt, something expliciter, something formally stated, expressed, put, placed, or set, but still something that is reciprocally stated, &c., and so something consequently that reciprocally states, &c.

The two sides, Voice and Note (Being and There-being or Object), are still mutually unequal, uneven, or their unity is not yet mutuated. We can see now the full force of the mutuated; each side remaining abstract, or separate, there is difference, duality, mutual inequality; but when it is seen that the voice still is in the note, Being still is in There-being, then reconciliation has taken place, the concrete truth is restored, the unity of the two sides is mutuated, is set. What follows about finitude, determinateness as such, relative and absolute determinateness, is now easy. ‘In Being-for-self, the difference between being and determinateness or negation is posited and equated’—this also is plain; the difference between the two sides, voice and note, is mutuated and ausgeglichen, levelled-out, equated.

‘Quality, Otherwiseness, Reality, Being-in-itself, Ought-to, &c., are the imperfect infigurations of the Negative into Being, &c.’ The series of notes (say in this way) is a series of infigurations, indentations, into the voice, and they are imperfect so long as they are held to be different from the voice. Einbildung, however, must be seen to imply its usual sense of subjective conceit and conceiting, as well as its literal meaning of infiguration; the assignments in question have that in them which approximates them to subjective fancies; they are not regarded in their truth when regarded as absolute. The application of our illustration to what follows may now be left to the reader. We may remark in passing on ungleich, ausgeglichenen, and Einbildungen as examples of that favourite Hegelian irony in which the direct, literal, structural sense flirts or coquets with the reflex, figurative, and conventional one. Indeed, Setzen, Daseyn, Differenz, and even Vollendet, are in the same key: as regards Setzen, Hegel has gone back to its ancient idiomatic, colloquial sense; Daseyn is to be seen both as There-ness and as this Being here below; the Differenz is the difference, as the Unter-schied is the inter-cern; and we are even to see that Vollendet applies to what is not only ended, but full. As we have seen, too, this verbal care of Hegel extends itself into a syllabic one: in Vergleichung, for example, we are perpetually made to see that it is a comparison. Then the terminationshaft, ig, lich, sam, are never lost sight of; and, as
regards the verbs, such prefixes as er, ver, zer, are his very instruments. As respects these, the student of Hegel ought to consult the more advanced grammars.

A.

**Being-for-self as such.**

Here the notion Being-for-self is completely prescinded. — The distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness, which is wholly German, ought to be well borne in mind. The expression *appearant* is a translation of erscheinend which seems forced on us: we are to see that a certain duality is always implied in this word; there is an outer *show* or *shine* or *seeming* or *appearance* which appears *other* and independent, but which is still only a moment, only ideël in another and inner. Self-consciousness, though further advanced and more concrete than Being-for-self, is still abstract when compared with the Absolute Spirit.

a. *Here-being* (*There-being*), and *Being-for-self*.—b. *Being-for-One*.

The distinctions here are subtle, but they are simple, and they are intelligibly put. In Being-for-self the real and the ideal sides, or the Finite and the Infinite; that is to say, the Notes and the Voice, as it were, (Daseyn and Seyn), have fallen equal, have fallen identical. So far as there is notification, there is voice; and so far as there is voice, there is notification; or so far as there is definite Being, there is infinite Being, &c. There is present but a single ideality, which, at the same time, is rather a single many than a single one. We have before us, so to speak, a sentient material breadth; so far as there is sentiency there is matter, and so far as there is matter there is sentiency; the diffusion and the concentration, the extension and the intension, are coincident; but there is not properly a one on either side—there is only a Being-for-One. We have, in fact, only a simple solution, in which *solvent* and *solvend* are co-extensive: but such solution cannot be viewed as yet quite One; it is rather a self-identical breadth than a self-identical One.

From this there will now be little difficulty in reading (b.) the Being-for-One.—‘There is only a Being-for-Other;’ the notification (to say so) reflected into the voice is but a single system, a single
Being-for-other, and so a Being-for-one. The notification is the sublated other; the voice is at once sublatedness of this other, and referent of itself to itself as to this sublated other: the voice, then, like the sublated notification, is also only for-One. The conclusion, ‘God is, therefore, for himself, so far as he is himself that that is for him,’ is not only of vast importance, but of simple intelligibleness.

Remark.

What is said about the expression peculiar to the Germans when inquiring into the what sort or the quality of any man or thing, What for a man is he?—What for a thing is it?—sheds a quite decisive light on the distinction in question, the Being-for-One. The applicability of the phrase reflexion-into-self here comes out very clear. The general sense of this passage enables us to see that Hegel’s für is for, and not as; Seyn-für-Anderes, therefore, is Being-for-another, not as another. Nevertheless, what is for another is as that other; what is for consciousness is as consciousness, is in the form of consciousness, is consciousness;—there is a small dialectic here that would have pleased Hegel. The substitution of as instead of for in the relative expressions of the paragraph that follows will contribute towards the general light.

This light is Idealism, and there is that in the second paragraph here—as also in the first—to render it irresistibly intelligible if not irresistibly convincing. One here can as little resist believing, as resist seeing, the object eclipsed into the subject, and both constitutive only of a single ideal Being-for-One.

In this Remark there follow further words of the most penetrative lucidity as regards idealism in general, and the idealisms of Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte, in particular. In these critiques the strokes are few and single, but each is a creation, or each is a destruction. Philosophy is complete or incomplete only as it is complete or incomplete Idealism. This is plain, for the only quest of philosophy is principles, unities; and it ought to be plain to us, as it has been very plain to Hegel, that such quest—to be complete—can only terminate in the principle, the unity,—a result which, as expressing all eclipsed into one, is and can be only Idealism. But has any philosophy hitherto either seen this or done this? Of any philosophy yet has the principle been anything else than an abstract conception, or just an abstract utterance, in the face of which the actual still
smiled unconjured? By here a stroke and there a stroke, Hegel demonstrates this to be the state of the case both with Spinoza and the Eleatics. Justice is done to the character and to the greater perfection of the scheme of Malebranche, at the same time that this latter is reluctantly undermined and respectfully removed. It is impossible to praise too highly the extraordinarily pregnant, lucid, and comprehensive summary here, or the equally extraordinary dexterity with which, a support or two being undone, the whole structure is made to crumble and vanish before our eyes. It is as if art wonderfully lit up a sudden universe,—as wonderfully, as suddenly, to withdraw it again.

The critique of Leibnitz is equally masterly. The incongruities, the gaping edges, the incoherences, the general gratuitousness of the entire scheme, are all touched into such intensity of light that the whole vanishes. Such episodes as these assist us greatly as regards an understanding, as well of the painful abstractions of the text, as of the aims and objects of Hegel in general. By this Idealism 'lying more within the limit of the abstract notion,' is probably meant that it is more an affair of abstract notions, and just of subjective imagination in general, than the Idealism of Malebranche, which followed nearer the stream of the actual. 'Should one remind us that this movement of thought falls itself within an ideating monad, &c.:'—the ideating monad alluded to is, of course, Leibnitz himself—Leibnitz, too, conceiving other monads the same as himself.

The remark ends with a single but effective word as regards the Thing-in-itself of Kant, and the Anstoss of Fichte, the appulse, the unimaginable stone of offence, the reflecting plane from which the Ego's own energy returns to itself as the object. To Kant all that is in the subject is his own, whether in the shape of sensations or in that of categories; Kant, however, postulated still Things-in-themselves as sources of the sensations. Fichte again placed these Things-in-themselves also in the subject under the name of an Anstoss, a source of reflexion, which was in the subject and out of the subject, and performed for the subject all the functions of Things-in-themselves. Manifestly either expedient can only be said to be the Ego's; it is not traced to, it is not resolved into, the Ego; it remains a free other or otherwiseness, a negative and independent Ansichseyn; it is assumed in, but it stays out, and is never sublated by process of proof. To the last, then, there remains dualism, for which there is no cure but Sollen and the
Progressus in Infinitum.—Where we translate 'departure is thus made, &c.,' the er of the original may seem to be evaded: the antecedent of this er was to Hegel most probably the Anstoss; but if we go higher for it and assume it to be Anderer Idealismus, we shall get a meaning that includes the expedient of Kant as well.

c. One.

The moments collapsing into indistinguishableness, immediacy (Being) results for the Being-for-self—a negative immediacy; Being-for-self is thus Being-for-self-ity, the One.—The transition here is very delicate, and the defining phrase, 'the abstract limit of itself,' infinitely subtle. We saw this phrase before in the case of the point, and it will be useful to look back and see that the point differs from the One now arrived at. The point, too, is the abstract limit, but in einem Daseyn; as point, there is a There-being at its side; here There-being has disappeared.

The reason for the externalisation or distribution of the moments is also extremely fine: they must appear as separate independent units, seeing that they refer to a one so absolute and negative: it is in the form of negative independent immediacy, and so must they be as its. We have here the umbra of a Thing and its Qualities, and more than that. As regards the six moments themselves, they will all be found to lie in the one, by reflecting on what its development has brought along with it, and what it now implies. 'Of each determination thus its contrary must be equally said.' This because the six moments will be found to be so paired, and each as independent as the other, at the same time that each is inseparable from the other. Tality is appropriately used here, as it is a quality dependent on involution with other; and the determination results in every case here from involution with other, which other must also be equally said. Looking back, the phrase, 'There is only one determination present, the reference to itself of the sublation;' is an exceedingly happy one: the result can only be Immediacy, Being; Fürsichseynd is Fürsichseyndendes, or Being-for-self is Being-for-self-ity; and again, as this Immediacy is the result of a Negating, from such a negated Being-for-self-ity, 'all its inner import has disappeared,'—'it is the absolutely abstract limit of itself—the One.' The reader may still illustrate all this for himself by a reference to the illustration we have ventured to propose of Voice and its Notification. The Voice, as unity of its
own self and its notification (which stands for the Seyn-für-Eines, the Being-for-One), is Fürsichseyn, Being-for-self. But there is only one determination present now—the reference to itself of the sublation, indistinguishable one-ness, immediacy, Being, a beënt immediate one-ness that has resulted from negation; the voice thus is an absolutely abstract One, and, conceived as Thought or all that is, evidently the One. The voice so placed, say, manifestly implies negation in general; then two negations, i.e. the negation of itself by the notification which is the first negation, and the negation of this negation back into itself, which is the second. The two things negated, voice and notification, are, thirdly, the same; fourthly, they are directly opposed; fifthly, there is reference to self-identity as such in the voice; and sixthly, it refers negatively to its notification, but still to itself. The voice being thrown down into an absolutely abstract One, these its moments seem thrown off from it, to stand around it externally, independently, but still inseparably.

B.

ONE AND MANY.

The One being immediate, its moments are as There-beënt. The One still contains the negative (which was lately the Being-for-One), and so, though One, it has still determination. In its reference to Self the One is still Self-determination, and without end; entirely, infinitely. These differences, the determination and the Self-determination, are now, in the immediacy that has come in, beënt. Ideality is transformed into Reality, the hardest and abstractest,—One. But the determinateness of the Beingness is as opposed to the infinite negation of the Self-determination; or what the One is in itself, that it is now in it. The negative, that is, is distinguished as other. The unity is now a reference, and as negative unity it is negation of itself as of another.

We are to conceive the negative as One and identical with the One. We are to conceive also, nevertheless, that within the One there is a traffic of the One with its own negative, so that also within the One a certain diremption takes place—a certain rise of an sich into an ihm, of in itself into in it—to the distinction of the One from the One. The One is as One, but it is a negative One: this it is in itself; this it is also in it; that is, this it is
distinguishingy to its own self; but if it is this distinguishingly to its own self, it sets itself as another, 'it is the negation of itself as of another, exclusion of the One as another out of itself.'

The determination of an absolute One—the notification of the voice, as it were—is evidently its negative. The immediacy introduces the form of Being, and the moments become external to each other. Even shrunk into its abstraction, the One is intensely been, and its moments are independently There-beënt. Ideality is Reality.

The development here is so abstract and subtle, that there is great difficulty in getting the true Vorstellung for the Begriff, the true conception for the notion. A plural outer world is not, however, to be too soon disengaged: the One is to be left in simple traffic with the negative as negative. What puzzles the reader, and even an attentive one, is that, the moments being reciprocal, there is a difficulty of perceiving, which Hegel intends the One to be in as excluding, and which as excluded. But the metaphor of the voice is still applicable. Notification and voice are identified in the one unity, the voice—but this is immediacy, Being; notification and voice both are; the determinateness of Being stands opposed to the infinite negation; that is, the notes are opposed to the infinite negation of them—the one voice which is negative in that it absorbs them, and infinite in that it is entire, totum et rotundum. What the voice is in itself, it is now in it, or the notes (the negative) rise in it and show, and so on. It just comes to this, the moments re-assert anew their difference; the determination (the negative) separates from its recipient negation, and fresh distinctions arise. The poles, real and ideal, or material and formal, which have just collapsed, re-extricate themselves for a further collapse on a higher stage. And this is the case universally with Hegel: detach anywhere the smallest particle of his mass, and it will be found magnetic like the mass itself; it will throw itself in poles, one of reality and one of ideality, but neither of which is less real or more ideal than the other; so that the whole is an absolute ideality that is at the same time an absolute reality. This we see in the very first form, Being, Nothing, and Becoming. At first sight, one thinks of artifice; one says to oneself, Give me what is at once affirmative and negative, identical and non-identical, and I will make anything you like of it; but one calms oneself when one looks to the actual and sees what is there—above all, when one reflects that these, after all, are but expressions of the one living notion itself which contracts
to an atom and expands to a world. The \textit{an ihm} must be viewed as a certain rise of the \textit{an sich} into visibility; the abstract barren bottom of the vase becomes the pregnant middle. What has been just said, too, must be seen to be only preliminary to what follows under the \textit{minuscules}, a, b, c.

\textbf{a. The One in its own self.}

It appears contradictory, after what we have just read, to find the One \textit{unalterable}; and the whole industry may seem a mere trifling, a mere playing with words. But what we have just read (immediately under \textit{B}) is only preliminary, and if we but look close, we shall really find this one sentence that ends in \textit{unalterable} to be genuine metaphysic: the Absolute, God, is really so determined when thought contemplates him as the One \textit{in its own self}, i.e., in its irrespective absoluteness. This may be a hint to the reader that it depends on himself all through, whether the words of Hegel shall remain abstract and words only, or shall become concrete and alive—things. The notion, followed only in its naked nerve, is thin to invisibility; and the words that cannot seize it, or rather that do not seize it, for the reader, break asunder into an externality, as idle and contemptible, as trodden nutshells: with him it rests, however, to look till these broken nutshells cohere into a transparent, plastic menstruum which, not shows, but \textit{is} the notion: with him it rests to expand the same into Vorstellungen which are the universe; for all here is \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}.

This section (a) is very important in several respects. In the first place, the development is sufficiently simple, and requires not the assistance of repetition in another form, but only the touch of a word here and there. The conclusion drawn of the unchangeableness of the One, contains yet another lesson for us; it may teach us to remain true to our thoughts, and not to interrupt them by the contradictions of a divided reference, the end of which is but foolish wonder, perplexity, doubt, ignorance.

An \textit{ihm} selbst ist das Eins überhaupt—there is here in the very position of the words the usual Hegelian occult fullness of thought; to translate it, 'In its self' \textit{means} any 'one on the whole}, will show this. Perception of this must have been in Hegel's head, otherwise it would have been natural to begin, The one in its own self is the one on the whole, &c.
The Seyn, Being, that is referred to as indeterminate, but not in the same way as the One, is, of course, that we began with.

We have here three very inductive specimens of that troublesome word Setzen, which even mutuation does not yet seem to have laid: these are gesetztes Insichseyn, set (settled) Being-within-self; diess Nichts ist ein Gesetztes, this Nothing is a set issue; and So diess Nichts gesetzt als in Einem, this Nothing so-determined and as in a. The French constater would very perfectly render Setzen in all these expressions, and the French constater means to ascertain, to determine, to settle, to establish, to fix, &c. Of these English words, the word determine is the best in the sense of to make out and establish, a sense somewhat different from that contained in it when used to translate bestimmen, in which case it means to specificate, notify, characterise, &c. In the first of the three examples, we have the absolute before us, One, but full; its circle of determination complete within it, absolutes Bestimmtseyn, Absolute Determined-Ness—what is this but consummate Insichseyn, Insichseyn, Being-within-Self, just as such? In this sense it is gesetztes, a certain somewhat just definitely established and determined as that certain somewhat. The Being-within-self, here, therefore, is just the Being-within-self itself—Arthur, 'not Lancelot nor another.' Thus it is gesetztes Insichseyn, set (settled) Being-within-self, Being-within-self in actual position, formally posited, Being-within-self as such, Being-within-self explicit. In the second instance, it results from the simple incomposite immediacy of the One that there is Nothing in it, and this nothing is called ein Gesetztes, a set issue. Now the meaning is that, a concrete having gone away before us into an abstract (the concrete Being-within-self into the abstract oneness Nothing), it is for this reason that Nothing here is a Gesetztes; it is put as an Explicit here for another; the concrete has set or settled into this abstract; it is a set issue, a settled (together) Explicit, a settled consequent or resultant, a, consequent or resultant settled-ity: the water in a wink is ice, Being-within-self in a wink is Nothing;—this Nothing is a Gesetztes—it results from, it replaces another, it is an Explicit. It may also be named a Determined or a Determine, this having determined into that. From all this, it is evident that the common meaning of the words will not suffice us here, unless we can contrive to immerse them ever and anon in the secret light of Hegel's own thinking. Ein Gesetztes, then, is the exponent consequent or the resultant Explicit of a transition,
almost as if it were an ex-occultate. The third gesetzt simply means constituted: so constituted a Nothing in a or in a one is just the void. The reader will observe, however, that the very same process is pictured in this constituted as in the other words. The word mutuated, too, the process of transition or mediation it involves being considered, will convey the meaning of every one of the three expressions: in the first, we have mutuated Being-within-self, in the sense of something formally mutuated, formally expressed or stated after process—in a word, it is Being-within-self express (and the direct or derivative sense must here be seen to coquet with the ordinary one); in the second, the Nothing is very evidently a mutuate, an overt representative of another after process—here, too, in a word, an expression (in the double sense—and of another); and in the third, ‘this nothing so mutuated or expressed,’ conveys the same meaning on the same terms. Again the meaning of setzen has grown on us.

It will scarcely be necessary to make any remark on the exquisite felicity of the extrication of the void or vacuum. Only the inexperienced reader, always struggling painfully against the feeling of being lost, may once again in his bewilderment cry out, But what is this—what does it all mean? One thing it does not mean, and that is creation—what is commonly meant by creation. Creation, in this sense, does not exist to a Hegel. It is not to be supposed, then, that Hegel has the slightest desire here to make the vacuum—to create empty space. This is Logic; we have to do here only with thoughts; there is no question here of a single dust-atom, nor even of the space it might occupy. But we have here, nevertheless, the genetic thought of a void. There is evidently progress in this world; but progress is a thought, and cannot exist in outward matter. This alone is a guarantee of the ideal fundament, of the intellectual, of the spiritual nature of the absolute of the world. Let us assume it so, then. Thought is the absolute, or—to use the common parlance—the nature of things (natura rerum) is thought. But thought being this, and the life of thought being progress, a beginning is postulated. But this beginning is only—thought is;—that is, the beginning is Being, Seyn. Thought now starting thus with itself and with this as beginning evolves out of its own necessity by virtue—and that is necessity—of its own triple flexions (which flexions on a certain considerably advanced stage of the evolution name themselves simple apprehension, judgment, and reason) the whole
articulation of its own innate constitution. Now through Hegel we have got so far on with this series of articulation or articulate series; so far that we have reached the thought of the vacuum—the development of an actual There-bei[i]nt vacuum is another affair, and has yet to be waited for. Let the reader, then, see that as yet we have to do only with thoughts, and as they evolve themselves out of each other by their own necessity (which means, in obedience to the native flexions of the concrete notion);—but let him see as well that these thoughts are the thoughts of things and that they constitute what is essential in things, that without which things were not, or that without which it would be impossible to say what these things were. This ought to assist the reader to orient himself.

b. The One and the Void.

'The One is the Void as the abstract reference of the negation to itself:' here the reader ought to see that this 'negation' is thought itself. Thought is the One, but the reference of a One to itself can only be abstract; that is, this reference is the reference of a negation to itself;—thought in self-reference as only One has, so to speak, the sentiment of negation, though sentiment as sentiment belongs to another sphere. The mechanism by which the dif-ference is express, explicit, patent, or simply understood and accepted, is very fine, and gesetzt is again illustrated. 'Has again reached a state of There-being;' the original is simply 'has reached a There-being,' and Hegel would probably not have liked the addition 'state of;' but, perhaps, it will assist realisation of the position, and not, on the whole, injure the development; for 'to reach a There-being' is veritably to reach a palpable Here-ness or There-ness, a definitely relative, actual, existential state, though most of these words present themselves only later in the development. 'The One and the Empty (Void, Vacuum) have as their common simple basis, the negative reference to self;' this is exquisitely simple, but it is a flash that lights up at once—what was impossible to Sir William Hamilton, who could never con-trive to struggle out of the hole of this abyss—the very infinitude of space. Here-being and There-being are of course both for Daseyn, and though neither can absolutely represent that word, the opposition of the two phrases may picturesquely assist here. Daseyn is always a definite—a palpable Being-ness in
relation to other. The advantage of Daseyn is, that Hegel gets out his usual irony in it—a sense that coquets between its ordinary meaning of this Being here below, this sublunary life, this mortal state, and its literal meaning of being-there. Here-being were to be preferred in English, perhaps, because it seems best to preserve the equivoque.

**Remark.**

*The Atomistic.*

We shall in the first place supplement this Remark by translating the form in which it appears in the third edition of the 'Encyclopaedia.' There it runs thus:—

The Atomistic Philosophy is that in which the Absolute is determined as Being-for-self, as One, and as plurality of Ones. The Repulsion which manifests itself in the notion of the One, has been also assumed by it as the primary and original force; not Attraction, however, but—what is simply the Thoughtless—Chance, it is, which is to bring the resultant plurality together again. The One being fixed as One, its combination with any others is certainly to be regarded as something quite external. The Vacuum, which is assumed as other principle to the atoms, is Repulsion itself conceived as the *been* nothing between the atoms. The modern Atomistic—and Physical Science still retains this principle—has given up atoms in so far as it takes to diminutive particles, molecules; in this way it certainly assists sensuous conception, but has wholly abandoned the determination of thought. Further, a force of Attraction being added to that of Repulsion, the antithesis has been certainly made complete, and we have given ourselves much credit for the discovery of these so-called forces of nature. But their mutual connection—the concrete and true interest here—requires to be rescued from the obscurity and confusion, in which it has been still left even in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of a Science of Nature. In recent times, the atomic view has become in Politics still more important than in Physics. According to it, the Will of the Individuals as such is the Principle of the State, the source of Attraction (Association) is the Particularity of our Needs and Greeds, and the Universal, the State itself, is the external relation of Contract.

These episodes, which the *Remarks* constitute, are always both agreeable and auxiliary. Here, for example, this searching critique of atomism reflects a light both of meaning and importance back on the few abstract words which we have just read in the preceding paragraph. Such original incisiveness of eye extends of itself a warrant of truth to the Hegelian products, however trifling they may sometimes seem when externally looked at. There is matter in the Remark as extracted from the
Encyclopaedia of later development than the position on which we as yet stand in the Logic; and the reader will do well to return to it when he shall have completed Quality. The greater fullness of the Political allusion is the reason which has placed it here. Hegel is always content to say the least possible, and here he says no word but simply places the Political Confession (Profession) of the day side by side with Atomism. This side-by-side is quite sufficient to justify the general attitude of the present Germans, whose slowness of political movement depends on quite other reasons than that cumbrousness and unwieldiness which our own scribblers—lofty in their constitutional superiority—compassionately ascribe to them. What Hegel’s mere indication suggests is concrete wisdom, not the idle abstractions of the conceit to know better than its neighbour and than all its neighbours.

The (main) Remark contains no point of difficulty, unless that bearing on the Ground of Motion. This ground is placed in the negative reference of the One to its Negative. Now we have already said that the voice, as absorbing the notification, could be named the negation of the latter, as also that this same latter constituted, as determination, the negative of the former. Where we are in the development, then, the voice is One, and its determination its notification, is its; but in this abstract oneness—(we do not stop for the particular development)—the One refers negatively to its own negative (which is at bottom itself, though now presentant as there). But negative reference to another is Repulsion, and Repulsion of another is Motion.

c. More or Many Ones.

Repulsion.

The first paragraph accomplishes at full, what we have sketched in one or two of the preceding sentences,—the extrication of the determination, the negative of the One from the One as an Other;—and this amounts to more Ones.

We may remark that this extrication is pretty much the secret of Hegel. There is an original duality which is also not two, but one; this is the original antithesis, the original reciprocity, the absolute, the notion, the single necessity, or rather this is the Protoplast of Necessity itself: the one and its determination are two; but the one is the determination, and the determination is
the one. What is then, is God, the Absolute Spirit that *in itself* is thought. But thought is just the notion, the reciprocal unity, the necessity which we have just seen: it distinguishes itself from itself; it *is*, and its determination also *is*; but *it* is the infinite negation that absorbs its determination, and its determination is the negative, the finite negative of *it*; it then is the negation of the negation, that in which each side is the negative of the other: in one word, this is the pure negativity. The One *sets* itself: this is the whole secret. Or we may say, it sets or settles into itself. We may conceive thought as a successive *congealment* into another. Water congeals into ice. The ice is seen—and may be supposed to be *explicit, expressed* up out of the now occult other, the water. The water seems to have gone together into the ice, or to have been or *settled* into the ice. This *settled*, viewed in its double meaning, the one from without and the other from within, is pretty much Hegel’s gesetzt, which bears literally the force of set or settled together into, and, applied to thought, that of determined, established, decided, &c. It is this life of the one, then, an explication, exposition, or even an extrusion and ejection, which has led Hegel to the use of this peculiar word Setzen. All is a Gesetztzeyn, a mutuation or promutation of the infinite One that ever is. There is (to say so) but the voice and its notification. The voice is the absolute Seyn; and the notification is its infinite Werden. The universe is but the glory of God; existence, but the sport, the play of himself with himself. In an extract from Kant, we saw creation, Schöpfung, alluded to in its original sense of scooping or drawing-up. This may have proved suggestive to Hegel, who views creation as but this sublation of God up out of himself, this voluntary involuntary scooping or drawing-up of God himself out of himself. To say, then, that creation, or that existence, is but Gesetztzeyn, *settlement*, has its own picturesque truth of meaning, whether we view the process as taking place in the physical or in the intellectual world. The process of the Logic, then, is to be conceived as the process of God; and Hegel meant no metaphor, but literal truth, when he named this process ‘the demonstration of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a single finite spirit.’ Now of this whole process, the one secret is the secering of the One’s determination out of the One—in the end, indeed, to restore it again, leaving but the Absolute Spirit and his eternal and infinite life. The negation turns on its
negative; that is, settles into its Seyn, its Being, which is at first necessarily indefinite—Hence, the whole!

As regards the expression, 'as they stand in α, or in one reference, their difference is gesetzt;' the meaning may be, as the Two are in One, their difference is express (expressed); the sense being an equivoque of physical or direct expression, and of intellectual or reflected expression. The difference is settled, inferred, understood, taken for granted, accepted, &c. A and B are married people, but they have separated: when it is said the cause of this separation is not A, then B may be said to have settled or to be settled, or to be ex-pressed as the cause. An effect may be viewed as the ex-expression of its cause. Ice is an expression of water. In manipulating mathematical formulae, we get new expressions. Whether physically or metaphysically, then, the overt mutuative of another after process is the expression of this other which is now occult—occult in the ex-expression. What A implies is express or explicit when overtly set, settled, or determined as B: A, then, ex-presses or determines B, and vice versd. The process always is a settling, setting, or congealment of A to the ex-expression of B—this whether in nature or in thought; it is a reciprocal occultation into appearance, a reciprocal sun-setting into a reciprocal sunrise.

The reference of the negation to the negation as of another to its other, this may be put, the reference of the One in its negation to its negation as, &c.—'The Being-for-self of the One is essentially the Ideality of the There-being and of the Other;' the Voice is essentially the Ideality of the Notification, which in the development is now ex-pressed as There-being and another; 'it refers itself not as to another, but only to itself;' the general reference of the voice, though its notification is now distinguished and expressed as so-and-so, is still—and even in that regard—to itself. Still the voice is fixed as one, as one that is per se, a direct existence; consequently, its negative reference—as to its notification—is as to a beent, and, the negativity of the reference considered, to a There-beënt and another. But this other, the notification, is still essentially reference of the one, the voice, to its own self: it is not then indeterminate negation, not the mere void; it is itself one—a plurality of ones.

The next paragraph is easy. It (this last step) is not quite a Becoming; a relative Becoming, proceeding, that is, from Being, ought to come to Nothing, but here it is One coming to Ones.
The one that is referred, the notification, has the negative in its reference to the voice, and vice versa. What we have, then, is only the one’s own inherent reference—the inherent reference of the voice itself. But this inner reference implies duality; that is, the one, the voice, repels itself in the shape of the notification, from itself in the shape of the voice, or—the One’s own negative Self-reference is Repulsion. (Evidently Self-reference must always be of this nature where there is a One possessing a Determination, an articulate circle of manifestations.)

‘This repulsion thus as position.’ position is, of course, here for Setzen, and may be varied by settlement, expression, expression, explicit-ment, or any other similar expedient that may be calculated to convey a notion which now ought, at least, to be tolerably familiar. This repulsion is evidently that belonging to, or inherent in, the notion itself; it occurs within the notion, it is an sich or ansichseyend, in itself, or in-itself-beent. The difference of the repulsion of outer reflexion is plain; this latter presents itself as an already existent mutual holding-off of Ones just so found. ‘Schon vorhanden,’—there is a great temptation to translate this, already to the fore; this Scotch phrase accurately conveys the equivoque of the Vor, which is before both in space and time—not that there is any question as yet of actual space and time.

The becoming of the plurality cannot be called as yet so much a being produced as a being set, or as a becoming set, where of course set is the usual expressed, explicit, &c. The fulcrum here is still the independence or absoluteness of the One and of each One: it is only its own self it repels, and this is vice versa. Each is an equal beent in independent reciprocity.

They are thus mutually ‘prae-set,’ as it were expressed or explicit, or so settled-prae, i.e., settled so beforehand,—and that amounts to pre-(sup)-posed: set, (sup)-posed, ex-pressed by the inherent repulsion of the One in its own self; prae (or pre), that is, that this was an affair of beforehand, or already there, and so an arrangement ‘set as not set,’ which phrase for curt incisive vigour cannot be surpassed. Their origin through expression is sublated; they are equally beent, equally self-referent, or just equally self-referent beents.

In such entire isolation, they are not other to other, not for one another. Any reference between them is but the void—determined too not as limit, but simply as non-being.—Virtually the thing is
different, but this is the way in which it is now set. It is competent to some one to object here, 'Ay, just so; it is always a mere juggle, never absolute truth; to accomplish what you want, you hide something and show something; and then, again, when you change your mind and want to go on to something else, you show what you have hidden, and hide what you have shown.' The objection has its own plausibility, but it must fall to the ground, if the whole advance of civilisation, the whole progress of society, the whole life of thought itself can be shown to depend on, and consist of, nothing but this onwards and onwards of settlement after settlement, expression after expression, determination after determination, position after position; in which each new apparent not only replaces but implies its predecessor and all its predecessors. There is but a single life in the universe, and that from bubble on the beach to the sun in the centre, or from this dead sun itself to the Spirit that lives, is a perpetual Setting. (It is curious that this word, directly to us a going down, should be now, indirectly to us, through Hegel, a rising up: this is but again the infinite exchange, an ebb and flow that has still an onward, the Systole-Diastole of the Living One.)

The repulsion of the One from itself (the repulsion on the part of the voice of its own notification from itself), is the explication (the ex-pression) of that which—in itself—the One (the voice) is. But Infinitude (the one absolute infinite voice), as explicated or laid asunder (auseinander), is here a-come-out-of-itself infinitude (the endless units of the endless notification of the endless or absolute voice); but it is come out of itself through the immediacy of the infinite, of the One—(the voice becoming immediate to itself just as a One has withdrawn itself to itself from its notification, which is just thrown off from it as an endlessly Different and External). This infinitude (the original is simply Sie, and may refer to repulsion, but we prefer to refer to the come-out-of-itself infinitude; the repulsion, indeed, would involve the same reference) is quite as much a simple reference of the One to One (the endless notification is still the one voice), as rather the absolute referencelessness of the One (this the independence of the endless notification as in the negative reference, i.e. as distinguished from the voice); the former as according to the simple affirmative reference of the One to itself (even in its notification), the latter as according to the same reference as negative (voice and notification being distinguished and separated).
Or the plurality of the Ones is the own proper setting (ex-expression) of the One (this in its repulsion, as negative reference to its own determination, which as regards our ‘voice’ is the notification); the One is nothing but the negative reference of the One to itself (this both as regards the universal, the voice, and the particular, the notification—this single phrase, indeed, is a statement adequate to the whole case, and takes in both aspects), and this reference, therefore, the One itself, is the many ones (this is plain from the last parenthetic comment—the voice is the notification, the notification the voice, or the negative self-reference of the voice implies what it negates, &c.). But just thus the plurality is directly external to the One (the units of the notification are external to the voice); for the One is but the sublation of the Otherwiseness (the one voice brings its endless brood of notification under its own identity), the repulsion (i.e. of its determination, the notification) is its reference to self (is the voice) and (so) simple equality with itself. The plurality of the ones (the endless units of the notification) is infinitude as unconcernedly self-producing contradiction (i.e. of the one voice, and of the endless many of the notification, which, viewed here sub specie aeternitatis, or as the absolute, can only be named a contradiction which infinitely and unconcernedly reproduces itself: this paragraph is as a mirror of the absolute and actual which may be looked into—infinitely.

**Remark.**

*The Leibnitzian Monad.*

Leibnitz, in his Monad, seemed to have reached the conception of an ideating absolute; but he immediately fell into gross inconsistencies and gratuitous incumbrances. For instance, after assuming such absolute, he unnecessarily assumed a plurality of such. This plurality involves the repulsion which we have just considered; but Leibnitz, without thought of this repulsion, conceived it only as an external, abstract, indifferent plurality. In it the Ones were without relation, and it itself, wholly undeduced, was simply assumed as there and given. The Monad has indeed an inner plurality, but this affects not its character as indifferent One, for which any others are as good as non-existent. There is no thought in Leibnitz of deriving an outer many from an inner repulsion. The Atomistic again possesses not any thought of
ideality at all. Its atom is but dry individuality, wholly outer, without a within, which might unite the genetic twain of form and matter. Its plurality, indeed, is supposed to possess mutual connexion; but this connexion is not wrought out consistently and satisfactorily. The plurality of Leibnitz is so simply by primordial decree, so that any mutual connexion in it falls into the monad of monads, or just—into the reflecting philosopher.

The last touch is quite Hegelianly caustic, and the whole critique smacks of the usual iron, austere exhaustiveness.

C.

**Repulsion and Attraction.**

a. *Exclusion of the One.*

We spoke of the ‘genetic Twain of Form and Matter,’—nevertheless *prematurely* be it understood, for the *Twain* have yet a considerable road to travel before they assume these names. Still, it is true that the One before us (the voice) stands for form, as the many (the notification) stand for matter. We note this as well to indicate this prematureness, as to warn the reader not to understand by matter, as is usually done, mere earth, mere inorganic stuffing. The notification stands in no such relation to the voice; indeed, there is a mode of looking to which the notification would appear the form of the voice, its native form and circle of forms: still the voice has no other *matter* than that *form*; that form is what it *contains* or *holds in it*; but it does not simply contain it, or hold it in it—it is identified with it; if it is matter, it is matter absorbed and assimilated, matter organised and incorporated into the voice; it is the voice itself, but so viewed as contained or held in; it is its *intent*, its *Inhalt*;—and this is the proper name for matter when, as above, opposed to form. All this, as has been said, however, is premature.

The first paragraph transforms active repulsion into neutral exclusion. The One (the voice) self-referent, the *for-One* (the notification) self-referent,—both are simply mutually exclusive. This is the manifest contradiction, that the infinite One (the infinite voice relatively to its notification—the latter also, indeed, relatively to the former) is set or expressed in an immediacy of Being. From this immediacy the repulsion ceases to find itself
repulsion; it just finds what it repels there before it. This is exclusion.

The plurality, though determined as mere plurality and not relatively others, have still in the repulsion their common connexion. The amber at once disjoins and conjoins the flies. The repulsion, then, is the means of establishing them in a Daseyn, in a definite relative There-being or Here-being mutually. This is plain by a reference to the voice and its notification, but in the form to which both are now reduced—infinitude in immediacy, an infinitude of Ones. Their repulsion is their common reference; for each is what the other is; or this mutual repulsion is the expressed Daseyn, relative finite existence, of the many Ones, for their mutual There-being amounts to that—it is a Here-being that is also There. 'They negate themselves (each other mutually), &c.: this duplicity of translation is necessary in order to convey fully Sie negiren sich gegenseitig. 'They set each other as such that they are only for-One,'—each takes the other to be no absolute but a relative that has its affair in a One; they, then, in a body are the Being-for-One of the Being-for-Self. 'But they negate just as much at the same time this, that they are only for One; they repel this their Ideality and are.' All now is Infinitude out of itself, voice and notification an infinitude of notes mutually There-beënt—an infinitude of There-beënt voices, then—each would be for itself—would negate its only Being-for-One, would repel its Ideality and simply be. The One is Being-for-self and Being-for-One indistinguishably—a thoroughly independent voice. But each note is beënt in the many notes; the Being-for-One, then, as it is determined in the exclusion, is therefore a Being-for-Other. That is, the single note, after all, is not independent, but relative; its Being is not, as it was seen at first in the Being-for-Self, a simple Being-for-One, but in very truth a Being-for-Other. This is really what the exclusion brings us to in the development. But observe the full force of such words as Explication and Exclusion: they must be taken at once in reflected sense as they are, and in direct sense as a folding out and a closing, which closing is at the same time a closing out. The contradiction which the word involves in itself—a closing, a movement inwards, which is a closing out, a movement outwards and so of the others—is put to full account. The voice counter the notification, a many which it is, but which it also sublates, is 'Wider-spruch, contradiction unconcernedly producing itself.' we
see here the same verbal equivoque. But to return—each note then is relative, is not for itself, but for One, and that another one. We can carry the image to the mutual relations of finite spirits, Men;—in fact, what is here is the One Spirit, and the Many Spirits which are, or which, indeed, is What is.

The double side in the repulsion or mutual negation, at once of self-preservation and of dissolution, is plainly brought out.

The next paragraph has the same theme. The dialectic seems too trenchant; but its effect is mitigated by the explanation of the next again paragraph that it was our comparison.

The many notes are, this their mutual reference presupposes; and they are so far as they at once negate and negate the negating. The double edge all through is subtle but not difficult to an attention that will apply itself. The double edge is this: in that each is negated, it is implied as ideal; but in that it negates it is real: now both characters come to each here;—no note of the many but negates, no note of the many but is negated.

The paragraph that effects the transition into Attraction is sufficiently intelligible.

**Remark.**

The Unity of the One and the Many.

This is in every way a deep and admirable Remark. The nature of self-will, of the bad, is most luminously indicated; and a most important lesson is thus read to us. In our selfishness, we lose ourselves, at the very moment that we hug ourselves in the thought that it is but ourselves we gain. Even in that we would turn only to our own selves, it is only on our own selves that we have absolutely turned the back. The one is the many, the many is the one. Reconciliation, then, is to abandon the One, which is but the negativity of self; or rather not to abandon it, but to turn it towards the many, identifying that which it assumes to be only its negative, as its own genuine and true self.—What we have here, placed in connexion with that atomism, political and other, which has been already mentioned, yields a moral or a social atomism; and such is the historical attitude of humanity at this very instant of time. Each man nowadays seeks but himself: everywhere it is but one universal rivalry of individuality, and that only an external one. Self-interest, in the form of one's own individual self-interest, in the form of self-will—that is, of
caprice,—has been proclaimed the only wisdom, and has all but received even legal enactment. No wonder, then, that at this moment the whole social fabric should be felt to totter. No article of material existence but is sapped by self-will: we are poisoned when we would be fed; we are in rags when we would be clothed. Our houses smother us, our bridges break into chasms that devour us, even our very roads rise up as monsters to extirpate us—and all this because we have called to self-interest to brand its consuming mark into them. Nor is it otherwise with the spiritual side: self-interest, being allowed the right, has seized it too, and made it material. Whatever is spiritual nowadays is, just as whatever is material,—a commodity. But look to the result—a universal revolt of the will of the unit against the will of the One! The best proof of this state of the fact lies in this—that each one sees and censures this condition of things in others, and is absolutely blind to it in himself. The very mistress, for example, who shall this moment be loud against the revolt of domestic servants, shall, the next, be equally loud for the revolt of the sex. ‘The injustice to woman commences at her birth: the parents regret to find her not a boy!’—Are we always, then, to separate the difference and turn against it? Nay, at the very moment that we turn against the difference, as but a relative, as not the absolute—at that very moment is it not the longing of our whole soul actually to make absolute this very difference? This we, this atom we call we, is a very good atom and the very best of atoms, make it immortal and absolute by all means; but the difference! is our atom but the difference, and is it only against our atom we turn when we turn against the difference? Yes, it is even so; we do but separate our own difference and turn upon it; and another Menenius were very acceptable now to persuade us again into the identity—but the differentiated identity—of the concrete. The social atomism which sapped and dissipated Rome, the mightiest empire that time had ever seen, was animal enough; but what we witness now is baser. The coldest, shallowest, meanest, every way the most miserable atomism of which universal history can speak, is commercial atomism, politico-economical atomism,—the atomism of Manchester. And in this atomism, the very arrangement which it demands as best, is it, let us say even the superior atom, so very much at its ease? Rebuffed—however superior it may be—by yet a superior superiority, on 'change, in the street, at church, in its newspaper, it retires from
the misery of the day to that solitary evening hour—solitary, but alone the rose of life to it—when, gnawing at still a difficulty, and not yet enough, and comparing the ash of the present with the live-coal of the past, it once again admires the vanity of vanities, and bitterly mellowed itself towards the oblivion and the elysium of an eight hours' sleep! *

But there is more here than an exposure of atomism—immortality itself is here! The pure notion has—in purity—followed its own movement, its own native dialectic: the One is Many, and the Many One; the Differences are in Identity, and Identity is in the Differences.—It is impossible fully to expose to a reader all the burthen of these wonderful paragraphs: each is but a water-drop, that and nothing more; but to him that looks into it, it radiates into—that which is.

‘Each is excluding the others,’ sounds not quite satisfactorily; still it is literal and intelligible.

b. The one One of Attraction.

This section is sufficiently exoteric to require no comment. Towards the end, the German word which is translated extension is Umfang: now Umfang is opposed to Inhalt, as logical extension to logical comprehension; but here, nevertheless, something of its literal meaning, its fang um, its grasp about, is also to be seen.

The reader ought not to fail to see here, however, the divine sense, how all is sub specie eternitatis; and, indeed, it ought to be matter of wonder to him, how a simple prosecution of the pure notion should be able to lead to such concrete wisdom—the peace of reconciliation, the establishment of all those great religious truths which, at least lately, have had the character rather of aspirations than of known facts. Clues to the attitude indicated may be attempted to be conveyed thus: In the first paragraph of the preceding section (a), what is the full force of that ‘exhibited contradiction, Infinitude ex-pressed into Immediacy of Being;’ or in the last paragraph, same section, what is the full force of that ‘going-together-with-self?’ The reflexion must be seen to be double: if a consciousness goes together with its own self, it has certainly its own self inwardly; but in going together with its own self, it has also gone together with its own self outwardly;

* One asks oneself in 1897, was, then, that somewhat cold and thin bogie now really so warm and stout in 1864?
the contracting inwardly into its own abstract negativity is a proportional dilating outwardly into its own self as the differences, its differences, the objects, the seen outward concrete. Thus doubly is it a going together with its own self; and thus is it the dis-played contra-diction—Infinitude unfolded into the Immediacy of Being. Here again, under (b), the full force of the one One that is the realised Ideality must not be missed. In a word, he who has an eye to see may know how to discern himself henceforth secure in the finite infinite, the relative absolute, with God assured to him, immortality assured to him, free-will assured to him,—and all this by virtue of the simple notion.

**c. The Reference of Repulsion and Attraction.**

Beziehung, the German word for reference, has a stronger sense than its English counterpart, amounting to a be-drawing, as it were a drawing together, and almost equivalent to connexion. What we have here, then, are repulsion and attraction in mutual connexion; and by these words we are to understand, not a merely physical repulsion and attraction, but a metaphysical also,—a repulsion and attraction sub specie aeternitatis, in the realm of thought, in the world of Spirits.

The apparent immediacy of the repulsion, to the foundation of the self-dependent Ones, with the apparent—in the first instance—externality of the attraction, is the first point; and to what all this in rerum natura is directed must now be evident. Both, then, appear, in the first instance, as abstract, as per se.

Repulsion, thus alone, would be simply the irretrievable dissipation of the Ones. But thus, again, the Ones were not, as they are determined to be, repellent, excludent. The repulsion still implies reference; what excludes is still in liaison with that which is excluded. But this is attraction; repulsion itself implies attraction. Abstract repulsion, and beënts only self-referent, are thus negated.

Repulsion and attraction, then, at first view independent, are, in effect, mutually presuppositional, the one of the other.

Each has precisely the same constitution; each is the other; and each is so, not through the other, but through itself.

They are so while merely relative.

The implication of repulsion and the Ones is again made prominent.
Attraction is similarly gone into; and its implication of Many, even while it would set ideality or the One, made equally evident. This, in fact, is the true metaphysic of the necessity of thought, \( \textit{i.e.} \) of existence, that there should be \textit{at once} and both One and Many: so some of the weightiest of human interests are thus brought to a settlement.

Each negates itself and sets itself as the other, and the other of itself. The attraction of the There-beënt units is their ideality, the setting of the One. But in the One, attraction simply sublates itself. To set a One is to be the negative of itself, that is, repulsion.—The thoughts here are sufficiently fine; but they are also sufficiently obvious, and sufficiently \textit{fact}. The words are few and abstract; but if they be gazed into, and in the proper mood of mind, they will expand to the concrete—and that, too, with resolution of the most fundamental problems.

‘But not only is the \textit{In itself} as such long since gone over into the Being-for-self:’ we are to consider that the development has advanced, and, moreover, that this development is actuality, and not mere expression of a book.

For this concluding paragraph of Being-for-self, in which Quality, completed, passes over into its opposite, Quantity, let us avail ourselves again of our metaphor, the Voice; but let us conceive this time that it is a conscious voice. Well, this voice is a One that repels from itself its own self (in its determination, its notification) as its absolute \( \textit{i.e. abstract} \) otherwiseness (the Many). Its series of notes is just its absolute otherwiseness; but also its \textit{abstract} otherwiseness, in that it is abstractly looked at, and not, in that reference, identified with itself. But in that it refers itself to this sequent notification, negatively, or as to its non-being, it sublates it, it refers itself in it only to itself. The voice is thus but a \textit{mediation} of repulsion and attraction, of a negative reference to itself as \textit{setting} the notification, and of an affirmative (yet negative) reference to itself as \textit{sublating} it. The voice, then, is just this becoming, in which its form as immediate, as beënt, as beginning, as \textit{catching-on} (dass es \textit{anfangt}), as note in the notification, and equally its form as result—as the one, immediate, excludent voice—have disappeared. The process, then, which the voice is, assumes the voice itself always as \textit{sublated}: in the reference outwards, it encounters not itself, but its otherwiseness, its notification,—there then it is sublated; and in its reference inwards it is again sublated, in that it sublates into itself
that really which it is—its notification. The sublation as consciousness is a relative sublation, a reference which is a different repulsion and attraction at once; or it repels its note (object) as note, and attracts its note (object) as its. But consciousness becomes self-consciousness, or the conscious voice becomes the self-conscious voice;—that is, through negation of the mutual externality, the mutual immediacy and There-beingness, it goes over into the infinite (the unended, the endless) reference of mediation, or re-mediation. Again as result, then, the self-conscious voice (notification included, notification just its) is that becoming that in the retentionlessness of its moments (its notes) is a collapse, a precipitation, a going together with itself into simple immediacy—a simple immediacy at once as absolute and infinite—or a simple immediacy at once of its own absoluteness as voice, and of its own infiniteness as notification. But voice and notification gone together into this mutual indifference—an indifference both of One and Many—an indifference in which any reference to being is sublated, or in which any particular beingness is just indifferent—have gone together into simple Quantity.

Read in a similar mood, as it were, of pictorial reflexion, the two remaining paragraphs, which briefly sum together the moments we have gone through, will yield a similar captivating felicity and marvellous far-reachingness. The qualitiveness of the voice and its notes is readily seen to be founded on what is meant by being or by immediacy. Again, the qualitative immediacy of any one note is seen to have limit, determinateness, so identified with its very being, that with its alteration the note itself disappears: the notification presents itself thus as finitude. If one conceive to oneself a wandering light or reflexion, one will be able to realise to oneself, how with the slightest shift,—with the alteration, that is,—the objects themselves change, and that is disappear. The qualitative unity is so immediate, so without mediation, or intervention of other, in any one note, that difference, so far as it is concerned, seems to have disappeared. The note, however, is in itself at once being and negation, or being and nothing; but this difference being only in itself and concealed from it by its own immediacy, falls as otherwise in general, out of it. To the voice, its single note is so immediate, or the voice in its single note is to itself so immediate, that the difference just falls out of it as the otherwise of the various notes. This otherwise is sublated into the Being-for-self of the one voice; and
all settles into the one unity—that is, a determined or differentiated unity—but a unity self-determined. Thus the voice, even in its negation, the notes, is but consonant with its own self.

This unity is thus being, affirmative, negation of negation, remediated immediacy: the voice can be readily seen to be all this; and so, consequently, as the unity that passes through and continues through its own determinatenesses or limits (the notes), which are set as sublated within it. It is also There-being, relative distinctivity, no longer, however, in the form of the abstract notes, but in these, as now identified with the one voice, with that which simpliciter is. In this self-continuity of being, the one itself has in a manner vanished; one has gone over and beyond itself, as it were, into unity,—limit determined as limit simpliciter, but a limit which is none—a limit which, as regards the voice, is in it and within it, but indifferent to it; but the indifferent limit is again Quantity.

Remark.

The Kantian Construction of Matter by means of Forces Attracting and Repelling.

Into any explanation of this Remark it will be unnecessary to enter, the reader being now already amply supplied with all that is required to enable him to comprehend it. It will constitute another sample of Hegel’s irresistible incisiveness, and of his exhaustive and utterly overwhelming argumentation.

It is worth while pointing out that repulsion and attraction, centrifugal and centripetal forces, discretion and continuity, intension and extension, &c., are but the same elements which we have seen from the beginning, but in new and higher forms. This of itself is a proof of the truth of the notion. Thought thus in its own movement assuming by due degrees all the forms of the concrete,—this in itself is irresistible demonstration,—irresistible demonstration that what is is thought, or that thought is substance. These forms themselves, in fact, by-and-by convert themselves of themselves into the reciprocals of simple apprehension and judgment, which coalesce in reason, and constitute the notion itself in direct logical manifestation. It is worth while adding, also, that this word Setzen literally finds its explanation in the peculiar organic reciprocity that is the pulse and life of the whole movement. What is Gesetzt, is the momentarily overt, apparent, ex-
press, ex-plicit moment—an outcome of process, which process has now disappeared and is only implicit. But the process of implication and explication involved here must be seen to be directly reciprocal: if there be a movement down, there is equally a movement up, if in, then equally out. The currents meet as in two inverted cones; as the one current rushes out into one cone, the other rushes out equally into the cone it meets: but these currents are one; draught and back-draught are identical; there is present, in reality, but a single movement. Perhaps, the best illustration is what we have seen already as the going-together-with-itself: that which is, consciousness, the voice, the one, in going together with its own self inwardly, equally expands into its own self outwardly; the infinitude of its out-of-its-self-ness, its constituent notes, lighten up or out to the voice at the very instant that it would darken itself down or inwardly into its abstract One.*

*This chapter of Fursichseyn, occupying some thirty-six pages in the ‘Logik,’ is satisfied with little more than one in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia, and cannot be produced, even by the Zusatze, to more than eight in the last. With its extraordinary contents before us, does this indicate that Hegel came to think that he had been unnecessarily prolix in the beginning? In writing Hinrichs, Hegel intimates in regard to the latter’s ‘Logik,’ ‘es wurde mich grosse Anstrengung kosten (it would cost me great labour) to go into the particular.’ That, too, in his case costs us great labour! Should we, too, follow his own example by that most difficult ‘Fursichseyn,’ and even fight shy of all strict dialectic thought given by himself? That Seyn-fur-Eines, Being-for-One, Being-for-a, what, for instance, in the world is that? Even there the interest must be supreme, or why should Hegel think proper to discuss there what in Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, precisely concerns—l’être suprême ? The fact is that its supreme, and he that will but enter into the business will assuredly find it so. The text, however, strikes even me, after so many years of absence from it; and I see with astonishment my own explanations. Here, indeed, I myself can but remind myself of the cricketer once seen at practice, who, after a lucky hit to leg, marched round his wicket, triumphantly ejaculant, with a hand in his coat-tail My hit to leg is, particularly, the ‘voice.’ Were philosophers rich, and did they understand the value of the hit, I should almost feign modestly to decree myself a small fortune in reward! This, too, is true, that Hegel, in this, the first of his feat, and in view of what ‘Quality’ is, has been prompted to open his whole magazine of means (say), so that, almost already unstrut, he that will is very fairly in a case to proceed.—New.
IV.

TRANSITION FROM QUALITY TO QUANTITY.

Before passing to Quantity, it may be well to seek to perfect our general view of Quality by adding to the detailed exposition of the Complete Logic which the preceding has attempted to convey, the condensed summary of the subject which presents itself in the Encyclopaedia. But, in taking up this latter work, we cannot resist extracting certain preliminary passages (generally from the first edition as the shortest statement) which seem calculated to assist the student. And first from the

**Introduction,**

on which we shall spend a very few words only, in order to give prominence to such eminently Hegelian characteristics as are useful or indispensable to what follows as regards the System itself. The commencement may be paraphrased thus:—

'The objects (subject-matter) of the sciences in general are granted as presupposed,—as there without more ado; that is, they are already given in conception, or they are allowed to pass as admitted common possessions, awakening no question and demanding no justification. It is thus, too, as regards the method of these sciences: this, too, is granted as a matter of course; and we are permitted to begin and prosecute our investigation according to a current and conventional manner which every one accepts as right and natural—so right and natural, that any doubt of its legitimacy never occurs. What forms a striking portion of this manner, too, is this—that the very terms and notions which are applied in characterisation of the objects discussed, are themselves just taken up—out of conception, as it were—in the same loose and uninquiring fashion. As regards the facilities of a beginning, of a method, and—in a large sense as applying to a general mediating
element of decision and discussion—of a terminology, the sciences in general, then, have a great advantage over the science of philosophy, which, widely different from the rest, is seen at once to be under an obligation to demonstrate the necessity of its object, the necessity of its method, and the necessity of its characterising means or medium, or machinery of terms. In geometry, arithmetic, jurisprudence, medicine, zoology, botany, &c., for example, we have just to begin with the familiar name of the respective objects, magnitude, space, number, justice, disease, animal, plant, &c.; and that suffices—without it ever occurring to us to doubt of the existence of any such objects, or to demand—at the hands of thought as thought—a demonstration of the necessity of the same. But, beginning thus, it is evident that we begin with the mere crude instinctive conception or Vorstellung of that into which we inquire; and, as regards progress, it is evident also that all considerations which we apply in description or characterisation of the same arise in like manner out of an element of current conception, and that the whole business is just an empirical appeal from the Vorstellung of the writer to the Vorstellung of the reader concerning a Vorstellung—not, however, without the frequent emergence of an inconvenience, which, indeed, were only to be expected—namely, that Vorstellung differs from Vorstellung to the production, possibly, of a blind debate which protracts itself endlessly. The movement of cognition in the ordinary sciences, then, is one of mere conception; there is no necessary first, and no necessary transition thence to another and another, and an end: the line of movement, too, lies across a field that is blindly given, among much on both sides of it that is blindly granted, and which the movement itself constantly blindly uses up for its own progress and advance.

‘With philosophy it is otherwise: neither its method nor its medium of characterisation and determination can refer themselves to conception (Vorstellung); and, for its object or objects, these belong as little to conception as to sense. Conceptions, certainly, in the order of time precede notions; but it is by turning on the former, and through and by means of these, that thought attains to the latter—attains, that is, to cognition and comprehension. Necessity is the element of philosophy; and object, method, and determining media are alike inadmissible, unless stamped by its ineffaceable impress. In such field, proofs, demonstrations, are the requirements; and presuppositions and assertions are idle and
inapplicable. In short, it is within philosophy itself that a
beginning—which as such must be indervative and incomposite,
and which yet even so seems necessarily a presupposition—that
the object, that the method, that the characterising terms must
exhibit and demonstrate themselves; and anything that is said
now by way of what is named introduction can be only of the
nature of an anticipation. Religion, it is true, has the same objects
as philosophy: both regard the true, and that, too, in the highest
sense—that God is the true, and alone the true. Again, both
would understand the finite, and nature and man; as also the
relation of these both to each other, and to God as their truth.
Philosophy must really therefore, then, presuppose a certain
acquaintance with its objects, as well as an interest in them: but
the element of religion is sentiment, feeling, while that of philo-
sophy is the notion, thought. But as regards the objects of
philosophy, we are not restricted to religion for illustration; there
justifies itself a preliminary appeal to common, crude, current
conception itself: for it is matter of universal acknowledgment,
that the man who commences with the perceptions and the
greeds of mere sense is speedily impelled beyond these to the
presage and presentment of an Infinite and Eternal, both as
regards knowledge and will—a presage and presentment which
prompt the questions: What can I know—of God—nature—my
own soul? What ought I to do? What dare I hope? True;
there are those who, unable to deny this natural human tendency,
still utterly reject these the objects at which it aims. There are
those, indeed, who suppose themselves to possess philosophy, not-
withstanding that they profess to know only what immediate
sense gives them to know: but for the refutation of these, while
conception (common sense) can point at once to its own presage,
thought brings forward just philosophy itself.'

After these pregnant deliverances so paraphrased, appears a
paragraph (§ 5 in the first edition) which we do not recollect to be
represented anywhere in the subsequent editions, and which, for
that reason and for its own importance, we translate pretty closely
thus:—

'Philosophy, then, is the Science of Reason, and of reason
conscious of its own self as all that is. Engaged in any cognition
but the philosophical, reason, as a subjective element on the one
side, presupposes given to it on the other an object, in which, con-
sequently, it recognises not its own self: such cognition, therefore,
is but cognition of what is finite, or it is a finite cognition. Suppose the objects of such cognition to belong even to self-consciousness, as Right (Justice), Duty, &c., they are still particular objects, beside and apart from which, as apart from, or without of, self-consciousness itself, the remaining riches of the universe are to be found. The object of religion is, indeed, in itself the infinite object which is to comprehend all others: but these conceptions of religion remain not true to themselves, for, in spite of them, the world in the eyes of religion still remains without, apart from, the Infinite,—self-substantial by itself; and what it (religion) proposes as the highest truth is still, for the consciousness that would discriminate and distinguish, inexplicable, incomprehensible, a secret, a something given, and just in the form of a something given and external. To religion, truth is as feeling, vision, aspiration, figurate conception, devotion generally,—not, it is true, uninterwoven with thoughts, but still truth not in the form of truth. Its mood, indeed, is all-embracing, but, compared with other forms of consciousness, religion constitutes but a region apart, but a region of its own. Philosophy may be regarded also as the science of Freedom, because in it the foreignness, the otherness of the objects, the finitude of consciousness vanishes, while contingency, physical necessity, relation to an outward, dependency, longing, and fear perish; only in philosophy is reason perfectly at home, shut into its own self. It is from the same grounds that in this science reason is freed from the onesidedness of a merely subjective reason, which were regarded as property of a peculiar talent, perhaps, or as gift (like art with the artist) of a special divine good—or it may be bad—fortune: here, on the contrary, reason being but reason in the consciousness of its own self, this science is capable in its own nature of constituting universal science. Neither is this science that idealism in which the objects of cognition have only the value of a something set up by the ego, of a subjective production confined within self-consciousness. Because reason is conscious of itself as that which is, subjectivity—the ego that conceives itself as a separate individual beside the objects, and its own modi as in it and as diverse from those of everything else out of it or over it—this subjectivity is taken up and resolved into the rational universality.'

In this paragraph the declarations of Hegel are both valuable and clear: in particular, the relation of the individual to the universe—a point always of great interest to the student of Hegel
—is remarkably plainly characterised. The relative doctrine taught may seem to be the absorption of the individual into the absolute. It is fair to remark, however, that such inference, especially in the naked manner in which it is thus and generally stated, is not by any means necessary; and that Hegel's orthodoxy were still safe, even had he not, by withdrawing the passage, involved the opinions it contains so far in doubt—But the One is Many, &c.

From §§ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (1st Edit.) we translate as follows:—

‘Philosophy, in so far as it exhibits the entire range of the philosophical sciences, but at the same time with definite indication of the parts, is—Encyclopaedia; and in so far as it exhibits at once the distinction and the connexion of the parts as due to the necessity of the notion, it is—Philosophical Encyclopaedia.

‘Philosophy being throughout rational cognition, each of its parts constitutes a philosophical whole, a self-inclusive sphere of the general totality; but in every such part the philosophical idea is, as it were, in a particular specificatum or element. Each single sphere, just because it is a totality in itself, breaks through the limitation of its element and founds a higher sphere. The whole presents itself, then, as a sphere of spheres, of which latter each is a necessary moment of the whole; and the system of its own proper elements constitutes the complete idea, which again just appears (as a single manifestation) in each individual.

‘Philosophy is also by very nature Encyclopaedia, inasmuch as the true can only exist as totality, and through discrimination and assignment of its distinctive differences, the necessity of these, and the freedom of the whole: that is, philosophy is necessarily—System.

‘A philosophising without system cannot be anything scientific; for such philosophising, besides that it expressly offers itself as rather a mere subjective manner of looking or thinking, is contingent in its matter (its objects), inasmuch as this matter can receive its authorisation only as a moment of the whole, and apart from this whole must remain an ungrounded presupposition or mere subjective certainty.

‘By a system of philosophy, there is erroneously understood only a philosophy of a certain one principle that is contradistinguished from others: the principle of veritable philosophy, on the contrary, is to include in itself all particular principles. Philosophy exhibits this in its own self, while its history also manifests partly
that the various philosophies but constituted a single philosophy in various stages of development, and partly that the special principles of these—one underlying one system, another another—were but branches of one and the same whole.

'The Universal and the Particular [the Common and the Various] must be accurately distinguished, each in its special constitution. The Universal, formally taken, and placed beside the Particular, becomes itself particular. Were such position imposed on objects of ordinary life, the impropriety and inaptitude would strike at once. Suppose, for example, that a person in want of fruit should decline cherries, pears, grapes, &c., on the plea that they were cherries, pears, grapes, &c., and not fruit!—In the case of philosophy, nevertheless, people think themselves free as well to justify their contempt of it by the objection that there are so many philosophies, and each is only a, not the philosophy,—as if the cherries were not also fruit,—as to set a philosophy whose principle is the universal side by side with those whose principle is a particular—nay, side by side with doctrines asserting that there is no philosophy or bestowing this name on a mere to and fro of thoughts, which assumes the true as something given and directly there, and only applies reflexions to the same.

'As Encyclopaedia, nevertheless, the science is necessarily not exhibited in the complete evolution of its particular details, but only as limited to the beginnings (principia) and rudimentary notions of the individual sciences. The whole of philosophy, though capable of being regarded as a whole of many particular sciences, constitutes truly but one science; while each particular science is at once a moment of the whole and a whole in itself.

'Whatever is true in any science, is so through and by virtue of philosophy, whose encyclopaedia therefore comprehends within it every veritable science.

'Ordinary encyclopaedias, unlike the philosophical, are only aggregates of sciences empirically and contingently fallen on; many of which, too, as mere bundles of facts, are but sciences in name. The unity to which, in any such aggregate, the sciences are reduced, is, as it was but externally that they themselves were fallen on or taken up, equally an external one,—an order, an arrangement (a ranking). This order must always, for the same reason and because the materials are of contingent nature, remain an attempt, and exhibit incongruent edges. Besides, then, that the philosophical encyclopaedia excludes (1) such mere aggregates of
facts as, for example, philology is, it excludes also (2) such sciences as are founded in mere arbitrariness, like heraldry: sciences of this nature are out-and-out positive. (3) Other sciences are also called positive, which possess, however, a rational foundation and principle: this latter element in them belongs to philosophy; the positive side, again, remains special to them. This positive element, too, is of various kinds. (1) In the ordinary non-philosophical sciences, their principle (beginning), that which is the veritably true in them, has the contingent as its end, because they have to introduce and reduce the universal into the empirical unit and actual. In this field of mutability and contingency, not the notion, but only grounds or reasons can be made available. For example, Jurisprudence, the System of direct and indirect Taxation, &c., require final exact determinations which lie without and apart from the determination proper of the notion, and leave for decision, therefore, a certain latitude or margin which may be disposed in one manner on one reason and in another on another, and is insusceptible of any certain and definitive last. In the same manner, the Idea of Nature in its singularisation (or endless separation into units) runs out into contingencies, and Natural History, Geography, and Medicine fall into distinctions of fact, into species and differences which are determined by external accident or the sport of caprice, and not by reason. History, too, falls to be included here, inasmuch as, though the Idea be its true nature and substance, its manifestation or appearance is in contingency and the field of self-will. (2) Such sciences are also in so far positive, as they do not recognise their determinations as finite, nor demonstrate the transition of these and of their whole sphere into a higher one, but assume them as valid simpliciter. With this finiteness of the form, as the first was the finiteness of the matter, there connects itself (3) the finiteness of the cognitive ground, which is sometimes raisonnement, sometimes feeling, belief, the authority of others, in general the authority of inner or outer perception. That philosophy also which seeks to found itself on Anthropology—facts of consciousness, inner perception, or outer experience—belongs to the same class. (4) It is still possible that it is merely the form of the scientific statement that is empirical and notionless, while in other respects thoughtful observation arranges what are only outer appearances in a like manner to the inner sequence of the notion. There is added, perhaps, that through the antagonism and multiplicity of the appearances (phenomena) which are
brought together, the external, contingent circumstances of the conditions are removed, and the universal steps before us. A thoughtful experimental physic, history, &c., would in this manner present the rational science of nature and of human eventualities and deeds in an external image which should mirror the notion.

'The whole of science (scientia) is the exposition of the Idea; the division (distribution) of the former, therefore, can be understood only by reference to the latter, and, like this preliminary conception of philosophy itself, can be something only anticipated. The Idea, however, demonstrates itself as Reason directly identical with its own self, and this at the same time as the capability to set itself—in order to be for itself—over-against itself, and in this other to be only by itself. Thus science falls divisively into three parts:

I. Logic, the Science of the Idea in and for itself.
II. Philosophy of Nature, or the Science of the Idea in its Otherness.
III. Philosophy of Spirit, as of the Idea which from its Otherness returns into itself.

'It has been already remarked, that the differences of the various philosophical sciences are only characteristics of the Idea itself, which latter alone is what exhibits itself in these various elements. In Nature it is not an other than the Idea which is to be recognised, but it is in the form of externalisation, just as in Spirit it is the same Idea as beent for itself and in-and-for-itself becoment. Such a form in which the Idea appears is at the same time a fluent moment; therefore, any particular science is just as much this—to recognise its matter (object) as beënt object, as also this—to recognise immediately in the same its transition into a higher sphere. The conception of the Division, therefore, is an external reflexion, an anticipation of what the Idea's own necessity produces, and shows this inaccuracy—that it sets up the various parts or sciences beside each other as if they were stable and substantial in their mutual contradistinction, like species or sorts.'

To a reader who has advanced this length, the above passages will be readily intelligible without comment; and they will serve to strengthen any conception already formed of Hegelian pene-
trativeness, comprehensiveness, and systematic wholeness. We proceed now to make a few extracts from

THE PRE-NOTION

which precedes the Logic; using specially for this purpose, §§ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 35, 36, and 37 (First Edition).

‘Logic is the science of the pure Idea,—that is, of the Idea in the abstract element of Thought.

‘It may, without doubt, be said that Logic is the science of Thought, its forms and its laws; but thought is at strictest the pure identity of cognition with itself, and constitutes, therefore, only the universal determinatum, determinateness, or the element in which the Idea is as logical. Thought is truly the Idea, but not as thought formal; on the contrary, as the Totality of its own forms which it itself gives to itself. Logic is the hardest science, in so far as it has to do, not with perceptions—not even with abstract ones, as in Geometry—or other sensuous forms, but with pure abstractions, and demands, on the part of its student, a power of retiring into pure thoughts, of holding such fast, and of moving in them. On the other side, again, it may be regarded as the easiest science, inasmuch as its import is nothing but one’s proper thought and its current notions, and these are, at the same time, the simplest. The utility of Logic concerns its relation to the particular subject or individual so far as he would give himself a certain training and formation for other objects. The training of Logic consists in this—that in it we are exercised in thinking, for this science is the thinking of thinking. So far, however, as the element of Logic is the absolute form of the true, and even more than this—the pure true itself,—it is something quite other than what is merely useful.

‘In form, Logic has three sides: (a) that of understanding, or the abstract side [the dianoëtic]; (β) the negative-rational or the dialectic side; and (γ) the positive-rational or the speculative side [say the noëtic].

‘These three sides do not make three parts of Logic, but are moments of every logical real,—that is, of every notion, or of every true in general. They may be set under the first or dianoëtic moment, and thereby held asunder from each other; but, so held, they are not considered in their truth.

‘(a) Thought as understanding holds fast the fixed individual
and its difference from others; and such limited abstract has the value to it of what is independent and self-subsistent.

'({\beta}) The dialectic moment is the self-sublation of such individuals, and their transition into their opposites.

'({\alpha}) Dialectic, isolated by understanding and taken by itself, constitutes, especially when manifesting itself in scientific notions, Scepticism, which views mere negation as the dialectic result. (2) Dialectic is usually regarded as an external art which arbitrarily produces confusion in accepted notions and a mere show of contradiction, the decisions of the understanding and the accepted notions being still supposed the true, while the show itself is to be considered but a nullity. Dialectic, however, is rather to be regarded as the true and proper nature of the decrements of the understanding, of things, and of the finite in general. Reflexion is properly a going out over and beyond the isolated individual, and a referring, whereby the individual is placed in relation, but for the rest remains still in its isolated validity. Dialectic, on the contrary, is that immanent going-out which exhibits the onesidedness and limitation of the decrements of the understanding as that which it is,—the negation, namely, of this and these. Dialectic constitutes, therefore, the motive soul of progress, and is the principle by which alone there comes immanent connexion and necessity into the matter of science, just as it is in it that the true, and not the external, elevation over the finite lies.

'({\gamma}) The positive-rational or speculative side recognises the unity of the distinctions even in their antithesis, the positive element which is retained and preserved in their resolution and transition.

'({\alpha}) Dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate import or matter; or because its result is really not the empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain distinctions which are retained and preserved in the result—because it is a result, and not a simple nothing. (2) This rational act is, therefore, though abstract and of thought, still at the same time a concrete, because it is not simple formal unity, but unity of distinguished distinctions. Philosophy, therefore, has nothing whatever to do with mere abstractions and formal thoughts, but only with concrete notions.

'As regards matter, the determinations of thought are considered in Logic in and for themselves. In this way they present
themselves as the concrete pure thoughts, that is, as the notions, with the force and import of that which constitutes the absolute ground and foundation of all that is. Logic, therefore, is essentially speculative philosophy.

'Under the speculative moment, form and matter are not sundered and severed, and held apart, as under the two preceding. The forms of the Idea are its distinctions [say its native inflexions or intonations], and it were impossible to say where it should get any other or truer matter than these its own forms themselves. The forms of the mere Logic of understanding are, on the contrary, not only not something true per se, but they cannot be even only forms of the true. Rather, since, as merely formal or formell, they are affected with the essential antithesis to the matter, they are nothing more than forms of the 'finite, of the untrue.—Because, however, Logic, as pure speculative philosophy, is the Idea in the element or form of thought, or the absolute still shut in to its eternity, it is the subjective or first science, and there fails it still the side of the completed objectivity of the Idea. It not only remains, however, as the absolute ground of the real, but, in manifesting itself as this, it demonstrates itself as the real, universal, and objective science. In the first universality of its notions, it appears per se, and as a subjective special activity, without and apart from which the entire wealth of the sensuous, as of the more concrete intellectual, world is still supposed to live its own life. But when this wealth is taken up in the philosophy of the real part of the science, and has there manifested itself as returning into the pure Idea, and possessing in it its ultimate ground and truth,—then the logical universality takes stand no longer as a separate entity counter said wealth of the real, but rather as comprehending this wealth, and as veritable universality. It acquires thus the force of speculative theology.

'Logic, with the value of speculative philosophy, takes up the place of what was called Metaphysic and treated separately. The nature of Logic and the stand-point of scientific cognition now receive their more particular preliminary elucidation in the nature of this Metaphysic, and of the Critical Philosophy which ended it.—Metaphysic, besides, is a thing of the past only in reference to the history of philosophy; in itself, as lately manifested especially, it is the mere understanding's view of the objects of reason.

'In order to place oneself on the stand-point of science, it is
requisite to renounce the presuppositions which are involved in the subjective and finite modes of philosophical cognition, viz.: (1) that of the fixed validity of limited and opposed distinctions of understanding generally; (2) that of a given substrate, conceived as already finished and ready there before us, which is to be taken as standard decisive of whether any of those distinctions are commensurate with it or not; (3) that of cognition as a mere referring of such ready-formed and fixed predicates to some given substrate; (4) that of the antithesis of a cognising subject and a cognised object, which latter is not to be identified with the former; and of this antithesis each side, as in the preceding, is to be equally taken per se as a something fixed and true.

