DOES GOD EXIST?: HEGEL AND THINGS

by
David Gray Carlson
Professor of Law
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003
212-790-0210
<dcarlson@yu.edu>

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from the Social Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract=518164
Does God Exist?: Hegel and Things

Does God exist? This is the perennial question of the enlightenment. Usually it means to ask whether God exists as an immediate being beyond thought. For Kant the question was undecidable. For the empiricists, the matter was unprovable.

Hegel rescues the inquiry by shifting the attention from the subject "God" to the predicate "existence." Existence, as Hegel develops it in his monumental *Science of Logic*, is Hegel’s word for advanced Being—"the immediacy of being to which essence has restored itself again." (499) Existence is the realm of Things. It is nevertheless a deficient realm. Things are finite. On their own logic, they are doomed to pass away. For this very reason, God is no mere Thing:

It is the *definition of finite things* that in them the Notion is different from being, that Notion and reality, soul and body, are separable and hence that they are perishable and mortal; the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is precisely that his Notion and his being are *unseparated* and *inseparable*. (89-90)

---

1 G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic* (A.V. Miller trans. 1969). Since citations to the *Science of Logic* are frequent, I place cited page numbers in parentheses directly in the text of the essay. The German equivalent, drawn from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* 41 (Georg Lasson ed., 1975) (two volumes) are relegated to the footnote, with citation in brackets. I have also omitted ellipses at the end of any quoted phrase. An ellipsis signals that a sentence does not end with the quoted words. Hegel’s sentences, however, never end, and so ellipses convey no useful information.

2 "[D]ie Unmittelbarkeit des Seins, zu der sich das Wesen wieder hergestellt hat." [II:122] See *Science of Logic* at 93 ("For being which is the outcome of mediation we shall reserve the term: Existence") ("Für das Sein, welches vermittelt ist, werden wir den Ausdruck: Existens" [I:78]).

3 "Es ist die Definition der endlichen Dinge, daß in ihnen Begriff und Sein verschieden, Begriff und Realität, Seele und Lieb, trennbar, sie damit vergänglich und sterblich sind; die abstrakte Definition Gottes ist dagegen eben dies, daß sein Begriff und sein Sein ungetrennt und untrennbar sind." [I:75]
In other words, one must not think of God as a finite Thing. In posing the question, "Does God exist?", the problem, according to Hegel, is not on the side of God. The problem is entirely with the concept of Existence—a state quite inadequate to God.

This essay is the fifth installment on an attempt to illustrate every step in Hegel’s Logic by means of schematic illustrations. This essay focuses on the middle part of Hegel’s doctrine of Essence—on the Existence of Things, their Appearance (which turns out to be disappearance) and the Essential Relation between Existence and disappearance.

Existence, in Hegel’s system arises from the Ground. Ground is very oddly analyzed by Hegel. It represents the idea that Form disappears. This active fact is the very content of Form. Ground represents this "deeper" content. Accordingly, it is the nature of Ground to erase itself. It is the "proto-thing"—a vanishing mediator of Things. When the Ground of a Thing erases itself, the Thing just is. It appears to be unproblematic and self-identical—an illusion that is necessary and inadequate to the nature of Things. In Hegel’s system, Thinghood is but a moment which is doomed to pass away.

Although a vanishing mediator, Ground also stands for the proposition that a Thing is both dependent on its external conditions yet is distinguishable from them. Hegel calls this contradictory state der Sache—the heart of the matter of Things. Der Sache is "the immediacy which has proceeded from ground, but form is not as yet posited in it." (529) Having as yet no form, it remains for the Thing to appear as a Thing. As a Thing, it will
be both independent from, yet dependent on, context. In other words, a Thing at one moment has no Ground; it just is (or so it appears). Yet it is equally true that conditions determine a Thing. Meanwhile each condition is likewise a "Thing," so that any one Thing is really a network of Things—a metonym.8

In chronicling the emergence of Things from their Ground, Existence comprises the first step in Hegel’s overall theory of Appearance. In Existence, "an existent or thing" (479)9 has "an element of self-subsistence." (479)10 The Thing at first is taken as self-grounded. But the immediate Thing "sublates itself and the Thing makes itself into positedness." (479)11 By "positedness," Hegel means that the Thing is presupposed to exist by something else--by the network of Things. When taken as a positedness, the Thing is dependent on what it posits. As a positedness, a Thing is not self-grounded. Any one Thing therefore implies an entire network: the world of Appearance, which stands over against "the world that is reflected into itself, the world of essence." (479-80)12 "What appears . . . points to something that appears."13

These worlds of Essence and Appearance stand in relation to one another. Accordingly, the two worlds taken together are an Essential Relation, "for what exists can only develop through

---

8 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel defines a thing as follows: "The existent therefore includes relativity and has . . . its multiple interconnections with other existents: it is reflected on itself as its ground. The existent is, when so described, a Thing." GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S LOGIC § 124 (William Wallace trans., 1975) [hereinafter cited as LESSER LOGIC].
9 "Existierendes oder Ding." [II:101]
10 "Element des selbständigen Bestehens." [II:101] In medieval usage, existence stood for duration over time and an objectivity outside of our minds to the thing. 1 HARRY AUSTYN WOLFSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA: UNFOLDING THE LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING 349, 354 (1934).
11 "[H]ebt sich seine Unmittelbarkeit auf; es mach sich zu einem Gesetzttsein." [II:102]
12 "[D]ie sich die in sich reflektierte, an sich seiende Welt gegenüber." [II:102]
this relation although it itself is not this relation."\textsuperscript{14} Still an imperfect union, this relation will piece out its imperfections and become *Actuality*.

We start, then, with the existent Thing, wherein all its Conditions are united with the Ground in an immediacy. The proposition of Ground has previously been: "whatever is has a ground." (481)\textsuperscript{15} That is to say, everything is mediated. The proposition of Existence is twofold: whatever exists has (1) a ground and is conditioned, and equally has (2) no ground and is unconditioned. Ground is therefore a vanishing mediator that has sublated itself when the Thing emerges into Existence. The Thing seems to exist on its own--without a Ground. But this moment of self-evidence is just that--a moment. On its own Logic, the Thing must dissolve.

Before we examine the birth and death of Things, we may pause, with Hegel, to consider the question, "Does God exist?" For those wedded to the logic of self-identical Thinghood, the answer to this question can only be "problematic"--in Kantian terms, God's existence is only a "permitted conclusion."\textsuperscript{16} Kant famously divided the universe into phenomena and noumena. Knowledge is limited to matters empirical--to phenomenal Things. Concepts like God, free will, and the thing-in-itself are noumenal. Of these we can know nothing. We can only believe in them. Yet belief is not knowledge. Indeed Kant was proud to have destroyed true knowledge in order to make room for faith.\textsuperscript{17}

Kant's victory, then, is Pyrrhic, confessing and even making a virtue of the ignorance of God. As Hegel puts it in the *Science of Logic*, "Knowing is supposed to have reached this conclusion, that it knows nothing." (482)\textsuperscript{18} Yet, given that Kant's

\textsuperscript{14} *Id.* at 90.

\textsuperscript{15} "Alles was ist, hat einen Grund." [II:102]


\textsuperscript{17} IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON xxxix (F. Max Müller trans., 1966) [B:xxx] ("I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief").

\textsuperscript{18} "Das Wissen soll zu diesem Resultate kommen, daß es nichts weiß, d.h. daß es seine vermittlnde Bewegung . . . wieder aufgibt." [II:104]
allegiance to the dogma of ungrounded self-identity of the thing-in-itself--the thing not dependent on context--there was no other choice for him but to renounce knowledge. If noumenal "things" cannot be known, then the only possible results are atheism or dogmatism--each equally blind and each covertly the same. Each can be asserted only at the level of belief.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel undertakes to prove God logically. By no means can this be done adequately at the level of Existence. Existence is the realm of finite Things, and God is no mere Thing. As Hegel says early in the *Science of Logic*: "The genuine criticism of . . . reason is just this: to make intellect aware of this difference [between Notion and Existence] and to prevent it from applying to God the determinations and relationships of the finite." (90)19

Three kinds of Being are dreamt of in Hegel’s philosophy: immediate Being, Existence, and Objectivity. Only the last of these is adequate to God. For Hegel, "conceptual activity (der Begreifen) is the most authentic being . . . ."20 Least adequate is immediate Being, which instantaneously turns to nothing. Immediate Being proves that it needs thought to perpetuate itself. The passage of Being into thought is, for Hegel the passage from grossly inadequate "reality" to ideality.

Existence is the second stage of Being--the realm of things. Here finite things endure for a time, through the will of the thinker. Accordingly, Existence is for Hegel (and Kant) a subjective realm. On this definition, it is automatically apparent why the question, "Does God exist?", is unsatisfactory. On Hegel’s definition, "Does God exist?" is the equivalent of asking "Is God a thought?": The very posing of this question shows that God is a thought. The question "Does God exist?" therefore answers itself in the very posing of it. Yet it is a mediocre question. Unicorns exist, on this definition. Everything exists, if

---

19 "Die wahrhafte Kritik der . . . Vernunft ist gerade diese, das Erkennen über diesen Unterschied zu verständigen und dasselbe abzuhalten, die Bestimmungen und Verhältnisse des Endlichen auf Gott anzuwenden." [1:75]
20 MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, *supra* note 12, at 111.
we only think of it. The ability to think things into being is what Kant called an "intellectual intuition." Intellectual intuitions are an attribute to God. According to Charles Taylor:

Hegel reproaches Kant for not having cleaved to the notion of an intellectual intuition, which he himself invented. This would be an understanding, which unlike ours did not have to depend on external reception, on being affected from outside, for its contents, but created them with its thought. This archetypical intellect Kant attributed to God; it was quite beyond us. But God’s intellect is ultimately revealed to us for Hegel, it only lives in our thought. Hence we can participate in an intellectual intuition. God’s thought is ours.

CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 301 (1975). An intellectual intuition amounts to "the direct apprehension of things as they are . . . " STANLEY ROSEN, G.W.F. HEGEL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM 267 (1974).

In this essay I propose to disengender God.

22 "[V]ermittelte Erkenntnis." [II:102-03]
imply their own kinds of mediation, so that the nature of proof, too, will differ in respect of each." (481) The proof proper to existence is that all things erase themselves on their own logic. This is a necessary but insufficient step in Hegel's proof of God, since it clears the way for God's subjectivity--independent of and separate from any adduced, merely subjective ground of finite thinkers.

Our current task is to focus on Existence, and why this state is inadequate with respect to God. To understand thoroughly Hegel's mid-level mode of existence and its role in the ultimate ontological proof, we need to examine Kant's attack on St. Anselm's famous ontological proof of God. Anselm, a French cleric and archbishop of Canterbury to Henry I, reasoned as follows:

Certainly that than which nothing greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even if it is in the intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in fact: and that is greater. If then that than which nothing greater can be thought, is in the intellect alone, then the very thing, which is greater, is in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which is greater than anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in thought. But certainly this is impossible.

Or, to paraphrase this, God ("that than which nothing greater can be thought") cannot be merely imaginary. If it were, then I can think of something greater than the imagined God: God that exists both in and out of the imagination (God+). If God+ can be thought, then God+ exceeds thought, yet can be captured in thought. This is impossible--thought cannot exceed itself. Hence, we are left with God+, which is both thinkable and existent in a realm beyond mere thought.

Hegel thought little of Anselm's formulation. Yet

---

24 “[F]ordern oder enthalten irhe eigene Art der Vermittlung; so wird auch die Natur des Beweisens in Ansehung einer jeden verschieden.” [II:103]
25 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 7, at § 193, at 258.
26 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel writes:
Anselm’s failed proof interests Hegel because of Kant’s attack on it. According to Kant, even if you could prove God exists, nothing is accomplished because existence is not properly a predicate of an object. Objects can be "blue" or "noble" or infinite other predicates. But it is useless to say the object "exists." Any such observation adds not a whit to the object. Kant’s abolition of existence, Hegel suggests, is possible only if "Things" are already self-grounded, free from finitude and eternal—a proposition Hegel vastly disputes throughout the *Science of Logic.* If Things are not eternal—if every Thing contains the seeds of its own destruction—then existence is properly a predicate of a thing. To say that Caesar is in Gaul is to assign an important predicate to Caesar. To say that Caesar was in Gaul is an entirely different proposition—one implying that the Gaul-Caesar relation no longer exists. Existence is all about presence, in the full temporal sense, and presence is a powerful predicate indeed.

For Kant, existence is entry of a noumenal thing “into the context of the totality of experience, that is, into the determination of an otherness and into relation to an other.” (481)27 That is, there is the Thing and there is its other—the thought of the Thing.

In psychoanalytic terms, the obtrusion of the Thing is traumatic. The network of thoughts and concepts cannot completely capture the thing. The thing is "non all" in Lacanian terms. Jacques Lacan notoriously said, "The Woman does not

---

The real fault in the argumentation of Anselm is one which is chargeable on Descartes and Spinoza, as well as on the theory of immediate knowledge. It is this. This unity which is enunciated as the supreme perfection . . . is presupposed, i.e. it is assumed only as potential. This identity . . . between the two categories may be at once met and opposed by their diversity; and this was the very answer given to Anselm long ago.

*Lesser Logic,* *supra* note 8, at § 193, at 259.

27 “[I]n dem Kontext der gesamten Erfahrung, d.h. in die Bestimmung eines Andersseins und in die Beziehung auf anderes.” [II:103]
exist.”28 This is sometimes taken to be an attack on empirical women. But Lacan intended quite the opposite. All he meant was that Woman (one of Lacan’s synonyms for God) cannot be entirely captured by the "existing" symbolic order. Woman is for this reason "non all"--as is God.29 Existence is not robust enough to sustain either God or Woman. This is Hegel’s proposition about the existence of God.30

The logic of Existence is that finite Things erase themselves. Hegel claims that this erasive mediation is unknown to the ratiocinative [beweisende] reflection that asserts the validity of Anselm’s ontological proof. By deeming the derived ground of God to be subjective only31--a ground of cognition--Anselm’s proof "removes its mediation from God himself.” (482)32 And since proof is mediation, the removal of mediation is fatal to the proof. Anselm and Kant both failed to see that Ground erases itself and becomes one with the thing it posits.33

Something else is going on in Hegel’s theory which must be strongly emphasized. According to Hegel, Kant’s thing-in-itself is just a Thing. It too must erase itself and enter into Existence. "Essence must appear." (479)34 Perhaps thinking of Kant’s fourth antinomy,35 Hegel remarks: "the essence of God, it

30 Sarah Kay suggests that one result of Hegel’s encounter with modern psychoanalysis is "his promotion to a philosopher of the flawed symbolic, a symbolic fissured by the real, rather than a philosopher of maginary totality." KAY, supra note 29, at 45.
31 For Kant, any such ground must be "merely a ground for cognition." (482) ("So ist er bloß ein Grund für die Erkenntnis.” [II:103])
32 "[E]ntfernt hiemit ihre Vermittlung von Gott selbst.” [II:104]
33 We will see later that, according to Hegel, the reduction of the ontological argument to formal syllogism condemns it to mere subjectivity. Hegel will argue that the true proof of God requires the sublation of mediatedness altogether. See Science of Logic at 705-07.
34 “Des Wesen muß erscheinen.” [II:101]
35 According to this antinomy, “An absolutely necessary being exists, either as part of or as cause of the world,” and “An absolutely necessary being does not exist as its cause.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
is said, is the abyss . . . for finite reason." (483) Hegel agrees with
this, in so far as reason "surrenders its finitude" (483) and erases
itself. "[B]ut this abyss, the negative ground, is the positive
ground of the emergence of simply affirmative being--of essence
which is in its own self immediate." (483) In other words,
egere must negate itself. The self-erasure of the noumenal
God is therefore the essential movement that brings God into
Existence. In Existence, God-as-abyss is not left behind; the
Ground is in immediate union with the self-sacrificing God-Thing.
God is therefore present-existent and more. In this resulting
immediacy, mediation has vanished. Relevant here is Hegel's all-
important earlier remark: "What is thus found only comes to be
through being left behind." (402) The thing-in-itself appears
"comes to be") by leaving itself behind--by sacrificing its
noumenality and entering into existence.

Here we have a preview of the Absolute Idea at the very
end of the Science of Logic. There, Absolute Idea constitutes the
final erasure of mediation and the institution of a thing--the one
and only thing--that really, truly, and purely is (in a post-
existential sense). The key to the Science of Logic is that the
universe is self-erasure only. Therefore, the self-erasure or self-
sacrifice of God is the ultimate proof that God exists.

