NEW GERMANY

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ITS

MODERN HISTORY, LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND ART.

BY

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LONDON:

HOLYOAKE AND CO., 147, FLEET STREET.

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THE

'CATECHISM OF HUMANISM.'

THE following essays, which were partly delivered as lectures in Willis's Rooms, London, in the Albion Rooms, Brighton, and at the Birmingham Mechanics' Institute, have been written under the impression that it would be most desirable to lay before the English public at large the results of the modern German History in an abridged but plain and intelligible shape.

The author communicated his little work to the publisher, stating 'that it might be considered as a CATECHISM OF HUMANISM for freethinking men of every class in England, and of course for their opponents too.'

Such, indeed, is the case; and the author has not to regret that this denomination found its way into the interior of the volume.

If an opportunity should be given to him to explain at a greater length the new German philosophy in a series of scientific lectures, he would be happy—as he has reason to think that the English public would be interested in a subject which bears so closely on the intellectual defence of European Liberty.

The only way to secure the freedom of the mind is *the critical discussion of all abstract ideas or principles in a system*, or *the logical development of all the ideas which hitherto have formed the principles of scientific systems*, the historical limits of 'human understanding,' or the steps of its progress.

May the CATECHISM OF HUMANISM lead to such a result!

ARNOLD RUGE.

Brighton, June 13th, 1854.

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CATECHISM OF HUMANISM.

I.

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL EVENTS OF GERMANY SINCE 1789.

In the present crisis of European affairs, whilst Russia —a barbarian power in the hands of a German house of princes, of a race of German statesmen, of a set of German police officers, and of German generals—influences the German governments and disturbs the peace of the world, it is well worth while to consider the events which, setting out in 1848 from the very opposite principle—from the principle of freedom and humanity—could lead us to such a startling question as we now have before us, when England is almost left alone to fight the enemy of mankind. Left alone, I say; for the tyrants of the continent will not earnestly fight their head—at least they will not hurt him much; and this makes him so insolent as he is.

There is, however, one consolation left to the party of justice and human freedom—that is, the difference of the tyrants and the people in every quarter: a philosopher would say, history is not what the despots please to do, but what men make of themselves and society.

The number of barbarians is by far larger than the number of civilised people; the number of thoughtless men is greater than that of thinking men: neverthe-

less, the world is ruled by a few civilised nations, and those nations live under the influence of the most intelligent amongst them.

Leading nations we may call those who work out and apply the highest principles of humanity as a system of science and policy—the Germans, the French, and the English, including, of course, their free American colonies. Their government must be self-government. Despotism is the government of barbarians and savages only; English statesmen, therefore, committed a great crime in destroying the first French republic, as well as in supporting the re-establishment of despotism in the continent in 1848 and 1849. It is now high time to alter the system, for Hannibal is at our gates, and he and his atrocious system are exceedingly liked by a considerable portion of our governing men. England cannot conquer the chief of despotism if England do not give up the despots and tyrants altogether, and side with the people and the immortal principles of the great French Revolution: the war once seriously commenced, must change the system here as well as in France and Germany.

What is necessary here everybody knows; what must follow in Germany, we shall see in the course of this essay.

Our subject is the history of Germany since 1789. In 1789 the French Revolution opened our present period of modern history, proclaiming the rights of men in a place where hitherto the most impudent degradation of men and women had been the rule. History made a great step forward from the riding-school of the Tuileries, where the National Assembly of France was sitting. A republican government at Paris in the capital of Louis XIV., the head of abso-

lutism, was quite the same thing as a Russian republic would be in our age.

The word history acquired another meaning. It was no longer the history of despots and their courts; it was connected in the mind of every one with the improving condition of mankind; it was understood, as it really is, to be a record of events producing human liberty.

Events, consequently, which have no relation to liberty, deserve no longer a place in history; events which successfully destroy human liberty, destroy history.

It is not generally admitted that the French Revolution did so much for the benefit and honour of mankind. That great event has been decried since Burke and Pitt, by every tool of despotism who knows how to use pen and ink. The right appreciation, however, cannot fail to extend; and it does credit to German independence that the great philosopher, Immanuel Kant, expressed himself about the French Revolution in the following terms:—'The events,' said he, 'which have happened in France, had the power of convincing everybody of a moral progress of the human race, which hitherto was left very uncertain by history. Such a conviction is a precious treasure; and even if we could wish that in France many things might have happened otherwise than they did, even if this time mankind should not succeed in organising themselves into free societies, the impression of that great struggle for the highest and fairest objects of humanity will remain for ever, and the nations all over the world will rise again and again for that free condition, of which they have the ideal before their minds, until they succeed in obtaining it.'

Such was the impression made by the revolution of 1789 upon the German mind, and Kant, a man in the service of the Prussian state, was allowed to pronounce it.

But before we can see how re-organised France acted upon Germany, we must know what Germany herself had become at that time.

The German Revolution was the Reformation, and its offspring the state of Protestant Prussia and scientific liberty.

Prussia may be called *New* Germany, and Frederic II. the man who established it. Frederic II., or the great Frederic, was, through his mother, of English origin, and, by his self-education, he became one of the most free and liberal men not only of his people, but of his period. Voltaire lived with him; Lessing praised him in his poems; the philosopher Wolf at Halle, and Kant at Königsberg, were protected by him. In the seven years' war he conquered Austria, established the complete independence of Prussia, and thus really formed a *new Germany*, the Protestant and freethinking portion of it, in opposition to *old Germany*, or Jesuitic Austria. It is well known that Frederic's glory induced the Emperor Joseph II. to imitate his example, but that he failed being not sufficiently supported by the inhabitants of his barbaric dominions.

Prussia having become a European power, the German empire existed only by name—in reality it was dissolved into a complete anarchy, every little prince being left alone and exercising his despotism, good or evil, without any control whatever. As a nation, the Germans did not exist any longer, and, consequently, no feelings of nationality could animate them.

Frederic II. was, like all the rest of the anarchical nobles or princes of the empire, an absolute despot; but he commanded his subjects, even a little against their own desire, in the name of liberal ideas; he fought the enemies of the Reformation and of religious freedom abroad, and created liberal laws at home—the now existing common law of the country. At his time there was no question of public or political liberty; but the king being the most republican of all Prussians and Germans, God gave it to them when they were asleep; and when, towards the end of the century, the French Revolution created public life and republican form of government, Frederic II. was gone, and an incapable prince, his nephew, Frederic William II., occupied the throne. Impostors with ghost stories, absurd and insolent, together with mistresses of a low and dissolute character, ruled him. He deserted that proud position of a king who was the real head of the most civilised part of Germany, and made the Emperor, the very enemy of the new Protestant Germany, his ally. The small princes joined the party, and the Congress of Pillnitz initiated that notorious conspiracy of the despots against the people, which by craft and violence plunged the whole of Europe in its present state of misery. The German princes, supported and instigated by the Tories of England, opposed the liberal movement of France by an armed invasion. They were beaten in the plains of Valmy and Gemappes, in Champagne; and of the wars against France the next result for Germany was the complete and formal dissolution of the old empire, and, after the battle of Jena, in 1806, the dismemberment of the independent monarchy of Frederic II.

Although, in the course of these wars, the conquering

French had lost their own liberty, a great criminal being the leader of their plundering armies, they introduced valuable reforms, by destroying everywhere the abuses of dark ages.

But the most remarkable result of the downfall of Prussia from her high position in Europe, was the determined return of her government to the enlightened policy of Frederic II., and a most wonderful *regeneration of that state by democratic institutions*, which they called 'voluntary adoption of the results of the Revolution.'

After the battle of Jena, the King of Prussia, Frederick William III., father of the present king, fled with his government, his family, and his army, to Königsberg, under the shelter of a Russian army. At Friedland, a small place near the Russian frontier, upon a field of snow, the Prussians and Russians were beaten in a terrible battle. The peace of Tilsit finished the war, and the fate of Prussia was sealed.

She was reduced to a very small territory, but an energetic patriot, the Prime Minister von Stein, directed the course of the state towards a complete democratic reform, which, indeed, would leave no other privilege in existence but the privilege of genius and moral character, and establish a parliamentary government instead of despotism. He is the founder of a completely-renewed Prussia. The first step he took was to abolish the family despotism of the towns, and to introduce a self-government by the citizens, according to his charter of 1808, called 'organisation of the towns' (Städteordnung). The exclusive guilds were dissolved, and a perfect liberty of trade and industry had its full sway. Napoleon Bonaparte demanded the dismissal of the 'revolutionary minister.' Stein was

dismissed. Hardenberg, his successor, continued his policy. In 1810 he assembled a preliminary parliament in Berlin. For the moment the material did not answer. But the man persevered in thorough reforms of every branch. He himself held office by the disgraceful interference of the conqueror. In order, therefore, to recover one day the independence of the country, the old system of enlisting vagabonds and idlers was abandoned, and every citizen obliged to serve in the army. The service lasted for a short time only, when the man was dismissed as a member of the regular militia, called landwehr. Together with the old enlisting system the flogging system gave way to a correction by imprisonment only, and the whole body was supposed to be governed, not by fear, but by honour. The same reform took place in the public schools; and in order not to corrupt the soldiers by idleness during the time of their service in the army, that army itself was made a school, the officers and the private soldiers of the upper classes had the employment of teaching their comrades. Now, the whole people having to undergo that education, and the public schools being likewise admirably provided with teachers, to which everybody was obliged by law to send his children—if he should not prefer to supply them with professors at home—the national education was on an admirable footing.

The system worked wonders. The schools adopted gymnastic exercises as a preparation for war, and the people formed secret societies against the conqueror, called the league of virtue (Tugendbund), and Fichte, the great pupil of Kant, delivered at Berlin, under the eyes of the French generals, his patriotic speeches to the German nation. Fichte, whom the stupid Saxon

government had banished from Jena as an infidel, was called to Berlin by the Prussian reformers, who, in the middle of the noise of arms, laid the foundations of a university, which was designed to represent in every branch of science the latest and highest development.

Such things were done by the great men of the Kantian school, the friends of Fichte and Schiller. Their immortal names are—Stein, Schön, W. von Humboldt, Hardenberg, the Prime Minister, and, above all, Altenstein, a friend and pupil of Fichte, who for a long period superintended the department of public instruction, and, after Fichte's death, called Hegel to the philosophic chair in Berlin.

Bonaparte despised the Germans until he was taught by his defeat on their plains, that they were capable of a spirit and of an enthusiasm infinitely superior to that plundering and military spirit, the only one which he had left to the French armies. The republican feelings of liberty and national dignity had deserted the camp of the French, and lived now in the heart of the Germans. A fierce and general national insurrection overthrew the French armies everywhere, and proved the best generalship in serious warfare to be the spirit of a free and noble-minded people.

But this generous revival of a national feeling of Germany was mixed up with the selfish alliance of all the aristocrats of Europe, and with the barbarous alliance of Russia. Even the Pope and the spirit of the old German empire joined in the cry against the tyrant. And now came the restoration. The Pope was restored; the Jesuits were restored; the aristocrats were restored; the German despots were restored; and the Bourbons brought back to the Tuileries crowned the work. During all these happy events, Frederic William III.

forgot his liberal intentions; and the diplomatists of Vienna were in the best course of restoring every abuse of the middle ages, when all at once Bonaparte escaped from Elba, frightened the Bourbons out of the Tuileries, and marched directly upon Brussels and—Germany.

Hardenberg and his friends took advantage of that event to remind their master of his duty against the people, and the king, frightened by the danger, signed the law of the 20th of May, 1815, in which he laid down the outlines of a constitutional government, to be established as soon as the common enemy of all the dynasties, who was again approaching the Rhine, should be beaten back; and the Prussians, trusting their king, fought the battle of Waterloo with the English, destroyed the foreign tyrant once more, and saved their own perfidious master.

For a while, Hardenberg carried his liberal policy. We find him still, in 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, insisting by a solemn declaration of Prussia, as a party to the treaty of Vienna, upon the fulfilment of the thirteenth article of the German act of confederation, which bound every German Prince to introduce constitutional reforms into his dominions.

But the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was the last prominent step of liberal Prussia in Germany and in Europe; there the influence of the statesmen of the Stein and Hardenberg party was essentially arrested; in foreign affairs it ceased altogether to be observed; Prussia sided again with Austria and Russia in all the European Congresses against the liberal movements of Spain, Italy, and Greece, and again Prussia came down to the greatest degradation, and to an almost insignificant position. The mischief has been done by the old German party, under the guidance of the Crown

Prince, the present king, and the late General Radowitz; whilst men like Manteuffel, and, in former times, Kamptz, were and are mere tools and admirers of the old police government.

The police party, the soldiers, and the royal family, were frightened by the consequences of all the great and liberal reforms.

As a powerful state, with such an education of the people, with such preparatory free institutions, with every man a soldier, with every intelligent man a patriot, Prussia ought to have become German, and a republic in reality if not in name. Speaking of Prussia, we speak of Germany.

Neither Austria, opposing every scientific, moral, and religious, aye, even industrial development of her subjects—nor the small German dominions, without a radical religious reformation and education of their population, without any decided principle, and, above all, without a national feeling of their own—can stand the competition with Prussia. Wirtemberg could, if not so small—Wirtemberg, the native land of Schiller and of Hegel, of Uhland and of Strauss. But now Prussia is indeed the head of Germany, and must become Germany itself as soon as she dares to draw the consequences of the sincerely popular policy of her founders, the great Frederic, Stein, and Hardenberg; and with a free Germany there would be no such eastern question as the present.

We may call these men, together with all the free-thinking philosophers and poets of the country, the *New German* party.

Their antagonists, who now are in power, the *Old German* party, endeavoured to revive the institutions and religious feelings of the glorious days of mediæval

Germany. They called themselves first the Romantics, then the Christian German party. Most of them converted to Catholicism, and, of course, to Austria: Frederic Schlegel and Gentz were secretaries of Prince Metternich, and drew up the instruments of the counter-revolutionary congresses. All of them looked back to the wisdom of bygone ages; they invented a primeval nation and a primeval wisdom, to be found in the old fairy tales of Egypt, Asia, and Greece; and to believe the grossest superstition, or to introduce the greatest nonsense, they held up for the most judicious course a man could pursue. We call them Jesuits: Joseph Görres, one of their famous writers, was a member of that order; and for Radowitz and his friend the King of Prussia, it was superfluous to join the order—the order had only to join them.

The Germans have had the misfortune of possessing two kings, who tried in good earnest to realise the doctrines of such a set of men as the old German party are—the King Ludwig, of Bavaria, and the present King of Prussia.

In Roman Catholic Bavaria, no great mischief could be done by Jesuitism. But in Prussia, such a policy destroyed the very heart of the state, the spirit by which it had grown into the shape and position of a European power.

The immediate consequences were—

1. The policy of the European Congresses against constitutional liberty, and armed interference in Spain and Italy—Prussia siding with Russia and Austria.

2. The perjured course of the Prussian government, not to carry out the thirteenth article of the act of confederation, nor the law of the 20th of May, 1815, the solemn pledge of Waterloo or La Belle Alliance.

The universities were suspected and attacked, the self-government of the towns was crippled, the army and the government fell into the hands of the poor nobility; and in the course of thirty years since 1818, the whole constitution of the kingdom was perverted, and the small principalities felt most happy in following such an example.

However, with all the resources of thirty-three governments, the despotic and Jesuitic party was not able to check the liberal movement of the German mind; and being deprived of all information by an independent press, these rulers were taken by surprise when the events of 1830 and 1848 showed the feeling of the people.

