

Cardozo Law School
Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies

April 2001

Working Paper Series No. 42

Hegel's Theory of Quantity

David Gray Carlson

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=xxxxx

Hegel's Theory of Quantity

by David Gray Carlson
Professor of Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003
212-790-0210
dcarlson@ymail.yu.edu

Work in Progress
March 5, 2001

Introduction

Can you define what quantity or magnitude is? Undoubtedly you can provide *examples* of quantities, but what is quantity as such? Almost universally, the definition is assumed to be self-evident and, therefore, far from evident. Hegel himself complains that, in common mathematical discourse, "[a] magnitude is usually defined as that which can be increased or diminished." (186) This, Hegel finds, is a lousy definition. What does "increase" mean? It means "make the magnitude more." What does "diminished" mean? It means "make the magnitude less." Hence, covertly the word defined ("magnitude") appears in the definition. Nothing is learned from such a definition, except that magnitude is magnitude.

Hegel will provide a massively detailed definition, which will be important for philosophy and jurisprudence in many ways. Lawyers are constantly involved in "balancing" tests, in which "factors" or "policies" are "weighed" against each other. Within the law schools, the law-and-economics movement thinks that preferences can be aggregated. Such assumptions presuppose the possibility of a quantitative relation between diverse qualities. What is the nature of the quantitative relation on which these discourses depend? These are issues for which Hegel will provide concrete answers.

This article--second in a series of nine--explicates Hegel's theory of Quantity from his the *Science of Logic*.¹ The article continues a series of pictographic conventions developed in the earlier essay.² According to this conventional system, logic is divided into three distinct moves, which repeat themselves over and over.

First, there is the move of the Understanding. The Understanding tries to come to grips with all the previous steps of the Logic that have preceded. It proposes a unified definition of its own logical history. At first, it seized upon what seemed *immediately* true about its past. This was portrayed, for example, in Figure 2(a), in which the Understanding interpreted the concept of Becoming as Determinate Being.³

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

¹ All numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers from GEORG W.F. HEGEL, *HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC* (A.V. Miller trans. 1969). I have also omitted ellipses at the end of any quoted phrase. An ellipsis signals that a sentence does not end with the quoted words. Hegel's sentences, however, never end, and so ellipses convey no useful information.

² David Gray Carlson, *Hegel's Theory of Quality*, 22 *CARDOZO L. REV.* 425 (2000).

³ In general, capitalized terms indicate that the term has won a place in the official steps of the Logic. For example, in Figure 2(a), Becoming, Pure Being, Pure Nothing, and Determinate Being are all official steps. In contrast, "being-within-self" or "concrete" are common terms for Hegel, but they do not appear in a "Figure."

Figure 2(a)
The Move to Determinate Being⁴

In the above drawing, the Understanding pulls a prior "middle term" over to the left side of the page. The left side of the page stands for "being." The right side of the page stands for "nothing."

Notice that the Understanding has distorted [7]. It has rounded it out and, in the course of doing so, has ignored the segments labeled [4, 5, 6]. The Understanding therefore suppresses the truth of the prior middle term. It has privileged immediacy over mediation.

Dialectical Reason, however, brings history to the fore. Dialectical Reason proves that the Understanding suppressed mediation, shown as [4, 5, 6]. It therefore reads double; it is "dia-lectical." Hence, we have:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 2(b)
Quality and Negation

In Figure 2(b), Dialectical Reason speaks from the position of [2]. It is the concept's own "immanent" voice. In Freudian terms, it is the unconscious voice of the Understanding made manifest. In effect, [2] stands for the suppressed history of Determinate Being.

When Dialectical Reason [2] speaks, it differentiates itself from the Understanding [1]. Being different, it implies a radical otherness from the Understanding. [2] therefore generates [3]. Positioned on the right side of the page, [3] is on the side of nothingness. It is Negation--radically other to Quality.

By emphasizing difference, Dialectical Reason replicates the error of the Understanding. Just as [1] was denounced as falsely "immediate," [3] is likewise just as immediate and diverse as [1] was. Suddenly, we cannot distinguish between the Understanding and Dialectical Reason. Negation is just as determinate a being as Determinate Being was. The mind passes back between the thought of Quality and the Negation of Quality.

Speculative Reason names the movement between the two extremes of the syllogism. Speculative Reason sees that the only thing that Quality and Negation have in common is ceaseless *movement*. [1] is really [1, 2]. [3] is really [2, 3]. The movement between [1] and [3] depends on [2]. The middle term seizes upon [2] as the *identity* between Determinate Being and the Negation of Determinate Being.

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

⁴ A "Figure" denotes an official step in the *Science of Logic*. The "(a)" in Figure 2(a) denotes a drawing of the Understanding. The "(b)" in Figure 2(b) will denote the position of Dialectical Reason. The "(c)" in Figure 2(c) will denote the conciliatory movement of Speculative Reason.

Figure 2(c) Something

Speculative Reason sees that [2, 4] mediates [5] and [6]. [4, 5, 6] should be viewed as active. The name Speculative Reason gives to [4]--as the movement between [5] and [6]--is itself a static thought. This stasis is represented by [7], which is precisely in the middle of the page. Static [7] is the speculative return on the investment in analyzing Dialectical Reason. As static, [7] is distinguishable from active [4, 5, 6]. The active contradiction is therefore "solved"--for a moment. But the Understanding will stir up new contradictions in Figure 3(a), which Dialectical Reason will critique in Figure 3(b). Speculative Reason again comes to the rescue to solve the new contradiction.

In this process, the Understanding becomes less stupid. At first it seized upon [7] as representing Determinate Being, only to be humbled by Dialectical Reason. It soon learned that Being is just as much Negation--an activity--as it is static Being. It begins to seize upon the activity of Negation as the heart and soul of the universe. Hence, we have drawings such as

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 3(a) Something/Other

Starting in Figure 3(a), negativity has smuggled itself over into the left side of the page--the realm of Being.

Ever perverse, Dialectical Reason now begins to accuse the Understanding of privileging Negation over Being--quite the opposite of its prior accusation. Now "being" has defected over to the *right* side of the page--the realm of nothing. In the course of the analysis, Speculative Reason begins to notice that the Understanding is seizing upon a *finite* entity instead of the whole. The very nature of finite entities is that they must cease-to-be--negative Becoming. "[T]he hour of their birth is the hour of their death," Hegel memorably writes. (129) Hegel strongly argues that a finite entity *ought* to cease-to-be. That is its destiny. The actualization of this destiny is the passage from "reality"--which for Hegel is super-abstract--to ideality. Being forces itself into the world of thought by erasing itself. But, being a True Infinite the erased self *preserves* itself. This is the all-important concept of sublation. According to the law of sublation, all prior steps of the Logic are preserved in the current step, and all future steps are likewise implied in the current step.⁵

If the Finite terminates itself and passes over into non-being, is not non-being just as Finite as the original Finite? Must not this "finite" Infinite likewise pass over into *its* other? This is the Spurious Infinite, another senseless modulation between two diverse Finities.

A very key moment is Figure 7(c), when Speculative Reason plucks

⁵ On sublation, see Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 452-54.

from the nettle of this ceaseless turmoil the flower of True Infinity.

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 7(c)
True Infinity

The True Infinite includes itself *and* its other. The True Infinite manages to *become other while remaining itself*. Thus, the True Infinite becomes truly what destiny demands--nothing. The True Infinite chases from itself *all* its Being. This brings us to the door of Quantity. In effect, Quantity is a True Infinite Being with all its Being outside of itself. Whorish Quantity is whatever external reflection *wants* it to be. But it has the barest core of integrity nevertheless.

After Figure 7(c), the Understanding learns that it must consider the *unity* between passive Being and active Negation. Accordingly, Figure 8(a) looks like this:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 8(a)
Being-for-self

In Figure 8(a), the Understanding grasps the whole--the positive *and* the negative, the Finite *and* the True Infinite.

In the current study, all of the steps of the Understanding will bear the shape of Figure 8(a). The Understanding knows that it is a True Infinite. It exceeds its limits and renders itself "other" even while it remains what it is. Nevertheless, within its tenuous grasp of the totality, the Understanding may emphasize some aspect of the whole. Therefore, to jump ahead, Figure 11(a) will look like this:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 11(a)
Continuity

In this drawing, the Understanding sees the middle term in its entirety. It nevertheless slightly emphasizes [4, 5] to give character to its proposition. It does not deny the very validity of [7] or [6] as it did early in the Logic. The intent of portraying this emphasis is that it explains a certain feature of Continuity--the Understanding's proposition about Quantity.

I hope this will serve as an adequate summary of what has proceeded. Needless to say, a reading of the Quality chapters will vastly enrich a reading of the Quantity chapters.

In the discussion to follow, Hegel first investigates Pure Quantity. This is Quantity too primitive for the complex notion of Number or Quantum. In Pure Quantity, the concept finds out that it is *nothing*. Its Being has been alienated. The concept begins to retrieve its Being throughout Quantum. Finally in Quantitative Relation or

Ratio, Quantity discovers it has *some* independence from outside manipulation. At this point, it is Measure.

I. From Quantity to Quantum

Upon reaching the realm of Quantity, a word of comfort is in order. Many readers will suffer from "math anxiety." Such readers will have nothing to fear from Hegel. With the exception of some notorious (and quite extraneous) remarks on calculus, nothing in Hegel's Quantity chapters extends beyond ordinary algebra or calculus of the most rudimentary sort, knowledge of which I will *not* presuppose. Hegel was no great believer in math⁶--though his education in it was formidable.⁷ In fact, he had great contempt for its spiritual worth, as we have already seen.⁸ Nevertheless, Quantity has an important place in the *Science of Logic*. In this first chapter on Quantity (and fourth in the Logic),⁹ we will find that Hegel equates Pure Quantity with time, space and the ego--deeply metaphysical ideas.

For Hegel, Quality precedes Quantity. "[H]itherto," Hegel complains, "the determination of *quantity* has been made to precede *quality* . . . for no given reason." (79) Thus, Kant famously reverses Hegel's preferred order.¹⁰ Errol Harris suggests why:

⁶ *Science of Logic* at 120; GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT ¶ 42 (A.V. Miller trans. 1977); see also CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 247 (1975) ("a low view of mathematics as a philosophical language").

⁷ The details of this education are set forth in Michael John Petry, *The Significance of Kepler's Laws*, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 439, 476-83 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).

⁸ Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 471-73. Hegel calls mathematics a "subordinate field." (27) He refers to the "dead bones" of mathematical logic. (54) Its claim to "necessity" was inadequate, and its practitioners do nothing but ward off heterogeneity, an act itself tainted with heterogeneity. (40) In these remarks, and many others, Hegel will anticipate Gödel's critique of mathematics as inherently contingent and subjective. See Michael Kosok, *The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation*, in HEGEL: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 237, 263 (Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., 1972) ("dialectic logic can be taken as a way of generalizing Goedel's theorem, and instead of regarding it merely as a *limitation* to the expression of consistent systems in ordinary logical structures, it now becomes the *starting point* for a dialectic logic, which regards these limitations as the essence of its structure").

⁹ Hegel starts renumbering his chapters after every section, so there is no "chapter 4" in the Quantity chapters. I take the liberty of renumbering them. Hence, we are reading chapter 4 and will continue straight through to chapter 6.

¹⁰ IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 104-05 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1990).

Kant gives quantity precedence over quality but that is because he maintains that the categories are applicable only to sensuously intuited experience the *a priori* forms of which are space and time. Space and time, therefore, take precedence over that which fills them, and space and time are quantitative schemata . . . ¹¹

For Kant, space and time are added to the object by the conscious subject. For Hegel, however, space and time are Pure Quantities, which are derived from the very concept of Quality. They belong to the object itself. Hence, Quality precedes Quantity. Because Quantity is derived from Quality, Quantity can impose itself on qualitative Nature and, to paraphrase, G.R.G. Mure, Quantity is able to supervene on a world that is not "wholly unprepared."¹²

In chapter 3, Quality worked itself pure. It became Being-for-self--being that was utterly indifferent to otherness and hence radically free. Yet "it cannot be conceived of as something which is entirely without relations . . . as was the more basic category of pure being."¹³ But Being-for-self found out that its otherness was entirely outside itself. Ironically, it found itself completely dependent on otherness to define itself. Instead of being radically free, it was radically unfree. One can say of Being-for-self--now Quantity--that its "will is infinite . . . and [its] act a slave to limit."¹⁴

Quality as pure relation, divorced and separate from the "parts" which it relates, is Quantity. Quantity is devoid of all content. It is "indifferent to its affirmative determinateness." (372) Quantity represents the pure idea of simply not being Quality. The job of Quantity over the next three chapters is to recapture its own content. When it succeeds, it will pass over to Measure. Quality, Quantity, and Measure are the three parts of the Doctrine of Being. They may be drawn as follows:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

The Doctrine of Being Section Two: Magnitude (Quantity)

Quantity is therefore a "rightward" leaning discourse, according to our convention of placing "being" on the left and "nothing" on the right. For this reason, Professor Clark Butler is correct to state that

¹¹ ERROL E. HARRIS, *AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL* 124 (1983).

¹² G.R.G. MURE, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL* 117 (1965).

¹³ Gerd Buchdahl, *Hegel on the Interaction Between Science and Philosophy*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 61, 67 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).

¹⁴ WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, *TROILUS AND CRESSIDA* Act 3 Scene 3.

Quantity interrupts the development of Quality.¹⁵

Magnitude. Prior to the commencement of Hegel's first chapter on Quantity, there is a short introductory essay entitled "Magnitude (Quantity)." There, Hegel states broadly that Quality was "the first, immediate determinateness." (185) Quantity, in contrast, is

the determinateness which has become indifferent to being, a limit which is just as much no limit, being-for-self which is absolutely identical with being-for-other--a repulsion of the many ones which is directly the non-repulsion, the continuity of them. (185)

That Quantity is a determinateness can be seen directly as [4, 5, 6] in Figure 10(c).

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 10(c) Quantity

That it is indifferent to "being" was documented through chapter 3. In effect, the Understanding constantly repulsed its own content--its own determinateness--until it had worked itself pure.

Why, from Quantity's perspective, is "being" a "limit which is just as much no limit"? Limit, of course, has been sublated. It has been rendered into a mere ideality--a memory of a past reality. Quantity therefore is, on the one hand, distinguishable from "being" in general. But, on the other hand, "being" is no limit, and so Quantity suffuses or "continues" into the heart of external being with no opposition.

In the above-quoted passage, Quantity is said to be Being-for-self. This is obviously true on the law of sublation.¹⁶ As a Being-for-self, it is identical with Being-for-other. This is just to say that Quantity has driven away all its otherness, and so now it has no content of its own. The other must supply *all* its content. Hence, Quantity is nothing *but* Being-for-other.

Finally, Quantity has repulsed the Many Ones (which were equated in chapter 3 with Attraction). But Quantity is the middle term between Attraction and Repulsion. Hence, Quantity just as much attracts the Many ones. It is "continuous" with them. The idea of Quantity is therefore closely connected with and indeed *is* the idea of continuity.

Continuity. It is worth contemplating on our own the idea of continuity--recently the subject of a law review symposium under the name of "commensurability."¹⁷ If Quantity is continuous, then we must

¹⁵ CLARK BUTLER, *HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY* 91 (1996).

¹⁶ That is, sublation always obliterates *and* preserves the prior logical steps. Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 453.

¹⁷ See *Law and Incommensurability*, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).

be implying that Quantity is a substance, such that it exists for itself, but also flows--continues--into its other, so that the other can share in this substance. The substantiality of Quantity coheres with Hegel's notions. After all, Hegel has made Quantity the midsection of the Doctrine of Being. It must therefore be some species of "being." Quantity, however, is likewise very negative--though, on the law of sublation, full of inherent positivity. If all "things" contain negativity, then Quantity has continued from itself into these things. Quantity is, in short, the "universal" that all things have in common. For this reason, all "things" are "commensurable." This is the truth of Dialectical Reason, which reigns supreme in Hegel's theory of Quantity. But negativity is only one side of the story. Hence, all "things" are just as much incommensurable.

The law review symposium on commensurability entirely misses this point. What we find there is a group of scholars still caught in the dogma of self-identity. Each side can only assert a one-sided view. Thus, one group thinks things are universally commensurable. These are the utilitarians, who wish to assert that preferences can be weighted and aggregated, by virtue of something universal within that "thing" they call preferences.¹⁸ What commensurates for these scholars is money. Everything has its price. Without this commensurability of utilities in money, their so-called "policy science" would instantly implode. Hence the dogmatic passion for commensurability.

The opponents of utilitarianism are rights-based dogmatists who insist that certain "things" are so sacred that they share nothing in common with other things. Thus, human dignity cannot be sold for cash.¹⁹ These theorists are what Hegel, in chapter 1, called "pantheists."

Both sides suffer from self-identity. The utilitarians insist that preferences are quantities--commodities whose difference can be dissolved in the unified numéraire of money. The qualitative aspect of preferences is simply denied. The rights-based libertarians insist that certain values--chosen on an ad hoc basis according to the law of sentimentality which covertly governs their discourse--are complete qualities. The commensurable side of these sacred values is simply denied. Each side can only shout slogans at the other side. No solution is possible, and so the law review symposium must be counted what Hegel would term a Spurious Infinity.²⁰

¹⁸ Perhaps the fringe extreme of this view is represented by Eric A. Posner, *The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis*, 146 U PA. L. REV. 1185 (1998), who goes so far to suggest that the very attribution of incommensurability is a strategic trick to obtain commensurable advantage over their fellows. Incommensuration is itself thus made a commodity commensurable with all other commodities. *Id.* at 1208.

¹⁹ Cass R. Sunstein, *Incommensurability and Valuation in Law*, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).

²⁰ Hegel pointedly denounces such thinking later on when he remarks:

[P]roceeding analytically, [common sense] now extracts

Hegel provides the solution. Each side is partly right. Human values are commensurable, because they are in part negative and hence quantitative. The negative substance Hegel calls Pure Quantity continues in all discrete things--including the things the rights-based libertarians identify as sacred. Likewise, human values are incommensurable, because they are in part positive entities, just as the rights-based theorists insist.

Where does that leave Hegel on the issue of human rights v. utilitarian contempt for rights? I think Hegel would recognize that each intuition has its moment. Human rights are prior. They set up the boundaries in between which utilitarian calculation is permissible and legitimate. Utilitarian calculus can never be permitted to set its own boundaries. It must not decide who lives and who dies, or who is a slave and who is free, but it might govern in relatively unimportant human institutions, such as market exchange. How shall the borderline between rights and utilitarianism be discovered? In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel makes clear that Logic provides no clear answer. Rather, custom and tradition must set the border. It is useless for theorists to deduce the location of these borders from pure theory. In short, Hegel is ultimately a pragmatist in his politics, but, of course, when he philosophizes, he operates according to the dictates of necessity. Pragmatic politics is, in contrast, rife with contingency.²¹

Quantity's Indifference. To continue our analysis of Hegel's introductory essay on magnitude, Hegel reminds us that, at the end of chapter 3, Being-for-self has been forced to admit that it is the ultimate Being-for-other: "that which is for itself is now posited as not excluding its other, but rather as affirmatively continuing itself into it." (185)

Quantity is therefore "otherness in so far as *determinate being*

especially identity and *then also again* obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and *then also again* a positing of unlikeness--likeness when *abstraction* is made from difference, and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since they are in a certain measure merely *historical*; the truth is rather that a consideration of everything that is, shows that *in its own self* everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself. (412)

²¹ In warning that philosophers are not licensed to make policy suggestions, Hegel wrote: "Plato could well have refrained from recommending nurses never to stand still with children but to keep rocking them in their arms; and Fichte likewise need not have perfected his *passport regulations* . . ." GEORG W.F. HEGEL, *ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT* 21 (Allen W. Wood trans. 1993).

again appears in this continuity." (185) Of course, determinate being is the archetypical mode of Dialectical Reason. Hence, Quantity cannot be a determinate being unless there is an other into which Quantity can continue. When this other appears, Quantity's determinateness will no longer be "in a simple self-relation." (185) That is, the relation will be overtly a relation with an external other. In this relation, Quantity "is posited as self-repelling, as in fact having the relation-to-self as a determinateness in another something (which is *for itself*)." (185) Or, in other words, Quantity will say, "I am not my radically external other." It will refuse to recognize itself in the "other something," but this refusal to recognize is the ultimate recognition. Hence, Quantity is a slave to the other; only this other is truly "for itself."

Quantity and its other will pose as mutually indifferent to one another (which is a lie, of course). From this perspective of utter independence, both entities are "indifferent, relationless limits reflected into themselves." (185) In this pose, each entity can say that "determinateness in general is outside itself." (185) These external determinatenesses are external "somethings," with which Quantity (in the false pose we are now considering) has nothing to do. Yet Quantity is also indifferent to its own Limit and so continues into these external somethings. This indifference "constitutes the *quantitative* determinateness of the something." (185)

Preview. Hegel next give a preview to the first chapter on Quantity. As always, the true demonstration of these ideas must await their detailed unfolding. It is not expected that the reader will fully grasp the import of the preview that follows.

First we have Pure Quantity. This must be distinguished from its more complicated stage--Quantum. The challenge here is to remember that Quantum --i.e., "Number"--is too advanced. We are aiming to isolate the deeper essence of numbers. Numbers appear only in chapter 5.

Pure Quantity "develops a determinateness" and will become Quantum (185) This determinateness of Quantum will be posited as *no* determinateness--as a determinateness which is both inside and outside of Quantity. Quantum is therefore "indifferent determinateness, that is, a self-transcending, self-negating determinateness." (185) These remarks should make some sense. As with everything that has appeared after the True Infinite, Quantum is an infinite being that erases itself. How this actually unfolds must await chapter 5. Hegel at this point predicts that, when Quantum self-erases, it lapses into a Spurious Infinity--now to be called the mathematical infinite, an idea with which common sense is quite familiar.

We saw that the Spurious Infinite amounted to the pure act of self-erasure. This act of self-erasing is what the (enriched) Finites did. This unity between the Finite and the Spurious Infinite was precisely this self-abnegating activity, whose name was the True Infinite. Something similar will happen to the mathematical infinite. The self-erasure of the infinite integers will emerge as a True Infinite. When that happens, Quantity will have taken back its Quality.

Once Quality is back together with Quantity, we will have arrived at chapter 6, which Hegel names Quantitative Ratio. Here we will find that the qualitative other to Quantum is yet another Quantum--just as Being-for-other discovered that the repulsed other was another Being-for-other. Hence, the ratio is in fact a ratio of two quanta.

In the ratio (by which Hegel means "relation in general"--not division or fractions), the quanta are still indifferent to each other. That is, the number 7 doesn't care if it is related to 8 or to 9 or any other quantum. It will accept any partner that the mathematician--an external force--cares to impose. We will discover, however, buried deep within the idea of "ratio" lies a true qualitative moment, in which the two quanta are *not* indifferent to each other after all. The relationship (which will turn out to be the square of a quantum)²² will have an objective resistance from outside manipulation. When that point is reached, we are ready to move onto Measure--the culmination of the Doctrine of Being.

Remark

The essay introducing Quantity terminates with a short Remark. In this Remark, Hegel begins by reminding us that Limit, in Figure 4(c), *is* determinateness.²³ When a quality exceeds its Limit, it changes radically. Beyond the Limit was the Finite, whose fate (i.e., Being-in-itself) was to erase itself. Not so with mere quantitative limit:

If, however, by limit we mean quantitative limit, then when, for example, a field alters its limit it still remains what it was before, a field. If on the other hand its qualitative limit is altered, then since this is the determinateness which makes it a field, it becomes a meadow, wood, and so on. (186)²⁴

Hegel gives this example: "Red" is a quality of some thing--its color. Let's change its quantitative limit by making the thing brighter or paler red. It remains red all the same. But let's paint the thing blue. The thing has now undergone a *qualitative* change, not mere a

²² That is, if we take 16 and contemplate $x^2 = 16$, then the ratio of x^2 is immune to outside manipulation. The internal integrity (or Quality) of the ratio insists that $x = 4$, where $x = \sqrt{x^2}$. See *infra* text accompanying notes 68-69.

²³ In Figure 4(c), Limit was the unity of Constitution--internal negativity implying change--and Determination of the in-itself. In effect, in Limit, inside and outside have switched places, and the self-destruction of "being" is much accelerated.