Existence, then, is not the mere predicate or determination
of Essence, because this suggests something is left behind in the
noumenal world. In such a case, Essence itself would not "exist."
Essence actually exists. "Existence is essence's absolute emptying

36 "[D]as Wesen Gottes sei der Abgrund für die endliche Vernunft."
[II:104]
37 "[I]hre Endlichkeit aufgibt." [II:104]
38 "[A]ber dieser Abgrund, der negative Grund, ist zugleich der positive
des Hervorgehens, des an sich selbst unmittelbaren Wesens." [II:105]
39 "Essentiality" should be understood as the propensity of a thought to
erase itself. Essentiality signifies that a concept is only an appearance--
"only a posited being, not a being in and for itself. This constitutes its
essentiality, to have within itself the negativity of reflection, the nature of
essence." (499) ("Dies macht ihre Wesentlichkeit aus, an ihr selbst die
Negativität der Reflexion, die Nature des Wesens zu haben." [II:123]
40 "Dies Vorgefundene wird nur darin, daß es verlassen wird." [II:16]
of itself or self-alienation.” (483) Essence does not remain behind. Essence is Existence and is not distinct from it. Being a True Infinite, \( \text{“Essence has passed over into Existence in so far as essence as ground no longer distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded.”} \) (483) The point is anti-transcendental. There is no proper distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal in Hegel’s philosophy. Both exist at the same level. What truly exists—is what really endures—is the self-erasure of finite thought.

Before we can begin to examine the erasure of existing Things, it is necessary to describe my diagrammatic conventions, which have memorialized every step in Hegel’s Logic. Very briefly, Hegel proceeds by repeating the steps of Understanding, Dialectical Reason and Speculative Reason. The Understanding begins by making a proposition about all the previous steps. The proposition, however, is one-sided and always leaves something out. Dialectical Reason retrieves from the history of the logical progression what the proposition fails to account for. Dialectical Reason recalls or remembers. But in recalling what is omitted, Dialectical Reason relies on a one-sided proposition of what was—the very one-sidedness of Understanding that the Dialectical Reason is supposed to be criticizing. Dialectical Reason likewise always leaves something out. Speculative Reason, the final step, retrieves the very thing that the Understanding and Dialectical Reason have in common—that which each side left out.

The diagrammatic convention works as follows. First, imagine the left side of the page is the side of positivity and "being." The right side of the page is the side of negativity and "nothing." At first, the Understanding makes propositions about what is. It therefore summarizes in a one-sided proposition what

---

41 “[D]ie Existenz ist seine absolute Entäußerung.” [II:105]
42 A True Infinite becomes something different (here, Existence) and stays what it was (essence). See Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 541.
43 “Das Wesen ist in die Existenz übergangen, insofern das Wesen als Grund sich von sich als dem Begründeten nicht mehr unterscheidet.” [II:105]
44 The appendix includes a reproduction of all the steps of the Science of Logic heretofore accomplished, plus all the steps to be achieved across Reflection--the first part of Hegel’s doctrine of Essence.
it learned from Speculative Reason. At the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, this was done on the left, positive side of the page:

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 2(a)**

**The Move to Determinate Being**

In Figure 2(a), the Understanding positivizes Becoming by moving it to the left side of the page and by proclaiming it to represent the determinateness of Being. In making its immediate proposition, however, the Understanding has forgotten that Becoming is just as much Nothing as it is Being. Dialectical Reason exploits this omission:

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 2(b)**

**Quality and Negation**

In this drawing, [2]--the overlap between [1] and [3]--represents the oppressed "Nothing" that was absent in Figure 2(a). Yet [2] was implicit in Figure 2(a). Dialectical Reason merely makes express what was previously implicit. Dialectical Reason is the voice of [2] and is therefore the *internal* voice of [1, 2]. Determinate Being must now be understood as the duality of [1, 2]. Yet [2] is a positivization of what was supposed to be Nothing. [3] represents this positivization of [2]. [2] always generates [3]. And [3] is precisely Nothing, which *denies* that it is Being. In short, Dialectical Reason [3] and the Understanding [1] *both* deny that they are [2]. This denial is what they have in common.

Speculative Reason intervenes to point out that suppression in general [2] is what the Understanding and Dialectical Reason have in common. [2] is itself positivized into [7] in the next drawing:
Something (Etwas) stands for the idea that Being inherently includes its own negation, which leads to the notion of Finitude of Being. When the Finite passes away, it preserves itself in the True Infinite, which can be defined as "that which becomes something else while remaining what it is."\footnote{Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 541.} God is the True Infinite. God sacrifices itself and yet remains God after the sacrifice.

Being eventually gives way to the realm of Essence. I have analyzed these intervening steps elsewhere and will not repeat them here but will instead leap o'er this firstlings and broils to Hegel's analysis of Essence. By the time we reach Essence, the Understanding has become considerably smarter. It now resembles Dialectical Reason. It sees that all things are correlatives of what once was and what now is--of Nothing and Being. Dialectical Reason pointed out what is not--negation in Figure 2(a)--the Understanding now does likewise. Its dialectical proposition is now made on the right side of the page--the side of negativity:

Here the Understanding summarizes the prior step of Complete Ground. It interprets the step as meaning that a thing is what it is because it is conditioned. In other words, things are metonyms. They cannot be known directly but can only be inferred from their context. So, the Understanding reasons, any "thing" gives
off inessential Conditions. These Conditions are on the right (negative) side of the page. Conditions are not the thing. Ground is the real thing, and it finds itself placed over on the left, positive side of the page.

Dialectical Reason intervenes. If the conditions are not the thing, the thing (Ground) must have some positive existence completely separate and apart from the Conditions. The thing, according to Dialectical Reason, is Absolutely Unconditioned.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 33(b)
The Absolutely Unconditioned

Speculative Reason reconciles the two positions. It sees that the Conditions of the thing are, by definition, not the thing. But it also sees that, without its Conditions, the thing is no-thing. This is what Hegel calls the Fact (Sache), sometimes translated as the "Heart of the Matter"\(^{46}\)--the true thing. The heart of the matter is that "things" don't exactly work. They are both separate from and dependent on their Conditions.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 33(c)
Fact

Figure 33(c) is where the last installment left off. We are now ready to examine Hegel's theory of Existence.

I. Existence

A. The Thing and Its Properties

\(^{46}\) JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL’S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 100, 252 n.7 (1981).
(a) Thing-in-itself and Existence

The previous installment culminated in the Absolutely Unconditioned, "the something that has simply affirmative being." (484) It was "essentially that immediacy which has arisen through the reflection of mediation into itself." (484) The Absolutely Unconditioned was the last stop in Ground, and Ground stood for self-erasure. When the Ground of Things disappears, the result is a self-identical immediate Thing.

The Understanding now proposes that the Absolutely Unconditioned is a correlation between the Thing and its Properties. The Thing is essential and negative. It leans to the right side of the page. The Properties are on the side of "being"—the left side of the page. Properties represent the being-for-other of a Thing.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 34(a)**

The Thing

---

47 See Figure 33(c).
48 "[D]em Seienden Etwas." [II:106]
49 "[W]esentlich eine solche Unmittelbarkeit, die durch die die Reflexion der Vermittlung in sich selbst entstanden ist." [II:106] In German, "unconditioned (unbedingt) means "not a thing" or "un-bethinged."
50 This Thing is

the thing before the development of the properties and features that, so to speak, define the thing in question or that constitute its essence. It is the state where these properties and features exist potentially but not yet actually. It is the internal structure that grounds the properties and features of the particular thing.

JUSTUS HARTNACK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL’S LOGIC 58 (Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans., 1998). Hegel would not, however, say that the properties of a thing constitute its essence. Rather, essence is simply not the being—not the properties—of the thing.
Hegel thus associates Properties with a Thing’s outward Existence—contrary to Kant, who defeated St. Anselm by asserting that existence is not an independent predicate of an object.51 The difference between Existence and the Thing, Hegel says, is that Existence "has within itself the moment of mediation." (484)52 In other words, Existence [3] is where the thinker has the thought of the Thing. The Thing [1] is immediate. Being immediate, the Thing is the Kantian Thing-in-itself.

Dialectical Reason now discerns:

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 34(b)
The Thing and Its Existence

In Figure 34(b), the difference between the Thing and its Existence "falls apart into indifferent determinations." (484)53 On the one side is the Thing-in-itself [1] as "non-reflected immediacy." (484)54 Contrary to Kant, who would say that the Thing-in-itself causes phenomena,55 Hegel suggests that the matter is quite the other way around. The Thing-in-itself is the "simple reflectedness" (485)56 of Existence, which is to say that Existence posits the Thing-in-itself. The Thing-in-itself is not Ground to Existence, as Kant would have it. Rather, the opposite is true. Existence is Ground to the Thing-in-itself. Ground erases itself, so the Thing-in-itself (supposedly the Ground of phenomena) is "sublated mediation and therefore only the substrate of the

---

51 See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
52 "[D]as Moment der Vermittlung an ihr selbst hat." [II:106]
53 "[F]ällt in gleichgültige Bestimmungen auseinander." [II:106]
54 "[N]icht reflektierte Unmittelbarkeit." [II:106]
55 As to the notion that the thing-in-itself causes sensations, Hegel points out that this implies sensation is beyond reason, and the thing-in-itself is an "extraneous impulse." GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT ¶ 238 (A.V. Miller trans. 1977).
56 "[E]infache Reflektiertsein." [II:107]
Substrate stands for indifference;\textsuperscript{58} it stands in contrast to Ground, which is \textit{related} to the Grounded.\textsuperscript{59} If the Thing-in-itself is substrate, Reflection--which stands for enduring notionality and "being-in-and-for-self--necessarily "falls outside the thing-in-itself." (485)\textsuperscript{60} The Thing-in-itself "is not supposed to contain within it any specific manifoldness; and it therefore only obtains this when brought into relationship with external reflection." (485)\textsuperscript{61} That is to say, for Kant, if a thing is distinguished from another thing, the distinction falls on the side of the subject. Of the thing-in-itself, we can know nothing.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, the Thing-in-itself has color only in relation to the eye, and smell in relation to the nose, Hegel says. None of these properties is determined by the Thing-in-itself but is rather determined by an other.

Reflection is now external to the Thing. The Thing is immediate and aloof, and so is Existence. The two sides cannot maintain themselves as separate--this was the lesson of Diversity.\textsuperscript{63} Diverse things are "self-identical"--that is, radically unrelated to an other. They are \textit{immediate beings}. Immediate beings are wont to fade away. The Thing and Existence are now diverse. They sublate themselves, and, in their self-erasure, both sides are one and the same Diversity.

There is now a \textit{plurality} of self-erasing Things-in-themselves. Two Things-in-themselves now constitute the "extremes of a syllogism whose middle term constitutes their external Existence." (486)\textsuperscript{64} Because the Things-in-themselves sublate themselves, they send their being elsewhere--into a

\textsuperscript{57}"[D]ie aufgehobene Vermittlung zu sein, und daher nur die Grundlage desselben." [II:107]
\textsuperscript{58}See Figure 21(b).
\textsuperscript{59}See Figure 29(a).
\textsuperscript{60}"[F]ällt . . . außer dem Dinge-an-sich." [II:107]
\textsuperscript{61}"Dieses soll keine bestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit an ihm selbst haben und erhält sie deswegen erst an die äußerliche Reflexion gebracht." [II:107]
\textsuperscript{62}Hegel notes parenthetically that the thing divorced from its existence is the Possible, (484) a subject he will take up in the last part of Actuality.
\textsuperscript{63}See Carlson, \textit{Reflection}, supra note 5, at ---.
\textsuperscript{64}"[D]ie Extreme eines Schlusses, dessen Mitte ihre äußerliche Existenz ausmacht." [II:108]
middle term toward which they are indifferent. In their indifference, the two Things-in-themselves collapse into one. "[T]here is only one thing-in-itself, which in external reflection is related to itself." (487) Hegel calls this unitary Thing-in-itself the Totality of Existence. Hence, we have

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 34(c)
The Totality of Existence

This collapse of the Things-in-themselves is the very determinateness of the Thing. In other words, because the Thing-in-itself collapses of its own accord, it enters into Existence and is, indeed, nothing but Existence. Hegel calls the Thing’s determinateness "the property of the thing." (487) Though the point is still implicit, there is only one real Property of a Thing--self-erasure of its noumenal self and entry into the consciousness of the thinker (i.e., Existence).

(b) Property

65 "[E]s ist nur Ein Ding-an-sich, das in der äußerlichen Reflexion sich zu sich selbst verhält." [II:109] In Hegel’s penultimate chapter on Cognition, the True will become an official step in the Logic. See Figure 75(c). What is True is that Kant’s notion of a transcendent thing-in-itself falls apart.

66 "Eigenschaft des Dings." [II:109] In the Lesser Logic. Hegel complains that what a thing is “in itself” must become for itself, yet in Kant’s usage, the thing-in-itself is inert. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 8, § 124 Remark. Here we see Hegel’s Thing-in-itself does indeed become something by collapsing in on itself.

Charles Taylor disagrees that the Thing-in-itself collapses. He holds that "things” might be the "peaceful coexistence of different properties in the thing." TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 270; see also id. at 271 ("Hegel’s claim that there is an unavoidable contradiction in the notion of the thing with properties is no stronger than his thesis that finite things in general are contradictory"). In his remarks, Taylor has not adhered to Hegel’s analysis of Diverse things, nor has he escaped the fundamental prejudice that, in spite of everything, things are self-identical.
From Figure 34(c), the Understanding has gleaned that the Properties of a thing are the totality of the Thing’s Existence. The Properties therefore succeed to the position of negative essentiality.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 35(a)**

*The Thing and Its Properties*

Property is now the "negativity of reflection through which Existence in general is an existent." (487) That is, the Properties announce, "We are not the Kantian thing-in-itself." In the realm of Essence, things show what they are by announcing what they are not. Therefore, when the Properties deny they are not the Thing-in-itself, they prove they are the Thing-in-itself *tout court.* As Hegel puts it: "The abstract thing-in-itself is itself this relationship in which it returns into itself out of the other; it is thereby *determinate in its own self.*" (487) In other words, Properties are Things.

Notice that, between Figure 34(a) and Figure 35(a), Properties and Things have switched places. The Understanding is growing wiser. Whereas in Figure 34(a) it saw the Thing as a negative unity of positive Properties, now it thinks there is *no* thing separate and apart from its properties. The Thing is on the side of Being by grace of Properties which nevertheless are distinguishable from and therefore are *not* the Thing.

Figure 35(a) is a move of the Understanding in the distinctive mode of Essence. Accordingly, Figure 35(a) is an immediacy that is both a "sublated mediation" and an "*identity-

---

67 “Negativität der Reflexion, wodurch die Existenz überhaupt ein Existierendes." [II:109]
68 Why this is so is established in the opening parts of Reflection. Reflection is the manifestation of what is by manifesting what is not.
69 “Das abstrakte Ding an-sich ist selbst dies aus anderem in sich zurückkehrende Verhalten; es ist dadurch an sich selbst bestimmt.” [II:109]
The Thing, as portrayed in the Totality of its Existence, is determinate, yet, in its relation to the other, it does not pass over into otherness and is therefore free from alteration.

We now know, on the logic of Reflection, that the Properties are as much Thing-in-itself as the Thing-in-itself was. In Figure 35(a), the Properties (each one being a Thing) presuppose the Thing, and by the Properties the Thing appears. The Properties are therefore the determinate relation of one thing to another thing. Property is a mode of relationship. That the Properties are implicated in a positedness is clear on the face of Figure 35(a). The externality of the relation signals that the Thing can now be perceived by outside consciousnesses. In short, the Thing now at hand is a sophisticated version of the self-identical thing. Common sense holds that Things project their Properties outward. Properties are reliable indicia of what a Thing is.

Hegel says of this sophisticated self-identical Thing that it is "only a surface with which Existence is exposed to the becoming and alteration of being." In short, the Properties of the thing come and go; they are mere Beings. But the Thing stays what it is. To use a famous philosophical example, a sock

---

71 Legal scholars have emphasized the relationality of the legal concept of property. Some have taken property’s relationality to the extreme of saying that there are no "things" at all but only relations between persons. This justifies the conclusion that there is no separate legal doctrine of property, but rather only pure law that mediates between persons. Hegelian legal scholars, however, insist on the vital role of "things" separate and apart from persons as to which persons can have property relations. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, Property, and the Feminine --- (1998).
72 "D]ie äußerliche Reflecion und die Seite des Gesetzteins des Dings." [II:110]
73 "[N]ur eine Oberfläche, mit der die Existenz sich dem Werden des Seins und der Veränderung preisgibt." [II:110]
74 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel emphasizes that the Thing passes from being to having:

As a term of relation, "to have" takes the place of "to
is darned and patched and eventually contains no thread of its original manufacture. Yet it is the same sock. Such a sock is a True Infinite--it stays what it is while becoming something different. Similarly, biologists calculate that, after so many years, the human body has replaced every one of its cells with new living cells, so that materially we are entirely different material now than we were a decade ago. Yet we are the same "thing" we always were. Thinghood, whether it applies to socks or persons, is obviously very negative in its constitution, and this very negativity is what allows for the Thing to survive quantitative change in its Properties.