For the first time, in 1830 the people remembered the treaties, the promises, and the laws of 1813 and of 1815, and several small princes — the Coburg, the Hessian, the Hanover governments—were forced to grant liberal institutions. The popular movements in the small estates cannot be called a revolution, but they showed that the people were not asleep.

Monster meetings in the open air at Hambach and Hanau declared a strong feeling of nationality; a revolutionary movement ran over the country, but stopped for once at Hanover.

The Prussian government was not seriously attacked, the old king being yet alive, and the upper classes relying on the scientific liberty which, by that king and his worthy minister, Altenstein, stood always unimpaired. But the king had grown old in his perjury and in his holy alliance, and no Prussian statesman of that time had genius and influence enough to stop the fatal course adopted against liberal institutions.

The king, instead of supporting the Poles, supported the

Russians, although he had written at the margin of his Macchiavell 'the Russians are our Goths;' and Warsaw fell. The small princes, recovering from their submission to a legal state of things, looked out for support to Vienna and—to Berlin. What a change since the declaration of Prussia at Aix-la-Chapelle!

A conspiracy of all the princes and—one should not think it possible—of the magistrates of Hamburgh, Lubeck, Bremen, and Frankfort, was formed; a secret meeting held at Vienna, in 1834; and a stipulation framed, which in about seventy different clauses annihilated every obligation of the princes to fundamental laws or resolutions of parliament, and promised armed intervention in every emergency, when a prince should not be able to stand against the will of his people, as we have since seen in Hesse-Cassel. Prince Metternich, who was in the chair, delivered a speech, in which he accused *the constitutional party* in Germany of being the real enemy of every good and sound state of things. A formal treaty against any sort of *constitutional* government—mind the word constitutional—a conspiracy to put it down by military force, was signed by all the Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs, Coburgs, and other burgs, and for nine years secretly supported and openly and most impudently applied.

In Baden, for instance, liberty of the press had been granted by a law enacted by parliament, and published by the government, when suddenly the prince abolished by his personal authority, not the law, but the obedience to the law, adopting every restriction he pleased. And, I am ashamed to say, the Badish courts of law, without any exception, were base enough to condemn people who stood by the law and opposed the contravention.

As long as the secret treaty of Vienna remained unknown to the public, every one was at a loss in finding out the real cause of such violent and impudent actions of the small courts against their parliaments and their own laws; and when in 1843, amongst the papers of the late M. Klüber, that stipulation, together with the speech of the worthy chairman, was found and published at Strasburgh and Paris, a unanimous cry of indignation burst from every mouth. The traitors were condemned by every honest man; and as soon as in 1848, in February, the bell of Notre Dame de Paris rang and the throne of Louis Philippe was burnt, the indignant feeling of the German nation prevailed, and, after having seen their soldiers beaten at Vienna and at Berlin, the despots granted everything the people demanded.

They might have been destroyed, as they deserved it. The Hapsburgs, as well as the Hohenzollerns, were in the hands of the population of Vienna and Berlin. The victorious people, after having seen hundreds and hundreds killed by artillery and by skilled riflemen, after having tired to death the soldiers in the streets, depriving them of all means to get food, after having conquered all the army and expelled them from Berlin, entered the palace of the king and found him. They were outraged, they were enraged; they met him face to face with gun in hand, and they did not punish him for his treason and for his murder; they gave him a horrible lesson, but they saved his life. Piling up all the dead bodies from the barricades before the frightened king in the courtyard of his palace, they called him out, forced him to kneel down, to take his hat off, and to sing with them a psalm from the prayer book. After the performance they shouted out, 'Look here,

that is your work!' Then they left a guard to watch the palace and their murdered fellow-citizens.

Next day, when a guard of citizens was on duty in the palace, the king, considering himself their prisoner, came down and addressed them, asking if they would allow him to go to Potsdam to meet his soldiers? The men sent for his carriage and accompanied him to Potsdam, where he made a speech to the soldiers, recommending them to be quiet, as he felt quite safe in the hands of the generous people of Berlin. After that he returned with his guard to Berlin and to the palace. We should think that the man felt ashamed of his former conduct, and was determined to go honestly with the people, 'the generous people.' We have learnt since how that generosity has been requited. Had there been a republican party at that time, as there is one formed now by the treason and cruelty of the courts, events would have taken another turn. So the battle was enforced by the soldiers, and the king was beaten by a royalist insurrection.

The character of the revolution of 1848 is a remarkable one; it may be called the Revolution of Petitions. The people, conducted by the constitutional party, insisted everywhere upon the laws and liberties granted to them in 1815, and by fundamental laws subsequently enacted. And when the petitions were answered by cannon-balls, and when the universal indignation of the whole people had crushed the criminals, the leaders of the victorious citizens wanted a king in order to establish a constitutional government after the model of England, as far as possible, but of course without aristocracy and without the church of Henry VIII. And that is the very reason why they could not succeed in establishing a 'glorious constitution'

supported by the interest of the governing men themselves.

The kings and their armed and unarmed servants were beaten, but they were neither deprived of their arms nor dismissed from their places; they were left to repeat the battle, and so they did, as soon as they had separated the people from their leaders, or, rather, witnessed that separation, which took place very soon.

Having enforced the establishment of constitutional governments, free parliaments, free press, trial by jury, and so on, in the different kingdoms and principalities, the constitutional party had a meeting at Heidelbergh, and resolved to have, besides the parliaments of the different states, a parliament of the empire. They recommenced petitioning the petty kings to support their resolution. It is true: at the same time they spoke of the formation of a southern German republic, if the parliament should be refused, and assembled a provisional parliament in Frankfort, accompanied by a little fight of republicans and constitutionalists. The republicans, under the command of Hecker, separated themselves from the constitutional or royalist majority, left the provisional parliament alone, and so enabled the constitutional party to obtain the consent of the different governments to establish a German parliament at Frankfort.

Who would have thought such a thing possible? Was that general parliament to be supreme or was it not? I was not in the confidence of the constitutional party, being occupied with my friends in the formation of a democratic party, in order to purify the different armies and the governments from the enemies of the new system; but as in Leipsic I had worked with them together in the struggle for the rights now ob-

tained, they wished me to join them in the parliament question.

I asked them, 'What do you mean by the German parliament? Do you intend to make it supreme, and do you know that a supreme parliament at Frankfort is the German Republic?' They answered, 'That they did not think so, but that they were sure to have it, and also to have the majority in it.'

Having liberty of the press and of public meetings, we both went to work, the one party to show that the parliament implied the republic of Germany ruling the different kings of the empire; the other, that both principles might be combined by electing an Emperor of Germany.

The elections came on; the constitutional party dropped their Emperor, and spoke only of the *sovereign* parliament; and the *sovereign German* parliament was elected. The diplomatic ambassadors of the Frankfort Diet were dismissed; and, instead of the old aristocratic republic of the princes, there sat, surrounded by the armies of thirty-three sovereigns, a democratic republic of the people.

I was elected myself by the town of Breslau, and met at Frankfort hundreds and hundreds of old companions in the struggle for the liberty and unity of Germany, which commenced from 1815. I insisted upon the idea, 'that now the time had arrived to dictate terms to the despots, to take from them their armies and their treasures, and to govern Germany by the delegates of the nation from Frankfort; aye, we would be traitors to the people who had elected us, if we gave up their sovereignty and our power.' The majority answered, 'No, we will not govern; we will have a king over the kings, and elect an emperor.'

After the election of the Archduke John of Austria, and after the resolution of the majority of 525 out of 700 members, 'that the archduke should not be bound by any resolution of the parliament,' I for my part considered that an abdication of the parliament, and left Frankfort for Berlin, where a more sensible body of men formed the Prussian assembly.

The Frankfort parliament sat one year and several months, sent armies against popular movements in the small states, supported the princes as if they had been parties to the treaty of Vienna of 1834, elected the King of Prussia Emperor of Germany, experienced his refusal, and were dissolved by the same armed force they had employed to put down democratic and republican movements in Baden, Wirtemberg, Saxony, and so on.

No emperor, no empire; 175 republicans out of 700 representatives of the German nation were not enough to convert the nation into a republic. Frankfort could not become Germany.

Vienna did not pretend it. The Italians fought in Lombardy, the Sclavonians fought at Prague, the Hungarians fought Austria, and Vienna itself rose in favour of the Hungarians, who forsook Vienna—Austria being placed between such national contradictions, could not pretend to become Germany.

Prussia could have become Germany, even in spite of the king. But the ministry of Camphausen (the first after the revolution) betrayed the people, by missing the opportunity of remodelling the army and the government.

The democratic party of the Berlin assembly tried to do it when it was too late. The army was not reformed according to M. Stein, the Breslau deputy's

act, but engaged in a conspiracy against the National Assembly, which was dissolved by the *coup d'état* of the fifth of November, when the constitutional party found out that it was of no use to set up a jury amongst an armed force of assassins.

After the fifth of November, the cause of regenerated Germany was lost for years to come. The Croats at Vienna, the Russians in Hungary, the Prussians at Dresden and in Baden—there was no difference between them. They were all equal in violence against law and humanity; they were Russians in manners and in principle: they themselves established a supremacy of Russia, first in order to have their revenge, and then in order not to be punished for their atrocious crimes.

The principle of personal supremacy or of absolute despotism has got the day for once. Anarchy, no law but the supreme pleasure of kings, is to govern the world. That idea put them very naturally under the command of the Czar; and the present complication in the East shows us the consequences. They fancy the time has arrived to conquer England, the last bulwark of legality.

It is not necessary to be a prophet in order to understand that every gun fired by the Russians is aimed at England and English liberty. The continent has become a Russian dominion; and that empire of mischief now tries to strike at the honour, aye, at the heart of this free country, the last supreme republican power in Europe.

It appears that the year 1854 is selected to break the neck of that monster of tyranny, which hitherto has been allowed to perpetrate every crime against civilised Europe with impunity. But the task has become the more difficult the longer it has been postponed.

The present state of things must bring home to every mind the danger into which a false policy of the constitutional party in Germany, as well as—I must speak it out—in England, has plunged the civilised world; and such a state of things must rouse the minds of nobler and more intelligent men than those which, of late years, have been at the head of affairs. It cannot be expected that the business of the people should be done by their enemies; nevertheless, the Czar himself enforces a war, which is a war of principles, and enlists friends for the party of law and justice, which, for instance the *Times*, could not be won over by arguments, and had to be convinced by cannon-balls, that the Emperor of Russia was an enemy of order and law.

As for Germany, we have proved, I think, there is no reliance on the governments of that country. But who would believe, that the whole history of Germany, the literature and the education of a century, the institutions and the experience of a long, progressive, and glorious period, should be lost?

A mischievous policy of their governments may lead nations to great disasters, to a shameful degradation; but the reality, which is at the bottom, we have to look for. We have to consider the feelings which animate the people, the degree of civilisation they have acquired, the principles by the application of which they have obtained their national existence, their character, and their self-esteem.

In that respect I am satisfied I have indicated what Germany in reality is—reformed Germany as well as democratic Germany—created by immortal philosophic statesmen; and you may easily guess from such evidence, which stands bright upon history's record, what

one day, and very soon indeed, the fate of Germany will be.

Wheresoever England now has to look for allies, the only allies to be relied upon are the nations freed from their despots, and no war against the chief of the despots can successfully be carried on, unless it sets free the nations. A war against Russia is A WAR AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF STANDING ARMIES, who hold in servitude the unarmed masses of the European nations. IT IS A WAR AGAINST WAR, against its very principle —violence. Will that meaning of the present struggle be understood?

And who can help in disbanding the Russian and all Continental standing armies? Everybody knows the answer. May the people never desist from repeating the question!

II.

THE GERMAN LITERATURE SINCE LESSING.

The knowledge of the German literature of the last hundred years is spread over this country by the learned men, who appreciate the German as the mother language of the English, and by the influence of fashionable circles, where an acquaintance with the best of our authors is expected. However, if we consider that neither the learned nor the fashionable world reads *the German philosophers*, and usually passes over *the philosophy in the German poets*, we are induced to believe that something new may be said even on a subject so universally known as the modern German literature really is.

Philosophy—if it deserve its name—brings out the secret of its time.

Therefore it is dreaded by those who have an interest in keeping the secret, and by those who prefer a sound sleep to the excitement of meditation. No doubt there are secret-keepers and sound-sleepers enough in England, but knowledge is now no more a forbidden fruit, and I think we may freely discuss every scientific secret.

The key of the German literature of the last hundred years is the German philosophy; and it was a mistake indeed of many a learned man to write an history of

our literature, without the slightest knowledge of our philosophy.

German philosophy requires application and perseverance, being a system of science completed by the hard work of nearly a century. At the end of the work, however, it is much easier to contemplate it, than in the course of its erection to help in building it. No philosophy understands itself, its real bearing; it is thoroughly appreciated only by its successors. The same of course must be said of every popular system of convictions, or of every religion.

At the end of a period of human progress, the scientific and the popular systems combine. The results of science are then accepted by the people, and converted into public opinion.

We are standing now at the end of a period; we witness the convulsions of a dying world. This gives us the advantage of appreciating easier than our forefathers could, the bygone systems of religion, as well as of philosophy.

The German history since the Reformation is different from the English. We Germans lost all our mediæval forms of public liberty, but German Protestantism made a uniform and universal progress from the popular to the scientific system of general truth—from Christianism to Humanism—under the guidance of our universities, which either reformed themselves in the course of time, or made the required progress by a sort of colonisation to another place.

By a glance at their history we shall see it. The Reformation itself sprang from Wittenberg. Leipsic—the colony of the learned refugees from Prague—Jena, and Halle, called the three Saxon universities, continued the work. Leipsic then remained stationary

with the Lutheran dogmatics—a sort of new scholastic philosophy. Halle, the first time with the pious school of Spener, and Francke, and with Wolf, the enlightened philosopher, made a progress. Jena and Halle then took the lead a second time, becoming the chief representatives of the Kantian philosophy—Halle by its literary review (*Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*), and Jena by Fichte's first appearance and success. Göttingen was a colony of Leipsic, Leipsic in a modern form, the principle being no generality of knowledge, but speciality and elegant expression. Berlin, initiated by Fichte and Hegel, represents the last form of Protestant science, and is a colony of the Jena-Weimar circles, by which Fichte, Schiller, Göthe, the two Schlegels, Schelling, Tieck, Novalis, and Hegel, were united in that centre of Germany.

Berlin attracted the rational part of them, whilst Münich, established by King Ludwig, of Bavaria, became the university of mediæval Teutonism, and represents a romantic reaction against Berlin with men like Schelling, the opponent of Fichte and Hegel, and Görres, the famous Jesuit, who, in 1813, was a powerful writer against Bonaparte.

Since 1840, the King of Prussia has invited and employed the leading men of Münich and other romantic (reactionary) authorities, in order to make Berlin like Münich—a decided failure. History could not be undone by the Schellings and Tiecks. They arrived, but in Berlin they were buried by the activity of the free northern spirit before they had time to die. Schelling, the last father of the church, lives, but he is forgotten. Hegel is gone, but his philosophy survives as the last predominant form of German Protestant science. Berlin we may call the Wittenberg of our

days—Hegel, the grandson of Luther, for his philosophy creates the humanism of our time.