²⁴ Cf. TAYLOR, *supra* note 5, at 247 ("[Q]ualitatively considered, the determinateness or limit of a thing is not a matter of indifference; if we alter the limit, we alter the nature of the thing; but considered purely quantitatively, the limits of a thing can be altered without changing its nature; it is 'indifferent' to them. It is thus a mark of the quantitative, says Hegel, that we are dealing with such indifferent limits, that the things can increase or decrease in extension without changing their nature.").

quantitative change.²⁵

With regard to red that grows brighter or paler, Hegel states that the degree of redness is its magnitude. In magnitude, redness "has a permanent substratum of being *which is indifferent to its determinateness.*" (186) In other words, red as such continues to be red even as the brightness or paleness (its determinateness) is manipulated by outside forces.

Magnitude. Hegel also, in this Remark, warns that "magnitude" means Quantum--not Quantity. Magnitude is too advanced for the concept of Pure Quantity, because it implies a determinateness that is beyond Pure Quantity. Thus, in common mathematical discourse, "[a] magnitude is usually defined as that which can be increased or diminished." (186)²⁶ It is clear that, in this definition, "the *more* or *less* can be resolved into an affirmative addition" (or subtraction) which is externally added (or subtracted)." (186) "It is this *external* form both of reality and of negation which in general characterizes the nature of *alteration* in quantum." (186) In other words, Quantum cannot alter itself. It requires an outside manipulator to make a thing *more* or *less* of what it is. Of "more or less," Hegel remarks:

In that imperfect expression, therefore, one cannot fail to recognize the main point involved, namely the indifference of the alteration, so that the alteration's own *more* and *less*, its indifference to itself lies in its very Notion.
(186)

In other words, the essence of Quantum is that it is indifferent to being changed by outside forces.

This last observation is poignant. How many times have you heard someone, fearful of affirming something absolutely, refer to it as "more or less" true? What is aimed for here a switch from fragile qualitative Limit to robust quantitative Limit. If the speaker gains your acquiescence to this transition, then the speaker's proposition will be harder to refute. Of course, we should not fall for this trick. If the speaker is making a qualitative point, then the speaker is not

²⁵ See also GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 80 Remark (William Wallace trans., 1975) [hereinafter cited as LESSER LOGIC]:

Quality is . . . the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity. . . is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker.

Hegel further remarks that "in quantity we have an alterable, which in spite of alterations still remains the same." *Id* § 106 Addition.

²⁶ We have already alluded to Hegel's criticism of this definition for its circularity. See *supra* text accompanying notes 1-2.

entitled to the relative ease and comfort that mere quantitative Limit affords.²⁷

Alteration of Quantum, then, is accomplished only externally--hence inessentially. This is the penalty Being-for-self pays for driving out all content. Only strangers can tell the Quantum what it is--until chapter 6 discovers a moment of self-integrity within Quantum, from which will spring forth the slave-rebellion Hegel calls Measure.

A. Pure Quantity

Hegel begins his first chapter on Quantity by reminding us of what unfolded in chapter 3. There, Quantity was "the repelling one." (187) This can be seen in Figure 9(c). Repulsion said of itself: "I am not *that*." In so announcing, it "treats the other as identical with itself, and in doing so has lost its determination." (187) The expelled content was then united in Attraction, as Figure 10(a) showed. "The absolute brittleness of the repelling *one* has melted away" into Attraction. (187)²⁸ Attraction, however, "is at the same time determined by the immanent repulsion" (187)²⁹ Of course, Quantity is the unity of Attraction and Repulsion, as shown in Figure 10(c). Reminiscing about the relationship portrayed in Figure 10(c), Hegel announces that Attraction is the moment of Continuity in Quantity.

This brings us to Figure 11(a):

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 11(a) Continuity

The justification for this design is that Quantity has expelled all its content [4-7]. Therefore, the "content" of Figure 11(a) must be found amidst the expelled entities. Attraction [4, 5] is plucked from the exiles and made the Understanding's focus of attention. It becomes Continuity [1].³⁰ Of [1], Hegel writes:

²⁷ Some time ago I had cause to complain about a defense of legal determinism which asserted that the rule of law existed--more or less. David Gray Carlson, *Liberalism's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law*, 62 U. TORONTO L. J. 257 (1993).

²⁸ It will be recalled that, in Figure 10(a), [7] posited the Void/Many Ones as not itself. But, covertly, [7]--Repulsion as an immediacy--was swept along and was not left behind, as it hoped to be. Hence, [7] entered into Attraction as an immediacy, but Dialectical Reason retrieved it in Figure 10(b).

²⁹ This was shown in Figure 10(b).

³⁰ Of continuity, Errol Harris usefully reminds us that it has the attributes of Attraction. That is, continuity is a plurality held together by an external will. HARRIS, *supra* note 11, at 126.

Continuity is, therefore, simple, self-same self-relation, which is not interrupted by any limit of exclusion; it is not, however, an *immediate* unity, but a unity of ones which possess being-for-self. The *asunderness of the plurality* is still contained in this unity, but at the same time as not differentiating or *interrupting* it. (187)

The above passage shows a significant change of perspective. The first three chapters of the *Science of Logic* were the realm of "being"--the realm of *immediacy*. Hence, in those chapters, [1] was always immediate. Now, beyond the realm of immediacy, [1] is simple and not interrupted, but neither is it immediate. The Understanding continues to learn. It grasps [1] as a simple view of a complex "mediated" entity. Mediation as such now reigns in the extremes of Understanding and of Dialectical Reason. If immediacy exists at all within Continuity, it exists as a *moment*--a memory of its origin in reality. Indeed, Hegel will often use the word "immediate" in this and the following chapters. Understanding fully understands, however, that "immediacy" is always merely an ideal moment. The Understanding knows that it has left the crude realm of reality and exists now and forever more in the realm of the ideal.

Dialectical Reason is now rather less insulting to and patronizing of the Understanding. Acknowledging that the Understanding sees that Continuity contains mediation within it--the distinction of Many Ones--Dialectical Reason proposes with due respect that attention be focused on this moment of difference. Hence, we have:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 11(b) Discreteness

Of Figure 11(b), Hegel writes: "In continuity, therefore, magnitude immediately possesses the moment of *discreteness*--repulsion has now a moment in quantity." (187) The word "immediately" probably should not be invested with much significance here, for the reason just stated. We are beyond the realm of immediacy. Nevertheless, one could say that [3] is an "immediate" moment--but only in the ideal sense of remembering what [3] meant in the opening chapters of the *Science of Logic*. Hegel vindicates this judgment:

Hence, discreteness on its side, is a coalescent discreteness, where the ones are not connected by the void, by the negative, but by their own continuity and do not interrupt this self-sameness in the many. (187)

In other words, [3] is not immediate, except in an ideal sense. The Many Ones are acknowledged in Discreteness; and they are acknowledged as connected by Continuity.³¹

³¹ Hegel gives this useful example of Continuity and Discreteness in the *Lesser Logic*:

Hegel next indicates that an enriched Quantity is the unity of Discreteness and Continuity. Hence:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 11(c)
Enriched Quantity

Hegel, of course, does not use the phrase Enriched Continuity. I have added this to distinguish Figure 10(c) and Figure 11(c), which brings Continuity to the fore.³² In the next Remark, we learn that this Enriched Quantity is the same thing as time, space, the ego, and many other quantitative ideas.

Of Figure 11(c), Hegel writes: "Quantity is the unity of these moments of continuity and discreteness, but at first it is so in the *form* of one of them, *continuity*, as a result of the dialectic of being-for-self, which has collapsed into the form of self-identical immediacy." (187) This is a direct reference to Quantity as portrayed in Figure 11(a). Here we have reference to [1] in Figure 11(a) as an *immediacy*, when we said that our days of immediacy were over--except as an ideal "moment." Of Quantity in this guise, Hegel states:

Quantity is, as such, this simple result in so far as being-for-self has not yet developed its moments and posited them within itself. (187)

In other words, Hegel agrees that Quantity, taken as a mere immediacy, is retrogressive--a throwback to the last part of chapter 2. This

It may be said, the space occupied by this room is a continuous magnitude, and the hundred men assembled in it form a discrete magnitude. And yet the space is continuous and discrete at the same time; hence we speak of points of space, or we divide space, a certain length, into so many feet . . . which can be done on the hypothesis that space is also potentially discrete. Similarly . . . the discrete magnitude, made up of a hundred men, is also continuous; and the circumstance on which this continuity depends is the common element, the species man, which pervades all the individuals and unites them with each other.

LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 25, § 100 Remark.

³² Could I have said that Figure 11(c) is *the same* as Figure 10(c), but with the names of the extremes changed? I did something similar once before. In chapter 1, Figure 1(c) was Pure Being, Pure Nothing, and Becoming. Then the names changed, without an advance. Figure 1(c) became coming-to-be, ceasing-to-be, and Determinate Being. Nevertheless, an advance to Figure 11(c) is justified. In Figure 10(a), [1] was Attraction--precisely a stubborn unity that nevertheless covertly implies Repulsion. In Figure 11(c), Continuity shows no such stubbornness.

immediacy, however, is precisely what Being-for-self expelled by the end of chapter 3. Thus, Quantity, as portrayed in Figure 11(a), *contains* the moments of Being-for-self

posited as it is in truth. The determination of being-for-self was to be a self-sublating relation-to-self; a perpetual coming-out-of-itself. but what is repelled is itself; repulsion is, therefore, the creative flowing away of itself. (187-88)

This "creative" flowing of content out of Being-for-self is precisely what Continuity is. Thus, Being-for-self flows into all the other Ones: "On account of the self-sameness of what is repelled, this distinguishing or differentiation is an uninterrupted continuity." (188)

Hegel finishes his discussion of Pure Quantity by restating that Continuity--[1] in Figure 11(a)--"without being interrupted, is at the same time a plurality, which no less immediately remains in its self-identicalness." (188) Once again, "immediacy" must be taken only as an ideal moment. The Understanding has a simple, yet mediated, view of Quantity as a substance that continues itself in all things. (For this reason, *everything*, except God, can be counted.)

Remark 1: The Conception of Pure Quantity

In Remark 1, Hegel emphasizes that Pure Quantity does not yet have any Limit. Even when it becomes Quantum, it will not be bounded by Limit "but, on the contrary, consists precisely in not being bounded by limit." (188) In Figure 11(b), Discreteness appeared, but this is not to be taken as a Limit:

The presence in it of discreteness as a moment can be expressed by saying that quantity is simply the omnipresent *real possibility* within itself of the one, but conversely that the one is no less absolutely continuous. (188)

That is, Quantity holds the *promise* of self-limitation--of being "the one." This is what Continuity's relation to Discreteness portends. For now, Quantity is absolutely continuous.

In bad philosophy--what Hegel calls "thinking that is not based on the Notion"--Continuity quickly devolves into "mere *composition*, that is, an *external* relation of the ones to one another, in which the one is maintained in its absolute brittleness and exclusiveness." (188) For Hegel, "composition" is usually a derogatory term, suggesting that the unity is not immanent to the entities but is imposed upon them from the outside. "Compositional" philosophies fail to see that the One "essentially and spontaneously (*an und für sich selbst*)" passes over into ideality." (188) This spontaneous action was documented at the end of chapter 2 (when True Infinity appeared) and throughout chapter 3. This action proves that Continuity belongs to the One--here, Enriched Quantity in Figure 11(c).

Atomism--much denounced in chapter 3--holds that Continuity is external to the One, an idea that "ordinary thinking finds it difficult to forsake." (188) (Here, as we shall soon discover, Hegel is thinking

about the concept of time and space.) Mathematics, however, rises above this naive view. It "rejects a metaphysics which would make time consist of points of time [or space]. . . It allows no validity to such discontinuous ones." (188) A plane may consist of the sum of infinitely many lines, but the Discreteness of the lines is only a moment. The sublation of this moment is implied by the infinite plurality of the lines.

Time, space, "matter as such,"³³ the ego--these are to be taken as examples of Pure Quantity. These things are "expansions, pluralities which are a coming-out-of-self, a flowing which, however, does not pass over into its opposite, into quality or the one." (189) Thus, space is "absolute *self-externality* which equally is absolutely uninterrupted, a perpetual becoming-other which is self-identical." (189)³⁴ Time likewise "is an absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189) It generates the "now"--the present--but then immediately annihilates it. Time is the "continuous annihilation of this passing away" and the "spontaneous generating of non-being." (189) In its pure destructivity, self-devouring time is "a simple self-sameness and self-identity." (189)³⁵

The ego is also Pure Quantity. It is "an absolute becoming-other, an infinite removal or all-round repulsion to the negative freedom of being-for-self." (190) In short, the ego constantly states, "I am not *that*." No proposition ever captures all of the ego, which is nothing at all but Continuity over time--"utter simple continuity." (190) That the ego is Continuity (which *is* time itself) Hegel expresses this way: the

³³ In the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel identifies matter as the unity of Attraction and Repulsion, which is, of course, exactly what Quantity is. Host-Heino Von Borzeszkowski, *Hegel's Interpretation of Classical Mechanics*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 73, 79 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993), citing *HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE* § 262 (A.V. Miller trans., 1970).

Hegel also distinguishes between Pure Quantity and matter. Quantity is a determination of pure thought. Matter is the same thing, but in outer existence. Hegel quotes Leibniz for this: *Non omnino improbabile est, materiam et quantitatem esse realiter idem.* (189) ("Not every thing is improbable, matter and quantity being the same reality").

³⁴ Space (Pure Quantity) will be the starting point for Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, just as consciousness is the starting point for the *Phenomenology* and the autonomous individual is the starting point for the *Philosophy of Right*. See Lawrence S. Stepelevich, *Hegel's Conception of Space*, 1 *NATURE AND SYSTEM* 111 (1979).

In chapter 2, we saw Hegel derive nature as other to Spirit taken as other. We now may add that nature so expelled by Spirit is Pure Quantity. MURE, *supra* note 12, at 116 ("Quantity is conspicuous in Nature, since self-externality as opposed to the self-possession of spirit is the distinctive character of Nature").

³⁵ See Richard Dien Winfield, *Space, Time and Matter: Conceiving Nature Without Foundations*, 29, 61-62, in *HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE* (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998) (calling time "this self-devourer").

ego is

the continuity of universality or being-with-self uninterrupted by the infinitely manifold limits, by the content of sensations, intuitions, and so forth. (190)

The equation of the ego with being-with-self (which I interpret to be the same as "being-within-self") is very significant. In chapter 2, we saw that being-within-self equates with [4]--the sole entity that always appears in all three circles. It connoted immanence and hence freedom from outside compulsion. The birth of being-within-self in chapter 2 was therefore also the birth of human self-consciousness--though that concept as such was way too advanced for us in chapter 2 or even now.

The ego continues through its content--"sensations, intuitions, and so forth." None of these things, however, is adequate to the ego. The ego is always *beyond* these things and so never fully present to itself. But neither is the ego Pure Nothing. In fact, the ego is always suspended between its content and Pure Nothing. For this very reason, it is constantly restless.

Those familiar with Jacques Lacan's theory of the subject can glimpse it prefigured in Hegel's theory of Pure Quantity. Lacan thought the subject was "split" between the realm of the Symbolic--the external realm of "being"-- and the Real, the oblitative concept of Pure Nothing. The Lacanian subject constantly tries to fill in the gaps so that it can fully "be." This is precisely what "desire" is--the drive to be complete and whole. Yet desire must fail. For the subject to be whole would be for it to surrender its very essence--Continuity that stays forever free from the external realm of "being."³⁶

Remark 2: The Kantian Antinomy of the Indivisibility and the Infinite Divisibility of Time, Space and Matter

In this long Remark, Hegel makes his famous criticism that there are not merely four antinomies, as Kant alleged, but infinitely numerous antinomies; every concept is a union of opposites--as Becoming implies.

Kant's second antinomy is (1) there are no simples, because everything can be further subdivided, and (2) there *is* a simple that cannot be subdivided.³⁷ In Remark 2, Hegel states that it is Figure 11(c) that gives rise to this antinomy, which

consists solely in the fact that discreteness must be asserted just as much as continuity. The one-sided assertion of discreteness gives infinite or absolute dividedness, hence an indivisible, for principle; the one-sided assertion

³⁶ These thoughts summarize JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, *THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE* (1998). In this book, Professor Schroeder draws rigorous parallels between Lacanian and Hegelian thought.

³⁷ *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*, *supra* note 10, at 248.

of continuity, on the other hand, gives infinite divisibility. (190)

In other words, Discreteness implies an indivisible. Continuity implies infinite divisibility. Figure 11(c) shows *both* to be necessary moments. It diagrams the antinomy itself. Kant thought that both sides of the antinomy are false, because each can be disproved by *apagogic reasoning*--that is, reason by process of elimination. The Kantian solution to the antinomies, Hegel says, was to make the contradiction subjective, where it remained unresolved.³⁸ The genuine solution, however, is to recognize that each side of an antinomy is one-sided and hence not valid on its own. "[O]n the contrary, they are true only as sublated." (192)

Before demolishing the antinomies, Hegel praises them as "the downfall of previous metaphysics." (190) They helped to produce the conviction that finite things are null in content. Nevertheless, they are far from perfect. Hegel in effect accuses Kant of choosing these antinomies (from the infinite collection that could have been chosen) to match his four categories of the understanding, earlier developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.³⁹ This was done, Hegel remarks, to provide a mere "show of completeness." (191)

Hegel provides us with this memorable denunciation of Kant:

The Kantian antinomies on closer inspection contain nothing more than the quite simple categorical assertion of *each* of the two opposed moments of a determination, each being taken on its own in isolation from the other. But at the same time this simple categorical, or strictly speaking

³⁸ Harris states that the understanding holds the two sides of the antinomy "incommunicado," and that the result is "logomachy"--a war on words. HARRIS, *supra* note 11, at 128.

³⁹ Here is how the categories of understanding match up with the antinomies:

<u>Categories</u> <u>Of the</u> <u>Understanding</u>	<u>Antinomies</u>
Quantity	Beginning/No Beginning in Time
Quality	Infinite Divisibility/Simple
Relation	Freedom/Causation
Modality	Absolutely necessary God/No God

The categories are said to belong *a priori* to the understanding. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 62. According to Kant, we cannot think any object except by means of the categories. We cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions. *Id.* at 94. They are the mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from intuitions. *Id.* at 153.

assertoric^[40] statement is wrapped up in a false, twisted scaffolding of reasoning which is intended to produce a semblance of proof and to conceal and disguise the merely assertoric character of the statement . . . (192)

To make good on this criticism, Hegel paraphrases Kant's second antinomy:

Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nowhere does there exist anything but the simple or what is compounded from it. (192)

In this formulation, Kant opposes the atom to the composite, "a very inferior determination compared to the continuous."⁴¹ (192) The substrate (or common denominator) to both the atom and the composite is merely "substance." "Substance" here refers only "things as sensuously perceived." (192) The choice of substance has no influence on the antinomy. Space or time (which cannot be directly perceived) could have been used to explore whether divisibility is infinite, for these two could be infinitely divided (or not).

Simplicity. Hegel next attacks Kant's mode of proving the antinomies. They are established by apagogic reason--or reasoning by process of elimination. Thus, if it can be proved that infinite divisibility is impossible, Kant has proved apagogically that a "simple" exists which cannot be divided. Likewise, if Kant proves that simples are impossible, he thereby proves that everything is a composite. Unhappily, both infinite divisibility and simplicity are eliminated in turn, leaving both sides of the antinomy false. The choice between them is thus subjective and unresolved.

Hegel, however, claims that the apagogic demonstration is superfluous. He accuses Kant of bringing forth the very presuppositions that Kant introduced into the model, so that nothing is achieved. Here is Hegel's appraisal of Kant's *real* argument for proving that the indivisibly simple exists: (1) Assume there is such a thing as substance. (2) Now assume that composites do not have simple parts. (3) Now think away all composition. Nothing remains. (4) This contradicts the assumption that there is substance. (5) Ergo, there must be atoms. This, Hegel complains, does not move the argument. Kant could have begun this way: Composition is merely a contingent relation of the substance. By "contingent" is meant that the relation is externally imposed on substance and therefore not immanent to it and of no concern to it. If composition is external, then all substances are simple. In short, substance is a "thing-in-itself," which, in chapter 2, Hegel

40 Dogmatic, merely asserted.

⁴¹ Hegel has called composition "thinking that is not based on the Notion," and "external relation of the ones to one another, in which the one is maintained in its absolute brittleness and exclusiveness." (188)

suggested, was a simplex.⁴²

But this mode of arguing is likewise unsatisfactory. In it, the contingency of composition is assumed--not proved. Hence, the presence of a simplex is tautological. In other words, the structure of Kant's argument is: (1) Assume there is a simplex. (2) That would imply that composition is external and contingent. (3) Wish away composition. (4) A simplex remains.

Composition. Hegel likewise attacks the demonstration that everything is infinitely divisible, which he calls "a whole nest . . . of faulty procedure." (195) To disprove the existence of simplicity, Kant's apagogic argument proceeds as follows: (1) Suppose, for the sake of argument, a composite is made of simple things. This is the proposal that will be disproved. (2) Composites exist in space. (3) Space is infinitely divisible. (4) Since a simplex can occupy only one space at a time, it too must be equally divisible. (5) Ergo, simplicity does not exist.

Hegel complains that this argument assumes that whatever is substantial is spatial. It also assumes that space is infinitely divisible, which is by no means proven.⁴³ Furthermore, the second move ("composites exist in space") suggests that simplicity is *not* spatial. Simplicity, by definition, does not have complexity within it. Composition is outside it. If composition is outside the simple, so is space. Thus, simplicity is not spatial. Only composition is. For this reason, Kant's demonstration falls apart.

Kant assumes space is infinitely divisible. This is a further reason to think that space is not in the simple. The simple is by definition the indivisible. Hence, if the simple exists, it exists outside space.

There is also involved here a clash between the continuity of space and composition; the two are confused with each other. [Space is] substituted for [composition] (which results in a *quaternio terminorum* in the conclusion). (196)⁴⁴

Earlier in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant said that space is sole and single. It does not have parts.⁴⁵ There, Kant properly equates space with Continuity, as Hegel would do. But in the demonstration with regard to the second antinomy, this point has been forgotten by Kant. Now space has infinite parts.

In his discussion of the second antinomy, Kant reminds his readers that we know only phenomena. Space is a condition of possibility for

⁴² In chapter 2, with regard to Figure 3(b), Hegel suggested that Being-in-itself/Being-for-other amounted to the thing-in-itself, which had to be taken as a simplex.

⁴³ Recall that Hegel has already said that the second antinomy, which applies to substance, could have been applied to time or space. Hence, it is possible space is *not* infinitely divisible.

⁴⁴ "Quaternio terminorum" may be translated as "final four."

⁴⁵ CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 23.

phenomena. Hence, Hegel reasons, if "substance" means sensuous material, we are discussing only phenomenal substance, not substance-in-itself. Thus, the disproof of simplicity amounts to this: sensual experience shows us only what is composite. Not even microscopes can show us the simple.

When Kant's argument is liberated from "all pointless redundancy and tortuousness," (197) the proof of the antithesis ("everything is divisible") assumes space is Continuity, because substance is placed in space. In the proof of the thesis, however, space is not continuous. Rather, "substances are *absolute ones*." (197) Thus, the thesis asserts Discreteness. The antithesis asserts Continuity. When substance, space, time, etc. are taken as discrete, their principle is the indivisible One. When they are taken as continuous, division is possible.

Continuity contains the atom within it, however. If division is always a possibility, there must be something to divide--the atom. That is, a discrete thing must confront divisibility *before* divisibility, with its golden axe, cleaves it in twain. Likewise, Discreteness contains Continuity. In it, the ones are purely simple and hence identical to each other. The sameness of the ones is precisely Continuity. As Figure 11(b) shows, "each of the two opposed sides contains its other within itself and neither can be thought without the other." (197) Hence, neither side, taken alone, has the truth. The truth lies only in their unity--which is shown in Figure 11(c).