Yet Property is not lost in this. Specific Properties come and go, but Property as such remains, so long as there is still a Thing before us. Property therefore is the power of the Thing to affect another Thing. That is, by sending forth its Properties to the external world, the Thing expresses itself to another Thing--by implication a conscious Thing (though the conscious thing is

be". True, some[thing] has qualities on its part too: but this transference of "having" into the sphere of Being is inexact

... the character as quality is directly one with the some[thing], and the some[thing] ceases to be when it loses its quality. But the thing is reflection-into-self: for it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference, i.e. from its attributes. In many languages "have" is employed to denote past time. And with reason: for the past is absorbed or suspended being, and the mind is its reflection-into-self; in the mind only it continues to subsist-the mind . . . distinguishing from itself this being in it which has been absorbed or suspended.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 8, § 125.

75 The negativity of Constitution was memorialized in Figure 4(a).

76 Constitution appeared on the left side of the page--the side of Being. But it represented the Understanding’s proposal about the true nature of the universe--that it is composed by external reflection. See Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 514-15.

76 Much later, Hegel will equate thinghood as a version of Being-for-self and also as incipient Substance and Universality. All of these are forms with which "the infinite Notion clothes its differences." (605) ("Unendliche Begriff seiner Unterschiede bekleidet." [II:245]) Substance will appear in Figure 48(c), and Universality arrive in Figure 54(a).
not yet derived). "It demonstrates this property," Hegel writes, "only under the condition that the other thing has a corresponding constitution." (488) In other words, the Thing is an immediate Thing-in-itself and so is the (conscious) Thing it affects. It therefore follows that the affected Thing--the conscious subject--likewise leaves the affecting thing not unaffected. Perception is a compromise between True Infinite Things. "[A]t the same time," Hegel emphasizes, "the property is peculiar to the first thing and is [the first thing’s] self-identical substrate . . . [I]t is for this reason that this reflected quality is called property." (488)

In Property the Thing passes over into externality. Through its Properties the Thing will eventually become Cause. Cause preserves itself in Effect. For the moment, however, "the thing is so far only the quiescent thing of many properties . . . [I]t is so far only the implicit reflection of its determinations, not yet itself the reflection which posits them." (488) In other words, the

---

77 "Es beweist diese Eigenschaft nur unter der Bedingung einer entsprechenden Beschaffenheit des Andern Dinges." [II:110]
78 "Sie ist ihm zugleich eigentümlich und seine mit sich identische Grundlage . . . [D]iese reflektierte Qualität heißt darum Eigenschaft." [II:110] Earlier, Hegel says that Properties

are the means whereby this something in its relations with other somethings maintains itself in its own peculiar way, counteracting the alien influences posited in it and making its own determinations effective in the other. (114)

"[E]s sich dadurch in der Beziehung auf andere auf eine eigentümliche Weise erhält, die fremden in ihm gesetzten Einwirkungen nicht in sich gewähren lässt, sondern seine eigene Bestimmungen in dem Andern,--ob es dies zwar nicht von sich abhält--geltend macht." [I:101]

This passage, incidentally, has misled the experts on the early stages of Hegel’s logical progression. Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 491-93.
79 In the final chapter on Actuality.
80 "[N]ur erst das ruhige Ding von vielen Eigenschaften . . . [E]s ist nur erst die ansichseiende, noch nicht selbst die setzende Reflexion seiner Bestimmungen." [II:110]
Thing is *passive* and its effect upon consciousness is implicit. But soon the Thing will be *active*. Eventually it will become self-consciousness itself. When that occurs, the Thing does indeed assert itself forcefully in the world.

But we run before our horse to market. For now, the Thing-in-itself is no longer merely the positedness of an external reflection, as it was for Kant. Kant’s Thing was “substrate devoid of determinations and lying beyond of its external Existence.” (488) Rather, the Thing’s Properties are “its own determinations through which the thing enters into relationships in a determinate manner.” (488) The thing is *present* (in the Derridean sense) in its Properties. It is “identity-with-self in its positedness,” (488) a positedness that is “a self-external reflection.” (488) It is reflected out of itself by itsProperties but is also reflected into itself and “is in itself only in so far as it is external.” (488) At this stage “the whole is ground that in its repelling and determining, in its external immediacy, is self-related ground.” (489)

**Remark:** The Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism

Hegel returns to his attack on the Kantian thing-in-itself, which is

nothing else but the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which admittedly we can *know nothing*.

---

81 “[E]s ist nicht eine jenseits seiner äußerlichen Existenz befindliche bestimmunglose Grundlage.” [II:110]
82 “[S]eine eigenen Bestimmungen, durch die es sich auf bestimmte Weise verhält.” [II:110]
83 Jacques Derrida is famous for his critique of “philosophy of presence” - that is, of the assumption of self-identity that excludes negativity (or *différance*, as Derrida calls it).
84 “[D]ie Identität mit sich in seinem Gesetztsein.” [II:110]
85 “[Ä]ußerliche Reflexion.” [II:110]
86 “[E]s ist nur . . . an sich, insofern es äußerlich ist.” [II:110]
87 “[D]as Ganze [ist] der in seinem Abstoßen und Bestimmen, in seiner äußerlichen Unmittelbarkeit sich auf sich beziehende Grund.” [II:111]
Kant thought that all determination fell outside of the thing-in-itself and instead was located in consciousness. To the thing-in-itself Kant opposed reflection. This claim, Hegel suggests,

is directly contradicted by the consciousness of freedom, according to which I know myself rather as the universal and undetermined, and separate off from myself those manifold and necessary determinations, recognizing them as something external for me and belonging only to things. (489)
the true thing-in-itself demonstrates the abstract thing-in-itself to be an untrue determination.

(c) The Reciprocal Action of Things

In Figure 35(a), the Thing-in-itself exists. There are finally a number of things "which are distinguished from one another . . . through themselves." (490)93

At this stage, Dialectical Reason intervenes to remind the Understanding that, if a thing has Properties, each Property is as much a Thing as the Thing was. Accordingly, a Property can only be known by its properties, thereby launching a bad infinity in which every thing has its Being beyond itself. In effect, the Thing-in-itself is back. Property does not correlate with its Ground in the Thing, as it is supposed to. Rather, two Things-in-themselves face each other in Figure 35(b):

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 35(b)
Properties as Reciprocal Action

The different things stand in Reciprocal Action through their properties. Things are what they are because of the Properties, but Properties are also other things. Property now stands for the reciprocal relation between things. Reciprocal determination is therefore the middle term of the things-in-themselves.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 35(c)
Reciprocal Action of Things

The Things-in-themselves are supposed to remain indifferent to all relation--they are self-identical. Yet Things are determined by their Properties. Apart from Property (now conceived as

---

93 "[M]ehrere Dinge . . . sich durch sich selbst voneinander unterscheiden." [II:112]
Reciprocal Action), the thing is nothing. "Thinghood is thus reduced to the form of indeterminate identity-with-self which has its essentiality only in its property." (490)94 The Thing isolated from its Properties is merely quantitative--its being is entirely external to it. "There thus results a ‘totality’ of existing things, among which, each individual is a 'nullity.'"95 The point, then, is that there is no essence beyond the appearance of the Thing. It is Appearance all the way down. Kant’s metaphysical Thing-in-itself is a nullity. To the extent we think of it, it is just another phenomenon among phenomena. As Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology, "behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen. . . ."96

Reciprocal Action is the speculative step. Therefore, Hegel conceives of all Things having a unity in the concept of Property (conceived now as Reciprocal Action). Things are distinguished and related in the realm of Reciprocal Action. In Property is the continuity of one Thing into another. Yet every Property is itself a Thing. Without the Things called Properties, a Thing vanishes. Thinghood is therefore metonymic, as Hegel established at the level of Measure.97 Any Thing is simply the empty space of other Things (its Properties). And yet these Properties are the

---

95 MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, supra note 13, at 84.
96 PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 49, ¶ 165. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 273-74; see also KENNETH R. WESTPHAL, HEGEL’S EPistemOLOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF HEGEL’S Phenomenology of Spirit 165 (1989) (“If Hegel’s arguments in the consciousness section [of the Phenomenology] are successful, then the world has been found to be cognitively accessible; there isn’t anything more to the world than what it manifests”).
forceful appearance of the Thing in the World.

As the unity of vanishing Things, Property itself is self-subsistent, and so Things have their self-subistence in the concept of Property. The Thing is unessential, "in truth, only that unessential compass which, though a negative unity, is only like the one of something, namely an immediate one." (491)98 Previously, the Kantian Thing-in-itself was made into an unessential compass by an External Reflection, as seen in Figure 34(b). Even then, External Reflection (an intelligence conceived as absolutely separate from the Thing) supposed that the Thing-in-itself was "vaguely conceived as the essential," (491)99 that is, somehow not divorced from phenomenon. Now the Thing-in-itself makes itself unessential. It sublates itself and enters into its phenomenal Properties. "Hence property is now freed from the indeterminate and impotent connexion which is the one of the thing: it is that which constitutes the thing's subsistence, a self-subsistent matter." (491)100 Now, if there is to be a thing, it is a thing constructed out of diverse properties. There are only "various self-subsistent matters of this kind and the thing consists of them." (492)101

B. The Constitution of the Thing Out of Matters

In the Reciprocal Action of Things,102 Thinghood negated itself and became an an unessential moment. Properties did the same (since Properties are Things). Properties in Figure 35(c) are the very means by which all things are different, yet, in Reciprocal Action of Things, shown in Figure 35(c), all difference

98 “[I]n Wahrheit nur jener unwesentliche Umfang, der zwar negative Einheit ist, aber nur wie das Eins des Etwas, nämlich ein unmittelbares Eins.” [II:114]
99 “[A]ls das Wesentliche . . . vorschwebt.” [II:114]
100 “Diese ist somit nunmehr befreit von fer undestimmten und kraftlosen Verbindung, die das Eins des Dinges ist; sie ist das, was das Bestehen desselben ausmacht, eine selbständige Materie.” [II:114]
101 “[M]annigfaltige . . . selbständige Materien, und das Ding besteht aus ihnen.” [II:114]
102 Figure 35(c).
between Things is entirely erased. If Difference exists, it is supplied externally, not by the Thing.

What happens in the current section is that Properties, by which the Thing was supposed to distinguished itself from other things, is really the enduring mode by which things are continuous with other things. In other words, a Thing has its unique Properties, but it is not the only thing with those Properties. Every Property is a universal. In its universal guise, momentary Property is renamed Matters.

At first, the Understanding, gazing back at Figure 35(a), proposes that Properties fail to distinguish one Thing from another. Property is therefore "in the element of unessentiality." Property is not what distinguishes Things. External reflection does. What is essential in Things is the external reflection that distinguishes them.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 36(a)
Inessentiality of Property

Dialectical Reason intervenes to point out that Property was previously shown to be a "unity of externality and essentiality, because it contains reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another." This pairing of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-an-other is given the name This Thing and Matters, with reflection-into-self on the negative right side of internal essence and reflection-into-other on the left side of external Existence.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 36(b)
This Thing and its Matters

---

103 "[I]m Elemente der Unwesentlichkeit." [II:116]
104 "Diese Einheit der Äußerlichkeit und Wesentlichkeit stößt sich, weil sie die Reflexion-in-sich und die Reflexion in anderes enthält." [II:116]
Earlier, Properties were reduced to mere moments. "[T]hat is, they are reflected into their negative unity as into a substrate distinct from them, namely thinghood." (496) Properties deferred to the Thing and was no-thing on its own. Matters, in contrast, are more advanced. They are "self-subsistent stuff." (492) A Matter is "reflected into its own unity-with-self." (496) "This Thing" is now liberated from its Matters.

Property was that by which things were supposed to be distinguished; but now that [Matter] has freed itself from this its negative side [1], or inhering in an other, the thing [1], too, has been freed from its being determined by other things and has returned into itself from the relation to other. (493) Matter is self-subsistent only when the Thing--the owner of the Property--is suppressed. If Matter is before us, the Thing is not. The Thing is "abstract identity, the simply negative Existence, or Existence determined as the indeterminate." (493) Matter negates This Thing and "therefore contains the moment of the negative, and its self-subsistence is, as this negative unity, the restored something of thinghood." (492)

On the law of sublation, Thinghood is negated by but preserved in the Matters. This means the Matters are as much Thing as no-Thing. As a Thing, it cannot endure. Meanwhile,

---

105 "[I]n ihre negative Einheit als in eine von ihnen selbst unterschiedene Grundlage, die Dingheit, reflektierte sind." [II:119]
106 "[E]inen selbständigen Stoff." [II:114]
107 "[I]n seine eigene Einheit mit sich reflektiert ist." [II:119]
108 "Die Eigenschaft war das, wodurch sich die Dinge unterschieden sollten; indem sie sich von dieser ihrer negativen Seite, einem Andern zu inhärerien, befreit hat, so ist damit auch das Ding von seinem Bestimmtsein durch andere Dinge befreit worden und aus der Beziehung auf anderes in sich zurückgegangen." [II:116]
109 "[D]ie abstrakte Identität, die einfach negative Existenz, oder sie bestimmt als das Unbestimmte." [II:115]
110 "[E]nhält also selbst das Moment des Negativen, und ihre Selbständigkeit ist zugleich als diese negative Einheit das wiederhergestellte Etwas der Dingheit." [II:115]
111 It is common, Hegel says, to deny that Matters are "things." "Things and their constituents are distinguished without it being exactly stated
now that This Thing has once more been separated from its Matters, it is merely the Thing-in-itself again. It has "become an other to itself." (493) This Thing "is a self-identical negation only as against the positive continuity of the matter." (493)

Speculative Reason summarizes Things by saying that Things exist only by a kind of differentiation of This Thing and its Matters. "The thing consists of self-subsistent matters which are indifferent to their relation in the thing." (493-94) The relation between This Thing and its Matters is now seen as "only an unessential combination of them and the difference of one thing from another thing depends on whether and in what amount a number of the particular matters are present in it." (494)

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 36(c)
Constellation of the Thing Out of Its Matters

Matters now "pass out of and beyond this thing, continue themselves into other things, and the fact that they belong to this

E, 115, 116
thing is not a limitation for them." (494) In short, a "Matter" is never unique to a thing. If This Thing tastes bitter, bitterness in general is the property of many other things as well. Property/Matter, supposed to signal the particularity of the Thing, in fact is always a universal. Particularity, then, depends upon universality (an idea Hegel will emphasize much further on).

The Thing is therefore no limitation for Matters. And, since each Property/Matter is itself a Thing, they do not limit each other. For this reason, a Thing can have many Properties. Nevertheless, every Property is a thing-in-itself:

Therefore in their combination in [the Thing] they are impenetrable for one another, relate themselves in their determinateness only to themselves, and are a mutually indifferent manifoldness of subsistence. (494)

Properties, Hegel says, "are capable of only a quantitative limit." (494) Such a limit, it will be recalled, is no limit; Quantity continues itself into its beyond, while the Quality of the thing remains unaffected.

---

117 "Sie gehen über dieses Ding hinaus, kontinuieren sich in andere, und diesem Dinge anzugehören ist keine Schranke derselben." [II:117]

118 This occurs in the first chapter of the Subjective Logic.

119 "[I]ndem sie in ihm verbunden werden . . . sie sind . . . undurchdringlich füreinander, beziehen sich in ihrer Betsimmtheit nur auf sich und sind eine gegeneinander gleichgültige Mannigfaltigkeit des Bestehens." [II:117]

120 "[S]ie sind nur einer quantitativen Grenze fähig." [II:117]

121 In discussing quantitative v. qualitative limits, Hegel had earlier written:

If, however, by limit we mean quantitative limit, then when, for example, a field alters its limit it still remains what it was before, a field. If on the other hand its qualitative limit is altered, then since this is the determinateness which makes it a field, it becomes a meadow, wood, and so on. (186)

"Wenn wir aber unter Grenze die quantitativen Grenze verstehen, und z. B. ein Acker diese Seine Grenze
Meanwhile, the Constitution of the Thing is a "merely quantitative relation" (494)\textsuperscript{122} between the Properties. The Thing is cobbled together by outside force and has no integrity of its own. The Thing "consists of some quantum or other of a matter, also of a quantum of another, and again of others; this connexion of having no connexion alone constitutes the thing." (494)\textsuperscript{123}

The Thing is about to dissolve.