The German mind is not ruled by the German kings or nobles (our princes are our anarchical aristocracy), but by its most eminent scientific men. This we must acknowledge as an honourable fact; and if the Germans are ridiculed that they lose themselves in the clouds of speculation, it is forgotten by those who do it, that not the sciences, but the creeds, were the origin of the darkness of the human mind. And, as to the present despotism, we have nothing to observe but, where mental slavery is broken, brutal force cannot last.

The progress of the universities from Wittenberg to Berlin, from the Lutheran dogmatics to the Hegelian logic, is a great step forward; and it was made not without the people. The universities sent their missionaries to teach and to rule the people, the most important of all being the authors of successful publications, some of which were of greater influence than many universities, and held an independent standing of their own.

But the great thinking authorities are naturally the leaders of the periods in literature as well as of the periods marked out by the establishment of new universities.

The commencement of the last hundred years we find under the influence of Lessing; the next period under that of Kant; the third under that of Fichte; and our own under the influence of Hegel.

We may describe the period of Lessing as that of the enlightenment or of the struggle for supremacy of reason and science; the second period, headed by Kant, as the classic period, or as the time of the foundation of the temple of free science and art; the third

period, headed by Fichte, as the period of absolute licentiousness, or of the romantic opposition against reason and science, by superstition and mediæval tendencies; the last period, under Hegel's influence, as the time of the victory of reason and philosophy. The real school of Fichte is the Hegelian philosophy; the period of Fichte is the very reverse of rationality and science, the period of romanticism. We shall have to explain this at its proper place.

I. THE PERIOD OF LESSING.

Lessing, who was born at Misnia, in Saxony, in 1729, commences his public activity in the middle of the eighteenth century, and is, with Leibnitz, the pride of Saxony. He received his education at the royal school of Misnia and the university of Leipsic; but, as an independent mind, he profited very little by the lecture rooms of the professors, worked his own way through the ancient and modern authors, and read the ancient classics, and Shakspere, Voltaire, and Spinoza, with the unusual intention to make them useful for the German literature. He considered the theatre and good society as a proper school for himself, and never joined any of the learned guilds, but occasionally made them feel his superiority by the most splendid polemical essays that ever have been written. The consequence was, that M. Klotz and the philologists said, he is no philologist; the vicar Götz, he is no theologian (when Lessing published the 'Wolfenbüttel Fragments,' the first real inquiry into the authenticity and consistency of the Bible); the poets said, he is no poet; and the philosophers, he is none of us. And Lessing was indeed quite a wonder in his time—a learned man, who had no learned business; an author, who was

nothing else but an author—and a strange author, too, who opposed every existing authority, the Godsheds, Gellerts, Gleims, and Hagedorns, and even the friends of classic writing, learning, and art—Klopstock and Winkelmann—whom he surpassed by his knowledge and his genius.

When it was the general opinion that Voltaire was to be imitated as a poet, and to be opposed as a clear-thinking man, and as a plain prose writer, Lessing showed that the contrary should be done; he delivered the Germans from their theological superstition by punishing the insolence of the Hamburg Götz, and from the worship of the French school of poets, and directed their minds to Shakspere and the Greeks; he showed how to appreciate the Roman, the Italian, and the Spanish authors, and extended the view of his countrymen far beyond the old riding school of the French poetry. The Germans have since been led so far in their disgust of the French classics, and in their admiration of every liberty of Shakspere's original style; but that was no fault of Lessing's. His prose, as well as Göthe's admirable simplicity, originated from the study of Voltaire's prose, because both men were a nature congenial to the French philosopher's.

Lessing holds the same position in Germany as Voltaire in France. He is the patriarch of the period of enlightenment for Germany. His task, however, which even now is not generally understood by his unphilosophical biographers—in conquering the supremacy of reason and science in a Protestant country—was more positive, and less sarcastic and frivolous, than Voltaire's could be. Art and science, to teach the people religious tolerance and general forbearance,

were his principles, as he shows in his 'Nathan the Wise Man,' and in the famous will of St. John, which contained only the words, 'Children, love each other!' The priests would fain have destroyed the German Voltaire, if it only had been possible, under the government of Frederic II., who checked their fanaticism whenever they tried to do mischief.

A great reform of German poetry and art was produced by Lessing's dramatic writings, and by his splendid essays on the fable and the epigram; by his 'Laocoon,' as well as by his own plays, of which 'Emilia Galotti,' 'Nathan the Wise,' and 'Minna von Barnhelm,' left the deepest impression upon the mind of the public at large, and of the poets.

Towards the end of his splendid career, Lessing had conquered every opposition. Even Haman, called the Magus of the North, never dared to attack him. On what Lessing had said, Jacobi wrote a pamphlet; Lessing had pointed to Shakspere, Wieland translated him, and Shakspere became a favourite of Germany. Lessing used, in his 'Nathan,' the dramatic verse of Shakspere, and all the poets accepted it instead of the French Alexandrine. Lessing had spoken with high consideration of Spinoza, and Spinoza became a companion of Göthe's, and was explained and defended by Herder, the orthodox doctor of divinity.

In matters of science and art, of religious and moral feeling, Lessing has become an authority; as a writer, he is a standard.

In this period of Lessing, the most remarkable authors were Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, the philosopher; Haman and Jung Stilling, the pious writers; Count Frederic Stolberg, Klopstock, Voss, Wieland, Bürger, Mathisson, Salis, the poets of this preparatory

period; Lavater, Heinse, and Lichtenberg. Hippel, the humourist and political writer of Königsberg, we may also mention as a pupil of Rousseau's, and a friend of Kant's.

Some of those authors represent the philosophic, some the anti-philosophic, or the romantic tendency of the age; but the enlightenment is the common basis of all, every one relying upon his own authority, neither upon any church, nor upon the Bible. Jacobi unites both tendencies in his person.

LICHTENBERG, the Göttingen professor of natural philosophy, is the nearest to Lessing—a clear, sound, learned, and very spirited writer, well known by his satire on Lavater's physiognomic extravagances.

Haman and Jung Stilling, Lavater and Stolberg, were the remotest from Lessing.

HAMAN, the Magus of Königsberg, wrote in a style so dark and enigmatical, that he himself lost very soon the key of his own riddles. Thus he describes the public as 'nobody who is known.' A friend of his, M. Berns, a merchant of the town, he calls not by name, but 'that man who wishes well to everybody;' and Kant he describes as 'the man who pretends to be universally wise.' Himself he styled a great sinner, and boasted of his readiness to confess it. He was a man of extensive knowledge and uncommon sagacity, and had an influence by the curiosity and darkness of his style, as well as by many remarkable observations: his sins and bad habits were not felt beyond the circle of his friends. Towards the end of his life he left Königsberg and his rational friends, accepting an invitation of the Princess Galitzin, in Münster, a convert to Roman Catholicism and a friend of Count Frederic Stolberg.

STOLBERG, who in his youth had been of the most liberal opinions, a republican, and a companion of Voss, the successful translator of Homer, and many other classic poets, an admirer of the Greeks, and even a rival of Voss in translating them, became, after the abrogation of the privileges of the nobility by the French National Assembly, a Roman Catholic and a professor in the Jesuitic circles of propaganda in Münster, in order to counterbalance the liberal movement of the age.

KLOPSTOCK and WIELAND were the leading poets of this period. They were quite opposite characters—Wieland of a light French genius, Klopstock a serious Teutonic mind. Klopstock undertook to imitate Milton by his 'Messiade,' written in Homeric verses; and Horace by his 'Odes,' which, even for Germans, are more difficult to understand than those of the Roman poet. Therefore, as Lessing said, Klopstock was much admired, but very little read, and went soon out of fashion; whilst Wieland, who writes plainly and beautifully, had an immense popularity, before Göthe and Schiller, by the sun of absolutely humanised poetry, obscured his star as well as that of Klopstock. The 'highest subject' of poetry appeared then to be neither God and Christ as Klopstock, nor sensuality as Wieland believed, but real humanity and its refinement. However, Wieland exercised a salutary influence. He was the tutor of the Duke of Weimar, the friend of Göthe and Schiller. His writings introduced the language of German literature into Austria, where Joseph II. allowed such works to pass the frontier.

Of a less popular description were the works of JACOBI; but they had a great influence amongst the ele-

gant theologians and half-Kantian philosophers, who have borrowed his thoughts. Jacobi tried to be a philosopher, but was always overwhelmed by his fancy. He spoke in favour of science, and used his imagination and his eloquent enthusiasm in order to explain the mysteries of the world. He was opposed to authority, condemning Stolberg as a traitor; but he opposed likewise the common way of learning by experience and reasoning, his principle being knowledge of the highest truth by intuition and imagination. He made a poet of the philosopher, which was just the fault of all inventors of myths and dogmas.

His character was the most kind and amiable possible; and his pamphlet against despotism, published in Berlin, reminds us of an old classic writer like Thucydides or Demosthenes—it is the fairest expression of a noble and powerful genius.

Jacobi, by his principle—we cannot know the truth, we can only imagine it, feel it, believe it—considered himself agreeing with Kant, who also declared human knowledge to be limited; but Kant never acknowledged that anything could be learned by other means than by experience and reasoning; and the period of which Kant was the leader, the most splendid time of German literature, we find in direct opposition to Jacobi's principle of intuition.

II. THE PERIOD OF KANT.

In this period of independent science and art, the most eminent authors besides Kant were Schiller and Göthe on the one side, and Herder and Jean Paul on the other. We do not mention Lafontaine, the romance writer, and Kotzebue, the successful dramatist, because they represent only their business, no idea.

The men of this period proceed on the ground conquered by their forerunners—Kant, by the construction of a rational system of philosophy, in which he tried to give the philosophical solutions of all the problems of enlightenment; Schiller and Göthe, by preserving in poetic forms the free humane spirit of their time.

KANT. The scientific basis of Kant was the *popular philosophy* of the English, French, and Germans, of the eighteenth century. Locke, the great author of that philosophy, was recommended in France by Voltaire, popularised by Condillac. Rousseau, d'Alembert, Diderot, Helvetius, and even Montesquieu, must be considered as Locke's pupils; in Germany the philosophy of Wolf, the writings of Moses Mendelsshon, Lessing, and Wieland, expressed the same spirit. Frederic II. of Prussia, who protected Wolf and Kant, Joseph II. of Austria, who was anxious to equal the great King of Prussia, were inspired by that philosophy. Experience, observation, natural philosophy, no metaphysics, was their device; and by their spirited and accomplished popular works, those authors ruled the eighteenth century.

Kant was so great an admirer of Rousseau, that he interrupted the usual order of his uniform life, and forgot his afternoon's walk, when Rousseau's 'Emile' for the first time fell into his hands. But he did not agree with the men of enlightenment in their opposition to metaphysics. 'In order to enlighten the people,' he said, 'by popular and artistic publications, we must first understand the principle of the moral and natural world; we want a new logic and metaphysic, an organon of all abstract ideas.' And in promoting the object of that progress in philosophy, he continued exactly where Locke had left the problem, when he

inquired, 'What is the power and nature of human reason, and where must we acknowledge its limits to be?' Kant having finished his criticism of pure reason, exclaimed, 'Now I have answered the question of Locke!'

Kant, instead of simply using like men of the former period, his liberty and his reason as the highest authority, asked the question, 'Are we really free, and if so, what is the liberty of human understanding, and what is the free-will?' In his 'Critics of the Pure Reason,' which he intended for 'an organon of all abstract ideas,' and in his 'Critics of Practical Reason,' he answered the question thus:—

'Neither the will nor our reason is absolutely free; and in the region of ideas above all external experience, such as the universe, and all infinite objects, we involve ourselves in contradictions, of which we cannot find any solution. For instance, the world must be infinite, it must have an end.' Those contradictions, he said, are the 'Antinomieen der reinen Vernunft,' and with them he believed to have arrived at the limits of knowledge and of liberty, and such an answer he gave to Locke's famous question.

As it happens very often, the way to that aim was of greater importance than the result. By his independent, scientific method of inquiry, the whole nation entered a new arena, and the use made of the critical philosophy was quite unexpected, even to the author himself.

In his old age, he beheld the success of Schiller's poetic works with the greatest satisfaction, and even Schiller's contradiction, when he pointed to an existence of illimited liberty in a real work of art, did not make him angry with his famous pupil, although the

contradiction was a fundamental one; but when Fichte tried to give the solution of all the contradictions he had stated to be inextricable, he felt so unhappy, that he exclaimed, 'God protect us from our friends, our enemies we shall overcome alone!'

And, indeed, neither the tyranny of the minister Wöllner, nor even the elegant opposition of Herder, were a check to the Kantian philosophy. It was reserved to Fichte and Hegel to replace Kant's philosophy, in carrying out its idea. Kant was a severe man; as a writer he had no talent to make his ideas popular with the many, who like to read without being obliged to think. Therefore Herder, who was quite a different character, and had introduced an artistic form into science and theological discussions, felt it very severely, when Kant ridiculed his unsystematic, adventurous geniality; and when the universities were filled with overwhelming enthusiasm for Kant and Fichte, whilst Herder by all his elegant works could only command the applause of the past generation, of popular philosophers like Plattner, of elegant theologians like Ammon, who from Kant to Hegel opposed every philosopher without understanding a single one of them, and Jean Paul, who is one of Herder's most sincere admirers—Herder could not master his anger, and denounced Kant as a barbarian author, and his principles as dangerous to church and state, concluding one of his pamphlets with the phrase, 'Every one who reads this may do his duty to make that transcendent philosophy descend.'

Herder's 'Metacritic,' as well as his 'Kalligone,' against Kant had no other effect, than to show the immense importance of the new philosophy; they are now forgotten, and Göthe, who perceived the failure

at a glance, although he did not like the metaphysicians, advised Herder not to continue in swimming against the stream.

Kant experienced the triumphant success of his writings and principles, but it was left to posterity to appreciate the whole extent of that reformation of the German mind, of which he is the author. The inner self-government which the Kantian philosophy imparted to the nation, is above the reach of what tyranny soever; it protects the Germans from their bitterest enemies, the Jesuitic party, and is the basis upon which the glory of all the following authors is resting.

However, it would be unfair to mention Herder, the gifted, elegant friend of every promotion of liberty and progress of humanity, the emulating admirer of Lessing, the friend of Göthe, only in his capacity of an ill-advised opponent of Kant's. He was a successful author in prose and poetry; he introduced many foreign popular poems to the notice of his countrymen, and wrote many a golden sentence against despotism, as well as against the baseness of his time. The great point of all his works was promotion of humanity (Humanitaet), and it is acknowledged that he indeed was a humane man.

GÖTHE and SCHILLER. The two men of this period who did not for a moment deviate from the right course were Göthe and Schiller. They established for the use of the German mind a temple of beauty, in which the ripe fruit of the genius of the age, and the revived spirit of the Greek and Roman classics, might be gathered by the present generation and by posterity. The same enthusiasm by which the philosophical result of the eighteenth century was hailed, received the corresponding artistic work of the great poets.

Göthe had lived and striven with men of the former period; he was one of the most daring in a circle of passionate young men called the Extravagant (Stürmer und Dränger); and when his 'Werther' appeared, he was considered as a dangerous firebrand for the brain of every youth, and measures came into earnest consideration how to protect the poor enthusiasts who might read the tale from shooting themselves and desolating the country. Göthe's finished works of poetry began to appear when the period of passion and extravagance was over. His character, therefore, must be established as that of a man of the period of Kant, of which the system of independent science and the formation of pure humane beauty was the object.