'To abandon these presuppositions cannot be demanded so much for the reason that they are false—for science, in which these forms present themselves, has to show this in their own case—as for the reason that they are figurate conceptions and belong to immediate thought—thought imprisoned in the given, opinion (Meynung),—for this reason in general, indeed, that they are given and presuppositions whereas science presupposes nothing, but that it would be pure thought. In effect, we have to begin in complete emancipation from every presupposition; and, in the resolution to will to think purely, that is accomplished by the freedom which abstracts from everything, and holds steadily its pure abstraction, the simplicity (uniplicity) of thought.

'Pure science (scientia), or Logic, falls divisively into three parts:

I. The doctrine of Being.

II. The doctrine of Essence (inner nature).

III. The doctrine of the Notion and the Idea.

Or into the doctrine of Thought, or the Thought:

I. In its immediacy—the Notion in itself.

II. In its Reflexion and Be-mediation—the Being-for-self and the Shine of the Notion.

III. In its return into itself, and in its developed Being-by-self—the Notion in and for itself.'

All the above terms have been already commented on, with the exception of Shine (Schein) and Being-by-self (Bey-sich-seyn). Schein is just the Shine or show of a thing—not the thing in itself, but just its shining, showing, or seeming: it may thus be mere seeming, or it may be true seeming which amounts to
manifestation. Could we give the English word *seem* the sense of *shine*, or *shine* the sense of *seem*, a translation would have no difficulty. To be *by self* is to be *chez soi*, at home, or contented in seclusion to, and identification with, oneself.

We come now to

'The First Part of Logic,
or
The Doctrine of Being,
and there to

A.

**QUALITY,**
and


'Under Quality, then, we have

a. *Being.*

'Pure Being constitutes the beginning, because it is as well pure thought as the indefinite simple immediate, and the first beginning cannot be anything mediated (a product of means) or further determined.

'But this pure Being is the *pure abstraction*, consequently *absolutely negative*, and, taken also immediately, just *Nothing*.

'Nothing, as this self-equal immediate, is conversely the same thing that Being is. The truth of Being as of Nothing is, therefore, the *unity* of both: this unity is Becoming.

b. *There-being.*

'Being in Becoming as one with Nothing, and so Nothing as one with Being, are only disappearant; Becoming, through its contradiction in itself, falls together into the unity in which both are sublated: its *result* is, consequently, *There-being.*

'(a) There-being is Being with a Determinateness, which is, as immediate or *beënt* determinateness—Quality. There-being as in this its determinateness reflected *into itself*, is *There-beent-ity, Something*. The categories that yield themselves in There-being are now to be summarily stated.

'Quality, as *beënt* determinateness counter the *negation* that is contained in it but distinguished from it, is *Reality*. The negation no longer the abstract Nothing, but as a There-being and *Something*, is only form in this latter—it is as *Otherwise-being*. Quality,
in that this *Otherwise-being* is its own determination, but firstly distinguished from it, is *Being-for-Other,—a breadth (latitude) of the There-being, of the Something. The Being of Quality as Being, counter this reference to Other, is the *Being-in-itself* (or just the *In-itself*).

[The distinguishableness of anything is evidently an otherwise-being, an otherwise-ness, in it, while as evidently its distinguishablenesses constitute a *breadth*.]

‘(β) The Being, held fast as distinct from the Determinateness, or the *Being-in-itself*, were only the empty abstraction of Being. In There-being, the determinateness is one with the Being; which determinateness, set as *Negation*, is at the same time *Limit*, *Limitation*. The otherwise-ness is, therefore, a moment, not indifferent *out of* There-being, but its own. *Something* is through its Quality, firstly, *finite* (*endlich*); and secondly, *alterable* (*veränderlich*); so that Finitude and Otherableness belong to its being (it is at once *end-ed* and *end-able*).

‘Something becomes another; but the other is itself a something: it becomes, therefore, equally another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

‘This Infinite is the spurious, bastard, negative, false, or *Pseudo-Infinite*, inasmuch as it is nothing but the negation of the finite, which, however, just so arises again, and consequently is just as much not sublated—or this Infinite expresses only the *To-be-to* (*Sollen*) of the sublation of the finite. The Progress into the Infinite keeps standing by the enunciation of the contradiction which the finite involves; namely, that it is as well something as its other, and is the perpetual continuation of the alternation of these determinations, mutually introductive of each other.

‘(γ) What is here in fact is, that Something becomes another, and the Other another, just generally. Something in relation to another is already another in its regard; consequently, as that into which it passes is quite the same thing as that which passes—both have one and the same and no further determination than that each is _another_;—Something thus in its passing into Other goes together only with its own self; and this reference, in the passing and in the other to its own self, is the *True Infinite*. Or, looked at negatively: what is othered is the Other—it becomes the Other of the Other. Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is again restored, and is the *Being-for-self*."

In translating the paragraphs immediately above, certain supple-
mentary passages have been omitted. Before proceeding to Being-for-self, however, it may be well to spend a word on any points in these omitted passages which may seem calculated to embarrass the student. With reference to § 84 (Encyclopaedie, Rosenkranz', or Hegel's 3rd, Edition), that 'Being is the Notion in itself' is not difficult; for Being (Seyn) applies to everything of which we say is, or it is; and everything of which we say is, is just the Logical Notion in itself, that is, materialiter, not formaliter. The Bestimmungen, the determinations (and the reference in this word is always to the logical moments of the logical notion, which, of course, vary with the sphere), the distinguishable forms in the sphere of Seyn (Being), are evidently beent, other to other, while their progressive determination (the dialectic movement in that field) is plainly a passing into other. This, of course, is an attempt to express Being and its peculiarities in terms of the Notion; and certainly Hegel will be at least allowed to have brought before us an ingenious analogy. That this progress is 'a setting out of the Notion as it is in itself' is also plain: anything running through the circle of its qualities or powers sets out the Notion that in itself it is, and this at the same time can be seen to be 'a going into its own self,' 'a deepening of Being into itself.' Hegel then asserts that his doctrine of Being is at once representative and resolutive of the whole of the Seyn or Being; and thus we are led to understand what his object is in this doctrine.

The next paragraph declares the determinations of Logic to constitute the definitions of the Absolute, the metaphysical definitions of God; but that this is more especially the case with spheres that are First and Third, while those that are Second refer to the Finite. To define God is to think God, or to express God in thoughts; and Logic ought to comprehend all thoughts as such. It is a defect in the form of Definition in general, however, that in such operation there floats ever before the conception of the Definer a Substrate which is to be the receptacle of the defining predicates. For example, the Absolute, which we may suppose to stand for God as thought, is, in reference to its predicates, quite void, and only supposititious—a substrate; but the thought of the substrate—and that is the whole thing—is in the predicate. The predicate, then, is alone substantial, and the substrate, or even the form of a proposition, appears superfluous.

From § 86, we learn that all difficulties in regard to the com-
mencement with pure Being may be removed by simply discerning what a beginning in general implies. We are told, too, that the Fichtian Ego-Ego and the Schellingian absolute Indifference or Identity are not so very discrepant from the Hegelian Seyn or pure Being. The former, however, are objectionable as involving process, that is, as being products of means: in fact, properly put as a beginning requires, both of them just become Seyn or Being, while Being again just implies them. Being is the first predicate then; and so the first definition is, the Absolute is Being. This is the Eleatic definition, and also the common one, that God is the sum of all Realities; the limitation that is in everything being abstracted from, there remains for God only the reality that is in all reality.

In § 88, there are several points of considerable interest. In the first place, we see that the whole Hegelian business is the Setzen of the An sich—the exposition, or simply the position, of the In-itself, the explication of the implication, that formaliter expressed which materialiter is (and that just amounts to the Aristotelian moments which we have already so often seen). We see also that the manner of philosophical cognition is different from that which is usually employed, that of common sense, or of figurate conception; for, as Kant has already told us, the former is a knowing in abstracto, while the latter is a knowing in concreto. From this we see how much Hegel has simply been in earnest with the relative teaching of Kant. We have also the Metaphysic of a Beginning alluded to; the thing (whatever may be put in question) is not yet in its beginning, but still its beginning is not just the nothing of the thing, but the being of this latter is certainly also in its beginning. This must be referred to, and collated with, what has been already said in regard to a beginning, being, becoming, &c. Lastly, we are made to see very clearly how the proposition Ex nihilo nihil fit is tantamount to a proposition of the eternity of matter, of pantheism. 'The ancients have made a simple reflexion that the proposition, From something comes something, or From nothing comes nothing, just in effect annihilates a Becoming; for that from which there comes, and that which comes, are one and the same thing; what we have before us is only the proposition of the abstract identity of the understanding. It must, however, strike us as surprising to see the propositions, From nothing comes nothing, or From something comes something, even in our days quite unsuspectingly main-
tained, without consciousness that they are the ground-principle of pantheism, as without any knowledge of the fact that the ancients have exhausted the consideration of these propositions.

From § 89, we learn—and with conviction—that every one concrete consists of opposing note or significates; that it is the province of the abstraction of understanding, as understanding, to see only one of these, to lighten this one up to the darkening out of the other, and the fallacious appearance of a part as a fixed, isolated, individual whole. Hence also it is manifest that the demonstration of antithesis is not necessarily productive of a simple negation, is not necessarily reductive of the subject of antithesis to a simple nothing.

In § 95, the terminal remark in reference to the true relation of Finite and Infinite is a perfectly successful Hegelian statement, and a full compensation for the confusing tediousness and length which we have already animadverted on as the fault of the similar discussion in the detailed Logic. Our explanations in that reference, however, shall be allowed to dispense us from translating this remark, however admirable, here.

If in § 86 we found that the Absolute is Being, we see from § 87 that it is equally true that the Absolute is the Nothing. This not only because the Absolute is Difference as well as Identity, but because, all Difference being reflected into the one of this Identity, that one is as good as Nothing. This is illustrated by the nature of the Thing-in-itself, which is to be all substance, all being, but just emerges as an absolute void—Nothing. Both considerations, in fact, are the same.

It is curious, I may remark by way of conclusion here, that the ultimate generalisation of all generalisation should be Being, and quite as much Nothing. Of that there can be no doubt. This Nothing, too, is the only Nothing possible—in effect it is the Nothing, just what we mean by Nothing. Thrown back from these generalisations as quite abstract, as quite untrue, as nothing, one looks once more at the concrete; but what is it, again, in ultimate abstraction but a Becoming?—it never is. These are really the initial generalised abstractions: if we want to think purely of what is—of the laws, forms, or principles of all things in general, apart from each thing in particular—it is so we must begin. But, in spite of the Becoming, there is a Become, a Distinguishable, a Here-being, a There-being,—what we call mortal state. This has Reality; this has also Negation; it is so Something. As its
Reality against its Negation, it is Something in itself; and, vice versa, it is Something for other. Its Something-for-other identified with what it is in itself, is its Qualification. But its Qualification is its Tatification, and both coalesce in Limit. In its Limit, Something is not only ended, but endable; that is, it is Finite. But its end, the finis of the Finite, is the Infinite; and that is the One into which all variety is reflected. But this reflexion of variety into the One is the negative reflexion of this one into its own self; and, again, this negativeness of the Reflexion implies other than the One—more ones—(or, it is allowable by anticipation to say more I's, more Egos).—But thus we are fully in the field of Fürsichseyn, or of

c. Being-for-self.

'(a) Being-for-Self, as Reference to itself, is Immediacy; and, as Reference of the Negative to itself, it is Being-for-self-ity, One, the One,—what is within itself distinction-less, and so excludent of the Other out of itself.

'(β) The Reference of the Negative to itself is negative reference, so distinguish-ment of the One from itself, the Repulsion of the One,—i.e., the setting of many or simply more Ones. By reason of the Immediacy of the Being-for-self-ity, these Many or More are Beent, and the Repulsion of the Beent Ones becomes so far their Repulsion the one of the other as of entities already to the fore, or Mutual Exclusion.

'(γ) The Many, however, are, the one what the other is; each is one, or one of the Many; they are, therefore, one and the same. Or the Repulsion regarded in itself is, even as negative comportment of the Many Ones mutually, equally essentially their Reference mutually; and as those to which in its repulsion the One refers itself are One, it refers itself in them to itself. The Repulsion is thus quite as essentially Attraction; and the excludent One or the Being-for-Self sublates itself. Qualitative Determinateness, which in the One has reached its absolute determinedness (ihr An-und-für-sich-Bestimmteyn), is with this gone over into Determinateness that is as sublated Determinateness,—i.e., into Being as Quantity.'

These are translations of §§ 96, 97, 98 in the third edition of the Encyclopaedie, (for the future we shall chiefly follow this edition), and they constitute the entire Encyclopaedic summary
of the whole subject of Being-for-Self. This alone, even independently of the similar summaries of Being and There-being, would suffice to demonstrate as well the inadequacy of the Encyclopaedia to convey the System, as the fact that it is nothing but a handy leading-string, or useful synopsis to the student who has already penetrated, or is engaged penetrating, into the business itself—the complete Logic.—Further comment, after what has been so fully extended already, will be here unnecessary: 'the Reference of the Negative to itself,' the 'Excludent of the Other out of itself,' 'already to the fore,' 'in it itself,' 'comportment italicised for the equally-italicised Verhalten,' &c., may now be trusted to the intelligence of the reader.

Perhaps it may be worth while remarking that Hegel displays in what we have just read certain Gnostic analogies. Of the systems so named, we learn that it was a leading idea that 'God, the sum of all veritable Being, reveals himself in this way, that he hypostasises his Qualities, or allows them to pass out of himself into existence as Substances; but still directly from God their issues only one substance, the νοῦς, Reason; and it is from this latter that the rest follow, but always so that the one is successively out of the other, the divine substance being extenuated in proportion to the remotion from the centre.' Speculative Philosophy is not unrepresented in the definition of Gnosis as 'Higher Wisdom, a Religious Wisdom, that by aid of foreign philosophemes would lay deeper the foundations of the Positive and Traditional.' We know, too, that in Alexandria, the seat of Gnosticism, there was a desire and an effort to reconcile and unite 'opposing philosophemes;' there, 'when the fair blossom of Greece which the bland heaven had evoked, was faded and withered up Art sought to replace what Nature no longer spontaneously offered.' These are certainly Anklange, assonances; but it is not to be supposed that they were suggestive to Hegel; rather they ought to be suggestive to us only—suggestive of the analogy of the Historical Occasions: and, for the rest, we have to be thankful that Hegel has probably effected, by tenacious dogging of the pure notion, what the Gnostics, soaring into the figurate conception, were only able to convert into the monstrosities of dream.

We pass now from What sort to How much; nor is it difficult to see that How much is indifferent to What sort, or that it is just the indifferent limit.
V.

A SUMMARY OR TRANSLATION, COMMENTED AND INTERPRETED, OF THE SECOND SECTION OF THE COMPLETE LOGIC, QUANTITY.

We have seen the collapse of the entire round of the constituents of Quality into a simple identity from the qualitative indifference of which, its own opposite, a wholly new sphere, Quantity, emerges. This emergence, what Hegel names the Unterschied, the se-creation, the secession, the difference, we have now more closely to consider.

This section opens in a strain of singularly rich and beautiful reflexion, which is also always somehow of a double aspect. On one aspect, it is still Qualitative Being-for-Self which we have before us—(the voice, say)—thoroughly identified with, and indifferent to, its own determinateness—(the notes then); and on the other aspect we suddenly find that this is Quantity. The life, as it were, of the voice, now, then, is but indifferent continuity of one or ones; and what is that but Quantity? This reference being kept steady, the expressions of Hegel, however coy and elusive, will become intelligible. Quality—(a note)—will be readily granted to be 'the first, the immediate, or the direct determinateness;' whereas Quantity is a determinateness which is indifferent, so to speak, to what it is—indifferent to the being it conveys: 'it is a Limit which is none; it is Being-for-Self directly identical with the Being-for-Other;—the Repulsion of the many ones [the notes], which is immediately their non-repulsion, their continuity—or the voice which is in the notes and through the notes, at once Being-for-Self and Being-for-Other. The duplicity of this description is very evident: inwardly it applies to our latest qualitative values, but outwardly it just names Quantity, which is now then explicit.

Again,—to put it so—the notes appear no longer to have their
affair in themselves, but in another, the voice, while at the same
time both they and it are reflected into themselves as indifferent
limits: that is, 'the determinateness in general is out of itself, a
something directly external to itself and to the Something; such
a Limit, its indifference in its own self, and the indifference of the
Something to it, constitutes the quantitative determinateness of a
Something.'

It must be regarded as a great triumph of the method of Hegel,
that a mere dogging of the pure notion as it trends away off in
its own self before us, should lead to such an exhaustive statement
of the idea of Quantity—a statement, too, as will be found in the
end, no less exhaustive of the complete theory than of the mere
initiatory idea.

The general division which follows now will be more intelligible
after the discussion; and as for the Remark, it contains some
slight illustrative matter. A corn-field, for example, is still a
corn-field, though its quantitative limit be altered; but by altera-
ton of its qualitative limit, it becomes meadow, wood, &c. A
red, whether more or less intense, is still red; but its quality
being changed, it ceases to be red, and becomes blue, &c. Thus,
from every example, we may see that Quantity always concerns a
Beingness, which is indifferent to the very determinateness which
it now, or at any time, has. Quantity is usually defined 'anything
that will admit of increase or decrease.' To increase is to make
more—to decrease, less—in quantity. The definition is thus
tautological and faulty. Still, the true notion is implied: we see
the distinction of Quantity to be its own indifference to becoming
other; which othering or alteration, too, is always external.
CHAPTER I.

Quantity.

A.

Pure Quantity.

'Quantity is sublated Being-for-Self;' the voice (to call in again our illustration) is identified away out into the notes and on with them; 'or, the repelling One has become the referring One, relates itself to its Other as in identity, and has gone over into Attraction. The absolute denyingness of the repelling One is melted out into this Unity; but still this Unity as containing the One is influenced by the immanent repulsion—it is unity with itself as unity of the Being-out-of itself. Attraction is in this way the moment of Continuity in Quantity.'

But this unity is, so to speak, no dry unity; it is the unity of Somewhat, of the Many, of the units. Continuity, then, implies Discretion. The one unit is what the other is; and it is this sameness which the Repulsion extends into the Continuity. Discretion for its part is confluent; the discretes are the same thing, one then,—and so continuous.

Quantity is the unity of continuity and discretion, but firstly in the form of continuity, inasmuch as it has just issued from the self-identically determinate Being-for-Self. Quantity is now the truth, the Wahrheit, the wareness, the perceived factuality of the absolute, which in the last value of the Being-for-Self was left as the self-sublating self-reference, the self-perpetuating Coming-out-of-itself. 'But what is repelled is its own self; the Repulsion, therefore, is the genetic profluence of its own self. Because of the self-sameness of what is repelled and driven off, this very dis-cerning is uninterrupted continuity; and because of the Coming-out-of-itself, this continuity, without being interrupted,
is at the same time plurality, which just as much abides in its equality with itself.

These last sentences very tolerably convey Hegel's central conception of the Divine Life, which is always a perpetual One in a perpetual Many—a perpetual Self in a perpetual Other. What is, is the One flicker of a Two; what is, is nictitation.—Again, one sees very clearly into the moments here: they are continuity and discretion, quantity, the same but different. That continuity will become extension, discretion intension, one can readily anticipate: one can see, indeed, that continuity will become by-and-by the outer, and discretion the inner. Nor is it to be forgotten that Continuity and Discretion, Repulsion and Attraction, One and Many, Being-for-Self and Being-for-One, Finite and Infinite, Something and Other, &c., were originally Being and Nothing—the first abstract truths, as Becoming was the first concrete one, though but in naked abstraction all the same.

Two very important Remarks are here now intercalated. In the first, the first point noticed is, that Quantity is everywhere the real possibility of the One, the Unit; but that, vice versa, the One, the Unit, is no less directly continuous. The tendency of conception to confound continuity with composition is then remarked on—composition as a mere external putting together of the units; each of these—as we saw in atomism—being all the while self-identically independent. This idea-less externality of view is to be exchanged for the living internality of the concrete notion. Even mathematic rejects such composition of indifferent discreetes—what at any time it regards as Sum is but for the occasion so, and even in its discretion is an infinite Many.—A quotation from Spinoza next occurs, which maintains two modes of conceiving Quantity,—one through imagination, and one through intellect; the former finite, divisible, composite,—the latter infinite, indivisible, single. It is interesting to see in Spinoza the Hegelian distinction between imagination (Vorstellung) and intellect (Begriff), at the same time that it is not for a moment to be supposed that it was derived from him: as well might we assert—inasmuch as it is quite capable of being regarded as potential germ in that direction—that to this passage in Spinoza Kant owes—what mainly constitutes him—his manifold of Sense and his unity of the Notion. There is here a further parallelism, indeed: Spinoza characterises the view of imagination
as abstract or superficial, and that of intellect as substantial; now this, again, concerns the many of sense and the one of intellect;—Imagination (Sense) sees abstract superficiality, Intellect concrete substance. We may understand from this how it is that Hegel regards the operation of the first moment, simple apprehension (identified with Verstand), as of an abstract nature. The object of this faculty, indeed, is always abstract identity, surface-sameness, Seyn; it is another faculty that seeks substance, the Wesen, the notion. It is not only interesting, but corroborative, to come thus on thoughts in different great writers, which thoughts, though with very different lookings in each, involve at bottom the same truths: at the same time, it is not the competent student, but only the feverishly ambitious and feverishly imbecile (and so exasperated) dipper, who will talk in such cases of plagiarism.—

Time, space, matter, light, the ego, are then characterised as examples of pure Quantity, and in those penetrating terms peculiar to Hegel: space, an absolutely continuous out-of-itself-ness, a self-identical otherwiseness and again otherwiseness; time, an absolute put-of-itself-coming-ness, a production of the one, the instant, the now, which is the immediate disappearance of the same, and always, again, the disappearance of this disappearance; so that this self-production of non-being is no less simple self-equality and self-identity. As for matter, Leibnitz remarks, 'It is not at all improbable that matter and quantity are really the same thing'; and Hegel adds, 'in effect these notions differ only in this—that quantity is the pure notion, while matter is the same thing in outward existence.' Lastly, the Ego is, as pure Quantity, an absolute Becoming-otherwise, an infinite removal or omni-lateral repulsion into the negative freedom of the Being-for-Self, which remains still, however, directly simple continuity—the continuity of universality, or of Being-by-Self—which is uninterrupted by the infinitely varied limits, the matter of sensations, perceptions, &c.

The second remark is a critique on Kant in regard to his Antinomies, and its consideration will have fitter place elsewhere. We cannot pass it, however, without observing that 'it is an analysis of such annihilative penetration and resistless force as is in that kind without a rival. It will assist the reader here to know

* The Remark to the 'Relation of Outer and Inner' (Log. ii. 180) explicitly states this: 'In every natural, scientific, and spiritual development, this offers itself, and this essentially is to be recognised—that the First, in that Something is only first of all inwardly or in its Notion, is just on that account only its immediate, passive, external, particular identity as there-bent.' But see the whole Remark.
that the difficulty concerning the infinite divisibility of matter rests simply on the opposing of continuity to discretion, at the same time that both are one and the same thing; and that the solution, consequently, is effected by pointing out the onesidedness of the opposition, and the necessity of both moments coalescing in the identity of Quantity. The remark ends with some exceedingly interesting references to the Eleatics and to Heraclitus—to Diogenes, who, by walking, supposed himself to refute the sophism (falsely so named) of Zeno in regard to motion—to Aristotle, to Bayle, &c. Hegel bestows great commendation on the Aristotelian solution of the contradictions of Zeno in regard to the Infinite Divisibility, and is evidently convinced of its satisfactoriness. This solution would seem, indeed,—though, of course, far from being accompanied by the ultimate definiteness of the Hegelian vision,—to have been at bottom the same as Hegel's, and to have consisted in the opposing of the concrete whole and real to the opposition of the abstract moments—in the opposing, that is, of the concrete real quantities time, space, matter, motion, &c., to the abstractions continuity and discretion. Hegel observes here—'Bayle, who, in his Dictionary, art. Zenon, finds Aristotle's solution of Zeno's dialectic 'pitoyable," understands not the meaning of, Matter is only in possibility infinitely divisible: he replies, If matter is infinitely divisible, then it actually contains an infinite number of parts; and so what we have is not an infinite en puiss ance, but an infinite that really and actually exists. Rather, the divisibility is itself only a possibility, not an existing so of the parts, and multiplicity is at all attributed to the continuity only as moment, as what is sublated.—Sharp-sighted understanding,—in which, too, Aristotle is very certainly unsurpassed,—is not adequate to comprehend and decide on the speculative notions of this latter, just as little so as the coarseness of sensuous conception already mentioned (Diogenes) is adequate to refute the argumentations of Zeno; said understanding errs in this, that it takes for something—for something true and actual—such mere thought-things, such mere abstractions as an infinite number of parts; while said sensuous conception, on its side, will not let itself be brought beyond what is empirical and up to thoughts.'—

The conclusion here in reference to Diogenes is very clever, for it is made in perception of the possible objection that, after all, the reply of Diogenes to Zeno's argument against the possibility of motion was the same as that of Aristotle,—the opposition, that is,
of the concrete fact to the abstract thought; and that, if there were any difference between the two, it was but one of expression, Aristotle’s reply being couched in terms of the touched (writing), and that of Diogenes in terms of the legs (walking). Hegel has certainly correctly enough prevented this objection.

This on Aristotle here is not without a light of its own for Coleridge, De Quincey, and Sir William Hamilton. At page 102 of his own edition of Reid’s Works, the last-named very distinguished writer will be found averring, in a note, that ‘the fallacy of Zeno’s exposition of the contradictions involved in our notion of motion has not yet been detected’! Within sight of his enormous reputation at once in mastery of the Greek (Aristotle), and in refutation of the German (Hegel and the rest), we may not have been prepared to see Hamilton, either explicitly or implicitly, so commit himself. Coleridge, for his part, will be found saying somewhere that Zeno, in the matter of his contradiction in regard to Infinite Divisibility had forgot to bring Time into account; and De Quincey again exhibits himself somewhere, in commentary on Coleridge, firing up, as usual, into the figurate conception with loud exclamation, that here at last was a voice across the ages solving the mystery! Coleridge’s explanation here may very possibly have been, for very probably was, but a vague mention of Time, a schoolboy’s guess, without sight of what it meant or of what was to be done with it;—Coleridge, in fact, would in all probability have been quite powerless before the rejoinder—Why, Time itself is an example of the same contradiction. Greek and German were not weak points with either Coleridge or De Quincey! It is just possible that Coleridge’s remark and De Quincey’s comment (though with less probability in the case of the latter) preceded 1812 and the Logic of Hegel; but what of Aristotle?—and why should such Grecians not have directly consulted him, well known (Bayle) to have written on the point in question, when they had their attention expressly directed to the Zenonic problem?—Take it as one may, the reality of Hegel stands up at least somewhat in contrast here.*

* Abraham Tucker (‘Light of Nature,’ i. 309) will be found far in advance of De Quincey or Coleridge either, in regard to a relative mention of Time (he knows Zenonim Bayle) Nay, it is all even in Aristotle first of all. In his Physics, B. 6, c. 2, he distinctly says that Time opposes to Space an exactly similar infinitude (αἰ γὰρ αὐτάλ διαφέρειν άνεσα μνήμου καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου—233a 11-16); and therefore (263a 14), εἰ τοίνυν χρόνῳ δὴμοι δύναται τις—οὔδεν ἀπόστολο. See more on this under the Eleatics on the annotations to the translation of Schwegler. Still I may remark at this late day that, put a finite inch, infinitely divisible, into my hand, it would not be possibly infinitely divisible were there not infinite possible parts conceived!—New.
CONTINUOUS AND DISCRETE QUANTITY.

1. Quantity contains the two moments of continuity and discretion. It is to be set in both as its significates. It is immediate unity of these, already at first hand; i.e., it is itself set at first hand only in one of its significates, continuity, and is thus Continuous Quantity.

Or continuity is, indeed, one of the moments of Quantity, which (Quantity) is completed only with the other moment, discretion. But Quantity is concrete unity only so far as it is unity of distinguished moments. These, therefore, are to be taken as distinct and different, certainly—not, nevertheless, to be resolved again into attraction and repulsion, but in their truth each as remaining in its unity with the other, i.e., as the whole. Continuity is only coherent solid unity as unity of the discrete; thus expressed it is no longer only moment, but entire Quantity—continuous Magnitude.

2. Immediate Quantity is continuous magnitude. But Quantity, on the whole, is not an Immediate; Immediacy is a determinateness (a Quality) of which Quantity is the very sublation. It is, therefore, to be set or expressed in the determinateness which is immanent to it: this is the one or unit. Quantity is discrete magnitude.

Discretion is, like continuity, a moment of Quantity; but it is itself also entire Quantity, just because it is a moment in it, in the whole, and, therefore, even as distinguished, steps not out of this whole, not out of its unity with the other moment. Quantity is Aussereinanderseyn, asunderness, out-of-one-another-ness in itself, and continuous magnitude is this asunder-ness as setting itself forward without negation, as a coherence that is equal and alike within itself. But discrete magnitude is this asunder-ness as incontinuous, as interrupted. With this many of ones there are not again present, however, the many of the atom and the void—repulsion in general. Because discrete magnitude is Quantity, its discretion is itself continuous. This continuity of the discrete consists in this, that the ones or units are alike, are equal to one another, or that they have the same unity, the same oneness (i.e., of
being the like of one another). Discrete magnitude is therefore the asunder-ness of the many or repeated One, as of the like (as of this like of one another, or of the sameness), not the many One as such, but expressed as the many or much of one unity.'

The above is an exact translation; and translation is necessitated here by the impossibility of accomplishing any closer summary than the text itself. This is a constant quantity in Hegel, who seldom offers any loose tissue of \textit{raisonnement} to give a chance of distillation or compression into summary. (The true state of the case, then, is, not the impossibility of extracting any sense from Hegel \textit{without} distillation, but this impossibility with distillation, or rather the impossibility of distillation simply.) But little comment seems necessary. The \textit{immediacy} of the continuity of Quantity at first hand depends, it will be remembered, on the qualitative indifference, the value, from which it issued. Indeed, this value, the indifferent For-itself-beënt One, should never be left out of mind here, as it is precisely from this One that Quantity is, or that Quantity derives its peculiar character. The \textit{One} is but the prototype of the discrete, as the \textit{Oneness} is but the prototype of the continuous. The \textit{indifference} of the For-itself-beënt One, is just the \textit{continuance} of this One; there is nothing but One, One, One, onwards \textit{in infinitum}: what is this but Quantity in both of its moments? The reader, in short, must never forget ever and anon to \textit{orient} himself by a reference to the—\textit{sub specie aeternitatis}.—'Immediacy is a determinateness of which Quantity is the very sublation:' we saw this to be the case when Quality passed into Quantity; that transition was simply oneness, immediacy passing into indifference; but still in the indifference there is the immanent \textit{One}, which is the discrete of Quantity: Quantity, then, may be \textit{expressed}, may be set as \textit{explicit}, as \textit{overt} in this its moment of discretion, or it may be so \textit{stated}. Again, this One that is the discrete, is also the One, One, One, the One-ness that is the continuous; and either moment is Quantity and the same Quantity, the discrete as the One at all, the continuous as the one One of, or through, all the Ones. This will suffice also to supply the necessary commentary to what follows as regards 'the like of one another,' &c. The derivation of our \textit{asunder} from the German auseinander will also be obvious. The reader must be struck with the marvellous truth to the nature of Quantity contained in language that is meant in the first instance to apply only to the indifferent
absolute One we had reached in Quality. This is the true nature, then, of the Hegelian progress, as it is of thought, and just of the universe in general,—Setzen, explicitation; whatever at any time we have before us suddenly becomes explicit as another, a new. The phrase many One has been necessitated by the corresponding phrase of the original; it will be found not to shock if the reader read with his mind thoroughly addressed to the self-equal, self-like (discrete) One, that is also the many (continuous) One, of the one, but continued, For-itself-beent One. The indifference is the many One,—the continuum; but the one One that is persistently immanent all this time in the indifference, in the continuance, is the like One, the One of the Oneness,—the discretum. Both are the same, both are quantity; or quantity is only at once through their sameness and their distinction: without immanent difference or distinction there is no such thing as recognition of an Inhalt, an object, a concrete, in any case; and in every case the question is which moment is the set one, the express or explicit one, and which is the implicit one that is for the time only in itself?—Bestimmung, it will be seen, has been translated significate; it might have been translated function; but, indeed, Bestimmung always refers to signification, denotation. As regards the immediacy, in which Quantity appears as continuous, it is to be remarked that the first moment of the Notion in all its forms is one of immediacy: it is always the moment of identity, of understanding or simple apprehension, and that is immediacy. The three moments may be respectively named, then, immediacy, mediacy, and mediated, or re-mediated, immediacy: Apprehension (understanding) takes up just what is before it; Judgment refuses it as it is, and asks for it in another; Reason resumes. Re-extrication of the moments from each new whole, and in the form, or with the peculiar nature, of this new whole, is the spring and the means of the movement, or just the movement: thus Being acting on Nothing, but in Becoming, arose as Origin, while Nothing acting on Being, but in Becoming, arose as Decease; Being acting on Nothing, but in There-being, re-appeared as Reality, and Nothing acting on Being, but in There-being, re-appeared as Negation; Being acting on Nothing, but in Something, manifested itself as, Ansichseyn, In-itself-ness, the Something’s own being, and Nothing acting on Being, but in the Something, manifested itself as the Being-for-other, the Being of the Something when
under the negation of another, that is, relatively to another, and so on.

**Remark.**

*The usual separation of these Quantities.*

‘In the ordinary figurate conceptions of continuous and discrete magnitude, it escapes notice that each of these magnitudes has *in it* both moments, as well continuity as discretion, and that their difference depends only on which is the *explicit* determinateness, and which that that is only *in itself*. Time, space, matter, &c., are continuous magnitudes in that they are repulsions from themselves, a fluent Coming-out-of-self, that is at the same time not a going over or a relation to a qualitative other. They possess an absolute possibility of One being set anywhere and everywhere in them; this not as the empty possibility of a mere otherwiseness (as if one should say, it were possible that in place of this stone there were a tree); but they possess the principle of the One in themselves, it is the One of the factors which compose them.

‘Conversely in the case of discrete quantity the presence of continuity is not to be overlooked; this moment, as has been shown, is One as oneness.

‘Continuous and discrete magnitudes are capable of being regarded as species of Quantity only if the magnitude is not set under any external determinateness (as a certain So-much), but under the *peculiar distinctions or determinatenesses of its own moments*; the ordinary transition from genus to species is such as to render the former liable to the ascription of *external* distinctions dependent on some distributive principle *external* to it. Withal, continuous and discrete magnitudes are not *quantita*; they are only Quantity itself in each of its two forms. They may be named magnitudes so far, perhaps, as they have this in common with the *Quantum*, that they are a peculiar determinateness in Quantity.’

This Remark is also an exact translation, and little comment seems necessary. The One as Oneness is continuity; Oneness as One is discretion. The distinctions will not remain in *dry* self-identity: the Geometrical point is potential space, Attraction is Repulsion, Repulsion is Motion, &c., and the question always is, which elementary distinction is overt, express, explicit, ostensive, and which latent, implicit, indicated, indirect, &c.? Setzen contains the whole mystery: the Moon here is always either full 2 x
THE SECRET OF HEGEL.

or new. [A concrete must have difference and identity; mere difference were dissolution, and mere identity were equally extinction. Space has both principles; so also time; and these, though both pure quantities, are still different. The one and the many of space are at once and together. The one of time never is and always is; its one is its many, its many its one: time is thus a symbol of the absolute.

C.

LIMITATION OF QUANTITY.

The discrete magnitude has firstly the One as its principle, and is secondly multiplicity of the Ones; thirdly, it is essentially continuous, it is the One at the same time as a sublated One, as One-ness, self-continuation as such in the discretion of the Ones. It is set, therefore, as a magnitude, and the peculiar determinateness of such magnitude is the One which in this position and particular being is excluded One—limit in the unity. The discrete magnitude as such is supposed to be immediately not limited; but as distinguished from the continuous magnitude it is as a There-being (a special Beingness) and a Something, the determinateness of which is the One which One as in a There-being is also first Negation and Limit.

This limit, besides being referred to the unity, and besides being negation in this unity, is as One also referred to itself, and thus it is encompassing and containing limit. The limit distinguishes itself not in the first instance here from the Something of its There-being, but is as One immediately this negative point itself. But the being that is here limited is essentially as continuity, by virtue of which it is beyond the limit and this One, and is in that regard indifferent. The real discrete Quantity is thus a Quantity, or Quantum,—Quantity as a There-being and Something.

In that the One which is limit, contains the many Ones of the discrete quantity within itself, it sets these no less as sublated within it; it is thus limit in the continuity as such, and so the difference between continuous and discrete magnitude is here indifferent; or more correctly, it is limit in the continuity of the one, as much as in that of the other; in it both undergo transition into Quanta.'

These three paragraphs (of C.) are exactly translated, but
sufficiently difficult. Intelligence must be sought sub specie aeternitatis in the first instance—we must return to look again at the indifferent absolute One with which we entered Quantity. The One, the many Ones, the one One: all lies there; these are the 1, 2, 3 with which Hegel starts. In the indifferent life of the absolute One now, the One, the Unit, is still as the principle, but it continues, or is the many Ones, and also when it refers back to these and the series of these, it is one One and a Quantity, or Quantum. In its indifference it is certainly ‘essentially continuous;’ ‘it is the One as sublated One, as Unity;’ it is its own ‘self-continuation in the discretion of the Ones.’ It is thus a quantity, and the peculiar specificity of this quantity depends on the One that is its limit. A ten depends on the tenth. This One (the tenth) is seen also to be the excludent One. The quantity to which this One is limit is characterised as Daseyn, as Etwas, and as dieses Gesetztseyn. Etwas is, of course, translated only Something; Daseyn now as There-being (special Beingness), and again as particular being. As for Gesetztseyn, it will be found translated on this occasion, and not infelicitously, by ‘in this position.’ But why these words are used in this place requires a word of explanation. The key to the whole lies in what has taken place: the one is One, as continued it is many Ones, but as continued it is also one One. Now this last step is as a reflexion from other or others into self; but that is precisely the constitution of Something. Again, the continuance through the series of the Ones is a Werden, a Becoming, while its suspension (by the reflexion alluded to) gives rise to a Daseyn, a There-being, a definite relative So-ness. Lastly, the reflexion is a Setzen, and the result is a Gesetztseyn; the reflexion is only an explicitation of what was before implicit, and the result is a new explicitness, a new position, where this last word may be considered an equivoque of and between its ordinary and its logical senses. It will not be difficult to see now, then, that discrete magnitude, passing through these reflexions, has become a magnitude, the precise value or determinateness of which depends on the One from which the reflexion back was made; this One is the limit or the excludent One in the new position, or special There-ness which has been just effected through the reflexion. The tenth One in a ten will readily illustrate all this. The tenth One is the limit, the excludent One, the barrier that stops entrance to all other Ones; but it is the reflexion of this tenth One into the other Ones that gives birth to the particular and peculiar
and every way unique and special quantity Ten or a Ten; the whole acquires the edge the specificity of this One; each of the other Ones is as it—a tenth; each of the other Ones is it; from it is the new explicitation, the new position, the new There-ness, the new Something—Ten. The Ten is at first as ten units—discrete—without any definite boundary line—but these ten as distinguished from the possible continuation or continuity onwards into and through other units, are a special definite There-ness and So-ness, a special definite Something of which the One (the tenth) is at once the specificity, and also—as in a There-being (negated, suspended Becoming)—the first negation and limit. Thus far the first paragraph; which being thoroughly understood, the two remaining ones will not be difficult. The reader, however, may object here—why the digression?—why leap from the very absolute of absolutes to a thing so very everyday and common as the number ten? We answer, there is no necessity for the digression; all must still be conceived as sub specie aeternitatis; the number ten is but an empirical illustration. The life, so to speak, of the qualitative One, now a quantitative One, is still to be pursued by the clue and the virtue of the pure notion. What is, is now pure Quantity, sublated Quality, Determinateness external to its own self, an indefinitely continuous outering or uttering of itself of the One as One, One, One; but it is the pure notion that is so characterised, and whatever is implicit in this characterisation, that notion shall duly set or make explicit for us. Now One,—and One, One, One,—and again One that, referring back, resumes these One-One-Ones, is very fairly the movement of the notion in such an element. Not only is such movement characteristic of the element as element, but on the other side, it is the characteristic movement of the notion itself;—it is again apprehension, judgment, and reason; it is again identity, difference, and identified difference, or differentiated identity; it is again immediacy, mediacy, and re-mediated immediacy, or just immediate mediacy. This being seen, another deep glance into Hegel has been effected with realisation of the distinction that Hegel is not only true to the principle, the notion, but true to the element also; and so only is it that what he says is the exhaustive metaphysic, even in an external sense, of whatever sphere he enters. A great deal has been written about cause and effect, for example, but it will be found that Hegel alone, with vigilant eye immovably fixed on
the pure notion, has been enabled to speak the ultimate word, even as external explanation, on this subject also. The number ten, then, illustrates, but it does not create the present phase of the absolute or of the notion; that phase is one of pure Quantity, and is applicable not to numbers only, but to extension as well. There are many readers to whom all this prosecution of a One, One, One, &c., will appear but trifling—a trifling wholly unworthy of grown men: even so, to an external eye, a bearded Archimedes scratching lines, triangles, squares, circles, &c., might seem but a great boy very unworthily employing himself. Archimedes, however, through these scratches brought no less a power than that of Rome to bay; through these scratches Archimedes and the like enabled us to move mountains and to change seas, enabled us to seize Space and Time themselves: these scratches, indeed, have been to us the express successive steps heavenwards. So Hegel, following these soap-bubbles of One, One, One, &c., has made us freemen of the absolute itself.

The tenth of the ten will be found to illustrate the first sentence of the second paragraph also; it is 'referred to the unity'—Ten; it is 'negation in this unity;' it stops Ten there, and it stops others off from Ten; it is also 'referred to itself;'—it is the Tenth, and so each of the others is a Tenth, and the Ten itself has in it (the Tenth) its own particular value or virtue; and thus is it 'encompassing and containing limit.' The Ten—to follow the next sentence—are thus in the Tenth, the limit, 'this negative point itself'; the Tenth, then, is thus not distinguished from the Something, the Ten. Still the ten are a 'Being—essentially continuity—a Ten—beyond this limit,' this single One, the Tenth, and in that respect 'indifferent to it.' It is thus a Quantity, and a Something with a specific There-ness or peculiar nature.

The last paragraph opens with renewed consideration of the tenth unit of the ten; as it is it which gives the whole peculiar character of the number—a ten—it is the qualitative and quantitative limit; quantitatively it limits the continuity; qualitatively it absorbs into itself all the other units—each is a tenth, but only through it; it is thus limit in the continuity generally, limit to the continuity as such, and limit also, as it were, to the continuity of the discreetes themselves (in that it sums and absorbs them). Thus is it that—(the tenth unit sublating, absorbing, or taking up into itself both)—'con-
tinuous and discrete magnitude is here indifferent; or that 'both undergo transition into Quanta;' the discretes becoming each a tenth and so in continuity ten—through the limiting tenth.

The reader will find the illustration here a very perfect key to a very blank door indeed of indefinite abstraction. Nevertheless, it is always to the absolute that the reader must first address himself; only so will he find himself at home also, if we may speak thus, with soap, soda, and pearl-ash.

What is explicit now is Quantity as such—whether discrete or continuous—reduced to Limit,—let us well observe this.
CHAPTER II.

Quantum.

'The Quantum, first of all Quantity with a Determinateness or Limit in general,—is in its perfect Determinateness the Number (the Digit or Cipher). The Quantum distinguishes itself—

'secondly, in the first instance, into the extensive Quantum, in which the limit is as limitation of the there-beent multiplex (or many); in the second instance, (this There-being passing into Being-for-self)—into intensive Quantum, Degree, which, as for-itself, and even so no less immediately out of itself, seeing that it is as indifferent limit even when for-itself,—has its determinateness in another. As this express contradiction, to be thus simply determined within itself and at the same time to have its determinateness out of itself, and to point for this determinateness out of itself, the Quantum passes over—

'thirdly, as what is expressly in itself external to itself, into the Quantitative Infinite.'

If not intelligible now, this division will become intelligible by the end of the chapter. The many, the multiplex, the ones, or units of extensive Quanta, are evidently there-beent; they are not ansich; they are distinguishably there; they are relative distinctivity there; they are palpably there—sensibly there; and they are what they are through negation of Becoming, Limit.

A.

The Number or Digit.

'Quantity is Quantum, or has a limit; both as continuous and as discrete magnitude. The difference of these kinds has here at first hand no import.'

This has just been seen: the limit of the continuum is the limit also of, or affects with its own virtue, the discreta.

'As sublated Being-for-self, Quantity is already in and for itself
indifferent to its limit. But withal the limit, or to be a Quantum, is just so not indifferent to it; for it contains the One, absolute determinedness, within itself as its own moment, which One, therefore, as explicit in its continuity or unity, is its limit, which, however, remains as One, as which One it (the Quantity) now on the whole is.'

This is intelligible when viewed sub specie aeternitatis, and also when illustrated as before by ten, &c. Sublated Being-for-self is, as it were, punctuality gone over out of itself into its own opposite, and that is Quantity.

'This One is, therefore, the principle and principium of the Quantum, but as one of Quantity. So it is, firstly, continuous, it is oneness or unity; secondly, it is discrete, implicit (as in continuous) or (as in discrete magnitude) explicit multiplicity of Ones, which have equality, likeness, sameness, continuity, the same oneness or unity with one another; thirdly, this One is also the negation of the many Ones as simple limit, an exclusion of its otherwiseness out of itself, a determination of itself counter other Quanta. The One is so far, (α) limit referent of self to self, (β) self-comprehensive limit, and (γ) other-excluding limit.'

All this is pretty much what we saw already under (C.), 'Limitation of Quantity,' and it is quite susceptible of the same illustration: the tenth unit may be seen—or has been seen—to take up each of these three attitudes towards itself, towards the other units, and in sublation of these. This is so easy of application now, that no more need be said. 'An exclusion of its otherwiseness out of itself:' in the ten there are 1, 2, 3, &c.; now these, as 1, 2, 3, &c., are the otherwiseness, but they are excluded as otherwiseness by the tenth, and have become equally tenth, converted, that is, into the one identity.

'The Quantum in these forms completely explicit is the Number (the Cipher, the Digit). The complete position or explicitation lies in the special nature of the limit as multiplicity, and so in its distinction as well from the unity. The Number appears on this account as a discrete magnitude, but it has in the unity equally continuity. It is therefore, thus, the Quantum in perfect determinateness (specificity); this, inasmuch as the limit in the digit is as determinate multiplicity, which has for principle the One, the directly determinate. Continuity (as that in which the One is only in itself, or as sublated), expressed as unity, is the form of indeterminateness, indefiniteness.'
To return to the paragraph of the text immediately preceding the last, for a moment—we would observe that the division or distribution with which it ends is exceedingly instructive, inasmuch as the general principle of such movement comes very clearly to the surface. Number, meaning any number or digit, is a limit, firstly, Self-referent; secondly, Self-comprehensive; thirdly, Excludent of other. The self-reference is identity, immediacy, simple apprehension, but in the element before us—unity. The comprehendingness, embracingness, clipping or shutting about-ness (Umschliessend) of the Second is difference, mediacy, reference to other, judgment, but, in the present element, many. Under the third head we have what Hegel may be described as always specially bringing us, the Remedy, the Re-mediacy, identity through difference, that is, differentiated identity or identified difference, reference to self through reference to other, an othered self, or a selfed other, a concrete determinate definite One, the moment of reason, but here, in this element, a numerical whole, a Number. That is (with special regard to the element), unity and amount (amount of constitutive unities, that is,—Einheit und Anzahl) are the moments of the number, the cipher, the digit. The concrete, then, is the number, and the moments can be seen in its regard to be, the one, identity, and the other, difference, and both, so far, relatively abstract. Quantity, as a whole, might be more simply divided into the universal—Quantity, the particular—Tantity, and the singular—Quantified Tantity or Tantified Quantity (which last is just Quantitative Relation). In the same way, Quality might have been divided into Quality, Tality, and Qualified Tality, or Talified Quality (Being-for-self). The parallelism of the other triplets which we now know, will readily suggest itself. As regards the general division of the whole, Logic, Nature, Spirit, it can be seen to be quite parallel with Quality, Quantity, and Measure,—with Universal, Particular, and Singular, &c. &c. As for the division of Logic into Seyn (Being), Wesen (Essence), and Begriff (Notion), it is strikingly parallel with Kant's Categories of Relation, as if Hegel had said to himself, Logic is the Subject inquiring into the Object, that is, into its own relations. Now Kant's Categories of Relation are—Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity. Seyn (Being) is analogous to Substance; historically, it is the logic or philosophy of the Greeks, whose constant inquiry
was, What is this Seyn, this Being? A question to which there were such answers as, water, air, fire, the one, becoming, number, the atom, intelligence, and lastly, that of Socrates, which, though in a particular element, was *an sich* or *in itself*, the abstract generalised notion afterwards perfected by Aristotle through Plato into Formal Logic. We may say, then, here that the Subject (among the Greeks, that is) had not as yet got beyond Simple Apprehension, Understanding; at the same time, it is to be admitted that Aristotle names, and occupies himself to some extent with, the concrete generalised, or universal, notion. Wesen, Essentia, is the platform of the modern world, which, up to Kant, had demanded, in regard to the Object, What is its cause? or, what is the same thing, What is it in another? And what is this but Judgment declaring the Object *nothing as per se?* Kant for his part inaugurated the reign of Reason: his industry was Reason *an sich, in itself*; he declared the Wesen, the essential principle and nature, to be the Notion—or Notional Reciprocity. Into this final form at least, into the absolute or concrete Universal, the conception of Kant has been perfected by Hegel. Socrates reached the abstract Notion, then, and Aristotle completed it into the abstract Logic; but Kant discovered the concrete Notion, and Hegel completed it into the concrete Logic. This single sentence tells the whole tale. The concrete Notion, as it manifests itself in Hegel, is perhaps, at shortest, this—*The Absolute is relative.* Sufficient reflection, indeed, will soon disclose the fact, that an absolute implies *relativity*,—that an absolute is an absolute just because of its relativity, or just because of the relativity it contains. The general method of Hegel, then, is, in accordance with this constitution of the nature of things, always to extricate from any absolute—any self-identical whole may be considered an absolute—its own necessary relativity, the opposition of which latter to the former, the absoluteness, results in the collapse of both into a concrete and new identity. All this has been already said in a variety of forms: it is simply the Being-in-itself-ness and the Being-for-other-ness,—in ultimate abstraction it is just Being and Nothing. The generalisation of Socrates, then, which issued in abstract induction and abstract deduction, has, in the hands of Hegel, been, as it were, *doubled*, and doubled into a concrete: at any time that advance is made to a generalised identity, note must be made of the other side, also, of the generalised difference
or relativity, which will be found necessarily to constitute and
give its peculiar filling to that identity. The perception of this
double constitution of the nature of thought, and consequently of
things, it is, that has enabled Hegel to reverse the process of
Socrates; that is, instead of ascending from the immediate object
to universal notions, to descend from these last according to their
truth, and that is to say, by their own necessary self-genetic chain,
which ends not but in the system of the whole—a system that
comprises and gives meaning and place even to the contingency
and isolated singleness of the external immediate.*

Passing to the last paragraph translated, it is not difficult to
see that the number qua number is the Quantum completely
explicit in the forms mentioned. 'This complete position or
explicitation lies, &c.'—that is, the principle or reason of this
process expressed by these forms lies, &c. The definition that
occurs at the end, of the 'Form of Indefiniteness,' is exceedingly
happy.

'The Quantum only as such has a limit; its limit is its abstract,
simple determinateness. But the Quantum being a number, this
limit is expressly as manifold within itself. It (the number)
contains the many ones which constitute its distinctive being;
contains them, however, not in an indefinite manner, but the
determinateness of the limit falls into them; the limit excludes
other units, other distinctive being, and the units included by it
are a determinate number—the amount, to which, as the discretion
in the way in which it is in the number, the other is the unity,
the continuity of the same number. Amount and unity constitute
the moments of number.

' As regards amount, we must see more closely how the many
ones of which it consists are in the limit; the expression is correct
that the amount consists of the many, for the ones are in it not as
sublated, but they are in it, only expressed with the excluding
limit, to which they, however, are indifferent. But it is not so
to them. In the case of There-being (distinctive being), the
relation of the limit to it had firstly expressed itself so, that the
There-being remained standing as the affirmative on this side of
its limit, and it (the limit), the negation, found itself without by
the border; in like manner as regards the many ones, the breaking-
off with them and the exclusion of any others appears as a
circumstance which falls outside of the included ones. But we saw

* That external immediate is Nature.—New.
there that the limit pervades the There-being, reaches as far as it, and that the Something is thereby, as regards its determination, limited, i.e. finite. Thus, in the quantitativity of number, we conceive a hundred—say—so that the hundredth one, or unit, alone appears to limit the many in such wise that they are a hundred. This is right on one side; but then, again, among the hundred ones no one has any preference, for they are only equal; each is equally the hundredth; they belong all of them, therefore, to the limit, by which limit the number is a hundred: this number cannot want any one of them for its special determinateness; the others make up thus apart from the hundredth one no There-being (distinctivity) that were without the limit or within the limit, or in general different from it. The amount is not therefore a many as against the including, limiting one or unit, but constitutes itself this limitation, which is a determinate Quantum; the many form a number, a Two, a Ten, a Hundred, &c.

'The limiting one, now, is determinedness counter other, distinction of the number from others. But this distinction is not qualitative determinateness, but remains quantitative, falls only into the external reflexion that compares; a number remains as a one turned back into itself, and indifferent to others. This indifference of a number to others is an essential characteristic of it; this it is that constitutes the In-itself-ness (the independent self-subsistence) of its nature, but at the same time its peculiar externality. It is such numerical one, as the absolutely determined one that has at the same time the form of simple immediacy, to which, therefore, any reference to other is perfectly external. The one that is a number has further its determinateness, so far as that determinateness is reference-to-other, as its moments within itself, in its distinction of unity and amount, and the amount is itself a many of ones, i.e., there is within itself this absolute externality. This contradiction of Number or of Quantum in general within itself is the quality of quantum, and this contradiction will develop itself as the characterisation of this quality proceeds.'

There-being, as used in this connexion, refers to the special values of the various numbers; a Two, a Ten, a Hundred, &c., can be seen to have a Daseyn, a There-being of its own, a peculiar distinctivity which belongs to it and to nothing else. This throws light on Daseyn itself, which is always thus, as it were, the peculiar and differentiating sensibleness or palpableness of anything whatever; it is distinctive relativity. That it and its
peculiarity arise, too, from a negated Werden—here a counting forward, one, two, three, &c.—is also well seen in this example. The irrespective independent apathy, neutrality, and externality of number are well touched. Bestimmtheit, determinateness, is also well seen here to convey absolute peculiarity, specificity, &c.—anything's express and constitutive point. The reader has, in regard to these passages, already sufficient illustration at command, and we may pass to

Remark I.

The Arithmetical Operations.

An important critique on Kant contained here also we shall reserve for notice elsewhere; the remaining matter we shall endeavour to summarise—a process, as regards Hegel, possible only at rare intervals, and, for the most part, as here, only in the Remarks.

"Magnitude as in space (geometrical) and magnitude as in number (arithmetical), though bearing the one on continuity and the other on discretion, and so far different, are usually regarded as equally kinds of the same thing, as equally Quanta, and as equally determinate. But what holds of continuity cannot have the same keenness of limit, determinateness, as what holds of discretion. Geometrical limitation is limitation quite generally; for precision of determinateness it requires number. Geometry measures not, is not mensuration,—it compares, it likens together. Its distinctions proceed by like and unlike. It is thus the circle—its nature being absolute likeness of distance on the part of every circumferential point as regards the single central one—has no need of number. Like and unlike are characters, then, veritably geometrical; but they are insufficient, and number is called in, as we see in triangle, quadrangle, &c. Number has in its principle—the one—complete self-determinateness, and not determinateness, as in comparison, through another. There is the geometrical point, a one certainly, but in the line, &c., the point is no longer the point, it is out of itself into continuity—another; as essentially a one of space, it becomes, when in reference (i.e., in connexion), a continuity, in which punctuality, self-determinateness, the one, is sublated. To maintain the self-determinateness of the one in the Out-of-self-ness of the continuity, the line must be taken as a
many or multiple of ones, and must receive within itself the limit, the determinateness, the conjunct virtue, of the many or multiplicity; i.e., the magnitude of the line—and so of the rest—must be taken as number.

'Arithmetic considers, rather operates with, number, for number is indifferent determinateness, inert, to be brought into action and reference only from without. The arithmetical rules concern the modes of reference or connexion. They are rehearsed in succession, and seem to depend on one another, but no principle of mutual connexion is exhibited. From the nature of the notion of number, however, such principle of systematic co-reference may be deduced.

'From its principle, the One, number is but an externally united compound, a purely analytic figure, without internal connexion. As thus externally generated, all counting is a production of numbers, a numbering, or, more definitely, a numbering together. Difference in this external operation, which is always the same, can come only from the mutual difference of the numbers operated on, and must always depend on an external consideration.

'Numbers as Quanta are externally distinguished by external identity and external difference, or by likeness and unlikeness, characters which fall to be considered elsewhere. But the nature of number depending on the qualitative distinction of unity and amount, it is from that distinction that all others will follow.

'Again, external composition plainly infers external decomposition; so that a traffic with numbers in general must either, as composing, be positive, or, as decomposing, negative, and the particular species of this traffic, though following, will remain independent of, this antithesis.

'The first production of number is the composing of many ones just as many ones,—Numeration. Such externality is only externally exhibited by help of the fingers, points, counters, &c.; what Three is, or Four is, can only be pointed out. Cessation, the limit of the operation being so completely external, can only be contingent or at will. A system of numbers, dyadic, decadic, &c., turns on the distinction of unity and amount, and more precisely on what amount is to be considered as unity.

'Numbers, produced by numeration, are again numbered—Addition; and here from their origin the numbers are evidently mutually independent, mutually indifferent to likeness or unlikeness, mutually contingent—hence unlike in general. That 7 + 5
=12 we learn from actual counting in the first instance, and know afterwards from memory. It is the same thing with \(7 \times 5 = 35\). The ready-made tables of addition and multiplication save us the trouble of always repeating such external counting; but there is no process of internal reasoning or special intuition in the whole matter. Subtraction is the negative complement of the same operation that obtains in Addition;—a decomposition, equally analytic, of numbers equally characterised as unlike in general.

The next step is that the numbers which enter into the numeration are equal or like, and no longer unequal or unlike. They form thus a unity, and are subject to amount. This is Multiplication—the counting up of an amount of unities, the unities being themselves pluralities or amounts. Of the two numbers, either may be indifferently viewed as unity or as amount: 4 times 3 is not different from 3 times 4. Immediate assignment, in such cases, has been already shown to result from previous process and the intervention of memory. Division is the negative side of the same operation, and rests on the same distinction. How often (the amount) is a number (the unity) contained in another number? This is the same question as, A number being divided into a given amount of equal parts, what is the magnitude of this part (the unity)? Divisor and quotient are thus indifferently unity or amount.

The final step in the equalisation is, that the unity and the amount, which in the first instance (as opposed to each other simply as numbers generally) are to be considered as on the whole unlike or unequal, become now like or equal. Numeration, the equality that lies in number being thus completed, is now involution, the negative complement of which is evolution. Of this process, the Square is the perfect type, further involution being but a formal continuation, with repetition of equality as result, or with divergence into inequality. No other distinctions and no other equalisations of such are to be found in the notion of the number or cipher. So is the notion constituted in this sphere; and thus by a going back into itself is the going out of itself balanced. The imperfection of solution in the case of higher equations, or the necessary reduction of these to Quadratics, receives light from the principles enunciated. The square in arithmetic, like the right-angled triangle, as explicated by the theorem of Pythagoras, in geometry, is the pure self-complete
determinateness of its sphere, and to the one as to the other the remaining particularities of the respective spheres reduce themselves.

'Number in relation is no longer immediate Quantum, and proportion finds its place in the following section on Maass or Measure.

'The externality of the matter of number leaves no room for philosophy proper, or the exposition of the notion as such, which depends ever on immanent development. Here, nevertheless, the moments of the notion manifest themselves, as in external fashion, in equality and inequality; and the subject is exhibited in its true understanding. Distinction of sphere is in philosophy a general necessity: what is external and contingent is in its peculiarity not to be disturbed by ideas, and these are not to be deformed or reduced to mere formality by the incommensurableness of the matter.'

It is easy to object to these Hegelian classifications, that there are really only two operations in Arithmetic, addition and subtraction, and that devotion to the notion is here too obviously, too betrayingly external. It is to be said, however, that multiplication and quadrature really are these qualitative ascents. As regards the Square in especial, the qualitativeness which it seems to introduce will be found afterwards to have taken a strong hold of Hegel.

**Remark 2.**

*Application of Numerical Distinctions in Expression of Philosophical Notions.*

This is a very admirable Note, both important and characteristic: without losing matter we shall endeavour as much as possible to compress, however.

'Numbers, as is well known, have been applied by the Pythagoreans, and—especially in the form of powers—by certain moderns in indication or expression of relations of thought; and they have also appeared to possess such purity of form as to constitute them a most appropriate element in the interest of education—an element closest to the thinking spirit, and closest also to the fundamental relations of the universe.

'We have seen Number to be the absolute determinateness (as it were, point) of Quantity, determinateness in itself, and at the same time quite external; its element is the difference become
indifferent. Arithmetic is analytic; difference and connexion in its object are not internal to it, but come from without. It has no concrete object with latent inner relations to be made explicit by express effort of thought. It holds not the notion, nor does its problem concern comprehending (notional) thought; it is rather the opposite of that. What is connected is indifferent to the connexion, which itself is without necessity; thought, then, in such an element finds the effort required of it an utter outering of itself—an effort in which it must do itself the violence to move without thinking and connect what is insusceptible of necessity. The object is the abstract thought of Externality itself.

As such thought of externality, Number is at the same time an abstraction from the sensuous multiplex; of this it has retained nothing but the abstract form of externality: sense thus in it is brought closest to thought; it is the pure thought of the precise externalisation of thought.

The thinking spirit that would raise itself above the sensuous world and recognise its substance may, in the quest of an element for its pure conception, for the expression of its essential substance, and before it apprehends thought itself as this element and wins for its exhibition a pure spiritual expression, stumble on the choice of number, this internal, abstract externality. So is it that early in the history of philosophy we find number applied in expression of philosophemes. It constitutes the latest stage in that imperfection which contemplates the universal unpurged from sense. The ancients, and specially Plato, as reported by Aristotle, placed the concerns of mathematic between the Ideas and Sense; as invisible and unmoved (eternal) different from the latter, and as a Many and a Like different from the Ideas which are such as are purely self-identical and one in themselves. Moderatus of Cadiz remarks that the Pythagoreans had recourse to numbers because they were not yet in a position to apprehend distinctly in reason fundamental ideas and first principles, which are hard to think and hard to enunciate; but numbers were to them as figures to Geometers—signs merely, and it is superfluous to remark that these philosophers had really advanced to the more express categories, as is recorded by Photius. These ancients, then, were, in fact, much in advance of those moderns who have returned to numbers and put a perverted mathematical formalism in the place of thought and thoughts—regarding, indeed, this return to an incapable infancy

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as something praiseworthy, and even fundamental and profound.

'Number has been characterised as between the Ideas and Sense, and as holding of the latter by this that it is in it a many, an asunder or out-of-one-another; but it is to be said also that this many itself, this remainder of Sense taken up into thought, is thought's own category of the External as such. The further, concrete, true thoughts, what is quickest and most living, what is comprehended only in co-reference, connexion,—this transplanted to such element of outwardness is converted into something motionless and dead. The richer thoughts become in determinateness, and consequently in reference, so much the more confused on one side and so much the more arbitrary and empty on the other side becomes their statement in such forms as numbers are.

'To designate the movement of the notion by one, two, three, &c., this to thought is a task the hardest; for it is to expect it to move in the element of its own contrary, of reference-lessness; its employment is to be the work of sheer derangement. To comprehend, e.g., that three are one and one three, this is a hard imposition, because the one, the unit, is what is reference-less, what shows not therefore in itself any character that might mediate transition, but rather, on the contrary, excludes and rejects any such reference. Conversely mere understanding uses this as against Speculative truth (as, e.g., in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity), and counts the terms which are to constitute a single unity as if in demonstration of a self-evident absurdity,—i.e., it itself commits the absurdity of reducing that which is reference pure and simple into what is precisely reference-less. By the name Trinity, it is never expected that the unit and the digit are to be regarded by understanding as the essential burthen of the object. This name expresses on the part of reason contempt of understanding, which again, for its part, stubborn itself against reason, and fixes itself in its conceit of holding to the unit and to number as such.*

'To employ mathematical characters as symbols is, so far as that goes, harmless; but it is silly to suppose that in this way more is expressed than what thought itself is able to hold and express. If in such meagre symbols as those of mathematic, or in those richer

* Connexion and connexionless were here, perhaps, better for Beziehung, &c., than reference, &c. Still a button, a hook or an eye, a hat-pin, each by itself shows reference in it: it can but mean connexion.—N.
ones of mythology and poetry, any deep sense is to be supposed, then it is for thought alone to summon into day the wisdom that lies only in them, and not only as in symbols, but as in Nature and the living Spirit. In symbols the truth is only troubled and enveloped by the sensuous element; only in the form of thought is it thoroughly revealed to consciousness: the meaning, the import, is only the thought itself.

'To apply the forms of mathematic in explication of philosophy, has this of preposterous, that only in the latter can the ultimate import of the former be expected to yield itself. It is to logic, and not to mathematic, that the other sciences must apply for that logical element in which they move and to which they reduce themselves; that philosophy should seek its logic in the forms (but omens or sophistications of it)* it assumes in other sciences, is but an expedient of philosophical incapacity. The application of such borrowed forms is but external; inquiry into their worth and import must precede the application; such inquiry belongs to abstract thought, and cannot be superseded by any mathematical or other such authority. The result of such pure logical inquiry is to strip off the particularity (mathematical or other) of the form, and to render it superfluous and unnecessary: in short, it is logic that clears and rectifies all such forms, and alone provides them with verification, sense, and worth.

'As for the value of Number in the element of education, that is contained in the preceding. Number is a non-sensuous object, and occupation with it and its combinations a non-sensuous employment; thought is drawn in thus to reflexion within itself and an inward and abstract labour—a matter of great but one-sided import. For number involving the difference as only external and thought-less, such employment is but a thought-less and mechanical one. The endeavour consists, for the most part, in holding fast the notion-less and in notion-less-ly combining it. The object is the void unit; the solid burthen of the moral and spiritual universe, with which, as the noblest aliment, Education should fill full the young, is to be supplanted by the import-less unit; with no possible result, such exercise being what is main and chief, but to deaden and stupify the mind, emptying it, at the same time, both of form and substance. Numerical calculation being a business so very mechanical and external, it has been

* Shadowings (or foreshadowings) for Ahnungen, as scotchings for Verkummerungen, would hit the meaning better here! —N.
possible to construct machines capable of performing all the operations of arithmetic, and that most perfectly. This alone were decisive of calculation as principal mean of education—and of the propriety of stretching the thinking spirit on the wheel in order to be perfected into a machine.'

B.

EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE QUANTUM.

a. Their Difference.

The paragraphs under this head are again eligible for exact translation, the metaphysic being at once eminently characteristic and eminently intelligible.

'1. The Quantum has, as the result showed, its determinateness as limit in the amount. It is discrete within itself, a many which has not a being (an esse) that were different from its limit, or that might have this latter out of it. The Quantum thus constituted with its limit, which is a multiple in itself, is extensive magnitude.

'Extensive is to be distinguished from Continuous magnitude; to the former there stands directly opposed, not discrete, but intensive magnitude. Extensive and intensive magnitudes are peculiarities of the quantitative limit, but the Quantum is identical with its limit; continuous and discrete magnitudes, again, are forms of Quantity in itself, i.e., of quantity as such, so far as in regard to the Quantum, the limit is abstracted from. Extensive magnitude has the moment of continuity in itself and in its limit, in that its many in general is continuous; the limit as negation appears so far in this equality of the many as limitation of the unity. Continuous magnitude is quantity setting itself forward without respect to a limit; and so far as it is already conceived with one, this is a limitation generally, without discretion being explicit in it. The Quantum, only as continuous magnitude, is not yet veritably determined per se, because it wants the one, the unit, in which self-determinateness lies, and number. In like manner discrete magnitude is immediately only distinguished plurality in general, which, so far as it as such is to have a limit, is only a multiplicity (eine Menge), that is to say, it is what is indefinitely limited. To be a definite Quantum, to that there is necessary the taking together of the many into one, by which this many were set identical with the limit. Each of them, continuous and discrete
magnitude, as Quantum in general, has only one of the two sides explicit in it, whereby it is perfectly determined and as number. This (the number) is immediately extensive Quantum,—the _simple_ determinateness which is essentially as _amount_, but as amount of one and the same unity; the extensive Quantum is distinguished from the number only by this, that the determinateness is expressly set in the latter as multiplicity.

'2. The determinateness, nevertheless, how much something is, by number, is not in want of distinction from any other magnitude, so that this magnitude itself and some other magnitude should belong to the determinateness, inasmuch as the (numerical) determinateness of magnitude in general is self-determined, indifferent, and simply self-referred limit; and in number it (the limit) is explicitly set as contained in the self-dependent one, and has its externality, the reference to other, _within itself_. This many of the limit itself, further, is as the many in general, not unequal within itself, but continues: each of the many is what the other is; as discrete many it constitutes not, therefore, the determinateness as such. This many, therefore, collapses _per se_ into its continuity and becomes simple unity. Amount is only moment of number; but constitutes not as a multiplicity of numerical ones the determinateness of number, but these ones as indifferent, external to themselves, are sublated in the returnedness of number within itself; the externality which constituted the ones of the multiplicity, disappears in the one as reference of number to itself.

'The limit of the Quantum, that as extensive had its there-be-sent determinateness as the self-external amount, passes, therefore, into _simple_ determinateness. In this simple determination of limit it is _intensive magnitude_, and the limit or determinateness, which is identical with the Quantum, is thus now also explicitly set as simple oneness,—Degree.

'The degree is, therefore, determinate magnitude, Quantum, but not, at the same time, multiplicity, or several _within itself_; it is only a _severality_ (not a Mehreres, but a Mehrheit); the _severality_ is the _several_ taken together into the _simple_ quality, There-being gone together into Being-for-self. Its determinateness must, indeed, be expressed by a number as for perfect determinateness of the Quantum, but is not as amount, but simple, only a degree. When 10, 20 degrees are spoken of, the Quantum that has so many degrees, is the 10th, the 20th degree, not the amount and
sum of these; in that case it were extensive; but it is only one single one, the 10th, the 20th degree. It contains the determinateness which lies in the amount ten, twenty; contains it, however, not as a plurality, but is number as sublated amount, as simple determinateness.

3. In Number the Quantum is explicit in its perfect determinateness; as intensive Quantum, however, as in its Being-for-self, it is explicitly set as it is according to its notion, as it is in itself. The form, namely, of self-reference, which it has in degree, is, at the same time, the being in externality to itself of this same degree. Number is as extensive Quantum numerical multiplicity, and so has the externality within it. This externality, as multiplicity in general, collapses into the undistinguishedness of, and sublates itself so in, the one of the number, of its self-reference. The Quantum has, however, its determinateness as amount; as before shown, it contains it, although it is no longer explicitly in it. The degree, therefore, as within itself simple, having no longer this external otherwiseness within it, has it out of it, and refers itself thereto as, to its determinateness. A many external to it constitutes the determinateness of the simple limit which it is per se. That the amount, so far as it was supposed to find itself within the number in the extensive Quantum, sublated itself therein—in this it is determined, consequently, further, as set out of it (the number). Number being explicitly set as a one, self-reflected self-reference, it excludes from itself the indifference and externality of the amount, and is reference to itself as reference through its own self to an External.

In this, Quantum reaches the reality adequate to its notion. The indifference of the determinateness constitutes its quality; i.e., the determinateness is the determinateness which is in itself self-external determinateness. Accordingly degree, or the degree, is simple quantitative determinateness under a severality of such intensities as are diverse, each only simple self-reference, but, at the same time, in essential reference to one another in such wise that each has in this continuity with the others its own determinateness. This reference of degree through itself to its other renders ascent and descent in the scale of degrees, a continuous process, a flux, that is an uninterrupted indivisible alteration; each of the severals, which are distinguished in it, is not divided from the others, but has its determinatedness only in these. As self-referent quantitative determination, each of the degrees is
indifferent to the others; but it is no less in itself referred to this externality, it is only through this externality what it is; its reference to itself is at the same time the non-indifferent reference to the External, has in this (latter) reference its quality.’

The majority of readers will find all this very super-subtle and very superfluous. Reflexion, however, will convince some that it is necessary to bring to account all these myriad distinctions which pass current daily without inquiry. The Hegelian exposition is not only an explanation in the ordinary sense; but it lifts into sunlight all the secret maggots of our very brains—those hidden powers whose we are, rather than that they are ours.

b. Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude.