In the end, Kant leaves the solution of the antinomy to one side. According to Hegel, each side of the antinomy should have nullified itself (as each is by now a True Infinite). In this activity, each side is "in its own self only the transition into its other, the unity of both being *quantity* in which they have their truth." (199)⁴⁶

The Eleatics were "[i]ninitely more ingenious and profound" than poor, benighted Kant. (197) Hegel forgoes analyzing them, except to criticize the empirical procedure of the notorious Diogenes. Thus

when a dialectician pointed out the contradiction in motion, made no effort to reason it out but, by silently walking up and down, is supposed to have referred to the evidence of sight for an answer. Such assertion and refutation is certainly easier to make than to engage in thinking and to hold fast and resolve by thought alone the complexities originating in thought . . . (198)⁴⁷

⁴⁶ This would be the Enriched Quantity of Figure 11(c).

⁴⁷ In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel stated that Diogenes liked to defeat Plato by kicking a rock and thereby proving it "existed." But all this showed was the *utility* of the rock--its status as an object for actual consciousness; or the "being-for-other" of the rock. PHENOMENOLOGY, *supra* note 6, at ¶¶ 389, 579. Such a reality is one-sided, in that it emphasizes the negativity (being-for-other) of the thing and excludes the side of being-for-self. Such an insistence on the *factum brutum*--the "being-for-us" of the rock--paradoxically renders the rock entirely subjective and denies the rock the very integrity that the attribute of "reality" should have provided for it. *Philosophy of Right*, *supra* note 21, §275 Addition. This is,

Hegel claims that Aristotle was genuinely speculative about space, time and motion. He opposed divisibility to continuity. Of course, Hegel has said divisibility *is* continuity. But Aristotle understood that divisibility implies atoms--there must be something for divisibility to divide. He saw that discreteness and continuity each imply the other. Each, however, exists only at the level of possibility. Aristotle's critic, Pierre Bayle, did not see this. He assumed Aristotle was claiming that everything *actually* contains infinite parts--one side of the Kantian antinomy. Aristotle saw that *both* sides were possibilities.

B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude

We have seen that Continuity "requires the other moment, discreteness, to complete it." (199) But Continuity is not merely the *same as* but is *distinct from* Discreteness. Hence, we must extract difference from the middle term and consider it in isolated form:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 12(a) Continuous Magnitude

Of Figure 12(a), Hegel writes:

But quantity is a concrete unity only in so far as it is the unity of *distinct* moments. These are . . . not to be resolved again into attraction and repulsion, but are to be taken as . . . remaining in its unity with the other, that is, remaining in the *whole*. (199)

Here Hegel emphasizes that Figure 12(a) is more advanced than Figure 10(b), which featured Attraction and Repulsion. Attraction and Repulsion exhibited Being-for-self. Each expelled the other from the other so that each could be by itself. Now Continuous Magnitude humbly realizes it is part of a community, even though it asserts its individuality within that community. Posited as Continuous Magnitude, Continuity is "no longer only a moment but the whole of quantity." (199)

Continuous Magnitude is *immediate* Quantity--taken as a whole. But, of course, immediacy is only a sublated immediacy. Immediacy as such was the province of Quality. We are beyond that now. We partake of an *ideal* immediacy. Thus, "immediacy is a determinateness the sublatedness of which is quantity itself." (200) In other words, quantity as a whole has sublated Determinateness and rendered it ideal.

When we place the emphasis on this recollected Determinateness, we obtain Discrete Magnitude.

[All illustrations are set forth at

incidentally, the posture of law-and-economics toward law. ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 22-23 (1996).

the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 12(b)
Discrete Magnitude

Like Continuous Magnitude, Discrete Magnitude is to be taken as a unified whole, with a double moment of Continuity and Discreteness within it:

Quantity is in itself asunderness, and continuous magnitude is this asunderness continuing itself without negation as an internally self-same connectedness. But discrete magnitude is this asunderness as discontinuous, as interrupted . . .

(200)

Thus, the relations between the extremes is now much more genteel than it was in the first three chapters. Each extreme admits to its subordinate role within a community, whereas, earlier, the extremes selfishly insisted on being "for themselves."

Hegel emphasizes that, if Continuous Magnitude is "the manifold one in general," Discrete Magnitude is "posited as the *many of a unity*." (200) That is, just as [3] in Figure 9(c) was both the Void and the Many Ones, and in Figure 10(c) [3] was Repulsion (of each One from the other), so Discreteness in Figure 11(b) and Discrete Magnitude in Figure 12(b) represent *many* discrete ones which nevertheless continue into each other by virtue of their complete sameness.

Remark: The Usual Separation of These Magnitudes

There is a "usual" interpretation of Continuous and Discrete Magnitude that Hegel disfavors. It suppresses the fact that each extreme contains its fellow inside it.⁴⁸ The only proper distinction

⁴⁸ Terry Pinkard, who calls for a complete rewriting of Hegel's analysis of Quantity, is guilty of this fault. Thus, Professor Pinkard denies that Hegel's Continuity is connected to the modern mathematical notion. Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics*, 41 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 453, 459 (1980-81). This is, I think, precisely wrong. The continuity of a curve (which makes the curve differentiable) is exactly what is at stake here. Pinkard attempts to recast Hegel in the language of Bertrand Russell's obsession with set theory. Thus, "[c]ontinuity would then be the class as one, and discreteness would be the class as many." *Id.* 459. This misses the main point. Continuity is the activity of a thing going outside of itself and into the other while remaining itself. This is the hallmark of True Infinity, which is missing from Pinkard's account.

Pinkard wishes to keep the analysis in the realm of the self-identical--precisely the realm that Hegel's Logic wishes to implode. Thus, he writes: "The least one could do is reformulate Hegel's doctrine into saying that the two concepts defining numbers are those of *unity* and *multiplicity*; numbers would then be multiplicities of units which we count." *Id.* at 460. Thus, numbers are self-identical

between Continuous and Discrete Magnitude is that in, Continuous Magnitude, determinateness is merely implicit, while in Discrete Magnitude, determinateness is posited.

Space, time, matter, and so forth are continuous magnitudes in that they are repulsions from themselves, a streaming forth out of themselves which at the same time is not their transition or relating of themselves to a qualitative other.
(200)

Each one of these possesses the *possibility* that, at any time, the One may be posited in them. Thus, time's One would be the present. As a Continuous Magnitude, time holds open the possibility that it can be frozen. (Indeed, borrowing from earlier points Hegel makes, since time annuls all moments, it must indeed have a moment before it to annul.)

Hegel states that Continuous and Discrete Magnitude are "*species of quantity*." (200) By this he means that each extreme is Quantity as such, and is a determinateness in light of its own "moments." (201) The use of the phrase "moment" signifies that determinateness is but a memory, brought forth by Dialectical Reason. This determinateness now appears within the context of a whole--of Quantity portrayed in Figure 12(c).

What is the difference between Quantity or Discreteness in Figure 11(b) and Continuous and Discrete Magnitude in Figure 12(b)? The addition of the word "magnitude" signifies "determinateness in quantity." (201) Because this is so, Figure 12(b) shows an advance over Figure 11(b), where the positedness of the extremes was not yet manifest. This justifies the isolation of Figure 12(a)-(b) as separate official steps in the Logic.⁴⁹

units which are fused together only subjectively through counting. To these units Pinkard denies any inherent continuity or True Infinity:

He should begin with the notion of units . . . as members of classes and then proceed to show how construction rules which involve these units can be given for numbers . . . One could then use the categorial notion of a unit (a member of a class, represented by a variable), proceed to counting units (i.e., adopt construction rules), thus introducing the concepts of numbers, then define magnitude in the way mentioned, and *then* one could define quantity (i.e., that which is capable of relations of quantitative equality) . . . at the end of the series not at the beginning.

Id. at 460-61. This suggestion repeals the whole notion of the True Infinite and is definitively un-Hegelian in approach. Hegel is keen to show that Quantity is the *activity* of the True Infinite, and so he *begins* (not ends) with the concept of Pure Quantity.

⁴⁹ There is counter-evidence, however. With regard to Figure 11(c), Hegel states that space and time are represented by the enriched Quantity shown there. In the Remark now under discussion, he

Hegel finishes this section by saying a few words about genus and species. Ordinary thinkers organize species into genera "according to some *external* basis of classification." (201) But Continuous and Discrete Magnitude produce their own genus in Quantum, described in Figure 12(c). This is undoubtedly true for each stage of Speculative Reason.

C. Limitation of Quantity

As we saw earlier, Discrete Magnitude is One. It is also a plurality of Ones which repel each other. But each of these Ones is quite the same as any other. Hence, the Ones "continue" from one into the other.

When we focus on the oneness of Discrete Magnitude, we behold an "*excluding* one, a limit in the unity." (201) But Limit has been long sublated. Hence, Hegel adds, Discrete Magnitude is

immediately not limited; but as distinguished from continuous magnitude [1] it is a determinate being [2, 3], a something, with the one [3] as its determinateness and also as its first negation and limit. (201)

Thus, not only is Discrete Magnitude plainly a determinateness, considered as [2, 3], but even in its isolated form as One [3] it is still a determinateness, because Discrete Magnitude fully remembers its ideal moment of being the Many Ones. Furthermore, even as [3] is posited as the Many Ones, still it is One and, as such, is Limit and first negation to its own being-in-itself [2].

If we take [3], in Figure 12(b), as "enclosing, encompassing limit," (201) [3] is self-related and is the negation in Discrete Magnitude [2, 3]. [3] is "the negative point itself." (201) But Discrete Magnitude is likewise Continuity, "by virtue of which it passes beyond the limit, beyond this one [3], to which it is indifferent." This speculative moment leads us to Figure 12(c):

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 12(c) Quantum

Of Figure 12(c), Hegel writes: "Real discrete quantity is thus a quantity, of quantum--quantity as a determinate being and a something." (201) Thus, Quantum is to Pure Quantity what Determinate Being was to

says that space and time are Continuous Magnitudes. That space and time are represented by both Figure 11(c) and by Figure 12(a) suggests that no advance has been made. Nevertheless, Continuous Magnitude brought to the fore something not present within mere Continuity--an acknowledged membership in a larger community. Furthermore, the middle term will be Quantum (a Quantity). Hence, I have declared Continuous and Discrete Magnitude to be official steps.

Pure Being,⁵⁰ and chapter 5 is to Quantity what chapter 2 was to Quality--a display of Dialectical Reason. Quantum is, in effect, determinate Quantity.

Has Speculative Reason worked on Figure 12(b) in the same way it did in the Quality chapters? Recall that, at first, the extremes modulated back and forth. Speculative Reason then named the movement and produced the middle term. Later, the extremes turned on themselves and self-erased (the Finites). Speculative Reason named this self-erasure as the True Infinite. Now it appears that Speculative Reason has operated on [2, 3] without considering the role of [1].

Hegel ends the chapter by correcting this misapprehension. Reverting back to [3] for a moment, Hegel holds that this "one which is a limit includes within itself the many ones of discrete quantity." But these Many Ones are sublated. [3] serves as a limit to Continuity, which Continuity leaps over with ease. Since Continuity [1] leaps over [2] and enters into [3] with ease, [3] likewise leaps back into [1], which is just as much Discrete Magnitude as it was Continuous Magnitude. The extremes equally leap out of themselves, and so Speculative Reason, like a sportscaster, still names the activity it witnesses in the extremes.

II. From Number to Quantitative Infinity

We now commence what is, by far, the longest, most maddening chapter in the *Science of Logic*--Quantum.

At the end of chapter 5, we had derived Quantum. Quantum becomes Number--"quantity with a determinateness or limit in general." (202) Quantum/Number will melt, thaw, and resolve itself into a pair of terms that will not be familiar to the modern eye--Extensive Quantum and Intensive Quantum, which Hegel also indifferently calls Extensive and Intensive Magnitude. Intensive Quantum is also called Degree.

Extensive Quantum will exhibit "limit [as] a limitation of the determinately existent plurality." (202) We can hardly know what that means at this stage. Explanation must wait.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Intensive Quantum (Degree) will resist outside manipulation in a way that Pure Quantity--which had its being outside it--could not. In Degree, Quantum recaptures Being-for-self. But, because Being-for-self is merely an ideal moment at this stage--a memory--Intensive Quantum will be indifferent to its Limit. It will be both inside and outside itself.

As this manifest contradiction of being determined simply within itself yet having its determinateness outside it, pointing outside itself for it, quantum posited as being in

⁵⁰ As Hegel specifically emphasizes. LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 25, § 101 Remark.

⁵¹ I think Hegel is merely saying here that Extensive Quantum comprises the set of all the quanta which Intensive Quantum (Degree) eliminates. Thus, if we have the 100th degree, Extensive Quantum are all the degrees that the 100th degree is not--the 99th, the 101st and all the rest. Without Extensive Quantum, Intensive Quantum would not be coherent.

its own self external to itself, passes over *thirdly*, into *quantitative infinity*. (202)

All of this is not very helpful at this stage. Suffice it to say that, whereas as the middle chapter of Quality saw Being chasing away its own content, the middle chapter of Quantity will do the opposite--it will recapture some measure of its content.

A. Number

Hegel starts with the premise that Continuous Magnitude and Discrete Magnitude are the same, at this point. Each is Quantum, and Quantum has Limit. But Limit exists only in its ideal form:

The very nature of quantity as sublated being-for-self is *ipso facto* to be indifferent to its limit. But equally, too, quantity is not unaffected by the limit or by being quantum; for it contains within itself as its own moment the one, which is absolutely determined and which, therefore, as posited in the continuity or unity of quantity, is its limit, but a limit which remains what it has become, simply a one. (202)

In short, quanta have discreteness. Three is distinct from four. But three what? The number three has no content *except that* it is not four or five. In three's insistence upon its independence from four and the like we witness that three is "not unaffected by the limit" which exists in Quantum as an ideal moment.

Quantum, then, contains within itself the moment of the One.⁵² "This one is thus the principle of quantum." (202) But this One is more advanced than the One of chapter 3. First, it is continuous with all the other quanta. That is, it is a *unity* of Continuity and Discreteness. Second, it is discrete and hence different from all the other quanta. And third, Quantum is a negation of the negation. As such, it has exceeded the ideal Limit which Discrete Magnitude represented. It is an ideal being that excludes its otherness from itself. "Thus the one [of Quantum] is (") *self-relating*, (ß) *enclosing* and (:) *other-excluding* limit." (202)

Quantum, when completely posited in these three determinations, is Number. Thus, with reference to Figure 12(c), Number includes "limit as a *plurality*" (203)--or [4, 5, 6]. In its analysis of Quantum, the Understanding first isolates this plurality as Amount, and so we get:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 13(a) Amount

⁵² One commentator goes so far to suggest that the first three chapters of the *Science of Logic* are entirely dedicated to establishing this one proposition. Petry, *supra* note 7, at 485.

In Figure 13(a), the Understanding sees Quantum as containing the Many Ones. But Quantum "does not contain them in an indeterminate manner, for the determinateness of limit falls in[side] them." (203) In Amount, Quantum determines itself as unique from other pluralities. In short, "three" proudly boasts that it is uniquely "three" and *not* some other number like two or four.

Amount is a plurality--of what? Units! Hence, "three" is really always three units, or $3 = 3@1$. Hence, we immediately derive:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 13(b)
Unit

"Amount and unit constitute the *moments* of number." This brings us quickly to Figure 13(c):

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 13(c)
Number

Hence, Hegel says of Figure 13(c), "Quantum is limited generally; its limit is an abstract, simple determinateness of it. But in quantum as number, this limit is posited as *manifold within itself*." (203) The "manifold" is Number's Amount.

Number is a "complete positedness" (203)--that is, a complex--when the plural limit [4, 5, 6] is considered together with the immediate unity [7]. So considered, Number is a Discrete Magnitude, or a Unit. That is, in [7] it is unmediated. But [7] is just as much continuous [4, 5, 6]. Because it is continuous, it is a "complete *determinateness*, for in it the limit is present as a specific *plurality* which has for its principle the one, the absolutely determinate." (203)⁵³

What is the difference between Number as a complete positedness and Number as a complete determinateness? Positedness represents what a True Infinite presupposes by self-erasing--that there is an other that controls its content. Determinateness represents a cruder stage--"being" which admits that it is in unity with non-being but which refuses to self-erase:

In the sphere of determinate being, the relation of the limit to [Determinate Being, or, here, Amount] was primarily such that the determinate being persisted as the affirmative on this side of its limit, while the limit, the negation, was found outside of the border of the determinate being .

⁵³ Mure puts it this way: "Any whole number is the 'discerning' of a sum within a continuous multiplicity of self-equal units, within an endless flow in which the unit endlessly repeats itself." MURE, *supra* note 12, at 119.

In Figure 4(c), Determinateness as Such was given the name Limit. Hence, Number is likewise a Limit. For this very reason, 100 does not change into 99 or 101.

But why should Continuity lead to the conclusion that Number is a determinateness? Because, just as Attraction fused the Many into One, so Continuity fuses the plurality into One. Hence, Number [4-7] is made into One by Continuity. Yet this One refers to both being [4, 5] and nothing [4, 6]. Or, equally this One's being might be viewed as continuous plurality [4, 5, 6] or the negative unity [7] that holds it together. Either way, because it is complex, Number is a determinateness. Quantum is beginning to recapture some of the content that Being-for-self shed from itself in Repulsion.

With regard to Amount in Figure 13(a), Hegel asks how the Many Ones (of which Amount consists) are present in Number. In effect, Amount assumes an external "counter," who breaks off Amount for his own purposes and isolates it from the many other Amounts that could have been isolated.⁵⁴ For example, the counter, for reasons of her own, counts to 100 and breaks off the counting there. This amount is thus isolated from 99 or 101, by some external "counting" force.

Of counting to 100, Hegel writes:

In the sphere a number, say a hundred, is conceived in such a manner that the hundredth one alone limits the many to make them a hundred . . . but none of the hundred ones has precedence over any other for they are only equal--each is equally the hundredth; thus they [i.e., the units] all belong to the limit which makes the number a hundred and the number cannot dispense with any of them for its determinateness. (203-04)

In other words, Unit is Limit to Amount. 100 is simultaneously *one* Unit, but it also implies 100 equal units contains therein, each one of which lays equal claim to being the 100th.⁵⁵

Number has a limiting Unit--the 100th Unit. By this, 100 differs from 99 or 101. The distinction, however, is not qualitative. Qualitative distinctions are self-generated. Quantitative distinction is externally imposed. The units do not count *themselves* to 100. They require "comparing *external* reflection"--a mathematician--to do the counting. (204) 100 is thus externally derived. Once this is accomplished, 100 "remains returned into itself and indifferent to

⁵⁴ As Hegel puts it, "the breaking off [of the counting] of the many ones and the exclusion of other ones appears as a determination falling outside the enclosed ones." (203)

⁵⁵ A related point was made by Hegel earlier with regard to Attraction. In chapter 3, Hegel stated that the Many Ones were fused into One by Attraction. We were not, however, to assume that, amidst the Many Ones, a single Caesar had risen to become the imperial One. Rather, each of the Many Ones had an equal claim to the crown of One. So it is with the Units in Number.

others." (204)

Hegel finishes his analysis of Number by emphasizing that it is an "absolutely determinate" Unit, "which at the same time has the form of simple immediacy and for which, therefore, the relation to other is completely external." (204) Besides being this immediacy, Number is also a determinateness. Its moments are Amount and Unit. This contradiction--Number as an immediacy and determinateness--is said to be "the quality of quantum," (204) which will lead to further development.

Remark 1: The Species of Calculation in Arithmetic; Kant's Synthetic Propositions a priori of Intuition

Geometry. In this long Remark, Hegel distinguishes and also relates geometry and arithmetic. Hegel identifies the science of spatial magnitude as geometry, which has Continuous Magnitude as its subject matter. Arithmetic has Discrete Magnitude for its subject matter. Perhaps this can be seen in the Cartesian plane.

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Cartesian Plane

On the Cartesian plane, 100 is a rectangle and so is continuous through its allotted space. But the arithmetical 100 is, like valor, the better part of discreteness. It is simply neither 99, 101, nor any other Number.

Hegel emphasizes that geometry does not measure spatial figures. It only compares them. When it trafficks in equality of sides or equidistance of points from a center, it owes no debt to number. Thus, a circle is the set of equidistant points from a given center. But if geometry wishes to treat of triangles or rectangles that are not squares, number is requisite. Whereas before geometry was driven solely by the external force of the geometer, now the geometry of triangles and rectangles relies on Number, which contains a moment of Discreteness. Where Number appears, mere comparison by the geometer no longer has exclusive jurisdiction.

Spatial geometry nevertheless implies and "continues into" arithmetic. Hegel returns to the "point" that from the geometric point springs the line of its own accord.⁵⁶ This is because the Zeus-like point was the Limit of the Athenian line. Since Limit is a correlative term requiring two subparts in need of correlation, the minute we designated the point as Limit, we had to think of point's correlate--the line. Hegel admits that this demonstration indicates that spatial magnitude--i.e., geometry free and clear of Number--generates numerical magnitude. The One of spatial magnitude immediately sublates itself and continues on to become the line of many Ones. Furthermore, to the extent a line is limited, the Limit of the line--the spatial point--must be viewed as a Number that limits the line of many ones. In the point, the line's self-determinedness is located. Hence, from the

⁵⁶ Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 521-22.

line's perspective, its self-determinedness is self-external. That is, the line *repels* from itself its Limit. The point seems to be that geometry is never entirely isolated from arithmetic, just as Continuity is never entirely isolated from Discreteness.

Arithmetic. Arithmetic operates with Number (but does not speculate as to what Number is). To arithmetic, Number is "the determinateness which is indifferent, inert; it must be actuated from without and so brought into a relation." (205) This is arithmetic's function. Numbers do not add themselves. Arithmetic is the tool of some outside will.

Arithmetic has various modes of relation--addition, multiplication, etc. Arithmetic not being a speculative enterprise, the transition from one of these modes to another is not made prominent. These modes can, however, all be derived from the very concept of Number.

Number has for its principle the one and is, therefore, simply an aggregate externally put together, a purely analytic figure devoid of any inner connectedness. (205)

Thus, an external "counter" breaks off the counting at, say, 100, thereby isolating this Number from the infinite others the counter may have preferred. All calculation is essentially mere counting.⁵⁷

Suppose we have two numbers chosen by the counter. Whatever relation these two numbers have must also be supplied by the counter. Thus, the counter must decide whether to subtract or divide these numbers. Number has a qualitative difference within it--Unit and Amount. But the identity or difference between two given Numbers is entirely external.

Numbers can be produced in two ways. We can count up the units and produce a number. Or we can subdivide from an aggregate already given. That is, given 100, we can negate 70 of the Units and isolate 30. In both cases, counting is implicated. One is positive counting. The other is negative counting.

Addition and Multiplication. In counting *Units*, the Amount of the Unit is set arbitrarily. We can count five single Units. Then we can decide to count some more--seven more units are added. Hence, we get $7+5=12$. In "addition," the relation of 7 and 5 is a complete contingency. These two Numbers are quite indifferent to each other. They were simply put together by the mathematicians for their own private purposes--an arranged, not a romantic, marriage.

We can also count five Units of two (multiplication). Hence, multiplication is the same as counting. What counts as a Unit (one, two ten, etc.) is externally decided by the mathematician. All this counting, however, is tedious and so, to save time, we learn by rote what the sums and products of two numbers are.

Kantian Arithmetic. The sum $7+5=12$ was chosen by Hegel because Kant used this very sum to demonstrate arithmetic to be a synthetic

⁵⁷ In the *Lesser Logic*, Hegel refers to the mathematical operations as "telling a tale" about numbers. *LESSER LOGIC*, *supra* note 25, § 103.

proposition.⁵⁸ Hegel denounces this conclusion of synthesis to be meaningless:

The sum of 5 and 7 means the mechanical [*begrifflose*] conjunction of the two numbers, and the counting from seven onwards thus mechanically continued until the five units are exhausted can be called a putting together, a synthesis, just like counting from one onwards; but it is a synthesis wholly analytical in nature, for the connection is quite artificial, there is nothing in it or put into it which is not quite externally given. (207-08)

It is not clear to me why Hegel is so heated in denouncing Kant's invocation of synthesis with regard to arithmetic. Was Kant not simply saying that 5 and 7 do not add themselves? And is not Hegel in complete agreement that addition is a matter for the external counter? In short, "synthesis" to Kant is what "externality of content" is for Hegel.