'Our humane century,' wrote Schiller, 'has been prepared by the exertions of all bygone ages, although they did not know it. We live in a great epoch, but for the moment it is morally impossible to reform the state from its condition of necessity into a state of freedom; we must wait until we have reformed the feelings, and, above all, the fancy of the people. Address yourselves to the heart of the people, humanise their imagination by a world of beauty, and you will prepare mankind for a condition which is worthy of men. Art and poetry are independent of political slavery. Legislation and government may exclude science and art—they have no power to rule them; they may exile the philosopher—they have no power to reach truth; and truth may take its refuge to the immortalising forms of poetry.' He says, in his poem 'The Artists:'—

'Von ihrer Zeit verstossen flüchte
Die ernste Wahrheit zum Gedichte,

Und finde Schutz in der Camoenen Chor.
In ihres Glanzes höchster Fülle,
Furchtbarer in des Reizes Hülle,
Erstehe sie in dem Gesange
Und räche sich mit Siegesklange
An des Verfolgers feigem Ohr.'

(Holy truth, forsaken by its contemporaries, will take refuge with poetry, find shelter in the chorus of the Muses—whence, in its highest splendour, more awful under its veil of beauty, it will reappear to strike with terror of revenge, by solemn hymns of victory, the coward's mind who banished truth.)

Schiller was well aware of the fact, that a nation may be educated æsthetically, and freed in their thoughts, without obtaining that moral character which dignifies humanity and establishes free institutions; but he is the first of all who shows that the existence of beauty is an existence of perfection in itself—a reality of the absolute (des Absoluten). 'All other exertions,' he says, 'give to the mind a certain ability, but always a limited power; only the formation and intuition of beauty procures us the feeling *of an illimited liberty*.' 'Beauty is the only possible expression of *appearing* liberty, and the mind impressed by beauty is capable of truth and moral accomplishment.' He continues: 'The result of science and thought has no other way to the heart and the mind of the people at large than that of artistic composition; and the most beautiful poetry is of little value if it does not express the highest degree of mental freedom, the free idea of the philosopher.'

He not only demanded an education by beauty—he himself educated the nation by his poems, in which every sentiment of noble-minded men finds a beautiful expression. Every line he wrote was destined for the

immortal work of elevating and ennobling mankind by beauty and truth.

At first his intentions were not at all understood. He was obliged to write explanatory letters on his 'Don Carlos,' and his letters on æsthetical education; and then those letters were too learned for the public, and too obvious for the enemies of liberty. Nevertheless, he did not despair; he forced his way to the heart of the nation. He died early, and was buried without any public notice. The greatest triumph of his sublime and generous poetry arrived after his death, and the fruit of moral and political liberty, prepared by his successful education of the German nation, is yet to come. However, his labour is not lost, and what he said of a great man's work, may be said of himself:—

'Millionen beschäftigen sich, dass die Gattung bestehe,
Aber durch wenige nur pflanzet *die Menschheit* sich fort,
Tausend Keime zerstreuet der Herbst, doch bringet kaum Einer
Früchte; zum Element kehren die meisten zurück.
Aber entfaltet sich auch nur Einer, Einer allein streut
Eine lebendige Welt ewiger Bildungen aus.'

(Millions are busy in preserving our race; still very few propagate humanity. Thousands of seeds are scattered in autumn, when scarcely one of them brings fruit, and all the rest return to the elements; but, if only one prospers, that one alone brings forth of eternal forms a living world.)

Schiller died in 1805.

Göthe, who was ten years older, lived until 1832. He was born in 1749, about a century ago. He exercised a long and deep influence upon the literature of his time; and until his last moment, when he exclaimed, 'More light! more light!' never deviated from the free philosophical direction by which he commenced his unequalled career.

Göthe was not so happy as to die in the vigour of his age; he grew old, and wrote in his old age many a line unworthy of his name. Schiller's fate was an unexpected early death—Göthe's life was extended beyond the expectation of the world. But not his life at court, not his self-biography, not his correspondence, and not every poem he chose to publish at Weimar, or at Carlsbad, express the man: he is great and free only as the real poet, who forms and subdues nature and his own mind by eternal works of art. Not his resignation, not the childish opinions of an old man of the court of Weimar, but the deeds of his powerful genius, show us the real Göthe. And it was Schiller who awoke him to a new effort of his best period, when he had almost lost himself in ministerial business and natural philosophy.

Only in the enthusiasm of poetry, not in prosaical reflection, he feels the harmony of real perfection:—

'Wie Alles sich zum Ganzen webt,
Eins in dem Andern wirkt und lebt,
Wie Himmelskraefte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen.'

(How all things are interwoven to form a perfection, living and working one in another! How eternal powers go up and down, and hand over to each other the golden buckets of creation.)

By singing his sorrows he comforted himself and delighted the world.

For a while he became tired of his own success, and considered the poetic comfort not as a real victory. He then applied to natural philosophy, and wrote his 'Metamorphosis of the Plants,' and his 'Formation of the Animals.' He had a predilection for nature, in which he acknowledged an *existing perfection*:—

'Im Innern befindet die Kraft der edlern Geschöpfe
Sich im heiligen Kreise lebendiger Bildung beschlossen,
Denn nur also beschraenkt war je das Volkommene möglich.'

(A sacred circle of living self-formation encloses the power of the nobler animals; for only thus circumscribed could perfection ever be procreated.)

Haller's verse—

'Ins Innre der Natur dringt kein erschaffner Geist,
Zu glücklich wenn du nur die aeussre Schale weisst'

(No created genius perceives ever the interior of Nature: if he be excessively clever he may be satisfied to know only the very outside appearance!)—

was precisely the Kantian limit of the human understanding. Göthe's answer to that exclamation of Haller's was:—

'O du Philister!
Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.'

(O superstitious man! Nature has neither interior nor exterior; it is everything at once.)

This answer has been hailed and repeated over and over again by the philosophers of Germany.

Göthe required always an intuition and an external inducement to produce a work of poetry. He wrote his most finished dramas, 'Iphigenia' and 'Tasso,' in Italy, the land of art and beauty. He sings when in Italy:—

'Hier erleuchtet der Glanz des helleren Aethers die Stirne,
Phœbus rufet, der Gott, Formen und Farben hervor.'

(Here the splendour of a brighter sky shines on our brow; Phœbus, the god, brings forms and colours to bear.)

Göthe's clear and simple prose, as in his 'Werther,' was equalled by the clear and simple beauty of his ballads, songs, and dramas; and it is his preference that he knows how to express the highest conceptions of the thinking mind in the most simple forms of beauty.

'Werther's Sorrows' were not a simple tragedy, but the expression of sentiment and passion in opposition to fashion, law, and duty, showing the possibility that a noble mind might be involved in a similar conflict—which was a great heresy at that time.

His 'Faust' is no regular drama; but a series of scenes of a deep philosophical and moral meaning, and of sublime lyric expression.

Many a small poem of Göthe's has quite a different object from what a superficial glance at it will discover. For instance, the 'Fisher-boy,' who is drawn into the water, represents man's fate to return to the elements, and the mysterious power of nature by which every living being is overwhelmed. Thus the little ballad idealises death, and becomes only the more fascinating by its utter simplicity of language and imagination.

Göthe's first works had the sincere support of Lessing; at the end of his life he was on friendly terms with Hegel and his pupils, who used to explain Göthe like an old classic author. He experienced also an opposition by the church party, under M. Pustkuchen, and by the liberal party, under MM. Menzel and Börne. They found fault with him that he did not belong to their party; they attacked what they could reach of him; his principles of Humanism and his genius in expressing them were far beyond their capacity. However, they felt that something was to be objected to that aristocratic position of Göthe's, and of

all our philosophers and poets, namely, that science and poetry must become an object and direct interest of the people at large; although those authors were not guilty if the people were too far behind to make their ideas the foundation of a new life and liberty.

The German nation took a long way round to come back to the point of humanity, by which Göthe and Schiller were inspired. The learned men immerged in the most difficult philosophical inquiries, and the masses of the educated youth were lost in the dream of mediæval Teutonic glory. They produced, the one the philosophic, the other the romantic, party of the third period.

III. THE PERIOD OF FICHTE.

FICHTE, who undertook to give the solution of Kant's contradictions in the sphere of abstract ideas (der Antinomieen der reinen Vernunft), discovered the formula of it. In every contradiction, he said, there is a thesis and anti-thesis, and every thesis and anti-thesis admit of a syn-thesis, which gives us the solution of the contradiction. Such position, negation, and union of opposite terms, is THE METHOD of the operation of the thinking mind. His 'Wissenschaftslehre' ('Course of Science') was destined to be the organon of all abstract ideas which Kant had deemed necessary, and which Hegel accomplished in his logic.

Fichte's bold character, his eloquent and noble language, animated and excited the young men of Germany, when in his 'Addresses to the German Nation' ('Reden an die Deutsche Nation'), in the time of the French occupation, under the eyes of the French generals at Berlin, he spoke of the superiority of the Germans, and of the impossibility to conquer them finally.

All the young men of the time of the war against Napoleon, with their Teutonic and mediæval tendencies, appear, therefore, connected with Fichte's name; and the most different, aye, the very opposite spirit, was considered as a fruit of Fichte's philosophy. As for instance, that of Novalis and Schelling, of the two Schlegels and Tieck, who altogether either converted themselves to Roman Catholicism or superstition, or at least acted in its favour. The whole set of those deserters from the camp of reason and philosphy are called Romantics.

They certainly started from Fichte; but, if he was a bold conqueror in the dominion of logic and metayhysics, they, in order to imitate his boldness, were bold only in turning their faces round to every superstition, and submitting basely to the same authority which they themselves dispised in their innermost soul. Fichte's absolute liberty, which was meant for moral and intellectual self-government (die Methode des denkenden Geistes und die moralische Weltordnung), they interpreted by absolute frivolity and licentiousness.

To Fichte's severe method of thinking, the Romantics Novalis and Schelling opposed their dissolute fancy—to the intellect, the intuition; and Schelling was insolent enough to pretend that truth could only be known by *inspiration* of the genius, whose knowledge was not to be imparted to the audience or to the public. Schelling, who wished to be alone, has been left alone; he deserves no place in the history of German philosophy, except as its sworn enemy.

The romantic or mediæval period since 1813, is very fertile of second-rate spirited authors, and of learned men of great merit. For instance, the two Grimms, the authors of the 'German Philology,' Niebuhr, Schleier-

macher, the leader of the modern German theology, Uhland, Werner, Brentano, Arnim, Fouqué, Arndt, Körner, Schenkendorff, Rückert, the poets of 1813, Eichendorff, Chamisso, Hofmann (der Teufels Hofmann), Savigny, Genz, the secretary of Metternich, Görres, Immermann, Luden, Fries.

With few exceptions, as Luden, Fries, and Schleiermacher, the romantic school does not recognise the supremacy of reason and philosophy; they write, sing, and act, according to their *fancy*, in spite of their scientific, and often of their moral conscience.

IV. THE PERIOD OF HEGEL.

HEGEL realises the method and the system of philosophy. The severe Hegelian logic corrects that dissolute and substantially—that is to say, in matter of philosophical inquiry—ignorant spirit of the victorious mediæval party; but the heavy artillery of the immortal philosopher gave much time to the mutiny of the widespread romantic opinion; and when at last the Romantics were beaten in literature by a common effort of men, like Platen, Heine, Börne, and the philosophers, Strauss, Feuerbach, and Ruge, (Hallische and Deutsche Jahrbücher), the romantic reaction seized everywhere the reins of the military and police government of the German states, and opposed the liberty of thought, of art, of writing, and of the state. The compression reached the highest degree.

So the revolution of 1848 burst forth to remove the fetters, and the counter-revolution of 1849 to reimpose them.

Since that time, the question of liberty or slavery has ceased to be a philosophical controversy, and become the problem of the people at large. In the distressing

appearance of the present moment, we are obliged to recognise that immense progress of the movement from the few learned men to the masses, which, since 1848, the German nation has made.

In political respect, the consequence of the Hegelian philosophy has been, and must be, political self-government.

Self-determination must also be the religious result, or the system of free thought must become a popular system of free education. In the conversion of the scientific into the popular system, we must mention Strauss's combination of philosophy and theology; Feuerbach's scientific Humanism, 'Theology is Anthropology;' and Ruge's practical or positive Humanism, 'The Religion of our Time is Humanism.' The pamphlet—'Die Triarier David Friedrich Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, und Arnold Ruge, und ihr Kampf für die moderne Geistesfreiheit. Ein Beitrag Zur letztvergangnen deutschen Geistesbewegung von einem Epigonen. Kassel, 1852'—explains the position and the works of the three men. We will give the outlines of the movement. It commences in 1838.

Novalis, Schelling, the Romantics altogether, and even the old Hegelian school, returned, in spite of the Fichtian and Hegelian systems of absolute liberty, to the old popular system of Christianity and of despotism. It was generally believed, that philosophy supported the Lutheran, aye, even the Roman Catholic, dogmas. The merit of Strauss was to show that such a supposition was an error.

Strauss's 'Leben Jesu' made the criticism of the New Testament a theological object. His 'System of Dogmas' replaced the dogmas by Hegelian explanations. His authority was neither the scripture nor the church,

but the Hegelian philosophy; and he showed the incompatibility of the scientific and the popular system of philosophy and theology. At the same time, he despaired of the possibility to popularise the Hegelian philosophy.

Besides Daub, of Heidelberg, Strauss is the most intelligent of the old Hegelian school. His Hegelian orthodoxy, of course, was Christian heterodoxy. Strauss broke the ice, and the heterodoxy of science and philosophy was proved again; but, at the same time, the popular system of Christian dogmas was proved to be obsolete.

FEUERBACH. Here begins the work of Feuerbach. He shows, in his remarkable book, 'Das Wesen des Christenthums,' that the positive meaning of all Christian dogmas, that the solution of all mysteries, is the human being: 'Homo homini Deus—theology is anthropology.'

Thus Feuerbach obscured the star of Strauss, who had not seen that.

Feuerbach opposes Hegel and the popular system at the same time. He did not say, we must have a philosophy and a religion of Humanism, but ends with the negative formula—'No philosophy is my philosophy; no religion is my religion.'

RUGE thought it necessary to draw quite different consequences from Hegel as well as from the religious system, namely, a positive Humanism, which has to realise the Hegelian philosophy, as well as the Christian religion.

He shows in his 'Loge des Humanism,' and 'die Religion unserer Zeit,' that humanism is at the root of the scientific system of German philosophy, as well as at the root of all the past religious systems.

Real Humanism has to abolish neither philosophy nor religion, but to establish a new system of both, or to realise the German philosophy and the Christian religion.

In one word, Humanism pretends to make every individual a free man, free in intellectual, æsthetical, and moral or social respects.

We therefore have to show that Humanism is the combination of the scientific and popular system of our time, the most important fact if the attempt succeed, the greatest tragedy if it fail, as the sun of the moral world would be quenched by the darkness of former ages.

The poets of this period have not come up to the Humanism either of the philosophers or of Göthe's and Schiller's. Of the lowest standard are the Austrians of the liberal school—Anastasius Grün, and Lenau. The rising political spirit of the nation is expressed by the political lyrics—Herwegh, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Freiligrath, Hartmann, Alfred Meissner, Heinrich Heine, and several others. They are altogether republicans. Heine is the only one who understands the philosophy of the period. He is the poet of dialectics, the Mephistopheles of the Hegelian school, a man who does not pretend to have any moral character but that of a witty Jew—concealing, however, his Jewish quality, for he is a philosopher. Freiligrath has joined the communist faction of the democratic party. He is a sincere character, and a man of talent, distinguished by his descriptive songs, but of no philosophic education. The *young German writers* (das junge Deutschland) are so old that they have no claim to their name; penny-a-liners, imita-

ting Heine in having no character, but not in being dialectic talents and wits.