‘Degree, the degree, is not within itself a something external to itself. But it is not the indeterminate one, the principle of number in general, which is no amount, unless only the negative amount to be no amount. The intensive magnitude is, in the first place, a simple unit of the several; there are several degrees; determined, however, they are not, neither as simple unit nor as several, but only in the co-reference of this self-externalness, or in the identity of the unit and the several. If, then, the several as such are indeed out of the simple degree, the determinateness of each simple degree consists still, in its reference to them, the several; the simple degree, therefore, implies amount. Just as twenty, as extensive magnitude, implies the twenty ones as discrete within itself, so such particular degree contains the ones as continuity, which continuity this particular severality simply is; it is the 20th degree; and is the 20th degree only by means of this amount, which as such is external to it.

The determinateness of intensive magnitude is, therefore, to be considered on two sides. It is determined through other intensive Quanta, and is in continuity with its otherwiseness, so that in this reference to that (or them) consists its determinateness. So far now as it is, firstly, simple determinateness, it is determined counter other degrees; it excludes them out of itself, and has its determinateness in this exclusion. But, secondly, it is determined in itself; it is this in the amount as its amount, not in it as what is excluded, or as amount of other degrees. The twentieth degree contains the twenty in itself; it is not only determined as distinguished from the nineteenth, the twenty-first, &c., but its determinateness is its amount. But so far as
the amount is its, and the determinateness is, at the same time, essentially as amount, degree has the nature of extensive Quantity, is extensive Quantity.

'Extensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness (characterisedness, specificity) of the Quantum; they are only distinguished by this, that the one has the amount as within it, the other as without it. The extensive magnitude passes over into the intensive because its many in and for itself collapses into the unity, out of which the many stands. But conversely this unity has its determinateness only in the amount, and that too as its; as indifferent to the other intensities, it has the externality of the amount in itself; intensive magnitude is thus equally essentially extensive magnitude.

'With this identity, 
qualitative Something re-appears; for this identity is self—through the negation of its differences—to self-referent unity, and it is these differences that compose the there-beent quantitative determinateness; this negative identity is, therefore, 
Something, indifferent, too, to its quantitative determinateness. 
Something is a Quantum, but now the qualitative There-being as it is in itself is explicit as indifferent to this consideration of Quantum. It was possible to speak of Quantum, of Number as such, &c., without a Something that were their substrate. But now there steps in Something opposite these its determinations,—through their negation be-mediated with itself, and as there-beent for itself;—and, in that it has a Quantum, as that which has an extensive and intensive Quantum. Its one determinateness, which it as Quantum has, is explicit in the diverse moments of the unity and the amount; this determinateness is not only in itself one and the same, but its explicitation or expression in these differences, as extensive and intensive Quantum is return into this unity, which unity as negative is the explicitly set Something indifferent to them (the differences).'

The interpretation of the above rests so evidently on principles which we have so often stated at full length already, that it may here be dispensed with, especially as something of résumé will be necessary again. The super-subtlety will still appear to most readers the objectionable element; and it is to be confessed that, in very weariness of the flesh, one is again and again tempted to turn away eyes of irritation from these quick and evanescent needle-points, this ceaseless to-and-fro of an all but invisible shuttle from identity into difference, and from difference into
identity again, and throw one's exhausted body and vexed heart on the kindly breadth of the ready concrete: but again, and indubitably, this is subtlety, but not super-subtlety, what we are asked to look at is the veritable inner fibres of the very essence of things.

**Remark 1.**

*Examples of this Identity.*

'The distinction of extension and intension is generally taken so, that it is supposed there are objects only extensive and others only intensive. Then we have in physics the new dynamical view which, to the contrary mechanical one that would fill space, &c., by extension or a more, opposes an intension that would reach the same end through degree. The mechanical theory assumes independent parts subsistent out of each other, and only externally combined into a whole; while opposed to this, the notion of Force is the core of the dynamical theory. What—as in the occupation of space—results under the former theory from a multiplicity of mutually external atoms, is produced under the latter by the manifestation of a single force. In the one instance, then, we have the relation of Whole and Parts; in the other, that of Force and its Realisation; and the consideration of both finds special place further on. Force and realisation, it may be said here, however, are certainly a nearer truth than whole and parts; but still force is no less one-sided than intension itself: its realisation, manifestation, utterance, or outerance, is but as the outwardness of extension, and is inseparable from the force; one and the same Intent is common to both forms, to that that is as Extensive, as to that that is as Intensive.'

One gets a striking view here of the fundamental Hegelian truth; element succeeds element in gradual ascent towards the ultimate unity, but in each element precisely the same moments reappear as constitutive: continuity and discretion, extension and intension, whole and parts, force and its realisation, outer and inner—running through the whole of these, we can see the same moments and the same idea.

'The extensive Quantum sublates itself into Degree, which in turn is wholly dependent on the former; the one form is essential to the other, and the quantitative constitution of every existence is as well extensive as intensive.

'Take number as the example: it is amount, and so extensive;
but it is also one, a twenty, a hundred, &c., and the many gone into this unality is of the nature of intension. One is extensive in itself, it can be conceived as any number of parts. The tenth, &c., is this one that has its virtue in an outward several different to it; or the intension comes from the extension. Number is ten, twenty, &c.; but it is at the same time the tenth, the twentieth in the numerical system: both are the same determinateness, the same constitutedness.

'The unit of the circle is named degree, because any one part of the circle has its determinateness in the others out of it, is characterised as one only of a shut (definite) amount of such ones. The degree of the circle is as mere space-magnitude only a usual number; regarded as degree, it is an intensive magnitude which has a sense only as determined through the amount of degrees into which the circle is divided, as the number in general has its sense only in the numerical series.

'Concrete objects show the double side, extension and intension, in the externality and internality of the manifestation of their magnitude. A mass, as amount of pounds, hundredweights, &c., is extensive; as exerting pressure, intensive. The Quantity of the pressure is a oneness, a degree, which has its determinateness in a scale of degrees of pressure. As pressing, the mass appears as a Being-within-itself, as Subject, to which accrues intensive distinction. Conversely, what exercises this degree of pressure is able to move from the spot a certain amount of pounds, &c., and in this way measures its magnitude.

'Or warmth has a degree; the degree of temperature, the 10th, 20th, &c., is a simple sensation, a something subjective. But this degree shows equally as extensive, e.g., as the extension of a fluid, of the quicksilver in the thermometer, of air, of clay, &c. A higher degree of temperature expresses itself as a longer column of mercury, or as a smaller cylinder of clay; it warms a greater space, as a less degree only a less space.

'The higher tone is, as the intenser, at the same time a greater number of vibrations; or a louder tone—that is, one to which a higher degree is ascribed—makes itself audible in a greater space. An intenser colour suffices a greater surface than a less intense; or what is clearer, another sort of intensity, is further visible than what is less clear, &c.

'In like manner in the spiritual world, high intensity of character, talent, genius, is of a correspondingly wide-grasping There-
being, extended influence, and many-sided contact. The deepest notion has the most universal significance and application.

In illustration on the same side as these examples, we may observe that the death of the Redeemer is not only the most intense event in history, but just what is intetest in an absolute point of view and in the very possibility of things; hence it is, or will be, what is most extensive also both as regards time and space.*

On the other side, it may be said that intension will not always supply the place of extension, or vice versa. The wooden mallet and the iron hammer, though absolutely of the same weight, are not always interchangeable. In the galvanic battery, breadth is not found exactly to replace number of plates. Lastly, we are apt to see in characters an excess of intensity that leads to vacillation and lubricity, to flightiness, and in general feebleness: we are accustomed to desire for such characters a mitigation of intensity by increase, as it were, of extension in the nervous system and the general frame. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that these seemingly intense characters are only formally so, and that the depth of their capability is no greater than the breadth of their performance. In galvanism, implements, &c., it is quite possible also to find such facts or considerations as would again reduce both sides to a balance and an identity.

**Remark 2.**

This is a critique in relation to Kant, and is reserved for consideration elsewhere. I cannot help pointing out, however, that we have here a considerable light on Hegel's attitude to the doctrine of the Immortality. In reference to the usual argument that the soul being one and simple, is indestructible by dissolution of parts, Kant observes that the soul, though extensively simple, may still vanish by process of remission as regards its intensity. To this Hegel rejoins: the usual argument treats the soul as a Thing, and applies in its characterisation the category of extensive Quantum; Kant, therefore, has an equal right to apply that of intensive Quantum: the soul, however, is not Ding (thing) but Geist (Spirit), and 'to the Spirit,' these are Hegel's own words, 'there belongs certainly Being, but of a quite other intensity than that of intensive Quantum, rather of such an intensity that in it the form of immediate Being and every category of the same are

* There is a similar remark in Rosenkranz: Wissenschaft der Logik, p. 486.
as sublated; not only, then, was remotion of the category of extensive Quantum to be conceded, but that of Quantum in general was to be withdrawn: it is something further yet, however, to perceive how, in the eternal nature of the Spirit, there-again, consciousness, finitude, is, and arises therefrom, without this Spirit becoming thereby a thing."

c. The alteration of the Quantum.

'The distinction of extensive and intensive Quantum is indifferent to the determinateness (specific nature) of Quantum as such. But in general Quantum is the determinateness which is explicitly set as sublated, the indifferent limit, the determinateness which is just as much the negation of itself (as always in another). This distinction is developed in extensive magnitude, but intensive magnitude is the There-being (the actual existent specialty) of this externality which Quantum is within itself; (it is the appearance as it were, the realisation in a kind of outward mortal state of the notion). This distinction (of Quantum as negation of its own determinateness) is set as its (Quantum's) contradiction within itself—the contradiction to be simple self to self-referent determinateness which is the negation of itself—the contradiction to have its determinateness not in it, but in another Quantum.

'A Quantum, therefore, is explicitly set as, in its Quality, in absolute continuity with its externality, with its otherwiseness. Every quantitative determinateness, therefore, not only can be exceeded, it not only can be altered, but it is explicitly, expressly this, that it must alter itself. Quantitative determinateness continues itself so into its otherwiseness, that it has its Being only in this continuity with another; it is not a been, but a becoment limit.

'The One is infinite, or the self to self-referent negation, therefore the repulsion of itself from itself. (This is very fine, and not hard to see.) The Quantum is equally infinite, explicitly set as the self to self-referent negativity; it repels itself from itself. But it is a determinate one, the one which has gone over into There-being and into the limit; therefore the repulsion of the determinateness from itself, not the production of its own Like, of what is like and equal to its own self, as the repulsion of the One, but of its otherwiseness; it is now explicit in itself to dispatch itself beyond itself and become another. It consists in this, to
increase or decrease itself; it is the externality of determinateness in itself.

'The Quantum, therefore, dispatches itself beyond itself; this other which it becomes is firstly itself a Quantum; but equally as a limit non-beënt, that drives itself beyond itself. The limit which in this transition has again arisen is, therefore, directly only such a one as again sublates itself and passes into another, and so on into the infinite.

C.

Quantitative Infinitude.

a. Its Notion.

'The Quantum alters itself and becomes another Quantum; the further determination of this alteration, that it proceeds in infinitum, lies in this, that the Quantum is constituted as contradicting itself in itself. The Quantum becomes another; it continues itself, however, into its otherwiseness: the other, therefore, is also a Quantum. But this is the other not only of a, but of the Quantum itself, the negative of it as of a limited something; consequently, its unlimitedness, infinitude. The Quantum is a Sollen, a To-be-to; it implies to-be-determined-for-itself, and such self-determinedness is rather determinedness in another; and conversely it is sublated determinedness in another, it is indifferent self-subsistence.

'Finitude and Infinitude receive thus at once each in itself a double, and that an opposed import. The Quantum is finite, firstly, as limited in general; secondly, as self-dispatch beyond itself, as determinedness in another. Its Infinitude, again, is, firstly, non-limitedness; secondly, its return into itself, indifferent Being-for-self. If we directly compare these moments, there results, that the determination of the Finitude of the Quantum, the self-dispatch into another, in which its determination is supposed to lie (and lies), is equally determination of the Infinite; the negation of the limit is the same Beyond over the determinateness, in such wise that the Quantum has in this negation, the Infinite, its ultimate determinateness. The other moment of the Infinitude is the Being-for-self that is indifferent to the limit; the Quantum itself, however, is just so limited, that it is what is for itself indifferent to its limit, and so to other Quanta and its Beyond. The Finite and the Infinite (that Infinite which is to be
separated from the Finite,—the spurious Infinite) have, in Quantum, each already in it the moment of the other.

'The qualitative and the quantitative Infinites distinguish themselves by this, that in the former the antithesis of Finite and Infinite is qualitative, and the transition of the Finite into the Infinite, or the reference of both to each other, lies only in the notion, only in the In itself. The qualitative determinateness is as immediate, and refers itself to the otherwise-ness essentially as to a something that is other to it; it is not explicit as having in itself its negation, its other. Quantity, on the contrary, is, as such, sublated determinateness; it is explicit as being unequal with itself and indifferent to itself, and so as alterable. The qualitative Finite and Infinite stand, therefore, absolutely, i.e., abstractly opposed to each other; their unity is the internal reference that is implied at bottom: the Finite continues itself, therefore, only in itself, and not in it, into its other. On the contrary, the quantitative Finite refers itself in itself into its infinite, in which it has its absolute determinateness. This their reference is set out at first hand in the Quantitative Infinite Progress.

b. The Quantitative Infinite Progress.

'The Progress into the Infinite is in general the expression of contradiction, here of that contradiction which the quantitative Finite or Quantum in general implies. It is that alternation of Finite and Infinite which was considered in the qualitative sphere, with the difference that, as just remarked above, in the quantitative sphere, the limit dispatches itself and continues itself in itself into its Beyond; consequently, conversely also the quantitative Infinite is explicit as having the Quantum in itself, for the Quantum is in its Being-out-of-self at the same time itself; its externality belongs to its determination.

'The infinite Progress is indeed only the expression of this contradiction, not its solution; but because of the continuity of the one determinateness into its other, it brings forward an apparent solution in a union of both. As this progress is first expressed, it is the Aufgabe of the Infinite (i.e., at once the giving up and the problem proposed; both sides of the English puzzle or riddle are, as it were, glanced at), not the attainment of the same,—its recurrent production, without getting beyond the Quantum itself, and without the Infinite becoming positive and present. The Quantum has it in its notion to have a Beyond of
itself. This Beyond is, firstly, the abstract moment of the non-being of the Quantum; this latter eliminates itself in itself; thus it refers itself to its Beyond as to its Infinitude, as in the qualitative moment of the antithesis. But, secondly, the Quantum stands in continuity with this Beyond; the Quantum consists just in this, to be the other of itself, to be external to its own self: this, that is external, therefore, is just so not another than the Quantum; the Beyond or the Infinite is therefore itself a Quantum. The Beyond is in this way recalled from its flight, and the Infinite reached. But because this—now become a here from a Beyond, a cis or citra from an ultra—is again a Quantum, only a new limit has been made again explicit; this new limit, as Quantum, is again fled from by itself, is as Quantum beyond itself, and has repelled itself into its non-being, into its Beyond of or from its own self, which Beyond equally recurrently becomes Quantum, and as that repels itself from itself into the Beyond again.

The continuity of the Quantum into its other occasions the union of both in the expression of an infinitely great or infinitely small. As both have the determination of Quantum still in them, they remain alterable, and the absolute determinateness, which were a Being-for-self, is therefore not reached. This Being-out-of-itself of the determination is explicit in the double Infinite, which is self-opposed according to a more or a less, the infinitely great and the infinitely small. In each of them Quantum is maintained in constantly-recurring antithesis to its Beyond. The great, however much extended, vanishes together into inconsiderableness; in that it refers itself to the Infinite as to its non-being, the antithesis is qualitative: the extended Quantum has, therefore, won from the Infinite nothing; the latter, after as before, is the non-being of the former. Or, the aggrandisement of the Quantum is no nearing to the Infinite, for the difference of the Quantum and of its Infinite has essentially also this moment, that it is not a quantitative difference. It is only the expression of the contradiction driven closer into the straits; it is to be at once great, i.e., a Quantum, and infinite, i.e., no Quantum. In the same manner, the infinitely small is as small a Quantum, and remains therefore absolutely, that is to say, qualitatively, too great for the Infinite, and is opposed to it. The contradiction of the infinite progress, which was to have found its goal in them, remains preserved in both.

This Infinite, which is persistently determined as the Beyond of the Finite, is to be described as the spurious quantitative infinite.
It is, like the qualitative spurious Infinite, the perpetual crossing hence and thence from the one member of the persisting contradiction to the other, from the limit to its non-being, and from the latter anew back to the limit. In the quantitative progress, what is advanced to is indeed not an abstract other, but a Quantum that is expressed as different; but it remains equally in antithesis to its negation. The Progress, therefore, is equally not a progress, but a repetition of one and the same,—position, sublation,—reposition and re-sublation; (the equating setzend with ponens and aufhebend with tollens is conspicuously plain here)—an impotence of the negative to which what it sublates returns through its very sublation as a constant. There are two so connected that they directly mutually flee themselves; and even in fleeing cannot separate, but are in their mutual flight conjoined.'

Remark 1.

The High Repute of the Progressus in Infinitum.

This Remark turns largely on certain declarations of Kant; but it is not of such a nature as to suggest reservation, as is usual where Kant is in question.

'The bastard Infinite—especially in its quantitative form, this perpetual transcendence of the limit and perpetual impotent relapse into the same—is generally contemplated as something sublime, a kind of Divine Service,—just as in philosophy it has been regarded as an ultimate. This progress has manifoldly contributed to tirades, which have been admired as sublime productions. In point of fact, however, this modern sublimity enlarges, not the object, which rather flees, but only the Subject, that absorbs into itself such huge quantities. The indigence of this mere subjective elevation, that would scale the ladder of the Quantitative, declares itself directly in the admission of the futility of all its toil to get any closer to the infinite End, which to be reached indeed, must be quite otherwise griped to.

'The following tirades of this nature there is at the same time expressed, what such elevation passes into and ends in. Kant, e.g., speaks of it as sublime (Kr. d. pract. V. Schl.),

When the Subject lifts himself in thought above the place he occupies in the world of sense and extends the synthesis of his existence into infinite magnitude—a synthesis with stars upon stars, worlds upon worlds, systems upon
systems, and again also into the immeasurable times of their periodic movement, into their beginning, and incalculable duration.—Conception sinks under this advance into the immeasurable Far, where the farthest world has still a farther—the past, however far referred, a farther still behind it—the future, however far anticipated, always another still before it; Thought sinks under this conception of the immeasurable; as a dream, that we travel a long road ever farther and perpetually farther without apparent end, ceases at length with Falling or with Fainting (swimming of the head).*

'This description, besides compressing the matter of contents of the quantitative elevation into a wealth of delineation, deserves especial praise for the honesty with which it relates how, in the end, it fares with this elevation: thought succumbs, the end is falling and a swimming of the head. What makes thought give in and produces the fall and the faint is nothing else than the weariness of the repetition that lets a limit disappear only to reappear, but again disappear; and so ever the one after the other, and the one in the other,—in the thither the hither, and in the hither the thither,—perpetually arise and perpetually depart; and there remains only a feeling of the impotence of this infinite or of this To-be-to, that would be master of the finite, but is without the power.

'What Kant names the awful description of Eternity by Haller is usually also specially admired, but often just not for the reason which constitutes its veritable merit:—

I multiply enormous numbers,
I pile to millions up,
I gather time on time and world on world still up,
And when I from the giddy height
Seek thee once more with reeling sight,
Is every power of count, increased a thousand number
Not yet a part of thee.
I drag them down and thou liest there by me.†

'When this massing and piling up of numbers and worlds is considered what is valuable as in a description of eternity, it escapes notice that the poet himself declares this so-called awful transcendence to be something futile and hollow, and that his own conclusion is, that only by giving up this empty infinite progress, is it, that the veritable Infinite itself becomes present to him.

'There have been Astronomers who pleased themselves in making a merit of the sublimity of their science, because it has to do with an immeasurable number of stars, with such immeasurable

* The latter half of this citation is not found at the place cited.
† The original is but a similar doggerel!
spaces and times that in them distances and periods, in themselves never so vast, are but as units that, never so many times taken, abbreviate themselves again into insignificance. The shallow astonishment to which they then surrender themselves, the absurd hopes some time yet in another life to wander from star to star, and for ever to acquire such new facts, they alleged as chief moments of the excellence of their science—which science deserves admiration, not because of such quantitative infinitude, but, on the contrary, because of the relations and the laws which reason recognises in these objects, and which are the rational infinite as against said irrational infinite.

'To the Infinite which refers itself to outward sensuous perception, Kant opposes the other Infinite, when the individual returns into his invisible ego, and opposes the absolute freedom of his will as a pure ego to all the terrors of destiny and of tyranny, beginning with his nearest circumstances, sees them disappear in themselves, and even that which seems eternal, worlds upon worlds, collapse in ruins, and recognises singly himself as equal to himself:

'Ego, in this singleness with itself, is indeed the attained Beyond; it has come to itself, is by itself, here; in pure self-consciousness the absolute negativity is brought into the affirmation and presence which, in that progress beyond the sensuous Quantum, only flee. But in that this pure ego has fixed itself in its abstraction and emptiness, it has the There-being in general, the fullness of the natural and spiritual universe, over against it as a Beyond. There manifests itself the same contradiction which is implied in the infinite progress; namely, a returnedness into itself which is immediately at the same time out-of-itself-ness, reference to its other as to its non-being; which reference remains a longing, because ego has fixed for itself its intent-less and untenable void on one side, and as its Beyond the fullness which in the negation still remains present.

'To both Sublimes Kant adds the remark, "that admiration (of the former, external) and awe (before the second, internal) sublime, may stimulate, indeed, to inquiry, but cannot compensate for the deficiency of the same."—He thus declares said elevations insufficient for reason, which cannot rest by them and the feelings connected with them, nor accept the Beyond and the Void for what is ultimate.

'The infinite progress has been taken as an ultimate, especially in its moral application. The just-enunciated second antithesis
of the finite and the infinite, as of the complex world and of the
ego raised into its freedom, is properly qualitative. The self-
determination of the ego aims, at the same time, at the determina-
tion of nature, and the emancipation of itself from her; it thus
refers itself through itself to its other which is, as external
There-being, a manifold and quantitative. Reference to what is
quantitative becomes itself quantitative; the negative reference
of the ego thereon, the power of the ego over the non-ego, over
sense and external nature, comes therefore to be conceived in
this way, that morality can and shall become ever greater—the
power of sense, on the other hand, always less. The complete
adequacy, however, of the will to the moral law becomes mislaid,
into the infinite progress, that is to say, it is represented as an
absolutely unreachable beyond, and just this is to be the true
anchor and the legitimate consolation, that it is unreachable; for
morality is to be as conflict; this conflict, again, is only from the
inadequacy of the will to the law, and the law, therefore, is
absolutely a beyond for the will.

‘In this antagonism, ego and non-ego, or the pure will and the
moral law on the one hand, and the sensuousness and mere nature
of the will on the other, are presupposed as completely independent
and mutually indifferent. This pure will has its peculiar law
which stands in essential connexion with sense; and nature, or
sense, has on its side laws which are neither derived from the will
nor correspondent to it, nor can have even only, however different
from it, in themselves an essential connexion with it, but they are
in general determined for themselves, full and complete within
themselves. But both, at the same time, are moments of one and
the same single being, the ego; the will is determined as the
negative against nature, so that it (the will) is only so far as there
is such an element different from it that shall become sublated by
it, with which, however, it (the will) comes thus in contact, and
by which it is even affected. To nature and to nature as human
sense, limitation through another is indifferent, as to an independent
system of laws; she maintains herself in this limitation, enters
independently into the relation, and limits the will of the law
quite as much as it limits her. It is one act, the self-determi-
nation of the will with the sublation of the otherwiseness of a
nature, and the assumption of this otherwiseness as there-beënt,
as continuing itself in its sublation and as not sublated. The
contradiction that lies in this is not eliminated in the infinite
progress, but, on the contrary, is expressed and maintained as not eliminated and as incapable of elimination; the conflict of Morality and Sense is represented as the absolute relation that in and for itself is.

The incapacity to become master of the qualitative antithesis of the finite and infinite, and to comprehend the Idea of the true will, substantial freedom, has recourse to Quantity, in order to use it as mediatrix, because it is the sublated Qualitative, the difference become indifferent. But in that both members of the antithesis remain implied as qualitatively different, each rather becomes manifest at once as indifferent to this alteration, and just by this that in their mutual reference it is as Quanta that they now relate themselves. Nature is determined by ego, Sense by the will of the good; the change produced by the will in Sense is only a quantitative difference, such a difference as allows it (Sense) to remain what it is.

In the abstracter statement of the Kantian philosophy, or at least of its principles, that is, in the Wissenschaftslehre of Fichte, the infinite progress constitutes in the same manner the fundamental principle and the ultimate. The first axiom of this statement, ego = ego, is followed by a second independent of the first, the opposition of the non-ego; the connexion of both is taken at once also as quantitative difference, that non-ego is partly determined by ego, partly also not. The non-ego continues itself in this way into its non-being, so that in its non-being, it remains opposed, as what is not sublated. When, therefore, the contradictions thus involved have been developed in the system, the concluding result is the same relation that was the commencement; the non-ego remains an infinite appulse, an absolutely other; the ultimate mutual connexion of it and of the ego is the infinite progress, longing and struggle, seeking and searching,—the same contradiction which was begun with.

Because the quantitative element is the determinateness that is express as sublated, it was believed that much, or rather all, had been won for the unity of the absolute, for the one substantiality, when the antithesis in general was set down to a difference only quantitative. Every antithesis is only quantitative, was for a time a main position of the later philosophy; the opposed determinations have the same nature, the same substance; they are real sides of the antithesis, so far as each of them has within it both values, both factors of the antithesis,
only that on the one side the one factor, on the other the other, is *preponderant*; on the one side the one factor, a matter or power, is present in *greater quantity* or in *stronger degree* than on the other. So far as different matters or powers are presupposed, the quantitative difference rather confirms and completes their externality and indifference to each other and to their unity. The difference of the *absolute* unity is to be only quantitative; Quantitativity is indeed the sublated immediate determinateness, but it is only the uncompleted, only the *first* negation, not the infinite, not the negation of the negation. In that being and thought are represented as quantitative determinations of the absolute substance, even they, as Quanta, become, just like carbon, azote, &c., in a subordinate sphere, perfectly external to each other and void of connexion. It is a third (party), an external reflexion, which abstracts from their difference and perceives their *inner* unity, that is only in *itself* and not equally *for itself*. This unity, consequently, is represented in effect only as first *immediate* unity, or only as being, which, in its quantitative difference, *remains* equal to itself, but does not *set* itself equal to itself through itself; it is thus not comprehended as negation of negation, as infinite unity. Only in the qualitative antithesis arises the *explicit* Infinite, the Being-for-self, and the quantitative determination itself passes over, as will presently more particularly yield itself, into the Qualitative.'

**Remark 2.**

Which occurs here, concerns Kant, and is reserved for the present. It is again one of those marvels of analysis peculiar to Hegel.

c. *The Infinitude of the Quantum.*

'1. The infinite Quantum, as infinitely *great* or infinitely *little*, is itself *an sich* the infinite progress; it is Quantum as *great* or *small*, and it is at the same time non-being of Quantum. The infinitely great and infinitely little are therefore images of figurate conception, which, on closer consideration, show themselves as idle mist and shadow. But in the infinite progress this contradiction is explicitly present, and withal that also that is the nature of the Quantum—which as intensive magnitude has reached its
reality, and in its There-being is now explicitly set as it is in its notion. This identity is what we have to consider.

'The Quantum as degree is simple, unal, referred to itself and as determined in itself. In that through this unality the other-wiseness and the determinateness in it are sublated, this determinateness is external to it, it has its determinateness out of it. This its out-of-itself-ness is at first hand the abstract non-being of the Quantum in general, the spurious Infinite. But further this non-being is also a magnitude, the Quantum continues itself into its non-being, for it has just its determinateness in its externality; this its externality is itself therefore equally Quantum; that, its non-being, the Infinitude, becomes thus limited, that is to say, this beyond is sublated, is itself determined as Quantum, which is thus in its negation by its own self.

'This, however, is what the Quantum as such is an sich. For it is just itself (es selbst) through its outerliness; the externality constitutes that whereby it is Quantum, is by its own self. In the infinite progress, therefore, the notion of the Quantum is express, explicit.

'Let us take it (the progress) at first hand in its abstract distinctive features as they lie before us, then there is present in it the sublation of the Quantum, but equally also of its beyond, therefore the negation of the Quantum as well as the negation of this negation. Its (the progress') truth is their unity, in which they are but as moments. This unity is the solution of the contradiction of which the progress is the expression, and its (this unity's) closest meaning consequently is the restoration of the notion of Quantity,—that it is indifferent or external limit. In the infinite progress as such, it is usually only considered, that each Quantum, however great or small, must be capable of disappearing, that it must be capable of being transcended; but it is not considered, that this its sublation, the beyond, the downright Infinite itself disappears also.

Even the first sublation, the negation of Quality in general, whereby Quantum becomes explicit, is an sich the sublation of the negation,—the Quantum is sublated qualitative limit, consequently sublated negation,—but it is at the same time only an sich this; it is set as a There-being, and then its negation is fixed as the Infinite, as the Beyond of Quantum which stands as a Here, a This side, as an immediate; thus the infinite is determined only as first negation, and so it appears in the infinite progress. It has been shown that there is, however, more present in this last,—the
quantity interpreted, etc.

negation of the negation, or that which the infinite is in truth. This was before regarded as that the notion of the Quantum is thus again restored; this restoration means, in direct reference, that its There-being has received its closer determination; there has arisen, namely, the Quantum determined according to its notion, which is different from the immediate Quantum—the externality is now the contrary of itself, explicitly set as moment of the magnitude itself,—the Quantum so that by means of its non-being, the infinite, it has in another Quantum its determinateness, i.e., qualitatively is that which it is. Nevertheless, this comparison of the notion with the There-being of the Quantum belongs more to our reflexion, to a relation that is not yet present here. The immediately next determination is, that the Quantum has returned into Quality, is now once again qualitatively determined. For its peculiarity, its quality, is the externality, indifference of the determinateness; and it is now explicitly set, as being in its externality rather itself, as therein referring itself to itself, as in simplicity with itself, i.e., as being qualitatively determined. This Qualitativity is more particularly determined, namely, as Being-for-self; for the reference to itself to which it has come, arises out of mediation, the negation of the negation. The Quantum has the Infinite, the For-self-determinedness no longer out of it, but in itself.

'The Infinite, which in the infinite progress has only the empty sense of a non-being, of an unreached, but sought beyond, is in effect nothing else than Quality. The Quantum as indifferent limit passes out beyond itself into the infinite; it seeks so nothing else than the for-self-determinedness, the qualitative moment, that, however, in this way, is only a To-be-to. Its indifference to the limit, consequently its defect of being-for-self-determinateness and its going out beyond itself, is what makes the Quantum Quantum; that, its going-out, is to be negated, and to find for itself in the infinite its absolute determinateness.

'Quite generally: the Quantum is sublated Quality; but the Quantum is infinite, transcends itself, is the negation of itself; this its transcendence is, therefore, an sich the negation of the negated Quality, the restoration of Quality; and this is explicitly set, that the externality which appeared as beyond, is determined as the own moment of the Quantum.

'The Quantum is thus set as repelled from itself, whereby there are therefore two Quanta, which, nevertheless, are sublated, only
are as moments of one unity, and this unity is the determinateness of the Quantum. This (Quantum) thus referred to itself in its externality as indifferent limit, and consequently qualitatively set, is the Quantitative Relation. In relation the Quantum is external to itself, different from itself; this its externality is the referring of one Quantum to another Quantum, of which each is only valid in this its reference to its other; and this reference constitutes the determinateness (the special virtue) of the Quantum which is as such unity. It has in this reference not an indifferent, but a qualitative determination; is in this its externality returned into itself, is in the same that which it is.'

There is the possibility here of some very auxiliary remarks.—First of all, the contradiction in the notion of an infinitesimal, an infinitely great, or an infinitely little, is accomplished with the usual Hegelian masterliness in a very clear, and, as things are, very necessary exposition. It is to be at once Quantum and no Quantum, that is, it is an sich the infinite progress: now it is the reduction of this contradiction to the unity of relation which is the relative merit of Hegel. The limitless externality which lies in the notion of Quantum or Quantity is qualitative; and therefore it is a cheap wonder that falls prostrate before the infinite quantities that can be conjured up in the quantitative progress; for with such quality such quantity is the turn of a hand. The bearing which intensive magnitude—as that, as it were, qualitative One, which has nevertheless its affair in an external Many—has on the subsequent determination of Relation must not be lost sight of. Degree, quite generally as degree, has what constitutes its determinateness external to itself; but there is no end to the possibility of degree, therefore this its own constitutive externality is endless; or vice versa, the constitutive externality being endless, degree is endless; and we have thus in perfectly explicit expression the quantitative spurious infinite. In this infinite, the externality, the many, can be seen to be relatively to the one, the degree, this degree's abstract non-being as such; or this abstract non-being, the possibility of degree, is just the spurious infinite. Now all this is the very notion of Quantum in general: Quantum is itself, is what it is, through its own outwardness. We may even intensify the outwardness implied in the notion here; for we may say, the Quantum is what it is through that outwardness which it is, and also through that outwardness which it is not—any quantitative assignment being absolutely relative. This
relativity, the notion of a One from Two, is well before the mind of Hegel. As always relative, the assignment—Quantum—can be seen, then, always to flee—in infinitum. From this flight it is Hegel’s business, by virtue of the notion, to recall it.

I have translated Schlecht-Unendliche, downright infinite. The sense assigned is an old idiomatic use of Schlecht as seen in Schlechtthin, Schlechtweg, &c.; and again, looking close, the Un of Unendliche seems italicised, which somehow plays very much into the hands of Schlecht in the sense of downright. Beyond all doubt, however, we have here the usual Hegelian irony; what here is downright to figurate conception or ordinary reflexion is spurious to Hegel.

The reader will assist himself greatly here if he will recall the sub specie externitatis, and reflect that it is the pure notion, the absolute, which lies under all these forms. It was the sublation of Finite There-being, for example, that led through the absolute Being-for-self into the form of Quantity at all: all then was One, One, One,—that is, Quantity; but in that Quantity, the One, Quality, still is. ‘Quantity, then, is an sich the sublation of the negation’—of what negation?—why, of the qualitative negation, of qualitative limit, of the fact that the Voice—again to use the Voice—had a Notification different from itself: Quantity is the negation of this qualitative limit; what is, is One, but even so it must be One, One, One: Quantity is the condition of its life, of its very one-ness. All this is very plainly present, especially in the last four paragraphs, which have been just translated. The One is always One, the immediate; so the non-immediate is its non-being, the negation of itself: thus it is caught (befangen) in the spurious Infinite, the Sollen of all kinds, and is ‘das unglückliche Bewusstseyn,’ the unhappy consciousness that cannot find itself, but is for ever lost in its other. All this disappears before the simple consideration that the other is just the condition, the presupposition of itself; that the other is for it; that it is through the other; that it is One just because it is One, One, One; that it is the other, and the other is it. This is return of the Quantum into Quality: its determinateness as Quantum is its own externality; but its own externality was the determinateness of Quality also: sublation of the externality produces a like qualitative Being-for-self in both. In fact, read by this absolute light, these paragraphs will yield a perfectly marvellous meaning. While on one side all the assignments of Quantity are placed before us in a rigorous exactitude of form
that is now for the first time witnessed, on the other side we have the absolute itself demonstrated to us, and in those necessities which are the purest outcomes of its own reason, of its own pulse, that is, of its own self. Here, for example, we see that Quantity is not a thing apart and by itself, not something peculiar, independent and isolated, but absolutely one with quality, absolutely one with what is: it is part and parcel of the One All, and it is not part and parcel, but is that One All; for in no other way could there be One, One, One, a life, Quality: Quantity, in truth, is but the abstract expression of that concrete fact. To generalise and abstract may be necessary, but it is more necessary nowadays to conduct our abstractions back into the life from which they have been sundered. This life is one and many: these many are not to be fixed as dead immovable solids (bits of ice) taken up from the One, the life; they are to be taken back, re-dissolved and seen as they are in the living One. That Quality is Quality, then, is just that Quantity is Quantity, or that there is Quantity: there is an absolutely necessary nexus between the two entities; they are but sides of one and the same. How were an internality possible without an externality to extend it? There is not here internality then, and there externality; but what is, is at once external and internal, and such constitution is an absolute necessity of thought or of the notion. He that would see rightly, then, must always see in connexion, in co-reference. The Absolute Negativity, the negation of the negation, this is the key-note: what is, is a fire that feeds itself; the fire and its fuel are one; the former is through the latter, but the former always is, therefore the latter always is, and the one is the other. Such is the nature of the Divine Life: it is infinite, for that through which it is, the aliment, is infinite and itself. Thus is it the pure negativity or the negation of the negation, for it is through its other, its negation, which at the same time it negates: the Attraction that is explicit is for ever fed by the Repulsion that is implicit. In this way it is that Hegel has taken firm hold of the formula of the absolute; and this negation of the negation, this necessary duplicity in the character of every actual concrete existence, by which it has two abstract or relatively abstract sides, he has followed out through the entire circle of the universe, up from the abstractest determination to the concretest, and this too by an absolutely necessary method, and with an absolutely necessary beginning and end. The duplicity which we see here in regard to Quality and Quantity is
the single regulative truth of things, and, the element of thought being it and it nothing but thought, it is not more regulative than constitutive; it is what is, it is the absolute, it is the pulse of God himself—at least as expressed in this universe. Quantity is a necessary position—it is but Quality, completed Quality. Quality, when full-summed, consummated in itself, is Quantity, by virtue of its own life, its own continuance. Quantity, which is the life of Quality, its continuance, without which Quality were not, which is required to extend Quality, returns by virtue of its own notion and veritable constitution into the Quality which it was supposed to have left. We need not say, indeed, Quantity without which Quality were not; for that is simply tautological, Quantity being very evidently just the same thing as Quality, though on the other side. That Quality be, Quality is a necessary condition, and so is it a necessary ingredient of Quality itself. Without the Quantity that extends it, Quality is inconceivable and impossible; but conversely without the Quality that, so to speak here, intends it, Quantity is inconceivable and impossible. What were Quantum and Quanta if only Quantitative Quantum and Quanta? Quantum and Quanta must contract into the ultimate virtue, into the essential drop of Quality,—the ones are the One: Quantum and Quanta are only for Quality; they are only Qualitative. Time, Space, Matter, the Ego,—these we have already seen cited as examples of pure quantity; but they are all of them qualitative, and there only because they are qualitative, they are necessary positions of the absolute in the way in which we have seen such necessity as regards Quantity when referred to Quality. That they are qualitative is evident from this, that each has its own peculiarity; that is, they are not absolutely the same pure Quantity, and so not absolutely pure Quantity at all: pure Quantity as such is just the out-of-itself of Quality, or, what is the same thing, its continuance but in discretion, discretion and continuance being but another example of the absolute duplicity by which neither is possible without the other, or either is the other. Quality is the One; but to be the One, it must be One, One, One endlessly, or Quality: but the One refers these Ones to its own oneness—Quantitative Relation. However it may be with the absolute, it must be admitted, at least, that Hegel in pursuit of, his absolute has absolutely worked out and perfected, and for the first time in universal history, the Metaphysic or Theory of Quantity. Whether, then, what we may assign as the
ultimate dictum of Hegel—thought is the one ἀνάγκη, and the ἀνάγκη of thought gives this universe—be true or not, we must be thankful for the vast light his metaphysic has thrown on the particular and on all particulars. This brings us to say that before entering on the important enunciations of Hegel in reference to the Calculus and the higher analysis in general, which form the subject-matter of the three very long and laborious Remarks by the first of which we now stand, it will be advantageous to renew the values of Quantity we have just obtained, especially those which bear on what is called the Quantitative Infinite, True or False, Genuine or Spurious, Legitimate or Bastard.

The Qualitative Infinite we probably understand thoroughly, and on both aspects, from our illustration of the absolute Voice and its Notification. The Notification as finite Note after finite Note endlessly, is that alternation of endedness and unendedness that but replace each other and repeat themselves, which is the spurious infinite of Hegel. The absolute Voice itself, which is through these notes and these notes, typifies the true Infinite. In effect, Finite and Infinite are but a certain stage of the Notion, of the one double single, or of the single duplicity. An Infinite without a Finite were null, as a Finite without an Infinite is inconceivable and impossible: neither, then, is possible without the other; each implies the other;—either is the other: the one truth is the single duplicity that is both. When we see Finite by itself, and Infinite by itself, we see a concrete Notion, or a phase of the concrete Notion, in each of its two abstract sides alternately. The truth (say) is the absolute Voice which is through its other, which other it also negates or sublates; and so it is the negation of the negation, the pure negativity, the veritable Infinite.

This Infinite as One passed through what we may callMonadology or the Metaphysic of the Monad into the indifferent continuous oneness which emerged as Quantity. Quantity showed itself immediately as Continuous or Discrete; both of which went together again in the notion of limit, which was found to be not only the common, but the entire truth of each. Limit next manifested itself as Quantum or Number, which went asunder into Extensive and Intensive Quanta, but collapsed again into the quantitative Something which, as the very quality or notion of Quantum, is endless self-externality, or the quantitative Infinite. The quantitative Infinite is first the spurious Infinite of Quantum
fleeing ever into its indifferent limit. But this flight or transcendence is in its truth a transcendence of the one Quantum as well as of the other: this is a reference of Quantum to Quantum, is qualitative, and the true Quantitative Infinite of Quantitative Relation. Simple consideration \( \text{sub specie aeternitatis} \) of the One that issued from Quality and emerged in Quantity leads readily to all these forms. But, not to go too far back—as limitless one, one, one that is always away over into another one, it is the spurious infinite, while as return to its own oneness in all these ones it is the true Infinite and a return to Quality. This can be characterised, too, as the true reflexion for us here. Lastly, in an objective mode of looking, the oneness that results from the reflexion of one to one is—Quantitative Relation, and is here the true Quantitative Infinite, as it is Qualitative, or as it is the return of Quality to itself from Quantity. I may add, that once having the absolute as One, or just the form, character, determination, or term of One, the whole of Quantity, and of all that holds of it, is potentially given.

**Remark 1.**

*The Precise Nature of the Notion of the Mathematical Infinite.*

'The Infinite which the higher analysis has introduced into mathematical science, while it has led to vast results in *practice*, has been always attended with great difficulties in *theory*. The latter, indeed, has never been able to justify the former; confirmation has been required for the results, as it were, from without; and the operation itself has been rather granted as incorrect. This is a false position in itself—unscientific—and no science so situated can be either sure of its application or certain of its extent.

What is interesting to philosophy here is, that while this, the Mathematical Infinite, is at bottom the True Infinite, it is the False or Metaphysical Infinite before which it is summoned and required to justify itself. The former, indeed (mathematic), defends itself by rejecting the competence of the latter (metaphysic), and by professing to own no authority but that of its own consistency on its own field. But while, on the one hand, metaphysic cannot deny the value of the splendid results achieved by mathematic in consequence of the Infinite in question, it must be admitted that this latter science, on the other hand, is unable to procure for its own self a clear conscience as regards the notion it has introduced and the dependent processes.
'So far as the difficulty concerns the notion alone, that is a matter of no moment to any science which has rightly possessed itself of an element, and truly distributed it. But here in the science concerned there is a contradiction in the very method on which, as a science, it rests. It permits itself, for example, to handle Infinite Quanta as if they were Finite Quanta, and yet to apply, in determination of the former, expedients which it absolutely rejects in the case of the latter. Justification, it is true, is sought for the application of these expedients, in the fact, that their results can be proved from elsewhere. But while, on one side, all results have not been so proved, it is, on the other side, the very object of the new method, not only to shorten, but in certain respects to supersede the old, and obtain results impossible to the old. Again, a result cannot justify a manner per se; and the manner here has this inexactitude in it, that it now introduces as the very essential of the operation, what it presently rejects as too small to be of any account. Nay, what is more extraordinary still, the results obtained from this process, the inexactitude of which is admitted, are, as Carnot says, "not merely free 'from sensible error,' but rigorously exact." And we know all the while that something actually was omitted—something not quite zero. This is not truth as such—correctness as such—neither of which admits of a less or a more. Again, be it with the result as it may, proof as such is an interest, and in mathematical science the interest proper.

'It will be interesting, then, to examine closer the various modes in which the general notion involved has been viewed, as well as the various expedients which have been adopted to justify it.

'The usual definition of the mathematical Infinite is, that it is a magnitude beyond which—when it is infinitely great—there is no greater, or—when it is infinitely small—no smaller, or which, in the one case, is greater, and, in the other, smaller, than any assignable magnitude. This definition does not express the true notion involved, but only that contradiction which is the spurious progressus; and again if Quanta are, as mathematic elsewhere avows, what can be lessened or increased, then plainly it is not Quanta as such that we have now before us.

'This is already something gained, and this is what usually just fails to be seen: the Quantum as such is sublated, its character is now of an infinite nature, and yet its quantitative determinateness
is to be conceived as still somehow *persisting*. It is in continuing to regard what is *infinite* as *finite*, as Quantum, that *more* or *less* becomes capable of being falsely attributed to what is infinite. The infinite of a unity that is 2, or 3, or 4, &c., for example, may be regarded as *greater* than an infinite of a unity that is only 1, &c. How this depends on an infinite being still regarded as Quantum is evident. Kant—(but, as usual, this is reserved).

'We have seen that the true Infinite Quantum is infinite in itself (an ihm selbst); it is this inasmuch as both the Quantum as such and its beyond of externality, through which beyond it has its constitutive determinateness, are *equally* sublated. The Quantum is thus gone into unal self-reference. It itself and its externality, however, are still there as moments: it is the infinite Quantum as containing and being its own negated externality. But this is Quality: it is not any particular assignable Quantum; it is the constitution of Quantum as such universally, and so Quality.

['One can readily sublate the infinite series of Notes, through which the Voice is, into the one infinite voice *]; but, though the one infinite Quantum can be conceived as only through the series of finite Quanta, it is not so easy to conceive a qualitative infinite Quantum by sublation into its unity of the whole infinite variety or externality of the finite series. This, however, is what is required to be done: the *relativity* of Quantity is to be conceived in its own infinite qualitative form. Its infinitude is that it is a qualitative determinateness. The relativity, once firmly caught, can be seen to be but moment, Quantitative determinateness in Qualitative form. As moment it depends on its other; it has its determination from this other; it has a meaning only in relation to what stands in relation with it. Apart from this relation it is nothing; and is, in this respect, unlike Quantum as such, which as such seems wholly passive, indifferent as regards relation, and even in relation to possess its own immediate, settled form. But as moment in relation, its passivity and indifference disappear; its immediacy is sublated; it is what it is through another. Quite generally now, then, the Quantum that has taken up this attitude to its own externality (quite generally) can be seen to have sublated itself into a Qualitative Unity; it is infinite Being-for-self, but possesses and is quantitative Being-for-One. Or we may say that quantitatively it is a Für-Eines, a Being-for-One, while qualitatively it is a Being-for-self. Or again we might almost say

* See next note.
that it is quantitative matter (the For-One) idealised into qualitative form (the For-self). This distinction is very difficult to realise. Though something has here been added in elucidation, the reader will do well to re-read—'c. The Infinitude of the Quantum,' together with the relative comments—for this notion is evidently intended to be the key-note of all that follows. The moments are simply these: there is Quantum and its Beyond; so put they flee each other and we have the spurious Infinite through their alternate repetition; but they are not to be repeated: the Quantum is to be seen to depend on the beyond; the beyond is to be seen to constitute it: the beyond, then, is to be taken up into it to the formation of a single notion, a one infinite qualitative whole,—the quality being the peculiarity of its constitution.*

'This notion will be found to constitute at bottom the mathematical Infinite; and it itself will become clearer in the progress of a consideration of the various stages of the expression of the Quantum as a moment of relation, from the lowest, where it is yet at the same time Quantum as such, up to the higher, where it obtains the signification (value) and the expression of special infinite magnitude.

'The first example, then, will be Quantum in relation as exhibited in fractions. The fraction $\frac{3}{4}$, for instance, is quite a finite expression, and possessed of a quite finite value, the exponent or quotient; nevertheless it is different from the whole numbers, 1, 2, 3, &c. It is not immediate as they are, but mediate; the virtue it possesses is neither 2 nor 7, but as it were that virtue which depends on the relativity of these two virtues mutually. The sublation of immediacy has introduced quite a change, then: the immediacy is no longer the essential, but the mediacy; and so long as the latter is retained, the former may be as it likes. Thus a certain infinitude emerges: 2 may become 4, 6, &c.; and for 7 we may substitute 14, 21, &c. In this way we see more plainly that it is not an immediate 2 or 7 with which we have to do; for both the 2 and the 7 may be changed infinitely, provided only their relativity be preserved: $\frac{3}{4}$ has now, then, taken on a certain qualitative character, inasmuch as its quantitative character—its composing Quanta—manifest a certain indifference, in having

* Exact translation was not at first intended in this Remark—hence the admission of additions (the 'voice,' &c.) as above, though compression was the general object.
become susceptible of infinite change. The 2 and 7 together, then, are very different from what they are apart: the passive, inert, quantitative limit which each, as 2 or as 7, has, is sublated into a certain infinitude; their value seems no longer merely quantitative and of the nature of 2 and 7; this value, or their virtue, seems to have gone over into a qualitative drop, the qualitative Being-for-self, while at the same time quantitative determinateness seems still to be preserved, to enter as moment, as the Being-for-One. The 2 and the 7 are moments in fact; they are no longer 2 and 7, but each is what it is as in the relation, and so endlessly variable. That the virtue here is qualitative will readily appear, when it is recollected that Quality is but seyende Bestimmtheit, beënt determinateness. The beënt determinateness which is here again may be considered of an infinite nature, as it rests on an infinite relation, or on Quanta which are of an infinite character. The Quantitativity of 2 as of 7 remains, but as in itself qualitative, seeing that each is what it is only in relation to another.

Such fraction, however, is no perfect expression of Infinitude: the finite and quantitative character of divisor, dividend, and quotient—their mutual indifference and externality as Quanta—are too obvious. Its value as an illustration depends wholly on the infinitude which comes upon its Quanta when they cease to function as direct or immediate Quanta,—on the fact that Quantity seems to become indifferent, if the Quality but remain.

The more general form \( \frac{a}{b} \) might appear, so far, more eligible as an expression for the Infinite; nevertheless, as valueless in itself, as altogether symbolical and dependent on another, it is quite indifferent and external, and so inapplicable as illustration here.

The relation as we have seen it in the fraction, then, implies these two characters: firstly, that it is Quantum; secondly, that it is not immediate but mediate Quantum, or that it implies the qualitative antithesis (\( i.e. \), a one of two, a reflexion into self from reflexion to other). The single virtue of the relation is the determinate but indifferent thing it is, because it has returned out of its otherwiseness (the contraposed numbers) into itself, and is so far an infinite. In other words, it is the secret quality that 2 has to 7, or 7 to 2, that is the thing, no matter what quantitative amount this secret quality may assume. The two
characters are more distinct when developed in the following familiar form:

'The fraction \( \frac{1}{2} \) can be expressed as \( \cdot285714\ldots \), \( \frac{1}{1-a} \) as \( 1+a+a^2+a^3+\ldots \), \&c. In this form, the fraction is as an infinite series; the fraction itself is called the Sum or the finite expression of the series. These terms were, perhaps, more correct, however, if converted. Comparing the two expressions, \( \frac{1}{2} \) on the one side of the equation and its decimal expansion on the other, and so with the other fraction, we find that the side which is the expansion or infinite series expresses the fraction no longer as relation, but as Quantum, as an Amount, as a number of Quanta which add themselves to each other. That the amount consists of decimal fractions, and so again of relations, is not a consideration here; for the question refers wholly to the amount and not to the nature of the unity concerned. A number consisting of several places of figures is still an amount; and the unities of the amount are not required to be considered in their peculiarity as units of the general decimal system. Nor is it to be objected that all fractions do not, like \( \frac{1}{2} \), yield an infinite decimal series; for every fraction may be expressed as a numerical system of another unity than the decimal one.

'In the expansion, the infinitude of relation has disappeared, then, and has now the form of an endless series.

'But this series is evidently the spurious Infinite. It is the contradiction to state what is a relation and of qualitative nature as relation-less and mere Quantum. Thus, carried out to what extent it may, there is always a minus: such series is but a Sollen, a To-be-to; a Beyond that is ever beyond is here inevitable. This is the permanent contradiction that ensues from the attempt to express what is qualitative as a quantitative amount.

'The inexactitude is here in actuality, which is only in appearance in the true mathematical Infinite. Both in mathematic and in philosophy the true Infinites, True and False, are to be carefully discriminated. In spite both of some early and of some recent attempts, infinite series is no legitimate or necessary expression of the true Infinite. Such series is inferior as an expression even to the fraction.

'The infinite series remains a Sollen, a To-be-to; it expresses not what it is to express. What it expresses is burthened with a beyond, and is different from what it is to express. It is
infinite as incomplete, and reaches not the other which is to complete it. What is properly there is a Finite, and stated as a Finite: it is—not that—which it is to be. The finite expression, on the other hand, the sum, is without deficiency. It has what the other only seeks. The beyond is recalled from flight. What it is and is to be are unseparated and the same.

The distinction is closer this:—In the infinite series the negative is outside of what is stated, as that is only a part of the amount. In the finite expression, on the contrary, a relation, the negative is immanent as the determinedness of the sides of the relation through one another; it is thus as returned to within itself, a self-referent unity, negation of the negation (both sides being but moments); it has thus the character of infinitude within itself. The finite expression is thus the infinite expression; the sum is a relation. The infinite series is in truth sum, no relation, but an aggregate. The series, then, is what is finite; it is an imperfect aggregate, and remains defective; it is determinate Quantum, but less than it should be. What fails again is also a determinate Quantum, and it is this deficiency that constitutes what is infinite in the series—this in the formal point of view that it is what fails, what is not, a non-being; in real meaning and value it is a determinate Quantum. What is, only with what is not, constitutes what is to be but is not able to be. This word infinite, even in the case of the series so called, is to common opinion something high and holy; such opinion is but superstition, the superstition of understanding; that depends, however, only on a want. (Negative, as used above, has reference to the necessary negation, the necessary other, required for qualitative distinctivity or determinateness. "Formal point of view"—it is only as regards form that the series is infinite, that what fails is always not, &c.).

It may be remarked that there are infinite series incapable of being summed; but this is an external and contingent circumstance with reference to the form of series as such. These involve an incommensurability, or the impossibility of representing the implied quantitative relation as a Quantum. The infinitude of such series is of a higher order than in those that may be summed; but the form of series as such is still, even in these cases, the spurious Infinite.

The usual metaphysical Infinite, and not the true mathematical Infinite, it is, then, which ought to be called, not the absolute, but the relative Infinite. There must be a conversion of dignity in
these references. What cannot sublate its other is Finite; what has sublated this other and united it to itself is Infinite.*

* For the sake only of the illustration it contains, it may be worth while noticing the curious attempt of Thomas Taylor, in his 'Dissertation on Nullities,' to prove, through expedients which are at bottom only the spurious Infinite, that there exist 'Nullities,' 'not Nothings,' but 'infinitely small quantities' that 'belong to, without being quantity,' and 'have a subsistence prior to number and even to the monad itself.' Such Nullities are 1—1, 2—2, 3—3, &c.; and these, in order, are stated by Taylor to be infinitely small quantities of 1, of 2, of 3, &c. Of 1—1, he says, it 'is not the same with 0, or, in other words, 1—1 considered collectively, or as one thing, is not the same with 1 considered as taken from one, so as to leave nothing.' The key-note of this Thomas 'Taylor's Theorem' is, that \( \frac{1}{\infty} \) is equal to \( \frac{1}{1+1} \), which, when expanded, becomes 1—1+1—1, + &c., ad infinitum. Taylor, while he accepts the summation of this series at the hands of the Mathematicians, seems—for he is by no means explicit—to object to these gentlemen that they are 'very far from suspecting' that they have accomplished at the same time the summation of the 'infinite Nullities.' He, for his part, however, evidently sees very clearly that, 1—1 being 0, (1—1)+ (1—1), which is the single characteristic and constitutive act of the series, must be but a summation of 0 to 0 all through; and consequently that, as this summation issues, not in nothing, but in \( \frac{1}{2} \), 1—1 is, after all, not a Nothing, but a 'Nullity,'—a quantity infinitely small. Taylor then proceeds to point out—what it is singular that neither Euler, nor any other Mathematician, should have considered'—that \( \frac{1}{3} \) = \( \frac{1}{1+1+1} \); \( \frac{1}{4} \) = \( \frac{1}{1+1+1+1} \) and, in short, all fractions, whose numerators are Unity, and whose denominators are distributed into Unities, will, when resolved into infinite series, be equal to this same 1—1+1—1, &c., infinitely.' He does not on that account, however, alter his original conclusion that 'the sum of the infinite nullities is \( \frac{1}{2} \).' Surely, nevertheless, he has now an equal title to infer that this same sum is \( \frac{1}{2} \), \( \frac{1}{3} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), &c. Nay, \( \frac{1}{2} \), \( \frac{1}{3} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), &c., ad infinitum, being all equal to the same thing and consequently to one another, surely he has now an equal title to infer that 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and in general all numbers or whatever, are similarly equal! Another instance of a like confusion is this: 'If 1—5, in whatever way it may be considered, was always the same as —4, and 1—2 the same as —1, then, since —1 divided by —4 is equal to \( \frac{1}{2} \), 1—2 divided by 1—5 would also be equal to \( \frac{1}{2} \); but on the contrary, it is equal to the infinite series 1—3+15—&c.' Taylor's error is the omission to perceive that all his Infinites are 'spurious': had he but completed them by what Hegel names the 'defect,' the 'falling determinate Quantum,' and Euler—a few pages before the one cited by Taylor himself—the 'remainder' (which remainder is, in the cases mentioned, \( \frac{1}{1+1} \), \( \frac{1}{1+1+1} \), \( \frac{1}{1+1+1+1} \), \( \frac{1}{1+1+1+1+1} \) 75 \( \frac{1}{1—5} \) equal respectively, \( \frac{1}{3} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \)), he would have found them instantly converted into the original relations, \( \frac{1}{3} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), \( \frac{1}{4} \), and \( \frac{1}{2} \). These two one-fourths suggest that, on similar reasoning, Taylor might have declared 1—1+1—1, &c. = 1—3+15—75, &c.; but in this and in the other cases, absurdity and confusion disappear directly the spurious un-ended is ended by what it wants—the relative remainder. Elsewhere Taylor—possibly, in similar cases, Mathematicians generally—might reflect with profit on the Hegelian distinction between operating (through 'increase' and
'It is in the sense of these findings, that Spinoza opposes the notion of the true to that of the false Infinite, and illustrates the same by examples.

'Spinoza defines the Infinite as the absolute affirmation of the existence of a nature of any kind; the Finite, on the contrary, as determinateness, as negation. The absolute affirmation of an existence is to be taken, namely, as self-reference, not as what is because another is: the finite, on the contrary, is the negation, a ceasing as mere referentiality to another that out of it begins. Absolute affirmation is inadequate, however, to the notion of the Infinite; which is not immediate affirmation, but as what is restored through reflexion of the other into itself, or as negation of the negative. But the substance of Spinoza and its absolute unity are fixed and immovable: they have not the form of the self with self-mediating unity; they possess not the notion of the negative unity of the self, subjectivity.

'Spinoza's example of the Infinite is the space between two circles, one of which, without touching, and without being concentric, is contained within the other. 'The mathematicians,' he says, 'demonstrate that the inequalities, which are possible in such a space, are infinite, not from the infinite number of the parts, for its magnitude is fixed and limited, and I can assume such spaces as greater and smaller, but because the nature of the thing itself exceeds every determinateness.' This infinite of Spinoza, then, is present and complete, not any unended number or series; the space, in his example, is limited, but it is infinite because 'the nature of the thing itself exceeds every determinateness,' because the magnitude contained in it cannot be expressed as a Quantum. The infinite of a series he names the infinite of the imagination; that again which is self-referent, the infinite of thought, or infinitum actu. The latter is actually infinite, because it is complete within itself and present. The other has no actuality, something fails

The 4 or \(\frac{1}{1-a}\) is, like Spinoza's space, so far finite, and can be

'diminution') on what is Quantity, and on what is no longer Quantity. School-boys, with a single string, produce, by passing loop through loop and tightening loop on loop, a very sufficient whip-cord, which seems to consist of a series of sufficiently solid-looking knots: one pull at the tail of the last one, however, and the whole series vanishes into its first One, the single string. Thus Taylor's series remained solid to him because he forgot to pull the tail, the remainder. This at least illustrates what Hegel is so anxious to make clear, the spuriousness of unended progressus regarded as an Infinite, and will, perhaps, be excused by the reader.
assumed as greater or smaller; but it admits not of the absurdity of a greater or less Infinite; for this Quantum of the whole affects not the relation of its moments, "the nature of the thing," that is, the qualitative determination of the magnitude. What in the infinite series is there is not only a finite Quantum, but, moreover, a defective one. Imagination clings to the Quantum as such, and reflects not on the qualitative peculiarity which constitutes the reason of the existent incommensurability.

'This incommensurability—that of Spinoza's example—comprehends within it the functions of curved lines, and brings us nearer to the true mathematical infinite which is connected with such functions and with the functions of variable magnitudes in general.

'In $\frac{a}{b}$ both numerator and denominator, as we have seen, are, in a certain manner, infinitely variable; $\frac{a}{b}$ again is infinitely variable in a still more unrestricted sense: if in the functions of variable quantities, then, $x$ and $y$ are to be distinguished from such quantities as 2, 7, $a$, $b$, &c., the principle of distinction must rest on something else than variableness as such or in general. Variable quantity, then, as an expression that is to be specifically distinctive, is extremely vague, and, at the same time, very badly chosen for characters of quantity which have their interest and their principle of operation in something quite else than their mere variableness.

'In $\frac{a}{b}$ the 2 and the 7 are, each of them, a fixed independent Quantum, and any co-reference or connexion is not essential to them. In $\frac{a}{b}$ too, both $a$ and $b$ are such quanta as are supposed to remain the quanta which they are apart from, and independent of, the relation. Moreover, $\frac{a}{b}$ and $\frac{a}{b}$ have fixed quotients; the relation constitutes an amount of unitics, the denominator corresponding to the latter and the numerator to the former. To express it otherwise, whatever change is made on the 2 and the 7 (as into 4 and 14, &c.), the relation as Quantum remains the same. This is all changed, however, in the function $\frac{y^2}{x} = p$, for example. Here $x$ and $y$ represent variable Quanta capable of receiving determinate values; but it is not on $x$ and $y$, but on $x$ and $y^2$, that the quotient depends. That is, $x$ and $y$ are not only variable, but their relation is no fixed quantum but as a quantum
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also absolutely variable. The reason of this peculiar variableness of the quotient is, that the relation is not of one quantity to another, but of one quantity to the square of another. This introduction of a power into the relation is the circumstance to be regarded as the fundamental determination: the relation of a magnitude to a power is no quantum, but essentially a qualitative relation.—Now in such functions as that of the straight line, the relation does not concern a power; \( \frac{x}{y} = a \) contains a fraction quite similar to \( \frac{a}{b} \); the fraction is an ordinary one, the quotient an ordinary one: such functions, therefore, are only formally functions of variable quantities, and have not that character to which the principle of the Calculus applies. In view of the specific difference which we have here so strongly before us, it would have been proper to have introduced for the functions named variable not only a specific name, but specific signs also, and different from those of the usual unknown quantities in algebra. It is to fail to see the peculiarity of the Calculus and the need from which it sprang, that there should be included within its matter such functions as those of the first degree. It is right to complete the generalisation of a method, but it is a misunderstanding here so to leave the specific difference out of view that the interest of the science seems to concern variable quantities in general. Much formalism of consideration and of operation would have been spared, had it been seen that what was in question was not quantitative variableness as such, but relations to Powers.

'But, in addition to this, there is another peculiarity that distinguishes the mathematical Infinite. In the relation \( \frac{y^2}{x^2} \), the \( y \) and the \( x \) have still the force and the value of Quanta; but this force and value disappear in the infinitely small differences. \( dx, dy \) are no longer Quanta, nor do they represent Quanta; they have meaning only in connexion, a sense only as moments. They are no longer Something in the sense of a Quantum, they are not finite differences; but they are not nothing, not indeterminate zero. Apart from their relation they are zeros, but they are to be taken only as moments of the relation, as determinations of the differential coefficient \( \frac{dx}{dy} \)."
'In this notion of the Infinite, Quantum is veritably perfected into a qualitative There-being (specific existence): it is in explicit position as actually infinite; it is sublated not only as this or that Quantum, but as Quantum in general. Quantitative specificity remains, however, as element of Quanta, as principle; it is Quanta, as some one has also said, in their first notion.

'Against this notion is it that all attacks, bearing on the fundamental principle of the Calculus, have been directed. The misapprehensions of mathematicians themselves in this connexion occasioned these. Generally they have been unable to justify their object as notion; but this notion cannot be evaded; for here it is not finite determinateness that is concerned; rather on this field such determinatenesses are converted into identity with their opposites, curved lines into straight, the circle into the polygon, &c. The operations of the Calculus, then, are entirely contradictory to the nature of finite values and their connexions, and should have their justification only in the notion.

'That, as vanishing, these infinite differences should have been conceived as a middle-state between Something and Nothing, was an error. This has been already discussed on occasion of the Category of Becoming in Remark 4. A state is a contingent and external affection; it is the disappearing, the Becoming,—that is, the truth.

'What is infinite, it has been further said, is incapable of comparison as a greater or a less; a relation of infinite to infinite, orders or dignities of the infinite—distinctions which are spoken of in the science itself—are therefore not legitimate. The conception of Quanta and of the comparison of Quanta in relation still underlies this objection. But rather, it should be said, what is only in relation is no Quantum. A Quantum is what can have its own indifferent, independent existence apart from the relation—what, therefore, is indifferent to its distinction from another. What is qualitative, again, is that which it is only in its distinction from another. In this sense, these infinite magnitudes are not only capable of comparison, but they are only as moments of comparison, of relation.

'If we examine now the chief mathematical views of this Infinite, we shall find that they all imply the same thought of the thing itself (which we have just expressed), but not fully expiscated as notion, and that they are driven to expedients in the application at variance with their better element.
'The thought cannot be more correctly determined than Newton has given it; that is, the conceptions of movement and velocity (whence fluxion) being withdrawn as burthening the thought with inessential forms and interfering with its due abstraction. Newton says of these fluxions (Princ. Mathem. Phil. Nat., lib. i. lemma xi. Schol.) that he understands by them disappearing divisibles, not indivisibles—a form belonging to Cavalleri and others, and implying the notion of a Quantum determined in itself; further not sums and relations of definite parts, but the limits of sums and relations. It may be objected that vanishing quantities have no last relation, because what is before their disappearance is not a last, and after, there is nothing. But under the relation of such magnitudes the relation is to be understood not before they disappear and not after; it is the relation with which they disappear (quacum evanescunt). So of magnitudes that become, the first relation is that with which they become.

'Newton here bears to explain what is to be understood by such and such an expression: this belongs to the scientific method of the time, and has no foundation in the truth of things. The notion, which is in itself necessary, being demonstrated, any explanation of what is to be understood becomes superfluous as mere historical demand or subjective presumption. But Newton's words apply plainly to the notion as here demonstrated. We have quantities which disappear or are no longer Quanta; and we have relations, not of definite parts, but relations which are limits of relation. Not only the Quanta or sides of the relation disappear, but the relation itself so far as it is Quantum. The limit of a quantitative relation is that in which it both is and is not, or, more accurately, that in which the Quantum has disappeared, and there remains the relation only as qualitative relation of quantity, and its sides similarly as qualitative moments of quantity. Ultimate magnitudes, Indivisibles, however, are not to be inferred from an ultimate relation of vanishing magnitudes. This were to deviate again from the abstract relation to such sides of it as should be supposed to possess a value apart from their co-reference, per se, as indivisibles—as something that were a one, relation-less.

'The last relations, he urges, are not relations of last magnitudes, but limits, to which the relations of the infinitely decreasing magnitudes are nearer than any given, that is to say, finite, difference: the limit moreover is not exceeded, to the production of nothing. Last magnitudes were indeed Indivisibles, or Ones. In
the last relation, however, any indifferent one that were without relation, as well as finite Quantum, disappears. Here, however, conceptions of infinite decrease (which is only the infinite progressus) as well as of divisibility, have no longer any immediate sense, if the notion of a quantitative element, which is only moment of a relation, be held fast in its purity.

'As regards the continuance of the relation in the disappearance of the Quanta, there is to be found (elsewhere as in Carnot, "Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du Calcul Infinitésimal") the expression that by virtue of the law of continuity the vanishing magnitudes still retain the relation (or ratio) from which they spring, before they vanish. This conception expresses the true nature of the thing, so far as not that continuity of Quantum is understood which it has in the infinite progress, that is, so to continue itself in its disappearance that in the Beyond of itself there arises again only a finite Quantum, only a new term of the series; a continuous progress is always so conceived, that the values are gone through, which then are still finite Quanta. In the continuity of the true infinite, on the contrary, it is the relation that is continuous; it is so continuous that it rather wholly consists in this, to isolate the relation alone, and to abolish any element that is not the relation, any Quantum which as side of the relation were to be supposed to remain Quantum apart from the relation. This purification of the quantitative relation is the same thing as what is meant by an empirical existence of any kind being comprehended in its notion (begriffen). Such existence in such case is raised beyond its own self in such wise that its notion contains the same characterising constituents as it itself, but taken up in their essentiality and into the unity of the notion, in which they have lost their indifferent, notionless subsistence.

'These, Newton's generative magnitudes or principles, are not more interesting than the generated magnitudes. A generated magnitude (genita) is a product or quotient, rectangles, squares, or sides of these,—in general a finite magnitude. "Such magnitude being considered as variable, as in continual movement and flux, increasing and decreasing, he understands by the name of moments its momentary Increments or Decrements. These, however, are not to be taken as particles of a definite magnitude (particulae finitae). Such were not themselves moments, but magnitudes generated out of moments; what is to be understood is rather the Principles or Beginnings of finite magnitudes in
process of becoming." Here the Quantum is distinguished from itself, or how it is as product or there-beint, and how in its Becoming, in its Beginning and Principle, that is to say, in its notion, or what is here the same thing, in its qualitative characterisation: in the latter the quantitative differences, the infinite increments or decrements, are only moments; only what is become is that which has gone over into the externality and indifference of There-being, the Quantum. If, on the one side, such conceptions are to be acknowledged to imply the true notion, on the other side these forms of increments, &c., are to be seen to fall within the category of the immediate Quantum and of the progressus, and to constitute the fundamental vice in the method—the permanent obstacle to the isolation into its purity of the qualitative moment in quantity in contradistinction to the usual Quantum.

'The conception of infinitely small magnitudes, which, however, is contained implicit in the increments and decrements themselves, is very inferior to the above determinations. They are described as such, that not only they themselves in comparison with finite magnitudes, but their higher orders in comparison with their lower, and even the products of several in comparison with a single one, may be neglected. This call to neglect is more strikingly prominent with Leibnitz than with others who preceded him. This call it is which, if it has won facility for the Calculus, has also given to its operations an appearance of inexactitude and express inaccuracy. Wolf, in his way of making things popular, that is to say, of making turbid the notion and of setting in its place incorrect sensuous conceptions, has sought to render this neglect intelligible by such examples as, in taking the height of a mountain the calculation is not affected, if a particle of sand be blown away the while; nor does the neglect of the height of the house or tower interfere with the accuracy of the calculations of lunar eclipses.

'If the fair play of Common Sense accept such inexactitude, all geometricians unite to reject the conception. In such a science as Mathematic there can be no question of empirical exactitude; its mensuration, whether by operations of the Calculus or by constructions in Geometry, is quite different from that of empirical lines and figures, as in Land-surveying. Proofs from elsewhere, besides, establish that there is no question of a less or more of accuracy, while it is self-evident at the same time that an absol-
utely exact result cannot issue from a process that were incorrect. Then, on the other side, the process itself cannot do without this neglect—despite its protestations that what it neglects is of no account. And this is the difficulty, this is what requires to be made intelligible, and any appearance of absurdity in it removed.

Euler, in adopting Newton’s general definition, would, in considering the relations of the increments, regard the infinite difference as zero. (Institut. Calc. Different., P. I., c. iii). How we are to understand this, lies in the foregoing: the difference, if zero quantitatively, is not so qualitatively; it is no zero, but a pure moment in the relation. It is no difference by so much; yet again, it seems strange to characterise what is infinitely small, as increment or decrement or difference; and such external arithmetical operation really seems performed, addition or subtraction, in that, as regards the finite magnitude present from the first, something is added to it, or taken from it. It is to be said, however, that the transition from the function of the variable to its differential, must be regarded as of quite a different nature, namely (as already determined), as a reduction of the finite function to the qualitative relation of its quantitative elements. Again the difficulty reappears when the increments are called zeros; for a zero has no determinateness, and seems insusceptible of the relation still attributed. Conception here has correctly reached the negative of the Quantum, but does not hold it fast, nevertheless, in its positive value of qualitative determinations of quantity, which, isolated from the relation and taken as Quanta, are zeros.—Lagrange (Théorie des Fonct. Analyt., Introd.) remarks of Limits or ultimate Ratios, that though we can very well conceive the ratio of two magnitudes so long as they remain finite, we can form no clear or distinct notion of this ratio so soon as its terms have become zero. In effect, the understanding must transcend this merely negative side with respect to the terms of the ratio being null as Quanta, and take them up positively as qualitative moments. What Euler says further as regards zeros that are yet relations, and so to be otherwise expressed than zeros, cannot be considered satisfactory. He seeks to support this on the difference between arithmetical and geometrical ratios. In the arithmetical there is no difference between 0 and 0; in the geometrical, however, if $2 : 1 = 0 : 0$, then proportion is such, that the first 0 is twice the second. In common arithmetic, too, $n.0=0$, i.e. $n : 1 :: 0 : 0$. But just by this that $2 : 1$ or $n : 1$ is
a relation of Quanta, there cannot correspond to it any relation or expression of 0 : 0.