Hegel also objects to Kant's conclusion that arithmetic is an *a priori* synthesis. By a *a priori*, Kant meant a synthesis of diverse elements, none of which is derived from experience.⁵⁹ If we synthesize our *experiences*, then our knowledge is merely empirical and contingent, or a *posteriori*.⁶⁰ Hegel attacks the very distinction of a *a priori* and a *posteriori*. He asserts that every sense or impulse "has in it the *a priori* moment, just as much as space and time, in the shape of spatial and temporal existence, is determined *a posteriori*." (208) This plaint is related to Hegel's criticism of the unknowable thing-in-itself. In effect, Hegel believes that our knowledge of objects is always a unity of our perception (*a posteriori*) and the authentic integrity of the object (*a priori*).⁶¹

Hegel praises, after a fashion, Kant's notion of the synthetic *a priori* judgment as belonging "to what is great and imperishable in his philosophy." (209) But what he likes about it is the speculative content Kant never brought to light. In the synthetic *a priori* judgment, "something differentiated . . . equally is inseparable." (209) Identity is "in its own self an inseparable difference." (209) In other words, if arithmetic is a *a priori* synthetic, then 7+5 can be kept apart and also *not* kept apart simultaneously. Difference and identity each have their moments in 7+5=12. But this identity of identity and difference⁶² is no mere property of the *a priori* synthetic judgment. It

⁵⁸ CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 10.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 60.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 44.

⁶¹ These demonstrations are made in the early chapters of the *Phenomenology*.

⁶² The identity of identity and difference--a key Hegelian slogan--has already been discussed in Remark 2 following "The Unity of Being and Nothing" in chapter 1. It will be expressly considered as an important part of the Doctrine of Reflection.

is just as much present in intuition--*a posteriori* judgment. Hence, the compliment to Kant is, at best, ironically tendered.

In any case, Hegel attacks Kant's assertion that geometry is grounded in synthesis. Kant conceded that some of its axioms are analytic, but he also held as synthetic the proposition that the shortest line between two points is a straight line.⁶³ In contrast, Hegel has held that, at least if "point" is thought together with Limit, the line generates itself. This self-generated line is inherently simple. "[I]ts extension does not involve any alteration in its determination, or reference to another point or line outside itself." (208) Simplicity is the very Quality of the line, which springs forth from its Limit in the point. Euclid therefore was correct in listing amongst his postulates the purely analytical proposition that the shortest line between two points is a straight line.⁶⁴ Because this definition includes nothing heterogeneous to geometry, Euclid's proposition is analytic, not synthetic.⁶⁵

Subtraction and Division. Subtraction and division are negative counting. In subtraction (*i.e.*, $12-5=7$) the Numbers are indifferent or "generally unequal" to each other. That is, given a line segment of 12 units, we could have subdivided the line as 7 and 5, or 9 and 3, or 11 and 1, etc. The two Numbers into which a line of 12 units is subdivided bear no relation to each other.

If we make the two Numbers (qualitatively) equal, then we have

⁶³ CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 10.

⁶⁴ Euclid gave these four postulates upon which all geometry is based:

(1) a straight line segment can be drawn joining any two points.

(2) Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight line.

(3) Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the segment as radius and one end point as center.

(4) All right angles are congruent.

DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 90 (1979). A fifth was added, but is more controversial as to whether it is "objective" or merely "subjective."

(5) If two lines are drawn which intersect a third in such a way that the sum of the inner angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the two lines inevitably must intersect each other on that side if extended far enough.

Id. Hegel will return this fifth postulate much later (807-08).

⁶⁵ Antonio Moretto, *Hegel on Greek Mathematics and the Modern Calculus*, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 149, 154 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).

entered the province of division. Suppose we count up a Unit--say, 6. The Number 12 now has a Unit of 6 and an Amount of 2.⁶⁶

Division is different from multiplication, however. In multiplication, where $6 \times 2 = 12$, it was a matter of indifference whether 6 counted as Amount or Unit.⁶⁷ Division would seem to operate on another principle. After all, if we solve the above for 2, then $2 = 12/6$. $12/6$ is not the same as $6/12$. But, remembering that "negative counting" takes 12 as given, it is likewise immaterial whether the divisor (6) or quotient (2) is Unit or Amount. If we say 6 is Unit, we ask how often 6 is contained in 12. If we say that the quotient (2) is Unit, then "the problem is to divide a number [12] into a given amount of equal parts [here, 6] and to find the magnitude of such part." (210)

Exponents. In multiplication and division, the two Numbers are related to each other as Unit and Amount. Yet Unit and Amount are likewise "still immediate with respect to each other and therefore simply *unequal*." (210) If we insist that Unit and Amount be equal, we will complete the determinations immanent within Number. This last mode of counting is the raising of a Number to a power.

Take $6^2 = 36$. Here, "the several numbers to be added are the same." (210) Should not Hegel have said the *two* numbers [6 and 6] to be *multiplied* are the same? No. Hegel has already said that multiplication is counting, just like addition. Hence, we shall count six units. Each unit has six in it. In short, we count from 1 to 6. Next we count from 7 to 12, and so forth. Eventually we reach 36. The point is that in squaring 6, Amount equals Unit.

If we advance from $6^2 = 36$ to $6^3 = 216$, "inequality enters again." The new factor (6), is equal to the former Unit (6) and Amount (6). But this "new factor" must now be taken as Unit. The prior square (6^2) is now Amount. Hence, Unit and Amount are now not equal.⁶⁸ But, at least if we stick with squares:

[w]e have here in principle those determinations of amount and unit which, as the essential difference of the Notion, have to be equalized before number as a going-out-of-itself has completely returned into self . . . [T]he arithmetical square alone contains an immanent absolute determinedness . . . (211)

Here we have a preview of what, in chapter 6, will be called the "Ratio of Powers." The premise is that if we insist that Unit equals Amount, the number has a kind of resistance to outside manipulation. The Ratio of Powers will represent the last stage of Quantity. It is here that

⁶⁶ By qualitative equality, I mean that Unit and Amount have a kind of discreteness to them. Of course, we external reflectors must decide which of the two numbers is Unit and which is Amount. These numbers do not yet determine themselves.

⁶⁷ This is the "commutative" property of multiplication, according to which $ab = ba$.

⁶⁸ Of course, we could likewise say that 36 is Unit and 6 is Amount.

Quantum recaptures its integrity and wins its independence from the counters who have so tyrannized it prior to that point.

The self-integrity that squares enjoy explains various mathematical phenomena, according to Hegel. Thus, "higher equations"--equations involving powers higher than 2⁶⁹--must be reduced to quadratic equations, which only involve squares.⁷⁰ This also explains why "equations with odd exponents can only be formally determined." (211) By this Hegel seems to mean as follows: if I consider a higher equation involving an odd exponent, I can calculate the "root"⁷¹ only by the use of imaginary numbers, such as $\sqrt{-1}$.⁷² This route to the root is taken to be a bit of mathematical imperialism, from which mere squares are immune.

A last example of the dominance of the square is that, in geometry, only "right" triangles have immanent integrity. In a right triangle, where c is the hypotenuse, $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ --Pythagoras's theorem. In this figure alone is there "absolute determinedness." (211) For this reason, all geometric figures must be reduced to right triangles for their complete determination.

Hegel has a mysterious paragraph on "graded instruction." (212) By this he presumably means ordinary high school math courses.⁷³ Hegel

⁶⁹ An example:

$$ax^3 + bx^2 + cx + d = 0$$

where $a \neq 0$.

⁷⁰ A quadratic equation has this form:

$$ax^2 + bx + c = 0$$

where $a \neq 0$.

⁷¹ In quadratic equations, there are always two different solutions, or roots, though occasionally the roots are equal to each other (when $b^2 = 4ac$).

⁷² The entire sentence I am interpreting asserts:

[E]quations with odd exponents can only be formally determined and, just when roots are rational they cannot be found otherwise than by an imaginary expression, that is, by the opposite of that which the roots are and express. (211)

On solutions to the cubic equation, see CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 284-86 (rev. ed., 1991).

⁷³ Significantly, Hegel wrote these remarks while serving as a high school principal in Nuremburg, waiting impatiently for a university to offer him a professorship. TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 332-51 (2000).

states instructors teach about powers before they teach "proportions." I take "proportion" to mean ordinary division of numbers--fractions. Proportions are connected with the *difference* between Unit and Amount. That is, $6/2$ is not the same as $2/6$ --it rather matters which is the dividend and which the divisor. The study of "proportions" thus goes beyond immediate quantum, where Unit and Amount are mere moments. Any such study is external to Quantum. In Quantitative Ratio--to be considered in chapter 6--Number is no longer immediate quantum. Rather, ratio possesses a determinateness of its own.⁷⁴

Hegel has spent considerable time deriving addition, etc., from the very concept of Number. But, he warns:

It cannot be said that the progressive determination of the species of calculation here given is a philosophy of them or that it exhibits, possibly, their inner significance. (212)

Rather, Hegel suggests that we must distinguish what is self-external to Number. When we identify what is external to Number, then we know that what the Notion accomplishes happens in an external manner. Thus, any idea of equality or inequality of Numbers is external to the concept of Number as such.

Hegel concludes the Remark with this observation:

It is an essential requirement when philosophizing about real objects to distinguish those spheres to which a specific form of the Notion belongs . . . [O]therwise the peculiar nature of a subject matter which is external and contingent will be distorted by Ideas, and similarly these Ideas will be distorted and made into something merely formal. (212)

Presumably this warning means that speculative philosophy has its sphere, and higher mathematics has its sphere. Each should be wary of permitting the other field from unduly interfering the project at hand.

Remark 3: The Employment of Numerical Distinction for Expressing Philosophical Notions

Hegel has already shown that "number is the absolute determinateness of quantity, and its element is the difference which has become indifferent." (212) The indifference of Number implies that Number finds its content imposed upon it from the outside. Thus, arithmetic is an analytical science. It does not contain the Notion. All the combinations in arithmetic are not intrinsic to the concept of Number "but are effected on it in a wholly external manner." It is

⁷⁴ Of course, earlier Hegel has suggested that "proportions" are simply negative counting, involving Unit and Amount, just like addition or multiplication. See *supra* text accompanying notes 60-61. Here Hegel reverses field and states that division is more "advanced" than positive counting. Perhaps this is true only from a pedagogical point of view.

therefore "no problem for speculative thought, but is the antithesis of the Notion." (212) When thought engages in arithmetic, it is involved in activity which is the

extreme externalization of itself, an activity in which it is forced to move in a realm of thoughtlessness and to combine elements which are incapable of any necessary relationships." (213)

Mathematics is "the abstract thought of *externality* itself." (213) For this very reason, Number is the abstract version of sense (also external to thought). In Number, "sense is brought closest to thought: number is the *pure thought* of thought's own externalization." (213)

The ancients knew that Number stands midway between sense and thought. They knew that philosophy was not fit for mere numbers--something Hegel's contemporaries had forgotten.

Hegel relates the Many Ones to sensual material. The Many "is in its own self external and so proper to sense." (213) When thought--"what is most alive and most active"--is translated to Number, then what is concrete turns into what is abstract--"dead, inert determinations." (214)

Numbers are supposed to be educational for students, but Hegel thinks this is over-rated.

Number is a non-sensuous object, and occupation with it and its combinations is a non-sensuous business; in it mind is held to communing with itself . . . a matter of great though one-sided importance. (216)

But occupation with numbers "is an unthinking, mechanical one. The effort consists mainly in holding fast what is devoid of the Notion and in combining it purely mechanically." (216) Calculation dulls the mind and empties it of substance. Calculation is so debased, Hegel notes, "that it has been possible to construct machines which perform arithmetical operations with complete accuracy." (216)

B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum

(a) Their Difference

In Figure 13(c), Number can be interpreted as a having its determinateness isolated in Amount [4, 5, 6].⁷⁵ [7] is Number's Unit, which can be taken, in its Discreteness, as a plurality, since Amount continues right through it. [7] has no being outside its Limit. This Limit is not external to [7], as it was in chapter 3. Quantum "with its limit, which [Limit] is in its own self a plurality, is *extensive magnitude*." (217)

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

⁷⁵ [6] is beyond Amount proper. But, since Unit is just as much Amount as Amount, [6] can be included as part of the determinateness which Hegel names as Amount.

Figure 14(a)
Extensive Magnitude
(Extensive Quantum)

Since Extensive Magnitude represents a recognition that [7] is infused with its Limit [4, 5, 6], we show here that the Understanding grasps the entire middle term as a whole. Figure 14(a) stands for an advance in Quantum's quest to recapture its Being-for-self.

Extensive Magnitude is to be distinguished from the earlier stage of Continuous Magnitude in Figure 12(a). Continuous Magnitude was a component part of Number. It was derived by extracting [4, 5, 6] from Quantum. In Continuous Magnitude, Quantum was thus identical with its Limit. "Continuous magnitude is not yet truly determined as being for itself because it lacks the one (in which being-for-selfness is implied) and number." (217) It does not receive this "one" until Dialectical Reason arrives to bring out the merely implicit idea of Discrete Magnitude. Continuous Magnitude has posited in it "only one of the two sides which together make quantum fully determined and a number." (217)

Discrete Magnitude was more advanced. It brought out what was merely implicit in Continuous Magnitude, but it also suffered from the same fault. In Discrete Magnitude, there was a discreteness [3] which did not *expressly* admit its unity with Continuous Magnitude.

What was merely in-itself in these earlier stages is now made express. "Extensive and intensive magnitudes are determinatenesses of the quantitative *limit* itself." (217) That is, Extensive Magnitude is more expressly a determinateness. Figure 14(a) thus shows not just the plurality of [4, 5, 6] but also [7]--itself taken as infused with plurality--being grasped by the Understanding. In contrast, Continuous and Discrete Magnitude were "determinations of magnitude *in itself*." (217) Thus:

Extensive magnitude has the moment of continuity present within itself and in its limit, for its many is altogether continuous; the limit as negation appears, therefore, in this equality of the many as a limiting of the oneness.
(217)

Referring to Figure 14(a), Hegel states that Number "is immediately an *extensive quantum*--the *simple* determinateness which is essentially an *amount*, but an amount of one and the same *unit*." (217) The difference between Extensive Magnitude and Number is only this: "in number the determinateness is expressly posited as a plurality." (218) Now the unity of Number comes to the fore.

If something is determined in terms of Number, it need not be distinguished from some other numerically determined something. Thus, if I say I have three things and you say you have four things, our "things" have not yet been distinguished in and of themselves. They are still homogeneous "things" in spite of the numerical difference.⁷⁶ This

⁷⁶ Of course, they are distinguished because some of the things are mine and some are yours. But this "quality" of the things is purely external to the things themselves. They are utterly

is "because the determinateness of magnitude as such is a limit determinate by itself." (218) The determinateness of magnitude is not determined by the things to which it is applied. Number is rather indifferent to the things to which we apply them. Within Number is a complete openness to externally imposed content. In short, we can use Number to count *any* qualitative thing.

Hegel now returns to Amount, where plurality was made into one. Within Amount, each of the Many Ones was the same as any other. None was *primus inter pares*. If Amount is 100, each one could claim to be the determining 100th. Hence, Amount did not exhibit determinateness as such (Limit). Amount thus collapsed into Unit.

In Extensive Magnitude, this determinateness is now expressly acknowledged as the Limit of Number. But Dialectical Reason now intervenes to point out that the determinateness is likewise a unity. Hence:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 14(b)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)

Of Figure 14(b), Hegel writes, "the limit of quantum, which as extensive had its real determinateness in the self-external amount, passes over into *simple determinateness*." Here, I think, we have self-erasure. Extensive Magnitude says, in effect, "I am not a unity." Unity therefore flees the precinct of Extensive Magnitude and takes sanctuary in Intensive Magnitude.

Thus, Intensive Magnitude is a "simple determination of the limit." (218) This determinateness rendered unitary is also called Degree.

Degree is a specific magnitude. For example, it is the 100th One. As such, it "is not an aggregate or plural *within itself*." (218) Rather, it is a "plurality only in principle." (218) In Degree, "determinate being has returned into being-for-self." (218)⁷⁷

The determinateness of Degree must be expressed by a number. It must be, for example, the 100th One. In this expression, 100 is not Amount. It is only unitary (or a degree). Now, a single One emerges as *primus inter pares* over all the other Ones.⁷⁸

indifferent to whom their owners are.

⁷⁷ Shakespeare agrees:

Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows! each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy . . .

William Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*.

⁷⁸ Perhaps some of this is missed by Justus Hartnack in his description of Extensive Magnitude:

Degree enjoys a being-for-self. It resists continuity in a way that, in the earlier stages of Quantity, the Many Ones could not. But, at the same time, Degree's content is external to itself. If it is the 100th, the "100" is outside of it. It is Extensive Magnitude that owns plurality--the externality of Degree. Yet this plurality is likewise One. In effect, Extensive Magnitude has already turned it into One, when it said, "I am plurality itself." In this posture, Extensive Magnitude, by announcing itself not a unity, unified the plurality in [1]. Hence, Degree and Extensive Magnitude are doing the same thing--expelling their own content, which we can now interpret as [2]. Hence, "[a] plurality [1, 2] external to the degree [3] constitutes the determinateness of a simple limit which the degree is for itself." (219)

This of course produces a middle term, of which Hegel writes:

Number as a one, being posited as self-relation reflected into itself, excludes from itself the indifference and externality of the amount [i.e., the plurality] and is self-relation as *relation through itself to an externality*. (219)

Notice the return of self-erasure. In Figure 13(a) and 13(b), the left extreme announced an immediacy (Amount) and the right extreme brought out the ideal moment (Unit) that the immediacy did not fully emphasize. Now, in Figure 14(a), Extensive Magnitude sheds its unity [2] and insists on being plural as such (and in so doing unifies the plural into [1]). Meanwhile the unity it shed [2] was secretly plural [1, 2].

To say about a quantum that it is an extensive magnitude is to say that it is measurable. If I say about a quantum that its length is ten yards, this means that yard follows upon yard until one reaches the end, the tenth yard (ten being the limiting number) . . . By performing the act of counting, I treat the quantum as an extensive quantum.

JUSTUS HARTNACK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S LOGIC 32 (Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans., 1998). My problem with this account is that it does not quite capture Extensive Magnitude's role in making Degree coherent. Thus, if we think of the tenth yard, Extensive Magnitude is the plurality of numbers which are *not* tenth. Hence, Extensive Magnitude is the first nine yards and the eleventh yard and beyond. Extensive Magnitude is therefore not a Quantum on which we focus but rather the background which makes Degree coherent.

Hartnack goes on to say:

If we talk about . . . a room temperature of 20° C, then the degrees below 20° never formed an extensive magnitude that was absorbed in that degree of temperature . . . The degree cannot be verified by adding the degrees below 20°--as we can add the yards . . .

Id. I think this is absolutely wrong. The Extensive Magnitude of 20° is *precisely* all the degrees that 20° excludes.

Degree does the same. It sheds its plurality [2] and insists on being One [3]. The middle term names this self-relation.

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 14(c)
The Quality of Quantum

In this middle term, "quantum as a reality [is] conformable to its Notion." (219) The word "reality," perhaps, connotes "being" in conjunction with its non-being, although, since reality has long since given way to ideality, "reality" must be taken in the sublated sense. But non-being here must be understood as containing all the content that Quantity has shed into the external realm.

The middle term, in picking up [2] from Figure 14(b), emphasizes a determinateness that is indifferent to its extremes. [2] in fact consists of material shed by the extremes in their indifference. This indifferent determinateness is precisely the *quality* of Quantity--that Quantity is indifferent to its content.

Hegel concludes this section by dropping back and describing Degree as different from Extensive Magnitude. Degree is a unitary determinateness [2, 3]. But it is unitary amidst a self-external plurality [1, 2, 3]. Each Degree differs from another Degree, but the Degrees are likewise "essentially interrelated so that each has its determinateness in this continuity with the others." (219) There is a continuity running through the Degrees, which makes possible an

ascent and descent in the scale of degrees of a continuous progress, a flux, which is an uninterrupted, indivisible alteration; none of the various distinct degrees is separate from the others but each is determined only through them.
(219)

Degree is what it is because of what is external to it. It is therefore not indifferent to its content--even though it actually shed this same content in an act of indifference. Or, as always, by showing indifference to its content, Degree demonstrated how absolutely dependent it is on it. This very contradiction is the Quality of Quantum, as shown in Figure 14(c).

(b) Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude

The last section discussed the *difference* between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude. Ironically, difference was gathered together in a middle term: the very Quality of Quantum is indifference to content. Now we shall explore this Quality/difference and discover the identity lurking within Figure 14(c)--as if that were not already plainly visible there.

Our next move is as follows:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 15(a)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)

The Understanding now takes up one side of the middle term. But it fully sees that it takes up the one side. Hence, it moves the whole of the middle term, even as it isolates Degree.

With regard to Intensive Magnitude taken positively, we learn that "Degree is not external to itself within itself." (220) That is, [1] is taken as a simple immediacy. It is, however, more advanced than the "*indeterminate* one, the principle of number as such," (220) i.e., Discreteness. Degree is also to be distinguished from its ancestor, Amount, "save in the negative sense of not being any particular amount." Rather, Degree is

primarily a unitary one of a plurality; there are many degrees, but they are determined neither as a simple one nor as a plurality, but only in the relation of this self-externality . . . If, therefore, the many as such are indeed outside the simple unitary degree, nevertheless the determinateness of the degree consists in its relation to them; it thus contains amount. (220)

In other words, Degree [1, 2] sheds its content [2]--plurality--but by shedding it contains it.

What it sheds, of course, is other degrees, with which it is continuous--even while it self-relates. Thus, the twentieth degree sheds all the other degrees, even while it retains for itself the "twenty"--which uniquely distinguishes the twentieth degree from all others. These excluded degrees can be called, collectively, Extensive Magnitude (or Extensive Quantum)--this time taken negatively.

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 15(b)
Extensive Magnitude

Thanks to this exploration of the Quality of Quantum, we can see clearly that

[e]xtensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness of quantum; they are only distinguished by the one having amount within itself and the other having amount outside itself. (220)

Similarly, we previously saw that Unit and Amount were the same--also Continuous and Discrete Magnitude. Throughout Quantity, the extremes end up being each other--here, expressly as Intensive and Extensive Magnitude have literally swapped places.

The middle term between the obversely charged extremes is:

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 15(c)
Qualitative Something

This unity is an "identity . . . which is self-related through the *negation of its differences*." (221) In short, it is the standard move of Speculative Reason, as developed in and after the True Infinite. It names the very act of the extremes in erasing themselves and stating what they are not.

Of course, "Something" was the name of Figure 2(c)--a unity between Determinate Being and Negation. Furthermore, "Quality" has long since been sublated. Why does Hegel use the phrase Qualitative Something here?

Degree (in both its forms of plural and unique) still has its content outside itself. The Qualitative Something is precisely that content--but taken negatively as simply the opposite of Quantum. Degree depends on that Qualitative Something to define what it is. Meanwhile, as Degree changes, the Qualitative Something remains what it is. Such a Something is indifferent to its quantitative limit.

To be sure, the Qualitative Something is a Quantum. But it is Quantum that is indifferent to Quantum. It is substrate to the more primitive quanta.

Quantum, number as such, and so forth could be spoken of without any mention of its having a something as substrate. But the something now confronts . . . its determinations, through the negation of which it is *mediated* with itself, as *existing for itself* and, since it has a quantum, as something which has an extensive and an intensive quantum.
(221)

Why is the Qualitative Something a mere Quantum? Remember that the mere Something was far less subsistent than the Qualitative Something. Now we have the something that positively resists the transgression of its Limit--which the original Something could not achieve.

Remark 1: Example of This Identity

In this Remark, Hegel states that Extensive Magnitude is usually associated with matter in its occupation of space--density. But density is turned into something intensive and something dynamic. Density ("the specific filling of space") should not be understood as "a certain *aggregate* and *amount* of material parts in a quantum of space, but as a certain degree of the space-filling *force* of matter." (221)

In the mechanical point of view, the concept of separately existing, independent parts comes into play, "which are only externally combined into a whole." (222) But in converting to the dynamic point of view, there is the concept of force. In its occupation of space, an aggregate of atoms, each external to the other, is "regarded as the expression of an underlying simple force." (222) These consideration of

whole and parts, or of force and expression, are too advanced for Quantum and will be considered later on, Hegel assures us.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, it can be said now that the relation of force and its expression corresponds to Intensive and Extensive Magnitude respectively. In other words, like Degree, Force is one-sided and cannot be considered separately from its expression.