We expect still a poet who is worthy of our philosophy.

III.

THE LODGE OF HUMANISM.

1852.

I. OUR VOCATION.

GERMANS, we preached you the belief in humanity—we told you it would be the work of our days to accomplish every desire of the European nations, to realise Christianity, to restore the ideality of the Greeks and the virtue of the Romans; and when the great and noble movement of 1848 burst out, we congratulated Europe as on the commencement of a free, fair, and human life and activity. Few years have passed since 1848, and in the heart of every nation an abyss of corruption is laid open, such as even the meanest wretch would not have dared to dream of. Not the faculties of men—reason, justice, law, morality and truth—no, the violence of the wild beast, the lust of rapine, of murder, and fraud, the violation of the most solemn oaths and of every sense of shame and morality, open enmity against all cultivation of the human understanding and human life, absolute infamy, is uppermost; the devil is triumphant, and his empire established.

Under these circumstances, we who preached unto you humanity are bound by the most sacred duty to prove to you that we do not desert the truth now that the world forsakes it. No, never! On the contrary, now is the time to make good our faith. We preach

to you crucified humanity, whose cross lies prostrate from Archangel to Gibraltar.

These are not empty words—they are a fearful reality. For twenty centuries nations lived more like men than at this moment; for never were men so free in their minds as they are now, and the freest man the hardest brooks slavery. His degradation, therefore, never was worse than now. Never with such an insult to morality has a condemned criminal been appointed minister, and a convicted felon elected to the command of a nation. Never before has humanity, by so many popular votes, and by so many men who undertook to govern, been condemned, and every crime acquitted and honoured. The whole of mankind is the martyr—every virtue is a charter for distress and ruin, every vice a privilege for prosperity and luxury. Is this the destruction of the moral world? Are we arrived at the day of doom? And if mankind are not destined to set aside, for the sake of some criminals, every feeling by which they are raised above the condition of brutes, to what shall they apply? How shall they overcome that infernal league in whose fetters they are writhing?

Believe in humanity, nevertheless! and be assured, that the noble spirit of man, adorning so many centuries with wonderful exploits, and having elevated us to such a degree of mental freedom, and placed us in the throes of this great epoch, will prove to be immortal, and burst forth from every humiliation of our race more splendid than ever. But, if it should be our fate to be left alone, like Socrates in the midst of the Athenians, then the disgrace of this century will be our pillar of honour. We shall never belie our faith.

Now, Germans, we offer you the popular satisfac-

tion of saving your honour by the same faith; if you consent, you will make us happy. No! you will not forsake yourselves. A morning follows every night. Lift up your heads, and be free men, the successors of the reformers and of our great philosophers and poets, the contemporaries of a great revolution, and the brethren of its champions and its heroes.

Yes; we might lose a campaign—we never can lose ourselves. We may see the Jesuits usurping our government—we never will vote in their favour.

We were thrown upon our own resources by the apostacy from the democratic cause of which almost all our representatives, unanimated by the spirit of the present age, became guilty. We have now a second time to rely upon ourselves, on account of the melancholy suicide of the French republic.

The French people are in the fetters of the priests and of their own military vanity. Who shall now rekindle the sacred flame of mental freedom, which is the source of every improvement? Who but we, the Germans?

It will now be our task *to create, in the midst of tyranny, the Lodge of Humanism, the invisible church of humanity, voluntary freemasonry for our principles, an open conspiracy for the safety of all the achievements of the German genius; and to foster the belief in the unity and liberty of our nation, the saviour of all the rest.*

We Germans, and none but us, can release mankind from its spiritual bondage, the most insufferable and fruitful in evil; we alone can destroy that superstition under the dominion of which even our political free colonies in England and America are now groaning. Events will enlist for us allies in the army of political

liberty in England and North America. The struggle for the people and for humanity will be again revived, and consummated with success by the united forces of all nations. Then it will become our duty to deliver the world from its spiritual thraldom. Yes; the new Jesuitism will be conquered by German enlightenment—the principle of absolute servility by that of absolute liberty. Our spiritual freedom is the palladium of the universe: let us preserve it in every strait; and let us be united by the feeling of our vocation into the Lodge of Humanism, in order to realise liberty in all its forms.

II. THE LODGE OF HUMANISM.

Every one who shares our principles is a confederate and a brother. Our principles are known; but, like the globe of the earth, which throws over itself the shadow of night, so does the mind of man. Let us once more briefly and connectedly expound to the people the principles of liberty. And a favourable breeze may waft these pages over the channel, and millions of hearts may be impressed with the eternal truth they carry. These truths may be transmitted to unborn centuries to come; and long after we have returned to the elements, they will preserve our memory with a grateful posterity, who will inscribe on our monument—'Honour to these men, who never despaired of us, and who founded in the midst of tyranny the diamond temple of freedom.'

All men, without exception, are destined to be equal associates *in life*, equal citizens *in the state*, and equal champions for the richest intellectual prizes *in art and science*.

Such is the shortest expression for the complete hu-

manising of the *commercial, political,* and *intellectual* world. The Lodge of Humanism acts upon this principle.

1. We therefore intend to bring within the reach of every one the realities of science, and the accomplished works of art. We desire to attach the people to *our philosophy,* and to *the religion of our time,* and to extend to all alike *poetry and all fine arts.* This is the intellectual constitution of society which we have in view.

2. We struggle for the social and political liberty of the German nation; we intend *to reunite the Germans in one great self-governing community.* This is the social and political constitution which we have in view.

We certainly understand that many people deem all this impossible, especially the first proposition. We answer: if the results of scientific inquiry could not be made common property, if the religion of Humanism could not be infused into every mind, if works of art could not be propagated for the enjoyment of every one, mankind would never be enfranchised.

Now, if we consider what a degree of liberty they have hitherto reached, we may conclude, almost with certainty, they will also succeed in future. Not everybody, to be sure, will peruse the works of Aristotle, Hegel, Copernicus, and Galileo; but the system of Copernicus, showing that the earth turns round the sun, has become known to everybody. And the principle of Hegel, that the universe developes itself by the struggle of its internal contradictions—which, in the human world, is free self-government—this principle is also destined to become the conviction of everybody, and a fundamental article of the creed of all the future centuries.

That free state of the mind, then, becomes the foundation of the free commercial and political constitution, or of free society and a free state.

III. OUR PHILOSOPHY.

I intend to give here a short history of the scientific, as well as of the popular, systems—of the first, commencing from Kant; of the second, having a glance over all the most important forms of bygone religious systems.

By both these explanations I mean to show that *Humanism* is the positive result of the whole history. It has already its own history, since, in Germany and North America, more than one million of people have been united by that principle in '*free parishes*' (freie Gemeinden), and '*unions of free men*' (Vereine freier Maenner)—a religious reform which sprang from the humanistic philosophy, and on the Catholic side commenced with Johannes Ronge, of Breslau, and on the Protestant side with Gustav Adolph Wislicenus, of Halle, and very soon led to a union of both the parties. The convictions of Humanism, therefore, express the feeling of a great body of the German people, who drew earnestly and honestly the consequences of the science and knowledge of our time, and regulated their life accordingly.

The religion of Humanism has yet to play a great part in the world's history. There is only one way to the victory of the good cause of liberty—that way leads through the heart, and the heart of mankind is governed by their religion.

We commence from the scientific system, the German philosophy since Kant.

Every philosopher realises the preceding philosphy,

and makes us acquainted with the spirit of his time in the form of a system.

Let us begin with the last century. The end of the eighteenth century is called the time of *enlightenment*. The spirit of Locke, Hume, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Thomas Paine, Frederic II. Lessing—is the *philosophy* of enlightenment. Its religion is the belief in God and immortality, which was called 'natural religion,' in opposition to the 'revelation.' Its *moral principle* is virtue and republic. Its *art* in Germany, the poetry of Lessing, Göthe, and Schiller.

The heroes of enlightenment did not choose to have a knowledge of things revealed, but to acquire that knowledge by the labour of scientific discovery. They did not choose to be governed by masters, but to govern themselves. They have accomplished a revolution in religion, in art, in science, and in politics. The great writers of that splendid period, English, French, and German, have infused the spirit of enlightened progress into the hearts of all the civilised nations of the world.

Our philosophical ancestors, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel,* then founded on the basis of the enlightenment a system of science, organising, besides logical and natural philosophy, the moral, religious, political, and æsthetical world. And now it is our duty to cultivate and to realise that system.

The German philosophers sifted the spirit of the age of enlightenment. They asked, What is the nature

* We do not mention Schelling amongst our philosophers, for the same reason that we do not speak of the other fathers of the church. He could form no system of his own, because the system of the church or of the dogmas was invented long before.

of thought, and of the will? Is it to be free? What is the law of freedom of thought and will, its method and its procedure? What would be a just constitution and a convenient development of human society? How by art, religion, and science, do mankind rise to the real dignity of their nature? These questions concerned humanity.

Another question was, What is nature in its reality, and what is the procedure of nature?

And in bringing both sides together, the question was, Which is the relation of the development of freedom to that circle of natural procedure?

All these mysteries were involved in the philosophy of the period of enlightenment, or independent humanity. German philosophy has disclosed them; but now it is philosophy's turn to want explanation. Not everybody has the time and the good fortune to pursue the whole course of such a deep science; and a large class of men, living upon superstition, feel an interest in preventing those disclosures by fire and by the sword, by every form of violence, by every trick and lie. Certainly, truth has nothing to fear from those adversaries whose actions and our words are precisely the same revelation. Both cry for humanity in all mankind.

The system of freedom and the system of nature were not found by the first who ventured the discovery. The same difficulty obtained in discovering the nature of the moral world as in discovering that of the universe. That system of nature which is called, 'Le System de la Nature,' need scarcely be mentioned, if we contemplate La Place's disclosures about the origin and the motions of the heavenly bodies. A similar difficulty arose when the German philosophers undertook

the foundation of the system of freedom. We shall witness it directly.

§A. *Kant.*

To the question of enlightenment, 'Is man free, and what is freedom?' Kant gave the following answer:—'Thought and will are free; but reason, if it tries to comprehend infinite objects, is involved in unsolvable contradictions; and the will is only physically, not absolutely, free.'

1. '*Reason is free;* for it produces for itself pure determinations of thinking, like cause and effect, which occur in no experience of the senses. The realm of such ideas is the province of infinity, which reaches beyond the experience of the senses, or is transcendent, and comprehends the thinking subject, the infinite universe, and the author of the world. In this region reason is involved in endless contradictions. For instance: the world is finite, it is infinite; it is without an originator, it must have an originator; I am subject (free activity), I am substance (essential being). Such contradictions are natural to reason, and unsolvable' ('Antinomieen der Vernunft').

2. '*Likewise, the will is free.*' Kant says—'As reason and understanding originate their own ideas, so the will is its own legislator. Physically free, self-determination is the categoric imperative of free will; but absolutely unrestricted will we cannot comprehend.'

Such is the contradiction as to the freedom of the will at which Kant arrives.

What, therefore, was proved? Not the freedom of the thinking mind, but only its independence of experience; not the freedom of the will, but only its independence of the senses; and the knowledge of infinity,

as well as the absolute freedom of the will, are stated to be impossible.

He, therefore, who was not willing to give up freedom, was obliged to give a solution to the contradictions of Kant.

§B. *Fichte.*

This Fichte attempted to do. He maintained 'the absolute freedom of men,' and undertook, in his 'System of Science' ('Wissenschaftslehre'), the methodical solution of all contradictions.' Fichte took Kant at his word. He said—'Yes, you are right; only absolute freedom is real freedom; and if the person is not absolute, it is not free. I, therefore, am absolute and free. I will prove it. I,' said he, 'am really substance and subject at once, my being is nothing else but bringing myself into existence, producing and creating myself. I am free activity. Before I came to the knowledge of myself, I was not I. Now I am my own object, in thinking myself. I am the active person and the product of my activity at once: my being is to be for myself (Fürsichsein), freedom; I am the absolute subject,' or the absolute person.

Fichte not only resolved this contradiction of Kant's between subject and substance; but, in his 'System of Science' ('Wissenschaftslehre'), he derived everything from the I, which is absolute, by giving a series of resolved contradictions. 'With the I,' says Hegel, 'Fichte found the germ from which the world, like a flower, is eternally produced.' And '*that development*,' says Fichte, '*arises by the union of opposite ideas into an absolute unity*.' 'By those various unions the different categories, or definitions of the ab-

solute, the unrestricted free and the thinking I are produced.'

At the end of his life, Fichte fell back from this bold intuition into the common theological fancy of opposing God and the world, instead of subject and object. We, of course, notice here only his scientifical researches.

Whilst Kant had declared the solution of the contradictions of the pure, as well as of the practical, reason to be impossible, Fichte made it his principle to give the solution of those contradictions, and stated the method by which it should be performed. Like a hero, he braved the difficulty and overcame it. He has touched the shore of freedom—a Columbus in the dominion of infinity, he soars up to the absolute subject. He shows us the union of existence and thought, or of substance and subject, in the thinking man. But he did not carry out either the system of the universe or the system of the intellect. That logical, physical, moral order of the world which he proclaimed, was yet to be drawn from its source, arranged, and proved as a scientific system.

That work, as Fichte planned it, and after the very method pointed out by Fichte, is the *Hegelian system.*

Kant and Fichte, contemporaries of the revolution of 1789, establish mental and absolute freedom; Hegel organises it.

§c. *Hegel.*

I state the Hegelian philosophy at once in the form of Humanism.

Every movement, every development, is a solution of contradictions; the solution of all contradictions is the eternal activity of the universe; the solution of

those contradictions by thought is the task of philosophy. The activity of the universe, as well as the activity of the human mind, are both that development.

The self-conscious development is that of the thinking mind; it is free, it is absolute. The unconscious solution of contradictions is the activity of nature, of the mind in its natural state, and even of history; because with the development of nations the contradictions and their solution are not in the dominion of a clear-thinking mind, but come into action like blind events in nature, by mere necessity.

Absolute freedom, self-conscious, methodical development—such is the principle of the Hegelian philosophy. Therefore, we add, the freedom of human society is also the methodical and self-conscious solution of their inherent contradictions; this is the liberation of the history of mankind from the blind development of wars and violence, by keeping it within the bounds of a legitimate method of progress.

The method of thinking, called by Hegel 'the dialectic method,' is the chief point of his philosophy. Applied to human life, it is the fruition of a free constitution. Applied to nature, it is the law of the formation of the universe.

These three procedures—methodical thought, the legitimate development of society, and the formation of the universe—are self-determination, by inherent necessity to resolve the inherent contradictions.

Nothing is single. In everything there is an inherent *difference* (*Unterschied*). These differences are *contrarieties* (*Gegensätze*), if they rise into action against each other. Their activity against each other itself is the *contradiction* (*Widerspruch*), the father of all things.

How, then, are contrarieties dissolved into each other? Just as one foot is taken up when, by the opposition of the other, progress is made; just as acids and bases, at the point of their working contradiction, form themselves into a new body; just as man and woman, in their union, represent the solution of contrarieties, and produce by that contradiction offspring. The child is their real union, and the solution of their contradiction.

Real contrarieties always dissolve into one. To appear and to disappear are contrarieties; but every appearance is at the same moment a disappearance, every negation is affirmation, every construction is destruction. We cannot construct a sound system of thought without destroying a system of absurdity. The appearance of truth is the disappearance of error. We can put down no tyrant without raising the slave he oppressed.