'In the instances given, the veritable notion of the Infinite is really implied then, but it is not stamped out and taken up in its specific determinateness. It is not to be expected, then, that the operation can prove satisfactory. The true notion is not there kept in view; finite Quantum intrudes; and the conception of a merely relatively small cannot be dispensed with. What is infinite has still to submit to, and is susceptible of, the usual arithmetical operations, addition, &c.; and is thus so far finite. Justification, then, is required for such duplicity of view which would consider infinite magnitudes now as increments or differences, and again neglect them as Quanta, immediately after having applied to them the forms and laws of Quanta, of what is finite.

'There have been many attempts to remove these difficulties; I adduce the most important.

'It has been sought to procure for the Calculus the evidence of the Geometrical method proper and the rigour of the ancient demonstration—expressions of Lagrange. But the principle of the one being higher than that of the other, renunciation must be made of that sort of evidence, just as philosophy has no pretensions to that plainness which the sciences of what is sensuous (Natural History, &c.), possess, and as eating and drinking are a much more intelligible business than thinking and comprehending. As for the rigour of demonstration—

'Some have endeavoured altogether to dispense with the notion of the Infinite. Lagrange mentions Landen's method as a pure analytic process that, without any infinitely small differences, assumes, first of all, various values of the variables, and sets them equal in the sequel. He decides that the advantages proper of the Calculus—simplicity of method and ease of operation—are thus lost. There is something here corresponding to that, from which Descartes' method of Tangents proceeds. This process, on the whole, belongs to another sphere of mathematical treatment than the method of the Calculus; and the peculiarity of the simple relation to which the actual concrete interest reduces itself—that is, the simple relation of the derived to the original function—is not made sufficiently prominent.

'Many, as Fermat, Barrow, Leibnitz, Euler, and others, have always openly believed themselves warranted to omit the products of infinite differences, as well as their higher powers, only on the
ground that they disappear relatively to the lower order. On this alone rests with them the fundamental position, that is, the determination of what is the differential of a product or a power, for to this the whole theoretical doctrine reduces itself. What remains is partly mechanism of development, but partly again application; which latter, as will appear again, constitutes in effect the higher, or rather only interest. As regards what is before us, the elementary consideration may be worth mentioning, that, for the same reason of unimportance, it is assumed that the Elements of Curves, namely, the increments of the Absciss and of the Ordinate, have to one another the relation of the Subtangent and of the Ordinate; with the view of obtaining similar triangles, the arc, which forms to the two increments the third side of a triangle, formerly rightly named the characteristic triangle, is regarded as a straight line, as part of the Tangent, and withal the increment extending to the Tangent. These assumptions raise these forms, on the one hand, above the nature of finite magnitudes; on the other hand, again, there is applied to the moments named infinite a process that is valid only of finite magnitudes, and in which nothing can be neglected because of its unimportance. The difficulty under which the method labours appears in such procedure in its full force.

"An ingenious artifice of Newton to get rid of the unnecessary terms in finding the differentials, may here be mentioned. He (Princ. Math. Phil. Nat., lib. ii. lemma ii. post propos. vii.) finds the differential of the product in the following way. The product, when \( x, y \) are taken each of them smaller by the half of its infinite difference, passes into \( xy - \frac{x dy}{2} - \frac{y dx}{2} + \frac{dxdy}{4} \); and when \( x, y \) are taken greater by the same amount, into \( xy + \frac{x dy}{2} + \frac{y dx}{2} + \frac{dxdy}{4} \). The first product now, being taken from the second, there remains over \( x dy + y dx \); and this remainder Newton wishes us to regard as the excess of the increase by a whole \( dx \) and \( dy \), for this excess is the difference of the two products; it is therefore the differential of \( xy \). In this process we see that the troublesome term, the product of the two infinite differences, \( dxdy \), neutralises itself. But, the name of Newton notwithstanding, we must venture to say that this—certainly very elementary—operation is
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nevertheless incorrect; it is incorrect that $(x + \frac{dx}{2})(y + \frac{dy}{2}) = (x - \frac{dx}{2})(y - \frac{dy}{2}) = (x + dx)(y + dy) - xy$. It can only be the pressing necessity of establishing an interest of such importance as the Calculus of Fluxions, which could bring a Newton to palm on himself the deception of such a proof."

Arithmetically or algebraically (at least to Newton algebra was, by his 'Arithmetica Universalis' of 1707, still arithmetic) the only true result of subtracting the original product from the increased product in order to find their difference is $xdy + ydx - dxdy$. No arithmetical or algebraical statement of the same problem, but with a different result, can be correct. Hegel, consequently, in what he relatively says, is absolutely correct—if Newton only arithmetically or algebraically stated his problem, and only arithmetically or algebraically solved it.*

"Other forms employed by Newton in the derivation of the differential are rendered impure by the concrete adjuncts of motion, &c. The introduction of the serial form, too, brings a temptation to speak of attaining what accuracy we please and to neglect what is relatively unimportant, &c., not always to be resisted: it is thus that, in his method of resolving equations of the higher degrees by approximation, he leaves out of consideration the higher powers which arise by the substitution into the equation of each new-found but still inexact value, for the clumsy reason of their smallness; (vide Lagrange, Equations Numériques, p. 125).

"The blunder into which Newton, in the resolution of a problem, by the omission of higher powers which were essential, fell, which blunder gave his enemies the opportunity of a triumph of their method over his, and of which Lagrange (Théorie des Fonct. Analyt., 3ème P., ch. iv.) has demonstrated the true origin, proves the formality and uncertainty which still existed in the employment of said instrument. Lagrange shows that Newton threw out the very term which—for the problem in hand—was wanted. Newton had erred from adhering to the formal and superficial principle of omission because of relative smallness. It is known, namely, that in Mechanic a particular import is attached to the terms of the series in which the function of a motion is developed, so that the first term or the first function

* See further on this in the 'Lectures on Law.'
relates to the moment of velocity, the second to the accelerating force, and the third to the resistance of forces. The terms of this series are thus not to be regarded as only parts of a sum, but as qualitative moments of a whole of the notion. The omission of the remaining terms which belong to the pseudo-infinite series acquires here a wholly different sense from the omission because of their relative smallness.* Newton's error arose, then, from not attending to that term which possessed the qualitative value sought.

'In this example, it is the qualitative sense on which the process is made to depend. In agreement herewith the general declaration may at once be made, that the whole difficulty of the principle would be at once removed if—instead of the formalization which places the determination of the differential only in—what gives it its name—the problem to find the difference of a function from the alteration it undergoes when its variable magnitude has received an increase—the qualitative import of the principle were assigned, and the operation made dependent thereon. In this

* Both considerations (i.e., the qualitative and the quantitative) are found very simply beside each other in the application by Lagrange of the Theory of Functions to Mechanics (Théorie des Fonc., 3ème P., ch. i., art. 4). The space described considered as function of the time elapsed gives the equation \[ x = ft; \] this developed as \[ f(t + s) \] gives \[ f + 3ft' + \frac{3s}{2} f''t + \&c. \] The space, then, appears in the formula:

\[ = 9f + 9\frac{s}{2} f' t + \frac{9s}{2} f'' t + \&c. \]

The motion by means of which this space is described is, it is said, therefore, that is to say, because the analytic development gives several—rather an infinite number of terms,—composed of several partial motions, of which the spaces, correspondent to the time, will be \( 9f, \frac{9s}{2} f', \frac{9s}{2} f'' t + \&c. \)

The first partial motion is, in known motion, the formally uniform one with a velocity designated by \( f' \). the second the uniformly accelerated one which derives from an accelerating force proportioned to \( f'' t \). 'As now the remaining terms relate to no simple known motion, it is unnecessary to take them specially into consideration, and we will show that they may be abstracted from in the determination of the motion at the beginning of the time-point.' This is now shown, but shown only by the comparison of this said series (all the terms of which should belong to the determination of the magnitude of the space described in the time given) with the equation given, Art. 3, for the motion of a falling body, \( x = at + \frac{1}{2} b \), in which equation only these two terms are to be supposed contained. But this equation has itself obtained this form only by presupposition of the explanation which is given to the terms that arise through analytic development; this presupposition is, that the uniformly accelerated motion is composed of a formally uniform motion proceeding with the velocity acquired in the foregoing time, and of an increase (the \( a \) in \( x = at + \frac{1}{2} b \), i.e., the empirical co-efficient), which is ascribed to the force of gravitation—a distinction which has now any existence or ground in the nature of the thing itself, but is only the expression—falsely made physical—of what results in the case of an assumed analytic operation.'
sense the differential of \( x^n \) manifests itself to be completely exhausted by the first term of the series which results from the expansion of \((x + dx)^n\). That the remaining terms are not to be considered, does not depend on their relative smallness; there is no presupposition in this case of an inaccuracy, a blunder, an error which is to be balanced and amended by another; a point of view from which Carnot mainly justifies the usual method of the Infinitesimal Calculus. In that the question is not of a Sum, but of a Relation or Ratio, the Differential is completely found by the first term; and where further terms, differentials of higher degrees, are required, their determination is not to be considered as the continuation of a series as Sum, but the repetition of one and the same ratio, which ratio is all that is wanted, and which consequently is already complete in the first term. The necessity of the form of a series, its summation, and of what depends thereon, must then be wholly separated from this Interest of the Relation.

'The elucidations which Carnot gives on the method of infinite magnitudes are of the purest and clearest. But in passing to the operation itself there enter, more or less, the usual conceptions of the infinite smallness of the omitted terms relatively to the others. He justifies the method by the fact that the results are correct, and by the utility which the introduction of imperfect equations, as he calls them, that is to say, of such as exhibit such arithmetically incorrect omission, has for the simplification and abbreviation of calculation, rather than by the nature of the thing itself.

'Lagrange, as is well known, has taken up again the original serial method of Newton, in order to be relieved of the difficulties which attend the conception of the infinitely little as well as the method of first and last ratios and limits. His Calculus of functions, its merits of precision, abstraction, and universality being justly acknowledged, rests on the fundamental proposition, that the Difference, without becoming nothing, may be taken so small, that each term of the series shall exceed in magnitude the sum of all that follow. Even in this method a beginning is made with the categories of the increase and of the difference of the function whose variable magnitude receives the increase (by which increase the troublesome series comes in) from the original function; just as in the sequel the terms to be omitted are viewed only as sum, and the reason of omission is placed in the relativity of their Quantum. Partly the omission is not, as universal principle, reduced to the qualitative consideration, which we saw exemplifying itself in
some applications (where the terms neglected were exhibited not as quantitatively but as qualitatively insignificant); partly, again, the omission itself is omitted in the very principle which, as regards the so-called differential co-efficient, characteristically distinguishes the so-named application of the Calculus with Lagrange, as will be discussed more at full in the Remark that follows the present one.

'The qualitative character which has been pointed out, is to be found in its directest form in the category, limit of the ratio, which has been above mentioned, and the carrying out of which in the Calculus has given rise to a special method. Lagrange decides that this method wants ease of application, and that the expression Limit is without definite idea. We, then, shall take up Limit in the latter reference, and see closer what has been stated as regards its analytic import. In the conception of Limit there certainly lies the adduced veritable category of the qualitative relational character of the variable magnitudes; for the forms here which come in from the latter, \(dx\) and \(dy\), are held to be only as moments of \(\frac{dy}{dx}\) and \(\frac{dx}{dy}\); it itself is viewed as a single indivisible sign. That the advantage is thus lost which may be derived from the separation of the sides of the differential co-efficient, for the mechanism of the Calculus in its application,—this we may pass by. The limit is now, then, to be limit of a given function;—it is to assign in reference to this function a certain value, determined by the mode of the derivation. With the mere category of limit, however, we were no further than with what has been the object of this Remark, to show, namely, that the infinitely little, which presents itself in the Calculus as \(dx\) and \(dy\), has not merely the empty, negative sense of a non-finite, a non-given magnitude, as in the expressions, an infinite number, in infinitum, &c., but the definite sense of the qualitative determinateness of the quantitative elements, of a moment of relation as such. This category (limit) has even so, however, no relation to what a given function is, and enters not in its own character into the treatment of such a function, and into any application which, in reference to said function, were to be made of it (the limit); and so the conception of limit, confined to such rôle, leads to nothing. But limit at once means more. Limit is limit of something; it expresses a certain value which lies in the function of variable magnitude; and we have to see the nature of this concrete rôle. It is to be the limit of the ratio of the two increments mutually which increases two variables
conjoined in an equation, and the one a function of the other;—the increase here is quite indefinite, and there is no use, so far, of the infinitely little. But the manner of finding this limit leads directly to the same inconsequences as in the other methods. This manner, namely, is the following: If $y = fx$ become increased by $k$, then $fx$ alters itself into $fx + ph + qh^2 + rh^3, \&c.$, and so $h = ph + qh^2, \&c.$, and $\frac{k}{h} = p + qh + rh^2, \&c.$ Now, let $k$ and $h$ vanish, and all vanishes except $p$, which $p$ is now to be considered the limit of the ratio of the two increments. Though $h = 0$, then $\frac{k}{h}$ is not to be at once $= 0$, but is to be supposed still to remain a ratio. The conception of limit now is to be supposed to extend the advantage of warding off the inconsequence which appears here; $p$ is, at the same time, not to be the actual ratio that were $= 0$, but only that particular value to which the ratio infinitely approximates, so that the difference may be taken smaller than any given one. The preciser sense of this approximation in regard to what approximate will be considered again. That, however, a quantitative difference which may be taken smaller than any given one (and must be so taken), is no longer quantitative at all—this is self-evident; but there is no advance even so, as regards $\frac{dy}{dx} = 0$. If, on the other hand, $\frac{dy}{dx} = p$, i.e., if it be assumed as a definite quantitative ratio, as is in effect the case, then the presupposition which has set $h = 0$ is in a dilemma—a presupposition by which alone $\frac{k}{h} = p$ is found.

But if it be granted that $\frac{k}{h} = 0$, and with $h = 0$, $k$ of itself becomes $= 0$; for the increment $k$ to $y$ is, only if the increment $h$ is,—then it were necessary to say what $p$ is to be, which as $p$ is a quite definite quantitative value. To this there is at once the simple dry answer that it is a co-efficient and so-and-so derived,—the first function of an original function, and determined in a certain definite manner. If we content ourselves with this—and in point of fact Lagrange has virtually contented himself with this—then the universal or general part of the Calculus, and directly this form of it, which is named the Theory of Limits, are quit of increments and their
infinite or discretionary smallness—quoth of the difficulty of getting out of the way all the terms of the inevitable series except the first, or, rather, except only the co-efficient of the first—quoth of the formal categories of the infinite, of infinite approximation, of continuous magnitude,* and of all others the like, as effort, becoming, occasion of an alteration, to which men have been driven in the exigency of the case. But then it would be still necessary to show—besides the mere dry definition (sufficient for the theory), that it is nothing but a function derived from the expansion of a Binomial—what meaning and value, i.e., what connexion and application this same \( p \) still has for further mathematical requirements: this will be the subject of Remark 2. We proceed to discuss at present the confusion which the so current use of the conception approximation has occasioned in the understanding of the specific qualitative determinateness of the relation, which was the proper interest to be considered.

‘It has been shown that the so-called infinite differences express the disappearance of the sides of the relation as Quanta, and that what remains is their quantitative relation, pure so far as it is determined in qualitative form; the qualitative relation is here so little lost, that it is rather that which just results from the transformation of finite into infinite magnitudes. In this, as we have seen, consists the whole nature of the thing itself. So disappear in the ultimate ratio, for example, the Quanta of the absciss and ordinate; but the sides of this relation in principle remain, the one the element of the ordinate, the other the element of the absciss. Now, in resorting to figurate conception, and assuming the one ordinate infinitely to approximate to the other, the previously distinguished ordinate passes into the other ordinate, and the previously distinguished absciss into the other absciss; but essentially the ordinate passes not into the absciss, nor the absciss into the ordinate. The element of the ordinate, to remain by this example of variable magnitudes, is not to be taken

* 'The category of continuous or fluent magnitude comes in with the consideration of the external and empirical increase effected on the variables; but, the scientific object of the Calculus being a certain relation (usually expressed by the differential co-efficient), which specific peculiarity may be also named Law, to this peculiarity the mere continuity is partly heterogeneous, partly mere abstract empty category, seeing that as regards the law of continuity it determines nothing. What formal definitions one may be misled into, the following will exemplify:—‘A continuous magnitude, Continuum, is every magnitude considered in a state of genesis such that the progress is not saltuatim, but uninterrupted.’ This definition is tautologically the same as the definitum.'
as the difference of one ordinate from another ordinate, but is rather as the difference or qualitativo-quantitative value relatively to the element of the absciss; the principle of the one variable magnitude stands in relation to the principle of the other. The difference, in ceasing to concern finite magnitudes, has ceased to be a plurality within its own self; it has collapsed into the simple intensity, into the specificity, of one qualitative relational moment opposed to the other.

This state of the case is obscured, however, by conceiving what has just been named element—say of the ordinate, so as difference or increment that it is only the difference between the Quantum of one ordinate and the Quantum of another ordinate. The Limit has here thus not the sense of the Relation or Ratio; it is regarded but as the last value to which another magnitude of the same kind constantly approximates, and in such a manner that it may be as little different from it as we please, and that the ultimate relation or ratio may be a relation of equality. Thus the infinite difference is the libration of the difference of a Quantum from a Quantum, and the qualitative nature by reason of which $dx$ is essentially not a relational character with reference to $x$, but with reference to $dy$ becomes lost from view. $dx^2$ is allowed to disappear with reference to $dx$, but still more does $dx$ disappear with reference to $x$; and that truly is as much as to say, it has only a relation to $dy$. The endeavours of geometricians has been specially directed to the rendering intelligible of the approximation of a magnitude to its limit, and how as regards the difference of Quantum from Quantum, it is no difference and yet a difference. But besides this the approximation is in itself a category that says nothing and makes nothing intelligible; $dx$ has the approximation already behind it—it is not near, nor yet a nearer; and infinitely near were itself the negation of the being near and of the drawing near (approximation).

Since it has happened that the increments or infinite differences have been considered only on the side of the Quantum that disappears in them and only as its limits, they are moments quite without mutual relation. We might infer from this the inadmissible conception that it is allowable in ultimate relation to set, say, absciss and ordinate, or even sine, cosine, tangent, versed sine, and whatever else, all equal to each other. This conception seems at first hand to be motive, when an arc is treated as a tangent; for the arc is for its part incommensurable with the
straight line, and its element is directly of an other quality than the element of the straight line. It seems still more absurd and inadmissible than the interchange of absciss, ordinate, versed sine, cosine, &c., when *quadrata rotundis*—when a part however infinitely small of the arc is taken as a portion of the tangent, and treated consequently as a straight line. But this operation is to be essentially distinguished from the interchange censured; it is justified by pointing out that in the triangle constituted by the elements of arc, absciss, and ordinate, there is the same relation as if the element of the arc were the element of a straight line, the tangent; the angles are the same, and these constitute the essential Relation—that, namely, which remains for these elements when the finite magnitudes belonging to them are abstracted from. We might even say, straight lines, as infinitely small, have become curved lines, and the relation of them in their infinitude is a curve relation. In its definition, the straight line being the shortest distance between two points, its distinction from the curve would seem to rest on number (Menge), on the smaller number of what is distinguishable in this distance, which is therefore a consideration of Quantum. But this consideration disappears in the line when it is taken as intensive magnitude, as infinite moment, as element; but so also disappears its distinction from the curve which rested only on the difference of Quantum. Thus, as infinite, straight line and arc retain no quantitative relation, and consequently also—by reason of the assumed definition—no qualitative diversity any longer relatively to each other, and the former passes into the latter.

‘Analogous to the equating of heterogeneous forms, is the assumption that infinitely small parts of the same whole are equal to one another; an assumption in itself indefinite and completely indifferent, but which, applied to an object that is heterogeneous in itself—an object, that is, which possesses essential irregularity of quantitative character—may produce a peculiar inversion. This we see in the proposition of the higher Mechanic, that, in equal infinitely small times, infinitely small parts of a curve are described, in uniform movement, inasmuch as this is said of a movement in which, in' equal finite, that is, existent times, finite, that is, existent unequal parts of the curve are described—a movement, then, which as existing is irregular and is so assumed. This proposition is the expression in words of what is to be supposed as represented by an analytic term that yields itself in
the development we saw of the formula respecting a motion irregular but subject to a certain law (Note on Lagrange and relative text, p. 576). Earlier mathematicians sought, so, to give their own meanings to terms and results of the newly-invented Calculus (which was itself, however, just conditioned by concrete objects), and to apply them in geometrical delineations, essentially as established theorems capable of being used as principles of proof generally. The terms of a mathematical formula into which the analytic method sundered the magnitude of an object, e.g. of motion, took on, in consequence of such views, a real import, e.g. of velocity, accelerating force, &c. They were held to furnish, in agreement with such import, true positions, physical laws; and their real connexions and relations were supposed to be determined in accordance with the analytic combination. An example of this is the statement that in a uniformly accelerated motion, there exists a particular velocity proportional to the times, but that there constantly accrues to this pseudo-uniform velocity an increment from the force of gravity. Such propositions we find now, in the modern analytic form of Mechanic, absolutely as products of the Calculus, without any one troubling himself as to whether they have per se and in themselves a real sense—one, that is, to which there is a correspondent existence, and whether this sense can be proved. The difficulty of rendering intelligible the connexion of such forms when they are taken in the real sense alluded to—e.g. the difficulty of rendering intelligible the transition from the downright or pseudo-uniform velocity to a uniformly accelerated one—is held to be quite removed by the analytic manipulation as a manipulation in which such connexion is a simple consequence of the now once for all established authority of the operations of the Calculus. It is given out as a triumph of science, nowadays, to discover by the mere Calculus laws beyond experience, i.e., expressions of existence which have no existence.* But in the earlier still naive period of the Calculus, the endeavour was that, as regards said terms and propositions—presented, namely, in Geometrical delineations—a real sense per se should be assigned and made plausible, and they themselves applied in such sense in proof of the main positions that might be concerned. See the Newtonian proof of the fundamental proposition in the Theory of Gravitation, Princ. Math. Phil. Nat.,

* Kant, too, says (WW xi. 259): 'The mathematician takes his data from elsewhere.' Mathematic informs, it does not create, existence.—New.
lib. i. sect. ii. prop. 1, compared with Schubert’s Astronomy (1st ed., iii. B. § 20), where it is admitted that the truth is not exactly so (i.e. that in the point which is the nerve of the proof, the truth is not as Newton assumes it).

‘It will not be possibly denied that in this field much has been accepted as proof, especially with the help of the mist of the infinitely little, for no other reason than that what came out was always already known before, and that the proof, which was so constituted that it came out, brought forward at least the show of a scaffolding of proof,—a show which was always still preferred to mere belief or to mere knowledge from experience. I have no hesitation, however, in regarding this mannerism as a mere jugglery and charlatanery of proof, and in including under this category even Newtonian proofs, particularly those bearing on what has just been referred to, on account of which Newton was raised to the skies and above Kepler, as having mathematically demonstrated what the latter had merely found from experience.

‘The vacant scaffolding of such proofs was set up for the demonstration of physical laws. But Mathematic is not at all competent to demonstrate quantitative determinations of Physic, so far as they are Laws which rest on the qualitative nature of the moments; this for the simple reason that Mathematic is not Philosophy, proceeds not from the Notion, and has, therefore, what is Qualitative, unless taken lemmatically from experience, lying beyond its sphere. The desire to uphold the honour of Mathematic, that all in it is rigorously proved, has tempted it to forget its limits; thus it appeared against its honour simply to acknowledge experience as source and as only proof of propositions of experience; consciousness (opinion) has become of late better formed for the appreciation of this: so long, however, as consciousness (opinion) has not clearly before it the distinction between what is mathematically demonstrable and what can be only got elsewhere, between what are only terms of analytic expansion and what are physical existences, the interest of science cannot raise itself into rigorous and pure form. Without doubt, however, the same justice will yet overtake that scaffolding of Newtonian proof, which has been fulfilled on another baseless and artificial Newtonian structure of optical experiments combined with reflexion (inference). Applied Mathematic is yet full of a similar mélange of experience and reflexion, but, as of said Optic, since a considerable time, already one part after the other has
begun in point of fact to be ignored in science, with the inconse-
quence, however, of leaving alone the contradictory remainder,—
so is it also fact that already a part of those illusory proofs has
fallen of itself into oblivion or been replaced by others.'

It was, ir. the first instance, intended, not strictly to translate,
but to convey this Remark by compression of the words through
change of phrase or otherwise, without, however, omission, but
rather with addition, of matter where it might seem necessary.
Examples both of compression and of addition (the latter espe-
cially, where the notion of the quantitative infinite is concerned,
as the 'voice,' &c.,*) will be found; but in such a writer as Hegel,
always compressed to the necessity of the notion, but, at the
same time, to the same necessity equally full, attempts of either
kind will almost always prove abortive. So it has been here,
and I am disposed to believe now that an exact translation,
while infinitely less troublesome to myself, would have
been less motley and more satisfactory to the reader. As it is,
however, I venture to say that there is given, on the whole,
at once a correct and intelligible statement of the relative thought
of Hegel. This is something; for, to the best of my belief, this
most important note has remained hitherto absolutely sealed.
Rosenkranz, indeed, mentions three writers who have followed
Hegel on the subject. The first of these, C. Frantz, as in opposi-
tion to, is to be assumed ignorant of, the views of Hegel, which
plainly, so far as they go, are inexpugnable.† As regards the other
two, E. Huhn and H. Schwarz, Rosenkranz quoting nothing from
either (which surely he would have done, had he found they made
plain such statements as these of Hegel, the importance of which
no one with even the slightest tincture of mathematic, or through
whatever rust of time and desuetude, can miss seeing, once they
are made plain), and nothing seeming to have reached this country
on the subject at all, I am disposed to believe that they have both
failed to see, or evolve, the light which was necessary. In fact,
what is wanting to intelligence here is not mathematic, but meta-

* The reader may be amused by the persistence of our claim to the illustration of
the 'Voice.'! The truth ir, however, that perhaps the very best reader of the
S. of H. known to us did take said voice not to be ours but Hegel's.—New.

† So far as the allusion to 'Optic' means Goths on Light—that may be
excepted.—New.
physic: the Remark, indeed, must remain quite unintelligible to any one not long acquainted with the language of Hegel, and perfectly at home with his one vital thought—the notion. My belief, therefore, is, that—on the whole—the entire Remark has remained unintelligible. My belief, moreover, also is, that, despite the imperfection of form, of which I am very sensible, and for which I sincerely apologise, it is now, as I have already said, perfectly intelligible—if taken after, and in full understanding of, all that precedes it. There may seem, in the first instance, no positive material gain for mathematic here, and accordingly the mathematical reader may be expected to rise from his first reading not only disappointed, but hostile. Feelings both of disappointment and of hostility will vanish, however, if he but persevere. Hegel approaches the subject, it must be reflected, not as a mathematician, but as a metaphysician, and all that he wishes to be made clear in this remark is the simple notion. There is only one question, then, to put: is the notion, obscure before, now clear? Besides this, we may ask also, by the way, are these numerous particular critiques of his just? Indeed, we may ask, thirdly, is not the general result a new, clearer, and distincter power of vision, taken quite universally, and here specially in regard to all that holds of mathematic?

As regards the last of these questions, it can hardly escape any one that, with reference to the Calculus in general, as well as its various forms in particular and the chief subordinate conceptions in both respects, never has the determination of the negative been more sharply, more specifically and absolutely stamped out. Quanta, by very definition no longer Quanta, yet treated as Quanta; Quanta, as named or as believed, yet treated as it is impossible to treat Quanta; omission because of insignificance, but omission obligatory and indispensable in spite of insignificance; proof necessary from elsewhere, yet pretensions above any elsewhere; great results of the operation, but the operation itself granted incorrect; an incorrect operation, but absolutely correct results; a specific nature claimed from variableness of Quantity, but variableness of Quantity equally elsewhere; a specific nature really so-and-so characterised, yet matter not of this specific nature admitted; a science par excellence the science of exactitude and proof, yet expressly inexact and confessedly oppressed with difficulty as to proof: these are some of the examples by which this determination of the negative is
accompanied. Again, the concluding observations in regard to
the show of mathematical proof in matters known from experi-
ence alone, are extremely striking, and no less instructive; as
the notices of Newton, Leibnitz, Euler, Lagrange, the method
of Limits, &c., &c., are hits so instantaneously and felicitously
home, that the conviction from the reason, is hardly more than the
delight from the irresistible skill, of the thing.

The great merit of Hegel here, however, is the notion. You
utterly stumble and uselessly lose yourselves in an irrelevant
wood, he says, when you insist on seeing the thing in increments
and decrements, the omission of the insignificant, approximations,
continuations, nius, &c. &c. The question of Quantity ought to
be no difficulty to you, for you are simply to abstract from it and
take up what is positive enough and seizable enough as Quality:
what is present is only the qualitative relation of quantitative prin-
cipia, which as principia are elements, but not Quanta. Seize but
the relation, he says, and you may give it what quantity you
like.

To understand Hegel aright, then, here, we must put ourselves
perfectly at home in the first place with the notions of Quality
and Quantity. You think of salt and of sugar, of pepper and of
pap, of heat and cold, of wet and dry, of soft and hard, of light
and heavy—of stick, stone, metal, glass, and what not, and you
think to yourself, you sufficiently understand what Quality is.
But this that you have so before understanding, is only the Vor-
stellung, only the figurate conception, only the metaphor, the
hypotypose, the representation of the thing. What you want is
the thing itself, and that is—the notion. But Quality is the pre-
cipitation of the Werden, the Becoming; Quality is the One of
Being and of Non-being; it is not more through what it is, than
through what it is not; it owes as much to its difference as to its
identity: quality thus has—unlike the unended series—‘its nega-
tive within itself.’ It is complete, or infinite, that is, not ended;
or it has sublated its other, and thus it is infinite. The series, on
the contrary, has its other out of it, so it is indeterminate; when
it attains to this other, this negative, this that fails it, it will be at
once through that negative a determined Something, it will have
attained a qualitative character. Quality is beënt determinatenes,
and as a one of two, always of the nature of relation, or of
the negation of the negation. Quality, universally taken, is what
is; but Quality as What is, is, is; that is, it is Quantity.
Quantity is the out of itself of Quality; or it is Quality's necessity to be. In this way, the Qualitative and the Quantitative Infinite are alike and equal. Quality as What is, is 'the nature of the thing itself which exceeds all determinateness,' and Quantity is indifferent to it: it remains the same in all Quantity. The infinite discretion of is, is, is,—this is What is, is. The Being-for-self is for itself only because at the same time what it is, is for it: the Being-for-self and the Being-for-One are identical. Now the Being-for-One as the What is, is this endless discretion, or it is the quantitative form of Quality. But this referred to the pure quantitative sphere is the quantitative infinite. Or, simply the notion of Quantity itself, a notion necessitated by the notion of Quality, is the Quantitative Infinite. Quantum, taken not as any particular Quantum, but quite generally, is at once external non-being quite generally, and its negation; it is the one that is boundlessly many, and yet one; it is quantitativity; its infinitude is this, its one qualitative nature, or specific constitution. Quantity is the relation that Quality has to itself in that it is: Quantity is thus One and Many and Infinite. Being, were it only Being, would at once decease; Being is Being only by reason of a Non-being through which it is, is, is; to be it must not be. All this again refers to Quantity as taken \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}. That I should live, requires a to-morrow when I do not live. This is a negation to me as finite existence; but \textit{sub specie aeternitatis} that negation is taken up into, is made one of, is made one with, the absolute life. What has been said here as absolutely \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}, is equally susceptible of being said with reference only to pure Quantity. The Quantum quite generally is through its other, and so the negation of the negation: it is through the \textit{out}, and the \textit{out} through it, for the \textit{out} is it. Repulsion in Quantum is but self-reference; that repulsion is its what; it is through its repulsion that which it is. The one is the \textit{what}, and the what is the one; there is a look \textit{out} and a look \textit{in}. The one's \textit{what} is just all these ones; and that is just the one Quantum endlessly, but one. It is the one continuity of all that multiplied discretion. Quantum's own wing ever stretches and includes its other: there is no occasion either to conceive it always stretching, stretching \textit{ad infinitum}, but the two may be seen together and \textit{in potentia}. Quantum is the Fürsichseyn of all that Fürreines. Hegel now sees the true Mathematical Infinite to represent all this. The relation of Quantum to itself is as to
a power, is as to its own square; this is its own self-reference where unity and amount are alike, equal, and the same. Quality in Quantity indeed, as out of its in, may be said to square itself. I cannot help thinking Hegel to have even directly had such thoughts as these. I think also he must have seen, and intends us to see, that any qualitative One is similarly situated (as Quality in general) to Quantity. Quantity is but its Power, its Square; and the Quantity is quite indifferent to it, so long as it, Quality, or the qualitative One, is there. Now \( \frac{dy}{dx} \) is to any one so thinking the perfectly abstract general expression of a qualitative one in quantitative reference. The relation of Power is involved in it, the relation itself, and its sides or moments are no longer Quanta, but they have retreated into their principle, their element. Retreated here is a bad word if it recalls decrement, for in \( \frac{dy}{dx} \) there is no question of increment or decrement, of Quantum; all that is ‘at its back’ (im Rücken). To Hegel, then, the whole problem now is very simple: the consideration before us is qualitative, not quantitative; it is a relation; and this relation is expressed in the differential co-efficient; and so it is that all questions of other terms, of increments and decrements, &c. &c., does not enter, and ought not to enter. Quality in relation to its own self is Quantity, and so relatively to it, or as it, Quantity is the infinitely little. Quality is the limit which Quantity ever approaches and never is, or always is. It is the same thing with any quality in particular as with Quality in general. The relation of ordinate to absciss is qualitative and, as such relation, independent of any Quantum that may be assigned to it. \( \frac{dy}{dx} \) is the ultimate quantitative potentiality of any quality whatever; it is quantitative potentiality as such. The one thing necessary for intelligence here, as always, is to see both of the moments and be able to re-nect them into their concrete one. What mistakes are rampant nowadays because of a neglect of this one precaution, or rather because of entire ignorance of all elements that belong here! The world is deeply disappointed; its heart is broken; all the hopes which its own beauty has made grow in it wither rapidly down; religion fails from its grasp, and philosophy, which promised so much, is unintelligible or seems
but babblement: hark now how loud the cry of Materialism, that knows but, and cares but for, the carcase! Eminent men of science see a matter-mote rise up by an easy flux of development into a man, but (with an involuntary grin) through the monkey! The brain secretes thought, as the liver bile: this whole product of some strange chance, which need not be inquired into—take your dinner rather—will just go together in the centre as a vast mass some day—in the centre of infinite space!* Is there not an echo of self-contradiction in your own words, startling even to yourselves, Messieurs les Matérialistes? To say nothing of infinite time, of infinite space, which alone are always adequate to absorb any and every amount of matter the materialists may bring in explanation of them, does not the mere sight of matter uselessly heaped together there in the centre through all time suggest a glance back to all time and the easy question, time being infinite in the direction back as well as in the direction forward, and gravitation, moreover, being the only power, why has a whole back infinitude failed to bring this gravitation to its hearth in the centre—why is a future infinitude still necessary? It is not thought, then, it is but thoughtlessness which sees the whole universe reduced in course of time to a single central mass; it is but figurate conception amusing itself with very idle and very unsubstantial bubbles. That gravitation, loss of heat, &c., have not already effected what we are assured they will effect, or simply that they have to effect this consummation, is a demonstration rigorously exact of heat not always being directed outwards, as of gravitation not always being directed inwards.

If thought, not thoughtlessness, would inspect the problem, it would find that Attraction is only possible through Repulsion; that were there no Repulsion, there were no Attraction, and vice versa. There is but the one concrete Reciprocity. It is perfectly certain that Action and Reaction are not more necessary reciprocals than Attraction and Repulsion. A like one-sidedness it is which leads the friends of the monkey, in comparing him with man, to abstract from the Difference and regard the Identity alone. But what is this identity? It is hardly worth while modern philosophers making such a fuss about our identity with monkeys, were it only for what Sallust tells us, that we have our bodies in common ceteris animalibus. That man is an animal and that monkey is the caricature of him, has been known for thousands

* Where can this centre—in an infinite space—be?
of years;* and the modern philosophers who live by the cry
(strange, is it not?) know it not one single whit better than it was
known at first, nor have they deposited one single stone of the
bridge from the Difference to the Identity, nor yet will they—in
their way—should they take an infinite time to the task. A
strange métier this, then, that would enlighten us by telling us we
were monkeys originally, though it has nothing to show for itself
but the worn-out triteness of thousands of years! Yet we are
expected to admire, applaud, and—per Jovem—even pay! It
is the same abstraction from the difference which misleads other
eminent men to mis-spend whole laborious lives in twisting the
idle sand-rope of Transformation. The Difference is there not one
whit less than the Identity, and though you fly in your researches
utterly round all space and utterly throughout all time, you will
never eliminate it: it is impossible for you ever to take up an
Identity unaccompanied by its Difference. Your quest is thus at
once absolutely certain and utterly impossible: and this simply
because What is is at once identical and different. The power of
metamorphosis lies with thought only; it is not in nature. Never
shall we see a first Natural Identity—which all mankind will
accept as such—gradually giving itself difference and difference
up to the present, as we might see ice become water and water
steam. Such transformations are possible to the notion only.
Nay, these very thinkers acknowledge this same truth: they do
not accept what is as it is—they seek it in its principle. What
is this but accepting the metamorphosis of thought? Thought is
nothing but metamorphosis—the metamorphosis of the isolated
singular many into the one universal. It is inconsistent, then, in
these writers to accept thought only a certain way, and not follow
it out into the ultimate universal, the element of thought itself.
They may say, ‘Though we generalise, we still leave the in-
dividuals, and know always that our generalisations are but
abstractions.’ We too can say that we still leave the individuals;
but we cannot say that our generalisations end as idle abstractions
which have only formal application to what is, but, on the con-
trary, as truth itself and as the truth, and that the material and
constitutive truth of the whole of things. This is a difference.
Thought is the secretion of matter, as the bile of the liver, you
say: on the contrary, it is matter that is but the secretion of
thought. Show me your first atom, show me it become time,

* Ut Ennius, Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis. Cicero, N. D. i. xxxv.
space, matter, organisation, thought; then I ask you, was not this first atom all these virtually at first? Could it have become these, had it not been so virtually at first? But that it should imply such virtue—that is thought—these are thoughts. Or even to say it was at first virtually thought, is to say that thought was the veritable prius. Your path, then, ends in mine. But you have not this path; you have not made a single step on it; you have only talked of it; and you can only talk of it for ever: for your first problem, a deduction of time and space, is utterly impossible to you with matter only. We, on the contrary, have a path; We, thanks to Kant and Hegel, can prove thought to be the prius and the principle; We can prove all to be but the notion an sich. Once possessed of the concrete notion, We can re-live its life up to the fullness of the universe. The two positions, then, are widely different. Yet, since 1781, when the 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' and since 1812-16, when the 'Logik' was published, what innumerable writers have preferred obeying the impatience of their own vanity to patient assimilation, first of all, of the Historical Pabulum that at these dates was issued to them, and without which they could be nothing! Formal attitudinists on the gas of genius, men of fervour, men who could evolve—Systems, Poems, Pictures, Religions, Alchemy, anything—these we have had by the thousand; but how many men who knew that, in themselves, mere form only, they required the rock of another to which clinging they might, absorbing and assimilating matter into form, grow into their own complete entelechie? These men would be matter and form unto themselves, so they consumed themselves in futile subjective pulses, and died so. He only who knows how to connect himself to his historical other, will ever attain to an actuality of manhood. Be a man's formal ability what it may, unless he attain to this, his products, however blatant, are but vacant idiocy. So only even is it, that he can be original. Thomas Carlyle found his other in German Literature—but the germs of what he found lay first of all in himself; it was his own hunger that made the food; and if Thomas Carlyle is not original, what English writer is? But for its Difference, abstract Identity dies of inanition then. So it is as regards the nisus of genius. So it is as regards the nisus nowadays of a materialistic pseudo-science. In every concrete there are two abstract moments which are not seen truly unless together. So it is as regards the Attraction and Repulsion which are still before us in Quantity,
and whose union only is adequate to that quantitative infinite which Hegel finds represented in the mathematical infinite. Quantum, even in that it repels its other, flees into it; and even in that it flees into it, it flees into its own self: no flight expliciter without but is a flight implicitier within. Quantum, then, is this one infinite relation, this boundless relativity, this without of itself that is the within of itself, this negation of the negation. And such is the mathematical infinite: Quantity as such has disappeared, there remains only the Qualitative element and in relation of potentiation. The thought is abstract; but it is not more difficult than the abstract Something or any other pure notion.

It may be objected that Hegel does not sufficiently illustrate and, on the whole, bring out the fact that the relation implied is one of powers. That it is really so, we know now to be certain, for he has himself eliminated all variables of the first degree, but to know the fact is not necessarily to know the reason of the fact. Again, having asserted the first peculiarity of the mathematical infinite to depend on a relation of potentiation, he equally asserts the second peculiarity, and in complete isolation from the first.

We can easily conceive $\frac{dy}{dx}$ to be qualitative relation only; but these are not squares, and Hegel has not been careful to bring the two peculiarities together. That the relation of one quantity to the square of another is qualitative, is also but an assertion; intelligence and conviction are not secured by either reasoning or illustration. We know that Hegel regards the square, where Unity and Amount are equal, as of a qualitative nature; but this knowledge seems to throw but little light here. As regards this last point, it may be worth while suggesting that the relation of the sides to the hypotenuse, being a relation that concerns the square of the hypotenuse, the result is qualitative, the triangle is always right-angled. But such illustrations must be left to the mathematician by profession. As regards objections, it is to be borne in mind, too, that the subject is not exhausted; and that we have the promise of seeing in the second Remark, how the abstract notion takes meaning in actual application, which application, too, is termed the important part of the whole subject. It is with great regret, then, that I find myself (by the Number at the head of the page) obliged for the present to stop here, seeing that my matter already amounts to more than it is perhaps prudent to intrude on the public as a first venture on a
subject so difficult, and, at least to superficial observation, so equivocal, as the Philosophy of Hegel. Enough, however, has been done to enable the mathematician or the metaphysician to complete the rest for himself. The judgment of a pure mathematician has really been so peculiarly trained, that, perhaps, any such will never prove decisive as regards any Hegelian element. Still, it is much to be desired that such a vast mathematical genius as Sir William Hamilton, of Dublin, could be induced to verify the findings of Hegel so far as they bear on the concrete science. As they appear abstractly expressed in the present Remark, they seem perfectly safe from assault; but there are others (alluded to also here), such as the earnestness with which Hegel seeks to vindicate for Kepler his own law as in view of Newton's assumed mathematical demonstration, on which one would be well pleased to possess a thoroughly-skilled opinion. There is at least something grand in the way in which Hegel would set up time and space themselves as the co-ordinates that to the divination of Kepler and to the necessity of the notion of Hegel yielded and yield the law \( \frac{S^3}{T^2} \) or \( \frac{A^3}{T^2} \). Hegel may be wrong; but he possesses such keenness of distinction, that it is difficult to conceive any intellect—as the epoch is—too high to gain from it. It lies, too, on the surface to say that these Vectors, Tensors, Scalers, &c., of Sir William Hamilton are but forms of continuity and discretion in application to the concrete Quantity, Space.

By way of giving at least a formal close to the subject, I add here the whole of Quantity as it appears in the fourth edition of the Encyclopaedie.* The reader will be thus enabled to see as well Hegel's immense power of summary as the insufficiency of any such to a student who but learns, however advantageous it may prove to the student who has completed his course. He will also see that, besides the mathematical notes, which are two in number, what has yet to be completed of the general subject as it appears in the Logik is small, and that the bulk of it is already given in these pages. Some amount of change in the divisions he will also be able to discern; and the very fact of change on the part of Hegel it is important to know.

* That of Rosenkranz, which—intentionally—is without the Zusätze.
QUANTITY INTERPRETED, ETC. 595

B.

QUANTITY.

a. Pure Quantity.

'Quantity is pure being, in which the characteristic determinateness is no longer explicit as one (identical) with the being itself, but as sublated or indifferent.

(1) The expression magnitude (Grösse) is not pertinent to Quantity, so far as it specially designates some particular quantity. (2) Mathematic usually defines magnitude as that which may be increased or diminished. However objectionable this definition may be (as again implying the definitum itself), it involves this, that the nature of Quantity is such that it is explicitly alterable and indifferent, and so that, notwithstanding an alteration, an increased Extension or Intension, the thing itself, a house, red, &c., ceases not to be a house, red, &c. (3) The Absolute is pure Quantity,—this position coincides in general with this, that the character Matter is attributed to the Absolute, in which (Matter) Form is present indeed, but as indifferent. Quantity also constitutes the fundamental determination of the Absolute, when it is taken so that in it, the absolutely Indifferent, all difference is only quantitative. For the rest, pure time, space, &c., may be regarded as examples of Quantity, so far as the Real (or what is real) is to be conceived as indifferent filling of space or time.

'Quantity, firstly, in its immediate reference to itself, or in the form of equality with itself as explicit, or set, in it in consequence of the Attraction, is continuous; in the other term contained in it, the one (unit), it is discrete magnitude. The former, however, is equally discrete, for it is only continuity of the many; the latter equally continuous—its continuity is the one as the same of the many ones, the unity.

(1) Continuous and discrete magnitude must not, therefore, be regarded as kinds or species, as if the nature of the one did not attach to the other, but as if they contradistinguish themselves only by this, that the same whole is now explicit under the one, and again under the other of its discrimina. (2) The Antinomy of Time, of Space, or of Matter, as regards its infinite Divisibility, or again, its consisting of Indivisibles, is nothing else than the assertion of Quantity now as continuous, and again as discrete.
Time, Space, &c., being explicit only as continuous Quantity, are infinitely divisible; in their other term, again, as discrete magnitude, they are an sich (in themselves) divided, and consist of indivisible ones: the one term is as one-sided as the other.

b. Quantum.

'Quantity essentially explicit with the excludent determinateness which is contained in it, is Quantum, limited Quantity. The Quantum has its evolution and perfect determinateness in the Digit (Number), which contains within itself (implies), as its Element, the One, in the moment of Discretion the Amount, in that of Continuity the Unity, both as its qualitative moments. 

'In Arithmetic, what are called the arithmetical operations are usually stated as contingent modes of treating numbers. If a necessity and withal an understanding is to lie in them, the latter must lie in a principle, and this only in the moments which are contained in the notion of the Digit itself; this principle shall be here briefly exhibited. The moments of the notion of Number are the Amount and the Unity, and the Number itself is the Unity of both. But Unity applied to empirical numbers is only their Equality; thus the principle of arithmetic must be, to range numbers into the relation of Unity and Amount, and bring about the Equality of these moments.

'The Ones or the Numbers themselves being mutually indifferent, the Unity into which they become explicitly transposed appears in general as an external putting together (collection). To count is, therefore, in general to number, and the difference of the kinds of counting lies alone in the qualitative nature (tality) of the Numbers which are numbered together; and, for the tality, the determination of Unity and Amount is the principle.

'Numeration is the first, to make Number at all, a putting together of as many Ones as is wished. A kind of counting (an arithmetical operation), however, is the numbering together of such as are already numbers, and no longer the mere unit. Numbers are immediately and at first quite indefinitely Numbers in general—unequal, therefore, in general: the putting together or numbering of such is Addition.

'The next determination is, that the Numbers are equal in general,' they constitute thus one Unity, and there is present an Amount of such unities: to number such numbers is to Multiply; —and here it is indifferent how the moments of Amount and
Unity are apportioned in the two numbers, the Factors, indifferent which is taken as Amount, and which again as Unity.

The third characteristic determinateness is finally the Equality of Amount and Unity. The numbering together of numbers so characterised, is the raising into powers, and first of all into the square. Further potentiation is the formal repetition of the multiplication of the number with itself which runs out again into the indefinite Amount. As in this third form, the complete equality of the sole present difference, of Amount and Unity, is attained, there cannot be more than these three operations in Arithmetic. There corresponds to the numbering together, a resolution of the Numbers according to the same determinateness. With the three operations mentioned, which may be so far named positive, there are, therefore, also three negative.

c. Degree.

The limit is identical with the whole of the Quantum itself; as multiple in itself, it is extensive—as simple in itself, intensive magnitude: the latter is also named Degree.

The difference of continuous and discrete from extensive and intensive magnitudes consists, therefore, in this, that the former concern Quantity in general—the latter, on the other hand, the limit, or the determinateness of Quantity as such. Extensive and intensive magnitudes are, in like manner, not two sorts of which the one should possess a distinction which the other wanted; what is extensive is equally intensive, and vice versa.

In degree the notion of Quantum is in explicit position. It is magnitude as indifferently independent and simple, but so that it has the determinateness by which it is Quantum directly out of it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, viz., that the been-for-self indifferent limit is absolute Externality, the infinite quantitative Progress is expressly explicit,—an immediacy which immediately strikes round into its counterpart, mediatedness (a going over and beyond the Quantum that has just been posited), and vice versa.

A Number is thought, but thought as a beingness completely external to its own self. It belongs not to perception because it is thought, but it is the thought which has for its characterisation the externality of perception. The Quantum not only may therefore be increased or diminished ad infinitum; it itself is through
its notion this dispatch of itself beyond itself. The infinite quantitative progress is just the thoughtless repetition of one and the same contradiction which the Quantum in general is, and Quantum as Degree, or expressly set in its determinateness. As regards the superfluousness of enunciating this contradiction in the form of the infinite progress, Zeno in Aristotle says justly: it is the same thing to say something once, and to say it always.

'This outerliness of Quantum to its own self in its beënt-for-self determinateness constitutes its Quality; in it it is just itself and referred to itself. In it are united, Externality, i.e. Quantitativity, and Being-for-self, i.e. Qualitiveness. Quantum thus put is in itself the Quantitative Relation,—determinateness which is no less immediate Quantum, the Exponent, than mediatedness, namely, the reference of some one Quantum to another,—the two sides of the relation, which at the same time are not valid in their immediate value, but have their value only in this reference.

'The sides of the relation are still immediate Quanta, the qualitative and the quantitative moments still external to each other. Their truth, however, viz., that the Quantitiveness itself is in its externality reference to itself, or that the Being-for-self and the indifference of the determinateness are united, is Measure.'*

* In these mathematical references see further 'Whewell and Hegel, and Hegel and Smith,' as published with 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Law.'—New.
VI.

THE COMMENTATORS OF HEGEL—SCHWEGLER, ROSENKRANZ, HAYM.

In the interest of one's own self-seeking to demonstrate the shortcomings of one's predecessors, is a procedure now so vulgar that it would, perhaps, have been better taste to have left to others the task which is here begun. Any plea in excuse can found only on the important aid which may be so afforded to a general understanding of the single theme, and is only to be made good by the result.

There are many other Commentators of Hegel, but we have selected these—examples, too, of feelings impartial, partial, and hostile—as the latest and most generally-acknowledged best. Now, each of the three has devoted a vast amount of labour and time to the study of Hegel, and all of them have, more or less, attained to a very considerable relative knowledge. It is not, then, what is in general meant by ignorance that we would object here, but only a peculiar and insufficient state of knowledge in this way, that the path of this knowledge has been ever on the outside, from particular to particular, with darkness and incoherences between, and without perception of the single light in which the whole should show—without attainment to the single Rück, the single turn, stir, touch by which the painful and unreachable Many should kaleidoscopically collapse into the held and intelligible One. In a word, whatever general connexion these three Commentators may have perceived between Hegel and Kant, and however often they may have used, each of them, the word Begriff, they have not signalised that literal one connexion and that literal one signification which are prominent in the preceding pages. Hegel was literal with idealism; the whole is thought, and the whole life of it is thought; and, therefore, what is called the history of philosophy will be in externality and contingency, but a Gesetztseyn of Thought, but an explicitment, a setting of one thought the other. So it was that Spinoza was
Substance, Hume Causality, Kant Reciprocity, and Hegel the Notion—the Notion as set by Kant, and as now to be developed subjectively by Hegel into the Subjective Logic which ends in the Idea. So it was that he, as it were, analalgeorised actual history, even contemporary history, even his own position, into the plastic dialectic of his abstract Logic. Hegel was literal with Idealism up to the last invisible negation of the negation—up to the ultimate pure Negativity within which even the triple muscle of the Notion lay a hidden Nisus, retracted into transparency. To Hegel even the very way which had led to this was, so far, false; it was but the chain of the finite categories; and their whole truth was this negative One. Thus it was that Hegel completed the whole movement of which Kant, Fichte, and Schelling had been successive vital knots; but still this completion he reached only by making good his attachment directly to the first of them. This was effected by the entire realisation and vitalisation of Logic, even scholastic Logic (which operations Kant had begun), through reduction simply of the All into the simply technical moments of Logic as named Simple Apprehension, &c., and this through substitution of his own conscious concrete notion (which, in a word, is but the one existent, and the only existent, Entelechie of Difference and Identity), for the unconscious abstract notion of Kant that lay in the question: 'How are a priori Synthetic Judgments possible?' It is this literality which we suspect to have been generally missed, and we have attempted to make plain the notion which Hegel meant, what we call the concrete universal, as well as to elucidate the precise nature of the genesis of this notion with special reference to Kant.*

SCHWEGLER.

We have already spoken with sincere respect of this most accomplished man and admirable writer; and it is to be acknow-

* Of course one is never safe from these fallacious (and vexatious) ex post facto coincidences of which Kant himself may have had his own experience when he wrote (Proleg. § 3) as follows:—'For such principles are not readily learned from others, before whom they have merely obscurely floated. We must, first of all, through our own reflexion, have ourselves come upon them, and then it is we easily find them elsewhere, where otherwise we certainly never should have seen them beforehand for the simple reason that the authors themselves never for a moment suspected that any such idea lay in their own remarks. Those who never think themselves have sharpness enough, all the same, to detect all and everything in anything that has been ever anywhere said, though never seen before by anybody else—directly it has been once shown to them.'—New.
ledged at once that he has not only perfectly availed himself of many of the main lessons both of Kant and Hegel, but that he possesses also an accurate acquaintance with the bulk of their details. Nevertheless, we incline to think that, not having quite penetrated into the innermost articulation of Kant's à priori elements, he in a way missed the key without which it was impossible but that Hegel must have remained for him more or less an outer assemblage and, on the whole, but very strictly speaking, impervious. The few considerations on which this opinion rests we shall mention in the order in which they occurred to us in perusing his book, the 'History of Philosophy in Epitome.'*

The first point to which we shall advert is contained in the earliest pages of the excellent little work alluded to, and concerns, on the part of Schwegler, objections to, or rather a rejection of, the Hegelian equation of Philosophy and its History. In passing to this we may remark, that for a Hegelian he unduly accentuates the relation between philosophy proper and the empirical sciences: 'Philosophy (as the thought totality of empirical things) stands in reciprocity with the empirical sciences; as it on one side conditions them, it is itself again, on the other side, conditioned by them. There is just as little, therefore, an absolute or completed philosophy (in time, that is to say, generally in the course of history) as there is a completed empirie' (or science of all that reaches us by experience). There is here, on the whole, and for the position, too much stress laid on the empirical sciences, and too little on the fact of an independent logic, which is above contingency, which is a necessary and objective crystal of all that is empirical, and which, if it changes at least fluctuates not at will of the mere vicissitude of the latter.

—The identification of the historical with the logical evolution Schwegler combats from the position of the contingency of the former. He says, 'This view is neither to be justified in its principle, nor made good historically.' But he who were thoroughly on the standpoint of Hegel, would see that, while the contingency (even that of those who appear on the stage of history) is not denied, but, on the contrary, its relative necessity demonstrated, the principle, all being at bottom but an evolution of thought, must be true, and must be capable of being actually discerned across the fluctuation of externality. Schwegler's im-

* The 'Handbook,' afterwards translated and annotated by the present author, and now in many editions.
perfect discrimination of the elements concerned is seen also in his particular objections as to the notions of Heraclitus and the Eleatics (with reference to a place for them in logic) that they are ‘impure and materially coloured,’ or as to the Ionic Philosophy that it began ‘not with Seyn (being) as abstract notion, but with what is concretest and crassest, the material notion of water, air, &c.;’ and that, accordingly, ‘Hegel would have more consistently quite rejected the Ionic Philosophy.’ It is rather eminently Hegelian quite to acknowledge the impurity and crassitude of all commencements; though it is equally Hegelian that this impurity and crassitude should, under pouring on of the menstruum of thought, clear into the lineaments of the notion which, despite the clouding opacity, was never absent. Schwegler admits himself that the function of philosophy is to find in vicissitude a something fixed, that philosophy begins ‘there where an ultimate ground of the be:nt, of what is, is philosophically sought;’ and this is precisely the position he opposes.

‘History is not a sum to be exactly cast up: there must be no talk of an à priori construction of history.’ But do such expressions really affect Hegel? Would Hegel à priori construct history, or even count it up like a column in arithmetic? The concrete is a hither and thither of contingency; there are difficulties and checks of all kinds, chronological and other: Hegel denies them not; he would only with masterful hands rise them from before the face of the notion. ‘The datum of Experience is to be taken as a datum, a something given over to us just so, and the rational system of this datum is to be analytically set out; the speculative idea will for the arrangement and scientific connexion of this historical datum furnish the regulative: Almost everywhere the historical development is different from the notional: While the logical progress is an ascent from the abstract to the concrete, the historical development is almost always a descent from the concrete to the abstract: Philosophy is synthetic, the history of philosophy analytic: We may maintain, therefore, with more justice exactly the opposite of the Hegelian thesis and say what is an sich the first is für uns just the last.’ It will not be difficult to perceive that there is the same incomplete consciousness of Hegel’s true position in these extracts also, the burden of which Hegel would partly accept and partly reject, as what has been said already will enable the reader to see. It is worth while, perhaps, remarking that the evolution of thought
being Gesetzteyn, is at once of an analytic and a synthetic nature. Schwegler’s reversal of the Hegelian ‘an sich oder fur uns’ is also worth pointing out. We have another instance of it at pages 82, 83, where he says, ‘Virtue is to be defined as the keeping of the due middle in practice—not the arithmetical middle, the middle an sich, but the middle fur uns.’ Schwegler is, of course, at liberty to use these terms as he pleases; but, as we have seen, the distinction implied in them by Hegel is one eminently subtle and difficult, and may accordingly have escaped Schwegler. Hegel’s use of them as synonymes is beyond a doubt. Under ‘Die Schranke und das Sollen,’ ‘the Limitation and the To-be-to,’ we have already seen and come to understand ‘das Sollen ist nur an sich, somit fur uns;’ it has been pointed out also that this distinction, while it probably begins in the ‘Intro-
duction’ to the ‘Phaenomenologie,’ is to be found in the ‘Preface’ 
as well; and here are some more examples to the same effect: 
Encyc. § 162, and Logik, vol. ii. pp. 20 and 73, we have, ‘Begriffe 
an sich, oder was dasselbe ist, fur uns,’—‘nicht nur an sich, das 
hiesse fur uns oder in der außeren Reflexion,’—and ‘so ist es an 
sich oder fur uns bestimmt.’ Hegel’s intention with the phrase is 
beyond a question, then, and the synonyme of ‘outer reflexion’ 
in the last example but one not only confirms the signification 
already attached to it, but considerably lessens the difficulty with 
which it seemed burthened. He, then, who reverses this dis-
tinction, though of course free to do so, risks his reputation as a 
student of Hegel.*

From pages 45 and 67, I adduce now two passages, which—the 
former as regards the notion and the latter as regards the idea—
show that, even in writing on philosophy, a German may say the 
notion and the idea when he means thereby neither the Notion 
or the Idea of Hegel, but simply the abstract universals of 
generalisation: ‘That all human action reposes on knowledge, all 
thought on the notion, to this result Plato was already able to 
arrive through the generalisation of the Socratic teaching itself;’ 
‘If Plato had taken his station in the Idea in order to interpret

* These two other examples from the Phaenomenologie, where there are still 
more, we give as excellent: Fur uns oder an sich ist das Allgemeine als Princip 
das Wesen der Wahrnehmung (p. 82)—So, dass der umgekehrte Satz nicht an sich 
oder fur uns die Substanz zum Subjecte macht (p. 543). See back, at p. 420 
for more on this. Encyc. i. 70, fur den Gedanken means no more than for ‘outer 
Reflexion.’ At p 55 there, Ansichseyn is the potential as opposed to fur sich, the 
actual.
and explain the Given and Empirical, Aristotle takes his place in
the Given in order to find and demonstrate in it the Idea."

With reference to Aristotle, Schwegler has occasion to speak of
what must have suggested the notion of Hegel to him had he
known it; but (pp. 73, 74, 75, &c.) even in talking of 'Zweck'
and 'Entelechie' as 'vollendetes Wesen,' and in reducing the four
Aristotelian Causes to Matter and Form, he is not tempted to
remark on the striking essential analogy to the Concrete Notion,
but, on the contrary, concludes in this absolutely anti-Hegelian
fashion: 'There remains to us, therefore, the two ground-
principles which pass not into each other, Matter and Form.'
There is a certain defence to Schwegler here in this, that it is
from the position of Aristotle he speaks, and not from that of
Hegel: but then the irresistible temptation to correlate Aristotle's
notions with the notion of Hegel, had he known this latter,—if
not here, at least elsewhere?

Schwegler's summary of Kant is a very excellent one, and
perhaps the very best that, in a general literary point of view,
has been yet given. When compared, however, with the skeleton
which on this subject Hegel bore in his head, and which he allows
us to see in his various critiques, and especially in that which
occurs at the commencement of the Encyclopædie, we see how
much this summary of Schwegler is in its kind external. Light
here with him is always in proportion to the easiness and not to
the difficulty of what is summarised; and thus the discussion of
the Religious and the Practical parts is much more satisfactory
than that of the strictly Metaphysical. We just touch on a par-
ticular point or two:—

At page 154, we find: 'The Kritik of Pure Reason, says Kant,
is the Inventarium of all our possessions through pure reason
systematically arranged.'* This strikes strangely on one at home
with Kant; for every one who is really so, has been so much
acustomed to hear the Kritik, however complete as ground-plan
and system of inchoative principles, always spoken of as but
prosedeutical to the science of metaphysic itself, or to the trans-
cendental philosophy as such, that it grates at once. And this is
really the truth, and these words of Schwegler's are never used
by Kant in any such connexion: on examination they will be found
to be taken from the preface, and to be used there, not in reference
to Kritik, but to metaphysic. It was only in the future that Kant

* The translation substitutes for Inventarium, 'ground-plan'—rightly.
contemplated such complete Inventarium as a completed system of philosophy. The matter may seem small, but it points at least to a certain slovenliness of information on the part of Schwegler.

At page 150, again, we have: 'The question, therefore, which Kant set at the head of his whole Kritik, How are à priori synthetic judgments possible? . . . must be answered with an unconditional No.' This, too, grates; for we know the contrary: we know that Kant has pointed to whole spheres of such judg-
ments, and has demonstrated in his way the rationale of them; nay, we know that that is the express one object of his whole Kritik and Kritiken. It may be said that Schwegler must have had in his mind, that to every fact of actual knowledge Kant postulated elements of sense as well as those of intellect. But such defence were null, and from more points of view than one; for, in the first place, the knowledge of these à priori principles, though abstract, were still a knowledge, and would not be denied by Kant; in the second place, there are, in Kant's system, à priori elements of sense, as well as of intellect, which give occasion to the conjunction necessary for such à priori synthetic judgments, and have been expressly anatomised by Kant for this very purpose; and, in the third place, Kant actually details classes of such à priori synthetic judgments. Nay, at page 159, Schwegler himself says: 'These are the only possible and authenticated synthetic judgments à priori, the ground-lines of all and every metaphysic.' Thus, then, Schwegler categorically contradicts himself, and declares that there are such judgments—this in spite of his 'unconditional No!' Again, though it is true that the judgments mentioned are to be viewed as metaphysical ground-
lines, it is not true that these are the only synthetic judgments à priori; for does not Kant regard all the propositions of pure mathematic as à priori synthetics, and are not these a goodly number? These things belong to that special central domain of Kant which came to him straight from Hume, which was his own principal and principal industry, and which passed straight from his hands into those of Hegel, to constitute there the central domain of this last also.—Here, then, we conceive Schwegler not only open to the charge of slovenliness, but of insufficient information, and that, too, in regard to a main—or rather the main topic.*

* Kant himself (WW. ii. 107) says:—'Here, now, is a synthetic unity of consciousness, which is cognised à priori, and supplies ground for synthetic propositions à priori bearing on pure thinking, exactly in the same way as space and time supply ground for such propositions as concern the form of mere sense-perception.'—N.
Then to Schwegler the Hegelian system arises directly out of that of Schelling, and he has no perception of that whole field of considerations the issue of which is the partial elimination of Fichte and Schelling, and the attachment of Hegel directly to Kant: in short, he knows only the common and stereotyped view of what is called the literature of the subject! He says, p. 222, 'From reflexion on this one-sidedness (of Schelling) the Hegelian philosophy arose; it holds fast, as against Fichte, with the then Schellingian philosophy, that not a singular, the ego, is the prius of all reality, but a universal, which comprehends in itself every singular.' We may point out, in passing, that the phrase 'a universal which comprehends in itself every singular,' were correct language if applied to what we name the concrete notion. It has no such application, nevertheless, but refers only to the common consciousness on this subject—that Hegel, namely, leads all up at last into the 'Absolute Spirit.' We find him, indeed, a line or two further down speaking of the 'Idea as the Absolute,' without mention anywhere of the relation of the Notion to the Idea.

At pages 223, 227, 228, his perception of the method and general industry of Hegel will be found to be wholly from without, wholly as of a process and endeavour external and mechanical; there seems not even a dream of the one living force which is the creative pulse of the whole. 'The absolute,' he says, 'is, according to Hegel, not being, but development; explication of differences and antithesis which, however, are not self-dependent, or at all opposed to the absolute, but each singly as all together form only moments within the self-development of the absolute.' 'The Hegelian Logic is the scientific exposition and development of the pure reason-notions, of those notions or categories which underlie all thought and being, which are as much the ground-principles of subjective cognition, as the immanent soul of objective reality, of those ideas in which the spiritual and the natural have their coincidence-point. The realm of logic is, says Hegel, truth as it is without veil für sich. It is, as Hegel also figuratively expresses himself, the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of the world and any finite spirit.' 'Hegel has endeavoured, 1, completely to collect the pure reason-notions; 2, critically to purge them (that is to say, to exclude all that were not pure perception-less thought); and 3,—what is the most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian Logic,—to derive them dialectically from one another, and complete them into an inter-
nally articulated system of pure reason.' 'The lever for this development is the dialectic method that advances by negation from one notion to another.' 'Negation is the vehicle of the dialectic march. Every previously established notion is negated, and out of its negation a higher, richer notion is won. This method, which is at once analytic and synthetic, Hegel has carried out throughout the whole system of the Science.'

This language is not incorrect; it is largely Hegel's own. But this is its defect; Hegel's indirect ways have not been penetrated, and the one secret found. What sense, for instance, is there in this negation of which Schwegler speaks? How different it would have been could he but have explained it! We have objected already to an expression above being considered figurative. In short, what we have here are but external views, and, on the whole, the literature of the subject!

Nor does Schwegler, when arrived at the notion of the notion, manifest any consciousness of what is truly before him. Speaking (p. 231) of reciprocity, which we know now to be the very nidus where the notion is born, he says, 'We have, therefore, again a Seyn (a being) that disjoins itself into several self-dependents, which are, however, immediately identical with it: this unity of the immediacy of Being with the self-disjunction of Essence is the Notion.' And this is all: there is not one word of that marvellous dialectic in which we get sight of the particular as in a transparent distinction which is none, between the universal and the singular, each of which is but negative reflexion into self and the same negative reflexion, and thus come at length actually to see the notion, actually to realise at length the notion of the notion. After the sentence just quoted, Schwegler proceeds to define the notion, and he begins thus: 'Notion is that in the other,' &c. He says notion is so and so, not the notion is so and so; the notion, therefore, is to him just notion, just notion in general, the abstract universal of thinking as opposed to sense. In fact, when a German begins a sentence with a noun thus without article, the idiomatic English translation would require us to begin with the indefinite article,—to say here, then, a notion is so and so. But let us give the whole definition: 'Notion is that in the other which is identical with itself; it is substantial totality, the moments of which (singular, particular) are themselves the whole (the universal), totality which as well allows the difference free play as it embraces it into unity within itself.' When a man
once knows the notion, it is not difficult for him to see assonances to it in this definition; but would he ever have learnt it thence? These are but vague words, vaguely and imperfectly copied from others; and what their own author is determined only to see in them is a notion in general, the Socratic universal, Plato's idea, as the idea of a man, a table, &c. This is evident from the words, 'it is that in the other.'

'The spiritual substance (p. 241) of the Revealed Religion or of Christianity is consequently the same as that of Speculative Philosophy, only that it is expressed there in the wise of the Vorstellung, in the form of a history, here 'in the wise of the notion.' There is no reason to suppose here either, that the notion is meant; the particular words are just Hegel's own; Hegel himself uses Begriff in some three senses; and there is no reason to suppose, from anything in the whole book, that Schwegler ever saw more in the notion that Plato's abstract universal, as now specialised and particularised, at most, by Kant and Hegel under the name of Categories, and as opposed to Vorstellung.

It is to be said, too, that the whole statement of Hegel's system in Schwegler is external, and reads to every one at first—to every one at first, at least, who is not already an adept—just like a caricature, for which conviction can be expected from no sane human being. On the whole, we believe ourselves right, then, however willing we may be to ascribe to Schwegler participation in the spirit and extensive external knowledge both of Kant and Hegel, in denying him to have entered a certain internal adytum of either, which, nevertheless, is absolutely essential to knowledge.

Rosenkranz.

Though not superior to Schwegler so far as participation in the spirit of Kant and Hegel is concerned, Rosenkranz has, probably seen more clearly into the intimate connexion between these two, studied more closely the particular of the latter of them, and brought himself just generally into more intimate relations with the dialectic whole. Nevertheless, with all our consequent respect for Rosenkranz, and all our so far admiration for him in himself, we cannot make sure that Rosenkranz has ever certainly discerned either the literal attachment of Hegel to Kant, or the one thing that unites both and constitutes the single principle of the former—the concrete universal. In support of this opinion we shall take
our evidence from the 'Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee,' which, as published so lately, and as expressly devoted to a review and reformation of the Hegelian Logic, promises to be amply sufficient as relative authority.

It is to be admitted at once that Rosenkranz has again and again perfectly expressed the process of the Absolute, as that which is as well First as Last, Beginning as Result, that which returns into itself, the movement which from itself determines itself, &c. Nor less is it to be admitted that he has a hundred times accentuated the 'unity of opposites,' as well as (at least once) directly mentioned the triplicity, identity, difference, and reduction of difference into identity. Nay, Rosenkranz has actually told us foreigners that the first thing we had to do was to understand Kant's question, 'How are \textit{à priori} synthetic judgments possible?' and this idea of an \textit{à priori} synthetic judgment he has further identified with the more abstract statement, 'a unity of opposites.'* Nevertheless, we cannot help believing Rosenkranz, like all the rest of us, in fact, as yet to 'know only in part.' We cannot make out this avowal as his—this avowal of our preface—that, 'as Aristotle made explicit the abstract universal implicit in Socrates, Hegel made explicit the concrete universal implicit in Kant.' Neither are we quite sure that to him this concrete universal is the one logical \textit{nisus} (nameable Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason), of which this world, with all that is subjective in it, and with all that is objective in it, is but the congeries. Yet sincerity with idealism means, that the \textit{matter} (objects) of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, is identical with these its \textit{forms}.

The 'Science of the Logical Idea' opens in this manner:—

'Every man is flung unasked into a together of circumstances to which he must accommodate himself as conditions of his development. Thus in my youth I encountered the Hegelian Philosophy as one of those powers, in struggle with which my destiny has shaped itself. Years long alternately attracted and repelled, my relation to this philosophy has assumed finally this issue, that I have devoted my life to its critical correction and systematic perfection. I should like to complete it from within out, in order to promote the enjoyment of its veritable worth, as well as the fruitfulness of its application to all the sciences, &c.'

Now, what have we indicated here?—A life of struggle—of

* Hegel himself (Encyc. § 40) says, 'Synthetic Judgments \textit{à priori} (\textit{i.e.}, original co-references of Opposites).—New.
never-ending—and yet unended—struggle! Veritably Kant and Hegel are as those deserts of fable which lead to palaces of prophecy, but, meanwhile, whiten only with dead men's bones! Rosenkranz, a man of unbounded acquirement, of rich endowment, of keen susceptibility, of quick talent, has now a life behind him, and its one object—Hegel—is it this he would have us to understand?—is unconquered still! Surely at least such interpretation of the quoted words were not unjust. Alternately attracted and repelled during long years: this is not success, this is not the language of possession; these are but the words of the baffled but still passionate wooer. There is bitterness as he looks back, too, on the length of the struggle, and thinks of what has been gained; he sees a together of circumstances accommodation to which was but necessity; and he cannot help dwelling on his having been committed to them unasked. The task is not yet complete either: he would only like to complete it.

These considerations are strengthened by the avowals of the next paragraph, which records his experience as Professor of Philosophy. He had begun with Hegel simpliciter; doubts arose; for ten years he threw himself on Aristotle, but alternated him with Hegel; he separated Metaphysic from Logic; he takes Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel together and compares them, &c. This is not the repose, the oneness, of an intellect convinced, of a mind assured. If Hegel is right, his Logic supersedes all that has gone before it; for in it he professes to have brought the science down through all these two thousand years which separate us from Aristotle, and to have perfected it up to the highest level of the present day. Seclusion to Hegel, accordingly, would be intelligible if Hegel has succeeded, as regression to Aristotle if Hegel has failed: but what are we to say of an alternation of both?—and why formally explain and compare Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel as three interests apart, independent, each for itself? If Hegel is right, his Logic is the only one that requires to be taught, and the contributions of Aristotle and Kant can be duly exhibited as they present themselves in their respective places there.