With regard to Intensive Magnitude, Hegel gives the example of the circle with its 360 degrees. The determinateness of any one degree "derives essentially from the many parts outside it." (222) One degree of the circle depends on its relation with the other 359.

More concrete objects exhibit the dual aspect of being both extensive and intensive. Extensive Magnitude represents the outer being of such an object. Intensive Magnitude represents the inwardness of it. Hegel gives the example of mass as weight. It is an Extensive Magnitude in so far as it constitutes an amount of pounds. It is an Intensive Magnitude in so far as it exerts a certain pressure. Pressure is expressed as a degree on a scale.

As exerting pressure, mass is manifested as a being-within-self, as a subject to which belongs a difference of intensive magnitude. Conversely, that which exerts this *degree* of pressure is capable of displacing a certain *amount* of pounds, etc., and its magnitude is measured by this.
(223)

Heat famously has a Degree. But it also has Extensive Magnitude--the expansion of mercury in a thermometer or the expansion of air. Musical notes have a Degree--pitch--and Extensive Magnitude--the number of vibrations.

Meanwhile, in the sphere of spirit, "high intensity of character, of talent or genius, is bound up with a correspondingly far-reaching reality in the outer world." (223)

Remark 2: The determination of degree as applied by Kant to the soul

Kant applied Intensive Magnitude to the metaphysical determination of the soul, Hegel says. Kant considers the inference of the soul's immortality from the soul's simplicity, an inference he opposes.⁸⁰ Kant proceeds as follows: Admit the soul is simple. It thus has no Extensive Magnitude--no plurality to it. Nevertheless, the soul has Intensive Magnitude--a Degree of reality. This degree can diminish gradually and eventually vanish.

Kant's mistake is to consider the soul a "thing." If it were so, then to it could be attributed Quantum. But, Hegel, protests, the soul is Spirit, and Spirit forever exceeds the bounds of mere thinghood.

⁷⁹ This will occur in the middle chapters of the Doctrine of Essence.

⁸⁰ See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 221.

(c) Alteration of Quantum

Middle terms have generally proved to be names for *activities*. Thus, Becoming named the modulation between Pure Being and Nothing. The Ought named the self-erasure of the Finites. Likewise, the Qualitative Something names the self-erasure of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude each taken in turn.

The "difference" between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude [2] becomes the Qualitative Something--the middle term shown in Figure 15(c). This "difference"--the Something--is indifferent to Quantum. Quantum in fact has negated itself and is ineffectual against the Qualitative Something. Furthermore, Degree is said to be "the *existence* of this externality which quantum is within itself." (224) That is, Degree [1] is external to the Qualitative Something, and as such Degree exists.

The Qualitative Something of Figure 15(c) is said to be self-contradictory. It is "posited as being the simple, *self-related* determinateness which is the negation of itself, having its determinateness not within itself but in another quantum." (225) In other words, Extensive Magnitude in Figure 15(b) erased itself, and a new Quantum was produced. Taken as Quantum, the Qualitative Something has its entire determinateness [4-6] outside of itself [7]--in Degree and Extensive Magnitude. Yet it is simultaneously quite immune from these determinatenesses.

If we focus on the fact that the Qualitative Something has its entire determinateness outside of itself, we can say in fairness that it is "in absolute continuity with its externality, with its otherness." (225) From this perspective (even while admitting that the Qualitative Something is immune from other quanta), the Qualitative Something can *both* "transcend every quantitative determinateness" and be altered. (225) In fact, Hegel says it *must* alter.

In the Qualitative Something, Quantum reveals the "express character" of impelling itself beyond itself into its external character, thereby becoming an other. That is, the Qualitative Something is quantitative determinateness. As such, it consists in undergoing increase or decrease:

The quantitative determinateness continues itself into its otherness in such a manner that the determination has its being only in this continuity with an other; it is not a *simply affirmative* limit, but a limit which *becomes*. (225)

When Quantum impels itself beyond itself, it becomes another Quantum. But this new Quantum is "a limit which does not stay." (225) The new Quantum becomes yet another Quantum, "*and so on to infinity*." (225) With this we are ready to move onto Hegel's monumental treatment of Quantitative Infinity, an untravelled country from whose bourne few readers have ever returned.

C. Quantitative Infinity

(a) Its Notion

The nature of Quantum is to alter itself into another Quantum *ad infinitum*. As it alters, it conveys to its *other* the very status of

"Quantum-ness." "[T]he other is thus also a quantum." (225) Yet it is simultaneously, the very negation of Quantum-ness itself, "the negative of quantum as limited." (225)⁸¹

To draw this, we conceive the Understanding isolating the very act of Quantum going outside itself:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 16(a)
Quantitative Infinity

Hegel writes that Quantitative Infinity is

is an ought-to-be; it is by implication determined as being for itself, and this being-determined-for-itself is rather the being-determined-in-an-other, and, conversely, it is the sublation of being-determined-in-an-other, is an *indifferent* subsisting for itself. (226)

Are all these things true? Yes. Recall that the Ought was the self-erasure of the Finite. Now Quantum erases itself and becomes Other. This was the quintessential move of Being-for-self. Being-for-self turned itself into Quantity, which was total being-determined-in-an-other. But now Quantum, as Quantitative Infinity, sublates (*i.e.*, includes) all the other quanta. It is *all* the quanta. As such, it is indifferent to externality, because it has swallowed every Number. It is therefore indifferently subsisting for itself and no other.

Hegel now compares Quantitative Infinity to the Quantum of earlier stages. The Quantum was finite but impelled beyond itself. Quantitative Infinity is "unlimitedness" and also "returnedness into itself, its indifferent being-for-self." "[I]n the infinite, quantum possesses its final determinateness." (226)

Yet this Infinity likewise contains the "impulse to go beyond itself to an other in which its determination lies." (226)⁸² Therefore, the Quantitative Infinity is a Spurious Infinite--a Finite that propels itself to yet another Finite, which in turn propels itself to yet another Finite.⁸³

⁸¹ Errol Harris puts it this way: "The contradiction of Quantum is that its internal determination rests in a limit which in its very nature posits an external other, on which the precise magnitude of the quantum is as much dependent as it is on what precedes the limit." ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 138 (1983).

⁸² *Id.* at 136. ("And as the continuity of quantum expresses itself equally in endless extensity and in endless diminution, the progression is interminable either way, though neither the infinitesimal nor the infinite is ever attainable").

⁸³ The return trip is not to the original Number but to some larger or smaller Number *ad infinitum*. This conclusion is compelled

The upshot of these contradictions is that Quantum has both Finitude and the Quantitative Infinity in it at the same time.

What is the difference between Qualitative and Quantitative Infinity? In Qualitative Infinity, the extremes--[1] and [3]--stood "abstractly opposed" to each other. Their unity was only "in-itself"--implicit. This relation of the Finites was their transition (self-erasure) outside themselves. The self-erasure lay in the being-in-itself [2] of the Finites. This in-itself ("[q]ualitative determinateness, as an immediacy") is related to its others "as to an alien being; it is not *posited* as having its negation, its other *within* it. [T]herefore the finite continues itself into its other only *implicitly*, not *affirmatively*." (226)

Quantity, in contrast is "sublated determinateness; it is *posited* as being unlike itself and indifferent to itself, consequently as alterable." (226) The Quantitative Infinite *expressly* continues itself into its other. In short, the in-itself has become for-itself.⁸⁴

(b) The Quantitative Infinite Progress

Our next stage is drawn as follows:

Figure 16(b) Quantitative Infinite Progress

In this stage of Dialectical Reason, the extremes fall into a Spurious Infinity--a senseless modulation back and forth, but this time with a quantitative flavor. Hegel describes this flavor as follows:

[I]n the sphere of quantity the limit in its own self dispatches and continues itself into its beyond and hence, conversely, the quantitative infinite too is posited as having quantum within it; for quantum in its self-externality is also its own self, its externality belongs to its determination. (227)

In other words, at the level of Quantity, the Infinite self-consciously

by the lesson learned in the One and the Many. Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 566-68. There, the entity out of which the new entity springs does not go out of existence. Rather, the new entity springs out of itself and into yet another entity, creating infinitely Many Ones. The same result happens in Quantitative Infinity, though Hegel nowhere says so explicitly.

⁸⁴ It is possible to quibble with Errol Harris's remark that, to resolve Quantum's contradiction, "the externality of the other must somehow be internalized to produce a true infinity." HARRIS, *supra* note 11, at 136. At this stage, the extremes each have long since been True Infinites. Precisely what Quantum must express is that it is as much its other as it is its own self. Hence, Harris is right that the external must be internalized, but the external must also *stay* external as it becomes internal. Furthermore, it is already a True Infinite and therefore need not, at this late stage, become one.

goes beyond itself *and* stays within itself as it travels into this beyond.

Hegel says the "progress to infinity" is implicit in "quantum as such," its "expression of contradiction." (227)⁸⁵ This progress, however, is not the *resolution* of the contradiction. (This must await the middle term in Figure 16(c).) There is, however, a mere *show* of resolution, which Hegel blames on Continuity of one extreme into the other.

As Hegel sees it, the Quantitative Infinite Progress promises to attain the infinite but never actually delivers. "[I]t does not get beyond quantum, nor does the infinite become positively present." (227) The problem is that Quantum, by its nature, always has a beyond and is never fully present.

This beyond, considered on its own, is the non-being of Quantum. By its own act, Quantum vanishes into this beyond. Nevertheless, Quantum contains a qualitative moment in which it does *not* vanish into its beyond. But, simultaneously, Quantum continues *into* the beyond--its quantitative moment. Thus, "quantum consists precisely in being the other of itself, in being external to itself; this [beyond] is, therefore, no more an other than quantum itself." (227) In short, this beyond is *itself* another Quantum. "In this way, the beyond is recalled from its flight and the infinite is attained." (227) But such an infinite is spurious. (228) It is just another Quantum. "[W]hat has been posited is only a fresh limit." (227) This generates the familiar modulation back and forth between extremes.

The two extremes are unified in the expression "infinitely great or infinitely small." (227) But any *fixed* notion (or "absolute determinateness") of these ideas is not attained. Each of the extremes still bears the character of quantum and therefore remains alterable. (227) Each extreme is thus posited as self-external. There is always a "more" or "less." This beyond to any given expression of the infinitely small or great is a moment of qualitative opposition in every Quantum. This means that a decrease of the infinitely small or an increase of the infinitely large brings us *no closer* to infinity. Infinity is thus a liar. The infinitely great "is supposed to be *great*, that is, a quantum, and *infinite*, that is, not a quantum." (228) Infinity, however, is Quantum only.

Accordingly, Quantitative Infinity is spurious:

Like the qualitative spurious infinite, it is the perpetual movement to and fro from one term of the lasting contradiction to the other, from the limit to its non-being, and from this back again to the limit. (228)

There is nevertheless progress from the qualitative infinite. There, the movement was towards "an abstract *other* in general." (228) Now it is towards "an explicitly different quantum." (228) But a qualitative

⁸⁵ The presence of spurious infinity in every number will become vividly apparent in the Maclaurin series, where any fixed number can be expanded into an uncompletable infinite series. See *infra* note 145.

moment prevents Quantitative Infinity from reaching completion.⁸⁶ Hence, the Quantitative Infinite Progress is

not a real advance but a repetition of one and the same thing, a positing, a sublating, and then again a positing and again a sublating, an impotence of the negative, for what it sublates is continuous with it, and in the very act of being sublated returns to it. (228)

What is the bond between the two extremes of Figure 16(b)? Simply that each flees from the other, "and in fleeing from each other they cannot become separated but are joined together even in their flight." (228)

Remark 1: The High Repute of the Progress to Infinity

Hegel was no admirer of Quantitative Infinity. No doubt it is held to be sublime, and "in philosophy it has been regarded as ultimate." (228) With Kant obviously in mind, Hegel remarks:

[T]his *modern* sublimity does not magnify the *object*--rather does this take flight--but only the *subject* which assimilates such vast quantities. (229)

In *The Critique of Judgment*, Kant defined sublimity as a subjective feeling that one could actually know the thing-in-itself (which is impossible).⁸⁷ Hence, the sublime definitely does exalt the subject (and not the object) in Kant's work.

What makes thought succumb to the awe of the Quantitative Infinite Progress, Hegel remarks,

is nothing else but the wearisome repetition which makes a limit vanish, reappear, and then vanish again . . . giving only the feeling of the *impotence* of this infinite or this ought-to-be, which *would* be master of the finite and *cannot*. (229)⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Lacanians will recognize this qualitative moment as structurally similar to trauma--a stumbling block, or piece of the Real, which prevents the patient from completing his fantasy. BRUCE FINK, *THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE* 26 (1995).

⁸⁷ IMMANUEL KANT, *CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT* 100-01 (J.H. Bernhard trans., 1951); see also IMMANUEL KANT, *CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON* 142 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996).

⁸⁸ The late Carl Sagan, the telegenic Cornell astronomer, produced a popular TV program on astronomy in which he frequently announced his astonishment at the "billions and billions of stars" in the universe. Hegel reserves special scorn on such astronomers.

The shallow astonishment to which they surrender themselves, the absurd hopes of wandering in another life

Kant compares the sublime to the withdrawal of the individual into his ego, where the individual opposes his absolute freedom to all the terrors of tyranny and fate. At this moment, Kant says, the individual knows himself to be equal to himself.⁸⁹

Of this withdrawn ego, Hegel agrees that it is "the reached beyond; it has *come to itself*, is *with itself*, here and now." (230) This highly negative thing--the ego--has "determinate reality . . . confronting it as a beyond." (231) In this withdrawal of the ego,

[w]e are faced with that same contradiction which lies at the base of the infinite progress, namely a returnedness-into-self which is at the same time immediately an out-of-selfness, a relation to its other as to its non-being . . . (231)

It will be recalled that Quantitative Infinity stayed within itself, but this "in-itself" had no content. All the content was in the beyond. Simultaneous with its being-for-self, Quantitative Infinity was pure flight into the beyond and hence a constant modulation between these moments of flight and return. Now Hegel says that the ego is the same thing. Here we have the Lacanian view of the subject as suspended between the realm of the Symbolic (i.e., "being") and the Real (i.e., nothing).⁹⁰

That the Lacanian subject finds part of its selfhood in its beyond is the structure of desire itself. The Lacanian subject seeks wholeness but cannot achieve it. This is what Lacan called symbolic castration. Hegel, however, sees this precisely some 150 years before Lacan.⁹¹ Thus,

from one star to another . . . this they declare to be a cardinal factor in the excellence of their science . . . (230)

See also LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 25, § 94 Remark ("the infinity of [space] has formed the theme of barren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification").

⁸⁹ CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, *supra* note 87, at ---. [Probably toward the close]

⁹⁰ BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 59 (1995) ("*[t]he subject is nothing but this very split*"). Kant, in turn, describes the "I"--the pure universal aspect of personality, which Lacanians insist is *not* the subject. Mladen Dolar, *The Cogito as the Subject of the Unconscious*, in SIC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 11, 12 (Slavoj Žižek ed., 1998).

⁹¹ Slavoj Žižek describes castration as follows:

by means of the Word, the subject finally *finds* himself, comes to himself: he is no longer a mere obscure longing for himself since, in the Word, he directly attains himself, posits himself as such. The price, however, is the irretrievable *loss* of the subject's self-identity: the

Hegel writes that the relation of the subject to its non-being (i.e., the Symbolic realm, where the subject is accorded the privilege of "being"),

remains a *longing*, because on the one side is the unsubstantial, untenable void of the ego fixed as such by the ego itself, and on the other, the fulness which though negated remains present, but is fixed by the ego as its beyond. (231)

Hegel specially complains that morality has been equated with Quantitative Infinity, and once again the target is Kant. The antithesis just described--ego v. reality--was a qualitative opposition. In this opposition, the ego determines nature by distinguishing itself. That is, ego announces, "I am not *that*." *That* ends up being nature in general--that which opposes the ego. In this opposition, the ego is singular. External reality, however, is "manifold and quantitative." (231) But the *relation* between qualitative ego and quantitative nature is *itself* quantitative. This relation is morality itself--in Kantian terms the power of the universal "I" over nature (over what Kant would tend to call "inclination" or "pathology"). Thus:

the power of the ego over the non-ego, over sense and outer nature, is consequently so conceived that morality can and ought continually to increase, and the power of sense continually to diminish. But the perfect adequacy of the will to the moral law is placed in the unending progress to infinity, that is, is represented as an *absolutely unattainable* beyond, and this unattainableness is supposed to be the true sheet-anchor and fitting consolation; for morality is supposed to be a struggle, but such it can be only if the will is inadequate to the moral law which thus becomes a sheer beyond for it. (231)

verbal sign that stands for the subject--in which the subject posits himself as self-identical--bears the mark of an irreducible dissonance; it never fits the subject. This paradoxical necessity on account of which the act of returning-to-oneself, of finding oneself, immediately, in its very actualization, assumes the form of its opposite, of the radical loss of one's self-identity, displays the structure of what Lacan calls "symbolic castration." This castration involved in the passage to the Word can also be formulated as the redoubling, the splitting, of an element into itself and its place in the structure.

Here is a concise critique of Kant's doctrine of "radical evil."⁹² According to Kant, the ego is forever tainted with pathology. It can never finally purge itself of pathology but can only struggle for moral purity. Kant even goes so far as to deduce the immortality of the soul from the very fact that all eternity is required for the soul to reach the state of perfection.⁹³ Hence, Kant is quite guilty as charged. He has reduced morality to Quantitative Infinity.

With regard to Kant's opposition of ego-pure-will-moral-law and nature-sensuousness-inclination, Hegel complains that they are put forth as "completely self-subsistent and mutually indifferent." (231) "At the same time, however, both are moments of *one and the same being*, the ego." (232) Hence, the very constitution of the Kantian subject is the Lacanian split.⁹⁴ This contradiction is never resolved in the infinite progress. "[O]n the contrary, it is represented and affirmed as unresolved and unresolvable." (232)

This Kantian standpoint is "powerless to overcome the qualitative opposition between the finite and infinite and to grasp the idea of the true will which is substantial freedom." (232) Instead, this standpoint uses *quantity* to mediate. Quantity (sublated quality) is "the difference which has become indifferent." Hence, the qualitative moments of pure ego and nature are quite indifferent to the alteration of their quanta. The subject counts it as nothing that it has progressed toward the perfection of pure morality.⁹⁵

"That all opposition is only quantitative was for some time a cardinal thesis of recent philosophy," Hegel complains. (233) Oppositions were in effect reduced to polarities. In these polarities:

the opposed determinations have the same nature, the same content; they are real sides of the opposition in so far as each of them has within it both determinations, both factors of the opposition, only that on one side one of the factors *preponderates*, on the other side the other . . . is present in as *greater quantity* or in an *intenser degree* . . . But in so far as substances or activities are presupposed, the quantitative difference rather confirms and completes their

⁹² For a description of Kant's theory of radical evil, see Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, *Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?*, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653 (2000).

⁹³ CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, *supra* note 87, at 148, 155.

⁹⁴ Incidentally, Lacanians give Kant the greatest credit for this. Schroeder & Carlson, *supra* note 92, at 671-81.

⁹⁵ Fichte, Hegel's predecessor as professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin and a philosopher remembered today merely as a precursor to Hegel, is also singled out for relying on Quantitative Infinity in his theory of personality. Fichte saw the subject as a unity between self-identity and self-difference. MURE, *supra* note 12, at 30-32. The difference between self-identity and self-difference is likewise said to rest on Quantitative Infinity, in which the beyond remains forever beyond.

externality and indifference to each other and to their unity. (233)

In other words, at the base of any claimed polarity is a self-identical qualitative moment that Hegel finds to be an unjustified presupposition. Polarity is only the "first negation" (Dialectical Reason), not the "negation of the negation"--(Speculative Reason). (233) In fixed polar oppositions, "being" and thought "become completely external to each other and unrelated." (233) In short, fixed polarity is a species of atomism, much criticized in chapter 3. In polarity, "[i]t is a third, an external reflection, which abstracts from their difference and recognizes their unity, but a unity which is *inner, implicit* only, not *for itself*." (233) What is needed is an immanent sublation of the extremes by Speculative Reason.⁹⁶

Remark 2: The Kantian Antinomy of the Limitation and Non-limitation of the World in Time and Space

We saw in chapters 2 and 4 that Hegel had small regard for the four antinomies of reason that Kant presents in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Now he repeats his conclusion "that the Kantian antinomies are expositions of the opposition of finite and infinite in a *more concrete* shape, applied to more specific substrata of conception." (234) That is, the antinomies are spurious qualitative infinities. Each side of a given antinomy is merely a one-sided view of the truth. By "specific substrata of conception" Hegel means that Kant has taken his four categories of understanding and developed four antinomies with regard to them in order to produce the illusion that the antinomies are complete.⁹⁷

The antinomy Hegel now discusses is Kant's first one--whether the world is limited in time and space. This antinomy is the one Kant associated with the category of quantity⁹⁸ (which is why Hegel discusses it here). According to the thesis: (1) The world has a beginning in time and is limited in space. According to the antithesis: (2) The world has no beginning in time and no limit in space.⁹⁹

In terms of *time*, Kant proves the thesis by showing that the antithesis is impossible. If time has no beginning, then at any given point of time, an "eternity"--an infinite series of temporal measures--has lapsed. But an infinite series already lapsed is impossible. Therefore, time must have a beginning. Nothing comes from nothing, as King Lear and Spinoza discovered. In terms of *space*, Kant proves the

⁹⁶ This will occur in chapter 11, when Hegel explains why Oppositions must cancel each other out and fall to the Ground.

⁹⁷ The earlier critique which Hegel now summarizes takes place in the First Remark following "Transition" at the very end of chapter 2, and also in the Second Remark following the section entitled "Pure Quantity" in chapter 4.

⁹⁸ See *supra* n.34.

⁹⁹ CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 241-45.

thesis by showing that, if time was unlimited in space, then the universe would consist of infinite co-existing things. We cannot think of an infinite quantity of things.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, there must be a finite number of things.

The antithesis is also proved by ruling out the opposite. In terms of *time*, suppose the world has a beginning. Before the beginning, the world does not exist. An existing thing, however, cannot originate from nothing. In terms of *space*, suppose the world is finite. Space, however, has no limit. Hence, there must be a "void space." We thus have a relation of things *to* space. But this is a relation of things *to no object*. Such a relation is nothing. Consequently the world is not limited in space.

Hegel's first proposition about this antinomy is that the "world" could have been left out of the discussion. Kant could have addressed time as such and space as such.

Hegel's second proposition is that Kant could have restated his antinomy as follows: (1) there is a limit, and (2) limit must be transcended--two things Hegel says are true of Quantity generally.

The Thesis. Hegel next proposes that the entire proof of the thesis was unnecessary. The proof is itself only the direct assertion of what was to be proved. With regard to the thesis about time (it has a beginning), the very assertion that time has points introduces the idea that time is already limited. "In the proof therefore, a limit of time is *presupposed* as actual; but *that* is just what *was to be proved*." (235)

One point in time is, of course, "now." It designates an end of the past and is also the beginning of the future. With regard to limiting the past, "now" represents a qualitative limit. But why, Hegel implicitly asks, should "now" be a *qualitative* limit? Suppose, however, we say that "now" is a *quantitative* limit. Time would then continue on from the past, over the "now," and into the future, because Quantitative Infinity always leaps o'er the vaunts and firstlings of the "now." Quantitative Infinity "not only must be transcended but *is* only as the transcending of itself." (235) If time is a Quantitative Infinity, "then the infinite time series would not have *passed away* in it, but would continue to flow on." (235) A switch from qualitative to quantitative limit would therefore destroy Kant's argument.

But, Hegel continues, let us concede the qualitative nature of "now" as a limit to the past. In such a case it is also the beginning of the future. But this is precisely the thesis to be proved--that time has a beginning. What if this beginning was preceded by a now deceased past? This does not affect the argument. The past is conceived as radically separate from the future. Hence, the very introduction of "now"--a point in time--presupposes that time has a beginning.