Now, what is the union of those contrarieties or the new category, which, by the solution of their contradiction, is produced? What is it that appears disappearing, and disappears appearing? Everything disappearing here must appear there, like the sun, which at every moment is rising and setting at once. What is the result of the act of putting down the tyrant and raising the slave, in which they are united and become one? Both are men freed from injustice.

By methodical thought this development is made with the free consciousness of its necessity, and three steps are to be taken :—

1. To recognise the contrarieties.
2. To solve their contradictions.
3. To find by recognising their unity a new category. Then that new category is brought again into opposi-

tion with its contrary, and so on. The Hegelian system, therefore, has the three following parts:—

1. *Thought*, or the system of self-conscious development.

2. *Nature*, or the system of the unconscious development of contradictions.

3. *Thinking nature* (der Geist), man and his self-created world, the development of which is constantly to dissolve its unconscious self-creation in a conscious one (Aufhebung der blinden in die selbstbewusste Entwickelung).

Hegel calls these three parts, *logic*, *natural philosophy*, and *the philosophy of the human mind* (Geistesphilosophie).

So the Hegelian philosophy realises that of Kant and Fichte, and offers the solution of all the problems of enlightenment. It is the realisation of philosophy. It gives us the law and system of 'theoretical freedom' (des absoluten Geistes), and shows that all procedures, natural, moral, and intellectual, in their method are one and the same, namely, the solution of contradictions. This is what has been called the unity of thought and being (die Einheit des Denkens und des Seins).

§D. *Humanism.*

Likewise, as Fichte realised the philosophy of Kant, and Hegel that of Fichte, so it is now our task to realise the Hegelian philosophy.

We have done it already in theory by this sketch. We took all three philosophers by the word; we gave to their words and works the true interpretation, and signalised the Humanism involved in the Hegelian philosophy. We corrected the Hegelian philosophy

according to its own principle—the absolutism of freedom, the republican movement of the universe. So the history of the German philosophy has been explained, and so it is obvious now what must be the contrary into which the Hegelian philosophy, or the *theoretical* freedom, must be dissolved—it was, and it is, *practical* freedom.

In order to realise the theoretical freedom, we had, firstly, to correct the Hegelian philosophy according to its own principle—that of free development. Thereby its principle is understood to be absolute self-determination. Consistent Hegelian philosophy proclaims the autonomy of the universe as well as of mankind.

But consistent and humanised Hegelian philosophy—humanised, because 'absolute freedom' is understood to be nothing else but 'theoretical freedom of man'—remains *theoretical* freedom. Correcting that philosophy according to its principle, is only a theoretical realisation. And we have now not only to dissolve the theoretical, but also the practical contradictions. Real freedom will exist when the contradictions between freethought and enslaved mankind are dissolved. Freethinking men make the unconscious self-determination of their history a self-conscious one. Only the free man is a real human being—the realising of the theoretical freedom is free humanity. Such *humanising of the world* we call *Humanism*.

Every one endeavours to realise himself—to come up to the real standard of humanity. The system and the method of realising humanity by knowledge and thought, by determination and action, by religion and arts, is the realising of the theoretical system. It is the humanised society—a free world producing themselves consciously by the working of their genius.

Only such a realisation of the Hegelian system *is real Humanism.*

By that event, the system itself is made a step of the progress. And to the system of theoretical freedom is opposed a system of practical freedom—to the logical dialectic, the dialectic of history—to the philosophical movement, the revolution—to the thought of single men, the thought of all—to the aristocracy of genius, the genius of democracy.

The revolution has happened; the masses of the people have risen for political, religious, and social freedom. Every one in our days will rise up to the real standard of humanity; every one will be an equal citizen of the state, an equal associate of the social work and its reward which society carries on, an equal champion in the struggle about the highest goods in the realm of truth and ideality.

This wish of our century can only be fulfilled in a democratic and social republic, and in free communities of the religion of Humanism.

That *the counter-revolution* is universal, proves nothing but the universality of the revolution. Counter-revolution is a protest against the liberty of mankind; the negation of that protest is given in the law of progress; it will be the affirmation of universal liberty.

Such a no is now our yes. We shall speak it.

IV. OUR RELIGION.

Yes, we shall speak it: the great Dionysia of Humanism are not yet over. Liberty has inspired with enthusiasm the hearts of millions; it has its priests, its prophets; and its martyrs proclaim it by their blood. Liberty is the genius of our time. Our science is its truth, our poetry its garment, our religion its cultiva-

tion, and even the arms of the tyrants are nothing but an offer on the altar of that democratic divinity.

What, then, is the religion of our time?

The labour of centuries has torn the veil from the statue of truth, and we venerate the visible divinity in her beauty and her power. The mysteries of all religions are revealed, the gods of every altar are discovered, and from the sanctuary of the inner mind the ideal of humanity beams, to which the gods of all ages have endeavoured to attain.

The *absolute idea of philosophy* (free person) is likewise the *absolute idea of religion.*

The procedure of philosophy is thought; what is the procedure of religion? The aspiration, the impulse, the enthusiasm of the mind to approach the *Supreme Being*, the *real* being. It is an ideal ever before the mind. Religion, therefore, aims at the perception and intuition of its object—that is to say, at the idea and ideal. In order to venerate the Supreme Being, one must perceive it in mind as an ideal. The gods of every nation are the ideals of which that nation is capable. Ages of the world pass away before men discover that the Supreme Being is their own being, that the Absolute Being is the ideal of humanity; but that conception is at the root of all deities and all religions, *and the god of a religion is good in proportion as he is human.*

§A. *Fetishism.*

The first deities men worshipped, therefore, are very rude ones. The intellect of primeval man knew only that the real being was concealed from them; and so he could be induced to seek it behind everything that had for him a mysterious appearance.

This is the explanation of Fetishism, which, however, has survived among later religions. Amulets, crucifixes, and wafers, in the middle of Europe, and in the nineteenth century, are worshipped as fetishes.

§B. *The Worshipping of Nature.*

More reflection was required for the worship of *Nature.* In this religion man discovers that the *real being*, on whom he is dependent, whose power and appearance strikes him with admiration, is *Nature.* Either he worships the mother earth, or the mighty sea, or the enlivening sun, and the mild moon, the queen of the night, or a powerful or useful animal, within whose earnest, mysterious countenance he thinks to discover the divine thought and the unknown power by which himself, as well as nature, is ruled. He accepts the powers of nature as they themselves obtrude on him, as he sees them at work; and if the divinities of nature can be enumerated systematically, it is the system of nature itself which enables us to do so.

To animals of every shape, to every part of nature, which in the worship of nature, is adored, the imagination attributes human faculties, understanding, free-will, and free activity. Those gods are, like the Egyptian marble statues, nothing but animal masks of man, or they are men, who rule and govern the natural power, like Neptune governing the sea, and Phœbus conducting the chariot of the sun. In both instances it is the human being which the adherents of this religion are seeking and worshipping behind the natural being. So that men endeavour already, by the worship of nature, to reach their own being—real humanity.

In the worship of nature, it is an instinctive feeling

that mankind is produced by nature, and is dependent on nature. Therefore nature is deified. But as behind individual natural existences the human was sought, so it was an obvious progression to seek behind the universe the governing man, and to worship the Personification of the Universe. This all-powerful person now in turn produces nature, and the god of the universe governs the universe, as the god of the sun governed the sun.

§c. *The Worship of the Universe: or, the Jewish Religion.*

The progression from the many gods of nature to the one universal God of Nature was made by the Jews. Their Jehovah was the creator and governor of the universe, and at the same time the universe itself, all the qualities of which he has to unite to his personal and human attributes. Their God, therefore, grows to such monstrous dimensions, that no likeness could be made of him, and no description of poets could equal him.

With the whole of nature a personal superintendence was as inconsistent as it was with the sun. Nature is self-determined, according to its inherent laws, and does not admit of extrinsic control. All the controling influences, therefore, of this God, are disturbances of nature in its regular action—wonders or miracles; and because nature from eternity produces itself by itself, as its name very properly indicates, his accession to the government—the creation of nature—is likewise an act of usurpation, and a disturbance of the laws of nature—a miracle.

As the Jews are ignorant of the autonomy or republicanism of nature, producing since eternity all

things by self-determination, so they are likewise ignorant of the self-government of society. Their law is the discretion of their master. It is chartered to them in the name of their God, who is their despot. But if anything is understood in our days, it is that to the Jews, by their despotism of the universe, and by their law, chartered by their Lord, has happened something very common.

Even the lowest stage of religion, the worship of nature, and, consequently, every form of religion, is a relation of mankind to their own being; and religion advances as this truth is discovered clearer and clearer. Mankind carry out by degree the idea which they conceive of their own being to a higher reality, until they see the ideal of humanity itself placed before them, and made the immediate object of their consideration.

Does mankind, then, reach ultimately the ideal of humanity? Every truth, every beauty, the idea and the ideal, are only caught in the stream of thought and contemplation; they are not to be fixed; they are no *caput mortuum*, but life and activity. And mankind do not reach their ideal or their real being like the end of a journey, but only as by the contemplation of beauty, and by thinking the truth, they elevate themselves into the region of absolute freedom. The aspiration of religious feeling is always renewed by the discord of the ideal with the reality, of the spiritual with the natural life, of the idea with what is actual. The human mind is the incessant work of plunging into nature, and of elevating nature to the standard of its own element—to humanity.

§D. *The Religion of Beauty: the Greeks.*

The religion of the Jews stops at the contradiction,

that their God is a human personification, but, nevertheless, cannot appear in human shape. That contradiction is resolved in the religion of the Greeks. The Hellenic gods are beautiful men. The part of them which belongs to the worship of nature and their animals, such as the lightning and the eagle of Zeus, become their attributes, the moral part their character.

This religion is a product of artistic fancy. Poets, painters, and sculptors, created to the Greeks the idea of their gods, and humanised even the monsters which they received from Oriental tradition.

Whilst, by the fancy of the Jews, Jehovah, who formed chaos, was left without any form himself, the Hellenic gods spring from chaos—they themselves are the formed chaos. *Nature* is their basis. The sprightly world of Hellenic gods is a realm of *freedom*, wherein that nation virtually came up to the standard of their ideal, to a perfect shape of humanity, which in those beautiful types of the moral powers, or the human occupations, embodied in the Hellenic gods, is presented to us as a conception of genius never to be surpassed.

The Hellenic gods are a totality of all human ideals. The whole world of mankind, with its moral agencies, every faculty of genius and art, and even the common occupations of life, which pave the way for a human existence, we find represented and worshipped in eternal types. From the achievements of the athlete Heracles and the skilled blacksmith Hephaistos, the employment of the Hellenic gods rise to the chair of Olympus, occupied by Zeus, and to the artistic, wise, and heroic regiment of the daughter of his head, Pallas Athene, the democratic goddess—to the charming work of beauty and love, fostered by Aphrodite, and to

Eros, her son—to the cheerful, conquering god of civilisation—to Dyonysus and his dramatic choirs and contests, which have immortalised his festivals—to Phœbus Apollo, that younger Zeus, who on the Helicon presides over the Muses, and governs the most sublime activity of free genius in science and the arts.

Never has the world been so dignified as by the Hellenic artists, who created those gods, the ideals of the Greeks.

By the religion of a nation, always its whole life is governed and impressed. The achievements of the Greeks in subduing the natural world is, therefore, *æsthetical*; the aim of Hellenic life is to produce the *ideal man*, to bring beauty into existence.

§E. *The Religion of Virtue: the Romans.*

To the Hellenic life the Roman is in opposition; its aim is to produce the *real man*—not his beauty, not the arts and artistic emulation, but his *virtue*, his usefulness in society and in war. The Hellenic life is subservient to the ideal; with the Romans the ideal is subservient to common life. With the Greeks, war was only a gymnastic contest; with the Romans, even the gymnastic plays were contests for life and death. With the Greeks, the state was dedicated to the gods and to their cheerful worship; with the Romans, all the gods were slaves of the republic and of social exigencies, or confederates in war. With the Greeks the artists created the gods, their ideals; with the Romans, the consuls procured them, and the commanders of their legions collected them from foreign countries. The Greeks built the Parthenon to the goddess of democracy; the Romans erected a Pantheon for all gods, even the Indian rabble and the Egyptian beasts.

The ethical ideal of the Romans is the service of the republic, republican virtue, and patriotism. And this virtue is nothing but the free and proud domination of the Roman citizens over slaves and conquered nations. The commonwealth is the severe republican life at home, and the conquest of the world abroad. The whole world, every virtue and the gods, are subservient to the republic; and wherever, in peace or in war, ordinary means fail, a god was employed, or, may be, nominated, at once. Thus Jupiter Stator, who made the legions stand when they gave way, came into existence. Thus the Deus Rediculus, the god of return, when Hannibal went away from Rome. Thus the goddess of the fever, of the cough, and of the blight in corn (*rubigo*). Of some we know the history of their immigration; of all we know that they were received as they were found, and as a dictator in the necessity of the republic procured them.

The Romans are no men of genius; they are conquerors. They shrink from no toil and fatigue in order to appropriate everything, but they invent nothing. Even their thoughts and their poetry were imported to them from Greece. But they had the talent and the perseverance of discovering and appropriating the whole world with all its treasures. Their empire they called the orb (*orbis terrarum*), for its frontiers were the desert, the sea, and the barbarians.

It is true, for the sake of possessing the world, they destroyed themselves, their republic, and their virtue; even in their barbarian virtue of war and conquest they very soon were surpassed by the barbarians. Barbarians became Roman imperators, and Romans their slaves. It is true they had burnt Carthage and Corinth, and profaned with rude hands the columns of

the Greek Olympus, humiliated the gods with slavery, and destroyed the Hellenic world of beauty. The conquered world was godless, depraved, and degraded. But the frontiers of nations were no more, the world was united; and in that chaos all mankind felt one slavery, one necessity, and one desire, for a new religion, for a universal soul, for a cosmopolitan god.

The ethical ideal could be no longer a political dominion, a ruling republic. They were overwhelmed in a deluge of nations. And the ideals of the Greeks were extinguished with the ideas of Greece. Where could we now find the imaginative Greeks and the virtuous Romans, the aristocracy of nations? They were subdued like the barbarians, made slaves like them, and *men* alone were left in the world.

Therefore the god ceases to have a national character, a special æsthetic or political employment; he now becomes *man;* virtue becomes the common virtue of humanity, and the ideals one ideal, and a universal one—*Christ, who is the God-man, the living man who is God, the God who is born, who lives, who suffers, who dies*—whose fate, in one word, is the common fate of men.

§F. *The Christian Religion.*

The Christian religion is reformed Judaism, *worshipping the Creator of the Universe;* but it is at the same time a product of Hellenism, *worshipping the ideal of men,* and of the general Roman movement, uniting all nationalities in that one empire as their Pantheon, and extending the views of nations beyond the frontiers of their existence.

God Almighty, THE FATHER, remains certainly the creator with the Christians; he therefore remains the

God of the universe, or the natural God, as with the Jews; but he is no more a national God, and becomes *the universal God of all mankind*—he wishes to redeem them all.