C. Dissolution of the Thing

So far, the Thing is "the merely quantitative connexion of free matters." (494)\textsuperscript{124} That is, the Thing is purely negative and had its being outside itself, as did Pure Quantity. This Thing is what external reflection makes of it. It is the mere afterthought or "also" of the Properties.\textsuperscript{125} As such it is alterable. If too many of its qualities are taken away, or if too many properties are added to it, the Thing alters and becomes a different Thing than it was. Such a dissolution, however, is externally imposed. Meanwhile, "Matters circulate freely out of or into 'this' thing; the thing itself is absolute porosity without measure or form of its own." (494)\textsuperscript{126}

---

\textsuperscript{122} "[B]oß quantitative Beziehung." [II:117]

\textsuperscript{123} "[B]esteht aus irgendeinem Quantum von einem Stoffe, auch aus dem eines andern, auch andern; diesen Zusammenhang, keinen Zusammenhang zu haben, macht allein das Ding aus." [II:117]

\textsuperscript{124} "[D]er bloß quantitative Zusammenhang der freien Stoffe." [II:117]

\textsuperscript{125} The thing as an "also" recalls similar remarks in chapter 3 of the Phenomenology, where the Thing is both an Also and a One. PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, at ¶ 114 ("the differentiation of the properties . . . each property negating the others, thus falls outside of this simple medium; and the medium, therefore, is not merely an Also, an indifferent unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other").

\textsuperscript{126} "Die Stoffe zirkulieren aus diesem Ding unaufgehalten hinaus oder herein; es selbst ist die absolute Porostiät ohne eigenes Maß oder Form." [II:117]
The externality of the Thing’s constitution and dissolution is the very "truth of what we call things" (39)\textsuperscript{127} Hegel will shortly call Appearance. But, meanwhile, the Thing likewise consists of Matters. On the one hand, the Matters are dependent on the Thing. On the other hand, they are also self-subsistent Things on their own.

The Understanding now proposes that the Thing is unstable and alterable.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 37(a)

Dissolution of the Thing

In the view of the Understanding, the Matters are only self-related. They are unrelated to a Thing because the Thing is Dissolved. Yet Dialectical Reason intervenes to remind the Understanding that Matters partake of reflection-into-self. They \textit{require} the Thing. Accordingly, the Matters are correlative to the Thing and connected to it after all. When this relation is emphasized, content as such is not reflected into itself. It relates itself to an other. The Thing is no mere "also" to the Matters. It is equally the negative relation of the matters. Because they are determinatenesses, the Matters are negative Reflection. The negative Reflection is the "puncticity" (\textit{Punktualität}) of the thing. Puncticity appears in no English dictionary. Presumably the translator thought that "punctuality" was a word likely to be misunderstood by English readers.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 37(b)

Puncticity

\textsuperscript{127} "[D]ie Wahrheit dessen, was den Namen der Dinge führt." [I:19]
"The thing is, therefore, the self-contradictory mediation of independent self-subsistence through its opposite." (495) In the Thing so defined, "Existence has reached its completion, namely it is intrinsic being or independent subsistence, and unessential Existence in one." (496) In short, it is the essential nature of things that they require outside help to be things. An outside will must gather up the Matters and unite them into thinghood. Hence, "the truth of Existence is to have its being-in-self in unessentially." (496) Existence is therefore merely Appearance. Its ground or substrate is "its own nullity." (496)

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 37(c)
Appearance

Remark: The Porosity of Matters

In the prior section, Hegel paused to consider the nature of porosity--also the subject of the current Remark. In the Dissolution of the Thing and its passage into Appearance, each Matter belonging to the thing had self-subsistence. Yet each Matter interpenetrated the Thing and each other, so that the self-subsistence of one Matter is the self-subsistence of all the Matters. This was the puncticity (negative unity) of the thing, in which every Matter, as well as the Thing itself, interpenetrated

128 “Das Ding ist daher die sich widersprechende Vermittlung des selbständigen Bestehens mit sich durch sein Gegenteil.” [II:118-19]
129 "Die Existenz hat in diesem Dinge ihre Vollständigkeit erreicht, nämlich in Einem an sich seindes Sein oder selbständiges Bestehen, und unwesentliche Existenz zu sein.” [II:119]
130 "[D]ie Wahrheit der Existenz ist daher, ihr Ansichsein in der Unwesentlichkeit.” [II:119]
131 "[I]hre Nichtigkeit.” [II:119]
132 It may be noted that, in the Phenomenology, puncticity or porosity of the Matters yields Force. PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, ¶ 136. When the Force of the Thing vanishes into the Force of the Understanding, the Understanding arrives at the idea of a beyond, or Appearance. Id. ¶ 143. In the Logic, however, Force is reserved for Essential Relation, two chapters hence--well after Appearance as made its appearance. See Figure 42(a).
The matters are everywhere in the thing. They pervade it. "Therefore where one of these matters is, the other also is, in one and the same point." (496) Color is not in one place, heat in another. The Matters are not outside one another. The matters are porous to each other. One Matter "exists in the interstices of the other." (496) Meanwhile, the Matter that pervades its fellow Matter is likewise pervaded.

Yet in this interpenetration, the matters were indifferent to one another. In their interpenetration they do not touch one another. One property "subsists in the pores or in the non-subistence of the others." (495) But these others are just as porous. In their pores the first Matter also subsists. Their subsistence is also their sublatedness as well as the subsistence of others.

Ordinary thinking determines that "a thing consists of a number of independent matters." (496) The thing is its Matters, "whose subsistence is the thing." (496) But simultaneously, the Matters are subsistent on their own. "This Thing" therefore has two determinations. First it is This Thing. Second, it is a mere also. "The 'also' is that which presents itself in external intuitions as spatial extension." (496) But the negative unity--the This--is the puncticity of the thing.

The usual excuse by which ordinary thinking evades the contradiction of the independent subsistence of a number of matters in one thing, or their mutual indifference in their interpenetration, bases itself on the smallness of the parts and

---

133 "Wo daher die eine dieser Materien ist, in einem und demselben Punkte ist die andere." [II:119]
134 "$[I]n dem Zwischenräumen der andern existiert." [II:120]
135 "$[B]esteht in den Poren oder in dem Nichtbestehen der andern." [II:118]
136 "$[E]in Ding aus vielen selbständigen Materien bestehe." [II:119]
137 "$[D]eren Bestehen das Ding ist." [II:119]
138 See Figure 36(c).
139 "Das Auch ist dasjenige, was in der äußern Anschauung als Raumausdehnung vorkommt." [II:119]
Thus "ordinary thinking falls back onto external, quantitative difference." (497)\(^{141}\) The Matters interpenetrate This Thing because the Matters are small (yet self-identical).

"[P]ictorial thinking" (497)\(^{142}\) wants to hold on to perception and to have before it self-identical things. But the Matter should not be conceived as a self-identicality alongside its negation. Rather, in one and the same point lie self-subsistent Matter and its negation or porosity.

The physical laws which state that gases expand to fill the volume in which it is contained are one-sided views. "They show . . . that for example a certain volume takes up the same amount of steam whether it is empty of atmospheric air or filled with it." (498)\(^{143}\) If two gases are in the volume, the gases interpenetrate. What is neglected is this: "in this thing one matter is present where the other matter is, and the matter that penetrates is also penetrated in the same point." (498)\(^{144}\)

Matter is self-subsistent, but it also coincides with other Matters. Hence, the self-subsistence of one Matter is the self-subsistence of all the Matters. "This is contradictory; but the thing is nothing else but this very contradiction; and that is why it is Appearance." (498)\(^{145}\)

Is Hegel trying to deny atomism? For instance, does he argue that there is no oxygen and nitrogen but only

\(^{140}\) "Die Ausrede, durch welche das Vorstellen den Widerspruch des selbständigen Bestehens der mehrern Materian in Einem oder die Gleichgültigkeit derselben gegeneinander in ihrer Durchdringung abhält, pflegt bekanntlich die Kleinheit der Teile und der Poren zu sein." [II:120]

\(^{141}\) "[L]äßt das Vorstellen sich in den äußerlichen, den quantitativen Unterschied herunterfallen." [II:120]

\(^{142}\) "Vorstellens." [II:120]

\(^{143}\) "Sie zeigen . . . daß z. B. ein gewisses Volumen ebensoviel Wasserdampf aufnimmt, es sei leer von atmosphärischer Luft oder damit erfüllt." [II:121]

\(^{144}\) "[I]m Diesen die eine Materie sich befindet, wo die andere, und das Durchdringende in demselben Punkte auch durchdrungen ist." [II:121]

\(^{145}\) "Dies ist widersprechend; aber das Ding ist nichts anderes als dieser Widerspruch selbst; darum ist es Erscheinung." [II:121]
"atmosphere"? This is not the point, I think. Rather, there might be Matters—oxygen and nitrogen—but the atmosphere is nevertheless a Thing pervaded with Matters. At no point is there only oxygen but not nitrogen. These matters pervade each other. Nothing—not even the atmosphere—is truly self-identical (except Absolute Idea at the end of the book).

Hegel brings home the point to the spiritual sphere. The soul is said to have forces or faculties. They interpenetrate the soul.

Just as man in general is made to consist of soul and body, each of which has an independent being of its own, so too the soul is made to consist of so-called soul forces each of which has a self-subsistence of its own, or is an immediate, separate activity with its own peculiar nature. It is imagined that the intellect acts separately in one place and the imagination by itself in another, that intellect, memory, and so on, are each cultivated separately, and for the time being the other forces are left inactive on one side until perhaps, or perhaps not, their turn comes. (498)

Of course, modern science does not hesitate to locate some of these forces in precise segments of the brain. Yet metaphysically, such powers interpenetrate the entire being of a person and serve to identify the person as unique.

II. Appearance

So may the outward shows be least themselves:
The world is still deceived with ornament.

146 “Wie man den Menschen überhaupt aus Seele und Lieb bestehen läßt, deren jedes als ein Selbstständiges für sich gilt, so läßt man die Seele aus sogenannten Seelenkräften bestehen, deren jede eine für sich bestehende Selbständigkeit hat oder eine unmittelbare, für sich nach ihrer Bestimmtheit wirkende Tätigkeit ist. Man stellt sich so vor, daß man den Verstand, das Gedächtnis usf. jede für sich kultiviere und einstweilen die andern Kräfte in Untätigkeit linker Hand liegen lasse, bis die Reihe vielleicht, vielleicht auch nicht an sie komme.” [II:121-22]

147 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE Act V.
At the end of the last segment, autochthonous Existence, emerging from Ground, had returned there, having dissolved itself. At the end of that journey from ashes to dust, Existence posited itself as absolute negativity—a reflected immediacy. As such, it was Appearance—an "essential Existence." (499) The function of unstable Appearance is to disappear. Appearance does not have being-in-and-for-self; it must self-erase. It is, as Hegel will later say, "the reality that does not correspond to the Notion." (756) Thus, in ordinary parlance, when we say that X appears to be the case, we are saying that X may be true, but X must erase itself in favor of a deeper truth. If X turns out to be true, then it was no mere appearance. Nevertheless, this verdict can only be reached after X's appearance sublates itself. Hence, X is appearance only when it self-erases.

Yet disappearance implies a removal to some place. Appearance is therefore "equally immediately a sheer positedness which has a ground and an other for its subsistence." (500) From the beginning, sublation has meant preservation as well as cancellation. Accordingly, Appearance's very essence is disappearance in favor of some apparently deeper reality: "This
constitutes its essentiality, to have within itself the negativity of reflection, the nature of essence." (499) We therefore have before us a dialectic moment. "Appearance is accordingly the unity of illusory being [which erases itself] and Existence [which endures]." (500)

Appearance must undergo the usual three stages. First, the Understanding proposes to distinguish Appearance from what endures. "[T]hese two sides enter into relation with each other." (500) The relation is put forth as "simple self-identity which also contains various content determinations." (500) In the flux of Appearance, this relation stays constant as the Law of Appearance, or so the Understanding asserts.

Dialectical Reason then reinterprets the proposition of the Understanding: there must be two worlds opposing each other--the World of Appearance and the world of Existence. Each of these worlds will be a self-subsistent totality. Finally, Speculative Reason establishes that the two worlds coincide. Essence is in Appearance, and vice versa. At this point "Appearance becomes correlation or essential relation." (500) In Essential Relation, Appearance establishes its being-in-and-for-self.

A. The Law of Appearance

In this section, Appearance is defined as that which withdraws into Law, with which it enjoys a unity. Hegel has scientific laws in mind, but what he has to say likewise applies to jurisprudence.

As already indicated, the subsistence of Appearance lies in its non-subsistence, and so "Appearance is the existent

---

153 "Dies macht ihre Wesentlichkeit aus, an ihr selbst die Negativität der Reflexion, die Natur des Wesens zu haben." [II:123]
154 "Die Erscheinung ist daher Einheit des Scheins und der Existenz." [II:123]
155 "[D]iese beiden Seiten treten in Beziehung miteinander." [II:124]
156 "[E]infache Identität mit sich, die zugleich verschiedene Inhaltbestimmungen enthält." [II:124]
mediated by its *negation.*" (500)158 Disappearance is, paradoxically, the one permanent thing about Appearance.159 This alone is the "law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not."160 In effect, sublation has been sublated. "The existent," Hegel says, "is accordingly the *return* of itself into itself through its negation and through the negation of this its negation." (500)161 In other words, by negating itself, Appearance shows what it is--a negation of negation. This subsistence of self-erasure shows that Appearance is *essential* (self-sublation being the very essence of Essence). Accordingly, "Appearance is Existence along with its essentiality." (500-01)162

If Appearance erases itself, there must be a place to which it removes--the deeper essence which merely "appears." This deeper essence will be the Law of Appearance.163 Yet this "other" is likewise a subsisting negative--likewise a positedness. "In other words, the existent is, as an Appearance, reflected into an other which it has for its ground, which other is itself only this, to be reflected into an other." (501)164 Repeating a phrase...

---

158 “Die Erscheinung ist das Existierende vermittelt durch seine Negation.” [II:124]
159 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL’S DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES 40 (Christopher Smith trans., 1976) (“Constancy . . . . is the truth of disappearance”).
160 Daniel 6:8.
161 “Das Existierende ist daher die Rückkehr seiner in sich selbst durch seine Negation.” [II:124]
162 “[D]ie Erscheinung die Existenz zugleich mit ihrer Wesentlichkeit.” [II:124]
163 The Law of Appearance corresponds to the first supersensual world invoked in the *Phenomenology.* GADAMER, *supra* note 159, at 47; see *PHENOMENOLOGY,* supra note 55, at ¶ 157. The later Law of Law and Appearance will conform to the second supersensuous world--the "inverted world"--of the *Phenomenology.* Meanwhile, Law does not, in the Logic, amount to a "world." GADAMER, *supra,* at 47. Worldhood must wait its turn for the moment.
164 “Oder, das Existierende ist als Erscheinendes in ein Anderes reflektiert und hat es zu seinem Grunde, welches selbst nur dies ist, in ein Anderes reflektiert zu sein.” [II:124]
introduced in his analysis of Reflection, Hegel characterizes Appearance as "a return-into-self [as] the return of the nothing through nothing back to itself on account of the negativity of the moments." (501) Nothing is here except the negative. Appearance is therefore "essential illusory show." (501)

Yet Appearance is a connection of "reciprocally grounding existents." (501) Each side of the relation appears only if the other side is erased. Hence, each side erases the other: "the subsistence of the one is not the subsistence of the other." (501) Since each side finds itself erased when the other side is emphasized, the true subsistence of the sides is in their relationship to each other.

Appearance is therefore a self-identity with two sides. First, it is in the form of "positedness or external immediacy." (501) On this side, it is "a determinate being, but one which is contingent, unessential and, in keeping with its immediacy, subject to transition." (501) Second, it is self-identical. This side is "exempt from flux, the enduring element" (501) of the Thing. Hence, we have:

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

---

165 There, Hegel described Reflection as "the movement of nothing to nothing, and so back to itself." (400) ("[D]ie Bewegung von Nichts zu Nichts und dadurch zu sich selbst zurück" [II:14])
166 "Rückkehr in sich selbst ist, ist um der Negativität der Momente willen, die Rückkehr des Nichts durch Nichts zu sich selbst zürck." [II:124]
167 "[W]esentliche Schein." [II:501]
168 "[G]eigenseitig begründenden Existierenden." [II:134]; see PETER SIMPSON, HEGEL'S TRANSCENDENTAL INDUCTION, 128 n.9 (1998) ("It is important to see that appearance doesn't name simply the field of determinate things but the relation between that field and its unity. It is the difference between these moments that is appearance.").
169 "[D]as Bestehen des einen nicht das Bestehen des andern." [II:125]
170 "Gesetzteins oder der äußerlichen Unmittelbarkeit." [II:125]
171 "[E]in Dasein, aber als ein zufälliges, unwesentliches, das nach seiner Unmittelbarkeit dem Übergange . . . unterworfen ist." [II:125]
172 "[J]enem Wechsel entnommene . . . das Bleibende desselben." [II:125]
Here is emphasized the unity between flux and stasis of a Thing. Thus, the Thing is "the one and its other." (502) In this formulation, the other [1] is Appearance and the one [2] is the beyond of fluxional Appearance, but a beyond that cannot exist on its own without appearing as the one. The beyond is therefore just as much present as it is absent. The Law of Appearance is that the Matters of the Thing "constitute one subsistence, but at the same time as a diverse, mutually indifferent content." (502) "The thing is a unity and at the same time a multiplicity." Each side subsists in its other, as a unity. The Law [2] is the positive side of what appears. It is what remains when Appearance disappears.