Suppose we say the past is related to the future through the "now." In this case, "now" is a mere quantitative limit. "[T]he infinite time series would continue itself in what was called future and would not be, as was assumed, *completed*." (236)

Hegel now repeats his own theory of time. It is Pure Quantity. A point in time which supposedly interrupts time "is really only the

¹⁰⁰ If we think of the "whole thing," we are in effect assuming space is limited and does not surpass this "whole."

self-sublating being-for-self of the now." (236) This harkens back to Hegel's description of time as "an absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189) Time constantly generates the "now" but then immediately annihilates it.¹⁰¹ Hegel sees Kant's argument as merely asserting that the "now" is a qualitative limit to time--the very thesis to be proved.

The antithesis fares no better, in Hegel's opinion. It likewise merely asserts what must be proved. In order to prove that time has no beginning, Kant considers and dismisses the opposite thesis. Kant thus assumes a null, empty time (prior to the beginning). He then insists upon the continuance of the world into this empty time, "with the result that the existence of the world is continued into infinity." (236) As this continuance (into void time) is impossible--i.e., nothing can come from nothing--Kant rejects the thesis and thus proves the antithesis. According to Hegel, this argument presupposes that, just because the world exists, it must have "an *antecedent condition* which is in time." (236) But this is the very antithesis to be proved. Furthermore, when Kant insists that nothing can come from nothing--when "the *condition* is sought in empty time"--this means that the world is taken as temporal and hence limited. (236) Something always precedes the "now" of the world. There is always a yesterday. All of this, Hegel charges, is presupposed. It is the antithesis itself.

Kant's demonstration of the antithesis in terms of space is likewise rejected. There, Kant assumed that space was *no* object and unlimited. If the world were finite (and space infinite), space would exceed it. The world (an object) would have a relation with the void space beyond the world. But how could an object have a relation with *no* object?

Hegel finds again that Kant has merely restated the proposition--not proved it. Kant assumes that space is not an object, and that, in order to prevent the impossible relation of object to non-object, the object must continue itself as far as space does. This means that Kant thinks space must never be empty--the world must continue into it. Yet this is precisely the antithesis restated.

Hegel concludes this remark by criticizing Kant for "subjectivizing" contradiction.¹⁰² That is, the four antinomies do not occur in nature. Rather, they occur in consciousness. (Time and space, Kant says, are the very conditions of possibility for subjective intuitions).¹⁰³ Of this subjectivization of the first antinomy, Hegel writes:

It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong

¹⁰¹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 33-36.

¹⁰² See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Hegel's Appropriation of Kant's Account of Teleology in Nature*, 167, 176, in *HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE* (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998).

¹⁰³ *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*, *supra* note 10, at 23-24, 32-33, 85, 279.

that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too,
that knows how to resolve it. (237-38)

The "so-called world" *is* contradictory, Hegel insists. (238) The world
"is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to coming-to-be and
ceasing-to-be." (238)

(c) The Infinity of Quantum

The middle term between Quantitative Infinity and the Quantitative
Infinite Progress is the Infinitely Great and/or Infinitely Small. The
Infinitely Small, at least, is what mathematicians would call the
differential-- $*x$ in the derivative $*y/*x$.

[All illustrations are set forth at
the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 16(c) Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small

The Infinitely Great/Small is the destination that the Quantitative
Infinite Progress implies. It is a Quantum, but

at the same time it is the non-being of quantum. The
infinitely great and infinitely small are therefore
pictorial conceptions which, when looked at more closely,
turn out to be nebulous shadowy nullities. (238)

This should be clear to even the non-speculative readers who have
survived this far into this text. In the Quantitative Infinite
Progress, the counting mathematician is aiming to reach infinity. That
infinity has "being" is thus presupposed by the counter who is aiming
to reach this end. Yet this end will never be reached. It is a non-
being.

This contradiction--the non-being of infinity--is now explicitly
present, and so is the very nature of Quantum. When Quantum reached
Degree, or Intensive Magnitude, Quantum "attained its reality." (238)
But now the very notion of Quantum manifests itself.

As Degree, Quantum was "unitary, self-related and determinate
within itself." (238) As unitary, Degree sublated (*i.e.*, negated) its
otherness and its determinateness. These were now external to Degree.
This self-externality was the "*abstract non-being* of quantum generally,
the spurious infinity." (238) In other words, Degree in Figure 15(a)
yielded the Qualitative Something which in turn yielded Quantitative
Infinity in Figure 16(a). If we now examine Figure 16(b), we witness
each of the extremes--Quantitative Infinity and the Quantitative
Infinite Progress--erasing itself and establishing its non-being in the
other, while expressly continuing itself in the other, so that each was
a Quantum as well as not a Quantum. Hence, "this non-being of quantum,
infinity, is thus limited, that is, this beyond is sublated, is itself
determined as quantum which, therefore, in its negation is with
itself." (238)

The in-itself of Quantum is therefore to be external to itself.
Its externality determines what Quantum is. The Infinitely Great/Small

thus illustrates the very notion of Quantum. It is "not there" and yet treated as if it *is* there. Hegel writes, "In the infinite progress, therefore, the *Notion* of quantum is *posited*." (238) This must be taken to mean that the Quantitative Infinite Progress of Figure 16(b) shows what its content is--to be external to itself. The Infinitely Great/Small is the very beyond of the Quantitative Infinite Progress.

Hegel is extremely proud of Figure 16(c) and boasts:

In the infinite progress as such, the only reflection usually made is that every quantum, however, great or small, must be capable of vanishing, of being surpassed; but not that this self-sublating of quantum, the beyond, the spurious infinite itself also vanishes. (239)

How is this claim justified? Why has the spurious infinite vanished? Consider what the Infinitely Great/Small is: the end that the Quantitative Infinite Progress could never reach. If we have that end before us, then we do *not* have the Quantitative Infinite Progress before us. In short, we can take Figure 16(c) in terms of [7]--which is isolated from the vanished Quantitative Infinite Progress. This isolation is a sign that Quantity is beginning to recapture its Quality.

Quantum summarized. Hegel next reflects upon Quantum generally. Quantum (via Quantity) is the negation/sublation of Quality. Considered immediately by the Understanding, as in, say, Figure 11(a) or Figure 13(a), it is already the first negation--in *positivized form*. But Quantum is only the first negation *in principle*. It is posited as a "being," and "its negation is fixed as the infinite, as the beyond of quantum, which remains on this side as an *immediate*." (239) In this guise, it is the "beyond" that is *overtly* the first negation, as shown in Figure 16(b). Now, in the Infinitely Great/Small, we have "quantum determined in conformity with its Notion, which is different from quantum determined in its immediacy." (239) The Infinitely Great/Small is externality itself, brought inward as a moment of Quantity. For this reason, Hegel can say that

externality is now the opposite of itself, posited as a moment of quantity itself--quantum is posited as having its determinateness in another quantum by means of its non-being, of infinity. (239)

Because Quantum has brought its externality inward, "it is *qualitatively* [what] it is." (239) But, Hegel warns, to the extent we compare Quantum's recaptured quality to its Notion, this characterization is "for us. It "belongs more to our reflection, to a relationship which is not yet present here." (239) (Notion as such is strictly the province of the Subjective Logic, which Hegel alternatively names the Doctrine of the Notion).

For *itself*, however, "quantum has reverted to *quality*, is from now on qualitatively determined." (239) Its quality (or, to use Hegel's term, its "peculiarity") is that its determinateness (or content) is external. Quantum in Figure 16(c) is "indifferent" to its determinateness. But the outside is now in. Thus, "Quantum has infinity, self-determinedness, no longer outside it but within itself."

(239)

In Figure 16(c), Quantum is "posited as repelled from itself, with the result that there are two quanta which, however, are sublated, are only as moments of *one unity*." (240) In chapter 6, Quantum will now appear as a double--as Quantitative Ratio. In Quantitative Ratio, the content of Quantum will be external to itself (yet within itself). This externality will itself be a relation of quanta, "each of which is as such a unity." (240) This unity is not a mere "comparison" by an external reflection. Rather, this unity is Quantity's own qualitative determination. In Quantitative Ratio, Quality comes back into partnership with Quantity. The middle term between this partnership is Measure, which commences in chapter 7.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Charles Taylor expresses his dissatisfaction with Hegel's entire discussion of Quantum, and we are now in a position to answer his queries. Taylor writes:

But one might think that Hegel is a little cavalier in his transitions here. Granted that Quantity is the realm in which things are indifferent to their limit, how does that show that quanta must go beyond themselves, and change? (whatever that means)? And even if they do so endlessly, even granted Hegel's dislike for the "bad" infinity of the endless progress, does this show a contradiction requiring resolution by a higher category?

CHARLES TAYLOR, *HEGEL* 248 (1975). The answer to the first question is, since quanta are True Infinites, their very function is to go beyond their limit (while staying what they are). This very act is the Quality of the Quantum. But this does not necessarily mean that numbers change and that arithmetic is promiscuous and subjective. Quanta have limits within themselves. Three does not melt into two. If the limit external to a quantum is exceeded, it is exceeded spiritually, not empirically. The answer to the second question is that the bad infinity's modulation between quanta is itself the higher category. As always, Speculative Reason names the autistic modulation of Dialectical Reason and underwrites progress to a higher level.

Taylor's own response to his inquiries is to interpret the entire chapter on Quantum as an attack on atomism. Taking atomism to its extreme, Taylor sees it as the assertion that all things are mere aggregates of indistinguishable units. But if so, then how do atomists determine that one aggregate has 50 units but another has 100 units? Some non-quantitative criteria must operate, Taylor opines, and therefore the atomists are defeated. Taylor writes, "what drives the quantum on to its endless alterations is the search for an adequate specification in purely quantitative terms, a search whose object always eludes it, and which for this reason is endless." *Id.* at 250. While these are good arguments against atomism, it is hard to draw this moral from Hegel's discussion of Quantum. What seems to drive the progress on is the act of the True Infinite to erase itself while remaining within itself. It is the very erasure of quantitativity that produces the Infinitely Great/Small--the

Before we can move on to chapter 6, however, we must suffer through three long Remarks, the first two of which are by far the longest Remarks Hegel will include in the *Science of Logic*. Both cover the subject of calculus, which endlessly fascinated Hegel, because the "differential"--the Infinitely Small--embodied his slogan that nothing is something.

In the main, Hegel will criticize nineteenth century calculus for its lingering dependence on geometrical ideas, and for the quantification of $*x$, which Hegel views as an undefined quality.¹⁰⁵ Future generations of mathematicians would tend to agree with this estimate.

The calculus remarks are usually dismissed as "digression."¹⁰⁶ In the main, this is a fair observation. I have found few references to Hegel's views on the calculus, which nevertheless seem prescient for his day. Readers are invited at this point to skip to chapter 6, as virtually all Hegelians have done for generations.¹⁰⁷ Nothing great will be lost, if this is done. However, for the intrepid reader who wishes a "scorched earth" understanding of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, I summarize and simplify as best I can the thrust of Hegel's lengthy critique of the calculus.

**Remark 1: The Specific Nature of the Notion of the
Mathematical Infinite**

Mathematics makes much use of the mathematical infinite--for pragmatic reasons. Calculus works. But, Hegel remarks, that, as of his time, "mathematics has not yet succeeded in justifying its use of this infinite by the Notion." (240) Hegel denounces the utilitarian attitude of mathematicians as unscientific. On this attitude toward Quantitative Infinity, mathematics will be "unable to determine the scope of its

qualitative beyond of Quantum.

¹⁰⁵ In this regard, one recalls Hegel's early remark that mathematical necessity is inadequate. Mathematicians do nothing, he says, but ward off heterogeneous elements--an effort that is itself "tainted" with heterogeneity. (40) Perhaps the heterogeneous elements warded off is the qualitative nature of $*x$.

An astute commentator views the point of the calculus discussion as follows: Calculus cannot "yield the 'mathematics of nature which Hegel was looking for. [S]uch a mathematics can only take over what is qualitative from experience, it cannot develop it out of itself." Von Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 76.

¹⁰⁶ MURE, *supra* note 12, at 118.

¹⁰⁷ *E.g.*, CLARK BUTLER, *HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY* 110-11 (1996) ("Suspecting Hegel of wishing in part to demonstrate his mastery of mathematics and science to contemporaries and colleagues . . .").

application and to secure itself against the misuse of it." (241)¹⁰⁸

Often mathematicians defend themselves by denying the competence of metaphysics to comment on mathematical notions. They assert that, so long as mathematical concepts operate consistently in their own sphere, they need not concern themselves with metaphysics. Hegel paraphrases the attitude of the mathematicians: "Metaphysics, though disagreeing with the use of the mathematical infinite, cannot deny or invalidate the brilliant results obtained from it." (241)¹⁰⁹

If the difficulty were solely with the Notion of the Infinitely Great/Small, mathematics could dispense with it. The Notion of a concept is much more than a precise determination of it. But the calculus poses a special challenge to precise definition.

[T]he infinitesimal calculus permits and requires modes of procedure which mathematics must wholly reject when operating with finite quantities, and at the same time it treats these infinite quantities as if they were finite and insists on applying to [the Infinitely Great/Small] the same modes of operation which are valid for [finite quanta].
(241-42)

¹⁰⁸ Hegel memorably denounce the delusion that mathematics owns the fee simple of academic rigor, in a passage that law-and-economic movement in American law schools should take to heart.

If quantity is not reached through the action of thought, but taken uncritically from our generalized image of it, we are liable to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to raise it to the height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see when the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we have another trace of the bad metaphysics . . . which replace the concrete idea by partial and inadequate categories of understanding. Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if such objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God himself, because they cannot be measured or calculated, or expressed in a mathematical formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach of exact knowledge . . . And this mere mathematical view, which identifies with the Idea one of its special stages . . . is no other than the principle of Materialism . . . Matter . . . is just what . . . has that form only as an indifferent and external attribute.

LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 25, § 99 Remark.

¹⁰⁹ Michael John Petry reads this passage as meaning that "in this context it is metaphysics which has a lesson or two to learn from mathematics, not vice versa." Michael John Petry, *The Significance of Kepler's Laws*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 439, 486 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). But the thrust of Hegel's remarks is that it is the mathematicians who have not done their homework.

In other words, mathematics does not condone dividing by zero, but it condones dividing by non-numbers that are infinitely close to zero ($\lim_{x \rightarrow 0} y/x$). And, once it condones this, such differentials can be multiplied or subtracted as if they really were finite numbers.

Hegel states that the track record of the Infinitely Small is mixed.¹¹⁰ Hegel finds the calculus is

burdened with a seeming inexactitude, namely, having increased finite magnitudes by an infinitely small quantity, this quantity is in the subsequent operation in part retained and in part ignored. The peculiarity of this procedure is that in spite of the admitted inexactitude, a result is obtained which is not merely fairly close and such that the difference can be ignored, but is perfectly exact.
(242)

If I may intercede with an example that illustrates this last passage, suppose Δx represents a given change in x --not necessarily an infinitesimally small change. Suppose further that y is a function of x (or $y = f(x)$). If x_0 represents x at a particular value, and if $x_1 = f(x_0 + \Delta x)$, then $\Delta y = f(x_1) - f(x_0) = f(x_0 + \Delta x) - f(x_0)$. We can define the "difference quotient" by dividing each side of the equation by Δx to obtain

$$\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = \frac{f(x_0 + \Delta x) - f(x_0)}{\Delta x}$$

This difference quotient illustrates Hegel's accusation that the calculus exists by inexactitude. Let us apply this "difference quotient" to a concrete example. Suppose $y = 3x^2 - 4$. We can write:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} &= \frac{3(x_0 + \Delta x)^2 - 4 - (3x_0^2 - 4)}{\Delta x} = \frac{6x_0\Delta x + 3(\Delta x)^2}{\Delta x} \\ &= 6x_0 + 3\Delta x. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $x = 2$, and if $\Delta x = 3$, then, as x changes from 2 to 5, y changes from 8 to 71 (or 21 units of y per unit of x).

Where Δx is infinitesimally small, however, the calculus feels licensed simply to ignore Δx in the above calculation. Thus, the derivative of $3x^2 - 4$ is supposed to be $6x$, not $6x + 3\Delta x$.¹¹¹ The remainder $3\Delta x$ is simply dropped. This erasure shows that the calculus, as Hegel charges, is burdened with inexactitude.

Hegel remarks:

¹¹⁰ Terry Pinkard rightfully condemns Bertrand Russell who sees Hegel as wedded to the Infinitely Small as the basis of calculus. Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics*, 41 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 453, 463 (1980-81). The entire point here is to attack any reliance by the calculus on such a notion.

¹¹¹ This is according to the familiar "power rule," which states that $\frac{d}{dx} x^n = nx^{n-1}$.

In the operation itself, however, which precedes the result, one cannot dispense with the conception that a quantity is not equal to nothing, yet is so inconsiderable that it can be left out of the account. (242)

In other words, in the expression $\frac{y}{x}$, one can see that x is not zero, because one cannot divide by zero. Yet simultaneously x is "left out" as if it were zero.

In modern times, mathematicians would deny that $3x$ is simply erased. Rather, they would say that $6x$ is the *limit* past which they may not go, when

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow 0} \frac{3x}{x}$$

Accordingly, $3x$ does not vanish. Rather, it is simply unnecessary to refer to it when identifying $6x$ as a limit. In fact, the limit is never reached, because x never does reach zero.¹¹² This is a procedure of which Hegel would have approved. The "limit" of $6x$ is the qualitative "beyond" of Quantum.¹¹³

Infinitesimals. Hegel next considers the nature of the Infinitely Great/Small according to the mathematical point of view.

The usual definition of the mathematical infinite is that it is a magnitude than which there is no greater (when it is defined as the infinitely large), or no smaller (when it is defined as the infinitely small). (243)

It is simultaneously defined as greater (or smaller) than any given magnitude. Meanwhile, mathematics defines "magnitude" as that which can be increased or diminished.¹¹⁴ Since the Infinitely Great/Small cannot be increased/diminished, then the Infinitely Great/Small is no longer a Quantum as such. This is so on mathematical terms.¹¹⁵

What mathematics cannot comprehend is that the mathematical infinite is simultaneously Quantum and not Quantum. It is "something

¹¹² Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 76; A.W. Moore, *The Method of Exhaustion as a Model for the Calculus*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 147 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993)

¹¹³ See Michael Kosok, *The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation*, in *HEGEL: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS* 237, 254 (Alasdair MacIntyre, ed., 1972) ("the very notion of a mathematical limit entails the *negative* presence of *that* which is limited . . .").

¹¹⁴ See *supra* text accompanying note 1.

¹¹⁵ Carl Boyer has suggested that the infinitesimally small was "atomic" in nature--a self-identity that could not be further subdivided. CARL B. BOYER, *THE HISTORY OF THE CALCULUS AND ITS CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT* 12 (1949). If so, Hegel--a virulent opponent of atomism--would also oppose any use of the infinitesimal in the calculus.

which is not a quantum but yet retains its quantitative character." (243)

An Attack on Kant. Hegel returns to his criticism of Kant. Kant says of the mathematical infinite that it is a magnitude beyond which none is greater. But we can never name this amount. Some other magnitude could always be named that is greater, defeating our pretensions. But to say "infinite," we do not invoke the concept of a maximum. Rather we express only a beyond of any given, named magnitude. The infinite is therefore always a *relation* to a fixed number--a beyond of it.¹¹⁶

Thus, Kant declines to regard the infinite whole as a maximum. The maximum would be a mere quantum, which can always be exceeded. Rather, Kant sees that the mathematical infinite is *beyond* Quantum. Hegel complains that Kant thinks the mathematical infinite can never be completed. This, he finds, is "nothing but an expression of the progress to infinity." (243) It is represented as transcendental, by which Kant means (says Hegel) psychologically subjective. That is, subjective opinion burdens any given magnitude with an unreachable beyond--a species of the thing-in-itself.

Here, therefore, there is no advance beyond the contradiction contained in quantity; but the contradiction is distributed between the object and the subject, limitedness being ascribed to the [object], and to the [subject] the progress to infinity, in its spurious sense, beyond every assigned determinateness. (243)

That is, in Kant's critique, the proposed maximum is objective. The burden of the beyond is subjective. By subjective, Hegel seems to invoke the presupposition that we can never know the infinite; it is always beyond our experience. Hegel, however, believes the nature of the Infinitely Great/Small can be known precisely.

Mathematical v. Speculative Notions. Returning to the mathematical notion of infinity, Hegel says that, for mathematicians, the mathematical infinite is not a Quantum but a beyond of Quantum--a conclusion Hegel endorses (but only as a one-sided view, since the Infinitely Great/Small is just as much Quantum). This attitude Hegel now compares to the "speculative" point of view.

According to Hegel, the Infinitely Great/Small is "*in its own self* infinite." (244) That is, the Infinitely Great/Small of Figure 16(c) has sublated/negated both the quantum *and* its beyond. In the Infinitely Great/Small, the entire spurious infinity has vanished. The Infinitely Great/Small, viewed as [7] in Figure 16(c), is a simple unity.

Extensive Quantum in Figure 14(a) was also a simple unity, but the Infinitely Great/Small is an advance over this more primitive unity. Extensive Quantum erased itself and became Intensive Quantum. In this act, it determined itself only implicitly. Extensive Quantum saw itself as entirely separate and isolated from Intensive Quantum--the usual delusion of the Understanding. The Infinitely Great/Small, however, *expressly* sees itself as the beyond of the Quantitative Infinite Progress. Thus, it expressly says, "I am not that, *and that is what I*

¹¹⁶ CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, *supra* note 10, at 243-44.

am." It sees that it is simultaneously a unity of opposites. It is Quantum and not Quantum--something the Understanding cannot grasp.

The Infinitely Great/Small is no longer finite Quantum. Finite Quantum is determined by some other Quantum. In comparison, the Infinitely Great/Small is simple. As simplicity is the very hallmark of "being," the Infinitely Great/Small is "quantitative determinateness in *qualitative* form." (245) What it expresses is "its essential unity with its other." (245) By "essential" Hegel means that "it has meaning solely with reference to that which stands in *relation* to it. *Apart from this relation* it is a *nullity*." (245)¹¹⁷ Quantum as such is indifferent to the relation expressed in Figure 16(c). That is, if I propose one trillion as a candidate for the Infinitely Great, the number is indifferent to the fact that it has a beyond--an even larger number. Yet the Infinitely Great is nothing but the *beyond* of any given number. Hence, it is a nullity without the idea of a fixed, inert number.

But the Infinitely Great/Small is only a moment. If number is indifferent to it, the Infinitely Great/Small is not likewise indifferent to number. Hence, "the quantum in its infinity is a *being-for-self*." (245) In other words, it is qualitative, but has its content outside itself. But it is also a *Being-for-one*.

Why is the Infinitely Great/Small a Being-for-one? It will be recalled that Being-for-one "expresses the manner in which the finite is present in its unity with the infinite." (159)¹¹⁸ That is, Being-for-one is a memory embedded within a unity that there was once disunity. Hence, the Infinitely Great/Small is a unity that likewise appreciates its history--it was generated when the Quantitative Infinite Progress vanished, leaving only the bare idea of a beyond.

Fractions and Infinite Series. Hegel indulges us with an example of Quantitative Infinity. Quantum, he reminds us, is covertly a ratio. Thus, Number was the unity of Amount and Unit, as shown in Figure 13(c). Also, in the next chapter, ratio will become further developed as the qualitative moment of Quantity.

Hegel proposes to analyze the fraction 2/7. This fraction does not appear even superficially to be a unity, like a whole number does. Rather, it "is directly determined by two other numbers which are related to each other as amount and unit, the unit itself being a specific amount." (245)¹¹⁹ But consider the extremes of the ratio--2 and 7. These are indifferent to being in the ratio (which Hegel here calls

¹¹⁷ Essence, as we shall see, is always correlative. See JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 65 (1981) ("essence is not a simple concept that can be isolated in the way [Determinate Being] can be isolated. *Essence* signifies a much more complex process of thought: in . . . negating what is immediate given, it remains identical with itself.") (footnote omitted).

¹¹⁸ See CARLSON, *supra* note 2, at 551-53.