The critique of various later Logics that follows, confirms the same inference of doubt, hesitation, vacillation on the part of Rosenkranz. Hegel's Logic being what it pretends to be, there is but short work needed as regards these others. Rosenkranz seeks to classify these Logics, too, from the notion of thinking in general,
and, being a sworn enemy of all abstraction unverified by the concrete, he would like to correlate each theoretical stage of the classification with an actual historical stage. As regards this latter particular, he knows no treatise but his own 'where a similar attempt is made!' Now, Hegel's Logic is simply the development of the Notion qua Notion—that is, of Thought qua Thought; Hegel's Logic ought, then, at once to have supplied what Rosenkranz wanted, a topic and criteria, namely, for all the various presentant Logics. Hegel's Logic, too, is supposed to be correlative to historical fact, though it could not by anticipation of, so to speak, posthumous Logics, prevent Rosenkranz from ranging these too in subjection to the pure tree, were he so minded. In fact, to analyse the notion of thought and develop thus new classifications of Logic, is simply to put the Hegelian Logical classifications to the rout. That such analyses and classifications should be considered still necessary—does it not lead to the fear that Hegel is not yet perhaps thoroughly understood? Hegel is, of course, not absolutely the last, and, it is to be hoped, there is progress still.*

We come now to his proposed Reform of Hegel, to his actual objections to the master, and specially to his system of Logic.

'In the first place,' says Rosenkranz, 'its collective form oscillates between a dichotomy, namely, of Objective and Subjective Logic, and a trichotomy, namely, of the doctrine of Being, Essentiality, and Notion. The former division repeats the old one of theoretical philosophy into metaphysic and logic, but with an expression which is derived from the sphere of consciousness, and is consequently inappropriate and deranging. The antithesis of object and subject belongs only to the spirit, not to impersonal reason. The trichotomy repeats the Kantian distinction of understanding, judgment, and reason. This distinction of simple, reflexive, and speculative characters is one, however, which pervades all the moments of the whole science, and is, therefore, not competent to afford an actual principle of division.'

Now, not one of these objections can altogether hold. The first two divisions of logic may together be considered objective, for they are both stages of consciousness only, not of self-consciousness, the beginning of which constitutes the transition

* One of Rosenkranz's sentences in the above runs thus: 'I wanted to show proof that the abstract genealogy of the notion makes good its necessity in living fact.' The notion here is that of thought as made out by Rosenkranz, with special reference to his critique of the various recent Logics. This illustrates the general speech of the notion in German writers. It is just short for the abstraction and generalisation of thought in general: it is the abstract universal of thought as any such; not as the Universal, Hegel's Universal, the concrete Notion—the Notion.
from the second to the third. This is seen whether we consider that, in the first two stages, we have but Apprehension and Judgment in act, or that what is acted on is but outer, as Quality, Quantity, Substantiality, Causality, &c., while in the third stage it is Reason acts, and consciously on its own forms. Besides, it is Hegel (through Kant) who is the subjective logic, while Hume, Spinoza, and so backwards, are the objective logic. Up to reciprocity the progress was not Hegel's; after reciprocity the advance is due to his conscious subject. This last consideration is only ancillary, however. Metaphysic is rightly taken into Logic; for Idealism being the truth, all the principles of things must be logical. The trichotomy is 'competent to afford an actual principle of division,' and for the reason which is supposed to prove it 'not.' Indeed, it is interesting to observe Rosenkranz here naming some of the nearest forms of the notion and talking of one distinction pervading the whole, without at least referring to the connexion and living unity into which he might throw all. The triads of Being, Essentivity, Notion,—Understanding, Judgment, Reason,—Simple, Reflex, Speculative,—are named together; but, instead of being correlated, the general division under one of them is declared incompetent because another of them pervades all the moments of the whole! The reason really pro is to Rosenkranz the reason con. The 'going up of the light,' however, that Kant speaks of in reference to Thales and the equilateral triangle, Galilei and his inclined plane, Torricelli and the weighing of the air, Stahl and his chemical transformations, &c., is a curious thing! A man shall read over the right passages scores of times; he shall even have executed a translation of the Encyclopaedia (edn. 1) say; yet the light of the notion shall only rise to him when occupied on some other! This was my case; and it may have been similarly so with Rosenkranz, who names individuals, but brings not together into the One.

Logic as Logic, then, is its own element, and knows not a psychological distinction; but Logic, regarded as a History, was immersed in the object, till through Kant and Hegel it rose to the subject. Hume's causality is outward, but Kant's categories are inward, and from Kant the principle that moulds is subjectivity.

The second objection brought forward is to the transition of the subjective notion into objectivity, as mechanical, chemical, and teleological; and also to the admission of Life, the Good, &c., into
Logic; as if Logic 'were that total science which includes in it even reality itself.' To this we may add, that Rosenkranz objects also to the transition of the Logical Idea into Nature, as 'the crux of the Hegelianic,' and that, so far as the Teleological notion is concerned, he here offers us a Logic re-distributed in its interest, and so that it (the Teleological notion) appears intercalated between Essentity and the Notion.

It must be borne in mind, in the first place, here, that our present object is not to answer objections to Hegel, but to apply these in test of the relative knowledge of the objector. It is not for a moment to be pretended that Hegel is perfect, that there are not sins in him both of omission and commission, or that he may not be amended by certain of the suggestions of Rosenkranz. But surely it is inconsistent to seek to force upon Hegel matter which, it can be shown, he himself refused. The following passage (op. cit. p. 530), will, perhaps, sufficiently explain the grounds generally of these objections of Rosenkranz:—

The transition of the Idea causality of the notion into the reality fulfilled by it is the transition of the end (intended) out of its possibility into actuality, its effectuation or realisation. This connexion is presented by Hegel as a syllogism; the notion of the end is through the Means to clasp itself in its Realisation together with itself, so that there is to be assumed in the result no other content than was already present in the beginning. We have already admitted that a formal syllogism may be certainly as well pointed out here as in the process of mechanism or of chemism; but we have also noticed that a syllogism in the sense of the logical notion of the unity of the universal, particular, and singular is still not to be found in it.* A detailed critique of the logical incongruities into which here Hegel has fallen, has been given by Trendelenburg in his Logische Untersuchungen.' We fully agree with him when he says of the teleological notion—'If, in the manner of Hegel in the application stated, the syllogism be looked for in actual existence, the three terms are then arbitrarily distributed to three different realities in the relation of universal, particular, and singular, without holding fast the reciprocal relation of logical subordination. In the teleological reference, the subjective thought of End is in and for itself universal; but it is not the universal genus of its means and of its realisation: the means are in themselves the particular and different, but still not the species of the former thought; they are really subjected to it and are ruled by it, but still not logically subordinated as its species; the realisation of the end is a singular, but neither the individual of the heterogeneous mean, nor of the thought that projects the end. If it be said that the mean is subordinated to the design and the result to both, then this real dependence is to be duly distinguished from the logical one, which arises from the relation of the comprehension and extension of notions, and alone conditions the Syllogism.'

* As though Hegel had not himself said that! See Encyc. § 162, 3rd paragraph.—New.
What Trendelenburg, as quoted, says here is simply that Hegel when he is in the third chapter of his second section, is not at the same time back in the like chapter of his first.\* This consideration, had it occurred to Rosenkranz, might have strengthened his amiability to resist the authority of the somewhat imposing Trendelenburg, who only commits here, as is but the ordinary habit of all professed Logicians, an Ignoratio Elenchi.\† That is, Hegel would have admitted the objection, but maintained that his position was untouched. Hegel, in fact, knows all that already, and he just expressly does what he is reproached with. It is the same objection that lies against the admission into Logic of the notion of Life, &c.; and at page 244 of the third volume of his Logik, Hegel will be found formally explaining the grounds of his action. These grounds, however, concern the intimate structure of his whole philosophy; and as that has been missed, they themselves have not been regarded. The reader will do well to refer for himself here. The transition of the notion into objectivity is equally clear before the consciousness of Hegel, and equally necessary from the very nature of his system. From page 121 of the second volume of his Logik we see that he expressly contemplates three orders of Seyn (Being). He says there:

'It is to be remembered beforehand that, besides immediate Seyn firstly, and secondly Existence—the Seyn that springs out of Wesen (Essentify), there is a further Seyn—the Objectivity that springs out of the Notion.' Hegel manifests an equally express consciousness as regards Teleology; 'Where design is perceived,' he says (Log. vol. iii. p. 209), 'there is assumed an Understanding as its originator; for the Teleological notion there is required, therefore, the proper, free existence of the notion.' At page 77 of the second volume we have also the other distinct statement: 'This correlation, the whole as essential unity, lies only in the notion, in the designful end. . . . The teleological ground is property of the notion, and of be-mediation through the same, which is reason.'

\* See Encyc. § 162 sub finem—New.
\† Compare the somewhat laboriose Latin of Trendelenburg with the pithy vernacular of Hegel. The former (El. Log. Arist., Adnotata, § 40) says: 'Ejusmodi igitur refutatio justa conclusiones sive inductions sive syllogismo instituta elenches vocatur, cui quidem primitus id adheret, ut in eadem aliquis disputatone argumen-tando cogatur aut quod affirmavit negare aut quod negavit confiteri.' Hegel, again (Log. i. 406), says: 'Elenchhen d. i. nach des Aristoteles Erklärung Wesen, wodurch man genohtig wird das Gegenheil von dem zu sagen, was man vorher behauptet hatte.' To the neatness here the Italics are not the least contribution. It will be difficult to find the same neatness in Aristotle, and possibly Trendelenburg who too is neat, follows not Aristotle but Hegel here.—A definition so good is of general interest.
Of the designful, clear eye, with which Hegel worked, then, we are not allowed to doubt; nor ought it to be difficult for us to be convinced that there could be no Zweck, no purpose, no design in existence before subjectivity, and that it would have been absurd in Hegel to develop a consequent in anticipation of its antecedent. Besides, we know now that the change proposed by Rosenkranz would be historically false; for the Begriff, Kant's Begriff, Hegel's Begriff, was the notional Reciprocity that rose out of Hume's Causality. Yet Rosenkranz 'wants to maintain the right of the historical development!' Not only does he contradict this development, however, but, even by his own showing, that of the notion also; for he himself observes (p. 17) that 'the forms of Seyn are categorical, those of Wesen hypothetical, and those of the Begriff disjunctive;' which alone might have suggested to him Reciprocity as the immediate foregoer of the Notion. That Mechanism and Chemism should be forms of Causality, is no objection to their being treated where they are; for they are evidently concrete forms than abstract causality,—forms of the Begriff in objectivity itself. To Hegel, Logic is the prir of all; and in it, first of all, there appears in the abstract form of the notion whatever is afterwards found in the more concrete spheres of Nature and Spirit. It belongs, indeed, to the depth of Hegel's discernment that the Good should be regarded by him as a cognitive element, and should constitute to him the transition from Understanding to Reason. Why Beauty should not be included (another objection of Rosenkranz) may depend on this, that its abstract elements—as Kant also seems to have thought—are not discrepant from those of Teleology, and that its own place is, like that of Religion, only in a very concrete sphere.

But what has been said above is of no moment in comparison with this: the objection that Teleology, &c., are not technically exact syllogisms, is alone crucially decisive as regards the secret or principle of Hegel in its scope. Admit this objection, and the whole fabric of Hegel lies in pieces at our feet—perhaps not even with the exception of the doctrine of the syllogism itself. The principle which has given birth to Being, Nothing, Becoming,—to Being, There-being, Being-for-Self,—to Quality, Quantity, Measure,—to Ground, Phenomenon, Actuality,—to Substance, Cause, Reciprocity,—to Being, Essentivity, Notion,—is absolutely the same as that which gives birth to Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology; and if the objection of being but formal syllogisms
is fatal to these three last, it must be considered equally fatal to all the others, for they also are in precisely the same manner but formal syllogisms. A man who uses the language of Hegel cannot help naming the principle of Hegel; but to name is not necessarily to see. And this we hold to be the case with Rosenkranz. Had he been perfectly awake to what was in hand, he would have hesitated before contradicting the express, deliberate, perfectly conscious action of Hegel; and the last thing that would have occurred to him would have been to say, these forms—whether later or earlier than the syllogism—not being exactly the syllogism proper, must be rejected. How could they be the syllogism proper, if either later or earlier?—and to this syllogism proper is the whole system of Hegel required to shrink? Nay, observe this perfectly conclusive point: Rosenkranz actually denies the presence of the notion in any triad but (as we may say) its own, that, namely, where it is explicit: 'a syllogism,' he says, 'in the sense of the logical notion of the unity of the universal, particular, and singular is still not to be found in them,' (i.e., the various triads which together constitute the entire Logico). To yield to Trendelenburg here was to admit essential misunderstanding.

These same views—and something more—he expresses, at pages 504-5, thus:—

But now there was yet another revolution in linguistic usage introduced by Hegel; namely, as regards the word Notion. He declared that substance and subject were to be taken, not as if the subject were to be subordinated to substance, but, on the contrary, as if the latter were to be subordinated to the former, and maintained that essentially for the notion of truth the thing was to recognise Substance as Subject. He sought here, as the eternally memorable preface to the 'Phaenomenologie of the Spirit' exhibits in the grandest struggle of enduring effort to bring to an end the blind necessity attaching to the causa immanens of the Spinoism which, under the form of the Absolute, was now dominant, and to say that the self-determination of Substance (Wesen) it was which was ground of necessity. With this thought he stood to the Schellingianism of the day in the same relation that the monadology of Leibnitz bore to the immobility and indifference of the one Substance of Spinoza. Schelling's tractate on Free-will was, some years later, an express testimony to the truth of Hegel here, and sought (on a hint caught from him), to leap from the position of mere Reason to that of Spirit, though of Hegel's suggestion and instigation mention there was none. Now, when some time later Hegel in his 'Logik' advanced, in reference to the Reciprocity of Substance with itself, from Necessity to Free Will, he grasped together the whole sphere of the Ideas under the name of the Subjective Begriff, and for the first time caused thereby an indescribable confusion; for this word had
had till then the signification of a subjective Vorstellung, \textit{repräsentatio}, or of a subjective thought, \textit{conceptus}, or of an abstract determination of understanding, \textit{notio}. Certainly it was not unusual to say in German ‘Begriff,’ too for the necessity of the thing itself; for, it all comes to the notion of the thing, is as much as to say, It all comes to the necessity of the essential being of the thing. But now Notion was required to mean the \textit{subjective unity of the universal, the particular, and the singular}. There were little to be said against this, since Aristotle applies \textit{λέγος} in the same manner, but subjective was to express here not only our subjective thinking of a notion, but the \textit{self-determination to its differences} which lies in Substance (im Wesen), wherein we have unconditionally to acknowledge a great progress, an emancipation of logical forms from all improper psychological admixtures and adulterations. Thus far, then, therefore we should be considered to agree with Hegel. But now he had collocated the Kantian Categories as those of Being and Essence under the name of the \textit{Objective Logic}, and so made—from the notion of Substance out—the transition from the objective to the subjective logic; and now, then, again in the subjective logic, the subjective notion was to set itself anew as the objective notion; which objective notion, however, was only to extend to the \textit{forms of the objectivisation} of the notion; which forms are its realisation, for the complete notion, the unity of the sub- and objective notion, was to be only the Idea. Among these forms Hegel reckons now the teleological notion, and presents it thereby properly only as a mean of the subjective notion for its realisation. This would be for him completely to fall out with Aristotle, who subordinates matter and form to the notion of design, were it not perceivable, partly that what Hegel calls the subjective notion coincides with the teleological notion as the First, from which the movement issues; partly that he has carried over the objective notion of \textit{End} into the notion of the Idea as \textit{Self-End}. Only by means of this confusion of the \textit{logical notion} with the \textit{notion of the Idea} are many utterances of Hegel to be justified; he talks of the notion, of the divine, creative, free, self-dependent notion, and means thereby the Idea. If the objective notion is to be product of the subjective notion, it must possess also the articulation of this latter in the distinctions of universal, particular, and singular. Hegel in effect has endeavoured, in harmony with his method, to demonstrate this, but, as we believe, with a double error; firstly, that is, through the presence of a formal syllogism in the mechanical, chemical, and teleological processes which are to constitute the forms of the objective notion; and, secondly, by this, that these processes in the sphere of the idea are able to develop themselves into systematic unities. But the former determination is too little, and the latter too much. The former is too little, for a formal syllogism presents itself as early as the categories of Being and of Essence; the latter is too much, because the objectivity in it has no longer the sense of mediation to, but even that of the adequate statement of, the notion. In the mechanical, chemical, and teleological processes as such, there fails the \textit{middle term of the particular}, in the manner in which, as the distinction proper of the universal, it forms the transition to the singular, &c.

Rosenkranz continues in this way to censure the transition of the notion into mechanical, chemical, &c., objectivity through
syllogisms which are merely formal, and possess not the veritable universal, particular, and singular of the technical syllogism proper. He alludes, as we see, to the presence of a formal syllogism in the earlier categories; but this is no advance in insight. He seems to say only that, as a formal syllogism was present then, a formal syllogism is not enough, is 'too little' now; and he shows not a trace of the true principles involved. But the above passage has been principally quoted as bearing on this last question. We have here Rosenkranz expressly declaring what he knows about the notion. It is, however, not worth while entering into any special analysis: with the double, triple, and variously multiple confusion of notion and notions which exists in the above, it will be sufficient to contrast the simplicity of the Notion, Kant's notion, Kant's 'Copernican notion raised into the Hegelian, Kant's Reciprocity raised into the Hegelian Begriff—that Begriff of which Hegel himself gives us the Begriff, and which we have no excuse in failing to understand,—the one simple and single concrete notion. What does the Begriff of the Begriff, the Notion of the Notion, mean? It means that the Begriff, the one Notion which had been each and every one of all these manifold Forms from Being up to Reciprocity, is now formally the Begriff, has now reached its own appropriate form as Begriff, and this is true both Historically and Logically. This, then, is the divine, the creative, the free, the self-subsistent Begriff, and Hegel means it—expressly it—and not 'the Idea,' when he uses all such expressions: for if the Idea is its ultimate Logical stage, it itself is still the heart and soul and spirit of the Idea. In his preface to the second edition of his Logic, Hegel tells us with a pen of power that the categories are the substantial content of all natural and spiritual things, but even in them, pure as they are, there obtains the distinction of a soul and of a body. Now this soul is the Notion: not any general notion, subjective or objective or whatever other as Rosenkranz may be content to view it, but the one special Notion which has been already demonstrated. Hegel's words are these:—*

But these thoughts of all natural and spiritual things, the substantial content itself, are yet such a content as possesses manifold potentialities, and has even still the distinction in it of a soul and of a body, of the notion and of a relative reality; the deeper base is the soul per se, the pure Notion, which is

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* Log. vol. i. p. 18.
the inmost of objects, their single pulse of life, as also of the subjective thinking of the same.

‘Vom Begriff im Algemeinen,’ with which the third volume of Hegel’s Logic opens, is an extended explanation of the notion, is an extended notion exoterically (almost) of the notion: here is what Rosenkranz makes of it (pp. 22, 23):—

The full introduction which Hegel has given to the subjective Logic turns on this—to show how Substance determines itself as Subject, how necessity sublates itself into Freedom. This is the proposition which, with full consciousness of its infinite significance, he had first enunciated in the preface to the ‘Phaenomenologie,’ 1807, and which, rightly understood, lies at the bottom of his whole philosophy. This is the proposition out of which Schelling constructed his second philosophy, a scholastically confused imitation of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Spirit, &c.

It is impossible to say that this is not true; still it falls short of the truth. The section in question turns on something deeper and more universal than is here assigned to it, on a more penetrating and exhaustive principle than ‘the Absolute is Subject’ of the preface to the Phaenomenologie, however much the one may involve the other: what lies at the bottom of the Hegelian system, too, is something infinitely more definite and simple than that, and Schelling may have constructed his philosophia secunda out of whatever he may, but it was certainly not out of the Notion. In short, we oppose to the generalities, to the this and the other, to the vague hither and thither of Rosenkranz, the Notion, that which once seen the whole Hegelian system becomes seen—in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter. As we have said, however, he who uses the language of Hegel must a thousand and a thousand times state phrases which are perceived to tell the secret of Hegel, once that secret is itself perceived from elsewhere. Such utterances are to be found passim in Rosenkranz, and here is the very strongest that I have yet come upon:—

The admirable power of science becomes particularly obvious at particular stages. However unsatisfactory it may frequently appear to us, however great much that is doubtful it may leave behind, at such stages we are obliged to admit that science has already done much, and that it gives us pledges of a harmony of the universe capable of filling us with trust in the reason of the same. With immense velocity there rushes through infinite space a nowise particularly great ball. On this ball there move to and fro millions of nowise particularly great individuals, apparently given up to absolute chance, struggling with an existence ephemeral in its duration, often breaking loose into mutual enmity, or even murdering each other. But these feeble creatures have come gradually to learn that they live on a ball which moves round
another in an exactly-measured path. They have come gradually to learn that they are capable of mastery over the nature of their supporting planet; that with growing insight into the laws of nature there grows as well the might of their mastery, and that it is the same reason which they find in themselves as law of their actions and their thoughts, and which they meet without themselves in the phenomena of nature. And amongst these absolute laws of reason, they have come to know one that is, as it were, the law of laws, the key to all phenomena, the hidden-manifest Archens of all being and becoming. This law they name in variously manifold wise, according to the particular regions in which it manifests itself. In logic they name it on the side of subjective thought, abstraction, reflexion, speculation; or understanding, judgment, reason; or notion, judgment, syllogism; or thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Whatever names may be used, however, it is always the same stream, in whose magic bands all lies bound: for what we enunciate as a law of our subjective thought, has, if it is really a law, objective existence as well. We use, therefore, these same names in order to designate objective relations. We say, for example, a work of art is abstract when it wants the development into harmony of an inner antithesis. We say that one existence reflects itself into another. Relations of the Idea we designate as speculative. We do not call digestion, for example, an abstract, nor yet a reflected, but a speculative process, because it involves an assimilation of the inorganic, a transition from what is dead to what is alive. Such positive unity of opposed characters is speculative or dialectic.*

In what he says of a one law, Rosenkranz seems to have got very near here: perhaps, nevertheless, it may be but an external ray merely. It is not difficult from the very outside to perceive the never-failing three of Hegel, and it is not more difficult to see or divine that in all these threes unity of system is aimed at. This is the external form of Hegel—a form with which we become acquainted from the first, and in which we can very soon become expert, so far as speech is concerned, while, at the same time, we are still stone-blind to the principle, and know of origin and matter only what we can catch up, by an all-insufficient good luck, in those desperate and desultory rambles on the surface with which the most of us begin and with which the most of us end. In the beginning of what has been named 'the struggle to Hegel,' there will be found a variety of passages in which the writer seems perfectly at home with an sich, ausser sich, für sich, with difference and identity, &c., and even with the notion, at the very moment that he is divided from this last by years. Similarly, in the case of Rosenkranz, it is difficult to believe a perfect success, despite such passages as we have quoted above—it is difficult to believe this when we find him complaining that 'the

trichotomy of being, essentiaity, and notion allows the notion of the idea to be too much in the background behind that of the subjective notion! and adopting in preference to this trichotomy an early and imperfect one of Hegel, in which 'the first is the system of the pure notions of the Beént, the second that of the pure notions of the universal, and the third contains the notion of science.' It is difficult to believe this when we find him, in spite of Hegel, and of what he has accomplished and how he accomplished it, disjoining once again logic and metaphysic, designating design as ontological, and proposing classifications in the interest of an only external balance without regard to history or the life of the principle. It does not consist with such success even to hear that Hegel, 'despite the height of his standpoint,' 'took into the Idea concrete existential forms,' because he was 'still entangled in the form of science which he found to precede him,' or that it was 'indisputably the Schellingian definition of the notion of reason as of the absolute unity of subject and object which still forced itself on him here,' or that the passage from the Metaphysic of Aristotle 'with which Hegel has closed the second edition of his Encyclopaedia represents an unaccomplished Science,' a projected 'reintegration of all the moments of his system in a speculative philosophy!' It is difficult to believe in success when we ponder these and the other objections advanced: and it is impossible, so to believe, when we find Rosenkranz lamenting, 'the obscurities and incongruities which the Hegelian Logic has generated—through its doctrine of the notion!!'

Neither can we think Rosenkranz, though he defends it to a certain extent and would only remove misunderstandings from it, quite on the level of Hegel as regards the transition of the Idea into Nature. This transition is a perfect parallel to that of the subjective notion into objectivity, and both belong to the very life of the principle of Hegel. On that principle these transitions could not fail to be; and being, they could be no other. Reciprocity alone admits of no other transition; there they just are—reciprocals by the grace of God, the one out what the other is in. As regards the subjective notion passing into objectivity, we may say specially that this is historical, that a new determination of the object did in actual truth follow the subjective notion of Kant. When one reads the transition of the notion into objectivity whether in the Logik or the Encyclopaedia, and the express explanations by which Hegel, in elucidating, formally acknowledges the doctrine and
every step of the same, one feels much difficulty in believing that any one could object to this transition and yet still suppose that he really understood. The Begriff that as negative unity necessarily became Urtheil could only come together in the Schluss. (Observe both the etymological and the common meanings.) Once together, unity was restored, an immediacy, a vollständiges Selbstständiges, a completed Self-substantial,—the Object. So with the transition of the Logical Idea into Nature. This, too, is but an act of the living Reciprocity that is—that is the Notion, or that the Notion is. The Notion is now perfected into the Idea—the inner is full; it must fall over and asunder into the outer—Nature. The Entschluss and the Entlassung, the resolution and the release, are again the Hegelian equivoque that is the one triple of the direct and the indirect, the simple and the reflex, the literal and the figurative: what remarkable consistency, that Hegel should have sought to be true to the triplcity of the notion even in his single words! But how otherwise can any one state the fact? Or how otherwise can any one think the relation of God to Nature? The transition of God to Nature, which as his creation is still himself, how otherwise explain? It must be said, however, that Rosenkranz brings himself at last to be much more at home with the latter transition than with the former. Reminding himself of the Johannische Logoslehre, and putting 'in place of the word Reason the expression Logos,' he finds that it 'clinks already not so strange, when it is said of the latter that through its regard it produces nature—that, in the assurance of itself, it releases nature from itself.'

It is just this alternation of agreement and disagreement, without motive from anything in the thing itself to warrant the one now if the other then, that leads one to believe in the unsatisfactoriness of the catch that Rosenkranz exhibits as regards Hegel. Accordingly, in conclusion, it is perhaps permitted to infer without serious injustice that Rosenkranz has scarcely come to see that single principle which was an sich in Kant, für sich in Fichte and Schelling, and an und für sich in Hegel. This principle is notional reciprocity: this is the manifest Archeus which Rosenkranz assumes. Only Hegel clearly saw the peculiarity of the notion of Kant (as in his latent theory of perception)—the necessity, that is, of a union of the universal with the particular to the production of the singular, which concrete singular
alone is any reality, whether as notion or thing. Once arrived here, Hegel was able to see further, that a system on this principle was the next requisite; and that the means to this was determination, a progressus from the first abstract to the last concrete, or, what is the same thing, from the last abstract to the first concrete. This determination was but a general realisation and vitalisation of logic as a whole; of which simple apprehension is the first act, its truth being the universal; judgment the second, its truth the particular (otherwise nameable the difference, the other); and reason the third, its truth the singular,—which is the final truth, expressing that the actual is just a single concrete, the nature of which may be conceived to be a particular universalised into a singular, which again is the one logical nisus, the one logical vis; and a logical vis and the logical vis is what is, and all that is. Logic is the completed rhythmus of thought: Seyn, what it is; Wesen, what it was; Begriff (in that it be-gripes), what it is, was, and will be. These, too, are the three epochs both of philosophy and of history. So it was that Hegel spoke of history being near its term. If, as is probable, each epoch, however, be a triple of all the three moments, reason, which is now at last happily in germ—but only in germ—has still the whole of her own proper path to tread, and the term of history is still comparatively remote.

This concrete power, then, to which Hegel remained true everywhere, and which alone gave him his Logic and his Nature, his Aesthetic and his Politic, his Religion and his History; nay, which alone is the one subject, the one matter in all these elements,—Rosenkranz has scarcely succeeded fairly, clearly, firmly, and once for all to see, whether in its own distinct individual self-identity, or in the perfectly articulate cohesion and connexion of all its multiplex forms. His work on logic, indeed, which professes to reform and complete Hegel, reads and rattles like an amorphous heap of dry and disarticulated bones which a merely subjective breath turns over. Here dialectic, which is the very ghost of Hegel, has fled, and unity we have none. For the plastic demonstration of a scientific progress more strict and rigid than that of even a Laplace or a Newton, we have but a hither and thither of philological remark—not even common raisonnement—as in a dictionary. Hegel, in the Introduction to his Logik (pp. 44, 45), speaks of how 'unfree' thought finds itself when for the first time in presence of the 'Speculative,' and tells us that, would
it free itself, the first thing it has to do, is to accustom itself to the notions and distributions without entering on the dialectic. The logical statement that might so result, he says further, would give 'the picture of a methodically-arranged whole, although the soul of the structure, the method, which lives in the dialectic, appear not itself therein.' Is it possible to say even as much as this for the 'Wissenschaft der Logik,' the culminating, Hegel-amending work, of Rosenkranz?*

**Haym.**

Rosenkranz, whom Haym denominates, with the universal agreement of Germany in general, 'the friend and pupil of Hegel, the warmest and truest of his apologists,' published the work with reference to which we have just spoken, 'Die Wissenschaft der Logischen Idee,' in 1858, while the work of Haym with reference to which we are now going to speak appeared in 1857, a year earlier: why, then, do we take Haym after and not before Rosenkranz? The answer is, because the opinions of Rosenkranz were before the Public in many works previously to 1857, and because, in especial, the matter of his work on the Logical Idea—very certainly the matter criticised—had already appeared in the 'System der Wissenschaft,' 1850, and in 'Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie,' 1852. Haym, then, has been selected to 'close the debate,' because, so far as is known to me, he is the latest writer who has instituted a special inquest and come forward thereafter with a special and deliberate judgment on the general question of the worth of Hegel.

Haym remarks † of the preface to the Phaenomenologie, that 'it is not saying too much to maintain that he understands the Hegelian Philosophy who is completely master of the sense of this preface.' Now, while, on the one hand, it is impossible to over-rate the value of the exposition involved, it is to be said, on the

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* If the reader turn up in Rosenkranz what corresponds to 'Bestimmung, Beschaffenheit, und Grenze' in Hegel and in the relative commentary, he will realise probably what has just been said. Take the following sentence, where the Latin words are his own equivalents of the corresponding German ones (op. cit. p. 186): 'Determinatio is the Qualitas of Something by virtue of which it is able to maintain its own Existence in the circle of its Destinatio only through its Aptitude, Inclines, sive Natura,' and a style of explanation of things dialectic will manifest itself such, that of six of its main terms any one may be indiscriminately substituted for the other with the result of a very large number of quite identical sentences. This, then, is quite external.—In the translation, we may add, the pages correspondent to Schwägerl's are in order: 118, 64, 97, 105-109, 217, 218, 325, 315, 316, 323, 324, 329, and 345.—New.

† Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 215.
other, that this preface may be very fairly understood, and yet he
who understands it shall fail to understand—just anything of the
Hegelian system proper—just anything, that is, of the origin,

principle (the form, in a certain sense, lies on the surface), and
matter of this system. Nevertheless, what Haym says here may
be very allowably considered critical so far as he himself is con-
cerned. The preface to the Phaenomenologie contains—at least—
all that Haym knows of the principle of Hegel: the preface to the
Phaenomenologie contains within it the germ of all that Haym
says of the principle of Hegel. His book, to be sure, does not
confine itself to the preface to the Phaenomenologie, nor to the
Phaenomenologie itself, but passes through hands, as if under formal
judicial inspection, the whole series of the works of Hegel. It
never gets higher than this preface, however, and from its height it
is that what is said of the rest is seen. What is now so familiar
to us as the Substance-subject, or just in general the Spirit
(Geist) of Hegel: this, in fact, constitutes the entire key which
Haym offers us, and, as everybody knows, the preface to the
Phaenomenologie is the easiest quarry for that.

This, then, is all that Haym knows of Hegel, or, at least, all
that for his book he need know. But again to him the movement
alluded to, the schema implied in this key, is all too plainly facti-
tious—a thing got up, a pattern cut out. This to him—who is
very much of a politician—is but too clearly only Hegel’s ideal
resource against the horrors of the German political reality.
Göthe and Schiller, he tells us, hied them to Greece, and brought
thence the veil of poesy wherewith to shut out from themselves
the painful hideousness of this same political reality. So to
Greece Hegel too betook himself in order to be able to cover over
the Real of modern German ugliness with an Ideal of beautiful
Classical totality, the instrument of which is this same wonder-
fully artificial Spirit with its wonderfully artificial movement.
The philosophy of Hegel is but a side-piece to the poetry of
Göthe and Schiller, and of both poetry and philosophy the inspira-
tion is—as against our ugly German Political Real—an Ideal of
Hellenic Cosmos!

This is really no exaggeration: I know nothing else in Haym:
and from Haym of Hegel nothing else will anybody else ever
come to know.

The following quotations will probably more than suffice, not
only to confirm our sentence, but to illustrate as well the literary
abundance of Haym—the extraordinary rhetorical tenacity with which he accomplishes the extension and expansion of a single scanty formula over hundreds of pages:—

The universe, according to this system, is a Cosmos, or beautiful Totality; but it is at the same time Spirit, and describes, consequently, in whole and in part, the reflexive process which is the essence of Spirit. The universe is a living whole—all parts of the universe must, therefore, in constant mutual self-reference, be conceived as, dialectically fluent, rounding themselves into the whole (p. 221)

Unable to transmute his ideal into the actual, he transforms the actual into his ideal (p. 86).

It (the system) is not so much a great, unconscious creation of time—not so much a jet, an invention of genius, as rather a product of talent—something, with reflexion and design, essentially factitious (p. 10).

He found that the Gothes and Schillers had opened to the German people the treasure of its own inner and therewith the genuine treasure of spiritual life in general, that they for this people had brought to view its ideals and sentiments in a like manner as Sophocles and Aristophanes had brought for the Athenians theirs. He resolved in the same path to climb higher; he resolved to do the same thing in reference to the general notions and categories of the German nation—to put into its hand, as it were, a Lexicon and a Grammatic of its pure thought (p. 310).

True; the poetry of Gothe and Schiller sets before us a world of beauty and the ideal, which brings into repose and reconciliation the disunion of German spiritual life. But this reconciliation comes not into existence on the basis of a beautiful and self-satisfied actuality; these works take not nutriment from the marrow of the historical and actual life of the nation. That reconciliation comes into existence in contrast to, and in defiance of, an unbeautiful actuality; only by flight out of the present into the past of Hellenic life does it succeed with our two great poets to realise perfected beauty. Theirs, therefore, is an artificial poetry which terminates at last in an overcharged Idealistic and Typic. The end, then, again, is, with Gothe, resignation; with Schiller, the unfulfilled and abstract ideal. In the enjoyment of this fair picture-world, our nation must needs delude itself a moment with the dream of Greek fertility and Greek repose to awaken directly poorer and more restless than before. To Poetry such a delusion was indeed natural, and who would dispute it with her after she had offered to our enjoyment what was sweetest and most perfect? But we see now all at once Metaphysic seized with the same illusion. Turning aside from the strait path of sober inquiry and from the labour of deliverance through the most conscientious criticism, Hegel begins to expand over our spiritual world his ideal that was found in Hellas, that was strengthened by exhaustive penetration into the ultimate grounds of all religion. A dreamed-of and yearned-for future is treated as present. A system tricked out with the entire dignity of the science of truth raises itself beside our poetry, and with diamond net spins us into an idea with which the want, the incompleteness, and the unbeauty of our political and historical actuality is at every point in contradiction. With the Hellenising picture of nature and of fate through poets, we receive a
Hellemsing metaphysic which, in spite of our necessity, lures us to believe that all the limitations and contradictions of our knowledge, of our faith, of our life, reconcile themselves in the continuity of a beautiful whole (pp. 91, 92).

Halt we a moment; for we have put hand on the second decisive word for the composite enigma of the Hegelian Philosophy, the second key to the understanding of its inner texture. The first word [or key] was: the beautiful Cosmos is in whole the reflexive process of the Spirit: the Absolute is Spirit. The second more important word [or key] is: the beautiful Cosmos is just on this account in each particular part the same perpetually self-renewing process, a transition, a compulsion forward from moment to moment, a dialectic that returns into itself and gradually completes itself up to the whole: the Absolute is infinitely dialectic. And with this last word I signalise the strangely peculiar character and at the same time the pervading reason of the deep and enduring influence of this philosophy. An aestheticising and vivifying logic that concealed itself under an abstract schema, that procured itself authority and systematised itself under premiss of a metaphysical formula for the universe, that pushed itself into everything, on this mostly is that influence based. This philosophy is an out-and-out revolution of the treatment of the notion. It proclaims that 'the determinate as such has no other essential nature than this absolute unrest, not to be that which it is, that all that is is a bemediate' (a result). It brings through its dialectic into flux and movement the elements which were previously held as fixed and immovable. It tears up thus the whole floor of thought, and brings forth thereby, beside the noble fruit of a marvellous mastery of intellect that breathes life into cognition and the objects of cognition, the poisonous product as well of an unscrupulous and indefensible sophist (pp. 106-7).

And greater still than the difficulty of the outer, is that of the inner form. I mean that finnishedness-from-the-first, that at-once-into-existence of the whole of this world of thought. Here there is not a word of any gradual introduction into an investigation, of any joining on to ordinary views, of any previous setting-up of the question whereby one might know where one was, of any critical statement of the case where one might of himself be able to take his stand. With the first step we find ourselves as through stroke of magic in a peculiar new world. Like the prince in Andersen's tale, we seem in sleep to have fallen on the back of the winged spirit who carries us off through the air in order to let us see deep beneath us the world from which we have been snatched. In other words, the System, as it is there, appears to bid defiance to every analysis, to all research. It shows there like a smooth ball more ready to roll than easy to catch. Broken down is the scaffolding over which the arch was built. Filled up are all the inlets and outlets to this edifice of thought. One and only one possibility is there to penetrate here. We possess the key to this edifice only by this, that we have followed the philosopher in the course of his studies and the progress of his training, that we have stolen behind him into the innermost of his still resorts of thought and feeling. What is not in actuality—[this is the key as before]—shall exist in the ether of the Idea. The unreal notions of the Germans, divorced from the truth of things, shall

* Bemediate is an ugly mongrel for ein Vermittelites; but it seems to me to convey the peculiar Hegelian sense somehow.
through the native energy and force of thought shape themselves into real notions, and, through this their realisation, into a world of notions. Reflexion shall bring into reality the ideal which the praxis of German life denies. A deed of reflexion shall be set on whereby the gulf which by the political action of the German state is perpetually created and maintained between the universal and the particular, between formality and reality, shall be filled up. Through thought shall the fair concord between inner and outer, between the parts and the whole, be restored to that reality which it possessed in the poetry and art, in the State and customs of antiquity. Through thought shall that contradiction-annihilating life, shall that truth of love, and that truth of religion, be set into existence. The same sharp-sighted and matter-of-fact, penetrating and history-sifting thought which discovered in antiquity and the tenets of Christianity the ideal, but in the German present the negation of this ideal—the same thought moves now from the hem of the Hegelian spirit to the centre of the same; it throws itself once for all on this ideal itself in order to raise its burden into an absolute form for every interest, for the collective world of being and of consciousness. Leagued with the spirit of a better future, in silent agreement with the genius of German poesy, borne on the wave of a new world-epoch, it soars beyond the immediate level of the actual life at its feet—nay, beyond the self-acknowledged limits of all reflexion, in order to construct a world which is a reality only under the heaven of Hellen, a truth only in the deeps of the God-adoring soul. Only the boldness and the breadth of the conception can conceal the inner contradiction and the impossibility of the enterprise. Only the intensest exertion of the thinking faculty will enable the unwilling medium of reflexion to allow to rise from it an aesthetic product of cognition. Only the universe, on the other hand, will be wide enough to render inappreciable the dimensions within which every particular existence may be able to show as correlative part of a fair and living Cosmos. This is the history and this the character of the Hegelian system. I name it an aesthetic work of cognition. It will not, as it were, critically decompose the world of being and of consciousness, but construct it into the unity of a beautiful whole. It will not expose the aporias of cognition—not make clear to itself the limits, the contradictions, and antinomies in the world of spirit, but, on the contrary, it will strike down these difficulties and level out these contradictions. It is, I say, the exposition of the universe as of a beautiful living Cosmos. After the manner of the old Greek philosophy, it will show how in the world as in a whole all the parts conjoin to service of one harmonious order. It will make present to us the universal all as a vast organism in which each particular ceases to be dead and receives the significance of a living organ. It will show that the whole is an infinite all of life; to this end it will in everything finite expose its finiteness, and just with this and on account of this demonstrate its necessary completion into an infinite life. . . . Such main idea on which lies the conception of the whole system, will require now in the first place to be supplanted by the imagination of the systematiser. (Pp. 94-97.)

This theory of Haym, so enormous in word if so scanty in thought, must be allowed to possess it own correctness so far. The system of Hegel certainly aims at totality—(as for aesthetic
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beauty, Hellenic Cosmos, Greek Ideals, German Reals, Götthe and Schiller, and Poetry and all that, it may be viewed for the moment as simply literary importation)—and the Self-reflexion of Spirit is as certainly somehow present in it. An attempt at totality, and an attempt at dialectic articulation, no one can deny in Hegel. But did we want Haym’s five hundred brilliant pages to make us aware of this? Which of us did not see this for himself the very first moment he looked into Hegel? A whole, and, in dialectic symmetry, what else lies on the surface, on the very outside of the system? Is not this just what the table of contents at once makes plain to us? Is not this just the whole of the information we all of us get—and we get it at once—when we look at Hegel the first day, and perhaps the thousandth? And is not this the single grievance we would have removed? Is not this the single difficulty we long to have explained? Yes, it is a whole, ‘finished-from-the-first,’ ‘at-once-in-existence’—Why? Yes, it is dialectically articulate—but How? ‘Beautiful Totality!’ ‘Self-reflexion of Spirit!’—with such hollow assumption you but mock us by an exclamatory echo in return for an interrogatory call. Nay, nay! hide it not in rhetoric, cover it not with flowers and flourishes of literature—Hellenic Cosmos and what not: we see it perfectly clearly all the time—you see totality, you see self-reflexion; but as for anything else, you see it no more than we ourselves. How it is totality, and what is the totality, how it is dialectically articulate, and what it is that is dialectically articulate—just in general what is all this about—what are the thoughts here—till you can tell us something about that, till we can tell you something about that, both of us had better hold our tongues, however literary we be.

Haym’s rhetoric and literature we blow into space, then,—rhetoric and literature” being no substitutes for ideas, no substitutes for information, and we see the so-called key which was supposed to lie in their midst to be no key—no key, but a juggle practised on us, as it were, by means of our own admissions. The probability, then, is that Haym knows not the literal historical derivation from Kant—the probability, then, is that Haym knows not the literal Hegelian Begriff? Just so; this is the truth, and in the above extracts there are proofs to this effect; but before commenting upon these, we shall add others.

It (the Hegelian Philosophy) is the history of philosophy itself projected on a plane (p. 1).
As it is the history of philosophy *en nuce*, so it is philosophy *en nuce* (p. 2).
The Logic, to say it briefly, has a course like history; and this, because history as such has made the material and guide, the concrete agent of the dialectic (p. 320).

Critique and refutation of Kantianism pervade the 'science of logic' from one end to the other. This ('science of logic') relates itself to Kant as Kant's first great work related itself to Wolff and Hume. In Kant, Hegel sees his predecessor, as Kant his in Hume. . . . . And further. As the science of logic has its explanation with *Criticismus* (Kant's) behind it, so it has its explanation with the philosophy of the Romantic (Schelling's) behind it. Rather, it is nothing but the systematising of this latter explanation (p. 298).

However strange the articulation of this system may seem, however forced the development of moment from moment, we should be extremely blind, did we not see the clue by means of which the pretended necessity of the dialectic progress receives an authorisation of fact. It receives such authorisation by means of the history of the Pre-Hegelian philosophy. Our dialectician expressly turns himself in special polemical excursus now against Kant and Hume, now against Fichte and Schelling. Even this express polemic, however, always leans quite closely on his positive developments, and almost blends with the dialectic of the categories. Nay, more. Just in the last-stated parts does this logical dialectic directly take nutriment from the factual dialectic of the historical course and matter of the latest philosophy. It is self-evident—not the less self-evident because it is not spoken out—that it is the matter and context of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy which is criticised in the 'System of Grundätze' (axioms, principles) and in the 'Metaphysic of Objectivity.' It is the Fichtian Wissenschafleslehre, that, as in its Theoretical and Practical parts, we recognise under the title of the 'Metaphysic of Subjectivity.' Kant, as is well known, had no metaphysic of his own: he re-coined the Wolffian metaphysic into a metaphysic of Problems. He had, on the other hand, a Logic of his own, and different from the usual one, a so-called transcendental logic. In this transcendental logic he deduced the categories of Quantity and Quality, the relational notions of Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity; the modal ones of Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity. In the 'Critique of Pure Reason,' too, a 'system of Grundätze' followed the deduction of the Categories; and the dialectic critique of the previous Metaphysic followed the system of Grundätze. Here we have the outlines, much modified, it is true, of the Hegelian Logic and Metaphysic. . . . . In his system Hegel realised the notions in truth in the most varied manner. He realised them neither least nor least successfully in this way, that he modified their colourless abstract nature by the dye of their historical value. In the most varied way, also, he made them fluent and capable of movement. One of these ways, and not the least successful, consisted in immersing them in the stream of the historical evolution. Notions, he might in this reference have said, are in truth just as in a particular time they were understood, and they develop in truth into what, in the historical transition from system to system, they developed into. Much more certainly than this historical background of the notion—'realising' dialectic, behind the formalism of the same, do the various other ways, as just
so many other concrete supports of the progress of the reflexion from moment to moment, conceal themselves’ (Pp. 113-115)

These are the strongest expressions we can find anywhere in Haym in regard to his sense of the connexion of the Hegelian system with Kant and with history in general. And one is apt to exclaim at first, And what would you have more? Are they not strong enough? Is it not clear from them that Haym knows all about Hegel and Kant, and Hegel and History? We say, No: if the literal connexion with Kant and History on the part of Hegel which has been developed in these pages is to be interpolated by the reader into these words of Haym as uttered by Haym, we have again an instance of those fallacious ex post facto significations of which we have already spoken.

Hegel tells us himself that his Logic is the History of Philosophy itself, not 'projected on a plane' indeed, but freed from the concrete contingency of the historical form. In this way, the Logic may be very well spoken of as the 'History of Philosophy in nuce'; but how can we ever call the Hegelian System itself—whether with reference to the score of volumes of the 'Works,' or to the three parts of the Encyclopaedia'—Philosophy in nuce? Hegel's philosophy is philosophy in nuce: how shall we obtain any sense for this phrase, unless by simply explaining again that Hegel's philosophy is the History of Philosophy in nuce? There is something here of seductive literary jingle merely.

Then, Haym says that Hegel's Logic has a course like History, not of its own pulse, not of any internal principle in itself, but because of the simple and intelligible outside reason that Hegel has constructed his Logic out of History. But this is not to understand the Hegelian connexion of Logic and History. To Hegel, thought—Logic—is all; it has developed itself—it is a progressive alternating Gesetztszeyn, according to its own laws, its own necessity, its own life; and the History of Logic in concrete natural actuality is but the same process, the same life, in the mode of externality. In Logic, Substance by its own notional dialectic becomes Causality, which in turn and similarly becomes Reciprocity, and then the Notion. In the History of Logic (or of Philosophy, if you will), this series is externally represented or realised by the actual thinking of the men—Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke; then Hume, then Kant, and then Hegel himself. It is this literal connexion which neither Haym, nor, if we are right, anybody else as yet has understood; and it is a veritable inversion
of the truth to assert the Logic of Hegel to have been formed from without by a consideration of actual history. In this assertion, even, it is not for a moment contemplated that the transition of Reciprocity into the Notion is the abstract expression of the concrete history of thought from Kant to Hegel; and the last-named (Hegel), instead of being enabled by History to construe Logic, was, on the contrary, enabled by Logic to construe History. We do not mean to say that Logic was throughout the first; but we do mean to say that a generalisation of Logic on hint of Kant was the first; that the concrete connexion between Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c., and actual modern history, was a discovery that constituted the second; and that, after these, by means of a variety of labours and investigations now of history and now of philosophy, there arose as result—the Hegelian System. Now it is this literal statement which we think the right one as regards the connexion between the Hegelian Logic and actual History. Haym plainly has not even attained to the tinge of a dream of it. That there was some connexion, it was not difficult for Haym to know, for Hegel tells us again and again the fact; and a very simple comparing of their respective tables of contents sufficed to show that if Quantity, Quality, Substance, Cause, Reciprocity, &c., had been discussed by Kant, they had also been discussed by Hegel. Haym's knowledge amounts to no more than this; he simply points to this community of contents: he knows nothing and says nothing of the inner articulations: what we name the unknown and hidden heuristic life of Hegel when constructing his system, to this he has attained no access, with whatever closeness he has followed the outer history and appearances of Hegel. He sees some relation between the Logic and Kant, but immediately thereafter he sees some relation also between the Logic and Schelling, and this latter relation he decides to be the dominant one. 'Rather,' says he, 'it (i.e., the Logic) is nothing but the systematising of this latter explanation' (that come to with the Romantic of Schelling, namely). Haym, in fact, has to say a great many things, and this is one of them. The preface to the Phaenomenologie had very plainly a great deal to do with Schelling and his intellectual perception; it is to gain breadth to say the Logic is occupied with the same business, and we need not fear to blunder, for beyond doubt there is question of Schelling in the Logic as well. In fact, never getting the clue into his hand, Haym cannot simply
and satisfactorily just wind; he is obliged to grasp at a thousand scattered expedients as they float by. So it is that the Logic is this instant from end to end a refutation of Kant, and the next nothing but an explanation come to with Schelling: the simple original unit is never caught, and then developed into its necessary many. In default of this unit with its necessary many, he is compelled to see and to say that Hegel realises his notions, that is, constructs his system, 'in the most varied manner;' and just after the stress which he lays on the 'historical background,' as the main genetic source from which Hegel drew his materials, he speaks of 'the various other ways' which are the 'other concrete supports' of the dialectic evolution, and which 'conceal themselves certainly much more behind the formalism' of the dialectic than even this historical background.

But let us see what Haym himself says of what Hegel himself says about the historical supports of the Logic,—perhaps we shall gain thus more light:—

Hegel maintained—if, as regards the main notions of the successive historical systems of philosophy, we strip off that which belongs to their external circumstances of origin, their particular applications, &c., we obtain the various stages of the determination of the Idea itself in its logical notion; conversely, we have in the logical progress, the progress of historical phenomena in its main moments. This, so far as I see, is more than a mere hint; it is a naivé admission of the source from which the Logic drew partly its matter, and more than partly the form of its movement. What in the Frankfort sketch of the Logic and Metaphysic became visible only in individual passages, that becomes evident now with reference to the entire Logic. The Categories obtain their universal dialectic flux by the reality of nature and the mind being filled into them through the fine channel of abstraction. (P. 322.)

Here Haym quotes from Hegel himself an assertion of the existence of a much closer connexion between Logic and History than even he (Haym) seemed to seek to exhibit. Hegel says, History is Logic in concreto, and, conversely, Logic is History in abstracto. Haym's allusions to the Pre-Hegelian philosophy, to explanations come to with Kant, Schelling, &c., are thus by no means revelations, and not by any means discoveries: Hegel speaks much more plainly, much more unexceptionally than Haym. Nay, Hegel, as we have seen, has not been taken at his own word; it is here in these pages that what is the real significance (when concretely translated into history) of the transition of Reciprocity into the Notion, has been for the first
time pointed out; and Haym, for his part, still believes himself to throw a light of detection on Hegel, when he makes prominent some relation or other (he cannot say particularly what relation) to history in the Logic. Nay, more; Haym flatly refuses to take Hegel's own word, and insists on calling it 'a naïve admission!' An admission, above all, a naïve admission, and on the part of a Hegel! Did the Sphinx, then, naïvely babble her own secret, and was it so that OEdipus overthrew her? Hegel says, in such and such wise, History is Logic and Logic is History: Haym says, Don't believe him—that just means, he took outside facts and reduced them to his Logic by the fine channel of abstraction,—that just means, his Logic is but an artificial distillation, by means of a concealed process, of the concrete facts of nature, history, and consciousness, which are open, which are common to all of us. Haym will not take the hint that what is, is Thought; and that every particular of what is, must be but a particular of Thought. An outer world that comes one knows not whence, that is the prius of Haym, and Hegel's work is to him but a cunning and external metamorphosing of it. Hegel gets thence, he says, partly his matter and more than partly his form. This seems an inversion; surely Haym means to say that all the matter came from without! Whence else, in Haym's way of looking, could it come? Perhaps Haym has it in mind, however, that Hegel's matter is partly pure invention, pure fiction. But then, that the form is more than partly derived from the realms of fact! We thought the form was the dialectic, that it was an artificial and mechanical process got up somehow in imitation of the movement of Spirit, that it was a poisonous Sophistic, &c. &c.: but no; the form comes 'more than partly' from the realms of fact! To account for this Hegel, then, it is quite enough to be always brilliantly in speech? But, to Haym, with these realistic tendencies in him as we see, ought anything in this world to be more valuable than the categories, if, as he says, 'the reality of nature and the mind' has been 'filled into them'?

Haym's observations in regard to history and the Hegelian Logic are very far, then, from possessing that weight and appositeness which they may at first seem to possess. We may say, he names a historical connexion, but sees not the historical connexion. In fact, to him the whole truth here is, that certain historical materials have been taken up by Hegel—aesthetically—for completeness' sake—into his beautiful totality. The following
extracts will extend evidence in this reference of a directer nature:—

How does this apocrypha, this system which has grown in concealment, relate itself to the philosophy of the day; how first of all, and before all, does it relate itself to the then Philosophy of Schelling? (P. 143.)

Both had exchanged Kant's critical tendency in philosophy for a dogmatical one. Both had burst the thread with which Fichte had bound the whole of truth to the infinite self-certainty of the ego. Both had ceased to regard human freedom (free-will) as the highest form and the highest law under which cognition had to subordinate the entire universe . . . In contrast to the Fichtian method of reflection and deduction, both had come to develop the matter of their theory of the universe in a representative and descriptive manner. . . . Both saw in the sensuous universe no longer the mere reflex of 'the light immanent in the ego,' but the realisation and manifestation of a third (party), of a metaphysical absolute that grasped up both subjectivity and objectivity. The philosophy of both was, again, what neither the Kantian nor the Fichtian had been, a System. Both systems finally—and this one point is far and away the most important, to this one point all the rest may be reduced, from it all the rest may be explained—both systems rested ultimately on the same common principle, were dominated by the one, now more and now less distinctly enunciated thought. the whole of being is like a work of art, the whole—thought as action, nature as history—stands under the aesthetic schema and bears the type of absolute harmony. (P. 144.)

But nothing of such a struggle, of such a groping, of such a vacillating irresolution, shows itself in the genesis of the Hegelian convictions. From the moment he enters philosophy independently there hangs before him an ideal of a view of the world and of life that only late indeed realised itself in the form of a philosophical system, the physiognomy of which, however, was already visible in firm traits in those early paraphrases of the evangelical history and the theological dogmas. Heart and soul immovably directed to this ideal, he advances with firm step to his system; neither the Reason-Kritik nor the Wissenschaftslehre can impose upon him, perplex him, divert him, shake him. Unsteady, irregular, and eccentric, advancing by zig-zag, is the line which Schelling describes before he throws himself into the point of Identity: continuous, uninterrupted, straughtly, surely drawn the path along which the convictions of Hegel proceed till they establish themselves in the system. (P. 145.)

What Schelling had got at second-hand, that Hegel had got at first. The aesthetic world-theory of the former had the modern, that of the latter Hellenic, classicism and humanism as its foundation. . . . Hegel's philosophy in its original form, on the contrary, is an independent fruit of philological studies; it is a side-piece to the poetry of Goethe and Schiller, and grown on the same soil—a philosophical attempt to restore the antique, as this poetry was a poetical attempt. . . . He has, as it were, unconsciously converted into moments of his system both Kantianism and Fichtianism, and in the construction of this system these modes of thought have themselves received the colour of his ideal. . . . Schelling, because he has passed so directly from the school of the preceding systems to his new position, has the advantage over
Hegel of being able more sharply and fundamentally to point this position. His system has a name, and we know distinctly what it wants. In its genesis from the preceding systems, and in its own principle, it is perfectly transparent. (Pp. 146, 147, 148, 149.)

The more we consider the 'System of Ethics,' the more do we miss specific Hegelian features, the more do we discover in it Schellingian features (p. 171). The Schellingian mannerism of construction extends itself on the surface. (P. 174.) The metal was Hegel's, the stamp was Schelling's. It completes—I repeat it—the proof that the former, not only accommodated himself to the latter, but that, up to a certain degree, he was dominated and carried away by the peculiarity of the latter. (P. 179.)

When he describes Speculation as 'Synthesis of Reflexion with the Absolute Perception,' the true method as 'Self-destruction of Reflexion,' when he says that 'the Self-sublating Contradiction is the highest formal expression of knowledge and truth;' or when he characterises the 'absolute notion' as the 'absolute direct contrary of itself:' when he demands that every part of philosophy be presented in the shape of an independent, complete formation, and this formation be 'united with the logical element,'—all this amounts to expressions which do not indeed cancel his Schellingianism, but, &c. . . . The dialectic is his peculiar difference from Schelling (p. 212). He adapted himself in the first three and a half years of his Jena residence to the Identitute-philosophie: the consequence was, that he threw himself with greater stress on the aesthetic side of his world-picture (p. 221) Much deeper than the modern had the ancient spirit acted on him. Despite all acquaintance with later literary and philosophical endeavours, he was still a special intimate only of the genius of Hellenic Antiquity. The pith and marrow of his system had just for this reason—of this we have convinced ourselves—grown up out of antique root; almost perfectly foreign and isolated it stood beside those creations of the German Spirit which were even then in bloom, and had arrested the interest of contemporaries (p. 126).

The origin and character of this system were totally different from those of the systems of Kant and Fichte. The object of Kant was, first of all, before a single step was taken in philosophy, with the most self-denying and impartial accuracy to buoy out the terrain of possible cognition. It was his object to discover a fixed and immovable point of truth to which to attach with infallible certainty the whole of knowledge, and he discovered this point—grasping deep down into the undermost grounds of human nature—in the conscience. Quite otherwise lay the matter with Hegel. It is not in first rank the necessity of scientific conscientiousness and truth that impels him to philosophy, but it is the necessity to represent to himself the whole of the world and of life in a form fully ordered and arranged. It is not a fixed, marked-off point out from which he prosecutes the discovery of truth, but it is an ideal grown out of history and the mind itself—a concrete image, a broad and full idea, an idea of the authority of which beforehand he gives himself no abstract critical account, but which out of the full energy of his being he has appropriated to himself and lived for himself, which, he knows not himself how, has filled and penetrated him to the full, and into which he now longs to carry over the entire wealth of the being of nature and of man.
The Hegelian philosophy, accordingly, arises, as it were, from a poetic impulse—from the impulse to project a figure of the world according to an ideal type lying ready in the mind of the systematiser. It is beyond Kant and Fichte, without having and before he has expressly exercised any inquest into their leading principles. In Frankfort, indeed, he studied the Kantian moral and political theories which had just appeared; but even in the detailed study of these writings, as he plies it for himself pen in hand, he enters not properly into any critical analysis of the Kantian principles, but he opposes to the rigorous consequences which Kant had developed from his ground-notions, quite simply his own notions which had grown up from the soil of religious sentiment and historical idea. . . . The question is the authorisation of Hegel to translate that ideal into the form of reflection and thought. . . . Be it as it may with the truth of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, this is certain— they were pure and natural products of the factual situation of our nation (pp. 88-89).

It is an ideal grown up in a foreign soil and in an alien time by which Hegel is out and out actuated (p. 91).

This labour stood visibly, quite independently of its being only a Torso, all too isolated and special, all too apart from the consequent, connected, manifest course which philosophy had taken in the hands of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling (p. 123)

All here is and happens quite otherwise than in what has been elsewhere and ever called Logic and Metaphysics. We have here partly other notions than those we know from Aristotle, from Kant, or from the metaphysics of Wolff. Quite otherwise is the nature of these notions, quite otherwise are their cognition and mutual relations conceived. The Hegelian restoration of Logic and Metaphysics is a total revolution of them (p 313). The apriorism of Hegel, because it did not, like the Kantian, derive from the concrete inner, was what broke the point off all the apparent liberalities of the political views of Hegel.

. . . . These were furthest from true freedom where they spoke biggest of reason and the notion (p. 355). Since Kant we have had again an ethical, but no longer any speculative metaphysics: now (after Hegel) we have again a speculative but no ethical metaphysics (p. 367). The defect with which morality remains affected in Hegel arises from his inability to appreciate the Kantian conception of it (p. 376). The word free-will is a coin whose currency finds itself in constant oscillation. The inner intention alone determines the sense of this word. The construction which Hegel puts upon it, is the means of betraying the fundamental defects of his philosophy. What falls at once into the eye, is the preponderance of the theoretic over the practical, or, to say it more correctly, the absorption of the willing into the thinking Spirit. Will and free-will evaporate with Hegel into thinking and knowing. The will, so runs the psychological definition which forms the basis of his whole system of free-will, is 'a particular form of thought.' . . . The will, he says, 'is only as thinking intelligence true free-will;' free-will in that way is identical with reason. . . . Sharply to say it, this is a will, then, which wills not (p. 370).

If we saw from previous quotations that Haym ascribed the development of the Hegelian Logic to the actual use of the historical materials of Kant &c., and from others that he would
not, at the same time, accept Hegel’s own admission of this historical connexion as on internal principles, but would insist on a mere external, though covered, mechanism being the only agent at work, we see from these last quotations that Haym has not attained to the slightest conception of the veritable historical connexion which affiliates Hegel to his predecessors. The truth of the matter is, that Hegel, by means of the most laborious, continuous, and frequently-repeated analyses, especially of Kant, but very certainly and very particularly of Fichte and Schelling also, arrived at an accurate perception of the true nature and real reach of the principles that constituted the foci in the meditations of Kant, and of the respective influences of the further operations of Fichte and Schelling thereupon. Not till this was accomplished, did he discern the remarkable light which the new results reflected on the Philosophy of the Greeks and the History of Philosophy in general. The new interpretations thus obtained as regards these latter interests were more adapted, in the first place, to conceal than reveal his relations to Kant; but in this last he rooted, and the stiff, wooden, insecure enthusiasm for Sophocles which Hölderlin had awakened in him had no influence on his philosophy as such. We have it again and again under the hand of Hegel, though he was certainly not at all loud about it to his contemporaries, that he knew perfectly well that he worked only on a thing called the Kantian Philosophy, which was a genuine product of human history and human consciousness, and which he himself, as genuinely, endeavoured to advance to the place and function it promised to fill and fulfil as the Science of Philosophy at length. To Hegel it was perfectly evident that, do what he might, and let Fichte and Schelling have done whatever they may, this thing would be known in time as, and would be named only, the Kantian Philosophy. Nor one whit less evident was it, that it was a true interest and carried in its womb all the germs of the future. So runs the story with us and in truth; but the reader need only glance superficially back on the extracts we have made, to become at once aware that with Haym the whole matter runs in precisely the contrary direction.

To Haym, despite certain borrowed articles he sees in it, the house of Hegel is absolutely peculiar and absolutely isolated. It has no connexion whatever with the houses over-the-way. In origin, motive, plan, structure, it is wholly different from these. The very articles borrowed are but to fill his house; nay, they
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are just such household articles as all such houses cannot be without. Hegel tells him, indeed, that in raising his house, he laid others under contribution: but Haym will not believe him—not at all in his own way of it. The principle was modern and genuine, and its treatment was through thought, thought the sincerest and the truest; but Haym would have it that the principle was ancient, and its treatment through art, imagination, invention. To fill up this principle, accordingly, Haym has no natural clue of its own to wind into it: he is compelled to stop and to stuff it with a thousand miscellaneous expedients which his own great native ingenuity enables him to intercept on every side—but not, however, without falling on the face ever and anon over his own contradictions.

These matters are so plain that it is not worth while spending time on them, and we shall offer to guide the reader in interpreting the above extracts by only a word or two.

In the quotations (pages 626-633), which were made for another purpose, we shall find several expressions which militate against the truth of the case (the 'Secret of Hegel') as it has yielded itself in the present work, and demonstrate the blindness of Haym to the real origin of the System from Kant. From these it is clear that to Haym the work of Hegel is but a factitious and illusory attempt to transform, not his Ideal into the Actual, but 'the Actual into his Ideal.' For the accomplishment of this work, Hegel, in his opinion, 'turns aside from the strait path of sober inquiry, from the labour of deliverance through conscientious criticism' (such as Kant's), to set up a 'composite enigma,' 'tricked out with the appearance of a science of truth,' that merely seeks to be in relation with 'a dreamed-of and yearned-for future.' It stands in absolute isolation, absolutely without any connexion that might be a bridge to it. It is realised in 'the most varied manner' by a variety of expedients, and in general by a transcendence of 'the self-acknowledged limits of all reflexion.' It is no result of criticism and analysis; it has no examination of the nature and limits of concrete thought behind it; it does not thinkingly decompose, but aesthetically construct. It will not have things as they are: it will have things as it would, &c. Though the description of the isolation of the system is exceedingly happy and exhaustively representative of the feelings of every man who approaches it for the first time, it is out of place in one who pretends to have attained to initiation, and
gives not a hint of the true state of the case—the close and literal derivation from Kant. The whole conception which the words show Haym to entertain—the very phrase ‘composite enigma’ points to a conclusion the very opposite of that which has been here maintained.

In relation to the extracts which occur specially in this particular reference, we cannot speak differently. What concerns Schelling, for example, is an enunciation in many of its constituents completely wide of the truth. It is to follow quite a wrong scent to seek, ‘first of all and before all,’ to track Hegel in this reference. Haym himself acknowledges the incommunicable disjunctions which, as regards Schelling, the Frankfort sketch of the Hegelian System displays—it was ‘a quite other world’—and that ‘it (the system) never receded from these its fundamental articulations’ as contained in this sketch. And this is the truth: in that sketch Hegel had reached to the secret of Kant; he had attained to the Begriff, and stood but in small need of Schelling—unless for the lift which the shoulders of the Schellingian fame were able to extend to the then Hegelian obscurity. The whole affiliation, then, of Hegel to Schelling is full of items quite at variance with the veritable origin, with the veritable conditions. The Frankfort sketch is evidently ‘a Torso,’ and beyond a doubt it required a licking into shape; but how absurd to say it stood in need ‘of an understanding being come to with the general course of German philosophy,’ inasmuch as it was nothing but this ‘explanation,’ nothing but the result of this ‘course,’ and how infinitely more absurd it is to opine as follows: ‘that this in both respects (the ‘licking’ and the ‘explanation’) really took place, we have to thank the removal of Hegel from Frankfort to Jena’! Why, after such success as the Frankfort sketch demonstrates Hegel to have obtained, the System would have been eventually licked into shape though its author had been consigned to Timbuctoo,—had he been but left the necessary means otherwise. The well-balanced affinities of Hegel and Schelling, then, and their equally well-counterbalanced differences, are, for the most part, but words, words, words. Hegel had not exchanged ‘criticism’ for mere ‘dogmatism;’ he had not abandoned ‘the infinite self-certainty of the ego;’ he had not ‘ceased to regard human free-will as the highest form and the highest law, &c.;’ he had not adopted, ‘in contrast to the Fichtian, ‘a representative method’ (at least, this is no correct
account of the matter); lastly, he had not—with a great many
other things—viewed all as under an 'ästhetic schema.' Again,
it is speaking very wide to talk of the 'physiognomy' of the
system being 'already visible in firm traits' in his early theo-
logical studies. 'Neither the Reason-Kritik nor the Wissen-
schaftslehre can impose upon him, perplex him, divert him, shake
him!' Hegel had taken good care of that; he knew better than
that: he knew that out of these works only was it that he could
build, and he took good care to appropriate all he could for that
purpose out of both. We may almost say, indeed, that in these
two works, when they are rightly understood, will be seen the
beginning, the middle, and the end of Hegel. Then all that
about 'first hand,' 'second hand,' 'modern,' 'ancient,' &c., is
but mere literary verbiage, so far as the special issue is concerned.
The Hegelian System is not 'an independent fruit of philo-
logical studies.' He has not 'unconsciously' taken up into it 'both
Kantianism and Fichtianism.' The position of Hegel, when it is
understood, is as 'sharply pointed' as that of Schelling, and his
derivation from predecessors, not less, but more close, literal, and,
in the end, 'transparent.' Hegel could not get his Ethics from
Schelling, but only from Kant. Hegel did 'accommodate' him-
self to Schelling, but he was not 'carried away' by him; he did
not allow himself to be affected by his 'manier'; and both
'metal' and 'stamp' are in Hegel's works Hegel's own, all
conditions of genesis being duly allowed for. When Hegel talks
of 'the self-sublating contradiction being the highest formal
expression of knowledge and truth,' &c., these expressions
not only do cancel his Schellingianism, but exhibit 'him—
as in possession of the Begriff—infinity beyond Schelling. 'The
pith and marrow of his system'—we may have convinced
ourselves of whatever we please—was not ancient but modern,
and this system did not stand 'almost perfectly foreign and
isolated' beside its predecessors, 'which were even then in bloom,
but rose bodily a literal birth out of them. 'The origin and
character of this system' were not 'totally different from those of
Kant and Fichte.' Hegel, as much as Kant, and more open-eyed,
sought the 'terrain of possible cognition;' Hegel, as much as
Kant, strove to a fixed point (or principle) of truth; Hegel, as much as
Kant, is distinguished by 'the most self-denying and impartial
accuracy.' 'The necessity of scientific conscientiousness' is primal
with Hegel; and he was not one whit keener in his longing towards
totality and a system than Kant himself. It is a ‘fixed point’ (the notion) from which he proceeds, and not ‘an ideal’ which possesses him ‘he knows not how,’ of which he can give ‘no critical account beforehand’! No man that ever lived was ever less so possessed; no man that ever lived was ever abler just to give such an account. The system of Hegel does not arise from ‘a poetic impulse.’ He is not ‘beyond Kant and Fichte before he has exercised any inquest into their leading principles.’ He did enter—and vastly, infinitely, incalculably more thoroughly than ever student into any matter yet—‘into a critical analysis of the Kantian principles.’ Haym does not know Hegel’s ‘authorisation,’ certainly; but not the less on that account is this authorisation good,—though, of course, the whole thing still wants confirmation. The Hegelian, quite as certainly as ‘the Kantian and Fichtian philosophy,’ was a ‘pure product’ of the ‘factual situation’ in Germany. Hegel is not out-and-out actuated by an ‘ideal’ merely, and that by which he is actuated is neither of ‘alien soil’ nor of ‘an alien time.’ ‘The apriorism of Hegel’ did, ‘like the Kantian, derive from the concrete inner.’ The ‘isolation’ of the system and the ‘difference of the Logic from any other have had comment enough; but it is necessary to say a word as regards the relation of Hegel to morality and free-will. It must suffice at present, however, just to assert, without statement of proof, that Hegel, while he is nowhere greater in himself, is nowhere truer to Kant, than in all that appertains to Ethics. I know not that there is any lesson in any mere human book that can at all approach in value the lesson that comes to us from the words Subjective and Objective (Form and Inhalt) as used by Hegel in a practical or Ethical connexion. It is quite plain, then, from a thousand tracks, that Haym knows nothing of the true and literal derivation of Hegel from Kant.

His deliverances in regard to the ‘Frankfort Sketch’ are to the same effect. This sketch is named of Frankfort because it seems to have been written there; it dates thus not later than 1800; and it is still in manuscript—a manuscript ‘consisting of 102 sheets in 4to, of which, however, the three first and the seventh are wanting.’ As a specimen of the contents of this remarkable paper, I translate a passage contained in the notes to Haym’s book (p. 493):

What is united in a Judgment, the Subject and Predicate, the former the Particular, the latter the Universal, contradict themselves through their
antithesis in themselves and through the opposed subsumption which they mutually exercise; each is for itself, and each refers itself in its For-self-ity (Fürsichseyn), to the other, and sets [assumes, infers, implies, or exemplifies] reciprocally the same as a Sublated (-ity). The one as much as the other must exhibit itself as setting this ideality in the other. In the way in which they refer themselves to one another in the notion of a Judgment, the contradictory Fursichseyn (individuality) of each of them is set: each, however, is only for itself in that the other is not for itself; as they are in the Judgment each is for itself; the individuality of the one must therefore make the other something other than it is immediately set in the Judgment: this self-preservation through subjection of the other under itself is therefore immediately an othering of this other; but the nature of Judgment must at the same time equally assert itself in this alteration and sublate at the same time this otherness. The way, therefore, is reflexion of this other into itself. The realising of the terms of the Judgment is thus a double one, and both together complete the realising of the Judgment which in this its totality has itself become another; in that the peculiarity of the terms—which peculiarity is essential to the Judgment—has through the reflexions sublated itself for itself, and rather fulfilled for itself the empty nexus (co-reference).