Dialectical Reason intervenes to emphasize that, in Janus-faced Appearance, the presence of the one side depends upon the absence of the other. Dialectical Reason says, "You say law is stable and Appearance is flux. But in truth, Law is just an appearance and also a flux." The unity is therefore a failure. The Law is that each of the two sides exists in the sublating of the other. "[T]heir positedness as their negativity is the identical, positive positedness of both." (502)

---

173 It has bothered some that Form and Content, which was the culmination of Absolute Ground in the Science of Logic (see Figure 31(a)-(c) in the appendix), is discussed in the Lesser Logic in connection with the "Law of the Phenomenon (or Law of Appearance).” To be sure, the Content of Form is that Form self-erases. That is also the Law of Appearance. The two are obviously connected. It is sometimes overlooked, however, that in the Lesser Logic, Hegel states that Form and Content, "in its mature phase is the Law of the Phenomenon." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 8, § 133. This suggests that, even in the Lesser Logic, Hegel viewed Form and Content as more primitive than the Law of Appearance.

174 “[E]ines und sein Anderes.” [II:125]
175 "Sie machen Ein Bestehen aus, zugleich als verschiedener, gegeneinander gleichgültiger Inhalt.” [II:126]
176 HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION 107 (1999)
177 “[I]hr Gesetzsein als ihre Negativität ist zugleich das identische, positive Gesetzsein beider.” [II:126]
Speculative Reason suggests that the content common to Appearance and Law is the Law itself. Another way of putting this is that, from the fluxional World of Appearance, the Understanding posits a stable realm of many laws. "But what the concept of law has not yet done is to account for what kinds of appearances or laws there are."\(^{178}\) The many Laws themselves are unruly and unstable, and so the logic of the Understanding requires there to be a stable law of the many fluxional laws. Speculative Reason reduces Law to mere appearance and therefore subject to some meta-law.

\(^{178}\) SIMPSON, supra note 168, at 37.

\(^{179}\) That "genus" is the absent member in the set of species is a favorite theme of Slavoj Žižek. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 97, 158 (1993) (attributing to Hegel the view that every genus has two species: itself and its species). He calls this the "paradox of pas-tout." SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 44 (1991). Hegel will suggest that genus and species are the only two species in his chapter on Notion.
**The Subsistence of Appearance.** In dissolving, the Thing has become an opposition, and Appearance is this very opposition. Yet both sides of the opposition are equally self-erasing Appearance. This is the proposition of Figure 38(c), where Speculative Reason suggests that Appearance is "conformable to its determination" (502)\textsuperscript{180}--i.e., determined as a relation between flux and stasis. This is so in three different ways. These ways correspond to Figures 38(a), (b), and (c).

1. Subsistence [7] is opposed to the fluxionable immediacy of existence [4, 5, 6]. That is, immediacies are diversities which self-erase. But the Law of Law and Appearance [7] does not self-erase. On the positive side, the Law of Law and Appearance is identity-with-self [7]. But there is also a negative side [4, 5, 6] which announces it is not identity-with-self. Rather, it is a positedness.

2. The Law of Law and Appearance [7] is just as much [4, 5, 6]--a positedness. At this point, Hegel does not hesitate to exploit the etymological connection between Law [Gesetz] and positedness [Gesetzein]. "In this positedness lies the essential relation of the two sides of the difference which law contains." (502)\textsuperscript{181} [7] then represents the vanishing of the sides. This vanishing is the unity between Appearance and the Law of Appearance.

3. The Law of Law and Appearance is the unity of Law and Appearance in that both sides of the syllogism self-erase. Figure 38(c) stands for the proposition that "appearance and law have one and the same content." (503)\textsuperscript{182} Initially, this did not appear to be the case. Law was supposed to be the withdrawal from flux into deeper stasis. Appearance was supposed to be "the null immediate" (503)\textsuperscript{183} which opposes reflection-into-self. In truth, both sides self-erase, and one is no more or no less Appearance than the other side. In other words, the myth of a "beyond" of Appearance is just that--a myth, or a dogma.

\textsuperscript{180} "[W]ie es sich bestimmt hat." [II:126]

\textsuperscript{181} "In diesem Gesetzein liegt die wesentliche Beziehung der Beiden Seiten des Unterschiedes, die das Gesetz enthält." [II:126]

\textsuperscript{182} "Erscheinung und Gesetz haben einen und denselben Inhalt." [II:127]

\textsuperscript{183} "[N]ichtige Unmittelbare." [II:127]
The Understanding now interprets Figure 38(c). If Law is the unity of itself and Appearance, Appearance contains more than Law—namely, the unessential content of its immediate being. The function of unessential content is to erase itself. Yet Law erases itself. So Law must be just as unessential as Appearance. The Law is that Law is only an Appearance. This is the Law that endures. "Accordingly, law is not beyond Appearance but is immediately present in it; the realm of laws is the stable image of the world of Existence or Appearance." (503) What we have before us is a single totality—the World of Appearance.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 39(a)
World of Appearance

The World of Appearance includes Law and lawlessness. Oddly, since Law is self-dissolution, lawlessness is what endures. Lawlessness constitutes the external connection of Appearance with a positive law. Hence, the world of Appearance is full of multiple laws, none of which is adequate to its subject matter. Proper Law is self-erasure. Improper law is what science or

---

184 This, according to Nancy, is where freedom shows itself to be

the law or the necessity that posits the self outside of itself. It is thus the law of what posits itself without law, whose law lies, precisely, in that positing. But this law . . . cannot be represented as a law, for a (physical or moral) law is always "the stable image *** unaware of the restlessness of negativity."


185 "Das Gesetz ist daher nichts jenseits der Erscheinung, sondern in ihr unmittelbar gegenwärtig; das Reich der Gesetz ist das ruhige Abbild der existierenden oder erscheinenden Welt." [II:127]
jurisprudence\textsuperscript{186} puts forth separate and apart from immanent logic.

As an example of lawlessness, Hegel considers Galileo's law of the falling body: \( s = at^2 \), where \( s \) is space, \( t \) is time, and \( a \) is the acceleration effect of gravity.\textsuperscript{187} In this expression, spatial and temporal magnitudes are brought together empirically. Notionally, the unity of the two sides "would be their negativity." (504)\textsuperscript{188} The one would contain its other within itself. But this essential unity has not yet emerged in Galileo's law. The relation of time and space is merely posited. The Notion of space traversed by a falling body does not imply that time corresponds to it as a square. The determination of time--as it is "commonly imagined" (505)\textsuperscript{189}--does not imply a relation to space. Commonly, it is said that time "can quite well be imagined without space and space without time." (505)\textsuperscript{190} So conceived, the two are only externally related to each other. The magnitude by which time and space is related (\( a \), in \( s = at^2 \)) is also empirically ascertained. Philosophy, however, demands a notional proof, "showing that the law not only occurs but is necessary." (505)\textsuperscript{191} The law as stated does not rest on its necessity. "Law is, therefore, only the positive and not the negative, essentiality of

\textsuperscript{186} This is Hegel's ultimate judgment of positive law. In the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, "wrong" is defined as the positivization of right. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, \textit{The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law}, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481 (2003).

\textsuperscript{187} See Carlson, \textit{Quantity}, supra note 5, at 2124-25; Carlson, \textit{Measure}, supra note 5, at 152-54.

\textsuperscript{188} "[W]äre ihre Negativität." [II:129]

\textsuperscript{189} "[N]ach ihrer Vorstellung genommen wird." [II:129]

\textsuperscript{190} "[M]an könne sich die Zeit sehr wohl ohne den Raum und den Raum ohne die Zeit vorstellen." [II:129]

\textsuperscript{191} "[D]aß das Gesetz nicht nur statthat, sondern notwendig ist." [II:129]

For a description of Hegel's Notional derivation of the law of the fall--undertaken in the \textit{Philosophy of Nature}--see Stefan Büttner, \textit{Hegel on Galilei's Law of Fall}, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 331 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). In this proof, time is unit and internal; space is amount and external. The fact that time is in a ratio of power and in velocity's denominator (\( s/t^2 \)) shows that the Notion of falling bodies manifests itself externally in the space it covers.
In the negative essentiality of Appearance, content determinations are moments of form. They pass over into their other. In Law, the positedness of one side is the positedness of the other. Yet their content is indifferent to this relation. That is, when we assert the true Law about the realm of Appearances, we state some positive law, such as the law of falling bodies. The real law, however, is that Law is Appearance, and so this so-called Law of falling must itself fall to the ground. Law is essential in its form—it self-erases. But, as expressed in $s = at^2$, it is not yet real Form which is reflected into its sides as content. Its self-erasure is merely implicit.

Although Hegel is usually viewed as an opponent of English common law, his discussion of the Law of Appearance actually describes its basis perfectly. In the common law tradition, the judge states the law, based upon his reading of the cases. But this statement is merely the appearance of law.

---

192 "Das Gesetz ist daher nur die positive Wesentlichkeit der Erscheinung, nicht ihre negative." [II:129]
193 Hypolite describes the point as follows:

Newton, for example, presents phenomena as diverse as the free fall of a body on earth and the general planetary movement around the sun... as universal gravitation. But ever since his Jena dissertation on planetary movement, Hegel had tried to show the error of such a reduction; it can only reach an abstract formula which, though it has, no doubt, the merit of setting forth lawfulness as lawfulness, completely obscures the qualitative diversity of the content.

HYPPOLITE, GENESIS, supra note 93, at 128. According to Gadamer, the significance of Galileo’s law is that, because of friction, the law (as it exists in the World of Appearance) is never pure but is always compromised or perverted. Galileo’s law must therefore always be corrected by yet more law, in a bad infinity. GADAMER, supra note 159, at 43. But this does not mean Hegel discounts Galileo’s contribution. Earlier, Hegel praised the "immortal service" which Galileo performed with his empirical discovery. (343) ("unsterbliche Verdienste" [I:353])

194 On Hegel’s covert sympathy for the common law process, see Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
Subsequent generations of judges must find their own law. If the original case is upheld, the original statement may appear to endure, but in fact it is the new statement, not the old one, which is the law. The original statement fades away into memory as wise saws and modern instances displace it. No one can ever state what the common law is, except in the sense of Hegel’s Law of Appearance. The true common law, then, is that no statement of the law can endure.

In Galileo’s case, every new empirical measurement of bodies in fall is the law—not Galileo’s original publication of it. That is to say, empirical observation is king; should empirical observation depart from \( s = at^2 \), Galileo’s law would be dead.

Hegel, then, turns the tables on H.L.A. Hart, who famously argued that the meta-law was the rule of recognition. In effect, these rules tell the judge how to tell the difference between law and non-law. Of course, Hart is only able to give examples of such rules—such as, when the two houses of Congress enact a bill by the requisite majorities and the president signs it, the result is a law. He does not define the entire process of legal recognition, except to assure us that law is recognized, and that judges occasionally formulate the rule they supposedly followed in this act of recognition.

Hegel says something entirely different. Hegel implies a rule of non-recognition. Whatever a rule of recognition empirically causes to be recognized, that appearance is precisely what law is not. The only real law is that empirical law—an Appearance—must disappear.

B. The World of Appearance and the World-In-Itself.

"The existent world tranquilly raises itself to a realm of laws." (505) In Law, the World of Appearance has its subsistence. And the Law that subsists is simply this: that Appearances must disappear; "its subsistence is therefore its

---

196 "Die existierende Welt erhebt sich ruhig zu einem Reiche von Gesetzen." [II:129]
dissolution." (505) When Appearance erases itself, Appearance shows what it is and, when this occurs, "Law is this simple identity of Appearance with itself." (505)

But, Hegel says, Law is substrate, not Ground. If Law is Ground, then Appearance is Grounded. Appearance would then withdraw into Ground when it disappears, and Law would enjoy a deeper meaning than mere appearance. Yet Law is nothing but the activity of Appearance, there is no deeper realm of Law. Law and Appearance exist at the same level. Phenomenal things therefore have their grounds and conditions in other phenomenal things.

Nevertheless, Law has a different content from that of Appearance. Law reflects itself into Appearance, whereas Appearance reflects itself into Law. Because each self-erases, each is an "existent, which has its negativity for its ground." (505-06)

This very act of self-sublation is what Appearance and Law share. This action, Hegel suggests, was the Law of Law and Appearance. Hence, we have ordinary Law (self-sublation) and a meta-law (which requires that Law and Appearance self-sublate). Law is the "negative unity" between itself and Appearance.

Each side is the unity of itself and the other. This feature of containing itself, the other, and the unity of self and other, Hegel says, "is at first only their inner unity which stands in need
of proof and mediation." (506)²⁰³ This merely implicit (or "negative") feature is now made express (or posited). Law and Appearance are different, even while each is the other. In spite of their identity, each is self-subsistent against the other. "[T]he identity of law is therefore now also a posited and real identity." (506)²⁰⁴ "Posited" and "reality" are dialectical words. Dialectical Reason therefore proposes that two worlds--Appearance and Law--are each diverse totalities unto themselves.²⁰⁵

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 39(b)

World of Appearance and World In and For Self²⁰⁶

About these two worlds, Hegel remarks:

Existence has thus completely withdrawn into itself and has reflected itself into its absolute otherness in and for itself. That which was previously law is accordingly no longer only one side of the whole whose other side was Appearance as such, but is itself the whole. (506)²⁰⁷

Because each side contains the other and is the whole unto

²⁰³ "[I]st nur erst ihre innere Einheit, welche des Beweises und der Vermittung bedarf." [II:131]
²⁰⁴ "S[o] ist die Identität des Gesetzes nunmehr auch eine gesetzte und reale." [II:131]
²⁰⁵ "However, what he means is, not that there are two distinct worlds, but that there are two laws applying to one and the same world. The second law states that the selfsame repels itself from itself and is not selfsame but posits itself as selfsame, whereas the first law states that the selfsame remains selfsame." HARTNACK, supra note 50, at 64.
²⁰⁶ The subtitle of this section is World-in-Itself, but Hegel’s text always refers to the "other" world--other to the world of appearance--as the World in and for Itself.
²⁰⁷ "[D]ie Existenz ist somit vollständig in sich zurückgegangen und hat sich in ihr absolutes an- und für-sichseitendes Anderssein reflektiert. Das war vorher Gesetz war, ist daher nicht mehr nur Eine Seite des Ganzen, dessen andere die Erscheinung als solche war, sondern ist selbst das Ganze." [II:131]
Law "now also contains the moment of unessentiality which still belonged to Appearance, but as reflected implicit unessentiality." (506) In other words, Appearance had formerly self-erased and announced itself inessential; this was the very essence of Appearance. Now Law, as a totality unto itself, is likewise inessential. But this unessentiality is its "essential negativity." (506-07)

Hegel next refers to the phenomenal appearance of a body of law: "As an immediate content, law is determinate in general, distinguished from other laws, and of these there is an indeterminate number." (507) In other words, when immediately perceived, specific laws can be discerned. But law as such stands on a different ground. The Law of such contingent laws "now has within it essential negativity," and it "no longer contains such a merely indifferent, contingent content determination." (507) Rather, the content of the meta-Law is "all determinateness whatsoever, in an essential relation developing itself into totality." (507) In this passage, "essential relation" [2] must be understood as self-erasure. In self-erasing, the contingent laws show themselves to be mere appearance. But "Appearance which is reflected into itself is now a world, which reveals itself as a world in and for itself above the World of Appearance." (507)

---

208 The phenomenon of the extreme which is also its other and also the unity of itself and other has been on display since the Positive and Negative in Figure 25(a). See Carlson, Reflection, supra note 5, at ---.
209 "[S]ie nun auch das Moment der Unwesentlichkeit, das noch dieser zukam, entält, aber als die reflektierte, an sich Unwesentlichkeit." [II:131]
210 "[W]esentliche Negativität." [II:131]
211 "Das Gesetz ist als unmittelbarer Inhalt, bestimmt überhaupt, unterschieden von andern Gesetzen, und es gibt deren eine unbestimmbare Menge." [II:131]
212 In Hartian terms, rules are "recognized." HART, supra note ---.
213 "[E]nhält es nicht mehr eine solche nur gleichgültige, zufällige Inhaltsbestimmung." [II:131]
214 "[A]lle Bestimmtheit überhaupt in wesentlicher, sich zur Totalität machender Beziehung." [II:131]
215 "So ist die in ssich reflektierte Erscheinung nun eine Welt, die sich als an und für sich sieiende über der erscheinenden Welt auftut." [II:131]
All the contingent variations of self-erasing Appearance are now "the simple, changeless but varied content of the existent world." (507) Such a world contains the moment of "essenceless manifoldness." (507) Yet the world itself is self-substantive. The self-substantive world, beyond the contingencies of immediate perception, is the so-called "supersensuous world, in so far as the existent world is characterized as sensuous, namely, as determined for intuition." (507) In the supersensuous World-in-and-for-itself, "Essence has as yet no determinate being; but it is, and in a profounder sense than being." (507)

This is a good point to introduce everyone's favorite quote from all of Hegel's works. In the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel writes:

The True is thus the Baccanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent.