¹¹⁹ Earlier, Hegel stated that which is deemed unit and which is deemed amount is arbitrary. Thus, with regard to 2/7, we have either two units of 1/7 or 1/7 units of two.

the "exponent").¹²⁰ This exponent is a third to the extremes of 2 and 7. Once they are in the relation, however, they no longer count as 2 and 7 but they count according to the fraction in which they participate. The relation is now paramount. To prove this, Hegel points out that 4 and 14 or 6 and 21 could serve just as well to express the exponent. The ratio of 2 and 7 therefore has a qualitative character.

This qualitative character, Hegel says, is "a moment of infinity." (246) This qualitative moment survives quantitative change, as when 2/7 becomes 4/14. If the ratio has this qualitative "infinite" moment, it is only imperfectly expressed. The 2 and the 7 can be removed from the ratio, in which case they revert back to ordinary quanta. "[T]heir connection as moments of the ratio is an external circumstance which does not directly concern them." (246) Furthermore, the ratio of 2/7 is likewise an ordinary Quantum.

That the fraction is an ordinary Quantum can be seen if we express 2/7 as 0.285714 . . . So expressed, 2/7 generates an infinite series.¹²¹ The quotient of 0.285714 . . . (which Hegel calls the "sum") is the finite expression of the ratio. This Hegel characterizes as "an aggregate of units added together, as an amount." (247) True, the magnitudes of which this expression consists (2, 8, 5 etc.) are each a decimal fraction and hence each is a ratio, but this is irrelevant, "for this circumstance concerns the particular kind of *unit* of these magnitudes, not the magnitudes as constituting an *amount*." In other words, 8 (in 0.285714 . . .) is really 8/100. The "particular unit" of 8 is 1/100. Any such consideration isolates the 8 from the entire expression of 0.285714 . . . This last expression can be viewed as an aggregate of indifferent parts in the sense that it is 2/10 + 8/100 + 5/1000, etc.

In the above infinite series, "which is supposed to represent the fraction as an amount," the fraction has vanished, and with it has also vanished the aspect which makes the fraction "in its own self infinite." (247) It will be recalled that ratios such as 2/7 have a qualitative integrity that is indifferent to quantitative change, as when 2/7 becomes 4/14. When 2/7 is expressed as 0.285714 . . . , this moment of infinity is gone, but it is replaced by an infinite series. This is a different kind of infinity--the spurious infinite.

As spurious, the infinite series exhibits a contradiction. It represents a qualitative relation as if it were an immediacy devoid of relation. On the other hand, the amount expressed always lacks

¹²⁰ Hegel's usage here is unusual. The exponent is usually defined as measure of power of a base. Thus, in 6^4 , the exponent is 4, and it raises 6 to the fourth power. Thus, it would be an error to assume Hegel that the exponent of 2 and 7 is $\log_2 7$. Rather the exponent of 2 and 7 seems to mean the *product* of 2 and 1/7.

¹²¹ Hegel also states that $1/(1-a)$ can be expressed as $1 + a + a^2 + a^3$ etc. This, however, is true only if $a < 1$. More generally, if $|r| < 1$, the geometric series

$$a + ar + ar^2 . . . ar^{n-1} . . .$$

converges to a sum $a/(1-r)$.

something. "[I]n order to reach the required determinateness, we must always go further than the terms already posited." (247) Hence, "to express as an *amount* that which rests on a *qualitative* determinateness is a *lasting contradiction*." (247)

In the above infinite series, inexactitude is always present. But "in the genuine mathematical infinite there is only an appearance of inexactitude." (248) In fact, the genuine infinite is quite precise. The genuine mathematical infinite cannot be compared to a mere infinite series. Indeed, any expression of the infinite series is even inferior to the fraction $2/7$ (which itself implies the genuine infinite, which survive the increase to $4/14$, etc.).

The infinite series contains Spurious Infinity, "because what the series is meant to express remains an *ought-to-be* and what it does express is burdened with a beyond which does not vanish and *differs* from what was meant to be expressed." (248) The series is actually only something finite--"something *which is not what it ought to be*." (248) In the infinite series, the negative is outside its terms. That is, if $2/7$ is expressed as 0.2857, the defect of the expression is that (0.000014 . . .) is left out. In comparison, in the expression $2/7$, the negative is "immanent as the *reciprocal* determining of the sides of the ratio and this is an accomplished return-into-self." (248) That is to say, both sides of $2/7$ are merely moments of the quantum expressed. As a mere moment, each side (2 and 7, taken immediately) is the negative of the ratio. The "self-related unity" that $2/7$ represents is "a negation of the negation" and "consequently has *within it* the determination of infinity." (248) This internalization of infinity is a sign that Quantity is beginning to recapture its own substance, which has been imposed on it by an other. Thus, "the so-called *finite expression* [$2/7$] is the truly *infinite expression*." In 0.285714 . . . , however, the infinite is expressly missing.¹²² (It is what the ellipsis tries to capture.) As a taunt at the infinite series, Hegel remarks:

The word *infinite* even as used in infinite series, is commonly fancied to be something lofty and exalted; this is a kind of superstition, the superstition of the understanding; we have seen how, on the contrary, it indicates only a deficiency. (249)

Hegel next calls attention to the fact that "the existence of the finite series which cannot be summed is an external and contingent circumstance with respect to the form of the series as such." (249) That is, if the ordinary division of 2 into 7 generates an infinite series, the division of 1 into 4 ($1/4$) does not. Nevertheless, the infinite series expresses "a higher kind of infinity than do those which can be summed"--i.e., $1/4$ can be summed and hence is

¹²² The usually astute Professor Mure thus gets it wrong when he comments that "the logical principle of the convergent infinite series" is the True Infinite. MURE, *supra* note 10, at 119. Rather, the True Infinite lies in the rational expression of the number, not in the infinite series in which any number can be expressed, as Mure recognizes elsewhere. *Id.* at 120.

speculatively inferior. (249) $0.285714 \dots$ at least expresses "an incommensurability, or the impossibility of representing the quantitative ratio contained in them as a quantum." (249) This incommensurability is even more pronounced in irrational numbers--numbers that cannot even be expressed as fractions (*i.e.*, $\frac{2}{7}$). In any case, a series capable of summation likewise contains the same spurious infinity that an inexpressible series contains.¹²³

Hegel claims that a similar terminological inversion occurs in the work of an unnamed philosopher, who designates the mathematical infinite--in the sense of the True Infinite--as the relative infinite. This philosopher gives the name "absolute" to the Spurious Infinite. "But in point of fact it is this metaphysical infinite which is merely relative, because the negation which it expresses is opposed to a limit only in such a manner that this limit *persists* outside it." (249) In other words, Spurious Infinity is always a Finite facing another Finite which is its beyond. The True Infinite encompasses both the finites, as Figure 6(c) showed in chapter 2.

The mathematical infinite, properly viewed, is a True Infinite.¹²⁴ It "has within itself truly sublated the finite limit because the *beyond* of the latter is united with it." (249)

Spinoza. Spinoza recognized the True Infinite and profitably compared it to the Spurious Infinite. According to Spinoza, the infinite is "the absolute affirmation of any kind of natural existence." (249) Such an absolute affirmation "is to be taken as its relation to itself, its not being dependent on an *other*." (250) The mere finite, for Spinoza, is "a determinateness, as a negation . . . a ceasing-to-be in the form of a *relation* to an *other* which begins *outside* it." (250)

These are sentiments with which Hegel is in accord, but Hegel also thinks that "the absolute affirmation of an existence does not . . . exhaust the notion of infinity." (250) An infinity is not merely an immediacy. Rather, it is "restored by the reflection of the *other* into itself, or as negation of the negative." (250) In short, the True Infinite is a middle term. With Spinoza, however, substance is an inert unity--"a fixity or rigidity in which the Notion of the negative unity of the self, *i.e.* subjectivity, is still lacking." (250) Nevertheless, Spinoza at least recognized that the True Infinite (Spinoza's "infinite of thought") was "complete and present within itself." (250) The Spurious Infinite (Spinoza's "infinite of the imagination") "definitely lacks something." (251) Thus, according to Hegel's reading of Spinoza, $\frac{2}{7}$ is what the infinite series ($0.285714 \dots$) *ought to be*. Meanwhile, imagination, in contemplating the Spurious Infinite, "stops

¹²³ Thus, $\frac{2}{7}$ can be expressed as $1 + a + a^2 + a^3$ etc., where $a = .5$. This is on the formula $1/(1-a)$, where $a < 1$. See *supra* n.121.

¹²⁴ Justus Hartnack, who admits that he struggles with Measure, sees that more advanced state as showing "why the alleged bad [mathematical] infinity is a true infinity." Hartnack, *supra* note 78, at 35. But it must be recognized that the concepts here have been True Infinities ever since the end of Chapter 2. What Measure will do is to show the sublation of both Quality and Quantity, and the establishment of a true self-subsistence of things.

short at quantum as such and does not reflect on the qualitative relation which constitutes the ground of the existing incommensurability." (251) In other words, Speculative Reason sees that the Infinitely Great/Small cannot be named as such and so it is both qualitative--independent of outside manipulation--and a relation between the alternating finites of the Spurious Infinite. As the name of the alternating activity, the Infinitely Great/Small is thus incommensurate with the finites it unites.

Incommensurability Between Arithmetic and the Calculus. Hegel next wishes to consider this incommensurability, which lies inherent in functions of curved lines (e.g., $y^2 = ax$). Such a function is said to involve *variables*. These variables are different in character than the variability of 2 in $2/7$, which equally can be 4 or 8, if the denominator becomes 14 or 28. In contemplating $y = ax$, x and y can be any magnitude. Hegel complains, "The expression 'variable magnitudes' is therefore very vague and ill-chosen for those determinations of magnitude whose interest and manner of treatment lie in something quite distinct from their mere variability." (251-52) Hegel's basic complaint is that, because the same terminology ("variable") is used in both arithmetic and calculus, an enormous metaphysical difference between the two practices remains hidden.

What is our interest in x and y , as these appear in the function $y = ax$? Recall that, in $2/7$ or y/x , the numerator is an independent quantum with regard to the denominator. The relation of numerator to denominator is not essential to the quanta that are made to participate in the ratio. But $2/7$ and y/x are also "a fixed quantum, a quotient." (252) But this observation does not hold if we consider the function $y^2/x = a$. x and y^2 have a determinate quotient, but, within $y^2/x = a$, x/y has no fixed relation with y^2/x . In other words, y/x is irrelevant and indifferent (or, as Hegel puts it, "variable") to the ratio y^2/x . Thus, x has a relation, not to y , but to y^2 . This leads Hegel to observe that "[t]he relation of a magnitude to a power is not a quantum, but essentially a qualitative relation." (252)

What does Hegel mean by this? If we map y/x on a Cartesian plane, a straight line is generated. On this straight line, the quotient never changes. This is no longer true with regard to y^2/x . Thus, where $y = 7$ and $x = 2$, $y/x = 7/2 = 14/4$. But this does not hold for the exponential function y^2/x ; $7^2/2$ is not the same as $14^2/4$; y^2/x enjoys a qualitative moment free of arbitrary outside manipulation. In comparison, y/x is "only *formally* a function of variable magnitudes." (252) In the ratio y/x , y and x are "not in that determination in which the differential and the integral calculus considers them." (252)¹²⁵ Presumably, what Hegel means by this is that, in y/x , the ratio is dependent on otherness-- y and x are in an indifferent relation. But calculus trafficks in $*y/*x$. Where $*y$ or $*x$ are the infinitely small changes in y or x , these entities are not even quanta, as Hegel is about to

¹²⁵ If differential calculus studies $*y$ given $*x$, integral calculus goes backwards. It contemplates x as a differential, and it derives the primitive formula of which x is the differential. For example, if differential calculus states that the derivative of $y = 5x$ is 5, integral calculus contemplates 5 and deduces that it is the derivative of $y = 5x + c$.

emphasize.¹²⁶

Given the qualitative moment in y^2/x , which is not present in y/x , "it would have been fitting to have introduced both a special name for them." (252) There is "an essential difference between those magnitudes and such quanta which are merely unknown, but are in themselves completely determined or are a definite range of determinate quanta." (252-53) Thus, mathematics should have seen what a radical break calculus is, compared to the "equation of the straight line." (253)¹²⁷ "A great deal of formalism would, indeed, have been avoided if it had been perceived that the calculus is concerned not with variable magnitudes as such but with *relations of powers*." (253)¹²⁸

By way of preview, Hegel will end his analysis of Quantity with the Ratio of Powers, in which Quantity recaptures Quality. From thence, Hegel will move to Measure, in which Quantity and Quality enjoy equal dignity.

The Differential Calculus. Suppose x and y are in a power relation, such as y^2/x . In this relation, x and y still signify quanta. But "this significance is altogether and completely lost in the so-called *infinitesimal differences*." (253) Take the expression $*x/*y$, where $*x$ stands for some change in x and hence some fixed change in y . In this expression $*x$ and $*y$ "are no longer quanta, nor are they supposed to signify quanta; it is solely in their relation to each

¹²⁶ Hegel elsewhere emphasizes that the Infinitely Great/Small is simultaneously Quantum and the beyond of Quantum. Here Hegel obviously means a more primitive Quantum. That is, the calculus of Hegel's time viewed $*x$ and $*y$ as Numbers, not qualitative entities.

¹²⁷ According to one commentator:

Mathematics is essentially the science of operating with finite quantities. Calculation in respect of the infinite requires procedures that are clearly at odds with this. At one and the same time, procedures relevant to computation in respect of finite quantities are being used in connection with infinite quantities. This notionless procedure apparent in the differential calculus, shows that this kind of mathematics is incapable of dealing with qualitative differences, and such a calculus is therefore quite unsuitable for physics.

Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 76.

¹²⁸ Modern textbooks reflect this notion that application of the calculus to linear functions masks the true qualitative significance of the practice and even take the point farther. One exemplar refers to the "degenerate case of a function of one variable," and states, "The notion of the differential of a function does not appear in its true light in the theory of functions of one variable." R. CREIGHTON BUCK, *ADVANCED CALCULUS* 243 (2d ed. 1965). In considering $2x$ as the derivative of $y = x^2$, this textbook advises: "one must draw the subtle distinction between a number c [*i.e.*, $2x$] and the 1-by-1 matrix $[c]$." *Id.* These remarks are entirely Hegelian in their thrust.

other than that they have any meaning, *a meaning merely as moments.*" (253) Hegel states that x and y "are no longer *something* (something taken as a quantum), not finite differences; but neither are they *nothing*; not empty nullities." (253) Apart from their relation to each other, they are nullities, but as moments of x/y , each is highly significant.

In x/y , Hegel says, Quantum is "genuinely completed into a qualitative reality; it is posited as actually infinite; it is sublated not merely as this or that quantum but as quantum generally." (253) In other words, neither x nor y is a quantum on its own. Rather, each is a "vanishing magnitude" and hence no particular quantum. (254) What we have is pure ratio, no longer a Quantity determined by outside forces. The ratio posits (announces) itself as infinite. It is a negation of the negation. It has sublated its finite parts and has genuine being-for-self. Because x/y exceeds finite quanta, it stands for Quantum generally, just as the True Infinite stood for all the Finites. Nevertheless, x/y is still a determinateness. Mathematics takes x/y as "not nothing" but as "an intermediate state . . . between being and nothing." (254) This state does not exist, however, just as Becoming does not exist. It is erroneous to think of Becoming (or x/y) as a *state*.

The nature of Quantum is that "it is supposed to have a completely indifferent existence apart from its ratio." (254) That is, 2 and 7 have meaning on their own apart from 2/7. But x/y "has being *solely* in the ratio" (254) and hence is not even a Quantum.

The True Infinity of x/y has been a target, even for mathematicians, Hegel says. But these attacks come from an inability to digest the Notion. Nevertheless, anyone wishing to practice the calculus--which converts curved into straight lines and the like--must come to grips with the fact that the practice exceeds "the nature of merely finite determinations." (254)

Newton. Hegel undertakes to show how the originators of the calculus did not adequately grasp the nature of the True Infinite. As a result, they "found it necessary in the application to resort again to expedients which conflict with their better cause." (255)

Newton correctly saw a differential as, not an indivisible, but as a vanishing divisible--not as a sum and ratio but as the *limit* of a sum and ratio. For Newton there are no indivisibles. Indivisibles would imply "a leap again from the abstract ratio to its sides as supposedly having an independent value of their own as indivisibles outside their relation." (256)

Hegel quotes Newton's reference to x/y as a "final ratio." (255, 256) Is this attribution of finality fair, when the ratio itself is in the business of vanishing--i.e., approaching zero? Hegel thinks so, because the "ratio of vanishing magnitudes is to be understood not [as] the ratio *before which* and *after which* they vanish, but *with which* they vanish." (255) In other words, the ratio is "final" only in this odd, contradictory state of ceasing-to-be. The phrase x/y is therefore a species of Becoming.

Newton saw that this final ratio (x/y) is not to be taken as a ratio of final magnitudes, but as a limit to which the ratio of the "magnitudes decreasing without limit are nearer than any given . . . difference." (256) If Newton had been attentive to the Notion, however, "there would have been no need for the *decreasing without limit* into

which Newton converts the quantum and which only expresses the progress to infinity." (256)

The ratio $*x/*y$ is therefore in a state of continuity between being and vanishing. Hegel approves of the phrase *continuity*, "if the continuity of the quantum is not understood to be the continuity which it has in the finite progress where the quantum is continued in its vanishing." (257) This is only Spurious Infinity. But where transition is made, not to another finite quantum, but to the True Infinite, the usage is appropriate:

so *continuous* is it, so completely is it preserved, that the transition may be said to consist solely in throwing into relief the pure ratio and causing the non-relational determination--i.e., that a quantum which is a side of the ratio is still a quantum outside this relation--to vanish. (257)

This purification of the quantitative ratio--the loss of indifferent quanta as the determining sides--"is thus analogous to grasping an empirical reality in terms of its Notion." (257) Still, the very expression $*x$ is

the fundamental vice in these methods--the permanent obstacle to disengaging the determination of the qualitative moment of quantity in its purity from the conception of the ordinary quantum. (258)

That is, the very reference to x --a fixed quantum--in $*x$ leads away from proper appreciation of the Notion inherent in the obviously fascinating concept of the derivative.

Hegel dislikes the word "infinitesimal." "The nature of these magnitudes is supposed to be such that they may be *neglected*." (258)¹²⁹ This neglect, "along with a gain in facility," gives the calculus "the appearance of inexactitude and express incorrectness in its method of procedure." (258) Hegel criticizes Christian Wolff¹³⁰ for comparing the calculus to a surveyor "who, in measuring the height of a mountain is no less accurate if meanwhile the wind has blown away a grain of sand

¹²⁹ For example, where $f(x) = 3x^2 - 4$, it is said that $*y/*x = 6x$. In truth, it equals $6x + 3*x$. But, since $*x$ approaches zero, the calculus feels entitled to treat $3*x$ as if it has vanished. *E.g.*, ALPHA CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 129 (3d ed. 1984).

¹³⁰ Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was professor of Mathematics and Philosophy at Marburg and was a "popularizer and systematizer of Leibniz." See André Mense, *Hegel's Library: The Works on Mathematics, Mechanics, Optics and Chemistry*, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 670, 690 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). At a time when he was considered Germany's leading philosopher, he was discharged for heresy from the University of Halle. TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL: A BIOGRAPHY 90 (2000).

from the top."¹³¹ (258) Hegel rejects the common sense approach that allows for tolerance of such inexactitude. "[I]n the science of mathematics there cannot be any question of such empirical accuracy." (258)

Euler. Leopold Euler, Hegel says, "insists that the differential calculus considers the *ratios of the increments* of a magnitude, but that the *infinite difference* as such is to be considered as wholly *nil*." (259) In truth, Hegel responds, the infinite difference is a nil "only of quantum, not a qualitative nil." (259) The infinitesimal is perhaps not a quantitative difference. For this reason, it is wrong, in Hegel's opinion, to speak of these moments as "increments or decrements and as *differences*." (259) Such terms imply that "something is *added to* or *subtracted from* the initially given finite magnitude." (259) Such arithmetical operations are quite external to the essence of the calculus. "[T]he transition of the variable magnitude into its differential is of quite a different nature." (259) Rather than reducing a quantum through subtraction, $*y/*x$ "is to be considered as a reduction of the finite function to the qualitative relation of its quantitative determinations." (259)

In any case, we must not reduce $*x$ or $*y$ to zero, "for a zero no longer has any determinateness at all." (259) True, zero negates the quantum, which is useful, since $*x$ and $*y$ are not quanta. But zero fails to capture the positive significance of the negation of quantum.

Calculus, then, neglects the True Infinite and transforms $*y$ and $*x$ into the "finite determinateness of quantity and the operation cannot dispense with the conception of a quantum which is merely *relatively small*." (260) These quanta are then subject to ordinary arithmetical operations, as if they were finite magnitudes.

How has mathematics tried to justify the transformation of the True Infinite into mere magnitudes? The precursors of calculus (Fermat and Barrow) "frankly believed that they were entitled to omit the products of infinitesimal differences and their higher powers, solely on the ground that they *vanish relatively* to the lower order." (262) For example, x_1^2 or x_2^2 are, by definition, always greater than $*x^2$. The differential therefore vanishes "relatively" to the variable x .

The attitude toward curves demonstrates a like methodology of omitting that which is taken as insignificant.¹³² In effect, where x_1 and

¹³¹ According to one commentator the point is that Wolff

combines empirical and analytical argumentation and therefore is not conclusive. Wolff's analogy is inadequate and inconsistent because it identifies two logically different arguments: mathematical inference and measurement. The limited accuracy of measurement is not a mathematical proof.

Wolfgang Neuser, *The Difference Between Begrifflicher Spekulation and Mathematics in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, in 226, 236, in *HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY* (David Lamb ed., 1987).

¹³² Calculus holds that $*y/*x = y/a$, where x is distance on the abscissa, y is the distance on the ordinate between the tangent and

x_2 are points on the curve that are infinitely close together, calculus assumes that the two points are connected by a straight line. Area exists between the straight line and the curve, but this space is ignored.

Hegel presents a demonstration by Newton as an example of the inexactitude from which calculus suffers.¹³³ This involves Newton's derivation of the "product rule" of the differential calculus. According to this rule, where $y = f(x)$, $*xy/*x = x*y + y*x$.¹³⁴

Newton derived the product rule as follows. Take the product xy . First, reduce each element by half its infinitesimal difference ($x - *x/2$ and $y - *y/2$). Second, multiply these reduced quanta together. Thus, $(x - *x/2)(y - *y/2) = xy - x*y/2 - y*x/2 + *x*y/4$. Now do the opposite: increase each element by half its infinitesimal difference, to obtain $xy + x*y/2 + y*x/2 + *x*y/4$. Now subtract one result from the other:

$$(xy + x*y/2 + y*x/2 + *x*y/4) - (xy - x*y/2 - y*x/2 + *x*y/4) = y*x + x*y.$$

This last formulation ($y*x + x*y$) is, of course, the product rule. This product rule is the surplus when the first product was subtracted from the second. The surplus, Hegel says, is "the difference between the two products" and "therefore the differential of xy ." (263)

Hegel retorts, "in spite of the name of Newton it must be said that such an operation although very elementary, is incorrect." (263) Hegel thinks Newton's proof of $y*x + x*y$ fairly implies the following:

$$(x + *x)(y + *y) - xy$$

That is, Newton's procedure was to increase x by $*x$ and y by $*y$ and multiply them. Then Newton subtracted xy and was supposedly left with the product rule. Yet, if the above expression is expanded (or multiplied out), we obtain

$$(x + *x)(y + *y) - xy = y*x + x*y + xy - xy + *x*y$$

the abscissa, and a is the subtangent (i.e., the line segment on the abscissa between the tangent point and the place where the tangent (as hypotenuse) meets the ordinate. In particular, this describes the technique of Isaac Barrow, Newton's teacher. W.W. ROUSE BALL, *A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS* --- (4th ed. 1908).

¹³³ Apparently, Hegel "had no very high opinion of Newton's ability to deal with thoughts." Renate Wahsner, *The Philosophical Background to Hegel's Criticism of Newton*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 81 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). Thus, Hegel elsewhere accuses Newton of having "flooded mechanics with monstrous metaphysics." *HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE* § 270 Remark (A.V. Miller trans., 1970).