This extract will probably appear only so much ‘clotted nonsense.’ Still, what Hegel is employed on here, tangled as it may be, is, so to speak, the essential act of the logical judgment as such—the terms of it now as disjunct and again as conjunct. The various extracts, however, concern the whole subject, root of the System, in cognition by perception, category (notion), and idea, as suggested by Kant. The quotations of Haym, in truth, surprise one with the light they throw on the true nature of the genesis and operations of Hegel. Indeed, the perfection to which this latter has already brought the inquiry is alone fitted to surprise. The triplexity is full-formed, and the various divisions and subdivisions, if with differences and different names, are well advanced towards the form they were afterwards to assume. In short, reciprocity, the disjunctive syllogism, the generalisation of the generalisation of Kant into its ultimate principle, the realisation of the tri-une logical nisus, named in its separate or abstract moments simple apprehension, judgment, and reason—this realisation carried into everything,—these are the creative motives apparently throughout the whole sketch.

To Haym, however, on the whole, this, the sincerest striving after the inner dialectic of the Notion can only show as a barefaced and external escamoterie. Had Haym truly seen what was at work, had he truly seen the exhaustive study of Kant and the carrying forward of the principles so found;—had he known the veritable nature of what Hegel carried in his pocket at the moment
that he—in appearance—gave in his adhesion to Schelling,—we should have had some very different remarks from him on all these points. But to all this Haym is simply external. Of the transition of the notions, the einfache Beziehung, our reflexion, and that of the thing itself,—of such things, he remarks (p. 109):—‘It is clear, however, that it would be a false subtlety, would we see here more than one of the many formalistic turns and expedients of the system at present in its commencement.’ Haym can only see sophistic here; he does not know ‘from what point as first our dialectician took his departure, and how he conditioned this departure,’ but supposes so and so; he speaks of ‘the designations in themselves quite unintelligible of Reference, Relation, and Proportion, &c.’ This last graduated triplet ought not to have been so unintelligible, for it exhibits very clearly its relation to the Notion—it exhibits very clearly the struggles of Hegel towards his System. Failing to perceive his departure from Kant, it is no wonder that the differences of Hegel from Schelling prove so puzzling to Haym. But turn we now to his mode of using the term Begriff, and let us see if it ever stood up to him—the Begriff.

This Philosophy is an out-and-out revolution of the treatment of the Notion (p. 107). He forgets, in the necessity to see his Ideal in representation before him, the impotence of the mere Notion, of which he himself had spoken (p. 86). With both there unites itself the necessity to represent the inner, and to find what were so represented, as an actual. The organ of such representation is to him, such is the nature of his spirit, the understanding, the sole medium in which said actualisation can accomplish itself, the Notion. It is not enough to him to have begriffen Religion; he will at the same time possess it, represent it, realise it in the Begriff (p. 87). When he characterises ‘the absolute notion’ as ‘the absolute immediate contrary of itself’... this is a declaration which does not do away with his Schellingianism, &c. (p. 212).

It were endless to pursue everywhere—especially where only an ingenious association of ideas is at work—the trail of this dialectic. Take, however, by way of example, the transition from the ‘Relation of Being’ to the ‘Relation of Thinking.’ The relation of reciprocity is assumed as the most highly developed form of the one, the definite notion as the most original form of the other. Transition is to be accomplished from the former to the latter. This transition then is to be conceived as a transition of the one into the other as its ‘reality.’ This making real is to be considered to take place according to the form of the process of the absolute spirit; according to the form, that is, of ‘the othering and of the return from the othering.’ How runs the deduction? In the relation of reciprocity opposites are—exist together. Each of the opposed substances now is in relation to the other at once active and passive. The double effect of both only goes to this, that in the same way each of the two is in the same way neutralised, that both are reduced into the quiescence of equipoise. With the completest reality is this
process described by Hegel and shown to have its part in the operations of nature. We see depicted, how here the line of coming and going moves forwards and backwards \textit{an infinitum}; how there are here infinitely many points equally of rise and division; how through this infinite intricacy and intercrossing of coming and going, the actuality becomes the coming and at the same time also the ceasing \textit{being} of the substances. Directly, however, the limning of this living fact becomes compressed into an abstract sum. Only so namely by means of the espial of an ingenious analogy, can the reciprocal interaction and interpassion of the opposed substances be converted into their ‘truth,’ into the notion of the notion, that is to say, into the relation of universal and particular. The truth of the relation of reciprocity is to be assumed now to be a realised oneness of the opposed entities, and in this neutralisedness at the same time a manifestation of them as so neutralised. There has thus become, however, a self-contrary; for in the original notion the opposites were as existent. It is thus, negatively, the dropping of the characteristic peculiarity of reciprocity to be a relation of existent entities, and, positively, the advertence to the \textit{oneness of opposites}, it is the one-sided reflecting on the abstractest trait of similarity between this relation and that in which universal and particular stand to each other in the definite notion, —it is by this that dialectic here turns to nought the upright doctrine of Kant, that the notion enters indeed into existence, but never wholly assumes it. The notion, then, is the ‘self-equal unity of opposites,’ the manifestation of what is latent in the process of reciprocity:—on this thin thread hangs the transition from the ontological to the logical forms! (Pp. 116-17.)

It is hardly necessary, in regard to these extracts, to show that Haym does not know \textit{the} notion;—this has been indirectly shown already;—but our purpose at present is only to show that when Haym says the notion and the notion and the notion, he does not mean \textit{the} notion. We are not called upon at present even to take note of what Haym says of reciprocity. In this reference we shall say this, however, that, in what he has in view, Hegel has, properly, nothing immediately to do with existents as regards the reciprocity he contemplates. It may be true that, according to Kant, the notion ‘enters into existence but never wholly assumes it;’ with this, Hegel here has no concern. But, if we withdraw from existence itself, or any existence, all the moments of the notion, it will very much puzzle Haym himself to tell us what then remains. (In a very simple sense, indeed, that of which there can be—nd is no notion, must be nothing). To Hegel the \textit{notion} (not any thing, not any existence or existent) of Causality, which is but \textit{a} form of \textit{the} notion, has by its own dialectic movement passed into Reciprocity. What \textit{was} Cause \textit{is} now Effect as well, and what \textit{was} Effect \textit{is} now no less Cause. They were tautological before, and they are now only \textit{differently} tautological; and this \textit{difference}
is the product of the thing itself. To Hegel the notion of Reciprocity is a necessary result of the native movement of the element Thought itself. But Haym may illustrate the thing to himself otherwise. Haym, we may certainly say, for example, has now a crude or figurate conception, a Vorstellung, of Reciprocity. Well, if he will but take the trouble narrowly to watch his Vorstellung, whether as in imagination or as in actual perception—if he will but take the trouble to throw out all foreign admixtures, if he will but take the trouble to purify and reduce his conception into its absolutely abstract notion,—he will obtain a result—something still appertinent to existence—so peculiar that even he will have some difficulty to prevent it passing into—the notion of the notion. What we have before us, then, are notions as notions, or the forms of the notion as such, and any sneer about existence and existents is quite irrelevant and beside the point.

Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and indeed any German writer since the first of these, have been in the habit of speaking of the notion just as they would speak of the perception. This is simply a German method of expressing what Englishmen express by notions in general, notions as such, perceptions in general, perceptions as such. The notion and the perception of such usage are just the universals of notions and perceptions. But the notion, as notion universally, as universal notion (though the meanings will in the end be found to come together), does not at all mean in this usage the notion, the notion singularly, the singular notion, which, though coming to him by natural genesis from Kant, is peculiar to Hegel. Now 'the notion,' and 'the mere notion,' &c., of Haym is the former notion, and not the latter. The perception is at this moment intelligible as perception taken universally; but if 'the perception' were used as Hegel uses 'the notion,' then the perception would be one special, particular and peculiar—would be a certain single or singular perception. This has just to be pointed out; and now the Reader, every time he opens his Hegel, will be astonished again and again in every page that he did not see before that Hegel meant by the notion, a notion, a certain particular and peculiar notion.

It requires no minute inspection of the quotations from Haym to discern that all this has escaped him. To him to have begriffen something and to realise this something in the Begriff are two different things; but to Hegel they are the same thing, for to him to begreifen and to have the Begriff have both the
peculiar and the same peculiar Hegelian meaning—(a meaning in the end, however, that coalesces with the ordinary one, though to the development of a higher and entirely new stage of thought). The mode in which Haym talks of the 'absolute notion' is quite unconscious, quite blind, quite unwitting. Then the notion of the notion is not to Haym the notion of the notion: it is but the relation of universal and particular (which, of course, is true too in the new and higher, but to Haym unknown Hegelian sense). In fact, both the way in which he uses the term, and his perfectly unconscious commentary on the transition of reciprocity into the notion—the actual genesis of the latter—demonstrate Haym never to have even dreamed of regarding the notion as the notion—that single and singular entity which Hegel means, and which we here and elsewhere attempt to express and convey.

What Haym sees is but the attempt at an organically articulated Whole, which attempt everybody else sees. What he would do now is, account for this attempt; and the means he uses are an Ideal of Hellenic Cosmos which he holds Hegel to realise, and which he himself would in explanation realise, by 'various ways,' by 'many turns and expediens.' Haym accordingly follows Hegel step by step through his life and the series of his publications. He is thus with Hegel and near Hegel, and can always allude to some fact of Hegel. But the boastful exclamation, every now and then, 'Ha! you see I am on his traces; I take you with me into the very den of the unknown and inexplicable monster at last,' is about the hollowest attempt to bawl oneself and others into a baseless conviction of success which, perhaps, any one has ever witnessed. In fact, it needs not directly to demonstrate the failure of Haym by reference to the historical connexion, the Frankfort Sketch, the Begriff, &c.: Haym's whole edifice cannot support itself on its own incessant self-contradictions, but tumbles through these into an untenable chaos; and, for a conclusive and satisfactory refutation, it suffices to show this. Nor is this an operation of any difficulty, unless, indeed, the extreme abundance of the materials shall be thought such.

The single Begriff is the genetic One of the Many and of the All of Hegel. Knowing this, Haym would have given us simplicity and consistency; not knowing this, he has given us, instead, only multitude and incongruity. Not knowing this, he has exclaimed, That symmetrical totality is but an ideal, a Greek ideal, and Hegel has necessarily given it body through a variety of mis-
cellaneous expedients. Haym accordingly sets up this ideal as his own principle of explanation; this is his *facing*, and behind it, to fill it out into a show of substance, he stuffs all manner of rags and rubbish. These, however, as only disconnectedly together, easily fall piecemeal. *Esthetic fiction enunciated of a work in pure philosophy, of a work in logic,—that we feel at once is not likely.* Involuntarily we expect the theory to prove insufficient, self-contradictory, and compelled to eke itself out ever and anon from elsewhere. *A dream of beauty is to construct a logic!* That vast Hegel, whom we so long to know just something of,—that vast Hegel is but a dream, and as the smoke of a dream he shall be shut together into the shining, little, literary casket of Haym!—No; these things cohere not! Statement is easy, and especially to so accomplished a rhetorician as Haym; but how—just to say it at once—how are we to make intelligible a warp of reflexion and a woof of imagination weaving into a logic?

Even in the extracts which have been given already, many contradictions, on examination, show. *Literature,* in fact, occupied with the satisfaction, with the applause of the moment, is, perhaps, in its own nature prone to contradiction. Consider this point alone: In the extract that occurs above at page 626, we are told that Goethe and Schiller ‘had opened to the Germans their own inner,’ ‘had brought for this people its Ideals and Sentiments to view’—‘even as Sophocles and Aristophanes (Thucydides and Plato are added elsewhere—p. 146 of Haym’s book) had brought to the Greeks theirs;’ and that Hegel, following in the same track, wanted to do the same thing by the categories and notions of the Germans—wanted to put into their hands ‘a Lexicon,’ ‘a pure Grammatic’ of such. Now, all the world is agreed that Sophocles, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Plato did well in this matter, that they did in this a genuine work which is to reap the gratitude of the latest posterity. We are to suppose, then, that as these were to the Greeks, Goethe, Schiller, and Hegel are to the Germans, and similarly deserve well at the hands of posterity for an honest and glorious work done. But, in our very next extract, all this is strangely changed. It was not German Ideals and Sentiments, it seems, after all, that Goethe and Schiller, and Hegel brought,—it was Greek ones, and accordingly the Hellenising poetry of the former is only ‘artificial,’ ‘an over-charged Idealistic and Typic,’ as the Hellenising philosophy of the last is but deception, delusion, and sophistic!
This, as one sees, is but a kind of literary speaking in the air—
for speaking's sake!

But there are other contradictions, and bearing more directly
on the matter in hand. We see, for example, to begin with the
earlier extracts, that the motive of Hegel is an ideal of beauty,
'a poetic impulse,' derived 'he knows not how;' and we feel that
the result is not such as we should have expected, when we are
told that it is 'no unconscious creation,' 'no jet,' 'not an invention
of genius,' but 'a Gemachtes (an artefact) of talent.' Then
analysis is demonstrated to be the forte of Hegel; but towards
his Logic it is not analysis of the aporias of thought, &c., which
he has employed—no, his Logic, on the contrary, shall be a
synthesis, an aesthetic, an artificial synthesis! It is from Schelling
that Hegel shall derive too, at the same time, that his work is
quite unlike that of Schelling, 'another world from the first!'
One moment Hegel is to Haym in historical connexion with Kant,
Fichte, and the rest; and, the next, he is wholly isolated, discon-
ected, cut off,—in short, totally unlike all other philosophers in
origin, character, &c. History (and the same thing is said of
perception) is the 'concrete agent of the dialectic,' 'natural and
mental life its principle,' yet, 'because his apriorism (=his
dialectic), unlike the Kantian, did not derive from the concrete
inner, &c. &c.'

A multitude of extracts which are now in place, and which
were translated directly for the purpose of demonstrating the
numberless contradictions into which Haym's impossible theory
leads him, must, out of considerations of space (which are now
not unnatural), be passed over with but an occasional touch. We
find, from page 229, that the Greek Ideal stands in need of—
among other supplementary expedients—a Protestant Real! We
are told, too, that in the Frankfort Sketch (p. 121) 'never has the
Hegelian system receded from these, its fundamental articula-
tions;' yet, 'when Hegel undertook the elaboration of a Logic,'
we learn (p. 293) that 'he did this from quite other points of
view, with multiplied other objects!' We are led to suppose,
then, that Haym is quite prepared for a difference here. But no:
having said this—which would account for any difference—he
seems immediately to forget what he has said, and suddenly to
awake to the necessity of demonstrating—as in agreement with
his theory—that we have still the old identity everywhere.
This, indeed, is not effected without something of confusion.
Though the crabbed opacity of the Frankfort Sketch has been made obvious to us by the most telling words, and though the grateful change of the Logic to perspicuity and symmetry, to aids and assistances of all kinds, has been by the same means made equally plain, we find that it is expected of us to believe, that there is no real difference between these works, but only the appearance of such, in consequence of 'the freshness, fulness, and colour of youth' in the former having naturally contracted 'the wrinkles, ossifications, and callosities' of age in the latter! It does not surprise us that Haym should intimate here that it will tax 'all our powers of memory and discernment' to see this —this, and any moderately satisfactory measure of human consistency and sense! These metaphors, indeed, about 'wrinkles,' 'hulls,' 'kernels,' 'cores,' &c., only betray the contradiction they are intended to hide (see p. 302).

At pages 173, 318, 323, are opportunities of inspecting the materials, 'the most multifarious sensuously realistic and spiritually realistic, as well as historical motives,' out of which the beautiful Cosmos (!) is 'woven together;' and at pages 103–5, we have a detailed statement of how Haym believes Hegel to have gone to work in rearing his system generally. Positively the resultant edifice is not one whit stronger, not one whit less miscellaneous than any school-girl shall build you of a holiday. To Haym it all depends on this, 'that the same combining imagination which suppleted the schema of the whole, should perpetually conjoin and bring into play at once both of the faculties from the co-operation of which the problem as problem sprang.' The two faculties which imagination is here expected to unite, are understanding and perception. Now the word for perception here (Anschauung) is very frequently used—by Haym himself among others—in a way that confounds it very much with imagination itself. It commonly indicates the apprehension of images whether outwardly by sense or inwardly by phantasy. It is not really, then, hair-splitting, to say that Haym here calls on imagination to conjoin two faculties one of which is itself. But no sooner has Haym made this call on imagination, than he makes the same call as strongly, and more strongly, on understanding:—

The special strength of this intellect (he says) lies in the tenacity of its faculty of abstraction, in the indefatigableness of its reflection: the whole burden and honour will fall, consequently, on the function of the understanding. [what is imagination to be about now, then?]: in fact, and in truth, it will be
the totality of the mind [Haym has got it at last] which acts in the execution of the world-picture; in pretension and appearance, it will be a work of pure thought, or of abstract understanding.

Haym, then, asks as regards the getting actually to work,—and, in view of such processes and tools, the question seems very natural,—

How otherwise will this be possible but by a series of compromises? The logical element plainly (he continues) must be everywhere blunted and bent; the living element, again, must everywhere up to a certain degree accommodate itself to the logical one: only with broken limbs, indeed, will the beautiful life of the all appear in the form of reflection; but this reflection, on its part, will become [will become is not difficult to say] as much alive as possible, it will become elastic and dialectic reflection!

A perusal of the whole passage will bring out every mark that is set here, in infinitely stronger relief, in infinitely more glaring colours, and the reader will feel no surprise that all this should suggest itself to Haym as 'not unlike the quadrature of the circle!' He will probably raise his eyebrows, however, when he finds that to the same Haym, 'all these operations' shall 'express the special secret of Hegel's treatment of the notion'—only—'they must conceal themselves under abstract forms!'

The confusion, the inconsistency, the inconceivableness, the constant necessity of plausible shadings and additaments—all this is too clear here to require exposition. How imagination and understanding might co-operate to a fiction, one can see well enough; but that this fiction should be also a Logic and a Grammatic of pure German thought, and a Sophistic of Greek Ideals, and a beautiful Totality, and a broken-limbed beautiful Totality!—'comprises' we do see, but they are compromises into which Haym himself flounders, in the bewildered defence of an altogether impossible theory!

Such is the wonderful double faculty, the sinniger* Verstand, with which Haym, for his own purposes, compliments Hegel. In this reference the following passage is worth quoting for additional illustration:—

It is easy to see that this vacillation between the preference which is given now to the pure Spiritual and now to the Real has its foundation in the ambiguity of the Hegelian mood of mind generally. It is the same vacillation

* It is difficult to translate the sinniger of Haym. The dictionary senses are: sensible, judicious, thoughtful, circumspect, ingenious, well-devised, etc. Haym has probably both its etymological and ordinary senses in his mind. It seems to convey to him a sense at once of subtle (even crafty) and realistic.
that makes him declare at one time the reality of the state, at another the ideality of art, religion, and science, as the most consummate truth of the absolute spirit. It is the same vacillation that sends him to seek the greatest satisfaction now in the practical establishment of a vigorous and capable German State, and now in the philosophical construction of a harmonious Ideal State rounded into itself. It is the same vacillation that leads him to work the concrete into his Logic and Metaphysic, and then again in his Real philosophy to rarify the concrete into abstractions. It is the same vacillation that on every point of the system causes the tongue of the dialectic balance to swing now over to the actual, and now—though in the ever-identical tendency of the 'Realising' of the moments—to swing back to the notional. On this ambiguity the whole system rests. From this ambiguity the whole dialectic feeds itself. It is the bottom and the root, the life and the movement—it constitutes the worth and the worthlessness, the strength as well as the weakness of this philosophy. The philosopher is quite the same as the pedagogue (Hegel is now at Nürnberg). The inconsequence of the latter is the inconsequence of the former. Here as there, in fine, the preponderance inclines periodically now to the one and again to the other of the two sides. It inclines at the present period to the side of the abstract and logical.

At the same time at which the philosophy of the Spirit is, in the Encyclopaedie, enriched by a new section in being carried up beyond the System of Ethics into the consideration of Art, Religion, and Science, at that same time it is declared that a philosophical education in public schools must apply itself to the abstract form—that the abstract is not merely in itself the earlier and the truer, but also the easier and to the pupil the more intelligible! . . . The most essential result of his scholastic activity (at Nurnberg namely), the special memorial of this epoch of Hegel's life lies before us in the three volumes of the 'Science of Logic' (pp. 289-91).

The vacillation, the ambiguity dwelt on here is but misintelligence. The reason seems to lie in this, that the oscillation of the dialectic is altogether misunderstood and mis-named. Vacillation is in very truth the absolutely last word that it should occur to any one to attribute to Hegel, who, as much as any man that ever lived, is always consistent with himself. The reality of the state, of nature, &c., and the ideality of art, of logic, &c., have all of them their prescribed places—they interfere not with each other, and Hegel looks through all and over all from the beginning. How differently Haym would speak did he know the Begriff, did he truly know the origin, principle, and matter of Hegel! It is the very essence of the science itself that there should be ever and everywhere a factor or moment of ideality and a factor or moment of reality, and that the latter in the end should always be subordinated to the former. We have seen already Hegel enunciate the advantage of abstract instruction at the commencement of study, and we feel that it really requires no very special know-
ledge of the man and his work to understand that the theoretic writing in the Encyclopaedia and the practical prescripts of the Nürnberg Gymnasium nowise clash, and that it is only externality of view that could possibly be tempted to make them clash. Haym himself, with acceptance, points out elsewhere that Hegel demonstrates ‘the abstract’ to be at present the nearest and most current to us. In fact, the extract is a very excellent specimen of the worth of mere literature. These words, in literary reference, are perfect: no general member of the public, hearing them, but must yield to the delight and the seeming instruction they convey. No trick, no air, no antithesis of such balanced characterisation fails. The very breadth is in keeping with the edge, the fullness with the point. It seems decisive; yet is it but words. Go and see Hegel handle a Kant, and know the difference between a thinker and a littératur—between the solid aliment that fills and feeds, and the brilliant gas that but inflates and makes windily to reel.—Hegel’s Logic the most essential result of his scholastic activity! This is in one apex, the type of the entire business. Does any one believe that Hegel’s Logic is the result of his temporary employment as schoolmaster at Nürnberg, when forced by Napoleon’s Prussian campaign to degrade from his Professorship at Jena? Does any one believe that we should not have had the Logik, and essentially the same Logik—its roots lying in quite another soil—though Hegel had never seen Nürnberg? Why fill up paper with these emptinesses, then—this mere playing at causative relations, at connective articulations? Is this aught else than a sort of customary Tarantula-dance of what is called Literature? Will the slowest to believe this any longer doubt when he is told that Haym cannot restrain himself from deriving the Bau of the Logik from the Bau of the Nürnberg street-gables?

Haym accentuates elsewhere also, and at great length, the incongruity that seems to lie between the pretensions of the Logik as the pure truth, and those of the Philosophies of Nature and the Spirit as also the pure truth, and asks where is the special seat of Hegel’s Philosophy. This is from the outside and beside the point. The incongruity, however, is held up to reprobation by the same method of dexterous literature. Haym, however, would never have seen incongruity, had he been able through Hegel to see Reciprocity, the animating reciprocity of the undeniable actual.

To Haym, then, ambiguity is the product, and sinniger Verstand
the instrument. It but suits the case that this instrument should, as we have seen, be itself an ambiguity—should be itself, even like the rest of the business, an ambiguity and a blur,—confusion which every new shift but worse confounds. Had Haym been but able to look from the inside instead of the out, from the centre instead of the circumference,—had he been but able to see the one shuttle and the one thread of the Begriff,—the incoherent and untenable Many of a dead chaos would have collapsed before him into the One of a living organism: . . . in other words, sinniger Verstand would have become anschauender Verstand! And now we have touched the thing with a needle: it is impossible more glaringly to put the mistake of Haym; it is impossible more glaringly to put the self-refutation of Haym.

This even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips.

Shall this suffice, or shall we spread—after the method of Literature—the burthen of these two simple adjectives over a score of pages? Shall we form antitheses: the one is confusion, the other order, the one falsehood, the other truth; the one darkness, the other light; the one death, the other life, &c. &c.?—Well, it is impossible altogether to resist remark here, but we shall endeavour to be short.

Haym speaks (p. 108) of the sinniger Verstand which is one of his compulsory shifts to explain Hegel, as an understanding that is 'at once accompanied and led by an instinct for the concrete, and for the concrete that lurks in the abstract: just so,' he says, 'is Hegel enabled to disentangle those threads from the notions through which it is possible to spin them into other and further notions.' Look now not from the outside, like Haym who sees only the rising up of an artificial aggregate, but from the inside, to which the opposed adjectives have given entrance, and observe the wonderful, new, living, and coherent sense which these words of Haym have at once assumed! 'An instinct for the concrete!'—Yes!—but not such as Haym contemplated. 'So he was enabled to disentangle the threads of the notions!'—Yes!—but not by artifice, not by pretence, not by a sinniger Verstand that was merely glued together,—No!—but by a living anschauender Verstand, an understanding which had come into possession of the Concrete Notion, and was filled and quickened by its life. That
broad-painted ambiguity, then, of which Haym, ambiguously to thought if antithetically to literature, speaks as ‘the worth and the worthlessness, the strength as well as the weakness’ of the Hegelian philosophy, is an involuntary testimony to the success of this last. That Haym should think of a sinniger Verstand with reference to Hegel tends to point out that Hegel has succeeded in realising that anschauender Verstand of which Schelling made so much with reference to Kant. The presumption is thus extended to us, that Hegel has found the single unity of the All, and from it and through it been enabled to develop the All. The lusus naturae of an impossible faculty, so far as Haym is concerned, is seen to indicate the very inmost secret of the very latest philosophy!

It is true that Hegel would conduct the universe into totality, into a single life, and Haym’s error is in assuming the process to be only ambiguity. Hegel simply believes in God, believes that the universe is God’s; believes that in God, therefore, all rounds itself to totality. Totality, then, is the one fundamental truth, and Hegel has only sought the clue to it. When Haym talks of Spirit as this clue, he is nearer the truth than when he forgets it for his sinniger Verstand. God is a Spirit, and Man, made in the image of God, is a Spirit, and the life of a Spirit is Thought. The early notes, however, in what is called the Struggle to Hegel, show that knowledge to this extent comes from the surface and from the first; and Haym cannot really name the whence, the how, the what of this Spirit. He can only talk of its analogy; he cannot realise, he cannot effect its fusion into the diversified material. Haym says of this movement: ‘This dialectic, to believe Hegel, is nothing else than the principle of all natural and mental life: the reverse is the truth,—natural and mental life is the principle of that dialectic’ (p. 320). To reverse, is to misunderstand, Hegel: but what, after all, does the reversal amount to? Would it be wrong in Hegel to make natural and mental life the principle of his dialectic? Where else would Haym have Hegel look for the principle of his dialectic? Again, if natural and mental life thus identify itself with the dialectic, shall we not prefer to regard the latter, or abstract element, as the principle, and the former, or concrete element, as the realisation of the principle? But, take it either way, let it be said with Hegel that the dialectic is the principle of reality, or let it be said with Haym that reality is the principle of the dialectic, we have in
both ways the same result—an identification of Logic and the Actual!

Are they, then, not to be identified? Are Logic and the Actual for ever to confront each other divided by the impassable chasm of an irreconcilable difference? What were Logic thus separated, thus inapplicable? What were the good of Logic, if it is not to be conceived as the thought, the principle, of the Actual? But this is just Hegel’s attempt: he would realise and systematise the identification of Logic with the Actual. Why, then, should Haym stigmatise this attempt as ‘self-contradictory in itself,’ as ‘a confusion and corruption of the understanding and its conscience?’ Idealism would result, but that need not scare us. That we are here to think, involves the virtual identity of thinking with that which it thinks; for to think is to assimilate. Reality and Ideality must be set equal; the breadth of the universe is the reciprocity of Reality and Ideality; but the single pivot of rotation is Ideality itself. Nevertheless, though, in this way, Thought and Perception are virtually identical; there is no necessity to confound opposing spheres.

Can it be else, then, here, than that Haym has just missed the matter in hand, and all the while been but beating the air? It is the problem of problems that Hegel would solve, and not the contradiction of contradictions that he would only cloak: his crime to Haym is his virtue to the Absolute. Nay, Haym himself means nothing else, though he does not see it, when he accentuates the Real and would have us seek wisdom in the Concrete. When the whole Concrete had disappeared, resolved into the Wisdom which Haym contemplates, what were this Wisdom but the Thought of the Concrete—Logic? The aesthetic element and the logical element must, in the end, coincide; and of the two ways of putting this,—dialectic is principle of life, life is principle of dialectic,—is not the alternative of Hegel the more legitimate and correct? Haym, thus, would seem unable to bring his own thoughts together. Like a true litérateur, he riots in the infinite out of one another of Perception; Ideas, Thoughts, Notions, are as casual and diverse organisms that delight him there; but he is unable to bring the different of Perception into the unity of the Understanding. This purblindness seems strange in a spirit so vivid, but—(witness the German Ideals that were yet Greek Ideals)—it is a true trait and constant.

Haym, in truth, is perhaps very nearly exclusively concerned
with the perfecting of his merely literary picture; and that is largely accomplished by the liberal use of that peculiarly literary expedient, the supposititious es soll. That is, Haym gets within Hegel, and reports to us how Hegel sketches out his work before him by a 'this shall be done,' and 'that shall be done'; but Haym all the time is lapped only in his own dream. This soll and solen (v. p. 316 and the volume passim), this ascription of plausible genetic motive, grows into a very happy literary structure, which, however, just builds the philosophy it would enclose—out.

There are deliverances of Haym in reference to Being and Nothing, Finite and Infinite, Qualitative and Quantitative, &c., which might be used towards the same general conclusion here of contradiction and defective information; but enough probably has in that respect been now said, and we may remind only of the wonderful and true metaphysic which we have seen these points really to contain. It throws light just to know that Haym (291) is surprised Hegel should speak of 'Philosophy being as doctible as Geometry'; and there is a little mistake, on Haym's part, about Reason, which it is perhaps worth the trouble to cite. One aspect of the duplicity which Haym sees in Hegel concerns the contrast which this latter exhibits of the remotest unreality in the extravagance of his speculation, and of the nearest reality in the sobriety of his understanding. Now the 'Reason' of the following sentence (269) is supposed by Haym to stand for this said sobriety of understanding. 'That "Reason" which a reader of Hegel's philosophical writings,' says Haym, 'might easily mistake for an element wholly apart, is curtly defined as the capability of "being awake, of seeing in all, and of saying to all, what it is."' Reason here, however, is not simply vigilant common sense; it is more than that,—it is transcendental reason, dialectic reason, speculative reason, Hegel's reason, Reason Proper, which, when employed on one moment of a concrete, will not allow its own abstraction to blind it to the other: it will keep 'awake,' it will see 'all,' and it will say to all, 'what it is.'

In the obliquity of Haym towards Hegel there mingles, as we would now point out, a certain political bias. Political bias, indeed, what we may call a sort of Fichtian flame of Liberalism, is a chief characteristic of Haym; and he cannot view with patience the conservatism of Hegel, whom he seems almost to suspect of simple ratting. This comes forward in what he says of Hegel's inaugural address at Berlin. The address itself, we
may remark, is very short and very plain, but in its matter peculiarly rich. Hegel begins in it by expressing pleasure at the wider sphere of usefulness extended to him by his new position, now and here: now that peace promises scope for philosophy; and here in a centre of civilisation that has so distinguished itself. Now this last topic receives but a word—a word, too, perhaps tamer than is usual and conventional in all such circumstances—yet to Haym ‘the sum of this address consists in the demonstration of the mutual affinity and necessity of the Prussian Government and the Hegelian Theory!’ (Page 357.)

Something of the same spirit sharpens the chuckle: ‘thus runs the naïve self-confession of the Absolute Idealism that it is not absolute’ (p. 387). Hegel, in his works, stands so perfectly self-consistent as regards what is absolute and what is not absolute in his mode of looking, that both ‘self-confession’ and ‘naïve,’ as words quite alien, simply surprise. We have but to read the Begriff der Natur with which the Naturphilosophie opens to obtain the necessary conviction here.

There is an allusion to Jacobi which is not discrepant. ‘This is the first instance,’ says Haym, referring to a certain identification of himself, on the part of Hegel, with the philosopher just named, ‘of that Geneigtheit des Concordirens und Pacisirens, that trick of making union and peace which, later in the philosophy of Religion, as in reference to the Dogmatic of the Church, reached its acme’ (p. 346). Now this is not the first example of the tendency in question, nor were it very easy to point out where that first example is contained, unless we just say that the first sentence written by Hegel, after he reached years of discretion, constitutes such example. From first to last Hegel has no object whatever but this Concordiren and Pacisiren. The Aufklärung, or Illumination, by the light of Private Judgment, has gutted humanity of its whole concrete substance: Hegel would restore this substance but—in this light. This is the whole—there is nothing but this in Hegel—and this is a compromise. It is this compromise, however, which Haym does not understand—certainly not in its grounds—and which, therefore, he jeeringly names a ‘Concordiren and Pacisiren.’ Now what else was the action of Jacobi than to take stand by this very substance, the enlightened gutting-out of which it was the precise object of Hegel to undo? What wonder, then, if Hegel pointed out that what Jacobi sought to realise by the method of sentiment, and in a consequently
rhapsodic form, he himself had realised by the method of knowledge, and in a consequently exact and necessary form?

Haym’s dissatisfaction with certain of the Hegelian religious tenets is on the same platform. ‘Only the long predominance,’ he says, ‘first of the Kantian and then of the Hegelian philosophy, has availed to obscure the simple truth, that religion, quite as much as speech or as art, is a specific mode of expression of the human spirit’ (p. 399); and, again, ‘an offensive coquetting at once with orthodoxy and philosophy became the order of the day, perplexed the head and the conscience, and ate like a cancer into the sound reason of our nation as into its character for straightforwardness’ (p. 431). If conclusions are to be drawn from these allegations as regards the tendency of the religious teaching of either Kant or Hegel, and as regards the nature of the religious belief especially of the latter, great injustice will be done both. While there is nothing in the teaching of Kant that could avail to obscure the ‘simple truth’ spoken of, that ‘simple truth’ is the special belief of Hegel. Again, the compromise sought by Hegel between religion and philosophy is frank, open, unconcealed; and it is only the jaundiced or clouded eye of a Haym that, in a bearing so simple, could see the base and disreputable coquetting which he at least lays at the door of the system.

But, as already hinted, it is Hegel’s political teaching that Haym regards the most obliquely. He attacks, for example, with the greatest keenness the celebrated dictum, ‘what is rational that is real, and what is real that is rational.’ We are spared, however, the trouble of any defence here; for Hegel’s own, in the beginning of the Encyclopaedia, is ample—such, indeed, that it is rather surprising to find Haym repeating what Hegel himself had already met. In fact, he who knows the Hegelian Philosophy at all, knows that ‘the logical forms are the living spirit of the actual, and that only of the actual is true which, by virtue of these forms, is through them and in them true.’

As belonging to the liberalism of Germany, to know the better and to will the better are two of Haym’s presuppositions. We may fancy with what feelings, therefore, he watches the grim contempt with which Hegel casts an utterly extinguishing

* Rhapsodic is here used in the Kantian sense which has reference to a process of contingent and disconnected snatch. This is an inversion or perversion of the original Greek use of the word: scholars think that ἐνθέω διασπρ refers to a continuous recitation.

† Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, § 162. The translation is exact.
thunderbolt or two at the shallowly conceited Besserwissen as at the shallowly sentimental Besserwollen of the modern—let us say revolutionist. Haym's astonishment is indescribable. So many things are all wrong,—it seems so natural to him that it should be thought right to know better and to will better. Especially to will better—why is not that virtue itself? It is not wonderful, then, that Haym terms this portion of the system—though, surely, it is not difficult to see that Hegel finds his contempt on the mere empty subjectivity of the bulk of those who raise the cries—immoral, sophistical, and a tribute only to the quietism of the conservative re-action. He accuses it of neglecting the concrete inner of man, of degrading willing into knowing, and of ignoring individual subjectivity before a mere universal. Hegel's political system coheres with his theory of morals; and, as not blind to this connexion, Haym dislikes the latter also, and for reasons that relate to this same subordination of the individual to the universal and of will to thought. Fortlage, in a work already cited, speaks of Hegel having 'rolled forward the foundation-stone of a more intelligent conception of the historical development of States, of positive law and political justice;' and this is the truth. Hegel is nowhere greater than in the practical sphere—in that sphere, namely, which relates to morality, politics, and what in general concerns action. Whatever may be imperfect in Hegel, not so is his theory of morals, which, as only behoved the following out of the ethical principles of Kant, has placed the whole subject in such solidity, breadth, and consummation of development as will yet, if we mistake not, lead to many most important changes in the social arrangements of Europe.

Yes, it is true that subjectivity qua subjectivity is not the true practical principle, and that it must give way to a universal. In the practical field, subjectivity that would be subjectivity is simply Evil, the Bad, and all that can be called such; whereas subjectivity that would be the universal is really all that we possess as the Good. In the interests of the universal the individual must harness himself. In general, the probability is that—through Hegel—we are on the point of receiving political principles at last, and of attaining to the possibility at length of a nation governed. Is it, then, government—and this is not only what is practically done, but with much pomp even theoretically laid down nowadays—to wait for the voices of the governed, and then to move only with such calculated slowness
as shall just anticipate any outbreak of impatience on the part of the same governed? If Hegel is correct, there are objective principles which, by teaching us the right, render us independent of the shallow conceit and shallow sentimentality of the bulk of those vain subjectivities that so commonly know better and would better than their neighbours. But these objective principles require quite another knowledge and quite another will than these same subjectivities can extend to them. It were easy to dilate here; but enough has been said to suggest probably that the utterances of Haym in this reference have been singularly rash and inconsiderate, and countenance the assertion of his erroneous and external position to the Hegelian system generally.

It cannot be denied, nevertheless, that Hegel, in his actual connexion with the Prussian State, seemed to play—at least weakly—into the hands of the aristocratic re-action. This was a grave error; this was, on the part of Hegel, to do vast injustice to himself. If the place of the philosopher was very certainly not at the side of insensate revolution, neither was it—and quite as certainly—at the back of selfish, brutal, and merely aristocratic obstruction. Hegel the staunch bull-dog of Prussian pigheadedness and pride, that honoured his inferior blood when it employed his talent—this is a position of all possible the most preposterous and pitiable! It is not impossible, however, something to extenuate the blame of Hegel. Hegel’s life had not been one of prosperity, of uninterrupted advance. For six years an humble house-tutor, for an equal period Schelling’s unknown second, and at the same time an unintelligible and almost unattended sub-professor (though holding any actual professorship only for a few months), for two years, being ‘in want of all other means of subsistence,’ editor of an inconsiderable journal, for eight years a mere schoolmaster in Nürnberg, and reaching his true place at length in Berlin only at the ripe age of 48,—pain, disappointment, difficulty, mortification—in a word, humble-pie had been his only nourishment from the moment he stepped out of sanguine student-life into the chilling world. At Berlin he was at last in full sunshine; no wonder that he opened to the heat, that he chirruped to it, that in thought he truckled to the givers of it. In thought to truckle to such benefactors is natural to universal mankind. But how is such truckling in thought to be translated into action by an awkward, inexperienced, unacquainted recluse of books? It is only the accomplished
world-man who knows what is his own, and, with that, when to speak and how to speak, when to act and how to act, when to take offence and how to take offence. Most book-men are in such matters—babies; apt, perhaps, to fall into convulsions if obliged to go and ask change of a shilling; now pocketing with an insensate smile, what men of the world would throw off with a glance of the eyes, or receive on the edge of a still keener joke; and now with hysterical eloquence, or maniacal violence, furibund in demeaning positions, which these same men of the world never would, or never could, have entered, or which—if by some evil star they had been once for all flung into them—they would have been but too happy to be allowed to quit, in submissive silence and with their heads down. The natural truckling in thought to exalted benefactors is but too apt by such bookish innocents to be translated into a truckling in fact,—and they cannot help it. Hegel was a vigorous piece of mother-spun Suabian manhood undoubtedly; but he was a recluse of books, he had tasted the bitters of adversity, he had had to creep for his bread: place him now at once in the position and with the associates that, however far off, he had always by presentiment known as his own! Would he not be innocently pleased to find that his book-theories were able to lend an even welcome aid to the great state-policies of those high and mighty names which had been familiar to him from the distance, and whose bearers were now in personal contact with him? He was now one of them himself! He was a power in the State!

It is in the same way we would reduce to ordinary human motives the action of Hegel with reference to Schelling. There was a certain cunning, a certain calculation in the approaches of Hegel to Schelling at Jena, and in the relative position he assumed there. He undoubtedly stood as Schelling’s adherent, as Schelling’s second, and he undoubtedly knew that he had voluntarily given himself something of this air in order to obtain the benefit of Schelling’s introduction and support. Nevertheless to Hegel, in the unclear consciousness to all such matters of a mere book-man—shall we say of a mere pedant?—the whole thing was very differently named. He longed keenly for a certain advantage, he knew that he could identify Schelling’s philosophical platform so far with his own. So far, then, said innocent book-cunning to him, propitiate Schelling, and obtain this thing you so long for. This cunning, equally with the
Berlin truckling, we believe to be a feature of the innocence and babiness incidental to a life of mere books, and the impression, egoistic, inwardly-living men who usually adopt such. Cunning, too, it undoubtedly was, for, when Hegel appeared in Jena, he had brought with him the Frankfort Sketch of his System; and that sketch proves him to have then penetrated to the ultimate generalisation of Kant—to the Begriff. The hysterical vehemence with which he called some one 'in so many words a liar,' who had given his relation to Schelling its coarsest name, throws light on Hegel's own feelings and on the theory of his general action now propounded. In the same way, the defence he sends up to the Prussian Government in reference to the Roman Catholic priest who had taken umbrage at his language as regards the mouse that nibbled the host, illustrates his frame of mind as man of books that knew himself a functionary of the State and —on the right side.

It is always to be seen, however, that what Hegel did say as regards Schelling at Jena, did not compromise him as said, but as interpreted,—though, at the same time, it must be confessed that the unnecessary and cruel bitterness with which he afterwards threw off Schelling contrasts unfavourably with the calculated language of suppression and accommodation with which in the first instance he had taken him on. Similarly, the conservatism of his writings is a genuine result of his researches and convictions; as there it is without motive from considerations of the State; and he erred only in the too prominent pleasure with which he observed that it was capable of application to the interests of the day. Hegel manifests the same bookish simplicity of obsequiousness, together with a congruously innocent irrepressibleness of delight, in his relations with Götze. When Götze quotes him, he cannot help appending to the passage quoted a notice of the honour done it. In every correspondence that takes place between them, too,—seeing that there is on one side a—certainly not larger—sort of German Voltaire, and on the other the deeper Aristotle of a modern Europe,—the superiority of Götze both as given and taken, is surely of a veritably bookish innocence on the part of both. Usage of the world seems requisite to make a book-man (Hegel) know where his own honour lies; and certainly roughing of the world were not amiss where this same world's success may have stiffened a book-man (Götze) into so much ridiculous starch.
It is in this manner we would attempt to scratch off some appearance of ambiguity from the action of Hegel; but, be all this as it may, we hold with perfect conviction, as against Haym, that not only is he honest in his moral, political, and religious position, but that that position is the ripest outcome of his reflexion and the special sphere of promise to us.

In the state of his belief, however, we cannot feel surprise at the sentence which Haym in the end has pronounced on Hegel. A few extracts will explain:

An intelligent contemporary of Hegel, a man of action, who, indeed, knew not how to speculate, but only so much the better how to judge, has compared the Hegelian Logic to the gardens of Semiramis; for in its abstract notions are artfully twisted into Arabesques: these notions are only, alas! without life and without root. With the practical philosophy of Hegel, it is not otherwise than with his metaphysic. Where he persuades himself that he is most and deepest in reality, he penetrates only superficially into its outside. His practical notions have the withered look of plants that root only in the flat surface. In the entire depth of individual life, in the concrete inner, lie the mighty motive and matter of reality. Into this richest mine of living actuality the absolute idealism disdains to descend. It esteems subjectivity only so far as it has ceased to be subjectivity and clarified itself into the universal. Hence the superficialising of willing into knowing; hence, moreover, the disregard manifested for what is subjectively spiritual in general, and with it for what is individual. (Pages 374-5.) The Logic, briefly to sum it, is the sustained attempt to intensify and concrete abstract thought as such by means of the fullness of the totality of the human spirit, and by means of the fullness of actuality. Contradictory in itself as is this attempt, it must be designated from the standpoint of living spirituality, from the standpoint of religious and aesthetic conception, a crude and tasteless barbarism; while from the standpoint of pure rationality, it must be designated a confusion and corruption of the understanding, and of its conscience. . . . In a dogmatic and uncritical, in a confused and barbarous form, the Hegelian Logic has been the first fraudulent attempt at such a Gnosology and Philosophy. . . . That was, I repeat it, a rude and coarse manoeuvre, resting on a palpable confusion and confounding of what is of the understanding, and of what is of the concrete spirit. (Pages 324-27.)

This is plain. Whatever of external form may have been seen by Haym, it is evident that he has missed the origin, the principle, and the matter. Of these he has even said what must be held to be the exact reverse of the truth. It is impossible, indeed, to mistake the nature of this conclusion; it is impossible to fail to see that in Haym's opinion the Hegelian Logic is an utter and—what is worse—a fraudulent failure. Nevertheless, as usual, contradictions perpetually turn up in Haym, as regards both failure and fraudulence; and perhaps it is not impossible to adduce
himself in confutation of himself. Some such, indeed, we have already seen; and, I dare say, the reader has been already puzzled to reconcile, on the one hand, that marvellous faculty of sober understanding, of which he has heard so much, with failure, and, on the other hand, that marvellous labour of research (for what, if not to see the thing, the truth?) with fraudulence. The sort of double faculty into which this sober understanding converted itself by an alliance with a so-called æsthetic faculty, was so much of a contradiction, that we could only name it a bimus naturæ; but these new contrasts seem even worse—seem capable of being considered only irreconcilable contradictories. When we hear, for example (p. 328-9), that 'the allmächtige (almighty) understanding which Hegel lets operate, saw, in most cases, into the actual foundation and genuine sense of the notions, and behind this understanding there stood a solid knowledge, pure feeling on the whole, a sober sense, and a modest phantasy,' we feel that we have just received an express receipt against all possibility of failure—and quite as much an express receipt against all possibility of fraudulence. Failure and fraudulence, it must be said, are entirely unintelligible side by side with such endowments. But Haym is consistent with himself throughout—consistent, that is, in his inconsistency; he does not content himself with this antithesis in general or in reference to Logic only,—he carries it with him throughout the whole of his Critique.

We have seen, for example, the unmitigated reprobation which he has heaped on the Rechtsphilosophie, yet we hear presently that even the Rechtsphilosophie 'possesses an imperishable Kern (core).'</This too, he says, after having spoken thus: 'Only one step, indeed, but that a great one to this self-destruction, is the Hegelian Rechtsphilosophie: it essentially has the blame of the fate, that the highest science has sunk into contempt, and stands opposite the powers of the actual almost impotent!' It is in a similarly dubious mood that Haym finds himself in presence of the Religionsphilosophie; but as regards the Æsthetic and the Philosophy of History his satisfaction seems simple and unmixed. 'The German people,' he assures us, 'possesses in the former an æsthetic such as no other nation possesses;’ and, as this æsthetic 'constitutes an atoning side-piece and a correction for the Religionsphilosophie, the Philosophy of History constitutes a no less important complement to the Rechtsphilosophie.' As regards the
Philosophy of History, indeed, Haym expresses himself at great length, and always almost rapturously:—

An energy of concrete vision (he says) accompanied here the energy of abstraction, which must have surprised him to whom it was unknown that even the Logic and Metaphysic had sprung from the same combination of faculties. The capacity of thinking himself into a peculiar spiritual life, and of bringing it, out from the firmly-seized centre, into an expanded panorama, was in youth scarcely so special to him as now when in age he made a second voyage of discovery into the wide realm of the life of peoples. With this talent for generalisation stood that of compression into a single significant word, the talent of categorising and of bringing to a point, in the most admirable equipoise. Not but even the philosophy of history has a logical impress,—[but]—these are thoughts of a metalline clang which cause us to forget the thin and soundless thoughts of metaphysic. (Page 451.)

It is impossible, we say, to believe in such a mangled operation of so supreme a faculty: it is difficult to believe in failure; it is impossible to believe in fraudulence. Compare thoughts of failure and fraudulence with the following:

After talk of 'the bitter and unsparing thoroughness of Hegel's criticism,' his 'hard and stinging words, &c.,' Haym goes on:—

Here again comes to the surface that power of an all-generalising characterisation which had condensed the entire compass of German thought into a system of sharply-limited, surely-signalised categories; here again is manifest that talent of incisive critique—invasive into the flesh and life of the opponent—that skill to operate with knife and club at once. (Page 350.) Here, before all, Hegel appears in the entire mastery of his insight. Just as experienced age discourses of the worth of life, so discourses the philosopher of the worth of the intellectual and imaginative forms of his time. Completely in it, he stands at the same time triumphant over it; with every turn of opinion he is familiar; he sees through every standpoint, and against all of them he makes good, with a superior air of quietude and urbanity, a definitive conclusion of the deepest and most matured conviction. (Page 393.) And, what is peculiar, the Hegelian delivery was most helpless there where the ordinary talent of declamation is just most at home. In narrative he foundered in an almost comical fashion. Just in what was easiest he became dull and tiresome. Just in what was deepest, on the contrary, did he move with a grandly self-assured complacency and ease. Then, at last, 'the voice rose, the eye glanced sharp over the auditory, and the tide of speech forced its way with never-falling words to every height and depth of the soul.' And that, too, not merely when the question was of fleshless abstractions, but no less when he descended into the deeps of the material outward. Even to paint epochs, nations, events, individuals, succeeded with him perfectly. Even the most special singularities and depths of the character withdrew themselves not from this gift of statement. (Page 396.)

In quotation from Haym we are certainly peculiarly diffuse, but
there is an irresistible pleasure in dwelling on his vivid and perfectly successful words at all times that he praises. Of this the reader may rest assured: however wide he may be when he censures, Haym is always absolutely home when he applauds. We may seem here to perpetrate the very contradiction on which it is our present business to animadvert; we may seem here to expose ourselves to the retort: Are not the cases parallel?—if Haym is so very right when he commends, is it not a contradiction that he should be so very wrong when he blames?—in what respect is the contradiction greater to speak well of Hegel here, but to denounce him as a fraud and a failure there? To this it is easy to answer: It is no contradiction to say, that though Haym has hit the form, he has missed the matter; though he sees, that is, the subjective power, he is blind to the objective product, of Hegel. But it is a very great contradiction to allow a man all the attributes of success, and yet predicate failure of the very work special to these attributes; and it is a vastly greater contradiction to portray a man, as in the last extract, who shall display every sign and token by which the true, by which the genuine shall be known and discriminated, and yet this man shall produce, nevertheless, only what is artificial, only what is fraudulent. Here in a final extract surely this contradiction, as a general attribute of Haym, is palpable:

Quite undeniably, Hegel is excelled in purity and acerbic of thought by one of his fellow-labourers for the philosophic palm—Herbart. That the understanding and the actual, that pure thought and the other faculties cannot be alternately set equal in the manner of a Quiproquo, that between this setting equal the want of a transcendental critique of the living spirit of man remains to be filled up—this hint the disciples of Hegel may borrow from the doctrine of Herbart. Hegel, compared with Herbart, is an inexusable confusionary. To the position of the former, that contradiction is the soul of things, Herbart—with his philosophy that is wholly of the understanding—opposes the principle, that only the method of the elimination of the contradiction leads to truth and the inner soul. But not only that in power of abstraction, in penetration and tenacity of thought, Hegel may very well measure himself with his rival—his greatness just lies in his courage to bend and to break the law of the understanding. That means: he alone has had the great instinct to bring to a halt the spiritual powers which awoke in our nation through our classical poetry, to train them into the service of philosophy, and in this manner to let them sink into the scientific mind of the age for further purification. He was, perhaps, not altogether the greater thinker: he was certainly the greater philosopher. 'Give up all hope,' one must call to those who even yet endeavour to avenge the fate of the neglected Herbart: the Hegelian Logic is a living term in the history of the development of the German Spirit, and will continue to
exercise its powerful influence even then when the name of a Hegelian shall have as completely ceased to be heard of as those of a Cartesian or a Wolffian. (Pages 330-31.)

Here is what Hegel would name, after Kant, a complete nest of contradictions. Herbart undeniably excels Hegel 'in purity and acribie of thought;' yet, 'as regards power of abstraction, as well as penetration and tenacity of thought,' Hegel may 'very well measure himself with Herbart:' Hegel of the two is 'the greater philosopher;' if not quite the greater thinker.' Of any difference that may exist between a thinker and a philosopher, as in reference to two such men and so placed as Herbart and Hegel, we may give Haym the benefit; but what is 'power of abstraction,' if not 'purity of thought?'—and what is 'acribie,' if not 'penetration and tenacity of thought?' That is to say, in the same purity and acribie of thought in which Herbart 'quite undeniably' excels Hegel, Hegel, nevertheless, may very well measure himself with Herbart! It may be pleasant to ring changes on literary phrases, and no doubt it is agreeable to have the credit of incisive antithesis; but really some consistency of thought were, with all that, much to be wished. We are given to understand that Haym's preference of Herbart to Hegel turns on this—that while, on one side, the work of the latter, his _Quiproquo_ of faculties, is an untenable contradiction, the want so indicated has, on the other side, been filled up by the work of the former. Herbart shall be the express antidote, the exact counter-poison to Hegel. Or, the principle of Herbart shall be the honourable and true one of the elimination of contradiction, while that of Hegel shall be the sophistical and confusionary one of contradiction itself. Yet—despite this, and despite all that superior purity and acribie of thought—it is the true and genuine Herbart that is to succumb, that is, like the damned of Dante's hell, to abandon all hope; and it is the sophistical and confusionary Hegel that shall be held the greater philosopher—it is this false man's influence that shall endure when, &c. &c. &c! In presence of such things, one recurs involuntarily to the problem of a Providence. But, while we are lost in wonder at this extraordinary reversal of what is just and right—while we are engaged speculating on the possible secret reason of it,—we are suddenly quite dumbfounded to find that the precise source of the inferior virtue of Hegel is the precise source as well of his superior success, or that just for his righteousness' sake is it that Herbart has been condemned and consigned to the
place without hope! The confounding of the understanding and the other faculties—the *Quiproquo*,—this it was that seemed to found the inferiority of Hegel to Herbart: but, if this were so, we find now that Hegel's greatness—his 'grandeur'—just rests on the very 'courage with which he bent and broke the law of the understanding!' To bend and to break the law of the understanding, it appears, is synonymous with bringing 'into harness to philosophy the spiritual powers which German classical poetry awoke, and so sinking these powers into the mind of the century for further purification!' Why, then, because of this bending and breaking, because of this *Quiproquo*, was Hegel denounced as a fraud and a failure; and why is a fraud and a failure to continue, all the same, to exercise on the German Spirit, such a wonderful influence, when Cartesians, and Wolffians, and even Hegelians themselves, have so completely gone to the dogs, that their very names are lost?

It is quite possible—it is pretty certain, that Haym has here an idea in his head—an idea which we have already attempted to reduce to its true specification; this, namely—that we have to look for wisdom in the concrete, and not in abstractions. But surely the realisation of this idea does not necessitate a bending and breaking of the law of the understanding! Surely Haym—to whom, we have been led to suppose, understanding is the highest faculty—by whom, just because of his supreme understanding, now Herbart and now Hegel (did this latter bend and break, then, just what he was best in? or is it possible to exhaust the contradictions here?) was praised—must stand appalled before a bending and breaking of the law of the understanding! Surely he does not mean to say now that the Hegelian *Quiproquo* is the means of the realisation of his idea! Have we not been just given to understand that 'a transcendental critique of the living spirit of man' is what is wanted for this realisation; and has not this critique, as the work of Herbart, been opposed to the denounced antagonistic work of Hegel? How, then, after all, is it Hegel's work that gets the credit of the realisation which Haym specially desires, and which, we were led to believe, he had actually found accomplished in Herbart—and in Herbart as exultingly opposed to Hegel? But, after all, did the German poets do what Haym says here they did do? Has he not told us himself, that it was to shut out German Reals, that they brought Greek Ideals, and that so, consequently, their poetry was
an 'artificial Idealistic and Typic?' Has he not told us also, that just such was the industry of Hegel; that he, too, with similar objects, and for similar purposes, addressed himself to Greece? 'What, then, are these specially German Powers that are, nevertheless, awakened, and that are to do so much? Here truly we have but confusion worse confounded! Here we have but a rankness of literary phrase that usurps the appearance of philosophical thought! That is it! Haym demonstrates to the quick what difference there is between the careless abundance of the Littérateur, and the anxious parsimony of the Philosopher. Had Haym been but as familiar with philosophical distinctions as he is with literary images! Images and again images, let them be brilliant—let them but dazzle, let them but interest, and be it as it may with the unity of thought! 'This,' says Lord Macaulay, 'may serve to show in how slovenly a way most people are content to think;' and it is certainly strange, 'the slovenly way' in which so brilliant a writer as Haym 'is content to think!'

Hellenic Cosmos, this is the conclusion to which we have been brought on Hegel; a Cosmos, of which we do not very well know what to think,—a Cosmos, of which we do not very well know what to think Haym himself thinks. To this conclusion we have been borne along on an abounding and triumphant stream of the most brilliant and vivid rhetoric. Not but that we have become aware, from time to time, of how this stream has been indebted for its volume to contributions from without; for we have seen gliding into it the spirit of the Protestant present, facts of esthetic perception, experiences of Hegel's own life, as Nürnberg and his vocation of teacher, influences of Fichte, of Schelling, criticisms of Kant, and just, in general, as Haym says himself, 'the plunder of historical and natural actuality.' So it is that we have been borne in triumph to this conclusion of a Hellenic Cosmos which has been—artificially manufactured and put together, violently, coarsely, crudely, barbarously, sophistically, fraudulently, by aid of an unheard-of confusion and contradiction of facts or faculties, or both! . . . . But in what condition are we when we arrive? With much complacency we had remarked in the preface the singularly satisfactory previous advantages and preliminary preparations possessed and made by Haym for the important task he undertook. We heard, well pleased, that 'he had repeatedly lectured at the University on the life, writings,
and tenets of Hegel;’ that ‘he had attained to the possession of a material that compelled him to enter into the details of the doctrines and individual development of Hegel;’ that he had procured for study ‘the whole abundant treasure of the manuscripts left by Hegel,’ as well as other ‘most desirable communications.’ All this we heard with delight; and it was even with the intensest interest that we listened to the magnificent scheme he pronounced—a scheme by which very plainly the Hegelian secret would be at length secured. How otherwise were it possible to feel when experiencing the promise of such words as these?—

I shall not supplant and subdue metaphysis by metaphysic, dialectic by dialectic—not system by system. Not this; but I shall give, at first at least and before all, an objective history of this philosophy. Very certainly I propose to expound it, very certainly to criticise it—but the ground to both, I shall win in the method of history by an analysis of its origin and development. . . . Our purpose is to conduct the current of history into a well-enclosed and fast-shut edifice of thought. . . . In the place of reason there steps up the entire man, in the place of the universal the historically determined human being. It was by an abstract critique that Kant, it is by a concrete historical critique that we, with the resolution of a metaphysic abandoned by the belief of the world, seek to furnish a contribution to the purification of the science of philosophy. . . . Our business is the historical cognition of this system. Our business is to resolve it into its special genesis and into its historical value, to follow into its very structure the power which history has exercised over it, and to discover the threads to which the progressing time could attach itself, through which this time could get power over it. Our endeavour shall it be to restore it to the departed or half-departed life in which it had its foundation. Something analogous it shall be ours to effect in its regard to what for his part Hegel effected as regards the systems of his predecessors. He set them altogether in his own system. He threw over their dead bodies the mighty pyramid of his absolute idealism. It is fit that to this idealism no less an honour fall. In a wider, more imperishable tomb we shall set it—in the huge structure of eternal history we shall preserve it; a place and veritably a place of honour we shall assign it in the history of the development of the German Spirit. Unfiguratively to speak: we shall see this philosophy take birth and develop itself, we shall co-operate in its production. Step by step we shall follow the growth of its originator—shall bodily transport ourselves into the spiritual environment, into the historical relations out of which his mode of thought and his entire intellectual fabric rose—shall conceive to ourselves that the influences of development, the intellectual and the moral instigations which worked on Hegel, work also upon us, and shall then inquire whether we should have allowed ourselves to be determined by them, should have employed and formalised them, should have decided in their regard in the same manner as he. (Pages 2, 11, 14, 8.)

Penetrated by the wonderful promise of these and other such words, we had listened breathlessly from the first, and never for
a moment flagged. As for that, indeed, we were never allowed to flag: perpetual incitement, rather, even goaded us into a preternatural intensity of attention. 'Hold we a moment in!' 'Let us take it more objectively!' 'Turn we now the leaf, sharpen we our memory, strengthen we our attention!' 'We have reached the point to understand the universal articulation of the Hegelian system!' 'Learn we it at last in its entire peculiarity!' Goaded by such prickles, how otherwise can we arrive than breathless, haggard, worn, and—at such a finale—after such promises, through such torments of disappointment and contradiction, with the echoes of such cries of excitation still in our ears—at such a finale—Hellenic Cosmos, still Hellenic Cosmos, nothing but Hellenic Cosmos; how can we but stare and stagger, how can we but wanly, wildly smile and ask, as we choke, Hah! is that it?

Ah! we remember the pride with which we joined in the exclamation of Haym: 'No longer shall either the logical abstractness or the linguistic barbarism prove a hindrance to our intelligence!' But we are ashamed now. We heard, with a smile, Haym declare of Hegelian formulæ: 'No doubt that he who were so instructed, would find himself quite in the position of the student to whom Mephistopheles, disguised as Faust, holds the first prelection on the method of academic study; no doubt that he would understand nothing of the whole of it, that these formulæ would appear to him very strange, and their identification very confused.' With a smile of superiority and pity we heard this, for we believed what Haym assured us in regard to our own knowledge—we believed him when he said: 'They (these formulæ) can no longer appear to us as a witch's rhyme; they will appear to us only as an abbreviation for a view of things which is now perfectly intelligible to us, not only in its meaning, but in its historical genesis and real value.' We smiled with pride, pity, and superiority then; but when we look back to the very occasion on which Haym made these declarations (p. 220), we find that, despite his protestations, he had given us no keys whatever, unless those very formulæ at which he pretended to smile—Substance is Subject, the Absolute is Spirit, the True is System;—we find this, and by as much as we were proud then, by so much are we dejected now. It can seem, indeed, as if Haym had been but chaffing us. Where is the 'view of things' which is to be 'perfectly intelligible to us?' Where is the Hegelian 'genesis' which we are supposed
to be so much at home in? What is, then, that ‘real value,’ of which the knowledge is so coolly attributed to us? We know nothing of these things—with all the phrases we have learned.

The article on Hegel in the ninth edition (1844) of the Conversations-Lexicon contains the following:—

The Hegelian System—through its connexion with the Identitätsphilosophie, through the original and (at cost of those logical laws on which all the sciences directly repose) dearly-bought novelty and seeming depth of its method, through the semblance of a universal knowledge that equally embraced God and the World, through the imposing confidence with which it presented itself as the sole possessor of ‘rational’ thought, through the captivating symmetry of its arrangement, through the unremitting labour with which its originator, supported on a wealth of knowledge, continually applied himself to the following out of the fundamental thought of his system even into the most concrete phenomena,—finally, through the favour of external influences, which is not by any means to be considered of small account—had acquired a great and extensive influence. . . . He saw the necessity of a thinking development of what ‘the intellectual intuition’ meant. This necessity, taken together with—what is common to every Identitätsystem—the proposition of Spinoza, that the order and connexion of our thoughts is the same as the order and connexion of things—may be regarded as the natural germ of the peculiar method which gives to the Hegelian system its specific character.

There is nothing here that can be considered widely different from the external view of Hegel, which is common and current everywhere. Now, while it is quite certain that Haym adds nothing to this, it is not quite certain that he either says all this, or says as well this. In particular, we may instance the proposition attributed to Spinoza, which is the same thing, but in an infinitely more penetrating form than the ‘Spirit’ of Haym.

To what end, then, has Haym written?—to what end are his whole five hundred brilliant pages? Are these aught else than the glittering bubbles of mere literature, that, after the manner of bubbles presently die out, as with a murmur at their own inanity? Is it that Haym, known to have been engaged on Hegel, felt himself obliged, for his own credit, to say something of Hegel? Is it that all this—all this brilliant rhetoric and all this perfect literature, all these adroit turns and all these expert antitheses, all that is unhesitatingly arrogated, and all that is unhesitatingly denied,—is it that all this—and we have taken every care, at least, to examine and inquire,—is it that all this is but Haym’s way of saying, the grapes are sour?
Of the three writers we have passed under review, Rosenkranz is the most at home with Hegel. He has evidently read him faithfully—most faithfully. Nor could he so read without attaining to a very satisfactory insight into the general spirit of his author. We have convinced ourselves, however, that, on the whole, he has remained outside of the single secret. Indeed, the failure of a spirit so vivid as Haym—coming after Rosenkranz—testifies to the failure of the latter as well. If these three have failed, then, we may rest assured that no other has succeeded; for—so far as general evidence of books can be depended on—these three, of all who have approached the subject, are the latest and the best, and ought to be amply representative of whatever has preceded them. The general failure of Germany and of Europe in this matter must seem extraordinary; but when we think of the failure of a man so peculiarly endowed and so peculiarly placed as Schelling, we are left but small room for wonder at the failure of the rest. Schelling opined that the system was but 'Wolffianism,' and that Hegel himself was but the 'purest exemplar of inner and outer Prosa.' We take leave to think differently. Only a maker, only a faculty of the intensest poesy could move as Hegel moved. It is possible that what the imagination of a Homer or of a Shakespeare saw—compared with what the imagination of Hegel saw—will yet—so far as ultimate speculation is concerned—show but as a schoolboy's pictures on a schoolboy's books. Everything in existence—were it but a dry wall or a morsel of soap, a grain of sand, a drop of water, or the twig of a plant—is valid and valuable only by the amount of thought it contains; and the imagination of Hegel holds in solution as deep, as pure, as comprehensive thought as any, the most philosophic imagination that has yet appeared.

Yet to Haym this very thought, has been 'more than refuted: it has been judged!' At the same time, it is declared—not quite without the usual contradiction—that 'this one great house has only failed because this whole branch of business lies on the ground;' 'we find ourselves at this moment in a great and almost universal shipwreck of the spirit, and of faith in spirit at all.' 'Of pretenders to the empty throne, it is true, there is no want; we hear now this one and now that one wagered on as the philosopher of the future: now at last, timidly hope the disciples of Herbart, is the time come when posterity will do their master a tardy justice; now many for the first time hear of the Schopen-
hauerian philosophy, &c., &c. The truth is—just this crowding up, this obtruding and intruding of the *Dei minorum gentium* is the proof of what we say—the truth is, that the realm of philosophy is in a state of *complete masterlessness*, in a state of break-up and demise.’ Haym then tells us that the most rigid Hegelians themselves admit this; that, with a timidity unlike their ancient assurance, they only plead now, ‘Hegel was “still not unfruitful” for the development of philosophy;’ and that they do ‘not trust themselves to decide whether the Hegelian system has yet found “its Reinhold and Beck” or not.’ Haym also asks, as if with the hope of cure for these things, ‘what if science now should have only to seek a broader and surer basis—for what Kant did?’ Now, we do not dispute what is so vividly described here—only we should prefer to say that, instead of Hegel having failed because philosophy is in ruins, it is philosophy that is in ruins because Hegel (*who just sought said basis*) has failed—to be understood! Hence the want of successors—hence the shipwreck of philosophy—hence the judgment on Hegel himself—hence the necessity of a return to Kant—hence the inquiry after a Beck and a Reinhold, who were still to seek, perhaps, not only for Hegel, but even possibly for *Kant!*

* Haym, pp. 6, 5, 3, 4, 5, 13.
† This is said, however, if with direct and sufficient knowledge of Reinhold, only with indirect and insufficient knowledge of Beck.
VII.

CONCLUSION.

In the course of his inquest, it probably occurred to Hegel, that the one common object of the search of all of them—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—was the concrete notion. Kant named what he wanted, an à priori synthetic judgment, which amounts to a principle the oneness of which were already multiple—the sameness already different, and this as determined independently of all experience by pure reason, or, what is the same thing, as self-determined. Fichte aimed at precisely the same thing in his synthesis, which was to be the one of thesis and antithesis, the last, too, being a process as spontaneous, à priori, and necessary, as the second. Schelling, again, gave direct name to the operations of both Kant and Fichte, when he spoke of the identity of identity and non-identity. Lastly, Hegel, while he felt that what he himself had been striving after was no less and no other, perceived that this very principle was the principle as well of the concrete and the actual. There was this actual world; consequently, the First had been no bare identity, no abstract identity: it must have at once and from the beginning contained difference,—it must have been from the very outset a concrete, i.e., a one at once of identity and difference. Nay, such was the actual constitution and nature of every single entity in this universe. How did I know that door, this window, or that shutter? The difference of each was simply the identity of each: what each was for-other, that it was as reflected into self, or each was only and nothing but its for-other reflected into its in-itself, its difference reflected into its identity, or (as, in its way, even ancient logic holds of definition—Bestimmung!) its Differentia reflected into its Genus. This was the common character of the whole world, and of every denizen in the world. Again, and, as it were, on another side, to perceive was to think, and to think was to identify difference.

There is a vast amount of material which can be all brought under this one point of view. A summum genus, for example, is
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a necessity of thought; but the true name and nature of a *summum genus* were only identity. That *summum genus*, too, if it were the *summum genus* of this actually varied universe, must have been not more the primitive and original identity than the primitive and original difference: in other words, that *summum genus* must have already held within it also the *summa differentia*. A union of opposites, then, was thus the one concrete fact; and it was no wonder that—as principle of explanation—it had been the one abstract quest of Kant and the rest. It was thus seen that what we ought to look for was not, as in common thought abstract identity, but pure negativity; for a one that is through opposites, or an identity that is supported on *differents*, that lives, that *is* through these, can be named no otherwise. What is pointed at, in fact, is but the *concrete reciprocity of a disjunctive sphere*, where each term is no less itself than it is the other also. Nay, the reciprocity is such, that you cannot *signalise* the one without *implicating* the other; or but for *invelopment*, and to the extent required, *development* is impossible: the current forward is equally the current backward—only the *intent* makes the *extent*. You look before to attraction; but could you look behind, you would equally see repulsion: if the *one moment* of the *antithesis* is *explicit*, the *other of the two* is always also at the same time correspondingly *implicit*. Reciprocity has been the bottom consideration of all modern philosophy, and it is remarkable that in just such reciprocity it began. Hume closed his inquiry by concluding Causality not to be *necessary* because it was *matter of fact*; and Kant, with a sort of reciprocating reversal, opened his by inferring Causality not to be *matter of fact* because it was *necessary*.

This perception on the part of Kant led to the important conclusion, that there must be *inferences* in us quite *à priori* and independent of any reference whatever to sensible *facts*. This single thought of Kant it was that Hegel gazed into its ultimate abstraction, or into its ultimate life,—the *concrete notion*, the primitive and original radical, the Roc's egg of the whole huge universe. Study of Kant, too, enabled Hegel to see that the content or matter of this notion was not confined to the intellect proper, but repeated itself in perception as well; for an act of perception was to Kant this, that only by the universal is the particular converted into the singular. This singular, further, a *phenomenon* to Kant as *σύνολον* of *variety* of unknown thing
from without and of unity of known categorical universal from within (affection brought by function into focus), became a noumenon to Hegel, the actually existent concrete, the only reality and truth—this, by abstracting from any and every subject, as well as by regarding the universal, (i.e., generalising thought), and the particular (i.e., individualising sense) as only the abstract moments of the single singular. To find the primordial form of this singular, then, and let it by means of the nisus of its own life develop, through the fullness of all and every, into the one spirit that alone is—this was to find also the system of Hegel.

The ultimate of Hegel, then, is the notion as notion. Let us suppose a spore, a germ, and call it the notion. Now, this spore has its own life; there are three glances in it, each of which is the spore itself and the whole spore. Such is the nature of notional universality, particularity, and singularity. They are necessary mutual complements, and cannot be disunited—unless by the fiction of abstraction. They are the constituent reciprocals of a disjunctive sphere: they are the constituent reciprocals of the disjunctive sphere; it is the unity, the all, the absolute; they are its—(its own proper inalienable, inherent)—manifold, plurality, variety, or phenomenal show of attributes. It is the one Identity; they are the one Difference: and identity and difference are the moments of the single concrete, or they are universality and particularity in the single singular. The secret of the universe is thought, the spirit of thought, whose own life is the play of what is, and that which is, is thought in its own freedom, which at the same time also is its own necessity. The absolute is the vibration of a mathematical point, the tinted tremble of a single eye, infinitesimally infinite, punctually one, whose own tremble is its own object, and its own life, and its own self.

This is what it is to be serious with idealism. If God is a Spirit and thinks, if God created the universe on thought—: in other words, if thought is what is, then all is reducible to thought, and logic is the name of the whole. If the word 'logic' offend, let us say λόγος; but let us admire then our own resultant satisfaction! The three—absolute reciprocals, that is,—may be named Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason: with these we can shadow out the whole history of man, and the whole life of the individual.—Idealism is this: the Inhalt of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason is identical with these its Forms; Perception is identical with Intellect; Affection is identical with Function;
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Object with Subject. What is, is the 'intuitus originarius,' the anschauender Verstand, the one absolute Spirit—God.

How very little is required to convert the Vorstellung of Kant into the Vorstellung of Hegel, we may see from these words of the former:—

The transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly only intelligible, nowise subject to the vicissitudes of time, and that neither is there a beginning through birth nor an end through death: that this life is nothing but a mere phenomenal, show i.e., a sensuous Vorstellung of the pure spiritual life, and the entire world of sense a mere picture which hangs before our present mode of cognition, and, like a dream, has no objective reality in itself: that, did we see things and ourselves as they are, we should find ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, with which world our only true union had neither begun through birth nor would cease with death (as mere phenomenal appearances), &c. (Krit. of P. R., Discipline of P. R., third section, last paragraph but two.)