The point is that, as Appearance disappears, a stable world is created which does not disappear. According to Gadamer, Hegel

hits upon a brilliant formulation: the beyond, he says, is the appearance as appearance. That is, it is appearance which is not the appearance of something else, and which is no longer

---

216 "[N]ur den einfachen, wanderlosen, aber verschiedene Inhalt der existierenden Welt." [II:131]
217 "[W]esenlosen Mannigfaltigkeit." [II:131]
218 "[Ü]bersinnliche Welt; insofern die existierende Welt als sinnliche, nämlich als solche bestimmt wird die für die Anschauung," [II:132]
219 "Das Wesen hat noch kein Dasein; aber es ist, und in tieferem Sinne als das Sein." [II:132]
220 PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, ¶ 47.
221 See JEAN HYPPOLITE, LOGIC AND EXISTENCE 136 (Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen trans., 1997) ("What we call substance, absolute truth, is undoubtvedly translucent and simple rest as well as bacchanalian revel").
In other words, with Hegel, it is appearances all the way down.

**Essential relation.** Hegel concludes his analysis of Appearance with the concept of the Essential Relation between the two worlds. Existence, it will be recalled, started with the Thing. At first, the was "an immediacy that is not yet posited as essential or reflected." (507) But the Thing was also "not a simply affirmative . . . immediate. It is only as things of another, supersensuous world that things are posited . . . as veritable Existences." (507) In Things it is acknowledged that there is a being distinct from immediate being. Sensuous representation ascribes Existence only to the immediate being of feeling and intuition, but this is overcome in the deeper account of the Thing. Even sensuous representation has an unconscious sense that Things are not as they appear, but it is still not ready to acknowledge that "such determinations are not sensuous or simply affirmative immediacies, but reflected Existences." (507)

The World In and For Self is a totality, and so nothing is outside of it. "But since it is in its own self absolute negativity or form, its reflection-into-self is a negative relation to itself." (508) In other words, the World In and For Self shows what it is by expelling what it is not. This world "contains opposition and repels itself within itself into the essential world and into the

---

222 GADAMER, supra note 159, at 41.
223 “[E]ine Unmittelbarkeit, die noch nicht gesetzt ist als wesentliche oder reflektierte.” [II:132]
225 “[S]olche Bestimmungen nicht sinnliche oder seierende Unmittelbarkeiten, sondern reflektierte Existenzen sind.” [II:132]
226 “Indem sie aber an ihr selbst die absolute Negativität oder Form ist, so ist ihre Reflexion-in-sich negative Beziehung auf sich.” [II:132]
Although it is a totality, the World In and For Self is also only one side of a totality. It is the self-subsistent world against the World of Appearance. This supersensuous world is the determinate ground of the World of Appearance. We therefore have the collision of two worlds--the World of Appearance and the World In and For Itself. One is essential, one is inessential. But which is which? Outside forces must determine this, and because this is so "the ground relation has . . . been restored." (508)228 Ground Relation (or Form), it will be recalled, had no self-subsistence.229 But now we have before us the ground relation of Appearance. This is more than the relation of diversities. It is total relation--the relation of both worlds within the one world. As a consequence, "each of the two sides of law is, in the negative unity, in its own self its other content." (508)230 The other is not an indeterminate other in general. It is its other. It too contains the content determination of the first. The two sides are opposed, yet each side contains the other.231 Hence, we have "the essential relation of opposition." (509)232

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 39(c)**

**Essential Relation**

The ground relation of Appearance is "the opposition which, in

---

227 "Sie enthält den gegensatz und stößt sich ab in sich als die wesentliche Welt und in sich als die Welt des Andersseins oder die Welt der Erscheinung." [II:132]
228 "[D]ie Grundbeziehung wiederhergestellt." [II:133]
229 See Carlson, *Reflection*, supra note 5, at ---.
230 "[J]ede der beiden Seiten des Gesetzes ist in der negativen Einheit an ihr selbst ihr anderer Inhalt." [II:133]
231 Stanley Rosen comments, "To grasp this world is to invert it into a "Beyond" (Jenseits); the effort to dwell in or explain the Beyond leads immediately to its inversion into this world." ROSEN, supra note 21, at 147.
232 "[D]ie wesentliche Beziehung der Entgegensetzung." [II:134]
its contradiction, has fallen to the ground.” (509) Existence is, of course, the ground of Appearance. But in Figure 39(c), Existence has united with itself. It is the ground relation of opposed determinations, each of which is at the same time sublated ground. Existence has become the Appearance of Appearance, or the Appearance that does not disappear. 

The Essential Relation between the two worlds is one of inversion. One of these worlds is Appearance. The other is transcendent. But which is which? This is undetermined. Nevertheless, Essential Relation is not to be taken as a mere opposition. The relation of the worlds is an opposition and an identity.

C. Dissolution of Appearance

The World In and For Self is a unity between the World of Appearance and the World-in-itself. But at the same time the World In and For Self is merely a side of its own self.

The two worlds are therefore in such a relationship that what is positive in the world of Appearance is negative in the world in and for self. What is negative in the world of Appearance is the positive in the world in and for self. The north pole of one world is the south pole of the other. What is evil in the world of Appearance is in and for itself good.

This is the topsy-turvy world.

---

233 "[D]er in seinem Widerspruch zugrunde gegangene Gegensatz."

[II:134]

234 See PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, ¶ 47 (“Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth”).

235 "Beide Welten verhalten sich also so zueinander, daß was in der erscheinenden Welt positiv, in der an und für sich seienden Welt negativ, umgekehrt was in jener negativ, in dieser positiv ist. Der Nordpol in der erscheinenden Welt ist an und für sich negative usf. Was im erscheinenden Dasein böse, Unglück usf. ist, ist an und für sich gut.” [II:134]

236 A decade before the Science of Logic, Hegel would identify the "inverted" world with the world of philosophy. G.W.F. Hegel, On the
With regard to Hegel’s discovery of an inverted world, where the north pole is the south pole, Gadamer remarks, "Hegel is a Schwabian and startling people is his passion, just as it is the passion of all Schwabians." But ultimately Gadamer proclaims the polar illustration or the good-evil point unhelpful. These are mere oppositions, not inverted worlds. What inversion implies is that the world contains both law and the inversion of law. The topsy-turvy world is the world of satire, where opposites stand in for what should be, showing that things are not what they seem. Law is a possibility, but its inverse is also present in the world. As Hegel writes in the Phenomenology, "what is despised in the former [world] is honoured, and what in the former is honoured, meets with contempt" in the inverted world. What is noble is smeared with what is ignoble. The evil is also the good because the world is both the World of Appearance and the World In and For Itself. The two worlds are not opposed but each is actually the other world in addition to being itself.

In the opposition of the worlds, their difference has

---

*Nature of Philosophical Criticism in General and Its Relation to the Present Condition of Philosophy in Particular*, quoted in WALTER KAUFMAN, *HEGEL: A REINTERPRETATION* 56 (1978). "In order to become aware of its task, philosophy must first have experienced the dissolution of the intelligible world. In contrast to the 'upright' world, the world of philosophy is an 'upside down' (verkehrte) world; in contrast to total appeasement, it is one of total restlessness." MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, supra note 13, at 12.

237 GADAMER, supra note 159, at 37.
238 Id. at 48.
239 PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, ¶ 158.
240 That appearance does not always comply with law is why genera have species. Genera refer to species and species refer to individuals. But genera do not contain the principle of difference between the species. The world simply does not conform to the law. Inversion stands for the proposition that change, caprice and evolution are the law. GADAMER, supra note 159, at 45.

Ultimately, in the Phenomenology, the inverted world is what consciousness finds when it peers into the supposedly unknowable beyond. It finds a supersensible world which no different from the World of Appearance. Such a world is self-moving. In short the beyond of consciousness is consciousness, and so the inverted world stands for the transition to self-consciousness. Id. at 52-53.
vanished. Each world is unable to sustain itself without the other world. Hence, the World of Appearance is determined as Reflection into otherness. The World In and For Self is likewise reflected into its other. This is the enduring fact of both worlds, and to this extent the worlds are "exempt from otherness and change." (510) Each world becomes "essenceless content, self-opposed and self-inverting." (510)

Each world is Ground to the other. That is, the World of Appearance withdraws into the World In and For Self as to its Ground. But the Ground self-erases. The World In and For Self withdraws back into Appearance which is equally Ground. The two worlds engage in the modulation that typifies the dialectic relation.

Yet each side is as much a totality as it is a mere side. A totality repels itself from itself and reveals itself to be two totalities--reflected and immediate. The self-subsistence of each is "now so posited that each is only as essential relation to the other and has its self-subsistence in this unity of both." (510)

In the Law of Appearance, two contents were related to one another--that of Appearance and that of Law. At the level of Figure 37(b), the identity of the two sides is at first only an inner identity, Hegel says. These two sides do not yet have the relation within themselves. This relation is the content of each world, and this content is so far only implicitly determined. In Figure 39(c), however, the content of each world is determinately present in the center. Now the sides must expressly capture this idea within themselves.

"'World' expresses in general formless totality of manifoldness." (511) The diverse worlds, however, have fallen to their ground--Essential Relation. "There have arisen two

---

241 "[D]em Anderssein und Wechsel entnommene." [II:135]
243 "[N]unmehr so gesetzt, nur als wesentliche Beziehung auf die andere zu sein und ihre Selbständigkeit in dieser Einheit beider zu haben." [II:135]
244 "Welt drückt überhaupt die formlose Totalität der mannigfaltigkeit." [II:136]
totalities of the content in the world of Appearance." (511) Each one is only a self-erasing Form. The essential relation is the consummation of their unity of form.

III. The Essential Relation

The truth of Appearance is its Essential Relation with a supersensible world. The self-subsistent truth is that neither world can endure on its own without the other. Furthermore, Logic cannot determine which world is Appearance and which world is "in and for self." The predominance of one over the other is a "simply affirmative . . . immediacy." (512) That is to say, any such predominance is simply assigned by external reflection. Yet, since the Essential Relation represents worldly self-erasure, and since reflection is self-erasure, the relation is "a self-identical reflection." (512)

The Essential Relation is not yet the true third to Reflection and Existence. The true third will be Actuality, which arises at the end of this section. Nevertheless, the Essential Relation already represents a union of Reflection and Existence--erasure and endurance. Both of these "have withdrawn from their indifference into their essential unity, so that they have this alone for their subsistence." (512) What Actuality will require is the unfolding of the middle term within the extremes of the syllogism.

For now the sides of the relation are coincident with the totality of the relation itself. Each side is at once itself, the

---

245 “Es sind zwei Totalitäten des Inhalts in der Erscheinung entstanden.” [II:136]

246 See WESTPHAL, supra note 89, at 145 ("if [Hegel’s] holism is correct, if things what they are only through their contrast with and causal relations to other things, then there can be no epistemolgically opaque metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality").

247 “[Z]war die seiende unmittelbarkeit.” [II:136]

248 “[D]ie mit sich identische Reflexion.” [II:137]

249 “[D]iese sind aus ihrer Gleichgültigkeit in ihre wesentliche Einheit zurückgegangen, so daß sie nur diese zu ihrem Bestehen haben.” [II:137]

250 ROSEN, supra note 21, at 120 ("The coherence of the 'inside' and the 'outside' is then found within the shining of 'appearance.' This is how
Hegel tries to save the appearances.

251 Carlson, Reflection, supra note 5, at ---.

252 "[S]ie haben keine andere Bestimmung als diese ihrer negative Einheit." [II:137]

253 "[E]s die Einheit seiner selbst und seines Andern, also Ganzes ist . . . hat es selbständige Existenz." [II:137]

254 "[I]n sich selbst Gebrochenes." [II:137]

255 "[A]ls Moment der andern gesetzt . . . sie ist nicht ihre negative einheit." [II:138]
have the Relation of Inner and Outer. At that point, we will have arrived at the threshold of Actuality.

A. Relation of Whole and Parts

The Essential Relation is simultaneously immediate and reflected. Being a relation, it is a thing separate from its parts. As such, it is the whole. But any relation also depends on and hence posits and presupposes its parts. Hence, the Essential Relation "is as much this identity with its opposite as it is its own self-subsistence." (513-14)²⁵⁶ This is the proposition of the Understanding:

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

![Figure 40(a)](image)

Relation of Whole and Parts

At first, the Understanding perceives the immediacy of the unity of whole and parts. The unity [1, 2] is such that the whole immediately posits the parts, and vice versa. Hegel associates the whole with the World In and For Self from Figure 39(b). The World of Appearance is associated with the parts.

Earlier, Positive and Negative were said to have no self-subsistence on their own.²⁵⁷ But, by now, the sides of the relation are self-subsistent, "but in such a manner that each has the other reflected in it and at the same time only is as this identity of both." (514)²⁵⁸ Whole and parts are therefore simultaneously self-subsistent and not self-subsistent. Indeed, Hegel sounded this theme way back in the beginning, where he announced that one cannot think the whole and the parts at the same time. One can

²⁵⁷ This can be seen in Figure 27(b).
²⁵⁸ "[A]ber so, daß jede die andere in ihr scheinen hat und nur ist zugleich als diese Identität beider." [II:139]
think them in sequence only.\textsuperscript{259} This is the same as saying that each side of the unity subsists and does not subsist. The unity between them is simultaneously immanent and externally imposed. This is so on the law of sublation. It will be recalled that, in connection with Figure 39(c), Essential Relation was described as the unity between immanence and External Reflection.\textsuperscript{260}

Dialectical Reason seizes upon the negative unity inherent in the Relation of Whole and Parts.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

\textbf{Figure 40(b)}

\textbf{Negative Unity of Whole and Parts}

When the negative unity is emphasized, the whole and parts of Figure 14(a) are seen as diverse. From this perspective, the whole is mere substrate—not Ground to the parts. Also from this perspective, the whole is merely reflected self-subsistence—merely a moment, or a positedness.\textsuperscript{261}

In the dialectic moment, "the whole is the reflected unity which has an independent subsistence of its own." (514)\textsuperscript{262} But its subsistence is equally repelled from it. The whole is a merely negative unity of the parts. The whole is alienated from itself. It subsists only in the other. "\textit{The whole accordingly consists of parts.}" (514)\textsuperscript{263} It is not anything without them. It is "the whole relation and the self-subsistent totality; but for this very reason it is only a relative [concept]." (514)\textsuperscript{264} In other words, Whole and Parts are

\textsuperscript{259} See Carlson, \textit{Quality}, \textit{supra} note 5, at 467-68.

\textsuperscript{260} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 228-35.

\textsuperscript{261} A mysterious "2" precedes the second paragraph of this section. For a similar numbering mystery in Reflection, see Carlson, \textit{Reflection, supra} note 5, at ----.

\textsuperscript{262} "[S]o ist das Ganze die reflektierte Einheit, welche selbständiges Bestehen für sich hat." [II:139]

\textsuperscript{263} "Das Ganze besteht daher aus den Teilen." [II:140]

\textsuperscript{264} "[D]as ganze Verhältnis und die selbständige Totalität; aber gerade aus demselben Grunde ist es nur ein Relative." [II:140]
held together solely by External Reflection. Like the whole, the parts exist on their own account. At one moment, the relation of parts to whole is only an external moment, to which the parts are indifferent. Yet "they have this whole as their moment within themselves . . . for without a whole there are not parts." (515)265

Dialectical Reason, then, proves that, if the relation contains the self-subsistence of the sides, it also contains their sublatedness.266 Speculative Reason intervenes to describe the unity between the position of the Understanding and that of Dialectical Reason. The truth is that the Essential Relation is both self-subsistent and diverse (i.e., not self-subsistent). The relation is therefore conditioned--each cannot do without the other.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 40(c)
Conditioned Relation

As always, Diversity is untenable.267 The parts "collapse within themselves." (515)268 Their Existence (apart from the whole) is "reflectionless being." (515)269 The parts have self-subsistence only in the whole. The whole is self-subsistent without the parts. But the opposite is just as true. The parts are subsistent without the whole, and the whole has its self-subsistence in the parts.