CHRIST, as man in general, not the man of such and such employment, as with the Hellenic gods, *is made the ideal.*

And the HOLY GHOST is not a particular national spirit, but *the spirit of all Christian people comprehending and pervading the different nationalities.*

The three persons of the Trinity are, indeed, nothing but *the one universal being of humanity.*

§6. *The Religion of Humanism.*

But as soon as this meaning of Christianism is discovered, the whole Christian heaven falls to the earth, and a new religion is originated, the religion of Humanism, by which no transcendent gods, no Olympus, and no heaven, but the living man and his true reality, which is his ideal, is made the object of care and veneration.

This religion resolves the enigmas of all past religions into mere rational knowledge.

Judaism, retreating behind external nature to the conception of the infinite universe, leads to metaphysics, and that *one principle of every development.* But it is left to philosophy to discover that principle.

Now, the impulse to think and to discover the truth is religion with us. For the thinking man raises himself to his true reality. Contemplation of truth is a religious act.

The truth towards which *the Greek religion* leads, is *the ideal and the idealising of human life.* The Man-God, called the Son of Man by the Christians, com-

prehends all the ideals of the Greeks; and, indeed, the *real man* is the comprehensive existence of all ideas. But it was again left to philosophy to discover this meaning in Christianity, and to the arts to realise the true religion of beauty, by idealising the whole life of man.

By knowing that man raises himself to his true reality, in contemplating and enjoying beauty, this artistic act becomes a religious act.

The truth, towards which *the Roman religion* leads, is organised humanity, by which nature is subdued; *i. e.*, the conquest of the whole globe, by organising free communities.

Christianity proclaims that *every* man is to be recognised as a brother and equal; philosophy recognises that truth; and Humanism consequently states, that in a moral aspect the real religious activity is to raise every man to his human reality, in a political and commercial community of equal associates.

Thus the religion of Humanism intends to realise the ideal of humanity by knowledge, beauty, and liberty.

The question has been asked, How that can be done? We answer, by organising society after the method of self-conscious development, by free communities, schools, and academies of arts and sciences, and by making the refinements of education a part and a business of ordinary social life, from which they now are separated. Such a separation destroys the arts and sciences, or deprives them at least of a great deal of their beneficial influence on society.

V. OUR ART.

No one will doubt that poetry should express the intellect of its age. This is, at first sight, less plain with

regard to music, painting, and architecture, but not less necessary. Art expresses ideas in sensible material, makes ideas appear to the intuitive senses of sight and hearing. This manifestation of the idea we call the ideal, the work of art, the beautiful. Therefore, as the ideas of the artist, such are his ideals, and the brain of the artist teems with the ideas of his age.

It has been imagined that thought was an obstacle to the artist. Just the reverse is the case. The most distinct and deepest insight into the activity of philosophy, religion, and politics, is presumed, if the manifestation of his ideas are to have interest and impressive signification. The artist is not deranged by his prevailing idea, for his manner of expressing it, what we call his technicality, remains intact; whilst the idea inspires him, the more according as he comprehends it more perfectly. This is the sole warrantry for the immortality of his works. The poets who do not express all the freedom of the eighteenth century will perish; Göthe and Schiller will endure. The poets of our present time would be by far greater poets, if they were able to understand our philosophy—that is to say, their own age.

The problem of art is becoming in our age of a more elevated nature. It is perceptibly becoming the religion and the pursuit of the whole community. As with the Greeks, it will immediately appear in the 'religion of Humanism,' as one of the greatest public concerns, while now, in a great measure, a private affair, or even a luxury of an indolent aristocracy. Artists have been, and still are, subservient to courts, and appear as public buffoons, instead of educators, guides to, and conductors of, the sublimest of national concerns, of the religious ordinances, which now become merely esthe-

tical. The absolute signification of art first restores artists to their pristine honour that they have lost since the time of Praxiteles and Phidias, Homer and Sophocles.

Architecture, in a humane society, renounces the vacant temples, the dwellings of inanimate gods. It has to construct us instead academical halls of art for the people to visit, theatres, gymnasiums, and public buildings. The abodes of men will become a subject for art, and it will be the task of all the people to idealise and render worthy of the age the second world it produces by its architecture. This whole world will be a temple for man and his exploits. The temple will be no more the empty abode of gods, and we shall no more look for it isolated and dispersed under the shapeless mass, which by common necessity we are forced to accept at the hands of the avarice of uncultivated bunglers, destitute of all ideality.

Sculpture has become in isolated instances a national concern, as in the case of historical monuments, and it has been applied to public buildings. But it is plain that it has so long devolved to the share of accident, bad taste, and churchyards, until society presses forward to the religion of the ideal and the idea, and then takes an interest in elevating the beautiful forms it was animated by into enduring prototypes, and the successful ideals into types, by which taste and inspiration may always be rekindled. The religion of Humanism and humanised architecture, are the qualifications for a new real life in sculpture.

Painting has been plunged much deeper in romantic stupidity than sculpture, which could be but a regeneration of the classical age; and the distorted and inhuman shapes, of which in the shrines and niches of super-

stition we find the samples, are not regarded as belonging to art at all. But painting has turned out much more susceptible of the spirit of the age, and exposed all its contradictions. Humanism is such an absolute necessity with it, that even Raphael and Murillo, the great masters in Christian painting, could only manifest their religious intention by embodying it in pure human forms. Wherever they deviated from this track they foundered, and so the sedate and serious looks of the Son of Man are not beautiful, but render the child a caricature. The galleries and the palaces, now the only spots wherein the pictorial art can appear free and human, destroy their own effect by being overcrowded. They hoard their treasures up, and render looking at them a toilsome work, instead of an elevating enjoyment. No picture is painted with especial regard to any situation, and no scenery is appropriated to the work. The intellectual riches are suffocated by their own superabundance. No humanised world affords them a resting-place, and they are subservient to uncultivated sway, and still more uncultivated despots; they long to rend those unworthy shackles that they found after their escape from the inanimate Gothic vaults to the society of the present day.

The slavery of *Music* cries out even more loudly than that of painting. The recognition of its absolute meaning is never a question with regard to it. Music is taken for a luxury and a pastime, and in its most effective form, the opera, it is almost inaccessible to the masses. In the opera, the elevating and liberating power of music will force itself forward to every man of feeling, inasmuch as the actions and the words unlock its spirit and soul. But at the same time, in the opera that unpleasant meaning with which music, as a

mean incentive of a rude and corrupt world, so frequently teems, will become repugnant to him.

Moreover, the musician is the most compatible with the world, which may be the reverse of the ideal. As his work is merely an indeterminate emotion, he can always give the rein to all his sentiments without offending the prepossessions even of the most preposterous hearers. Orpheus found favour before the master of the infernal regions, and the beasts danced in concert to his strains, in which, of course, they meant to experience their own sensations.

Of all arts, *Poetry* is the most expressive revelation of ideas. While the rest seek to give to sensibility the power of speech, poetry renders its language sensible. It endeavours to unite the distinctness of thought with the visibility of the picture, and couples the signification of the words with melody, time, and rhythm. However, poetry does not roam so far into the domain of music as to degrade the idea to a mere sensibility and obscure emotion. It rather asserts the full effect of the thought, and, what is still more, impresses the thought as an ideal on the intuitive mind. It teaches the world not only to perceive its ideas, but to love them too. Poetry is, therefore, the most effectual and essential form of æsthetical religion, the most social of arts, and may be dispersed among a whole party of actors by the drama. In Protestant worship, poetry, music, and philosophy obtain, although all three in a very imperfect form, in order that they may not appear as the aim and the absolute itself, but as a means for the glorification of God or the absolute. In the religion of Humanism are all arts, and especially poetry and music, re-established in their absolute right. It is their works, to the free activity of which the community are

elevating their conceptions. Artistic representation and contemplation here, therefore, become the aim. This performance is the manifestation and revelation of the idea, and participation in these artistic works is not the concern of luxury and mere pastime, but the occupation and noblest problem for the entire nation, which seeks out and finds therein its highest liberty and satisfaction. Artists are not bound by their avocation to the ideas and forms of the humanised world of man; the contrary is open to them, they may lose themselves in the remoteness of antiquity, but will never renounce the foundation of their own education, by making the log into a Hermes, the rock into the body of an immortal. The poetry of Humanism will be as little dogmatical and doctrinal as the Greek dramas were, which constituted the worship of Minerva and Bacchus. The progress of our art is one with the progress of our philosophy, our religion, and our society. They all acquire a fresh soul and their full dignity.

VI. OUR SOCIETY.

The principle of our society is conscious self-determination, by which it is pervaded and moved. It is the social democratic republic.

1. The application of the principle of conscious self-determination to social institutions *in religion, art, and philosophy*, leads to the establishing of the *communities, schools*, and *academies of Humanism;* for nothing but the union of free men for the exercise of freedom and its propagation among the succeeding generations, by a new life and purified instruction, can realise and assure the intellectual conquest of our age.

2. The application of the principle of conscious self-determination to a society framed upon our principles,

and the method of free development, or to the state and its constitution, leads to *the democratic republic, and the absolute freedom of discussion and of public opinion.*

3. The application of the same principle to property, labour, and human intercourse, gives *the deliverance of society in social respect, or the solution of the social question.*

The task of the social democratic republic, therefore, is the CONSTITUTION OF THE TRUE DEVELOPMENT of mankind in the department of the ideal of morals and of economy. The arrangements of human society in all the three departments must be designed to produce the true man.

Before it was known what the dignity of man and the reality of free development were, these arrangements could not be attained to. This is now possible, but only become just possible. Still no state of the earth has contrived the bringing out and insuring of the dignity of man in every individual human being. The states which permit intellectual and industrial, yea, real corporal slavery, alternate on the inhabited part of the globe with despotisms, which wilfully cling to injustice in law and morals and to the degradation of all men—I said of *all*, for even an irresponsible despot, whom all others slavishly obey, is a degraded man. Social amelioration depends on the diffusion of intelligence; and, as this intelligence has been once incontestibly gained and proclaimed by events that shook the world, the interest of the minority does not in the long run extend so far as to deceive the majority on their opposite interests. The ruin of slavery is the interest of all, and it is a great mistake of the masters that it is a greater advantage to be the master among

slaves than free among free men. We proceed, then, on the behalf of all, to the arrangements of humanised society.

§A. *The Organisation of Free Instruction in Science, Art, and Accomplishments.*

The free (or theoretical) mind is necessarily anarchical. Thought and invention, like the glance of the eye, may perhaps be disturbed by the lower faculties, but not controlled. When man ceases to be free, he ceases to think. If he is not allowed to go on from the determination he has arrived at to a fresh one, the work of his mind ceases. But invention can be neither commanded nor annihilated. Control over the inventive, thinking, and contriving mind is therefore impossible. On the other hand, inventive thought and contrivance is unable to master common life, and the habits of traditionary thoughts. A new thought does not reach all understandings, and the inveterate habits of those it does reach are an obstacle to it. Thinkers and poets must have recourse to the expedient of occasioning the invention of their productions in every mind, and of making the world believe that itself thinks and invents those ideas—aye, they must induce them to do so in reality. For if man does not think himself, he does not think at all. Every one who really thinks determines and controls himself. But neither self-determination nor correct self-determination can be extorted; on the contrary, error, or the violation of the formal laws of thought, is as unavoidable with respect to truth as arbitrary choice with respect to freedom. Error is the twilight of truth; arbitrary choice is liberty groping in the dark. Can you forbid a child to stumble? Can you prohibit the night from

deceiving? As little can you command an act of the inventive thought, or poetry.

However, there is an organised resistance to the absolute freedom of isolated thought, and to the unconditional self-determination of the will, in *public opinion* and *public custom*. Both are thought and will in the masses; they are the philosophy and politics of democracy. Without established custom in public life, by which every transaction of public affairs in popular meetings is certain of its character, and firm method, there is no free constitution of society. Established custom abolishes unrestrained free will. Without public opinion, and its formation by means of public discussion, there is no progress, no intellectual activity, and no reformation of evil customs. Public opinion and public custom are the expression of the spirit of the age appropriated by an entire people. Upon that the unconditional freedom of the inventive thinkers and artists has to operate. Public opinion and public custom are the only moulds in which the public mind is organised.

The press and meetings form public opinion. The freer both these are, the more inveterate must be the custom, which is the habit of a settled mould, in which public opinion is cast, brought to light, and actuated. That every one during that attempt and afterwards submits to this custom, is the only warranty against violence and arbitrary power.

As private thinking cannot be controlled at all, so public thoughts, discussion, and the ascertaining of its result can be submitted only to very superficial regulations; and in its inner details it is likewise uncontrollable.

The results attained by quiet discussion, or pas-

sionate conflicts of parties, form the foundation of an epoch. They must therefore be handed over to the succeeding generations. This handing over is the instruction of youth.

The schools put youth in possession of the acquired treasures of the human intellect, and must therefore be organised according to the subjects and the method of their communication. Society has an interest that the truth, art, and accomplishments at its command should be propagated; but it also has an interest that the progress made in sciences should be adopted and incorporated in every successive communication.

There must therefore be public schools established for every one, and in all sciences, arts, and accomplishments, and furnished with competent teachers. To guarantee the competence of the teachers, and thereby progress in the sciences, it is only necessary to give the school its whole importance.

Because the cultivation of youth causes the progress of society, it is one of its most essential problems. Youth is to be cultivated—not subjugated, but to be trained for self-government. The corporal, ethical, æsthetical, and scientifical education of youth, in the mould of self-determination, therefore, requires an organised juvenile community.

Youth must be accustomed to self-determination. For that it needs democratic forms. The various ages govern best themselves, especially in their recreations, with which, as soon as they are duly practised and accomplished, the gymnastical, moral, and a part of the æsthetical education, is connected. If the schools try to take away from them their self-determination, they usurp it. Teachers, therefore, must strive not at despotism over this new generation, but rather to maintain

its freedom and self-determination. Learning is like gymnastics, only to be organised as an intellectual rivalry. The umpires selected from among the competitors will always be the fairest ones. Therefore the youth of the humanised world, contriving their own constitution, arranging their competitions in all spheres of their activity, and conducting their own tribunals for the decision of their moral questions, they become *ethically educated* and prepared for republican life.

By exercising their bodies by gymnastics, refining themselves by music, dancing, and dramatic exhibitions, by organising and representing mimic combats, war exercises, and public plays, and, finally, by being instructed in the arts, they receive their *æsthetical cultivation.*

By acquiring skill and learning the arts and sciences, they are prepared for the transition from the community of youth to civic society, and receive their *scientific education.*

The teachers in this system are delegates chosen out of civic society for the community of youth, in order to keep its free activity in the right track, and introduce the advancements in the sciences.

Schools and universities will henceforth teach nothing but the real science of nature and of man. The division into faculties is discarded. There is only one faculty—that of science, and only one principle of that science, truth. The sciences are physical sciences, history, and philosophy, wherein mathematics become a part of logic, theology a mythology, and jurisprudence becomes history and political philosophy. That the sciences may not become stereotyped, the old teachers are not to be permitted to have any privileges before the

younger ones, who must have an unfettered activity in order to clear the way.

Self-governing tribunals, and prizes of merit given by the community of youth itself, are substituted for examinations.

From intellectual equality, or equal right of all to their share in science, art, and artistic skill, follows spontaneously the eradication of the separate and subordinate education of the female sex. Separations ensue through particular avocations, not in the universal department of mankind, the arts and sciences.