That we should be able to say the same thing in such a variety of ways, is itself a proof of the truth of the principle. The reflexion of difference into identity it was, however, that Hegel probably kept in his eye when he described his dialectic in those words about each whole passing into its own opposite, which have been so often repeated without intelligence, and with the conviction at bottom that they concerned only an idle receipt, a something factitious that merely would be. Collation with the various other points of view which have been just indicated will, however, supply a correction to this conviction. Hegel, in short, perceiving that the reflexion of difference into identity was the one concrete principle in the world of sense as in the world of thought, must have at once seen that he had caught the principle of truth—the principle which would be at once beginning, middle and end. There was progress in the very thing itself: if difference could be reflected into identity, difference might also be separated from identity; and was not that the very definition of progress? The following out of such considerations could only lead to the development of Hegel's necessary chain of units, which were, at the same time, an all. A beginning would not be difficult to find; for a beginning would require simply to be as a beginning is in thought, thought being all. We have no admissions of Hegel's actual procedure; we have this latter expressed in abstract results only. We have seen for ourselves, however, that a beginning is impossible to any outward principle. Any outward principle would at once presuppose and leave unexplained both space and time. A single outward principle changing itself into thought,
changing itself into new kinds, changing itself even into new dimensions—changing itself at all—is inconceivable. A single outward unit that had so changed itself into this universe, would demonstrate itself to have held even at the first this universe potentially or virtually within it. This is idealism, but an imperfect idealism, time and space being left on the outside, absolutely unyielding to every attempt to pack them in. A beginning externally is absolutely impossible. The materialist, it is true, may admit this; but probably he will admit that a beginning must be thought. So admitting, he will now admit also, that that beginning must be thought in an internal principle. Should he deny, however, that a beginning must be thought, he will admit that it certainly very often is thought, and always, at all events, that it may be thought. But if a beginning may be thought, it must be thought only so and so. That is, as Hegel shows, the beginning must be both absolutely First and absolutely Incompound. Now, only pure Being corresponds to that description, and this is all that Hegel requires: from this, by process of simple watching, the whole universe ascends; into this, too, it rounds, taking up into itself the inconceivable Firstness and Incompoundness; for if a Beginning must be absolutely First and absolutely Incompound, it just as certainly can be neither. That what is, is the concrete notion, explains this. We have seen, also, many other considerations, as identity, the genus summum, the universal, &c. &c., which could only lead to the same result.

Being passes into its opposite, Non-being; and Non-being returning to Being passes into its higher opposite, Becoming. We have already seen this process at some length. By external reflexion of the moments into each other (as of Nichts into Seyn to the development of Werden), it has already appeared to us so easy to bring about the whole Hegelian series, that a danger manifested itself, on the one hand, of the whole business being considered phantasy and delusion, and, on the other, of our being exposed to an inundation of similar attempts, with endless modifications on the part of others. It must be said, however, that Hegel, for his part, has done his best to obtain only solid results. To this end, he has carried into each element the movement of the notion internally, and has not contented himself with the mere external reflexion of Nichts into Seyn, &c., or of Seyn into Nichts, &c. (for the process has always evidently the two directions to the evolution of the two new moments),—but has endeavoured, on
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this principle, to develop and demonstrate the whole concrete matter of logic, metaphysics, &c. Nor is this a light labour. It is indeed hard to conceive anything in this world more oppressively difficult than to attempt to follow Hegel into the inner of his transitions; as, for example, in Measure, or Substantiality, Causality, Reciprocity, &c. In these Hegel shows to us, like a man with an enormous load on his head, who endeavours laboriously, with many an ineffectual effort, many a sway, now to, now from, to turn into such a direction (that of the notion) as would immediately lighten his burthen into a new form. Nor can we enter with him into the same element without feeling the same weight imposed on us—to the utter crushing generally of our weaker powers. Hegel has not been crushed, however, but has veritably demonstrated the matter of metaphysics, logic, &c., even with such irresistible fascination of exposition as may prove to his reader in the end nothing less than a constant surprise.

Another aspect besides those of transition into opposites, reflexion of moments mutually, successive functions of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, &c., on which the principle of the method may be regarded, is this: Whenever there has been coalescence to a new element, the last moments may be re-extricated from this element, but in the form of this element, that is, as the new moments to a new and further coalescence. The moments, in short, always proceed in pairs, and in pairs that gradually ascend. Consider such sequences as these: Being, Nothing; Reality, Negation; Something, Other; One, Many; Attraction, Repulsion; Continuity, Discretion; Extension, Intension; Identity, Difference; Positive, Negative; Matter, Form; Whole, Parts; Force, Manifestation; Inner, Outer; Substance, Accident; Cause, Effect; Action, Reaction, &c. Does not one see an extraordinary tautology here? To limit ourselves to the three last pairs, does it not give to think that Substance and Accident are the same matter as Cause and Effect, and that, in Reciprocity, what was previously Cause and Effect is now alternately both Cause and Effect? Are we not made to see an ascending tautology here? Nor is it very different in other spheres. These pairs will be readily seen also always to constitute what Hegel calls the Antithesis: the successive ones of their union also will be as readily seen to prove a gradually ascending series till final eclipse in the Absolute Spirit.

It is not to be pretended that Hegel has always been successful,
or that what he has done, like everything else that holds of time, is
not to be—partly by rejection, partly by absorption—eventually
superseded. The work was too prodigious for that, the fever of
the zymosis of the day much too ardent. Indeed, the instrument
he has in hand brings with it its own temptations to merely arbitrary
products, and the bare show of a consistent and continuous ration-
ale: that is to say, there is a duplicity in the notion itself which
steads you easily whether you would distinguish into antithesis or
unite to harmony. This is a dangerous power for the architect of a
system to possess: whether an impassable chasm yawn in the Object,
or an exhausted faculty frustrate the Subject, the fascination of the
ready expedient is equally irresistible. We must lay our account,
then, with finding inequalities in Hegel—even crudities, it may be;
and things that revolt. Where such side of Hegel comes most
prominently to the surface is, as the nature of the element would
alone lead us to expect, in the Philosophy of Nature. Here the
object of Hegel is to lead the notion into the reports of nature
which the concrete sciences extend; and the inner principle finds,
as Hegel takes care to make us see, the outer element only naturally
stiff and refractory. Nevertheless, we have in appearance one un-
broken chain from the abstractest natural object—space, through
time, motion, matter, the laws of matter, light, heat, electricity,
chemistry, geology, &c., up to the concretest natural object, the
animal, and the last manifestation of the animal, death; and, no
doubt, glances of the most penetrating character have been here
thrown by Hegel on many of the hardest and most important
matters. Still at times the notion shows through these matters;
it is as a frame, a lay-figure, externally in their midst; they fall
off from it like clothes that are not its own and will not fit. It is
dangerous to read here, if one would preserve one's respect for
Hegel. Rejection is at times so unexceptionable, and in an element
of such feeling, that all the essential greatness of the man has
disappeared for the time, as it were behind a dwarf. It is to be
said, however, that the newer and slighter the look at these points,
the more instantaneous and unhesitating is our sentence. Con-
sideration dulls our disapproval, and we retire at last, perhaps, all
but won over to that in regard to which we had laughed our
scornfullest. At all events, one glance to the 'Science of Logic'
or the 'Philosophy of Spirit,' and our balance is restored;—one
glance to these—one glance (say) to that discussion of what are
called the fundamental laws of thought under Identity, Difference,
Ground, &c., for which Hegel has in this country been so much decried, and this same Hegel is once again to us the very master of thought. It is but fair, however, that the reader should have a sample of Hegel on this side also. In § 368 of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel thus delivers himself in regard to how it is with animal life here:—

'Life is subjected to the complicated conditions and circumstances of external nature, and may exhibit itself in the poorest forms. The fruitfulness of the earth lets life for every casualty and in all ways strike out everywhere. The animal world can, almost even less than the other spheres of nature, exhibit a rational system of organisation independent within itself, hold fast by forms which were determined by the notion, and preserve these from the imperfection and intermixture of conditions, in consequence of transitions, failures, and confusions. This weakness of the notion in nature generally subjects not only the development of individuals to external contingencies, so that the developed animal (and man the most) exhibits monstrosities, but even the genera are wholly a prize to the changes of the external universal life of nature, the vicissitude of which the life of the animal undergoes also, and is consequently only an alternation of health and disease. The entourage of external contingency contains almost only what is alien; it exercises a perpetual violence and threat of dangers on the animal's feeling, which is an insecure, anxious, and unhappy one.' (Encyc., Part 2, p. 651.)

'Even the genera externally a prize!' that is the so-called 'struggle'! But we must recollect the rôle of the notion and the whole teaching of § 249 (quoted p. 745); where it is literally said: 'It is wholly idle to represent the genera as evolving themselves, one after the other, in time.'

Allenthalben has been translated for every casualty, as the italics seemed to demand, but everywhere has been added. Of disease Hegel speaks thus:—

The organism finds itself in a state of disease, so far as one of its systems or organs in conflict with an inorganic potence becomes excited (irritated), sets itself fast apart by itself, and persists in its special action against the action of the whole, whose fluency and all-pervading process is thus obstructed. . . . The peculiar phenomenon of disease therefore is, that the identity of the entire organic process presents itself as successive passage of the vital movement through its different moments, Sensability, Irritability, and Reproduction—i.e., as fever, which, however, as process of the whole against the individual act is just as much the effort and the commencement of cure. . . . The curative agent rouses the organism to eliminate the special irritation, in which the formal activity of the whole is fixed, and replace in the whole the fluency of the particular organ or system. The curative agent produces this effect by being itself an irritative, but one difficult to assimilate and overcome, so that an external somewhat is offered to the organism against which it is necessitated to exert its force. Directing itself against what is external, it steps out of the limitation in which it was imprisoned, and with which it had become identical, but against which it could not react so far as it was not as object to it. (Encyc. §§ 371-3.) An es here should have been sie for the limitation.
Now, such speculation as this, in connexion with the pretensions of the Notion, gives pause. We feel disposed to ask, what is meant by 'conflict,' 'potence,' 'external irritative,' &c., and, in fine, has not Hegel here just committed himself to the carriage of that very Vorstellung which he would not hesitate sarcastically to blow to pieces from beneath the sitting of everybody else? The organism is a transparent breadth composed of myriads of ants in regular connexion and in regularly consecutive movement. An individual ant is suddenly thrown across to the production of an opaque spot, the opacity of which rapidly spreads and thickens under the misfortunes of the succeeding ants who stumble over the begun obstruction. The whole power of the general organism is now centred in that one spot. Present now a Spanish fly, or other hostile insect, at the periphery; instantly the ants flee asunder from the opaque spot, each to its post, to defend the common whole,—with restoration of transparency as the result! We have thus a picture; but have we more than that? Hegel, however, might conceivably say here, it is just the Vorstellung that is in place in Nature, the externalisation of the Begriff in the externalisation of the Idee. And it is to be admitted that the greatest philosophers, as Plato and Leibnitz, have made advances by just such expedients. Nay, the progress of those who are named scientific men par excellence, Bacon, Newton, Berzelius, &c. &c., is not differently conditioned. The most respected theories in all branches of science are at this very moment only such Vorstellungen: irritatives, conflicts, potences, are by no means confined to Hegel. It will reward the student's trouble, if he but consider the most current speculations in the most current text-books of the day. Should he regard them as pictures and question them as such, he will astonish himself with his own results. On the whole, then, perhaps we may conclude with Hegel himself here:—

However general, and therefore in comparison with the so multifarious phenomena of disease insufficient, the above determinations may be, nevertheless it is only the firm fundament of the Notion which is capable as well of penetrating and pervading the particular details as of rendering perfectly intelligible that which, whether as regards the phenomena of disease or the principle of cure, appears to Custom sunk in the externalities of the empirical interest, as extravagant and bizarre.

It is but fair on our part to add also, that in Hegel himself there is neither the ant nor the fly.

Hegel, then, on the whole, must be considered quite as eligible
for dispensation with respect to errors of detail as anybody else; and it is on his great principles that, in the end, his merits or demerits must rest. Now, for these surely much can be said. At the one great principle itself, the Notion, on the supposition of its being fanciful, we possibly may shake our heads; we may be allowed to express ourselves equally doubtfully as regards the method, which may appear to us a mere mechanical process of the easiest and at the same time the most fallacious nature: for what difficulty, or what likelihood of soundness, can there be in the reflecting of Nothing into Being to the production of Becoming, of Negation into Reality to the production of Something, of Quantity into Quality to the production of Measure, &c. &c.? But how are we to account for the results? It may appear to us that we but alternately intricate and extricate Affirmation and Negation from the very Alpha to the very Omega of the System; but how is it that this gradual rise of categories takes place—categories which strike down into the very heart of the actual? Is not the very conception of the examination of the categories as such, apart and by themselves, a master-stroke? We go on arguing and reasoning with each other, we settle Politics, Religion, Philosophy, Science, House-affairs, and all through use of certain distinctions which pass current with us like pounds, shillings, pence—Being, Becoming, Finite, Infinite, Essence, Appearance, Identity, Difference, Inner, Outer, Positive, Negative, Cause, Effect, Substance, Accident, &c. &c,—but we have never turned upon these things themselves to ask the warrant and nature of their validity. To use them, nevertheless, without this inquest is not to be free, but bound—is to drive about an absolute log, and absolutely at their mercy. This, then, must be granted as a great merit in Hegel, that he has taken these things up, and subjected them to analysis in their abstract and veritable selves. But the categories are not the only Hegelian results; there are others, and quite as striking. On many concrete interests Hegel is supposed to have thrown some very extraordinary and yet very acceptable lights. His Philosophy of History, his Philosophy of Religion, his Philosophy of Politics (Recht), his Æsthetic, have given to think to the very deepest and severest thinkers. Take the Æsthetic alone, it is a work unexampled, whether we consider the fullness, completeness, and captivating felicity of the divisions and classifications, or the almost surprising truth for the most part of the criticism in detail.
—as regards matter too,—Art, Poetry and General Literature—in which we have no reason to suppose that Hegel had ever particularly dwelt, and for which we have no reason to suppose that he was ever particularly called. Now, how is this?—whence is this immense, extraordinary, and unexpected success? The longer we inquire and the deeper we look, the more shall we be inclined to answer—the Notion, all comes from the Notion, the Notion does all. Just in proportion to the reality of a man’s piety, too, is his insight into the penetrating truth of Hegel’s statement of the act of devotion, of inward religious experiences. Yet in the very centre of this statement—the spirit that produced the matter—the notion can with a scratch be demonstrated to lie at full length. This, then, is very striking, that Hegel should have produced such important results and in such peculiar spheres, and all in consequence of utter and unswerving fidelity to his one single principle—the Notion. There cannot be a doubt of it, the most momentous questions that have interested or interest humanity, all lie in the pages of Hegel apparently in ultimate discussion; and this ultimate discussion has been attained only through the Notion. Special proof as regards these results were out of place here; but the reader, who is now better prepared, might like to see some expressions of Hegel’s own in regard to the Notion, which shall extend evidence in favour of what has been said of it in these pages. As remarked, now that the Notion has been held up to view, almost every page will offer illustrations in place (as shown, indeed, by these very last quotations in regard to disease, &c.), but it may be worth while to adduce one or two of a more striking character.

Thought has its forms proper, the universal of which forms is the notion. . . . From the notion in the speculative sense, what has been usually named notion is to be distinguished. (Encyc. § 9.)

In this field of mutation and contingency, not the notion, but only grounds (reasons) can be made available. (Encyc. § 16.)

The One Notion is in all and everything the Substantiality. (Encyc. § 114.)

The forms of logic are, as forms of the notion, the living spirit of the actual. (Encyc. § 162.)

As the spirit is not only infinitely richer than nature, but as moreover the absolute unity of the antithesis, in the notion constitutes its essential being, it shows in its manifestation and intervention in externality the Contradiction in its ultimate determinateness. (Logik, in p. 284.)

The notion is the eternal, the béñt in and for itself, just because it is not the abstract but the concrete unity—not determinedness abstractly referent of self to self, but the unity of itself and of its other; into which other, therefore,
it cannot pass over as if it othered itself in it, just because the other—the determinedness (the specific peculiarity)—is itself: and so, in this passing over, it passes over consequently, only into itself. (Lk. iii. p. 268.)

It is particularly the relation of potence or power which has been applied more recently to the moments of the notion: the notion in its immediacy was named the first potence; in its otherwiseness or the difference, the particularising of its moments, the second, and in its return into self, or as totality, the third potence. (Lk. i. p. 393.)

The notion which Kant has set up in the à priori synthetic judgments,—the notion of opposed principles which are equally inseparable, an identity that is in itself unseparated difference—belongs to what is great and imperishable in his philosophy. This notion, as it is the notion itself and everything in itself is the notion, is indeed equally present in perception. (Lk. i. p. 241-2.)

Although Kant made the deep observation that concerns à priori synthetic principles, and recognised the unity of self-consciousness as their root—recognised, that is, the identity of the notion with itself—he took, nevertheless, the matter of detail just from formal logic as given; the deduction, then, should of necessity have been the demonstration of the transition of said simple unity of self-consciousness into these its characterising forms and differences; but of the exposition of this truly synthetic movement, of the notion thus producing itself, Kant has spared himself the pains. (Lk. iii. p. 282.)

True science can organise itself only through the life proper of the notion; this—the peculiar principle, which a schema would merely stick on outwardly—is the self-actuating soul of the completed content. (Phaenom. p. 40.)

Now that the Kantian triplicity—only re-discovered by instinct but still dead, still uncomprehended—has been raised into its absolute significance, and so, consequently, now that the true form has at the same time been set up in its true matter, and that there has been established the notion of science, &c. (Phaenom. p. 37.)

'The categories demonstrate themselves to be nothing else than the series of the evolution forms of the notion, and that not just of any notion, but of the notion in its own self.' (P. of R. ii. 433.)

These quotations will make the Hegelian Notion, and all that it imports, so obvious,—as it were, so self-evident,—that little merit will seem to be left for any one who shall have signalised this. It is quite certain, however, that it was not from them that the 'light' of the Notion 'went up' to ourselves: before that light went up, they were all of them read repeatedly, but till that light went up they all of them remained unyieldingly dark. If we are right, too, though read repeatedly in all probability, they yet remain dark to many the most competent readers themselves. Again; it is to be considered that they lie here in one focus; whereas in Hegel they lie widely apart from each other, scattered over hundreds of pages. Nor is it to be less considered that, while here they are direct and express, they occur in Hegel
only indirectly, parenthetically, accidentally.—We add a few more such passages which may illustrate special points in the one operation, nameable exposition of the notion; and we feel assured that a perusal of ‘Vom Begriff im Allgemeinen,’ at the beginning, and of ‘Die absolute Idee’ at the end of the third volume of the Logik, will complete conviction, and definitively clinch all that we have in this respect anywhere said.

To be held fast in finite categories, i.e., in the yet unresolved antithesis. (Encyc. § 27.)
The antithesis expressed in immediaay as being and nothing. (Encyc. § 87.)
The second forms constitute a sphere in its difference. (Encyc. § 85.)
The negative, determinateness, the relation, the judgment, and all the other determinations which fall under the second moment. (Lk. iii. p. 342.)
That the totality be set, to this there belongs the double transition, not only that of the one character into its other, but equally the transition of this other, its return, into the first, . . . this remark on the necessity of the double transition is of great importance for the whole of the scientific method. (Lk. i. p. 392.)

It is one of the most important intellecions to know and hold fast, this nature of the reflexional forms considered, that their truth consists only in their correlation, and that each, consequently, implies the other in its own very notion; without this knowledge there is properly possible no step in philosophy. (Lk. ii. p. 66.)
The difference (Unterschied) is the whole and its own moment; as the identity is equally its whole and its moment. This is to be regarded as the essential nature of reflexion, and as the special ground proper of all actualisation and self-movement. Difference, like identity, [these] make themselves moment, explication, because as reflexion they are the negative correlation with themselves. (Lk. ii. pp. 38-9.)

Kant has applied the infinitely important form of triplicity, however much it has manifested itself with him only first of all as a formal spark of light, not to the genera of his categories (quantity, quality, &c.), but only to their species: he has, consequently, missed the third to quality and quantity [measure]. (Lk. i. p. 396.)

In general, every real is in its beginning an only immediate identity [and identity = Ansichseyn, Being-in-self, Lk. ii. p. 202] ; for in its beginning it has not yet opposed and developed the moments; on one side not yet re-innered itself (as though remembered itself) out of externality; on the other side through its own movement not yet uttered (outed, alienated) and produced itself out of internality; it is therefore only the inner as qualifyingness counter the outer, and only the outer as qualifyingness counter the inner. It is thus partly only an immediate being; partly, so far as it is equally the negativity which is to become the motive of the movement, it is as such

* See also (Lk. i. p. 18) the substantial content that has the distinction in it of a body and a soul: the soul is the notion (three pages further, too, at p. 21, perhaps the best passage yet, where it is said the notion itself, i.e., the ground principle of the particular notions)!
essentially only an inner. In every natural, scientific, and spiritual development generally this presents itself, and this is essentially to be recognised, that the first, in that something is only first of all inwardly or in its notion, is just for this reason only its own immediate, passive Daseyn (existential outness). So the relation here is only the relation an sich (in itself), its notion, or only inwardly. But on this account again it is only the external, immediate relation, &c. (Lk. ii. p. 181.)

Justification and support will be found in these extracts for many decisions in regard to the moments and their names with which the Reader may now be familiar. At page 62 above, and in reference to an extract of Kant which was spoken of as likely to have been suggestive to Hegel, it was remarked of the action on the world of a being that can think, that it would amount to a projection of this being out around him, so that the other would come to be only the stand for this being's qualities thereon disposed: if the reader will consult 'die Idee des Wahren,' in the third volume of the Logic, he will be struck with the singular truth of the accidental conception; and he will also see reason to admire Hegel for realising this side of the notion (for it is a side of the notion) under Erkennen (cognition).

At page 610 of Frantz and Hillert's Hegelian Extracts, we have the following from the Philosophy of Religion (as in edition 1, which is sometimes simpler than edition 2):—

The third is the abrogation of this antithesis, of this separation, this banishment of the subject from God, the realising that Man feel and know God within himself, raise himself as this subject to God, give himself the assurance, the blessedness, the joy to have God in his heart, to be united with God. This is the Cultus: the Cultus is not merely relation, knowledge, but act; the action to give himself the certainty, that Man is accepted by God, received into Grace. The simple form of the Cultus, the inner Cultus, is Devotion, Worship—this Mystic thing, the unio mystica.

The most fervid saint that ever lived could give no better and no other account of his inner experiences: yet here we are in the third moment of the notion! The development of the notion through its ordinary moments has led us to this! It is fidelity to the notion and its own accurate language that has given birth to this fidelity to the vital feelings and expressions of religion!

The last extract suggests the propriety of another word on the Matter of Hegel—and we may say again, in passing, that his Origin is directly from Kant, and more especially from Kant's Deduction of the Categories with peculiar reference to the Unity
of Apperception and the fundamental Kantian query as regards the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, or, what is the same thing, mental inferences independent of any reference to the facts of experience; his Principle is the Concrete Notion so developed, and his Form or Method is his evolution of new Moments to the production of a new Whole by means of extrication, or reflexion, or opposition of these moments, or disposal of them according to the triple movement constituted by Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, or however else we may name the operation indicated.* As regards the Matter, we may repeat at once, that it consists of all the questions which have ever in any sphere been regarded as philosophical. Probably no man has ever studied more deeply than Hegel the progress of humanity in regard to those questions which it puts for the procurement of explanation as respects its own existence, that of its world, and the constituent phenomena of both. A man so rich in knowledge of the real, a man that had so trained himself in the actual, could not by any possibility come to us offering only what was formal or formell, and without concrete nutriment. In an age that exacts such scientific requirements as the present, it is impossible that such a man, in such a position, and with such pretensions, could have treated of such interests as Logic and Philosophy, History and Æsthetic, Morals, Politics, and Religion, with no result but that of an arbitrary, fanciful, idle, and all but unintelligible systematisation, and without any addition or improvement of a solid and substantial nature. This is wholly incredible: rather, it is to be expected that Hegel has said what will prove for many a day almost the last word on all the great concrete interests for which alone humanity lives, and to which alone it strives.

In logic, to consider the categories alone abstractly and in themselves, is a glance the deepest and the truest, as the leading of them all up into the notion and the idea is perhaps the rarest feat yet of any one philosopher. Consider Being alone! What is Being? Driven on the literary hot-bed which is given us at present, we are all geniuses nowadays, men of rapid ideation and symbolical speech (which, I suppose, is the definition of this wonderful thing genius—often the perquisite of the weakest),—

* The extract from Kant (p. 60 above), in what concerns pure Reason as pure Syllogism, may, if looked deeply at, manifest itself as Hegel's pure Form, and so his pure Principle, pure Method, pure Matter, and even pure Origin.
and at the very first touch of the question, we soar away up on Vorstellung, on imagination, away up, up to the Empyrean in search of the unimaginable—big at heart—but to return presently drooping—with nothing! This is Vorstellung. The notion however, is a cool old swordsman, takes time, moves not from the spot, and looks at the thing. What is Being? it says,—why Being is simply presence absolutely indefinite—equally Nothing— but, this time, a seen nothing. Being is all in general, and no one thing in particular; and Nothing is no one thing in particular—and also all in general, for the Nothing that is no one thing in particular has not destroyed a single dust-point of the all, which just remains after as before. What is, has been, and ever will be: we are in presence of the infinite. Nay, this infinite as much is not as it is. The is to the was is another, the was is not. Unchanged identity exists not even in a dream. The is, to know itself—even to continue itself—must other itself, must become not. Not, Not, Not, are the links of the circle of Identity: only by Not, Not, Not, is Identity preserved. Truly to think these thoughts, truly to think Identity and Difference, but—sub specie eternitatis—is, in ultimate result, to develop the System of Hegel. The Hegelian notions are parallel to the Vorstellungen, the myths, of all concrete history: Chaos is Seyn, Creation is Daseyn, Christianity (Vision, Love, Submission,—Intelligence, Union with God, Immortality) is Fursichseyn. And this series is but Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, the one, single, and sole-existent logical throb! But we must renounce any attempt to present more of the special matter, in the meantime, than has been already presented in the two sections from the Logic, and in the various extracts which have occurred to be inserted here and there. Before passing on to certain concluding general statements and illustrative applications, we content ourselves with simply saying again, that the matter of Metaphysic, Logic, of the Philosophy of Nature, of Psychology, Morals, Politics, Religion, History, Criticism, Art, has all, or mostly all, been exhaustively considered by Hegel, and if presented in freedom from the peculiarity of the form, would speedily convince all men who cared to inquire, of his philosophical mastery. Nay, if even the Hegelian notion were proved (which would require such another industry as Haym's, but on quite another platform of vision) an artifice, a poem, and a dream, the state of the case would remain substantially the same. As to that, indeed, it is to be admitted, that the Hegelian notion has yet to receive
the guarantee of a competent jury who will decide as to whether or not it goes together in the end, as Hegel says, with notion as ordinarily used (if not seen), and constitutes, at the same time, the principle of perception.

Be this as it may, there can be no doubt but that Hegel’s object was truth. ‘That to which,’ he says, ‘in my philosophical efforts, I have wholly striven and strive, is the scientific cognition of truth.’ His works, he tells us, ‘have been many years thought through, and with all earnestness of the object and of scientific requirements worked through.’ He would ‘seek truth but with a consciousness of the nature and value of the relations inherent in thought itself, which are the uniting and determining element of every matter (Inhalt).’ *

A great motive of his action is ‘the misunderstanding, that the inadequacy of the finite categories to truth brings with it the impossibility of objective knowledge, from which misunderstanding the right is inferred to speak and pronounce from feeling and subjective opinion, so that, in place of proof, there step forward asseverations and the recounteds of what is found as facts in consciousness; and the more uncritical this is, it is considered the purer.’ To Hegel philosophy is ‘the reconciliation which the spirit solemnises of itself with itself;’ and this is accomplished by ‘the restoration of that absolute content (Gehalt) beyond which thought at first struggled and set itself out, but a reconciliation in the freest and most native element of the spirit.’ (Passages in commencement of Prefaces to second and third editions of the Encyclopaedia.) The theory, then, that would conceive Hegel’s operations to root in fancy, and to consist of express efforts towards an intentional artefact, is exceedingly absurd and entirely opposed to the truth. Never could human being more zealously receive the torch from his predecessor, or more conscientiously strive to pass it brighter to him that should succeed. To name Hegel’s ‘Philosophiren’ ‘Phantasiren’ is the most monstrous injustice. Concretely viewed, his action is but the necessary historical reaction and complement to the Illumination. In his youth he had shared the ardour of that movement; he had as keenly felt as any one the pang of intelligence, indignant at the monstrous contradictions which an interested superstition sought to impose on it; and in that sense he had for long, laborious years, though entirely by himself and

* In terms of Hume, this amounts to saying that Relations of Ideas constitute the veritably important element in all Matters of Fact.
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for himself, worked and written. It presently became evident to him, however, that it would be his duty and his task, not—with the shallow enlightenment and frivolous gaiety of the thoughtless—to push that movement to its ultimate consummation in an identification of man with the monkey, and of both with the unintelligible, baseless, and fortuitous atoms of an unintelligible, baseless, and fortuitous universe,—but to find such correction and complement for the false and one-sided extreme of the Illumination as would restore the equilibrium of concrete fact. The danger became presently plain to him—the danger of the dissolution of society, of its complete retrocession into barbarism before the attacks of an absolutely enlightened but utterly irrational understanding. The light which the Illumination had turned upon our whole human heritage of time was become, he saw, a flame to devour. God was to be burned out of us, the soul was to be burned out of us; we were to be left in presence only of the material elements, ourselves a material calx.

—Apart from the theoretical world, we can see for ourselves the same movement at work in the practical world. What is the principle of the economical enlightenment of the day? Self-will, and for the realisation of self-will the destruction of every realisation of universal will. Now, what is that but the dissolution of society—what is that but the reduction of all to an infinitely disconnected, inorganic atomism of irresponsible selves? Self-government is the word, not in the sense that the individual will, the false will, is to govern itself into the true will, into the universal will, into God’s will, but in the sense that the individual will, listening only to its own self-will, its own subjective interest, is to govern and prescribe the universal will—a universal will, however, which were then chaos. Yet there are men of the most undeniable talent, and in occupation of very responsible places, who openly avow and with all their heart promote this principle. They look forward with exultation to that day of freedom, to that day of light at length, ‘when we shall doctor and parson ourselves.’ * To doctor and parson ourselves is not to them a proposition of sheer dementia, but an axiom of enlightenment—enlightenment so advanced that it is only too advanced for its own generation! But why should we not also lawyer ourselves, banker ourselves, police ourselves? A large section of the com-

* This, written in 1864, referred to the actual words of an accepted public authority then.
munity would rejoice in the enlightenment and liberality that would relieve it of the incubus of a police. Strange how the gorges of some of these enlightened individuals indignant rise at this as at a palpable absurdity foisted into the place of their own immaculate wisdom! We would parson ourselves, they say, we would doctor ourselves, and we are not sure but that any prescription of the age at which a child shall be allowed to labour is an infringement of the liberty of trade; but we must not speak of attempting to police ourselves,—that is going too far. They say this, and with the most perfect conviction that they have still spoken as rational beings! If they adopt the principle of self-will, they adopt a principle absolutely subjective, there is no guarantee of agreement possible between any two whatever. What is going too far to A. is not going far enough to B., and there is no oracle (criterion) that shall ultimately and definitively decide. If they say, Oh, we do not mean to assert that self-will is to be absolutely trusted; they have opened the door to universal will—they have altered their formula from the unit for itself, to the unit for the whole. Instead of a subjective principle, they have now set up an objective principle; and with such there is the certainty of agreement, system, organisation in the end. Consistency of thought would teach them to see and understand this; but in their devotion to the principles they have inherited, they cannot bring their thoughts together. Point out, for example, that, in obedience to the maxim, Let the individual seek his own self-interest, this unit and that unit have injured the community, with punishment to themselves, it may be,—and, it also may be, without punishment to themselves,—it is not uncommon to be answered: Oh, the unit will find in the end that the general interest is its own interest. Now, they who so answer, are quite unconscious that they have just reversed the very principle in which they so implicitly believe. The community is best served by the individual serving himself, is surely not the same proposition as, The individual is best served by serving the community. But it is on the difference of these propositions that the whole case we seek to make out rests. The former is a subjective principle, and incapable of any one specific assignment or determinate appointment whatever; the latter is an objective principle, and contains within it the entire organisation of society. The one is the principle of Self-will—
Slavery; the other, the principle of the Universal Will—Liberty.

On what thin abstractions this Enlightenment sometimes inflates itself! Demand and Supply, for example,—this phrase is used as if it possessed in itself power—as if it fulfilled functions, performed operations, achieved results. There never was a greater mistake. Demand and Supply,—what is so named—is in itself utterly empty, utterly untrue. To be true,—it presupposes a concrete system and actually at work; it is this system alone which is its truth, and without this system it is an idle phrase: without this system, indeed, it is a phrase which would never occur to be used. Demand and Supply was the inexorable law to which the universe must submit; America was par excellence the land which recognised, honoured, and obeyed such principles: yet, because the negroes of Central Africa sell each other, this well-principled America rushes into a war and,—in cotton—negates the law. It is something else than Demand and Supply that has worked and works here then: not but that America is still true to the great principle of Self-will,—so true that she has here broken down and put an end to a concrete system in her own midst, through which, in a particular instance, the abstractions of Demand and Supply had a filling of fact. Demand may now 'burst its wind' in Manchester, and Supply die of glut in Charleston; but there is no longer any concrete system to reunite the pair.* In short, the formal generality that describes, is no substantial principle that animates and moves; and Demand and Supply, as no more than a naming, has but an abstract reference to temporary complexes which are a prey to thousandfold contingency.

Said Enlightenment, nevertheless, enjoys at this moment the most triumphant of reputations. Illustrious Statesmen boast to have imbibed it, all Politicians swear by it, and most Newspaper Editors live by it. It is not difficult to explain this. The Illumination is an historical movement, there is much truth in it, we accept it on the whole,—only, we would see into it, we would know its limits and conditions, we would ascertain the higher truth into which it must be absorbed. Now, as it is with the Whole, the Illumination in general, so it is with a part, this illumination in particular. This part brought its light also, and what it lit was not all found good. How could it? Was it at all likely that the arrangements which suited Feudalism, a state of war,

* In the time of the war.
would be found to suit Industrialism, a state of peace? The light once thrown, then, the discrepancy was visible, and of late we have done little else than throw off, much to the gain of Industrialism,—the obsolete provisions of Feudalism. It is this which constitutes the praise of the particular illumination in question,—Mr Buckle intimates as much,—Mr Buckle himself acknowledges with satisfaction that all reform as yet is but an undoing of what an ignorant (!) past had done. Nor—so far as Feudalism is opposed to Industrialism—would we willingly be understood to think otherwise here; we accept the relative demonstrations of Hume and Adam Smith; and we rejoice as sincerely as another in the advantages which have been accruing to industrialism from reformation or repeal, and in special reference to the appointments of Feudalism. What we seek to make plain is only—besides the true nature of its abstract principle—the peculiarity of that concrete material in battle with which it has earned its fame.

As regards the principle, what we have said can be made good also from another point of view. As part and parcel of the Illumination, Political Economy can have at bottom no principle but the Right of Private Judgment. But in this element the considerations are not merely theoretical: they concern action; the right of private judgment is here brought into application with individual commodity. No wonder, then, that the word private becomes much more strongly concentrated in this, a sphere of action, than in others that bear only on theory and belief. That Political Economy should openly set up self-will as its principle, was in such relations obviously irresistible. Nevertheless, that it was private judgment that was in question ought not to have escaped notice; and judgment applied to the interests of Political Economy,—that is, to the stewardship of the nation,—is competent to a system only, to an organisation, the necessity of which shall be reason. There is possible, then, a true Science of Political Economy, which shall boast not only to be negative of the past, but positive of the present, and in its tendency, therefore, certiorative of the future. This science, then, shall cease to be destructive, and become constructive; nor will it set up the merely subjective principle of self-will, but honestly and strenuously strive forward to the realisation of the objective principle of universal will. Then, perhaps, we shall have a stewardship of the nation, but now look at the chaos!

Political Economy is usually treated of under four divisions, the
last of which (Consumption), however, has no prescripts that cannot be included under the first. The objects of this science, therefore, may be all included under Production, Exchange, and Distribution; a classification that falls out not very diverse from the triplicity of the notion. Distribution as yet belongs very much to a region of doubt and difficulty—in every view, and may be passed over at present. But how does the principle of self-will work as regards the two spheres of Production and Exchange? We can, of course, in this place, not expound, but only suggest. Well, in these days is there not a tendency for self-will to penetrate and render rotten every article of Production, and have we not infinitely more difficulty to save ourselves from this enemy than even from our rats? Let us consider the colour of our clothes alone, or let us ask simply on what principles any farmer raises his potatoes. As regards Exchange, again, is there not at present a very large class who live by intercepting and laying their own toll on commodities,—who live, as it were, by taking rides on commodities—through their Capital? These men produce not, they merely put the consumer to the expense of their ride. The expense is the least part of the damage: the active centres of immorality that are thus generated, this is the great point. We hear the purest disciples of Political Economy as it is, speak themselves with positive terror of the threatened 'pestilential influence of these mushroom-moneyed men.' And, indeed, there seems good reason for the terror. There seems rapidly growing up among us a spurious middle class to which our legislators themselves pay deference, asking their advice in crises of actual government, as if they—in their political economy—were the depositaries of all wisdom. This class is not so much constituted by honourable and thrifty producers, as by bold and crafty commodity-riders, unscrupulous contractors, lucky colonists, &c. Now what is the life of such people? In one word, it consists of the coarse brutality and vulgar insolence of expenditure and display. Uneducated, unrefined, unpleasant persons they often are, who see the clothes you have on, and remark on the jewelry your wife wears; yet they push into parliament and infect their neighbourhood with the emulation of expense. Now these are a class, so far, of Political Economy's own making, and they are poisonous and deranging in the highest degree. They presume on the breadth of platform their money extends to them. Merit—as it is called—merit, in comparison, is rebuked into the cold
shade by such categories as, He lives at the Clarendon—he paid so-and-so for his brougham! True it is that evils are not without compensation, and that there is a reaction against this class on the part of gentlemen, as there was a reaction against the barbarity of the time on the part of the gentle Knights of King Arthur, or of a later period. Many of our best writers reflect this at present, as Tennyson, Carlyle, Dickens, Kingsley, Kinglake (whose chapter as against the coup d'état is but a manifesto of the principles of a brave English gentleman as he is now). We would suggest, then, that Production and Exchange, as they work at present, exhibit nothing of system, or generalisation, union, arrangement, reason, but form together the wide-weltering chaos of a disintegrated and irresponsible Atomism. Will any one pretend that the stewardship of a nation is best performed in such a miscellaneous and promiscuous fashion as this?

Political Economy, then, would it really be Political Economy, and prove adequate to the national stewardship, must reject this its principle of Self-will, and adopt instead the principle of Universal Will. Indeed, Political Economy itself shows a dim sense of this in that very answer which we have seen already as regards the unit finding out in the end that the interest of the community is its own also. This answer amounts to—The true universal will is the true individual will. What we would point out, however, is, that while Political Economy—at least as very generally advocated—has never made this principle plain to itself, but, on the contrary, has held by the opposite, it offers—so holding—no field for the realisation of the former. It would work out the universal will, we shall say, and it is sincere in believing that the true mean to that end is to leave the individual to his own interests, which he will find sooner or later to be identical with those of the community. We willingly grant also that this is perfectly true, and that the means are perfectly adequate—could the individual but live long enough. But just here lies the rub: the individual cannot live long enough. It is quite certain that a perfect experience would make us all gentlemen, in the sense which has been already partly indicated, that is, selfless; so selfless, that the very self we should assert—if in any way obliged to assert self—would be the universal, and not the individual self, our self, the objective one—but not our self, the subjective one. It is certainly best that a man should freely grow into manhood by the influences of his own natural life. But how if he have not time enough, or how if he should be
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individually so constituted as to be—of himself—incapable as regards such growth? Has Reason nothing to say, then? The ligaments of vows are not in general to be recommended, but they have saved many a man. Is there no system of Reason demonstrable that would train and discipline and school a man into his own true manhood? Is all organisation hopeless, must we be simply left each of us to his own self-will? We know that we are not in point of fact so left; we know that there is the Government, &c.; but we deny that it is competent to Political Economy—largely as at present—to allude to this, for that Political Economy would reduce Government to the Police—a Police, too, wholly subject to the will of its objects, and these objects being stimulated into activity by express injunctions to follow out their own self-interests. Nay, we might say that in that case Political Economy has no right to speak of Government at all, for no Government could long exist side by side with the principle of Self-will.—Is there no means of expressly guiding forward Self-will into Universal Will by human reason, or for that consummation must it be simply left to itself and the path of natural instinct? We do not make the most of Nature anywhere else by leaving it to itself: our gains everywhere else are brought about by empaling natural contingency within rational necessity. Are we to despair of a similar method in application to the natural man? Compare the man that comes as it were direct from the furrow with him, the son of a good house, who is bred—who from the cradle upwards feeds and fills on Inhalt, the Inhalt of experience inherited, of experience acquired, by his parents! The former enters on the world in mere natural immediacy, absolutely abstract; his action is a series of blunders, he has all to learn; he is a boy at forty, at fifty,—perhaps he drops into the grave 'an exasperated stripling of three-score years and ten.' Not so the other—(actual exceptions subvert not the ideal rule)—he is a man from his majority, and thenceforward does the work of a man. Here we see how the Family acts in converting mere nature into reason, and may be led by its example to anticipate the possibility of a like function on the part of Government as well. The method of the Family, however, is not to leave the individual to his own self-will and the casual experience of natural life, but, through the aliment of an objective reason, as it were, objectively deposited, to develop into full stature the true or universal will which is implicit in the natural will, the self-will of every human being. As is the method
of the Family, so then must be that of the Government. Nay, the rudest Government that ever existed had no principle at bottom but the conversion of self-will into universal will. The first step, the first stir to Society, ties a knot on self-will, cuts a knot from universal will. Only in a state of nature, only among men anthropoid merely—call them Gorillas if you will—do we find the principle of the Political Economy of the day at home at last. It is perfectly natural, then, that there should have been so much stir of late about the Monkey. The Illumination with the light of the Right of Private Judgment was destined to reach no less a consummation. So it delights to humiliate, in the triumph of its own intelligence, the dullards who pretend still to find bread in tradition, consoling its own self when it sighs—for it will sigh—by contemplation of the all of things, through dissipation of heat and mechanical energy, speedily at rest, a cold opaque idle bulk, in the centre of a cold opaque idle space—and so for ever—a useless, unlighted universe left to blank time and its own useless, unlighted self!—These are the latest results of the Illumination; and if these are to be accepted and held true, there is just no more to be said; there need not be talk any longer of self-will, or universal will, or government at all; there is but one conclusion: let those who can enjoy the senses continue to enjoy them; let those who cannot, take aconite, like Aristotle (if true), and go to bed.

But suppose we determine not to accept these results, perhaps we had better determine also to be just done at last and altogether with the Illumination as the Illumination. The wide welter of lonely, isolated atoms produced by it—each miserable, all miserable, divorced from Substance—is painful to look at. Why, books themselves, which formerly were as our cells of sacred fire, are now bound on the same commercial voyage as all the rest; they are but counters, and take rank by the amount they stand for: we ask now, not how much of the Ideal do they contain, but how much of the Real will they bring? Perhaps, then, we had better declare completely off with the Illumination, and turn to see if there can be any help elsewhere.

Hegel demonstrates, by History and otherwise, the end of man to be Freedom. Now, it must be said that the first step to Freedom—and this has been said by Aristotle—is material possession. We owe Industrialism, then, however misguided, sincere thanks for the immense mass of material commodity it has of late realised: we possess there a most indispensable magazine for the
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future. That this magazine is for the future, however, rather than for the present, is the proof that Industrialism is as yet misguided: who is there as yet that enjoys Freedom through it—is there a soul on this earth at present so situated as regards material possession that he is free from apprehension?

Und die Sorge, die mehr als selbst mir das Ubel verhasst ist!

By Freedom, however, Hegel means specially the realisation of the universal will; and his system must be regarded as the path of Philosophy to that end. Nor will it be found, on sufficient consideration, that we have reason to disapprove either of the meaning attached to the word, or of the method proposed for the realisation of the thing. If Philosophy have reached at length, as Hegel asserts, the position of a Science—if it be now Wisdom, and no longer simply the love of Wisdom—if, in fact, it be really the Science of Science, the knowledge of knowledge,—where else can we ever hope to find any better promise for the realisation in question? Hegel's books, however, are a hard road and a long: is there no short cut—is there no single practical principle competent to act at once as criterion, as test, as guide?—Ten years ago, in a little medical essay, we proposed for this very function—Health.

We live at present mostly for material enjoyment; material possession is held up as the only reward, the only success; and human effort, accordingly, hunts such game to the uttermost parts of the earth. Attainment, however, it is found on trial, rarely satisfies. Life is passed between two fevers—the first of inflammation and of struggle, the last of typhus and despair. Hence the rush to and fro of the ignoble at present, as of maddened animals stung by gadflies; hence the profound dejection, the cloud, that sits for ever on the nobler. It is a false end we seek,—it is a false life we lead,—and we owe both to the Aufklärung, Atomistic Spannung, mutual atomistic repulsion,—abstract Self-will,—material Greed: what other fruits could a science so-called, born of denial of the universal, born of destruction, bear? We are all now absolutely disintegrated, absolutely separated, absolutely unsympathetic units. Each, absolutely excludent of others, absolutely includent of self, is simply desperate. We live for the senses, and die. Mere life is the whole; there is no end to work out, no noble purpose to fulfil, there is no Beyond! Formerly, the world had an object; it was a scheme of probation,
of which all partook, in which all united, to which the Whole helped the Part. It is so no longer: it is a distracted ant-hill, in blind physical ferment. The Illumination could have no other end. But is there no cure? Will life again never come to have the meaning of probation? Will man again, indeed, never come just to live as in a meaning? Is it impossible to restore humanity, and ‘let the ape and tiger die?’ Now, in effect, Kant and Hegel have lived for no other end than this that is here indicated: both would complete the side of materialism, animalism, at which the Illumination is now nakedly arrived at length, by the other side of idealism, spiritualism, which is found to be equally authentic the moment we turn from perception as perception to thought as thought. And surely this is a very coarse conclusion,—Unless I touch, I will not believe; only what I hold in my hand is. Kant and Hegel, then, in one word, would restore Faith. The path to the new world is necessarily through them. Nevertheless, it is in the same interest that we would suggest here an application to the general problem of the principle of Health. Having health, we should be happy; having health, we should know we were in the right. Then health is a something known, it is a tangible object; there are means to it, it can be worked to. Suppose Government were but as a Board of Health, with no object but the health of the Community—with no duty but to do for the individual in that direction what the individual could not do for himself! Health is the outward sign of Freedom; health is the realisation of the Universal Will. Health as a practical principle—for it demands conditions, intellectual, moral, religious, &c., as well as physical—is adequate to bring into a focus, into a single point of action, all the great interests which philosophy demonstrates in the constitution of humanity. Man is a triple thread of cognition, emotion, volition; on that triplicity is his whole world disposed; and health may be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious operation of the whole system—as sign and as goal of a realisation of life.

Nor are we without good reason for supposing that the founders of Political Economy themselves would now agree with these views. The place of David Hume as regards this science, and the relations borne to him by Colbert, by Quesnay, and by Adam Smith, have been already suggested. In general, we may say, indeed, that in France the Illumination took on the form rather of a mockery of the contradictions of Tradition, and that it was
Hume who really constituted the thought of that movement—who may be called the High Priest, then, not only of the Aufklärung as a whole, but of Political Economy specially. This is the veritable historical position. In David Hume, nevertheless, we find none of those one-sided, and consequently untrue, extremes to which his followers incline: the complete Urtheil which we see now into mere self-identical abstractions, would have been an anachronism then. That Government, for example, should only be an affair of external and internal Police, and that, for the rest, everybody should be exhorted to follow his own self-interest,—of this we find nothing in Hume.* The existent dialectic of concrete things was too obvious to such an intellect as his, to allow him to remain immovable in a single side.

We have with regard to taxes, he says (Essay, 'Of Taxes,' last paragraph), an instance of what frequently happens in political institutions, that the consequences of things are diametrically opposite to what we should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the Turkish Government, that the Grand Signior, though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who has made such an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression; yet it is certain, that its effect is quite contrary.

The same open sense to the same natural dialectic is seen here (Essay, 'Of the Balance of Power'), where he is remarking on the irresistible tendency displayed, up to that time, by England, to interfere in the quarrels of other nations:

These excesses, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become still more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally careless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe.† The Athenians, from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece, finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no contest ever took party on either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.

Doubtless, there are those who will find that these words have already come true, and that England has already entered on the second Athenian phase. Again, though no man ever saw clearer into the advantageous side of what he named Luxury, yet, when claiming, firstly, to that extent, he admits, 'secondly, that wherever

* It is precisely to this, however, that 'advanced thinkers' and advanced political economists (see Buckle passim) would reduce government.
† This was what was commonly supposed the right thing to advocate then (1864 say).
luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, though perhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.’ (Essay, ‘Of Luxury.’)

There is dialectic here, too (Essay, ‘Of Commerce’):

It may seem an odd position, that the poverty of the common people in France, Italy, and Spain, is, in some measure, owing to the superior riches of the soil and happiness of the climate; and yet there want not many reasons to justify this paradox.

Similarly illustrative is his admission, though attributing the power of modern states to Commerce, that

Sparta was certainly more powerful than any state now in the world, consisting of an equal number of people. and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. . . . In short, no probable reason can be given for the great power of the more ancient States above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury. (Essay, ‘Of Commerce.’)

The extreme openness and candour of Hume’s nature is seen in these examples: it is only his disciples who have become thin, shallow, stiff, pompous, and at the same time fierce, bigoted and fanatic. Think of Mr Buckle’s rationale of the difference between England and France, and compare it with the admission of Hume (Essay, ‘Of Commerce’):

Lord Bacon, accounting for the great advantages obtained by the English in their wars with France, ascribes them chiefly to the superior ease and plenty of the common people amongst the former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike.

Observe his attitude here:

The public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extensive commerce of private men.

This is now stereotyped into a fixed and immovable axiom of Economical Science, and this is really the character Hume would wish to demonstrate for it; but he is led by his full nature and unjaundiced eye immediately to add:

This maxim is true in general; though I cannot forbear thinking, that it may possibly admit of some exceptions, and that we often establish it with too little reserve and limitation. There may be some circumstances, where the commerce, and riches, and luxury of individuals, instead of adding strength to the public, will serve only to thin its armies, and diminish its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being, and susceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found false when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.
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Now this has become true in these very days as regards his own doctrines. Society suffered in his time from prohibition and protection, which,

Deprived neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the Author of the world has intended, by giving them the soils, climates, and geniuses, so different from each other (Essay, 'Of the Balance of Trade').

That is, in ultimate abstraction, society suffered then from a certain assertion of Self-will against the Universal Will. It was to do good work, then, on the part of Hume to point out this; and the consequence is, that we live now in an entirely opposite system of arrangements. But the opposition may be too complete, and his own words may have become true of his own results. Absolute non-interference may be now 'false when we have embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.' Hume's object was, in essential meaning, to give scope to universal will, and frustrate self-will; but now, in an opposite state of things it is possible for precisely self-will to constitute the inconvenience, and we may be obliged to return to intervention, though in a new and higher light.

It seems so desirable to demonstrate affinity with the thought of Hume, that a little further development in this connexion may prove not unwelcome.

As soon as men quit their savage state, where they live chiefly by hunting and fishing, they must fall into these two classes (husbandmen and manufacturers); though the arts of agriculture employ at first the most numerous part of the society. Time and experience improve so much these arts, that the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men than those who are immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furnish the more necessary manufactures to such as are so employed. If these superfluous hands apply themselves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of luxury, they add to the happiness of the State, since they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments with which they would otherwise have been unacquainted. But may not another scheme be proposed for the employment of these superfluous hands? May not the sovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increase the dominions of the State abroad, and spread its fame over distant nations? It is certain, that the fewer desires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ; and consequently the superfluities of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and manufacturers, may support fleets and armies to a much greater extent than where a great many arts are required to minister to the luxury of particular persons. Here, therefore, seems to be a kind of opposition betwixt the greatness of the State and the happiness of the subjects. A State is never greater than when all its superfluous hands are employed in the service of the public. The ease and convenience
of private persons require that these hands should be employed in their service. The one can never be satisfied but at the expense of the other. As the ambition of the sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals, so the luxury of individuals must diminish the force and check the ambition of the sovereign. (Essay, 'Of Commerce')

In the first place, there suggests itself a lesson in method here. What we see at once in this passage is—after the loose manner or method common to the period and continued by Mr Buckle, but which is so unlike the rigorous deduction of the Notion—Hume engaged beating up ground for inferences through conjectural picturings of what would naturally be the case in such and such circumstances. It is easy to understand that such a method must be at the mercy of subjective contingency, and can insure no necessary result. We as subjects have as much right as Hume as a subject to set on our own conjectures and insist on our own results. By way of example, let us dream over again what Hume has dreamed, let us see if the same natural pictures which came to him will come also to us, and let us compare the conclusions. Well—Men as hunters have killed all their game; they must live, they take to agriculture. Practising agriculture, they require certain manufactures (tools, clothes, &c.). At first they supply these themselves. By-and-by certain individuals are found experter, more productive at this sort of industry than others. The latter say then to the former, Do the same thing for us—make our tools, our clothes, &c., and we shall pay you out of our growths. But to both classes, their respective industries become by practice easier, and take less time, or produce more abundantly in the same time. A surplus is the result. Every individual in the community is well off; he can afford to give. Accordingly he exchanges his surplus freely—a variety of skills having developed itself, meanwhile, in the manufacturing class, with a consequent variety of products—for such articles as please him, and he gradually surrounds himself with wealth. The variety of skills thus encouraged, sunders into the full discretion of the difference, and a civilised community blooms before us in full activity. But now self-will enters. Indolence and incapacity have led to inequalities, which, however, indolence and incapacity will not brook,—which they will balance by violence. Those who are the objects of this violence seek defence. An executive, a government, a power that can control, rises as the means of this defence. Now, the varieties in the fortunes of this power, as it presents itself in the various
peoples, constitute History. Suppose this power to arise late—
suppose the workers to have enjoyed a long immunity from
violence, and to have reached, each of them, a considerable
amount of well-being—then, probably, the resultant state will
be an England with the workers and the executive in a healthy
equilibrium. Hume supposes Sparta, Rome, &c., to arise from this,
—that the sovereign took the superfluous hands that resulted from
the surplus, and made—to the prevention of commerce—soldiers
of them. But suppose we go on our own way, and assume rather
the controlling power to have arisen early, we think it more natural
to see a France issue; and, in seeing this, perhaps, at the same
time, more light bursts on us as regards the differences between
England and France, which Hume cannot, and which Mr Buckle
can, attribute to differences of government as such, than is
contained, it may be, in the very pretentious but very unsatis-
factory hither and thither of statements accorded us at so much
length and with so much uction by the latter. As for Sparta,
the Helots were a conquered tribe, and their conquerors took to
themselves their surplus and lived as soldiers. It is not difficult
to prefer the other application of this surplus, that, namely, to the
encouragement of arts and peaceful activity, and it is plain as
well that an early seizing of an agricultural surplus might issue
in a splendid state with miserable inhabitants; but it is by no
means certain that the Spartans would have been less powerful
had they 'given employment to a great variety of trades and
manufactures,' as is the averment of Hume. Sparta was certainly
great without commerce, but not necessarily for that reason.
Rather, it should be said, Sparta was without commerce, for, as
yet, such organised intercourse between nation and nation hardly
was: demand and supply was then a dead letter, for no concrete
system on a sufficiently general scale was yet formed to make it
a living spirit. Had such system existed, however, then one
skilled Helot—only a single worker if in his own field—might
have drawn the produce of two agricultural workers elsewhere,
&c. Had such things taken place in Sparta, the Helots might
have gradually grown into a power in the state, nor would
this state have been, necessarily, less strong. It might have
possessed so many skills, for the products of which—on the
supposition of a general system of commerce existing—men would
give, that it would have been difficult for an enemy to exhaust it.
Of all this England is an example as opposed to France.
Consideration of this picture, and in comparison with similar pictures both of Hume and Buckle, may suggest some profitable inferences as regards the particular method involved, and whole general industry indeed. But we, for our parts, take leave to use the illustration for the purpose of bringing home our general argument. We would point out that, as self-will invaded the community with violence in early times, and necessitated an organised defence—a defence often based on no higher motive than again self-will—the interests of class (feudalism, &c.),—so self-will attacks the community now with fraud (in adulterations and impositions of many kinds), and necessitates insight on our part and a new defence. Now, I think Hume, had he lived at present, would have conceded this. His great intellect would have seen that his own words had come true, that the Illumination had done its work, that the due middle was being overstepped; that, as extremes meet, precisely that was making its appearance on the new extreme, which he had striven to crush on the old;—that, in short, 'what was true while we adhered to one way of thinking, was proving itself false now that he had embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.' In a word, as it was only self-will that he combated then, he would have had no difficulty in deciding that it was now all the more his duty to combat self-will still.

Thought, in fact, has infinitely improved since Hume, through Kant and Hegel, and in consequence of Hume; and, did this last live now, he would be able to think much more clearly, much more consecutively, than he did then. What had been then hazy to him would be now distinct, and all his opinions would be found to have undergone important modifications. If he saw then that there was a negative side to commerce, as in regard to the possibility of an excess of luxury and of a consequent diminution 'of strength to the public,' he would see the same thing now much more clearly. If he saw then, as in the case of Sparta, that ancient greatness was owing to the want of commerce, he would understand now better the reason of that, and would be more likely to admit that the fall of this greatness derived from luxury itself in one of its stages. That he would not allow then. Averring that

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He still asserts that—

It would be easy to prove, that writers mistook the cause of the disorders in the Roman state, and ascribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conquests: luxury or refinement on pleasure has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption, nor can anything restrain or regulate the love of money but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of luxury and knowledge. (‘Of Luxury.’)

Still, we are disposed to believe that Hume would have understood all this much better now. He would have seen more clearly, perhaps, into the truth of his own words, that what is good thus, may be bad so. Luxury may not always remain ‘innocent,’ and certainly it was not ‘innocent’ when Rome fell. Let it be easy to Hume to prove what he may, still the truth is this, that self-will had come into the state. Rome as Rome was now what she wished to be, the mistress of the world; the passion for ascent in the breasts of her children could no longer expend itself without; this passion still worked within, nevertheless, and would have an outlet; so it became a battle of self-wills, and the self-will of Cicero or Cato is no less visible than that of Catiline or Crassus. It became a battle of self-wills, till the realest of self-wills, the abstractest self-will, the self-will κατ᾽ εξοχήν, Caesar’s self-will, that which would be rather first in a village than second in Rome, asserted and made itself good.* Then there was a place instituted for the rest to strive to; for to it—in ultimate analysis—even the most distant strove, though through an intervening interdependency of patron and client: and they were all slaves: the empire, the freedom for which they had battled, proved their own enslavement.

The same luxury that has made our welfare, may, in other circumstances, prove our bane, just as it is the same oxygen that both makes and wastes our fire, ourselves. Hume will have it that honour and virtue abound more in ages of luxury, but this depends on the age of the luxury. There doubtless have been—perhaps there yet are—materialists both virtuous and honourable; but still virtue and honour are, in ultimate instance, incompatible with materialism, for materialism must end—in a worship of the senses. Now, so it was in the latter end of Rome;—all

* Even to this day, and in various lands, unlimited self-will names itself still—Cesar!
religion had fled—sensuous gratification was alone left—and there was no longer any place for honour and virtue.

The truth is, that commerce is both a private and a public gain—like everything else, when in measure: it is neither the one nor the other when it is out of measure. And it is out of measure now: it knows no longer anything of the universal will, it has abandoned itself to self-will, and it now visibly corrupts in the midst of a boundless fermentation. Interference, then, is now required, if we would not see the State destroyed. In very truth, the present cry of so-called Political Economy—consummate wisdom though it seem to itself—of, Hold off, hold off, leave self-will to itself, is sheer dementia. For to allege that the self-will it means, is self-will controlled by virtue, is an imbecility of blindness to the state of the question and to the fact that that one word hands the whole matter over to Reason qua Reason—an imbecility of blindness to this, that, while materialism is incompatible with virtue, it is materialism which dominates now. Much reason, then, have we to set up the principle of Health, and say, surely you will all agree to that, surely you would all like to be at least healthy.

While, on the one hand, then, we have reason to believe that Hume would have at once accepted the distinction between universal will and self-will, even as against himself, we have auxiliary glimpses into the incompleteness of his own positions as they then stood. Imperfections of thought, contradictions of thought, we have seen as regards Sparta and as regards Rome, and the case is not much better with such an allegation as this, that ‘a nation may lose most of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people.’ (‘Of Commerce.’) The may is a category that certainly leaves open for itself a very wide door; but surely the view must, on the whole, have been but hazy that could give rise to such an expression. Suppose the foreign trade had introduced a large amount of the necessaries of life, as grain, for example? In fine, while, in all probability, Hume would have seen it right to fight the battle of universal will even against his own descendants, we see that it is impossible to trust the loose method of miscellaneous reasonment on natural conjecture, as practised, with whatever captivating ingenuity, by himself, or, with whatever amusing breadth of make-believe, by Mr Buckle: we certainly stand very much in need of a method of the notion, and it is to be hoped that the Hegelian, or some other, will, in the end, substantiate itself.
CONCLUSION.

It will be plain, then, that it is not hostility to the founders of Political Economy that prompts the position here. On the contrary, Hume is to us one of the ablest intellects: if not preferable to Burns bulk for bulk, so to speak, he is still in a social aspect the most perfect of men, and probably the most important literary Scotchman that ever lived. His comprehensiveness, to use Mr. Buckle's favourite category (which with him meant pretty much only desultory miscellaneous reading, and, in the first instance, only his own), is superlative, and there is hardly an intellectual movement now in existence of which he was not the vital germ.* His most limited side is that of literary criticism; but that was the very weakest side of the Aufklärung generally (see Blair's Lectures, passim!), and it is pleasing to perceive Hume, if boundless in his estimation of Pope (not but that, duly, admiration in such a case is right, and very right too), not blinded by the same, like many other members of the Illumination, to the merits of Milton. It is a tic of the Aufklärung to say style, and style, and style, with very little regard to the matter if it be only of the ordinary, shallow, natural reasonment, but Hume must have meaning as well as style, he must have information from what he reads. 'An author,' he says, 'is little to be valued who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-house conversation;' and this he would have said, we doubt not, independently of the style. There are those who say still of literary excellence, really so far as the thoughts are concerned, there is nothing new, or peculiar, or great in it—it all comes to the style, it is the style that gives the value. It may be well to intimate again that a thing is valuable—and consequently style itself—only in proportion to the amount of thought it contains.

Still we think the position made good, that the disciples of Hume and Smith have pushed the doctrines of their masters into unwarrantable abstractions, one-sided, false, dangerous,—and utterly irrational. Hume points out himself the advantage of equable distribution, and talks of the dangers of monopolies. Now the great tendency at present is to these latter. All must be on the great scale nowadays—Farms, Factories, Contracts,—Speculations of all kinds. People are no longer content to ply a modest

* Hegel gives to Kant the glory of beginning the categories: yet Hume is here too in his seven classes of philosophical relation, as his distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas is just the an sich, the in itself, of German Philosophy in general.
and moderate industry with just sufficient surplus to insure the welfare of their children and the comfort of their own old age. That was possible formerly, when men—apart from their immediate occupation—still interested themselves in other objects of intellect, of morality, of religion. But now all is changed—what is now is but a longing and a rush—we have no time to wait—we must enjoy now—we must make a fortune at a stroke, or let us just go under. Self-will vies with self-will for material possession. Material possession, indeed, is, in sum, the single category now; and for result there is this boundless welter, where no individual is connected with another, where many fall every instant out, as through trap-doors of the bridge of Mirza, unheeded and uncared for. Nor is there any cure for this but in the promulgation of true principles—intellectual, moral, and religious—which will, perhaps, lead in the end to a coalition of upper, middle, and under-class veritable manhood against the spurious middle-class which self-love has so swiftly generated in the material of commerce. Destruction ought to be seen now to be as absurd as Obstruction, and Construction the only duty. Did but true Constructives form themselves there in the centre, possessed of principles, either of the extremes, Destructive or Obstructive, were overmatched, while any coalition of both were but the result of a blunder. The veritable Destructives among us are the apostles of self-love, who worship the American constitution of no institution, and know no human ability to admire but that which by successful commodity-riding raises itself into the spurious middle-class, the miserable, never-satisfied, self-love-goaded members of which vie, painfully, vulgarly, with each other, ‘in the fashion of a ring or the pattern of a shoe-buckle,’ in the cost of their carriages or the prices of their wines.

But if we can bring Hume to our side, we think it not impossible similarly to withdraw from the ranks of the enemy even Bacon himself. No one will deny that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were employed on true interests, political, moral, scientific, &c. How about their descendants, the Schoolmen, however?—Yes, here it is plain that what is a rich and living concrete with masters, can become a dead and empty abstract with pupils. This it was that disgusted Bacon and turned him once again to Fact. Nor is this alone less than a sufficient guarantee for the originality, or, as we prefer to name it, for the genuineness of the faculty of Bacon; which genuineness it is
that in all cases makes the superior man. Bacon—possibly for the rest, a somewhat weak and ostentatious personality, and as a writer, infected, on the whole, perhaps, by force of classical example (see Sallust in his openings), with the specious mouthing of a thin moralisation—said here: all these logicalities are but idle abstractions,—they do nothing;—let us turn to Fact instead, and then we shall have something that is, for something that only sounds. But if Bacon turned on what had degenerated from a concrete into an abstract then, we have a right to claim his protest against a similar abuse now; for that it really is a similar abuse which in these days we suffer at the hands of so-called Political Economy, we think certain. Such simple suggestion, however, as we have seen already, must on this head at present suffice. Men, indeed, who would have us regulate our conduct by such void abstractions as Demand and Supply, Capital will find its own outlet, Labour its own market, Wages their own level, &c., are really as idle in the lazy indifference of such cynical laissez faire as the seraphic doctors who discussed the number of angels that may stand on the point of a needle. Did any merchant ever make sixpence by any such prescripts? Apart from the cutting asunder of the ligatures of an obsolete system (Feudalism, &c.), and apart from the seeming convenience of hard, unrelenting self-interest (which will be found, however, just its own dialectic in the end), what merchant, since the promulgation of Political Economy, can point to a gain which he owes not rather to his own individual sagacity—that sagacity, for example, that found cheap markets for purchase and dear ones for sale, and that lessened, as well, the number and commissions of the intervening hands? Will those interminable platitudes about the nature of Credit ever enable a merchant to know more than his first transaction of the kind teaches him, that a credit, namely, is but a loan for a consideration; or, in fact, does any merchant ever trouble himself to read the same?

Demand and Supply, Capital, Wages, Labour, &c., all these are concerns of human reason, and can be guided by human reason only; they cannot be left to the mere allegation of a law that exists we know not where—in the air, perhaps? And would Political Economy (so-called) leave them to aught else? It is really worth while looking at the cheap triumph of immaculate wisdom which said Political Economy procures itself in this reference, as well as at the self-devotion of its trust, the awe, the
prostration, the superstition of its worship of mere abstractions, mere formalities that—substantially—are not. At present, for example, observe with what swelling self-complacency Political Economy (so-called) watches the rise of the rate of discount at the Bank of England in steady reply to the increasing ferment of reckless speculation! It is in the presence, it thinks, of infallible law, it sees Commerce—the mighty commercial system—correct itself—and this without meddlesome interference!* It remits its gas for a moment, indeed, when it suddenly sees reckless Banks spring to meet this reckless speculation, but presently recovers itself on renewed recognition of law. Even on the ultimate result of wide-spread ruin and misery, it still smiles, as on the legitimate fruit of law! Yet at this moment, Political Economists are never done with cries to England to interfere for the Danes and against the Prussians! Will, then, the bereaved widows and orphans of the foreign sin be worse off than the robbed widows and orphans of the domestic sin; and is English Reason all-powerful for a trouble without, but impotent for a trouble within? If we are passively to leave all to law,—law we don’t know where—law in the air—law which is just as a law of nature,—why make an exception of the Danish difficulty? That too, in the end, will settle itself on law—the law of the strongest, as the other case (reckless speculation, &c.) on the law of the cunningest and richest—a law of nature very truly each!

But, indeed, this levity of recognition and acceptance of law is wonderful. Where, after all, is this law? Is it in the commodities themselves? Political Economy (abstract) swells big as it thinks to itself of its laws of Production, its laws of Exchange, its laws of Distribution: but ought these abstract phrases to conceal from Political Economy this, that neither the Distribution, nor the Exchange, nor, in a true sense, even the Production, is in the commodities? Distribution, Exchange, even Production, lies only in Humanity; laws in this connexion can only be generalisations of Humanity’s action; and the action of Humanity as Humanity is Reason. The true laws of Political Economy, then, are laws of Reason, and not of Nature. But it is to some fiction of a blind law of nature that this Political Economy has in reality looked, superstitiously reverent. It seems to itself hitherto to have been in presence of a vast power which was supposed to be

* May not this acknowledgment of a commercial system be regarded as a tribute to the principle of system—to the principle of universal will as against self-will?
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quite beyond and above all assignments and prescripts of any mere man. Mr Buckle very naively betrays an instinctive consciousness of the true state of the case, not only in acknowledging that all triumphs of Political Economy hitherto have been but destructions of an old (that is, that Political Economy wins for its idle abstractions the credit of the industrial progress due simply to the cutting of ligatures which were in place elsewhere and at another time), but in proposing to mediate between man and nature through the laws of Political Economy, for in this he very plainly indicates what he felt, that, somehow or other, there was an effort on the part of Political Economy to reduce human interests to laws of Nature. Nor could it be otherwise, and the whole thing is a very simple matter: for Self-will is a law of Nature, a law of the flesh; it is universal will that is the law of Reason. The light here ought to be absolutely convincing, for to attempt to subject Reason to Nature—brute Nature with its brute Necessity and no less its brute Contingency—is simply the contradiction of contradictions, is simply preposterousness proper; for we are human just by this, that we supersede Nature, and that we conduct its Contingency into the Necessity of Reason.

Abstract Political Economy in this aspect, then, is but de-humanisation, and an abdication of Reason, and yet it will hardly be possible for any one to realise by-and-by the power possessed by the be-frilled and be-ruffled Political Economy at present, of sneering its opponent into the cold shade of ignorance, to be there, indeed, absolutely ignored. But I confess I cannot well see how this Political Economy can escape the correction that lies for it in the simple distinction between universal will and self-will: a concrete practicality, aetron, must correct its abstract impracticality, its mere pedantic ignavia. The only defence I can conceive for Political Economy here is, that it should say, self-will opposed to self-will neutralises self-will, and there is a universal human result obtained thus by the action of natural law without the dangerous and uncertain influence of legislative interference. But here, again, this Political Economy simply deludes itself by the abstractness of its own phrase. Self-will opposing self-will is but a state of nature: and this view has but to look around to see that, in the atomism its own call to self-will has produced, it has already carried us far on the road thither. Nature—brute self-will—this is the beginning of history, and this the Political Economy of the day would make the end also. We
are so far on our way, indeed, that we have actually reached the Gorilla and the Sensation Novel. Consider what important witnesses both are to the truth of the general position maintained here. What can be the nature of a population where the one is acceptable and the other necessary? 'Goats and Monkeys!'

The truth, nevertheless, is, that we must live in system: the individual belongs not to himself, but to the community. No Richard Arkwright can jump into the air—into isolation—and say, I am my own, and what I have is my own. Neither he, nor what he has, are opaque independent units, quite indifferent there in the middle of the current: they really constitute portion of its transparency and flow with it. The Arkwrights of the day, however, are so far from seeing this, that they would absurdly isolate each the whole poison of the universal into the punctuality of his single Ego,—a feat which, were it accomplished, would only prove its own dialectic—absolute want.