The whole and parts therefore condition each other. But the relation is higher than that of Ground (i.e., conditioned) and Condition in Figure 33(a). There, Condition was "only the

265 "Sie haben . . . dies Ganze als ihr Moment an ihnen . . . ; ohne Ganzes gibt es keine Teile." [II:140]
266 Errol Harris calls this dialectic relation of whole and parts "a mechanical correlation--the whole is the mere togetherness of the parts, yet if and so far as it is divided it ceased to be a whole; and if the parts are amalgamated they cease to be parts." ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 185 (1983).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
268 "[F]allen die Teile . . . in sich." [II:140]
269 "[R]eflexionslose Sein. [II:140]
immediate and . . . only implicitly presupposed" (515) by Ground. The whole is admittedly Condition to the parts, but it contains more. Now it is “realized, that is, it is posited that condition is the essential self-subsistence of the conditioned in such a manner that it is presupposed by the latter.” (515) Both sides of the relation are posited as conditioning each other. Each is an immediate self-subsistence within itself. But its self-subsistence is equally mediated or posited by the other.

Each side of the relation therefore has its self-subsistence in the other—as well as its own self-subsistence). What is present is only a single identity in which both sides are mere moments (and more than mere moments; each side is also self-subsistent and indifferent).

When unity is before us, "the whole is equal to the parts and the parts to the whole. There is nothing in the whole which is not in the parts,” and vice versa. (515) The relation has "an inseparable identity and one self-subsistence only." (516) The two infuse each other and cannot be considered apart. Nonetheless, the two sides are distinguishable.

Whole as sum of parts. According to common sense, the whole is said to be equal to the sum of the parts. What is Hegel’s position on this ancient nugget of wisdom? Naturally, he thinks common sense is confused: "although the whole is equal to the parts it is not equal to them as parts.” (516) The whole is a reflected unity—the parts announce that they are not the whole. The whole is therefore a surplus that exceeds the parts (as shown by [7] in Figure 40(c). Properly analyzed, "the equality of the whole and the parts expresses only the tautology that the whole

---

270 “[N]ur das Unmittelbare und nur an sich vorausgesetzt.” [II:140]
271 “[R]ealiziert: nämlich es ist gesetzt, daß die Bedingung so die wesentliche Selbständigkeit des Bedingten ist, daß sie durch dieses vorausgesetzt wird.” [II:140]
272 “[I]st das Ganze den Teilen und die Teile dem Ganzen gleich. Es ist nicht im Ganzen, was nicht in den Teilen.” [II:141]
273 “[E]ine untrennbare Identität und nur Eine Selbständigkeit.” [II:141]
274 “Aber ferner ist das Ganze den Teilen gleich; allein nicht denselben als Teilen.” [II:141]
**Remark: Infinite Divisibility**

275 "[D]ie Gleichheit desselben und der Teile drückt nur die Tautologie aus, daß das Ganze als Ganzes nicht den Teilen, sondern dem Ganzen gleich ist." [II:141]

276 "[E]bensowohl die reflektierte als die seiende Unmittelbarkeit aufgehoben sind." [II:142]

277 Michael Inwood complains, "The concept of a whole containing parts is not very obviously applied by Hegel either to itself or to its immediate predecessor, appearance... [I]t is hard to find any regular, systematic relationship between the object-thoughts and the meta-thoughts." M.J. Inwood, Hegel 291 (1983). The idea of a concept applying itself to itself, however, belongs to Actuality--too advanced for Essential Relation. But it should be easy to see that the Relation of Whole and Parts is related to Appearance, which culminated in the insight that Existence and Appearance are in an Essential Relation. Existence is the Whole and Appearance is the Parts.
Hegel returns to the subject of Kant’s second antinomy, which states, alternatively, that (1) everything is divisible, and (2) there are indivisible atoms. Hegel’s critique was that this antinomy represented Discreteness and Continuity. Discreteness presupposes the atom. Continuity insists upon divisibility. The antinomy thus consisted of taking a one-sided, isolated view of these contradictory concepts.

Hegel now suggests that Continuity and Discreteness were incipiently whole and parts. Continuity implies the whole of the number line. Discreteness is the parts into which the number line is divided.

Accordingly, Kant’s second antinomy can be reinterpreted as being an attempt to isolate a whole (a divisible thing) and parts (indivisible things). "[T]he one moment in freeing itself from the other immediate introduces the other." (517)

Kant’s simplex, however, cannot be a whole, because then it would have parts and would not be simple. Furthermore, as a simple, it excludes any relation with the whole. Hence, the indivisible atom is not even a "part." We have before us a "part" only if we also have before us a "whole." These terms are strictly correlative. If, however, the simplex is not a part, it must be a whole. Yet, if a whole, it must have parts and not be a simplex--"so on to infinity." (518) This is a qualitative "spurious” infinity, as shown in Figure 7(b).

The true meaning of Kant’s antinomy is this:

because the whole is not the self-subsistent, therefore the part is self-subsistent; but because the part is self-subsistent only without the whole, it is self-subsistent not as part, but rather as whole. The infinitude of the progress which arises is the inability to bring together the two thoughts which the mediation contains, namely, that each of the two determinations through its self-subsistence and separation

---

278 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 30, at 30.
279 See Carlson, Quantity, supra note 5, at 2041-42.
280 "[D]as Eine Moment, darin, daß es sich vom andern befreit, unmittelbar das andere herbeiführt." [II:143]
281 "[S]o fort ins Unendliche." [II:143]
282 See Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 535.
The Essential Relation, in effect, stands for an advanced version of Spurious Infinity.\(^{284}\)

**B. Relation of Force and Its Expression**

The Understanding looks at Figure 40(c) and concedes that we no longer have before us a stable Relation of Whole and Parts. Even to refer to one side is to introduce the other side and so obliterate the first side. This inability to express oneself without self-obliteration is the Relation of Force and Its Expression.\(^{285}\) “In contradistinction to the thing, which has no link to its many properties, force makes sense only insofar as it manifests itself and poses what is inside itself outside itself.”\(^{286}\)

---

\(^{283}\) “Weil das Ganze nicht das Selbständige ist, ist der Teil das Selbständige; aber weil er nur ohne das Ganze selbständig ist, so ist der selbständig, nicht als Teil, sondern vielmehr als Ganzes. Die Unendlichkeit des Progresses, der entsteht, ist die Unfähigkeit, die beiden Gedanken zusammen zu bringen, welche die Vermittlung enthält, daß nämlich jede der beiden Bestimmungen durch ihre Selbständigkeit und Trennung von der andern in Unselbständigkeit und in die andre übergeht.” [II:144]

\(^{284}\) TAYLOR, *supra* note 21, at 277 (“the contradictions . . . that we see by looking at part and whole show that it is in movement, that it is constantly going over from unity to multiplicity and back again”).

\(^{285}\) Michael Inwood suggests that Force and its Expression arbitrarily succeeds Whole and Parts. INWOOD, *supra* note 273, at 293. This claim is part and parcel to Inwood’s general claim that Hegel’s Logic is no logic but a string of thoughts connected contingently by Hegel’s own external reflection.

In fact, it is possible to comprehend the transition. Whole and Parts started out as a relation with self-subsistent sides. Speculative Reason, however, concluded that the relation is both self-subsistent and self-erasing. In proposing Force and its Expression, the Understanding surmises that it is impossible for one or the other side to be expressed without the erasing the other side. If Whole and Parts stood for a complacent relation, Force and its Expression stands for the dialectical impossibility of it.

\(^{286}\) HYPPOLITE, *GENESIS*, *supra* note 93, at 120; see also WESTPHAL, *supra* note 89, at 148 (“the gist of his view is that forces are exhausted by their
manifestations"). In the Phenomenology, Hegel remarks that Force "loses the determinateness given to it, for [Force] passes over--or rather has already passed over--to the other." PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 55, at ¶ 84. This always-past nature of Force echoes the feature of Pure Being in Hegel's first chapter, which "does not pass over but has passed over--into nothing." (82-83) It has already been noted that, in the Phenomenology, Force precedes Appearance. The vanity of the play of forces convinces perceptive consciousness that there must be a vanishing appearance (the forces) and a supersensible world beyond it that does not vanish. See chapter 13.

In his chapter on Quantum, Hegel compares Force to Intensive Magnitude and Expression to Extensive Magnitude. (222) His point there is simply to say that Intensive and Extensive Magnitude depend on each other in the same essential way that Force and Expression do.

287 On the gender of thinking and being, see SCHROEDER, supra note 63, at ---*

288 TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 277. For this reason, Hegel warns against the proposition that God is a Force. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 8, § 136 Remark.

On the verge of introducing self-consciousness, Hegel, I think, sounds a Lacanian theme avant la lettre. The Lacanians emphasize that one cannot think and "be" at the same time. Thinking is active/masculine. Being is passive/feminine. The minute thinking expresses itself, it passes over into being. At that moment thinking is obliterated in favor of being. Yet the unified self is nothing unless it expresses itself. Thinking, therefore, is negating activity. The thinking thing erases its being as it expresses itself. Its being is transported into expression. Expression of self is the only evidence that selfhood ever existed. For this reason, writers must write. Gene Kelly had to dance. Yet Force "proceeds blindly, and not as purpose does, toward a rational end."288

This theme is implicated in the following three subsections relating Force and its Expression. When the

---*

Figure 41(a)
The Relation of Force and Its Expression

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]
Understanding comprehended the Relation of Whole and Parts, the whole was "a dead, mechanical aggregate." (518)\textsuperscript{289} The unity of whole and parts was an external relation. The new Relation of Force and Its Expression, however, "is the higher return-into-self in which . . . the relation of the self-subsistent otherness ceases to be external." (518)\textsuperscript{290}

In Figure 41(a), immediate and reflected self-subsistence are sublated. In Figure 40(a), they were separate and independent. Now we have pure self-erasure. Force (\textit{i.e.}, thinking)\textsuperscript{291} erases itself instantly and passes over to Expression. The Expression is "only as borne and posited by force." (519)\textsuperscript{292} Each side of the relation is "not only a becoming and vanishing, but is a negative relation-to-self." (519)\textsuperscript{293} We have before us a vigorous True Infinite that becomes other and stays what it is. But now we are to view Force, "an internal excitation of formal moments,"\textsuperscript{294} as more negative than ever. Now Force is \textit{solicited} by its other, and its other is where Force begins.

\textbf{(a) The Conditionedness of Force}

Force, Hegel says, has a complex nature. It is immediate, it is related to another (\textit{i.e.}, attributed to some thing), and it is also the negative unity of its own immediacy and its other. This accords with the notion that each side of the syllogism is by now itself, its other and the whole of the unity between itself and other. "Each of those three movements is a way of relating to

\textsuperscript{289} "[D]as tote, mechanische Agregat." [II:144]
\textsuperscript{290} "[H]öhere Rückkehr in sich, worin die . . . Beziehung des selbständigen Andersseins . . . aufhört . . . Äußerliches." [II:144]
\textsuperscript{291} Force is not to be taken as physical force in the Newtonian sense. "Force concretizes the ‘potency’ of being over and against being-there . . . and realizes the self-externalizing, self-manifesting motility in the dimension of existing beings which have emerged from essence.” MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, supra note 13, at 92.
\textsuperscript{292} "[N]ur ist, als von derselben getrafen und gesetzt." [II:144]
\textsuperscript{293} "[N]ur ein Werden und Verschwinden, sondern es ist negative Beziehung auf sich." [II:144]
\textsuperscript{294} ROSEN, supra note 21, at 143.
Hegel considers Force in its immediacy. For common sense addicted to self-identity, Force is something merely attributed to a thing. Force and thing must therefore be distinguished.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 41(b)**

**The Conditionedness of Force**

In Figure 41(b), Force is a reflected unity. It belongs to the Thing. But Force is not a form of the Thing, to which the Thing must attend. The thing is quite indifferent to Force. It contains no ground for having a Force. Force is external to the Thing according to common sense, which is shown in the question: How does a thing come to have force?

Although the Thing is supposed to be indifferent to the Force that is externally supplied to it, Hegel nevertheless says that Force is "a quiescent determinateness of the thing." That is to say, Force does not express itself but speaks through the Thing. Just as the Thing was once said to be made up of

---


296 In Shakespearan terms;

And as the thing that's heavy in itself,
Upon enforcement flies with greatest speed,
So did our men, heavy in Hotspur's loss,
Lend to this weight such lightness with their fear
That arrows fled not swifter toward their aim
Than did our soldiers, aiming at their safety,
Fly from the field.

William Shakespeare, Henry IV Pt. 2 Act 1 Scene 1.

297 "[E]ine ruhige Bestimmtheit des Dings." [II:145]

298 Renewing the Lacanian theme, the subject is said to be the "thing that thinks." ŒDEK, TARRYING, supra note 90, at 61.
diverse Matters,\textsuperscript{299} so Force is (by common sense) "designated as matter, and instead of magnetic, electrical, and other forces, magnetic, electrical, and other matters are assumed." (519)\textsuperscript{300} But Force is nevertheless an existent, which means that it has an affirmative presence—an appearance. As an existent, it has both an affirmative immediacy and a reflected immediacy. And from this perspective, Force has being-in-and-for-self. The Thing in which Force is supposed to reside no longer has any meaning. Force is therefore not merely a "matter" to the Thing. The Thing, it will be recalled, melded with its Matters and passed over to Appearance.\textsuperscript{301} Force has more "staying power" than the Matters of a Thing.

In considering the dialectical moment of Conditionedness of Force, we have, on the one hand, the Thing indifferent to Force. We have, on the other hand, Force—equally a Thing—which is externally applied to the \textit{passive} Thing. We cannot think of Force and the forced Thing simultaneously. One of these concepts self-erases when the other is asserted. Force is supposed to be active, but when the Thing is front and center, Force has erased itself and is passive. Once again, Dialectical Reason cannot tell which side is active Force and which side is passive Thing. Force is therefore just as much an existent Thing as the presupposed Thing was.\textsuperscript{302} Force is "a relation in which each side is the same as the other." (520)\textsuperscript{303} A Force always faces another Force.

At first the Forces are simply different and hence indifferent. Their unity is only inner. But each Force is conditioned; it requires the other to be what it is. Thus Force is at first an act of presupposition, "a merely negatively self-relating

\textsuperscript{299} See Figure 36(b).
\textsuperscript{300} "Als Materie bezeichnet und statt magnetischer, elektrischer usf. Kraft ein magnetischer, elektrischer usf. Materie angenommen."[II:145]
\textsuperscript{301} See Figure 37(c).
\textsuperscript{302} GADAMER, \textit{supra} note 159, at 38 ("eliciting and being elicited are the same process").
\textsuperscript{303} "Verhältnis, in welchem jede Seite dasselbe ist als die andere." [II:146]
act; this other force still lies beyond its positing activity." (521)\textsuperscript{304} It is beyond return-into-self.

Force, in this position, is merely diverse. As such, it erases itself and gives way to the unity between the two sides, which is a shared self-erasing activity.

(b) The Solicitation of Force

Force posits, and so is conditioned by, another Force.\textsuperscript{305} In other words, Force posits and is posited by another. As a mere presupposition (and a reciprocal one at that), Force, if taken as an immediacy, erases itself. It cannot sustain itself without the aid of the other Force. Each Force shares this self-erasure as its truth.

When Force sublates itself, its being withdraws into [7], which, by this late stage, is as much inside itself [4, 5, 6] as outside itself.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 41(c)

Self-Externalization of Force
(Expression)

The truth of any Force is its self-externalization. But since diverse Force erases itself, and since Force is externality itself, externality is sublated when Force is sublated. The externality present in Force is "its own presupposing activity." (521)\textsuperscript{306}

Force [4, 5, 6] self-erases and withdraws into [7]. This means that the external as such is self-sublating. The outside is

\textsuperscript{304} "[N]ur negativ auf sich beziehendes Tun; diese andere Kraft liegt noch jesneits ihrer setzenden Tätigkeit." [II:]

\textsuperscript{305} This is at the very center of Hegel's theory of recognition, especially as formulated in the opening chapter of the Philosophy of Right. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 34 Addition (Allen W. Wood trans. 1993); see generally David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things With Hegel, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000).