§B. *The Free Communities.*

When the life of youth has been rescued both from neglect or anarchy, and violence or despotism, when it has been conducted to self-determination and organised into a juvenile community, when this life has been ennobled by æsthetics, when it is nowhere under the influence of superstition, but everywhere under the dominion of free science, this life of youth is itself an organised civilisation, for it is organised culture of real humanity in that portion of society which has the most ready and capacious intellect for the reception of ideas and ideals. With the previous establishment of a juvenile community of the humanly and democratically organised youth, it is very easy to establish free communities of grown-up people. They are, then, in the academies of the sciences and the arts, in social life, in the discussion of principles and measures, in the imparting of the sciences to all, and in the exercise of the arts for all, nothing but a continuation of the life and organisation of youth, because the theoretical life of youth is directed entirely towards the culture of the idea and the ideal, so that there is nothing left for the

community of adults but a higher degree of science and art, the mysteries of family, of civic life, and of the world of industry—the accomplishment of man.

§c. *The Democratic Republic.*

The democratic constitution of free communities, the setting aside of priests, senators, and all artificially-created authorities, is to be understood without explanation, as all are called to activity in science, morals, and the representation of the ideal: the difference of capacities in these achievements confers no title to command, but only to honour and gratitude. Even the forms of scientific discourses, as is now the case in England, may be democratic—that is to say, they may be discussions. In the practice of art, the majority of the people usually can only act a receptive part.

Discussions on practical subjects and their consequences, committees or deputations to the community of youth, and for all affairs connected with science, art, and politics, are democratical.

The democratic constitution of the republic is likewise a necessary consequence of the principle of freedom, or the conscious self-determination. As a free community for religious purposes can endure no artificial or official authority, but only the guidance of the scientific and artistic mind under those persons by which any advancements are made in thought and invention, so a free, self-determining people cannot permit any personal or official authority to start up against its own authority—against the supremacy of law and the sovereignty of public institutions. We have already discussed the nature of public opinion and public morals, on the occasion of the application of the progress, by thinking and invention. There we had

an interest in bringing inveterate customs, public opinion, and law, into a reforming activity, according to a new shape of public opinion. Here arises the question how to maintain the sovereign authority of law, given by majority; how respect for public opinion, how the working of those institutions and customs by which the will of the people is made to be understood, ascertained, and carried out? We answer, only and solely by unremitting exercise of the authority of the people.

A people that cannot assert their own authority, but give up the power to single individuals, or official—that is to say, fictitious—authorities, have neither thought, will, nor character of their own. They are stupid, degraded, and immoral. Such a nation, or such nations, are not then agitated by the real antithesis of the old customary and the new progressing opinion, but they make no resistance to the pleasure and whim of the official innovators at their head, who by any means are unable to think and to resolve in the name of the whole body. The pleasure of the despots imposes on them to-day this, and to-morrow another thing; breaks every law of nature and reason, breaks its own decrees, and puts the people exactly in the condition of a horse subject to the caprice of its rider.

The people can, therefore, constitute no official authorities, no unrestricted command over themselves, if they will live humanly. Its self-constituted law must be kept supreme, public opinion be respected as the creator of law, and public custom, as the regulator of the legislative precedents, be kept inviolate. The only authority is the law. Only in the name of the law has any person whatever any authority. But the democratic power of public opinion and public custom

are more than authority; they are the popular mind, life, and honour, and the source of all laws. The best constitutions, without a free moral character of the people, are superfluous and powerless; even the worst constitutions and laws are feeble and harmless with a healthy popular opinion, and a national character which is sure to maintain its democratic manners and customs.

A true republic, therefore, is in existence wherever the authority of the law is supreme, and the real sovereignty of the people exercised by unremitting activity of public opinion in the democratic way of free discussion and legislative majority.

And the *democracy* of the republic consists in no person being permitted to set himself up as an authority, in allowing standing offices only of a subordinate formal importance—the more important and general concerns being conducted by delegates and commissions appointed for the occasion. If the people are to determine themselves, they must not part with their most essential concerns out of their own hands, and confer a power to act in their names only in emergencies. The first thing must be the abolition of all command and personal authority and power; the magistrate acts in the name of the law, his authority being the will of the people. It is his business to ascertain and to apply at a given occasion, the will of the people; which business belongs, indeed, to every one under certain established forms. Every one is legislator for his own share; every one is judge in the jury if he chance to be impanelled; every one is guardian of public order, if it revolve upon him to do this duty; every one is defender of his country and its liberty. All these businesses being reclaimed by every member of the nation, so far as his own share is concerned, nothing remains

but subordinate posts for persons who direct the course by which the verdict is found, the majority ascertained, and the law carried out. These commissions and employments naturally acquire importance, but they can never degenerate into despotism. Ministers, or deputations, for constant general affairs, chosen by the majority, are to be recalled as soon as the majority disapproves of their conduct of affairs.

Every community nominates its own commissioners and its deputy to the general commission, but it would be absurd if all the different commissioned officers were formed into one army like soldiers, and made dependent on a chief officer. They are naturally dependent only upon the law and their community, like the supreme office of a prime minister, who depends upon the majority that elected him, and with this majority depends on the law and on the expression of public opinion in all communities.

So much for *the supreme authority of law, the supreme power of public opinion, and the importance of settled custom in ascertaining and applying it.* Whoever wants to learn these things, may repair to England, North America, or Switzerland. There official and personal authority is abolished, or rendered secondary. The supremacy of law subverts all other authorities. Everybody who undertook, for instance, in England to say 'I will,' would receive the answer, 'If the law allows it.'

That command and blind obedience, the whole military system and its organised slavery, are incompatible with civil freedom, now follows, of course. The people alone may say, 'I will,' and 'You shall!' Command is, therefore, to be eradicated from all social relations. To submit to it is excusable only on the

plea of necessity. To obey command is moral suicide. It must only be admitted, first, in play or joke, as on solemn exhibitions of art and of arms; second, for certain mechanical operations, conducted in common under the guidance of one—such as the steerage of large vessels, railway trains, and so on; lastly, in cases of extreme necessity in war. Free citizens must not allow themselves to be trained like dogs, and must not surrender at discretion to any will of another. If they do so, they deprive themselves of their human dignity and freedom. Therefore, even in war time, it can only be done occasionally, and only in action. There can be no question about serious command, except in an actual campaign. In peace there must never be a chief command, nor another than a command for the moment of military exercises, which are to be considered as a sort of national sport; nor must a standing army be allowed to exist. The disbanding of all standing armies is the first condition for civil liberty in Europe. A standing army is the eternalising of an organised and armed slavery, which leads necessarily to acts of violence towards the unarmed, for its organisation is a secret conspiracy among the few chief commanders.

Command, applied to civil relations, is despotism, tyranny, police—or military government, and dictatorship. Despotism is command become habitual; tyranny is usurped despotism, and abused command; police-government is command by civic soldiers; military government is transmutation of the army into a police; dictatorship is command transferred, or a special despotism. In all these forms command is substituted for the result proceeding as the will of the people from discussion. Imprecation and threats are substituted

for disquisition and conviction. Slavery, or submission to imprecations and threats without reserve, has been called 'order,' while it is the abrogation of all order to determine free men by extrinsic terror and violence, instead of leaving them to determine themselves by intrinsic reasons. The only real order is the free democratic custom of arriving by discussion at a majority, and by the resolution of the majority, to a law.

There is, besides, no fear that by eradicating *command*, or, what is the same thing, by the abrogation of the organised slavery of an army of civil officers and of soldiers, a deficiency in personal authorities should arise. Men would then make those their authorities who rid them of the trouble of thinking, or interpret their own thoughts; and all that is necessary is to keep such authorities in check by the authority of law. This, however, is not difficult after the abrogation of the hierarchy of police and soldiers, inasmuch as the individual has no prospect in making opposition to the organisation of the judicial or legal authority, the only one that would then remain, or in offering violence to a jury, before which he may be sent.

The administration is no more supreme than the jury. The president of *the administrative council* has, therefore, only a formal initiative. He has to convoke the ministry, and engage it in transactions, in which it represents the parliament whenever it commissions its individual members with them. The *legislative council*, or parliament, is supreme indeed, for it is the highest jurisdiction; but even this jurisdiction is not sovereign. The people must have the right of censuring their delegates at elections, of depriving them of their seat by majority, and of sanctioning the laws in the communities.

§D. *The Democratising of Civil Society, or Socialism.*

The introduction of the democratic principle into agriculture, industry, and intercourse, is the solution of the social question, or the abolition of domestic slavery, engendered by hire and service.

The principle *of abolishing labour for hire* is the negative principle of socialism. The society *of equal partners in production and in the exchange of products* is the positive principle of socialism, or the domestic liberation of civil society. *Hired labour and service* are incompatible with self-determination (whoever works for the interest of another, is determined by another's will) and with the moral equality of men (by service, man becomes the tool of another man). Our principle is, for every one to be his own master—a principle by which masters lose only their brutality, and servants their baseness, but all are, necessarily, elevated to more human existence.

Common labour is the business. Business with equal profit and loss for every labourer is the true domestic society.

As political democracy is only to be called to life, and kept alive, by the democratic spirit of the people, so social democracy is only possible by means of the popular spirit, which utterly banishes service and hire from human intercourse. If no man wills to be kept any longer at the grade of servitude, every assistance in business must be thrown into the concern itself. If no society wills to be treated as a grade of servitude, then the combination of all societies on a footing of equality cannot be resisted any longer. From the consciousness of all individuals being strictly maintained,

the participation of all in the entire business of all societies combined, or the community, irrefutably follows. It is to be understood that women are not to be excluded from equal domestic rights. Their part in production, first, the renovation of all mankind, by the children they give birth to, and the superintendence of their earliest youth; then the superintendence of beauty, love, and morality, is altogether superior to any estimate whatever, because it is not a product to be given to society, but the production of all society itself, its renovation and ennobling. Women, therefore, deserve, first, their chivalric preferance, and second, to be placed in a position of social equality. The social equality of all members of the business does not consist in all possessing an equal quantity, which is impossible, but in all members of the society working on the condition of equal participation in the production.

They are all *proprietors*, *tradesmen*, and *labourers* in the business. Their social democratic quality consists in each of them being these all at once, and as much so as every other. Only thus does every one assert his own free personality.

It is plain the PERSON is the principle and aim of labour, property, and commerce, or the circulation of productions. The person is incessantly producing itself. It is its own product, and its own PROPERTY, but it is the living product, life, LABOUR, which is continually resolving the existence of the previous minute, its own product, and transforming it into a new product, the existence of a new minute; and this motion of internal solution, and self-generation is the CIRCULATION of the blood, and the entire physical and mental fermentation of all the contradictions that

are reciprocally operating in the internal nature of men, and forming the drift of his life, and his intellect.

In the whole of this motion, wherein the person *consumes* itself and other products, it *produces* itself and other products, and by producing, must necessarily consume power and matter. This motion or *circulation* is, therefore, at once production and consumption.

But the single person by itself could neither arise spontaneously, nor produce itself another person or another product. The person with its labour, and the entire product of its labour, is, therefore, necessarily engaged with other persons in *circulation*, assistance, and exchange. The individual does not produce itself and the rest of its products without society, and society does not produce itself nor the rest of its productions without the individual in all his commercial functions —that is to say, the functions of *labour*, *capital*, and *enterprise*.

This unity of the individual and society is the unity of individual and communistic activity, produced *by the society of equal partners in the labour, the property, and the enterprise of society*.

Society, which, like the individual, is also a system of vital and mental activity, likewise needs an independent *existence*. It needs land and the presupposition of great labour, and important results from labour —capital—with which it must be supplied from all quarters. In society, every succeeding generation must lay claim to the land of the deceased, and likewise to the capital or the results of the labour of the departed generations, and make them the foundation of their enterprise, in order to assure to every man his place upon the globe, and to transmit the product of the labour of all proportionally to every sharer.

The *individual* must lay claim to his *full share*, but he is no longer capable to declare *the basis of society* his exclusive property, because such property is opposed to the right of every other person, who, by his labour, had his share of influence on the value and productiveness of the basis, and, without the assistance of whom the basis or the capital has no value at all. Proudhon's sentence—'La proprieté c'est le vol,' may here be understood. Property in this system is not abrogated but realised. Not a community of goods, but a circulation of productions, is introduced, which realises, conveys, and secures his property to every one. He may possess as much as he can get, but he is prevented from making private the basis of the industry and labour of society. Every man is put in possession, every one is set in activity, or rather each one by his own activity takes possession of his productions, and exchanges these productions according to his necessity or his means. His means are his labour and his relation to the society of equal partners, together with whom he produces, consumes, and exchanges.

The self-determination, the character, and the property of each do not disappear, but individuals, in their capacity of landlords, capitalists, paymasters, private speculators, and servants, cease to be met with. All on an equal footing become labourers, capitalists, and speculators.

Families, or *private life*, and their *private property*, do not disappear, but there are no families controlling others, or only letting them live on their land by sufferance; there are only families conscious of their connection with all other families on the equal footing of humanity and free fellowship, dissolving into the mass of society with the same consciousness with which

they separated themselves from it for the private community of matrimony.

Individualism without communism is a crazy idea. Communism without individualism is the same illusion. True individualism, or assertion of full personality in all relations, engenders true communism; and only by the justly-ordered communism of the society of equal partners can their property be asserted to all persons, and they be satisfied with their just claims as individuals. Every one gives to society himself and his work, and every one receives in return an improved existence.

The *communistic* element is *labour, life, intellect, thought*—the *social process.* The *egoistical or individual* element is *person, property, private life,* or the *personal process.*

The *social process* is a twofold one—a constitution and a solution of person and property. The insurance of the production and labour of each one would be *the organisation of labour;* and this we find in the society of equal partners for consumption—that is to say, for the commutation of activity in person and property.

These two functions—production and consumption—exhaust the activity of social man. It is only needful to know the true nature of what we have before us in civil society to find necessary its deliverance from the slavery of hire and service, and the universally-diffused knowledge of this necessity alone will bring us this social reform; for as soon as nobody will serve any longer for hire, free industrial societies are unavoidable.

VII. CONCLUSION.

And when our principles in the civil, political, and

intellectual world are realised, what will be gained thereby?

There is a radical change in two ways. First, in the *consciousness* and the *will* of men. They abolish authority, despotism, and service. Then the *social, political, and ideal position* of men is totally changed. Every one is an equal fellow and partner in all these spheres.

On the other hand, the vital progress of society, the social and mental process in politics, arts, religion, and science, is extricated from its previous blindness. Its origin, from the necessity which demands it, and from genius, which answers to the demand, is not changed. The system of necessities is not deranged, and not decreed, by laws, but is more clearly comprehended and more firmly regulated in all its parts than in the present anarchy, where everything is left to blind necessity. The present civil society, which is *the blind state of want*, corresponds completely to despotism, which is *the state of compulsion*, and to the old religion, which is *the blind faith in authority*.

Socialism, which is the idealising of the whole commercial world and the morality of commerce itself, *corresponds to the democratic republic and the religion of Humanism*.

We were entitled, by the philosophy and the revolution in theory that Germany has experienced since Kant, in laying the principles of socialism, democracy, and Humanism, at the heart of the German people. We are now still more so; for the great revolution of 1848 has openly proclaimed and defended them a whole year. The people at large have learned to know and love freedom; no organised slavery will be able to banish the spirit of it. This spirit was

formerly a disguised guest, and whoever harboured it was outlawed. It has now gone through Europe like a tempest, as the lord of the whole atmosphere, and its thunderbolts struck down the spirits of the slaveholders. It is silent now, but is no more a stranger in the brains and hearts of men.

Noble, ancient thunderer, friend of Pericles, Phidias, and Socrates, summon thy electrical might again and purify the beautiful heaven of Europe!

THE END.

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