We are to understand, then, that a national stewardship would create a garden of reason and reasonable work; whereas Political Economy, as it is plied now, can end in absolutely nothing else than a wilderness of self-will and animal rapine; that the one is concrete, whereas the other is abstract, and that it is for this reason we claim the countenance of Bacon. For Bacon's single constitutive virtue was to oppose the concrete to the abstract; from the mere formal self-identity of thought, from merely formal Logic, he sought to divert the attention of mankind to interests, actual, real, and substantial. True it is that Bacon is usually reckoned on the other side from that maintained here, and that to his authority is ascribed the present merely sensuous ransacking of Nature in the pursuit of a merely sensuous commodity. But this position is itself no concrete—this position is itself an abstract; if what Bacon opposed was the abstract Universal, this is but the abstract Particular, mere Sense. What Bacon pointed to was, however, not exactly this, but, as union of nature and thinking inquest, rather the concrete Singular, though, it may be said, perhaps one-sidedly, as only out. We see here, then, that if the descendants of Hume have come to occupy an abstract and untenable extreme, it is not different with those of Bacon. If Sense alone and Thought alone oppose each other, the concrete Singular is lost to both, which are now but mutually the abstract Particular and the abstract Universal. Bacon's own partialness, however, led to this; for if we are to see only an external magazine to exploiter, there is
no ascent over material commodity, and end there can be none but materialism and self-will. Hence the need of Hegel, who, to Bacon’s out, adds his own necessary in. It was said, some time ago, that there was no such great difference, after all, between Hegel and Looke—that if the latter derived Notions from Sensations, the former derived these from those. This is not strictly true; this were to assign to Hegel the position of abstract or formal Idealism, while that which he plainly arrogates to himself is manifestly a concrete, of which both Realism and Idealism are indifferently predicable. Hegel’s Notions, in fact, are not divorced from Sensations, but are the skeleton of Necessity in the Contingency of the latter; and thus the addition of the third moment completes a concrete in this element. So, then, is Hegel’s necessary in constituted; and there results, in place of Bacon’s man and nature, the single Geist, the one Spirit, the true concrete Singular which alone is—which takes up Nature into unity and meaning—possible only through both. There are both. The Idea is the Prius. What it becomes it is. It already is a completion of its own necessity.*

Each of these points of view will have thrown its own light, then, on the general allegation, that what constitutes the Matter of Hegel, constitutes also the correction and the complement of the Aufklärung. Hegel would restore to us—and in the light of thought—the concrete Substance which the light of thought carried off. Hegel would procure for us a scientific answer at length to these our questions, which are strictly and properly ours, which are strictly and properly human: Is there Free Will, Immortality, God? For we must presume to differ from Lord Macaulay here. ‘It is a mistake,’ this distinguished Aufgeklärter avers, ‘to imagine that subtle speculations touching the divine attributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the foundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual culture: such speculations, on the contrary, are, in a peculiar manner, the delight of intelligent children and of half-civilised men.’ We disagree with this, and would adduce against

* The public consciousness (Bildung) of 1897, will hardly recognise its own self in the public consciousness (Bildung) of 1864! Nevertheless it was just in such a Bildung that one had to pass one’s daily life then. Manchester, Edinburgh press were terrible political economists in those years, not that we go with either Carlyle or Ruskin in their mere abstract aversion to the ‘dreary science,’ or that we do not rejoice as much as Edinburgh press or Manchester either in the downfall of the corn laws.—New.
Lord Macaulay his own master, David Hume, who (‘Of Luxury’) affirms: ‘We cannot reasonably expect that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ignorant of Astronomy, or where Ethics are neglected.’ And this is the truth, and demonstrates the immeasurable superiority of Hume to Macaulay so far as thought is concerned. You cannot withdraw one element of the concrete without deranging and disturbing all. The fineness of an ode, of an epigram, is an element in the delicacy of a tissue, even in the edge of a razor. The poet enters the drawing-room no less honoured a guest than the inventor or the warrior, for he is known—though not consciously perhaps—to contribute to the common stock as substantially as either. Nor is the philosopher behind the poet. The philosopher is, indeed, the central light and heat of humanity; and this—by his answers to those very questions which Macaulay, the too precipitate pupil of Hume, consigns to children and half-civilised men. All men hang together to constitute humanity, and the Whole would perish were a single link to fail, for each is as a centre of the relations of the all. The interests represented by these questions, then, can simply not be omitted. As well might you hope that man, disencumbered of his brain, would remain man, if living by his stomach alone. These interests, in fact, stand to the universe in no less a relation than the brain to man, and their suppression, like its suppression, would reduce the universe, as it were, to a sort of stomach. These interests constitute what is essential to humanity as humanity. To convince ourselves of this, we have but to recall the passage already quoted from the Judgment-Kritik, where Kant points out that the existence of the world would have no worth if it consisted, firstly, of inanimate beings; or, secondly, of animate beings without reason; or, thirdly, of animate beings with reason, but a reason adequate only to considerations of bodily expediency. Guided by this passage, we shall have no difficulty in discerning that man, deprived of any interest in the questions concerned, would at once sink into no higher a place than that of a human beaver, who knew only and valued only what contributed to his merely animal commodity. Elsewhere Macaulay’s words show that he places quite under the same category the question of the immortality, and almost of the main mystery of religion in general. ‘The immortality of the soul,’ he says, ‘is as indemonstrable now as ever;’ and, as regards natural religion, we are no better off now
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than Thales or Simonides.' It is not unfair, on the whole, then, to infer that Macaulay said generally to himself on these points, These are things which we never can settle, and of which it is useless to speak—allons!—and, as Voltaire concludes, and Candide concludes, 'cultivons notre jardin!' That is, turning the back on all else, let us cultivate our garden of material commodity; for with the suppression of these questions and these interests, all would come to material commodity.

What is peculiarly human is not to live in towns, with soldiers and police, &c., safely to masticate our victuals; what is peculiarly human is to perceive the Apparition of the Universe; what is peculiarly human is to interrogate this apparition—is to ask in its regard—what?—whence?—why?—whither? It may suit Macaulay and the Illumination to say, It is absolutely useless to put these questions, you never can get an answer; do not trouble yourself with them, turn your back on what you call the apparition and look to the earth—'an acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia'—all your Platos and your Socrates but 'fill the world with long words and long beards'—take to Bacon and be content with the 'fruit': but,—apart from the valuelessness of such fruit, if alone, if all,—had there been no such questions, there could never have been this fruit itself, 'not even woollen cloth,'—in a word, had there been no such questions, there could never have been this formed world, this system of civilised life, this deposit of an objective reason. On no less a stipulation than eternal life will a man consent to live at all: so it is that philosophy and morality and religion are his vital air, without which his own resultant madness would presently dissipate him into vacancy.

No perception was ever clearer to man than this was to Hegel: his one work, in whatever number of volumes, is but an answer to what we may call—the questions. After Kant, the freedom of the will had little difficulty; for that is free which is amenable only to itself, and this is Reason. Reason is its own necessity, and in its own necessity is its own freedom, for in obedience there it but obeys itself. The universal will is free, then, and in the universal will man is free; for his true will is the essential and universal will, while his self-will is but enslavement. Man, then, as was a perception of one's early student days, is free because he obeys motives; for what obeys motives obeys itself, and is not subject to the compulsion of another. Kant is particularly beautiful on this question—particularly beautiful in the illustrations he adduces in
proof that men value a man, that a man values himself, just in proportion to the sacrifice he makes of self-will for universal Reason.

As for the Immortality of the Soul, that lies secure in the Notion. The notion is the vital heart of all, and for the notion self-consciousness is but another name. The subject and the concrete notion are identical, and they have not in them the character of the finite, but of the infinite. The system of Hegel, from stage to stage, is full of utterances on this head, and he who can read there has no room to doubt. Abstract absorption into the universal is not Hegel’s doctrine, and need be a fear to no one. ‘The One is Many, and the Many One.’ A system of horizons under one horizon, as Kant figures it—this is the true Monadology. God is no abstraction, but a Spirit in his own concrete differences, of which every finite spirit is one. That each is, is to each the guarantee of his own necessity both here and hereafter: that he should be then, is not more incredible or absurd than that he is now. At death, the external other of nature falls from us, we are born wholly into spirit—spirit concrete, for it has taken up into itself nature and its own natural life. Nature is to Hegel much as a late extract showed it was to Kant. It is but the phenomenon of the noumenon—it is but the action of what is, and passes, while the latter is and remains. Time and space and all questions that concern them reach only to the phenomenon, they have no place in the noumenon. There is but one life, and we live it with, as the Germans say. That life we live now, though in the veil of the phenomenon. There is but an eternal now, there are properly no two places and no two times in the life of the Spirit, whose we are, and which we are, in that it is all. So it is that Hegel is wholly sincere and without affectation, when he talks of it being in effect indifferent to him, how and whether he be in this finite life. He is anchored safe in thought, in the notion, and cares not for what vicissitude of the phenomenal may open on him. Hegel, then, not Fichte, is the rock, which Mr Carlyle, in reference to the latter, feigns: rock in his spirit, that is, in his faith and in his hope, which faith and which hope spring alike from knowledge, if, in his finite life, wraths, and indignations; even fears and apprehensions, were perhaps known to him, just as they are to us. Flesh is weak, and, while in the phenomenon, consciousness is but the mirror of its vicissitude, and never blank.

Then with regard to God—there is for Hegel nothing but God;
and this God is a personal God, and no mere Pantheistic Substance that just passively undergoes a mutation of necessity. Hegel, however, looks on the ordinary être suprême of infidelity as but a name, an empty abstraction, and he has attempted to construe God out of his universe into the one absolute spirit which he is. We say construe, not construct—Hegel as little constructs God as he constructs God's universe. The system of Hegel is but the process of this construing, in which all finite categories show their untruth and their finitude, and pass into their truth and their infinitude, the Absolute Spirit. As abstractions, for example, there are both Seyn and Daseyn; but the true concrete singular is the Fürsichseyn into which they both collapse. Neither Quality is, nor Quantity is—truly, or as such; what truly and as such is, is Measure. Both Ground and Appearance are the formal abstract moments of the concrete singular, the Actual, which alone is. Substance and Causality collapse into Reciprocity; Notion and Judgment into the Syllogism; Life and Cognition into the Absolute Idea, &c. &c. Being and Essence are but correlative abstractions that find their truth in the Notion; nay, Logic and Nature are only the abstract moments, the abstract universal and the abstract particular of the Absolute Spirit, which is the final concrete singular, the ultimate unity, the living One, which alone is. Here all finite categories collapse and disappear, while those which are infinite are but names of the One on lower stages. The pulse, nevertheless, the ultimate vital throb, is the notion.

So little does this scheme seem to Hegel to contradict Christianity, that it is just on this scheme that he is able to perceive that Christianity is, must be, and can only be, the Revealed Religion. It is here that Hegel is, perhaps, at his greatest, at his truest, at the greatest and truest of thought itself. Christianity is, in his hands, rescued not less from the contingency and externality of mere history, than from the contradictions and discrepancies of the mere separating, and, so to speak, self-identifying understanding*—rescued from the vulgarity of material sensation, and restored to a spiritual reality which is, in very truth, one and identical with the absolute inner of the living soul. To him who understands the full force of the

* The self-identifying action, alluded to here, must be supposed to fall on the objects as well as the subject; Understanding proper separates not only itself, but whatever is submitted to it, into independent, self-identical selves: in a wide sense, its function is thus simply to self-identify.
Hegelian terms, there is no profane reading whatever more ennobling, consoling, peace-giving, than that which Hegel offers us here. Crass facts, which were opacities and obstructions, melt and flow at his touch, and are taken up into us—sustenance, as it were, into the souls of men before whom there seems to open at length the kingdom of grace. It is not with the mere abstractions and distinctions of thought that Hegel deals here, but with the concrete element of religion itself, which is as truly human, which is as much ours and indispensable, as our very senses. If the instrument be thought, thought as clear and consecutive as that of the soberest Aristotle, the result is feeling—feeling as substantial, palpable, real, as ever gave beatitude to the intensest of Saints.

It is the doctrine of the Trinity which constitutes to Hegel the central and vital principle of Christianity. Again and again he may be found animadverting on the gratuitous astonishment of Understanding at the identifying of such differences as one and three. We saw a very prominent instance of this in Remark 2 of the second chapter of Quantity. Similarly, towards the beginning of Maass in the complete Logic, Hegel will be found expressing interest in the trace of a trinity even in the 'enormous phantastery' of Indian superstition,—'like a moderating thread in what is immoderate.' The passage continues:

'Though this Indian Threeness has misled to a comparison with the Christian Trinity, and though indeed a common element of the movement of the notion is to be acknowledged in them, we must still, however, gain a preciser consciousness in regard to the essential difference between them which is not only infinite, but the veritable infinite just is this difference.'

So much in earnest is Hegel with the doctrine of the Trinity, that he finds Christian writers of the most undoubted orthodoxy strangely lukewarm in its regard. Tholuk, for example, he censures most unsparingly, because he terms 'this doctrine a scholastic doctrine, and regards it merely on the external side of a surmised simply historical origin from speculation on scriptural texts under the influence of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle;' because he asserts also that 'the doctrine of the Trinity is not by any means a fundament on which faith can be founded.' Hegel complains also that 'he conducts his reader always only as far as the Passion and Death of Christ, but not on and up to his Resurrection and Ascension to the right hand of the Father, nor yet to the Pouring out of the Holy Ghost; and intimates that, in
this way, the doctrine of Redemption cannot have more than a moral, or even a heathen, that it cannot have a Christian, sense. Perceiving the taint of Illumination and mere morality in religionists represented by such men as Tholuk, Hegel avers further (P. of R. ii. 207 and 229):—

‘Through such finite mode of viewing the divine element,—that which is in and for itself, and through this finite thinking of the absolute content, it has come to pass that the fundamental tenets of Christianity have in great part disappeared from the formulary. Not alone, but in especial, philosophy is now essentially orthodox; the tenets which have been always held to be the ground-verities of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it. [To Hegel, indeed, it is not a care] to prove that the ‘Dogma, this still mystery, is the eternal truth; for this is what goes on in the entire of philosophy.’

In truth, no one can doubt the depth and fervency of the religious sense of Hegel, who will take the trouble to read his pertinent deliverances. They have the breadth of feeling in them of a George Fox or a Bunyan, yet do they rigorously issue from the notion, and rigorously dispose themselves according to its moments,—and this is no unimportant testimony to the truth of the principle. The peculiarly deep, living, and meaning way in which all the great doctrines of our religion—Good and Evil, Original Sin, &c.—are realised in the new element, is especially striking. We shall dwell on a few extracts by way of illustration:—

'The cultus is to give oneself this supreme, absolute satisfaction (Genuss)—there is feeling in it—I am there present with my particular personality: it is thus the assurance of the absolute Spirit in its people, it is their knowledge of their essential being; this is substantial unity of the spirit with itself.' . . . 'It is a two-fold act—God's grace, and man's sacrifice.' . . .

'The latter has reference essentially to the inner; it is the sacrifice of natural will, the will of the flesh, as comes more to the surface in Repentance, Purification, &c.' . . . 'God is the creator of the world; it belongs to his Being, his Essence, to be creator; so far as he is not this, he is imperfectly understood. . . . But a secret, a mystery in the usual sense, is God's nature not, least of all in the Christian religion; there God gave himself to be known, showed what he is, there is he revealed; but it is a mystery for sensuous perception, conception, for the sensuous mode of view and for understanding as such. . . . In the Idea, the Differences present themselves not as self-excluent, but so that they only are in this self-conclusion of the one with the other: that is the true supernatural, not the usual supernatural, that is to be conceived as up there; for that is just something sensuous and natural, that is to say, what is an asunder and indifferent. . . . The self-identical substance is this unity, which as such is fundament and principium, but as subjectivity it is that which acts, which produces.' . . . 'Religion is divine wisdom, man's knowing of God and knowing of himself in God; this is the divine wisdom.
and the field of absolute truth. In general, religion and the basis of the state are one and the same; they are in and for themselves identical. The laws of the state are rational and divine things, in view of this pre-supposed original harmony; religion has not its own principles as opposed to those which obtain in the state. (Hegel no voluntary.) There is one notion in religion and state; this one notion is the highest thing that man has; it is realised by man: the nation that has a wrong notion of God, has also a wrong state, wrong government, wrong laws: this relation is seen in men's ordinary conceptions, and expresses itself in this way, that to them the laws, the authorities, the constitution, come from God, that thus these are authorised and by the highest authority which can be given to them. But if the laws are from the will of God, it is important to know God's will; and this is not the business of one in particular, but belongs to all. When only the formal side is taken, room is given to caprice, tyranny, and oppression. This showed itself in a marked manner in England, under the Stuarts, when passive obedience was insisted on, the sovereign claiming to be accountable to God only. Through means of this same claim of a divine revelation, the antithesis, however, directly manifested itself. The distinction of priests and laymen, namely, is not held by protestants; the priests are not privileged to monopolise the divine revelation, and still less is this the case as regards the so-called lay. So there arose in England a sect of protestants who maintained it was given to them by inspiration to tell how they should be governed; in consequence of such inspiration of the Lord, they stirred up a rebellion in England, and beheaded the king.

This demonstration of the inevitable alternation of the antithesis—that in repelling the point you are struck by the but—Hegel accomplishes finely also with reference to the Roman Empire. The people so named worked only to a single end, universal dominion; but, this attained—'abstract dominion,' 'simple empire'—there manifested itself over all, a common present power, a power of self-will—the Emperor—which, without all moral restraint, could act, rage, give a loose to itself.' This same abstract dominion of the Roman people—'this universal unhappiness of the world'—was, in a religious point of view, the preparation for Christianity:

'The gods of all nations were collected in the Roman Pantheon, and they mutually annihilated each other just by this, that they were to be united. Rome fulfils this unhappiness of the annihilation of beautiful life and consciousness ... and produces a throe which was to be the labour-pain of the religion of truth. "When the time was fulfilled, God sent his Son," it is said; the time was fulfilled, when despair to find satisfaction in the temporal and finite had taken possession of the spirit of man.'

Again, of Faith, Hegel declares that it is indispensable:

'The relation of the individual to this truth, is, that the individual just comes to this conscious unity, renders himself worthy of it, produces it within
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himself, becomes filled with the Spirit of God: this takes place through process within him, and this process is, that he has this Faith, for Faith is the truth, the presupposition, that in and for itself and assuredly redemption is accomplished. only through this faith that the redemption is in and for itself and assuredly accomplished, is the individual capable of setting himself into this unity.'

Of Baptism we find it said, this rite
'testifies that the child is born in the community of the Church, not in outer wretchedness, that it will not have to meet a world at enmity with it, but that its world is the Church.'

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is characterised thus:—

'In it there is given to man the consciousness of his reconciliation with God, the entering and dwelling of the Spirit within him: the Lord's Supper is the focal centre of the Christian Church, and from it all differences in the Christian Church receive their colour and form. In regard to it there are three conceptions. 1. According to one of these, the Host, this external, this sensuous, unspiritual thing, becomes through consecration the present God—God as a thing, in the wise of an empirical thing, is just so empirically enjoyed by man. Inasmuch as God was thus known as an outward in the Lord's Supper, this centre and focus of the entire doctrine,—this externality is the fundamental basis of the whole Catholic religion. There arises thus servility of thought and deed; this externality pervades all further forms of it, the True being represented as what is Fixed, External. As thus existent without the subject, it may come into the power of others; the Church is in possession of this, as of all other means of grace; in every respect, the subject is passive, receptive, knows not what is true, right, good, but has only to receive it from others. 2. The Lutheran conception is, that the movement begins with an External, that there is an ordinary, common thing, but that the Spirit, the self-feeling of the presence of God realises itself, insomuch and in so far as the externality is absorbed, not merely bodily, but in Spirit and Belief. In the Spirit and Belief now is the present God. What is sensuously present is of itself nothing, and even consecration makes not of the Host an object of veneration, but the object is in the Belief alone; and so in the consumption and destruction of the Sensuous element, there is the union with God, and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here has the grand consciousness arisen, that, apart from the Enjoyment and Belief, the Host is a common, sensuous thing: the process is only in the spirit of the subject truly—certainly a trans-substantiation, but such that by it the external element is eliminated, God's presence is directly a spiritual one, so that the Faith of the subject belongs to it. 3. The idea here is, that the present God is only so in conception, in remembrance, and thus has only an immediate, subjective presence. This is the Reformed idea, an unspiritual, only lively remembrance of the past, no divine presence, no actual spirituality. Here the divine element, the Truth, is debased to the Prosa of the Aufklärung and mere Understanding, a merely moral relation.'

That, in general, it is the notion which is the guide to these determinations, will, perhaps, now at last come home to the
reader, in a perfectly undeniable and definitive manner from the Division (Eintheilung), which runs thus:—

'The First is the Notion, as always; the Second, again, its Determinateness (specificity, Particularity), the notion in its determinate (specific, Particular) forms; these cohere necessarily with the notion itself: in the mode of consideration properly philosophical, it is not the case that the Universal, the Notion, is put first only as it were by way of honour. Notion of Right, of Nature, as set first in ordinary usage, and as to which, as so set, we are still in uncertainty, are general determinations, on which properly the matter in hand does not depend, that depending, on the contrary, on the special contents, the several chapters. In this usage, the so-called notion has, in the sequel, no influence on these further contents; it indicates in a way the ground on which we find ourselves with these materials, and that we are not to introduce content (matter) from any other ground (sphere); the content—for example, magnetism, electricity—passes for the thing itself, the notion (that is, in the usage alluded to) only for the formal or formell element of it.

In philosophical consideration, the notion is also the beginning, but it is the thing, the Substance, as the seed from which the whole tree develops itself. In it are all the characteristic parts contained, the whole nature of the tree, the peculiarity of its saps, ramification, but not preformed in such wise that, if we take a microscope, we shall see the branches, leaves, in miniature—not so, but, on the contrary, in spiritual wise. In this way, then, the notion contains the whole nature of the object, and knowledge that follows is nothing but the development of the notion, of that which is contained implicit in the notion,—of that which has not yet come into existence, is not yet explicaded, laid out (displayed). And so it is that we begin with the notion of Religion.

The second, then, is religion in its determinateness (in its actual form) the determinate notion. But the various precise forms we take not from without; no, with us, it is the notion itself, that goes forward to its determinateness, its particularity, in its own freedom. It is not as if we empirically treated Right, for example: in which case, indeed, Right were, first of all, defined in general; but then we should go somewhere else for the determinate (particular) Rights (Roman, German, &c.)—we should take them, from actual fact. With us, on the contrary, the determinateness, the series of particular forms, has to yield itself from the notion itself.

The determinate notion of Religion is finite religion, a one-sided something, thus and thus constituted as compared with another, one particular religion as compared with another particular religion; Religion in its finitude.

The third is the notion that comes to its own self out of its determinateness, its finitude, that re-establishes itself again out of this finitude and limitation; and this re-established notion is the infinite, veritable notion, the absolute Idea, the true Religion.

The first religion in the notion is not yet the true religion. The notion is true certainly within itself, but it belongs to truth as well that the notion should realise itself, even as it belongs to the soul that it should have given itself a body. This realisation is the determination of the notion; the absolute realisation is that this determination become adequate to the notion: the
adequate notion is the Idea, the veritable Notion. These, abstractly put, are the three parts in general.

This division may be also characterised thus. We have to consider the Notion of Religion, first, in general, as universal, then in its particularity as self-differentiating notion, which is the side of the Ur-thel, of limitation, or difference and finitude; and thirdly, the notion which shuts itself together with itself, the Schluss (close, shut, or syllogism), or the Return of the Notion from its determinateness (particularity), in which it is unequal to itself, into its own self, in such wise that it comes into equality (adequacy) with its form, and its limitation is removed. This is the Rhythmus, the pure eternal life of the Spirit itself; and had it not this movement, it were dead. The Spirit is—to have itself as object; that is its manifestation, its relation of objectivity, as in finitude. The third is that it is object to itself in this wise, that in the object it is reconciled with itself, is by itself, and so has come to its freedom; for freedom is to be by self.

This division is thus the movement, nature, act of the Spirit itself, as regards which, we, so to speak, only look on. Through the notion it is necessary, but the necessity of the further progress has, first of all, in the development itself, to demonstrate, explicate, prove itself. *

* The quotations that refer to Tholak occur in the preface to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia; those that bear on Religion, in the pertinent extracts from Frantz and Hillert (Hegel’s Philosophie in wortlichen Auszugen), but partly also in the collected works.

From these extracts, I derive also the three following equations, which will interest the student; Beziehung = das, worin sie identisch sind;—Verhältniss = Auseinander-treten dieser Einheit; and Setzen = dass dies durch mich sey. Reference is thus reserved, as has been the general practice of this work, for the identity of the sphere of Simple Apprehension, Relation for the difference of the sphere of Judgment, and Setzen is seen to apply to what is established in consciousness through process of and from—another, which indeed is the life of thought itself qua thought. The internal process sets the external forms. That is gesetzt, into which another has formally become. A succession of intellectual results that appear from implication, and disappear from explanation, but into new explanation—this is Gesetzteyn—ostensive expression of an implicit mutation. There is the fruit of a womb in aperto, which is presently withdrawn again, as into eclipse for a new issue. If the ice is explicit, the water is implicit, but still there is substantial union. Ex-implication, Gesetzteyn, is all that goes on—it is the one onward. To know the Hegelian Notion, and to know that the verb setzen is retained for the determination of the life of the notion, is, as regards Hegel, pretty nearly to have arrived. I should say, indeed, that if the reader, who has studied his way this length, will now take the trouble to peruse the first two chapters of the second volume of Hegel’s complete Logic, he will find this author—really—at length in his power.

Hegel’s fidelity to the notion—which, indeed, is wholly unswerving—is seen, not only in the above equations, but in all the extracts in the text. As, in fact, we have seen, even in the single terms, he is true to the truiplicity of the notion: each of them is a syllogism; the ordinary sense coquets with the virtual sense into a third, the Hegelian or speculative sense; and thus the whole notion, even in a word, has come full circle. Urthel, for instance, is, first, judgment, then difference, and, thirdly, re-duction of the difference into the first identity. Begriff, similarly, is, as universal—a notion indefinitely; as particular—a notion definitely;
The depth and truth of these glances of Hegel into the inner significance of Christianity will be denied by no one; but there is now an external side on which it will be well to say a word. It relates as well to what is called plenary inspiration, as to the counterpart of the same,—the grubbing into what is supposed the region of historical fact by such men as Strauss and Renan. On the first head, we may say, that Hegel is perfectly sincere in his adhesion to the doctrine of plenary inspiration in its true sense—in that sense, namely, in which it relates to the inner: the Bible is to him perfectly instinct with the inspiration of the Spirit. Hegel, however, is unable, from the whole nature and principle of his philosophy, to believe in the inspiration of an outer as outer. The outer element, as in the sacrament, is to him but the medium, and disappears in the inner realisation of the spirit. Plenary inspiration, most assuredly, he would say, but not inspiration of the letter. The letter as letter is an outer; and the sphere of externality as such is a prey to boundless mutability and contingency. It is the decree of God that it should be so. The notion in external manifestation, is nothing but, and can only be, this spectacle of change and accident. Let any one look at his own copy of the Bible. He got it at a certain time, he carried it to certain places, he has used it on such and such occasions, and others have so used it: there are accidental dog's-ears in it, tears, burns, stains, thumb-marks (of Prussian officials or others). Then the binding,—it is in such and such materials, form, colour, &c. The paper is of such and such quality, and is at such and such stage of decay. There are such and such a number of pages. The printing is of such and such a date, and in such and such a type. The chapters, verses, &c., are appointments of certain human beings. Then the matter; it is in prose and in poetry; there are histories, legislative enactments, narratives, biographies, letters, proverbs, prayers, sermons, parables, revelations, prophecies, &c. Then there are a variety of authors actually assigned. These authors, too, are completely in the yoke to the categories of their respective countries, ages, languages, &c.

as the notion of some particular concrete; as singular—the Notion, Kant's Notion, Hegel's Notion, the concrete Notion.

Hegel is reported to have said, 'that only one man understood him, and he did not.' This man, I am inclined to believe, was Goschel. Hegel accepted Goschel's exposition of his own religious views with a 'dankaren Handedrucke'; but, no doubt, saw clearly that Goschel knew nothing, after all, of the Notion.
CONCLUSION.

Nay, externality goes deeper still,—there are discrepancies in this matter. Of the vision that appeared to Saul as he went to Damascus, we hear, for example, in the seventh verse of the ninth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, that 'the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man'; whereas, in the ninth verse of the twenty-second chapter of the same Acts, we are told, 'And they that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid; but they heard not the voice of him that spake to me.' Now, this is a contradiction in terms—a deeply-marked discrepancy, then: doubtless, reconciliatory explanation is possible, is easy; doubtless, it is an external discrepancy which, instead of weakening, adds force to the inner truth of the particular narrative, and of the Bible generally: still it is a discrepancy—a proof that whatever is external must yield itself a prey to the contingency of the external. We stop here; into discrepancies at all it is no joy to enter; we have had enough of them at the hands of the general Aufklärung; we would not protract the agony; what is wanted now is something quite else—an end to the misery, a renewal of Faith.

This, however, will probably sufficiently illustrate what we hold to be the relative position of Hegel, as justified by such passages as the following, also from the extracts of Frantz and Hiltert, which, from the first edition as already named simpler, are perhaps preferable here:

'The Christian is positive religion in the sense that it has come, been given, to man from without, . . . it will be interesting to see what is the Positive.' . . .

'The laws, municipal ones, laws of the state, are in the same way positive: they come to us, are for us, have authority; they are not so that we can let them stand, that we can pass them by, but that even in this their externality they are to be for us what is subjectively essential, subjectively binding. When we apprehend, recognise, find reasonable, the law that crime be punished, it is then essential for us, has power over us, not because it is positive, because it is so, but it is of validity inwardly also, to our reason, as what is essential, because it is inward, rational. As regards revealed religion, there is necessarily this side also: inasmuch as we have there what is historical, externally appearant, we have also there what is positive, contingent, that may be in this manner, and also in that. Even in religion we have this. Because of the externality, sensuous manifestation, which is implied to accompany it, there is always present what is positive. But this is to be distinguished: the Positive as such, the abstractly Positive, and the law, the law of Reason. The law of Free-will is not to be allowed to act, because it just is, but because it is the determination of our Reason itself; when it is so known, it is nothing positive, nothing blindly operant. Religion also appears positive in the entire tenor of its doctrines; but it ought not to
remain so, it ought not to be an affair of mere apprehension, of mere memory."

. . . 'The attestation is spiritual, lies not in the sensuous, cannot be brought about in immediate sensuous fashion: against the sensuous facts, therefore, there may always be something objected.'

This will suffice for the first head; as regards the second, the point of view may be seen to open in the following extract:

'As regards the empirical world, the Church does so far right in this, not to undertake such investigations as those concerning how it was with the appearance of Christ after his death: for such investigations proceed from the point of view, as if the thing depended on the sensuous element of manifestation, on this mere historical element; as if in such narratives of one as historically perceived, in historical manner, there lay the attestation of the spirit and its truth. This truth stands firm in itself, although it has such point of origin.'

There is an edge here that tells most unmistakably against those that grub into historical fact, as if they could so discredit the sacred history, let them find out what they may. Hegel has no sympathy whatever with this industry; and it is rather singular that it is one which—in appearance at least—has emanated from his school. The mantle of the prophet, however, is not always of direct descent. To Hegel it is no attestation of anything in a spiritual sense, or simply in meaning, that it should have such and such sensuous documents in its support. Apart his ordinary curiosity as man and interest as antiquary, Hegel would toss into the fire—if offered to attest, if offered for worship just so—never so authentic a piece of the true cross with as little compunction as John Knox flung into the water the painted board named Virgin. Really, what can sensuous facts attest? What were the value of a tooth of the wolf that suckled Romulus? Should we be really better off, had we even a letter to the fact under the hand of Lupa herself? Hegel's dislike to critical history (which really springs from his general principle), so lively in expression is it, is quite amusing: it is to him nothing but an exhibition of personal vanity. What can any man now hope to make of the death of Remus—what good would he do, did he even demonstrate it to have actually happened so and so—what really is the value of such an industry? To Hegel what is in the beginning is always the continuous identity of apprehension; it appears to him everywhere, as he actually names it in the geographical element, "gediegenes Hochland," hard, solid, unbroken steppe: it lies there under vapour; it recedes as you approach; it can never be got at to come under the knife
or to lie in the scales; it is but a cast of the eye, and is always there before you; it is the necessary presupposition of the notion itself: it is, in short, a sphere of apprehension, and in externality—why would you vainly seek to split it into the self-identities of the present Urtheil? So always is the germ; Hegel knows it such, and mocks the idle curious that would thrust fingers into it. And Hegel here is, no doubt, scientifically right, while Strauss and Renan (Hegelians that reverse their master!) are only inept. Hegel, in point of fact, recommends us, 'In considering this religion, not to go historically to work after the fashion of him who begins from the outward, but to take start from the notion.' He tells him also who begins in the external manner, that he only seems to himself 'receptive,' that he is in fact 'active'—that is, that the resultant work of his efforts is not a work which he has only found, but which he has also made. In short, the grubbers into the historical facts of such commencements are but mistaken men, who, as it were, with one foot on the centre, stubbornly endeavour to set the other on the horizon. Notion is the word, not the Datum of Fact; to which latter would you stretch 'the ladder of Jacob,' it instantly 'goes further off and becomes astronomical.' There is no ultimate solution of any element but the notion, which being in effect ourselves, any nearer nearness were a strange desideratum.

Hence, pageant History! hence, gilded cheat!
.. . . What care, though owl did fly
About the great Athenian admiral's mast?
.. . . . . . . Juliet leaning
Amid her window-flowers, .. . . .
Doth more avail than these!

So Keats exclaims, and Keats is right. Would we know truly how the spirit of man lived, and moved, and was in the old Greek world, it is to Homer we must turn, and not to Thucydides. In the Iliad and the Odyssey as they are given to us, in the soul of Homer—whom, despite the testimony of centuries and the voices of the demigods themselves, a prurient modern criticism would deny—in the Iliad and Odyssey, in the soul of Homer, veritably a one—there lies in crystal reflexion the whole Greek world, organically together; in the soul of Homer, there lies in crystal reflexion, organically together, the spirit of man himself gone asunder into its own necessary and native differences. Preserve the Real, Thucydides
—destroy the Ideal, Homer: we have lost both Greece, and the
deepest insight into man and the world of man. Reverse the
action,—and of what account is the loss, when compared with the
gain? As then, so now: the prologue of Chaucer, the plays of
Shakespeare, the poems of Burns, will readily outweigh any pro-
fessed history. We will agree with Hegel, then, that, possessed
of the notion, we feel ourselves lifted high above the historical, the
external, the contingent, and we shall only smile at the necessarily
futile efforts of a Strauss and a Renan to paw the horizon.*

'The spiritual is higher than the external; the spiritual cannot
be externally authenticated': it is this position also which gives
Hegel his peculiar place as regards miracles. He does not oppose
them, admits the belief they would bring to sensuous men, but still
he subordinates them. They are to him in a sensuous, external
element, and consequently lower than what is spiritual as such.
To support his view, he points out that the Egyptian Sorcerers
performed miracles as well as Moses; but

'The main point is, Christ himself says: There will come many who do
miracles in my name; I have not known them. Here he himself rejects
miracles as veritable criterion of truth. This is the main point of view, and
what is to be held fast: attestation through miracles, as the impugning
of the same, is a sphere which does not concern us; the testimony of the spirit
is the true one.'

Now I must not be untrue to Hegel in what concerns him here.
On the religious side, I know that it has been felt as a difficulty
that what we have on the whole for a God in Hegel seems to be
only a sort of logical universal that has no individual expression of
its own—that has an expression, in fact, only through us. Now, to
grant the miraculous element may, it has been thought, act, so far, as
a kind of guarantee against this difficulty. God must be conceived
as Lord of Nature: prayer must be believed, as it were, to stay the
arm that sways the universe. This difficulty, it may be said, however,
was never a difficulty with Hegel himself. The religious element,
very certainly, all through, is what is realest in Hegel. Unlike
Kant, he has never a word to utter against the efficacy of prayer.
Declarations there are express in him as to the personality of God
and the immortality of the human soul. Equally express is his
stand by Christianity. Publicly, in his lectures, he exclaims, 'I am

*I find Aristotle here consentaneous. He says in the Poetic (c. 9):—
'φιλοσοφότερον καὶ σπουδαίτερον πολλαίς ισόπαλα έστιν, the one dealing with
the universal, the other with the particular; so that no prosody could make a poet
of Herodotus.'—New.
a Lutheran, and will remain so.’ As above, however, we see his position to the miracles; and we have no desire to make a Westminster Divine of him. Miracles he does not impugn; but he subordinates them. In fact, it will illustrate his general position here if we refer to a passage in his Hist. of Phil., i. 213. He says there, in allusion to the popular marvellous that is attributed to Pythagoras, ‘his life appears to us as through the medium of first century apprehension, more or less in the style in which the life of Christ is narrated to us, from the point of view of common reality.’

If such be the attitude of Hegel in regard to religious relations, his bearing is quite of a piece in reference to politics, in reference to the State. The State is the rational substance of the universe, and depends not on the wise opinion and good knowledge of either you or me. The Aufklärung, to be sure, suddenly turned its lantern upon it, among others, and declared all there-appertinent rotten. Since then we have been stripping our walls bare, and Mr Buckle has been able, with much comfort—opening a waistcoat button—to perorate on Superstition. The value of Descartes, it appears, is that he saw into the imposition of priests and princes, and our forefathers were plunged in a hopeless limbo of ignorance and darkness! O Superstition! Superstition O! The category of superstition is not enough for Hegel, however; he is not unjust to the Aufklärung, but he will not deny all tapers but its own. On the contrary, Reason to him did not begin with the Aufklärung, but had been, for thousands of years, building itself into the outward crassitude. Hegel, then, examines Reason as regards the State, and assigns, through the Notion, the essential determinations that constitute its organisation and life. To say this much must here suffice, however; and, perhaps, for the present, the hint alone is sufficient, that political wisdom cannot possibly consist in undoing alone, else its own activity were speedily its own end. There are principles here, as there are in all human interests, and, through Hegel, we may yet get to see and realise them.

In simple truth, the last chance is offered us in thought as thought: in matter as matter, we have nothing but despair. In Germany, they already ask, how would life constitute itself—seposita animorum immortalitate? But we in England should ask simply, how would it be were matter all? This supposed, we shall presently see everything that has been formed out of the reason of man, during untold generations, break up and disappear.
Thought is but a function of matter, and must be studied in the laws of matter. There is, consequently, no God, no spirit, no immortality: Religion, Metaphysic, Morals, Politics, vanish. Even science remains not; for we are left with the registration of phenomena alone; and phenomena being but appearances, and not things in themselves, inquest is at once endless and hopeless. And is Poetry, Literature, one whit more possible? Will any one any longer take interest in sea or star, in mountain or in flower, or in the loves and hates of men? All must perish: there is nothing left us but material commodity; each is for himself—each would realise that. And would that—would material commodity continue to be realised? Does not the high priest, Hume, tell us himself, that a piece of woollen cloth cannot be expected to be realised in a nation ‘where Ethics are neglected’? What can be expected but a realisation of the ideal of abstract so-called political economy at length,—self-will the only principle—barbarism—a state of Nature? And could men now bear a state of nature?—The misery of the present is infinite, and it is because the Illumination has stripped us naked—to matter. Schopenhauer, who has fairly arrived at this stage, talks (Parerga and Paralipomena, Bd. II, § 156) thus:—

If we reckon up, so far as is approximately possible, the sum of want, pain, and misery of every kind which the sun illuminates in his course, we shall admit that it would have been much better, had he been as little able to evoke the phenomenon of life on the earth as on the moon, and did the surface in the former, as in the latter, still find itself in a crystalline condition. We may conceive our life, indeed, as a uselessly interrupting episode in the blissful repose of Nothing...as only a gross mystification—not to say, Prellerei, cheat!

This is the voice of Atheism, and to this voice only is Materialism adequate. This is the ‘unglückliche Bewusstseyn,’ the unhappy consciousness; and there is hardly a great literary man in England at present who smoulders not slowly into a grey ash under it. This is the infinite misery! What wonder, if the wretch who realises it to himself should creep to bed with a dose of hemlock in his stomach! The sick like himself will say, it is all one; but there are those who see the pain of the simple souls that stand in relation—and more! Even as they lift the hat that honours, not him, but death in his place—their lips shall involuntarily wear the shadow of a sneer—a sneer that means: Oh, no; it will not do to take the pet; you should have strutted your part out—you should have played out the Idea! This is
it—there is an Idea. It is ours to realise it—and in contentment so—but we are wretches if we refuse.

This materialistic ruin is illustrated also by the Illumination in its latest scientific phase. This phase, or this misnamed science, says simply, that all that we see and know are but material phenomena, that vary to contingent material conditions. The contingency of the variation may be understood from this, that such disturbances of the earth's interior as depend on volcanic agency,—which itself is due to accidents of the central conflagration, or to fortuitous complexions, gaseous or other,—may give rise to very various interchanges of land and sea, of heat and cold, &c., and, consequently, to very various worlds and very variously inhabited. Nevertheless, there is, at the same time, everywhere present in this variety such common analogy as can point only to a common origin; and it seems reasonable to conclude that all that we see is but the result of the successive transmutations of a single primitive species, or, indeed, of a single primitive atom. From such antecedents, there conceivably emerges, under favourable circumstances, the first rude cell, which propagates itself, which improves itself.* Improvement, in particular, becomes very intelligible so soon as a stage of animality has been attained: for what will exist then will be a battle of life; all action will be a trial of strength. Men select their breeders, and so modify species that they cease almost to be specifically the same. So Nature: through the struggle for existence and the victory of the strongest, she also selects her breeders.† Thus it is that we have the Flora and Fauna which presently exist; and these together constitute but a single chain of organisation from the lowest forms of life, up, through the monkey, to the man. If any links in this chain still fail, if intermediate steps are still required in order to complete the proof of actual transmutation, appeal need only be made to the element of time. All human records are but as a day, an hour: but infinite time extends a field, adequate, as we look backwards, to the possibility of the fact,—adequate, as we look forwards, to the actual demonstration of the same. Infinitude in the latter direction has probably its term, however, so far

* Observe the mere arbitrariness—the mere saying—of 'conceivable emergence,' 'favourable circumstances,' 'propagation,' 'improvement,' &c.
† This 'selection,' as already said, means only, is but, the play of natural contingency, and is no principle, new or other.—New.
as man (and, indeed, the present sidereal system) is concerned. Conditions being presupposed to remain as they are at present, there is evidently going on such gradual loss of heat, mechanical force, energy of all kinds, as will reduce all, in the end, to a single cold, dark, meaningless mass, in the centre of a cold, dark, meaningless space. Whether there be what is called a God to change that or not? . . .

This is what the Aufklärung, that began by seeing the corruptions of the mediæval church, has ended in. It is not to be supposed, however, that all the members of the movement are absolutely of the same mind in regard to the various articles of the general creed: rather, it is curious to watch the differences—to watch the particular predilections. One, the Philopitheque par excellence, bravely goes the whole ape—waves, as he advances to battle, the picture of a procession of monkeys, man at top, and triumphantly thrusts his fist of enlightenment into the blind pride and wretched superstition of weak humanity! Oilyly another,—buoying himself blandly up on a well-balanced series of smooth plausibilities,—talks, subrusively-deprecatingly, of this 'picture of the ever-increasing dominion of mind over matter,' and ascends—the gratification of a triumph of enlightenment being enough for him—in Jovine serenity to his elevated Olympus of—shall we say—'philosophical Atheism'? The figure of Mr. Buckle is quite comic here, Garrick-like: with tears in his eyes he speaks of the consolations of deism and immortality; but, suddenly recollecting his duty to himself as an advanced thinker, he struggles forward beyond—oh, if it were only possible!—beyond Comte himself—'whose great merits it were unjust to deny!' Another figure I know, more comic still, the pattern Illuminatus of a generation back: with Mr. Buckle, he too does not like the reproach of having been left behind; but old leavens are still strong within him, and he ventures to suggest that it is not quite certain yet, not quite agreed yet, that the belief in a God and in Immortality is to be given up. The specially comic element, however, lies in his shoulders. Above these shoulders there rises a clear, experienced head, and beneath them beats a sound, warm heart, by virtue of both of which he can speak in the fullest and most conclusive manner of books, and men, and crises of life, at the same time that he is the most social and agreeable of mortals. By these excellences he sets no store, however; all that he values himself on lies in his shoulders. His right shoulder he
names to himself Political Economy; his left he cherishes more quietly as Pang at the Biblical humbug. Talk to him of the first, of the right shoulder, and he raises it high, proudly advancing to the front in all the fullness of a crop well ruffled, in all the spreading dignity of Philosophy in bloom. Talk to him now of the second, and, ah! it is no less dear to him; but, see, it has instantly sunk, while over it suddenly shows, crouchingly, as if for a spring, a red, blue, green, yellow face, that spits out,—with a maniacal eye, and a rabidity that appals—And what of that?*

As regards the theory itself, perhaps, it would be fair to point out, in the first place, a certain vacillation as to what position it is to assume on the question of progress. For a long time,—generally, indeed, such is the case still, for the first three-fourths of the volume,—improvement in series, 'a chain,' from lowest to highest, was a fixed and undoubted tenet: it was always understood, for example, and it is still said, that 'the earliest known fossil mammal are of low grade.' Now, however,—and especially towards the end of the volume,—a change has set in; progress seems no longer necessary, and we are told that 'the earliest cryptogams are the highest.' It would be fair, we say, to point to this, and to call for consistency and decision; but we shall assume—to give materialism its strongest side at once—that progression as progression is out of place in any such element. Progression as progression involves an antecedent idea, involves design—a principle not by any means welcome to the materialist, who would know no moulding hand but that of external conditions. Accordingly, the progression that results from what is only misleadingly called Natural Selection is rather apparent than real. In certain seasons of scarcity, for example, the long-necked Herbivora might live, while the short-necked should die; but the former need not necessarily be an improvement on the latter. This, then, were not properly progression; this rather were but succession—contingent succession on contingent variations of contingent conditions. We shall not object that, perhaps, succession is inadequate to the facts; we shall adhere to such influences only as might lead to a natural selection of the Giraffa, on the one hand, and to an equally natural rejection of the Ox, on the other. But let us remark for a moment on

* Now in 1897 has not the time most remarkably gone by for anything but composure in even the left shoulder? Is there any church nowadays that can do more than settle its face at it?—New.
what in the theory concerns this Giraffe. How came the Giraffe by such a length of neck? Oh, it was not always so, poor thing; it used, indeed, to be much like other creatures; only, you must know, there was once a season of scarcity, and out of a mass of herbivorous quadrupeds, none survived but those that got at the leaves of trees, by having the advantage of the others in length of neck. But was one season enough? Oh, as for that, the same thing happened more or less every season. And why is the process terminated—why does the Giraffe's neck not lengthen still? How do you know the process is terminated? Perhaps it is going on still; from the short records of human existence, we cannot hope, you know, &c. &c.: besides, it is only fair to say that things cannot be expected to stretch for ever! Are not these just such propos as schoolboys might indulge in; all concerned, the while, being already as to bec of a colour, much too fonde to believe a word of them? This theory is supposed to be superior to that of Lamarck, who feigns the neck of the Giraffe to have simply stretched to the effort of desire; but is not this latter much the more likely of the two? Compare the hut of the first Barisius with the palace of the Tuileries, and see between, the long series of cabins, cots, cottages, and houses, which must have been built the while, before the skill adequate to the first was transformed into the skill adequate to the last. Figure this transformation now, not as in series, but as in an individual: behold the hut of the Barisius grow into the Tuileries. In this way, man's hut has so grown in process of time only in obedience to man's desire: why, then, should not the neck of the Giraffe have similarly grown, through long generations, in obedience to a similar principle? If we can figure a single hut and a single man to represent the one respective series, we may figure also similarly, respectively, a single Giraffe and a single neck. There, then, at the foot of its single tree, is the single Giraffe, with its single neck. It but reaches the lowest leaves as yet, and has no further desire. But now a breeze blows into its teeth a branch from the tier above: how tender, juicy, and delicious! Desire awakes, and by dint of effort it attains to the tier above. An accidental branch from the third tier similarly incites to new effort, which, ever similarly stimulated, continues ever stretching from tier to tier, till at length, in the end, the Giraffe—or, what is the same thing, its descendant after millions of generations—finds itself browsing on the very top!
CONCLUSION.

One must admit, at all events, the intrepidity of men who can commit themselves to such giraffe-stories.

But we do not wish to concern ourselves at present with the puerilities of the execution in detail, nor with the inadequacy of succession to progression, nor with the comic uncertainty of hand that cannot let go and yet will not hold progression: what concerns us here is the materialistic theory in itself, of which succession is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature. Now, succession does not by any means necessitate a beginning; and it is a proof of the haziness of the theorists that, through the principle of analogy, they nevertheless postulate such. Of this postulatum, haziness, indeed, is the very element; for though the conception of a primitive atom floats somewhere or other as nucleus in it, this nucleus, however primitive it is to be, has already around it an entire world of more primitive conditions, to which it, indeed, is but the medium through which they variously pronounce themselves. A beginning must be something First, and something absolutely One; but a primitive atom already in conditions is neither the one nor the other. The thought, then, is evidently very defective that would conceive an atom primitive, and yet would see it in time and in space, and surrounded by conditions. If all these elements were to be granted as a beginning, creation—at least to theory—were not so difficult. But, though a material atom be evidently thus wholly inadequate to Time, Space, and Conditions, and, consequently, quite impossibility a beginning, let us conceive it such; let us name it a First and One, and let us look at it on other sides. Now, in the first place, of what size shall it be? This question is adapted to give long reflexion, perhaps, to the majority of minds; but we hasten to interrupt this by asking again: Nay, all size being but relative, why think of size at all? Any size is surely quite indifferent to infinite space—one size quite as good as another; a needle-point were in this connexion quite as effective as a pin-head, and that as a whole solar system! A whole solar system of a single substance dwindles down in opposition to infinite space into a needle-point; and, e contra, a needle-point is thus tantamount—quantitatively—to a solar system. In a word, Quantity is indifferent; it must have been hazard that assigned the first quantity; or, in our way of it, we do not see any reason for quantity at all—we cannot tell why there should have been any quantity, or just such a thing as quantity. That is true; these
questions have been only concerns of Hegel as yet.* There

* There is that in the above which will give a firm hold at last on the Quantitative Infinite, which consists simply in the fact of the absolute relativity of Quantity; any positivity of Quantity seems absolutely and infinitely to flee. This is just the infinite divisibility on another side, but brought back, as it were, into unity of notion. The reader will do well to refer to the relative places under Quantity, and will probably be pleased to find himself in complete light at last. We may point out now too, that, though the rationale, formerly assigned for the apparent difficulties that presented themselves on occasion of the ‘Nullities’ of Thomas Taylor, is the technically correct one, what lies at bottom is this, that any quantity is quite as good as another, so far as a capability of discretion is concerned.

What is involved in all that, is simply the antithesis, the Notion, the fact that the seen explication implies, is through an unseen implication—the development is through envelopment. This is the Species. What is, is but the middle of the growing antithesis, which was at first Being and Nothing. There is no advance to identity that is not implicitly accompanied by an advance to difference: so it is you repel the point only to be struck by the but. Energy, you will grant to be positive, and very positive too; still it implies a negative, another, on which it acts, through which indeed it is. Nay, of the two, either is indifferently the other, just as it is often manifestly indifferent which of the moments you name universal, which particular. Energy is much talked of, nowadays, by philosophers, who take no note of this necessary mutation. They think energy a one / Hegel, with his pairs of inner and outer, energy and manifestation, &c., is there the while to suggest the right point of view. It is necessary to know that any identity, or whole, may be viewed as an absolute, which is absolute, however, only through its relativity, and identical only through its difference. The extrication and opposition of the relativity, the difference, from and to, the absoluteness, the identity, is the Method, the collapse or eclipse of the one into the other to a new. God is, what he is, through himself; God is, at the same time, not what he is, through himself; otherwise he were not what he is through himself. This again is the Notion, an Affirmative, an explicit 2nd that involves a Negative, an implicit 1st, a 1st and 2nd that are identical in a 3rd: the Trinity The whole secret nature of the case will yield itself to due meditation here.

The reader will, perhaps, perceive that there has been contemplated something of an arrangement to produce a graduated conviction; and the following statement will, it may be, complete the metaphysical side:—

The Notion, or Thought as Thought, which as such has always an object on which it is engaged, is, according to Hegel, this, that it (you or I if you will) cannot explicate without, accurately and exactly to the same extent, implicating—cannot set into position without, at the same time, quite correspondently, setting into negation. Of this notion, all antitheses are modes; or all possible antitheses are, in ultimate analysis, identical with each other in their essential form and in their essential matter. Thus, explicate Being as completely as you may, you are, all the time, just as completely, implicating Nothing; and of this absolutely abstract antithesis, all other antitheses are but repetitions—on higher stages, and in graduated series. All possible antitheses of thought will be found to constitute a System—the Logical Idea. Of this Idea, Nature is but—and accurately so—the externalisation. Spirit again is but a return of the idea from externality to internality. These three spheres, however,—Logical Idea, Nature, Spirit,—are not to be understood as each self-dependent and self-subsistent: they are together one—one in trinity. The total result is a System, by which Hegel conceives himself to
seems no reason, then, why we should not at once go back to nothing, so far as quantity is concerned: but, not to distress ourselves with this, we shall just assume a quantitative atom in the middle of Time and Space. Now, again, how shall this atom distinguish itself? It must be something—something positive—not nothing; it must affirmatively distinguish and assert itself. But it is impossible for anything to make itself distinguishable, to assert itself, unless as in contrast to another—and the atom is by supposition alone. As Hobbes says, \textquoteleft idem semper sentire, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt.\textquoteright The qualitative limit is here so far constituted quite as the quantitative one: the \textit{that} is not less a one of two than the \textit{there},—each is through its other. The redound, the \textit{contrecoup}, is inevitable. You cannot make a vacuum without at the same time filling the identically same vacuum: difference is identity, identity difference. Eliminate \textit{A}—its place is filled; and you have the labour of the Danaïds, not to the end of the chapter, but to the creation of the world. Setzung and Aufhebung, \textit{Ponency} and \textit{Tollency}, (we may coin also \textit{ponated} and \textit{tollated}, \textit{ponation} and \textit{tollation},) are the moments of the single mutuation that is. This \textit{explication} of nature, in which you are now, will disappear into its \textit{implication}, but in the new explication you will abide. Remain in the disappearing explication, and you remain in the eternal sorrow. The explication as the explication is the abstract side, and this you have chosen,—forgetting that you are the concrete, and will still be the other that emerges.

A primitive external atom is an untenable position, then, for it were absolutely indistinguishable without another. Such atom in fact, were no more than abstract Quality, that and no more. But, abstracting from the fact that, with a primitive atom, we are but in presence of abstract Quantity and Abstract Quality, let us hold a first and one space-filling atom to be still conceivable: Space is around it, Time is over it; it is there, one and single, the absolutely First. Why \textit{it} was the first, and not another, we shall not ask. It is there, and in such manner there: but how will

answer all philosophical questions which have ever yet been put. By this system also he conceives himself to complete as well, not only—its beginning and germ—the Kantian philosophy, but philosophy as such, and this finally and definitively, by raising it to a \textit{scientifique} basis and informing it with a \textit{scientifique} principle. In short, we may say that Hegel has shown the Metaphysical world to be not less under the control of \textit{Action} and \textit{Reaction} than the Physical; and that, while it is \textit{Action} that, as explicit and overt, is, in the first instance, believed the whole, \textit{Reaction}, though implicit and occult, is no less real, essential, and necessary.
anything else ever come there? It is absolutely single, how can it possibly change?—how can it possibly grow?—how can it possibly move?—and where are your necessary conditions?—Pshaw! kick thought into limbo: it is easy to see that condensation takes place, motion results, heat, light, and electricity are generated, and so we have the whole!—Certainly the kick has made Cosmogony easy!

The theorists, in fact, feign all back into a single identity, but quite forget to ask themselves, How, then, can we extricate difference from identity? This is really the problem in ultimate generalisation, and these theorists know not—who does?—that this was the problem Kant set up when he asked, 'How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?' This, however, is the first step towards a true way of stating the problem, and into this it is perfectly clear that Hegel saw.

What it all comes to, then, is simply things as they are; a primitive atom is nought, we have only material structure under material conditions. Indeed, the theorists in question may declare, We never intended it otherwise, of primitive atoms we never spoke. It may be said in reply, that to go back to a primitive atom was, in fact, to put their own problem into its true place. A primordial form seems really to demand a primitive atom; and to bridge the gulf from this first atom to an oyster, were not more difficult than to bridge the gulf from an oyster to a man: agencies adequate to the latter may be readily assumed adequate to the former also. But, indeed, the search for a primordial form, to which they say they are driven by the universal analogy, is, in ultimate analysis, nothing but the search—for identity without difference; quite the same problem as that of the primitive atom. The one great error of these theorists, in truth, is their one-sided resolution to look only for identity: I am like the monkey; so I am to abstract from the differences, and speculate on how and when I derived thence! But, similarly, I am like the rat; slit each of us from chin to pubis, and how analogous are the organs! I am, in fact, an animal, and as such analogous to all animals—nay, I stand as summary of the entire round of the principles of nature: but what then? Am I not also more?—have I not an inner as well?—and on which side is the testimony, if that whole outer be but one analogy of this inner, and on principles of this inner? It is a mistake, then, to abstract from difference and signalise identity alone, just as it is a mistake to signalise
difference and abstract from identity.* This mistake coheres with
the general mistake that these theorists propose to approach the
problem and manipulate the problem with all their categories
ready-formed: it has never occurred to them to say, we determine
all by difference and identity, by conditions, by cause and effect,
&c.: it will, therefore, be necessary to examine first of all what
these things mean, and whether what they involve be in itself
true or not. Now, this it was that occurred to Hegel; and so it
was that he was enabled to discern an entire internal system, of
which nature was but the externalisation, and thus complete on
both sides the single analogy, the concrete reciprocity.

Had the theorists in question but perceived the necessity of
verifying those internal standards by which they proposed to
appreciate and appraise all, they would have consulted Metaphysic,
and would have been surprised to find that the whole industry
they contemplated had received its rationale, and, in its extreme
form, its coup-de-grâce, more than fourscore years ago at the hands
of Kant. Or—as we may say it otherwise—they would have
been surprised to find that what they contemplated was at once
absolutely certain and utterly impossible.

In what he calls the Anhang, or Appendix, to the Transcen-
dental Dialectic, Kant proves the existence of three laws in human
nature imposed by it on the objects of sense, and received by it
from and with these objects, as if they (these laws) were part
and parcel of these objects themselves, and not a reflexion, a
colour fallen on them from the very faculties to which they (these
objects) presented themselves. This peculiarity is summed up in
the single word transcendental: that is transcendental which is
really a contribution to objects from us, but which, at the same
time, appears to us actually in the objects themselves. Further,
the three laws in question enter not into objects as Constitutive of
them, but only influence them, so to speak, from without, as
Regulative of them into unity and system. Now, it is such laws

* Enlightenment, on the general question of Man, would have done well to have
remembered these words of one of its own foremost priests, Bayle:—'L'homme est
le morceau le plus difficile à digérer qui se présente à tous les systèmes. Il est
l'œuf du vrai et du faux; il embarrasse les naturalistes, il embarrasse les
orthodoxes. . . . Je ne sais si la nature peut présenter un objet plus étrange et
plus difficile à pénétrer à la raison toute seule, que ce que nous appelons un animal
raisonnable.' Et moi, j'ajoute ici (1897), que c'est M. Darwin qui se vante pouvoir
aisément digérer ce morceau difficile, et qui (Life and Letters, iii. 116, 117) se trouve
tout-à-fait ébahi qu'il (ce morceau) est trop dur de descendre à M. Wallace.—New.
that become *transcendent* when wrongly applied—when, on the supposition that they belong to the objects themselves, conclusions are attempted to be made in regard to these objects which transcend the limits of all possible experience. Here, then, we have a perfect indication of the entire nature of the Darwinian industry: a law, not in objects, but falling from us on them, has been erroneously supposed by the reasoners in question to be still, nevertheless, in them, and to be capable of supplying results quite impossible to any experience. In other words, these gentlemen have supposed *objective* what was only *transcendental*, attempting, moreover, to force the same into such use that it became *transcendent*.

The three laws alluded to Kant speaks of thus:—"Reason, therefore, prepares for Understanding its field, 1. by a principle of the Homogeneity of the Variety of individuals under higher genera; 2. through a principle of the Variety of the Homogeneity of individuals under lower *species*; and, in order to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. a law of the Affinity of all notions, which law dictates a continuous transition from every single species to every other through gradual increase of Diversity: we may name them the Principles of the Homogeneity, of the Specification, and of the Continuity of Forms." The first law Kant further expresses by the proposition, "Entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda;" the second by, "Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas;" and the third by, "Non datur vacuum formarum," or, "Datur continuum formarum," or, "Est lex continuæ in natura." Each of these laws aims only at a "Focus Imaginarius," for the use of our understanding, which, therefore, as a focus imaginarius, can only be asymptotically approached, nor ever reached, for it is underived from experience, and is indeed wholly beyond the limits of any possible experience. Into the proofs of Kant we have no room to enter, but it will probably be found, in the end, that they are so far, cogent. Variety, Affinity, and Unity are three necessities of Reason, and they fall on Nature from Reason, but, Kant being right, are not in Nature as such: they are but, as he phrases it, the source of three *maxims* of Reason, which Reason only *seeks* to realise.

When, then, the supporters of the modern argument in question would refer all to a common genus, and would account for all variety by "transmutation of species" (accomplished by whatever expedients they may like), they are only, if we are to believe Kant,
repeating the schoolboy’s chase after the rainbow; they are pursuing only what is in themselves, and will move as they move. There is for him no single genus in nature, nor any infinitude of mutually-affined species: these are but spectra of the reasoner’s own projection, illusions merely when their real quality is undetected. They have their indispensable use, they connect and give meaning to experience, but they are only snares and pitfalls when applied beyond the possibility of experience. One grand system, unity of type, all this must be postulated from the very constitution of human reason; but from the very constitution of experience as well, it can never be realised in experience. It is ours to assume that there is such articulate chain in fact: we but stultify ourselves, however, would we attempt to see this chain in growth. This, nevertheless, is just what Darwinists would see; and just so it is that Darwinianism is at once absolutely certain and utterly impossible. We would catch Nature in the fact, would we—actually come upon her with an individual half in and half out! We would see identity end, and difference begin; but so still that the one were the other!

But we may quote here Hegel also (as referred to p. 683—Encyclo. § 249 and Remark):—

Nature is to be regarded as a System of Grades, of which the one necessarily rises out of the other, and is the proximate truth of the one from which it results—but not so that the one were naturally generated out of the other, but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the ground of nature. Metamorphosis accrues only to the notion as such, as only its alteration is development. The notion, however, is in nature partly only inner, partly existent only as living individual: to this individual alone, then, is existent metamorphosis confined.

It has been an inept conception of earlier and later ‘Naturphilosophie’ to regard the progression and transition of one natural form and sphere into a higher as an outwardly actual production which, however, to be made clearer, is relegated into the obscurity of the past. To nature externality—that is, to let the differences fall asunder and present themselves as neutral existences—is precisely proper: the dialectic notion which guides forward the stages, is the inner of the same. Thinking consideration must deny itself such nebulous, at bottom sensuous, conceptions, as in especial the so-called origin, for example, of plants and animals from water, and then the origin of the more highly developed animal organisations from the lower, &c.

This, written many years before the appearance of Mr Darwin’s book, reads like a critique on nothing else. This, in fact, is the truth of the case and ends the business. Nature is the externality of the notion, and, as such, a prey to boundless contingency: the
metamorphosis, the development, the articulation, is due to the notion alone. Name it in the language of Kant, or name it in the language of Hegel, it is the same thing that is indicated. Kant himself says, 'the principle of genera postulates identity,' that of species 'diversity.' In ultimate abstraction, indeed, the whole problem just concerns the metaphysic of identity and difference; neither of which is without the other.*

The error, then, of the reasoners in question is patent. We may say, in general, too, that they have been precipitate and rash, that they have attempted to execute the realisation of their problem without having first thought this problem out. Not only is it utterly impossible for any material principle to be an adequate Beginning, an adequate First and One, but the whole problem they set themselves concerns at bottom abstract Quality, abstract Quantity, abstract Identity, abstract Difference, abstract Condition, and, in general, the whole body of Metaphysic with which—though they knew it not themselves—unexamined, simply presupposed, they set to manipulate their atom or their species, as if so any legitimate result could be possible. Consider their zoological infinite alone! What is it but a blind presupposition that Difference, through its own infinitude, identifies itself at last? So it is that the infinitude of Discretion eliminates itself and restores Continuity; and thus, too, it is that we arrive at length at truth—the Kantian, the Hegelian, the Concrete Notion. Cuvier shall pursue Difference, and St. Hilaire Identity: but we shall take part exclusively with neither. There is a genus which holds under it all species, and all individuals; there is a horizon which holds under it infinite horizons, as they others: but this genus, this horizon is not a material atom; it is the Notion, it is Self-Consciousness, it is God.

In passing, let us point out again the one-sidedness of the Infinite of Natural Philosophy at Present, the progress of which is to bring all material atoms into a cold mass, or a hot mass,

* It is interesting to find Kant coming so often directly on the notion. At the end of this Appendix, he will be found saying, 'Thus, then, all human knowledge begins with Perceptions, proceeds to Notions, and ends with Ideas'—the triplicity of the notion almost in its very logical name. Still, the reader will see that, while in Kant the Begriff is only subjective and only seems to act on nature (only acts on nature, as said elsewhere, with an 'as if,' an 'als ob'), it (the Begriff) in Hegel is objective, and actually in nature—only so, however, that it acts not, so to speak, from without on nature as externally conditioned, but rather only schematically, as it were, from within.—New.
in the centre! Were there nothing in existence but the material forces of this Natural Philosophy, the past Infinite ought long ago to have achieved the result contemplated. That it has not done so depends on the duplicity of the Notion, to which Attraction were impossible, did it not possess, at the same time, just as much Repulsion.

We were badly enough off, then, with the mere brute law of Mr Buckle, but we are worse off still with the contingent lawlessness of varying conditions; for so, there were nothing left us but the atoms of Democritus, in the void of Democritus, under the τόχνη of Democritus. But even suppose it so—even suppose all the views of materialism accepted, one after the other, up to complete Darwinianism (necessarily, of course, Identity as Identity, but in material form—that is, as a Primitive Atom)—why, we have but to turn the back, and the world is as it was, the problem as it was. We shall admit all, we shall see the primitive atom, we shall see its gradual evolution into the formed universe. So admitting, so seeing, we shall lose ourselves in the despair of materialism; we shall lament to ourselves that material agency is all, that there is no hope. But just let us turn our backs on the atom a moment, just let us turn round to the formed universe, came it from whence it may,—Ah! it is all still there the Apparition, in its wonder, in its beauty, with its innumerable ideas! The majestic shape has been there all the while, in unmoved serenity, as if smiling on the tetchy infant, Man! How came she there, that majestic shape, jewelled in ideas—jewelled in ideas, were they but shells of the shore, or simple heath-bells of the most savage moor?—That is it, all has been duly developed from an atom, but whence are the ideas—the ideas of the vast resultant organisation?

Meantime—how easy soever, how varied soever the refutation —men have given themselves up a prey to this materialism: they go down everywhere desperate at present in a wide welter of atheistic atomism. The end of the Aufklärung is material self-will. But is it well so? Is it really good to end as Schopenhauer? Are we prepared to bear such misery? Is there no consciousness but the ‘unhappy consciousness’—das Unglückliche Bewusstseyn? Must we believe ourselves but isolated atoms—unconnected with each other, unconnected with the universe—disjuncts—foam-bells, haply murmuring ourselves out on some flashy pebble of a forlorn shore?
No: the triumph of superior enlightenment will not support the materialist himself long. It is in vain that the soul is burned out of us, that God is burned out of us; even when reduced to a material calx, these, which might have been within us to our comfort and support, return to haunt us from without, as ghosts of vengeance. God is what is, and he will pain his creatures till they confess him.

We live in the diastole of the universe, and our souls long for the season of systole. All is in the disjunct—cold, lonely, unsupported: fain would we have company once again, warmth, support, in the conjunct. Let us not be too miserable, neither; judgment is now the moment at work, we must accept the element—we may enjoy the variety. There is a comique to amuse at present, even in the shallow, even in the triumphant worthless. We must not give all to tears; there is matter still for laughter. Grisildis is, but not far off as well the wanton she of Bath. If there be the ‘Cotter’s Saturday Night,’ there are likewise the ‘Jolly Beggars’; if we have Milton’s ‘Cathedral Music,’ we have also an ode of Catullus—(to Furius if you will). So let us make the best of what is given us—Only, let us know rightly what that is, and of what whole it is but a part. We are shaken asunder from each other certainly, and the traditional substance in which we lived—a common cement—has fallen out; but it is ours to see this, and it is ours to repair this. Systole must succeed diastole: it is now the time to fill the bucket.

It is but another side of the same fact, that all weight, for some time back, has been put on feeling, conscience: not in our works, it has been said, is merit, but in the spirit which produced them. An eloquent utterance to this effect will be found in Carlyle’s Hero-worship. This, rightly understood, is true; otherwise, indeed, it may be also wrong. This, in one way, is but the empty bucket, and the bucket has value only in its filling. I, you, he,—we are not to be left, each to his own opinion of feeling, conscience, spirit; there must be a guarantee that these are true and right. No one can be trusted in that respect to his own self-will. What is concerned is a rational object, which can be realised by the universal will alone. The feeling of the individual is amenable to the prescriptions of the rational object, nor possesses authority but in assent and consent to the universal. It is not in the power of a single female individual even to refuse a crinoline at present without a creak in the machinery of society—a creak that
CONCLUSION.

falls with most pain on the ear of the recusant. This is an extreme case, and a temporary, unjustifiable too, certainly, to universal reason: but, in absolute fact, use and wont, observance, is the true morality. That is the meaning of the Hegelian distinction between (concrete) Sittlichkeit and (abstract) Moralität. Moralität is the conscience of the Aufklärung: it demands the right of private judgment—place for its own subjective feeling. Sittlichkeit is the deposit of objective reason realised by time in the practical ways of a people. Moralität—despite the tolerance, the enlightened liberality it asserts for itself at present—is a sour and thin fanatic that burns its enemy alive. Sittlichkeit is a jolly Burgher that lives in Substance, with his family, with his neighbours, with his administrators, with his God. It ought to be ours then, as it were, to fatten our Moralität with a filling of Sittlichkeit—to pasture, as it were, the one on the other. But—in direct antagonism to this—your thorough Illuminatus of the day shall laugh at the mass for wearing absurd round hats and absurd tailed-coats: he, for his part, shall be above the folly of the herd; his wedding shall be surreptitious, and he shall skulk about it with the air of a thief in the sulks; he shall not christen his children, neither, nor attend church; he shall not ceremoniously exchange cards, and never for the life of him drop one with a P.P.C. on it. He shall write no letters of sympathy, none of congratulation, not any of condolence. He shall never send any kind messages to inquire, and never be seen at a funeral. He shall exist in Pure Reason!—But what is this Pure Reason? It is only his own reason; it is uncorrected by the reason of others; it tyrannises over himself, it tyrannises over every one unfortunately submitted to him. Reason here, in fact, is simply tantamount to abstract self-will; and the rule of self-will is the only tyranny, the rule of self-will is despotism proper.*

This self-will feels itself, indeed, abstract—divorced from Substance. But the whole bent of all theoretic teaching for a long time back—in abstract Political Science and the Aufklärung generally (compare Shelley on that ‘Anarch,’ ‘Custom’)—has been to foster nothing but this self-will; and so it is that we are all, more or less, infected—Society, more or less, disintegrated by it. To seek a cure, then, is not now an affair of a few individual

* No doubt, even in common usage, while feeling, sentiment, is only subjective, spirit and especially conscience (like the German Gesinnung), are objective (guaranteed—the bucket has its filling).
Illuminati, but that of the community at large, and it is to be accomplished by a return to Substance.

But what is Substance? Substance is the traditional observances prescribed by objective Reason, in the elements of State, Town, Church, Family, &c. And would you have this Substance in the authority and articulation of the Notion, it is there for every one in the pages of Hegel. On such a wrong course are we all nowadays, that—to take a homely example—people still entertain indeed, but there is no longer any hospitality. Rather entertainments at present are periodical mortifications: I mortify you by a display of my splendour in April and June; you mortify me by exhibiting yours in May and July. And in the midst whether of mortification or triumph, we each sigh for the days when things were otherwise: we eat the dîner à la Russe, but what is present to thought—what is actually fragrant in the nostril—is some plainer meal years since. We are disposed to prophesy, then, that the first symptom of a return to Substance will be a return to meals actually intended for enjoyment—and next, perhaps, the recall of the children from the Boarding-school!

In short, what we all long for, is the Christian simplicity, the Christian happiness of our forefathers. We have seen already in picture the subject of this simplicity, the subject of this happiness; but it will do us good to see him once again, 'the simple pious soul, on the green earth, in the bright fresh air,—patiently industrious, patiently loving,—piously penitent, piously hopeful,—sure of a new world and a new life, a better world and a better life, united to his loved ones, there for ever in the realms of God, through the merits of his Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.' This is happiness—the thinnest Aufgeklärter, if he deny it with his lips, will confess it by his sighs! This is happiness, and this is what must be restored to us, else History indeed draws nigh its term: a universe recognised to be material only were but Humanity's grave. But this happiness will be restored to us, and in this restoration the very most powerful instrument will, perhaps, be the identical Hegel as in contrast to whom—so contradictorily opposed the error was—the picture of this happiness first suggested itself. Hegel, indeed, has no object but—reconciling and neutralising atomism—once again to restore to us—and in the new light of the new thought—Immortality and Free-will, Christianity and God.
With the quotation from Bacon with which Kant begins his Kritik, it seems fit that we should now, after Hegel, and the glimpse obtained into him, end. It runs thus:—

De nobis ipsis silemus: de re autem, quae agitur, petimus: ut homines eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non Sectae nos alicujus, aut Placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis æqui . . . in commune consult . . . et ipsi in partem veniant. Præterea ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostrum ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et ammo concipiant; quum re vera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.

Now, probably it will appear not presumptuous that Kant should have sought to prefigure his work so. Now, too, it may be, we are able to see not too dimly that the Kantian Philosophy concerns an opus, and not an opinio; the foundations of human advantage and advancement, and not the interests of any dogma or sect; and that it may, indeed, be the end and legitimate term of infinite error. And now, perhaps, we shall be willing to consult together, and, for our own profit, participate in the work—not without hope;—at the same time that we shall assuredly not bind ourselves to the mere human letter whether of Kant or Hegel, as either infinite or more than mortal. Finally, if we may be allowed de nobis ipsis non silemus, it will be only to say that we hope the imperfections of these pages may prove but as the irregularity of a ladder—but as the interruptedness of a series of stepping-stones which yet reach at least to the terra firma of a general desire—Hegel.

THE END.