\textsuperscript{306} "[I]hre eigene voraussetzende Tätigkeit." [II:147]
now in. Force--externality itself--is saying, "I am not the Thing," thereby proving it is the Thing. In this activity, Force/externality expels itself from itself and is therefore "that which in itself is null." (521)\textsuperscript{307}


Impulse and Expression. Hegel says that, when a Force conditions its other, the other experiences it as impulse. In the face of impulse, the thing (which is also conditioned Force) pretends to be passive. By way of a psychological example, a person sometimes says, "The devil made me do it." The devil (impulse) absorbs the blame for the act of the subject. But impulse actually belongs to the supposedly passive Force. The passive Force is actually active Force. As active, the impulsive Force actually solicits the devil.\textsuperscript{308}

But this is not to say there is no devil. It is only to say that the devil solicits the subject's act if the subject is open to it, consistent with the comic book assumption that a hypnotist can never induce an act from the hypnotized subject unless she is open to it.

Under impulse, Force repels itself from itself. It projects the impulse "out there." The devil is made real, but the devil is in fact the soliciting Force's own self. This other Force is thus the Expression of soliciting Force.

When Force expresses itself, it makes itself external. And in making itself external, Force negates externality. So, whether we start from supposedly passive Force or its impulse, we have the same unity in Expression.

Expression has several sides to it. In expressing itself, Force at first sublates itself. But in reality, Force is two Forces--one soliciting, the other solicited. Which one is it really? It is impossible to say. Only an outside external reflection can tell. The truth of the two Forces is therefore their unity in Expression. The Forces are therefore "essentially mediated." (522)\textsuperscript{309}

\textsuperscript{307} "[A]n sich Nichtiges." [II:147]

\textsuperscript{308} This is "weakness," one of the three Kantian evils. (The other two are wickedness and impurity.) Each of these evils consists of the subject fooling herself about her true motives. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000).

\textsuperscript{309} "[W]esentlich vermittelt." [II:148]
Expression is how Force gives itself "a determinate being-for-other." (523)<sup>310</sup>

Many psychological implications are present in this discussion. For instance, the comments on Force and its Expression relate to what Charles Taylor calls "expressivism."<sup>311</sup> Taylor begins his treatise on Hegel with a description of an intuition in the early nineteenth century which doubted that a self-identical personality precedes its expressions. Rather, it was intuited that a person is nothing until she expresses herself. We don't know what we think until we hear ourselves speaking about our thoughts. Expression is therefore a surprise to the speaker, who discovers what she thinks only as she begins to express herself. Everyone has had the sensation that, as one speaks, one changes her mind and is indeed transformed by the very act of speaking.

The themes sounded here also relate to the Lacanian concept of agency. A person acts. The act is Expression. The actor does not exist apart from the act. The very personhood of the actor is obliterated in the act. The actor cannot do and be at the same time. The reasons a person acts are only discovered epiphenomenally, and they constitute a self-serving narrative that ascribes to the actor a pre-existing rationality that accounts for the act. In truth, our own motivations are opaque to us. We really don't know why we do the things we do. This inability to understand our own acts is precisely what makes us spontaneous and free (i.e., not "caused").<sup>312</sup>

(c) The Infinity of Force

In this short section, Hegel makes some final observations about Figure 41(c), which asserts that the truth of Force is in its Expression.

Force is finite when conceived in its moment of

<sup>310</sup> "[E]in Dasein-für-Anderes." [II:149]
<sup>311</sup> TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 13-15 & n.1.
<sup>312</sup> See David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic Dimension of Law, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2287 (2003).
immediacy, Hegel says. From this perspective, its presupposing (external impulse) and its self-relation are distinct. Force is both passive and active. When passive, the other Force (impulse) is in charge. When active, the other Force is passive.

The two Forces, however, are one. This active unity is Expression itself. In Expression, externality is sublated. There is no longer any distinction between the inner and outer truth of the Force. "Therefore what Force in truth expresses is that its relation to other is relation to itself, that its passivity consists in its very activity." (523)³¹³ The impulse by which it is solicited into activity is its own soliciting. "In other words, what force expresses is this, that its externality is identical with its inwardness." (523)³¹⁴

C. The Relation of Outer and Inner

According to the Understanding, "Force in its expression is this, that the determining which presupposes and the determining which returns into itself are one and the same." (525)³¹⁵ That is, the Understanding now interprets Expression of Force as an immediate unity of Outer and Inner.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

Figure 42(a)
Outer and Inner

In this unity, Outer and Inner each have a self-subsistence of their own. This is what differentiates Figure 42(a) from Figures 40(a) and 41(a). In Figure 40(a), Whole and Parts represented a

³¹³ "Was also die Kraft in Wahrheit äußert, ist dies, daß ihre Beziehung auf anderes ihre Beziehung auf sich selbst ist, daß ihre Passivität in ihrer Aktivität selbst besteht." [II:150]
³¹⁴ "[O]der die Kraft äußert dies, daß ihre Äußerlichkeit identisch ist mit ihrer Innerlichkeit." [II:150]
³¹⁵ "Die Kraft ist in ihrer Äußerung dies, daß das voraussetzende und das in sich zurückkehrende Bestimmen eines und dasselbe ist." [II:151]
complacent relation with self-subsistent sides. In Figure 41(a), Force and its Expression, the relation was a turbulent either-or relation. Now there is a self-subsistent unity between Outer and Inner. In short, we have moved from an immediate proposition through a dialectical proposition to a notional proposition.

But, says Dialectical Reason, Outer and Inner equally "stand in essential relation." (524) When the negative unity between Outer and Inner is emphasized, Outer and Inner cannot self-subsist on their own. Their self-subsistence is in the Essential Relation. Compared to this unity, Outer and Inner stand aside and are diverse from their own being. Self-subsistence is their indifferent substrate. Any distinction between Outer and Inner is empty and transparent. Hence, we have

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 42(b)**

**Self-Subsistence of Outer and Inner in Essential Relation**

Being diverse (compared to self-subsistence), Outer and Inner sublate themselves and remove their being to this unity only—a unity in Expression, which, at this point, may be called the Actual.

[All illustrations can be found at the end of this document.]

**Figure 42(c)**

**Actuality**

We have now reached the end of Existence and the beginning of the last third of the Doctrine of Essence. Here, Outer and Inner cannot endure independently. Their self-subsistence is outside themselves in a relation. Yet the relation cannot endure without its constituent parts. Neither extreme endures. Each side exists

---

316 "[I]m wesentlichen Verhältnisse stehen." [II:150]
only in a totality which is Actual.

Before us now is one single actual fact. This fact is distinct from its form determinations. Form (which is in the business of self-erasing) is shed by and hence is external to the fact. Yet the fact is itself already established as externality itself. This means that external form is really internal to the fact—"an inner that is distinct from its externality." (524) In the fact, Outer and Inner "are present as an interpenetrating identity, as a substrate pregnant with content." (524)

What something is, therefore, it is wholly in its externality; its externality is its totality and equally is its unity reflected into itself. Its Appearance is not only reflection-into-an-other but reflection-into-self, and its externality is, therefore, the expression or utterance . . . of what it is in itself; and since its content and form are thus utterly identical, it is, in and for itself, nothing but this, to express or manifest itself. (528)

Essence, then, is nothing but expression. The dialectic of Inner and Outer "effectively puts an end to the duality posed in terms of elements and their link, for now the elements only exist as expression of the linkage." Here Hegel finally ties together themes that have hovered in and around the discussion from the beginning. For Hegel, there is no mysterious beyond. Everything is appearance. The job of Essence is precisely to appear--which it has now done. Essence (Reflection) is in total unity with Appearance, and the result is that Essence is actualized. What was in itself has become for-itself. Essence is nothing but this drive to express itself in the outer world.

317 "[E]in Inneres, das von ihrer Äußerlichkeit verschieden ist." [II:151]
318 "[I]n der Sache sind sie als sich durchdringende Identität, als inhaltsvolle Grundlage." [II:151]
319 "Was Etwas ist, das ist es daher ganz in seiner Äußerlichkeit; seine Äußerlichkeit ist seine Totalität, sie ist ebensosehr seine in sich reflektierte Einheit. Seine Erscheinung ist nicht nur die Reflexion in anderes, sondern in sich, und seine Äußerlichkeit daher die Äußerung dessen, was es an sich ist; und indem so sein Inhalt und seine Form schlechthin idetnisch sind, so ist es nicht an und für sich als dies, sich zu äußern." [II:155]
320 TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 278.
Inner and Outer, Hegel emphasizes, were implicitly actual. If Inner and Outer were form-determinations, they were equally more than mere form. Each was already the other. As Form, each erased itself and revealed itself to be itself, its other, and the unity of itself and other. What we get at the level of Outer and Inner is "not the real totality of the whole, but the totality or the fact itself only in the determinateness of form." When Essence is said to be merely inner, a defect is implied. Non-defective Essence must have a perfect unity with the Outer. Each must immediately be its opposite and each must expressly be the unity between the two. Taken at their own level, Outer and Inner still lack "this identical substrate that contains them both." 

Actuality, in contrast, constitutes the totality of the fact. When actualized:

   each of the differences of form, the inner and outer, is posited within itself as the totality of itself and its other; the inner, as simple identity reflected into itself, is the immediate and accordingly is as much being and externality as essence; and the outer, as manifold, determinate being is only an outer, that is, is posited as unessential and as withdrawn into its ground, hence as an inner. This transition of each into the other is their immediate identity as substrate; but it is also their mediated identity; for it is precisely through its other that each is what it is in itself, the totality of the relation.

---

321 Hegel comments that the Inner is the consummation of Essence "with respect to form." (525) ("der Form nach" [II:152])
322 "[N]icht die reale Totalität des Ganzen, sondern die Totalität oder die Sache selbst nur in der Bestimmtheit der Form." [II:152]
323 Charles Taylor sounds a false note when he remarks, "The more that the essence is hidden (inner), the more reality is purely externally related (outer)." TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 278. There can be no question of "more or less" here. Inner and Outer are in perfect unity here. The "inner" truth of Essence is nothing but outward Expression.
324 “[D]ieser beide enthaltenden identischen Grundlage.” [II:152]
325 “[D]iese negative Einheit, die sie zusammenknüpft, ist der einfache, inhaltlose Punkt.” [II:152]
Remark: Immediate Identity of Inner and Outer

"The movement of essence is in general the becoming of the Notion," Hegel writes. (526) The hallmark of the Notion is that any given member of the syllogism, whether it be one of the extremes or the middle term, is a unity of itself, other and unity of self and other. As Hegel will put it later, "the different moments of the Notion are themselves the whole Notion, universal in their determinateness and identical with their negation. This, now, is the very Notion of the Notion." (596)

Hegel states, "It is very important to notice that the unmediated identity of form is posited here without the movement of the fact itself, a movement pregnant with content." (526) Outer and Inner are not quite the Notion. Inner becomes Outer, but "there is also lacking that substrate which above was..." (528)
called the fact." (526) The thing is itself, its other, but not yet the express unity of itself and other. Or, as Marcuse put it:

There remains something that is not absorbed into and fully displayed by immediate existence, something that is merely inward, despite the fact that or precisely because of the fact that it is one that exteriorizes itself. So long as something is still exteriorized, there remains something else which has not yet exteriorized itself and which is only at the interior. And so long as something is merely at the interior, actual being has not been attained.

Notice that the Actual fact is movement. In Actuality, the extremes of the syllogism turn into each other instantaneously. Hegel compares this movement to the movement between Pure Being and Pure Nothing in Hegel's first chapter. There, Pure Being could not be kept apart from Pure Nothing. Here, something similar exists.

To be sure, in the beginning, Being "has not yet opposed and developed its moments." (526) At first it had not inwardized its radical other. Then (in Reflection) it had "not yet externalized . . . and brought forth itself out of inwardness by its activity. It is therefore only an inner as determinateness against the outer, and only the outer as determinateness against the inner." (526) In short, Essence was at first merely in-itself but not for-itself.

That the in-itself must become for-itself makes itself apparent in all natural, scientific and spiritual development generally and it is essential to recognize that because something is at first only inner or also in its Notion, the first stage is for that very reason only its immediate,

---

331 "[F]ehlt auch diejenige Grundlage, welche vorhin die Sache genannt wurde." [II:153]
332 MARCUSE, ONTOLOGY, supra note 13, at 91.
333 "[D]ie Momente noch nicht entgegengesetzt und entwickelt." [II:153]
334 "[S]eine Tätigkeit noch nicht entäußert und hervorgebracht; es ist daher nur das Innere als Bestimmtheit gegen das Äußere und nur das Äußere als Bestimmtheit gegen das Innere." [II:153]
passive existence. (526)

Science, Hegel implies, is rendering express and outward what is merely inward. Truth exists when Outer and Inner exactly coincide.

So long as Essence remains inward, a thing seems like a aggregate of arbitrarily combined features with no inner unity. Hegel gives public instruction as an example of a jumble with no apparent inner unity.336 Equally, if Essence is inward, a thing "is something passive, a prey to otherness." (527)337 The seed of a plant or a child is inwardly a plant or a man, but these may never grow into what they ought to become. For Hegel, there is no truck with what might have been. Logic is timeless and therefore what ought to be will be actual. And what is ultimately actual is that all "Things" must fade away.

Conclusion

Does God exist? For Hegel, this is to ask whether God may be taken as an immediacy--separate and different from other things. God must not be taken immediately. If it is, God is not God. Rather, God is other to itself--mere nature.338 Nature is therefore "only the inner God, not God actual as spirit, and therefore not truly God." (527)339

Existence is not adequate to God. Hegel's ontological proof of God must await a more advanced mode of being--that of the Notion, where God is Itself, Its other, and the unity of Itself...

335 "In aller natürlichen, wissenschaftlichen und geistigen Entwicklung überhaupt bietet sich dies dar, und es ist wesentlich dies zu erkennen, daß das Erste, indem Etwas nur erst innerlich oder auch in Seinem Begriffe ist, eben darum nur sein unmittelbares, passive Dasein ist." [II:153]

336 Hegel was the director of a public gymnasium (or high school) at the time he wrote these words. TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (2000)

337 "[E]in Passives, dem Anderssein Presigegebenes." [II:154]

338 On Hegel's derivation of nature, see Carlson, Quality, supra note 5, at 503-06.

339 "[N]ur der innere, nicht als Geist wirkliche und damit nicht der wahrhafte Gott." [II:154]
and other. In the sexist terms of Christian theology, God is father (Itself), the son (Its other), and holy spirit (unity of Itself and other.

Nevertheless, Hegel’s analysis of Existence does important work in anticipation of the ultimate *notional* proof. Existence already invokes a *relationship* between Appearance and Essence (or Reflection, which stands for 'I am not that’). For this reason, Essence is generally dia-lectical. What is revealed across this middle section of Hegel’s doctrine of Essence is that Essence and Appearance require each other. Essence must appear, which ironically means that any attempt to positivize Essence is itself an Appearance which must disappear. The Essential Relation between Existence and Appearance requires that the two sides of the relation must each disappear in favor of Actuality. Things are Actual only when they give into fate and disappear.

The important work this does in the ontological proof of God is that any adduced Ground of God--that which proves or disproves God--is a Thing that must self-erase. What is left standing is God itself, an active *subjective* force proves what it is by self-sacrifice. God must ground Itself, if God is to have the required omnipotence and omnipresence.
Figure 16 (a)  
Quantitative Something

Figure 16 (b)  
Quantitative Infinite Progress

Figure 16 (c)  
Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small

Figure 17 (a)  
Direct Ratio

Figure 17 (b)  
Inverse Ratio

Figure 17 (c)  
Ratio of Powers

Figure 18 (a)  
Immediate Measure

Figure 18 (b)  
Mediated Immediate Measure

Figure 18 (c)  
Specifying Measure
Figure 37(a)  
Dissolution of the Thing

Figure 37(b)  
Puncticity

Figure 37(c)  
Appearance

Figure 38(a)  
The Law of Appearance

Figure 38(b)  
Exclusivity of Law and Appearance

Figure 38(c)  
The Law of Law and Appearance

Figure 39(a)  
World of Appearance

Figure 39(b)  
World of Appearance and World In and For Self

Figure 39(c)  
Essential Relation
Figure 40(a)  
Relation of Whole and Parts

Figure 40(b)  
Negative Unity of Whole and Parts

Figure 40(c)  
Conditioned Relation

Figure 41(a)  
The Relation of Force and Its Expression

Figure 41(b)  
The Conditionedness of Force

Figure 41(c)  
Self-Externalization of Force (Expression)

Figure 42(a)  
Outer and Inner

Figure 42(b)  
Self-Subsistence of Outer and Inner in Essential Relation

Figure 42(c)  
Actuality