¹³⁴ For example, if $x = 2a + 3$, and $y = 3a^2$, then $*x/*a = 2$ and $*y/*a = 6a$. According to the product rule, $*xy/*x = (2)(3a^2) + (2a + 3)6a = 18a^2 + 18a$.

Hence, the product rule (by which we calculate the derivative of $\frac{xy}{x}$) leaves out the product of the differentials ($x \cdot y$)--the usual imprecision of which 18th century calculus was guilty. "It can only have been the need to establish the all-important fluxional calculus which could bring Newton to deceive himself with such a proof," Hegel remarks. (263)¹³⁵

Many of Newton's proofs, Hegel complains, involve the infinite series. His equations can only be solved by approximations. These omissions, Hegel says, "gave his opponents the occasion of a triumph of their method over his." (263) Thus, in mechanics, the function of motion is developed from a series. The series is given a specific meaning. The first term refers to the moment of velocity. The second refers to accelerating force. The third refers to the resistance of forces. The terms of these series are not to be regarded as parts of a whole, but are rather "qualitative moments of a whole determined by the concept." (264) Thus, Hegel says,

the omission of the rest of the terms belonging to the spuriously infinite series acquires an altogether different meaning from omission on the ground of their relative smallness. The error in the Newtonian solution arose, *not* because terms of the series were neglected only as parts of a sum, but because the term containing the qualitative determination, which is the essential point, was ignored. (264)

In other words, Newtonian physics omits the True Infinite, which was expelled from the analysis when the Spurious Infinite was transformed into a fixed sum.

In a lengthy footnote, Hegel, quotes Lagrange as demonstrating how parts of infinite series are left out in Newton's demonstrations. In this demonstration, space traversed is considered as a function of time elapsed ($x = ft$). When developed as $f(t + \Delta t)$, an infinite series is developed: $ft + f' \Delta t + \frac{1}{2} f'' \Delta t^2 . . .$ Motion is therefore said to be "composed"--a Hegelian swear word¹³⁶--of various partial motions. (264 n.1) Each part is likewise expressed by the same infinite series.

In the infinite series, the first derivative is associated with velocity. The second derivative is associated with acceleration.¹³⁷ The third derivative and the rest are simply ignored.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Newton called x or y "fluxions." Fluxions were "evanescent quantities" and had a significance separate and apart from the ratio $\frac{y}{x}$. BOYER, CALCULUS, *supra* note 115, at 255.

¹³⁶ Composed things--i.e., 2/7--are brought together by an outside finite will and are therefore doomed to de-compose.

¹³⁷ *E.g.*, GEORGE B. THOMAS, JR., CALCULUS AND ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 60 (3d ed. 1962).

¹³⁸ In other words, "negligibility of terms of order three and higher in the Taylor-development of the path as a function of time, is an empirical, not a mathematical fact." Louik Fleischhacker, *Hegel*

Newtonian procedure, Hegel remarks, "is made to depend on the qualitative *meaning*." (265) By this, Hegel probably means that, since the procedure is exact, it is not entirely quantitative and hence is therefore qualitative. Thus, Newton and his followers suppose they omit the tail end of the series because it is an insignificant sum, "while the reason for omitting them is made to consist in the relativity of their *quantum*." (266) The relativity in question justifies the belief that the omissions are based on a quantitative insignificance, not a qualitative one.

What physics should do, then, is to state the qualitative meaning and make the procedure depend on it. This would displace the formalism of Newtonian method. Speculative Reason has no difficulty in ending the series with the first derivative (f't), because Speculative Reason names this the True Infinite.

Thus the omission of the rest of the terms is not on account of their relative smallness; and so there is no assumption of an inexactitude, an error or mistake which could be compensated or rectified by another error . . . (265)

If Speculative Reason were in control of physics, it would recognize the first derivative as a relation, not a sum. Physics would be saved from the Spurious Infinite.

Limit. The mathematical notion of limit, Hegel says, is qualitative in nature. It implies "the true category of the *qualitatively* determined relation of variable magnitudes." (266) Thus *x and *y, which represent the infinitesimally small changes of x and y, "are supposed to be taken simply and solely as moments of *y/*x." (266-67) Indeed, the ratio *y/*x is to be taken as indivisible. Indivisibility (*i.e.*, simplicity) is the hallmark of Quality.

Limit here is the limit of a given function. For example, given $y = 3x^2$

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow 1} y = 3$$

In mathematics, the limit of $y = 3x^2$ has no relation to $y = 3x^2$ as such. But the very use of the phrase "limit" suggests "limit of *something*." (267) "It is supposed to be the limit of the *ratio* between the two *increments* by which the two variable magnitudes connected in an equation are supposed to have been *increased*"--or, in short, it is supposed to be *y/*x. This increase of the function need not be infinitely small. In any case, the "way in which the limit is found involves the same inconsistencies as are contained in the other methods." (267)

Hegel gives this example: suppose $y = fx$. Consider $y + k$. Any constant (k, to be taken here as $>x$) can be expressed as an infinite series. Hence, $k = ph + qh^2 . . .$; and $y + k = fx + ph + qh^2 . . .$ If we divide both sides of this equation by h, we get $k/h = p + qh + rh^2 . . .$ If h vanishes, because of its insignificance, the right side of

this equation also vanishes, with the exception of p . This p is the limit of the ratio of the two increments ($\Delta y/\Delta x$). In short, for "vanishing" purposes, $h = 0$. Yet k/h cannot equal $0/0$. It must remain a ratio, so, for this purpose, $h > 0$.

The idea of limit (p) was to avoid the inconsistency in which h is implicated. The limit (p) is not $0/0$, but only an infinite approximation. This limit (the infinitely small) is no longer a quantitative difference. But we have not gotten away from $\Delta y/\Delta x = 0$. If $\Delta y/\Delta x = p$ --a quantitative ratio--then how could $h = 0$ --an indispensable assumption if $p = \Delta y/\Delta x$?

To this there is at once an obvious answer, the simple, meagre answer that it is a coefficient derived in such and such a way--the first function, derived in a certain specific manner, of an original function. (268)

If this suffices as an answer, the theory of limits would be rid of the troublesome increments. But what meaning, then, does p have--"apart from the meagre definition, quite adequate for this theory, that it is simply a function derived from the expansion of a binomial"? (269)

Hegel next addresses the "confusion which the concept of *approximation* . . . has occasioned in the understanding of the true, qualitative determinateness" of $\Delta y/\Delta x$. (269) The "so-called infinitesimals express the vanishing of the sides of the ratio as quanta. [W]hat remains is their quantitative relation solely as qualitatively determined." (269) There is no loss of the qualitative relation here. On the contrary, "it is just this relation which results from the conversion of finite into infinite magnitudes." (269)

Hegel complains that the ordinate and abscissa each vanish into a yet smaller ordinate or abscissa. But the abscissa never seems to convert itself into the ordinate or vice versa. This is evidence of qualitative determinations of Δy or Δx .

The calculus, however, insists that Δy , for example, is a quantum--an "element of the ordinate." (270) In fact, "the limit here does not have the meaning of ratio; it counts only as the final value to which another magnitude of a similar kind continually approximates in such a manner that it can differ from it by as little as we please." (270) In truth, Δx or Δy are not even quanta, and, because of this, it makes no sense to speak of Δx or Δy expressing a distance between two quanta. For this reason, the phrase "*approximation* of a magnitude to its limit" is rankly abused. (270) Δx is in fact incommensurable with x_0 or x_1 .

Calculus and the physical world. Hegel accuses physics of extrapolating forces of nature from calculus instead of vice versa:

It is announced as a triumph of science that by means of the calculus alone, laws are found *transcending experience*, that is, proposition about existence which have no existence. (272)

Of this practice, Hegel remarks, "I do not hesitate to regard this affectation as nothing more than mere jugglery and window-dressing."

(273) Newton is expressly named as guilty of jugglery.¹³⁹

Mathematics is proclaimed "altogether incapable of proving determinations of the physical world in so far as they are laws based on the *qualitative* nature of the moments [of the subject matter]." (270) Hence, science is less than philosophy, because it "does not *start from the Notion*." (273) In science, the "qualitative element, in so far as it is not taken lemmatically^[140] from experience, lies outside its sphere." (270) Science has a desire to "uphold the honour of mathematics" and so it forgets its limits. "[T]hus it seemed against its honour to acknowledge simply experience as the course and sole proof of empirical propositions." (270) In Hegel's view, experience is a poor source for truth.¹⁴¹

Hegel predicts the downfall of Newton: "Without doubt, however, the same justice will be done to that framework of Newtonian proof as was done to another baseless and artificial Newtonian structure of optical experiments." (270) Here, Hegel refers to the basic rejection of Newton's optical theories.

Remark 2: The Purpose of the Differential Calculus Deduced from its Application

Hegel moves from the nature of the infinitesimal in the calculus

¹³⁹ One commentator opines:

Treating one of the greatest minds ever to have devoted itself to the natural sciences in this manner, naturally led many of Hegel's contemporaries, just as it has led so many of his later interpreters, into thinking that [Hegel's] manner of philosophizing was fundamentally at odds with Newton's mathematico-mechanical approach . . . Since Newton's dynamics have proved themselves in the course of time to be immensely superior to the competing approaches of Descartes and Leibniz, the conclusion has been drawn that there is really no point in paying any attention to Hegel's arguments.

Karl-Norbert Ihmig, *Hegel's Rejection of the Concept of Force*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 399, 399-400 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). But Borzeszkowski proclaims Hegel "quite right" on this score. "One has to agree with him completely when he objects to basing the calculus on, 'an increment from the force of gravity,' or the argument of the 'unimportance of the difference.'" Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 76 (footnotes omitted), *citing Science of Logic* at 272, 259, 262. Cauchy, Heine and Weierstrass, among others, would, more or less contemporaneously with Hegel's time, put calculus on the firmer footing of "limit. *Id*;" Moore, *supra* note 112, at 147; Moretto, *supra* note 65, at 162.

¹⁴⁰ *I.e.*, deductively.

¹⁴¹ To paraphrase Kant, experience has insufficient vouchers for the truth. *CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT*, *supra* note 87, at 74.

to the topic of the applications of the calculus, which he finds more difficult.

Hegel states that "the whole method of the differential calculus is complete in the proposition $*x^n = nx^{n-1}*x$, or $f(x + i) - fx/i = P$." (274) The former expression denotes the power rule. The latter is the difference quotient presented (by me) at the beginning of the last remark to illustrate Hegel's comment that calculus is burdened with inexactitude.¹⁴² In both these formulae, where a binomial formula has the form of $(x + d)$, $*x$ is the coefficient of the first term (e.g., where $y = 5x + c$, $*y/*x = 5$). Of calculus, Hegel sniffs, "[t]here is no need to learn anything further." (274) The product rule¹⁴³ or the power rule of calculus follows mechanically from this. It takes a half hour to learn calculus, Hegel claims:

What takes longer is simply the effort to understand . . . how it is that, after so easily . . . finding the differential, analytically, i.e. purely arithmetically, by the expansion of the function of the variable after this has received the form of a binomial by the addition of an increment;^[144] how it is that the *second stage* can be correct, namely the omission of all the terms except the first, of the [infinite] series arising from the expansion. (274)¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² See *supra* text accompanying notes 104-06. In Hegel's formulation, $P = >y/>x$. The letter i stands for "increment."

¹⁴³ $*xy/*x = x*y + y*x$.

¹⁴⁴ In the difference quotient, this expansion consists in $f(x + i)$.

¹⁴⁵ Such an omission can be witnessed in the Maclaurin series and the Taylor series, developed in the first half of the eighteenth century. The Maclaurin series can be described as follows: Suppose $y = f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 . . . + a_nx^n$. Where $f(x)$ passes through the origin, $x = 0$ when $y = 0$. Hence, $f(x) = a_0$, or $f(0) = a_0$. Furthermore

$$\begin{aligned} f'(x) &= a_1 + 2a_2x + 3a_3x^2 . . . + na_nx^{n-1} \\ f''(x) &= 2a_2 + 6a_3x + 12a_4x^2 . . . + na_nx^{n-2} \\ f'''(x) &= 6a_3 + 24a_4x + 60a_5x^2 . . . + na_nx^{n-3} \end{aligned}$$

Where $x = 0$, "all the terms except the first" vanish, as Hegel says. On this assumption

$$f_n^{(n)}(x) = n!a_n$$

where (!) stands for $1@2@3 . . . @n$. In other words, the n th derivative of $f(x)$, where $x = 0$, is a_n multiplied by the factorial of n ($n!$).

Setting x at zero ($f(0)$) and solving all the above formulae for a , we obtain

Calculus, Hegel claims, was not invented for its own sake. Only after it was invented did mathematicians reflect on the nature of the practice. In the previous Remark, Hegel showed how the differential (\dot{x}) was qualitative in nature. Hegel's interest in this demonstration was to show the Notion present in the practice. Now it is time to consider the transition from this origin to its application.

Relation of Powers. Calculus has its spiritual significance when it deals with the relations of powers. Thus, as emphasized in the prior Remark, $\dot{y}/\dot{x} = 5$, where $y = 5x + c$, but this is not particularly interesting to speculative philosophy. On the other hand, $\dot{y}/\dot{x} = 3x^2$, which implies $y = x^3 + c$ --this is spiritually significant, in Hegel's view.¹⁴⁶ In the next chapter, Hegel will show how, in the relation of powers (e.g., $x^2 = y$), Quantity recaptures its Quality.

To be sure, mere algebra deals with the higher powers, as when the roots of quadratic formulae are "extracted"¹⁴⁷ or when logarithms¹⁴⁸ are used. But "which of the various relations in which the determinations of powers can be put is the peculiar interest and subject matter of the differential calculus." (276)

The previous Remark showed "the futility of the search for principles which would . . . solve the contradiction revealed by the

$$\begin{aligned} a_1 &= f'(x) \\ a_2 &= f''(x)/2! \\ a_3 &= f'''(x)/3! \\ a_n &= f_n^{(n)}(x)/n! \end{aligned}$$

Substituting these values back into $y = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 . . . + a_nx^n$, we obtain

$$y = f(0) + f'(0)x + f''(0)x^2/2! + f'''(0)x^3/3! . . . + f_n^{(n)}(0)x^n/n!$$

This is Maclaurin's series. It calculates a power series for values of x near zero. Taylor's series works for values of x that are not near zero.

¹⁴⁶ Thus, Hegel remarks: "the express qualitative nature of quantity is essentially connected with the forms of powers, and . . . the specific interest of the differential calculus is to operate with qualitative forms of magnitude." (276) Only when calculus deals with the higher powers does calculus operate overtly with "qualitative forms of magnitude."

¹⁴⁷ Thus, a quadratic equation (i.e., one with a "square" in it), has the form of $ax^2 + bx + c = 0$. The "root" is x , and it is the privilege of a quadratic equation to have two different roots (where $b^2 \neq 4c$). Thus, in $x^2 = 25$ (or, to use the quadratic form, in $x^2 + 0x + 25 = 0$), x is either 5 or -5. Hegel, in the text, is saying that solving quadratic equations is spiritually unrewarding, compared to the operation of calculus on the relation of powers.

¹⁴⁸ A logarithm is the exponent that ties two known quanta together. Thus, in $4^t = 16$, t is the logarithm and, of course, $t = 2$. Logarithms are subject to their own strictly mathematical laws.

method instead of excusing it or covering up merely by the insignificance of what is here to be omitted." (276) But perhaps from applications adequate principles could be derived.

In his search for the speculative truth, Hegel examines two kinds of subject matter--(a) second degree equations and (b) infinite series (which Hegel calls functions of potentiation).¹⁴⁹

(a) Hegel mentions equations in the form of $y^2 = x$.¹⁵⁰ Such an equation is indeterminate. If, however, one of the variables is assigned a fixed value, then the other has one also. Thus, one is a function of the other. When such formulae are rendered determinate in this way, such formulas are "simple, unimportant, easy determinations." (278) They are made difficult, however, "by importing into them what they do not contain in order that this may then be derived from them--namely, the specific determination of the differential calculus." (278)

Hegel considers the relation of constants to variables. Of these constants, Hegel writes, "it is . . . an indifferent empirical magnitude determining the variables only with respect to their empirical quantum as limit of their minimum and maximum." (278) Thus, to change Hegel's principal example a bit, take $x^2 + 2 = y$. The constant determines the minimum of the parabola. Or, if $-x^2 - 2 = y$, 2 becomes the maximum of the parabola.¹⁵¹ No matter what values y or x take, 2 is unaffected. Yet 2 itself is related to y^2 by calculus. For instance, a straight line (e.g., $x = 2y$) is made into a parabola ($x = y^2 + c$) by

¹⁴⁹ Hegel's text subdivides the Remark into paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), which I have followed in my own text.

¹⁵⁰ This is in fact a quadratic equation, and can be expressed as $y^2 + 0y + x = 0$.

¹⁵¹ These parabolas can be drawn as follows:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Constant as Maximum/Minimum of Parabola

I have changed Hegel's standard example of $x = y^2$ because such a parabola does not properly yield a function at all and simultaneously has a minimum and a maximum. This parabola is not a function because each value of x yields more than one value of y, as the following diagram shows:

$$x = y^2$$

integration.¹⁵² The "expansion of the binomial generally" shows the constant to be related to the roots (278).¹⁵³ Hegel also writes, "Where, in the integral calculus, the constant is determined from the given formula, it is to that extent treated as a function of this." (278) "This" refers to the "root." Presumably this is illustrated by the fact that the "primitive" of the constant 2 is $2x + c$, thereby showing that the constant 2 is related to the root x (not to mention the additional constant c). This indifferent empirical magnitude is actually a relation to what is otherwise taken as diverse and unrelated.

Calculus, Hegel thinks, is most significant for speculative purposes when applied to equations of higher powers. The significance of this has to do with the major point of chapter 6 ("The Quantitative Relation or Quantitative Ratio"). According to that chapter, Quantum recaptures its integrity in this kind of relationship: $x^2 = 16$. In such a "ratio" of x to x , no outside mathematician can manipulate the value of x , so long as 16 holds fast. The variable x thus has "being-for-self," and Quantum has recaptured Quality.

These moves from chapter 6 explain why Hegel emphasizes the

¹⁵² Or, in other words, $y/x = 2x$, where $y = x^2$. $2x$ is a straight line, and $y = x^2$ is a parabolic curve. The exact phrase Hegel writes here is "a straight line, for example, has the meaning of being the parameter of a parabola." (278) It is also possible that Hegel has in mind the "directrix" of a parabola. A parabola is defined as the points equidistant from a straight line and a "focus"--a point:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Parabola, Focus and Directrix

In any case, both these ideas relate the line to the parabolic curve.

¹⁵³ Specifically Hegel states, "the coefficient of the first term of the development is the sum of the roots, the coefficient of the second is the sum of the products, in pairs." (278) Presumably, this remark is explained as follows. In a quadratic equation in the form $ax^2 + bx + c = 0$, x has two solutions which are the "roots." Thus, if we have $x^2 - 8x + 15 = 0$, $x = \{3, 5\}$. The above formula also can be expressed as $(x - 5)(x - 3) = 0$. In more general terms, if $3 = r_1$ and $5 = r_2$, then $(x - r_1)(x - r_2) = 0$. If we convert $(x - r_1)(x - r_2) = 0$ to the quadratic form, we obtain $x^2 - r_1x - r_2x + r_1r_2 = 0$, or $x^2 - (r_1 + r_2)x + r_1r_2 = 0$. Substituting 3 and 5 back in, $(x - 5)(x - 3) = x^2 - (3 + 5)x + (3 \cdot 5)$. In this last formulation, one can see that, if "the development" of the expansion of the binomial excludes x^2 and includes only $(r_1 + r_2)x + r_1r_2$, then the coefficient of the first term is the sum of the roots. The second term (which, however, is not a function of x) is a number (or "sum") that is the product of the roots. Hence, the constants (a, b, c) are related to the roots (the two magnitudes of x). This, at least, is what I think Hegel is driving at. In any case, Hegel is right that the constants are related to the roots.

significance of variables when they are in a relation of powers (as x is in $x^x = 16$). In such a relation "[t]he alteration of variables is . . . qualitatively determined, and hence continuous." (278) By "continuous" Hegel means that x remains what it is (hence qualitatively determined) even as it influences the other x .

In this relationship, it is very important, Hegel says, that what he calls the "exponent" x (what we would call the variable) be in a relationship with itself. The variable "raised" to the first power ($x^1 = x$) may have significance in relation with other, higher powers, but on its own, " x is merely any indeterminate quantum." (279) Calculus is (spiritually) pointless when applied to equations of the first order (as in $y = ax^1 + c$). To be sure, we can write $*y/*x = a$, but nothing is gained from this, in terms of developing the Notion of Quantum.

(b) In equations of the second order or higher (e.g., $y^2 = x$), "the power is taken as being *within itself* a relation or a *system of relations*." (279) Hegel defines power as "number which has reached the stage where it *determines its own alteration*." (279) In such a relation, the "moments of unit and amount are identical." (280)

Power is always a number. Thus, when 4 is raised to the second power, the result is 16, or when cubed, 4 becomes 64. These "powers" (16 or 64) could itself be "analysed into an arbitrary amount of numbers which have no further determination relatively to one another or their sum, other than that together they are equal to the sum." (280) If we take 16, these can be split into indifferent parts: $15 + 1 = 16$, or $7 + 9 = 16$. Such a procedure has no philosophic significance. But the power could likewise be "split into a *sum* of differences which are determined by the *form of the power*." (280) That is, if $x^x = 16$, x has a certain qualitative integrity of its own, immune from outside manipulation.

As Hegel is interested in quadratic formulas at this point, Hegel suggests that 16 should be viewed as a sum, or $(y + z)^2 = y^2 + 2yz + z^2 = 16$. Thus, each "radical root" is a binomial $(y + z)$. Although the roots could be taken as polynomial, such "further increase in the number of terms is a mere *repetition* of the same determination and therefore meaningless." (280) "[G]enuine universality" is on full display with the binomial. (280) Once we have a binomial "the law is found." (280 n.1) The law in question, presumably, is the "qualitative determinateness of the terms resulting from the *raising to a power* of the root taken as a sum." (280)

Hegel says, "This determinateness lies solely in the alteration which the potentiation is." (280) Potentiation may be defined as "the state of being rendered more potent, or more active." (280) Hegel uses the phrase "function of potentiation" to describe the following series: $x^n = (y + z)^n = y^n + ny^{n-1}z + n(n-1)y^{n-2}z^2/2 + n(n-1)(n-2)y^{n-3}z^3/3! . . .$ ¹⁵⁴ Thus, "potentiation" reveals any Quantum to be qualitative at

¹⁵⁴ This is the binomial theorem discovered by Isaac Newton. See BOYER, MATHEMATICS, *supra* note 115, at 393-96; Niccolò Guicciardini, *Newton and British Newtonians on the Foundation of the Calculus*, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 167, 170 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). The text reflects a slight change and extrapolation from the Miller translation on which this commentary is largely based. According to that source, $x^n = (y + z)^n = y + ny^{n-1}z . . .$ (281) In other words,

heart--a power to some binomial.

If x (which stands for some magnitude) is rendered into a series, x can be shown to contain within it a power relation.

But in this connexion it is essential to distinguish another object of interest, namely the *relation of the fundamental magnitude* itself (whose determinateness, since it is a complex, i.e. here an equation, includes *within itself* a power) *to the functions of potentiation*. This relation, taken in complete abstraction from the previously mentioned interest of the *sum*, will show itself to be the sole standpoint yielded by the practical aspect of the science. (280-81)

To translate, the "fundamental magnitude" would be the power (16 in the expression $x^2 = 16$). The function of potentiation reveals the qualitative core (x) at the heart of any Quantum. Divorced from mere arithmetic, the qualitative nature of the relation of powers thus emerges from a "spiritual" study of calculus.

Before this qualitative relation is considered, Hegel wishes to dispel a possible implication of what has been said. The variable that is self-determined in the power relation (x in $x^2 = 16$) is in fact a system of terms. Thus, $x^n = (y + z)^n = y^n + ny^{n-1}z + n(n-1)y^{n-2}z^2/2 + n(n-1)(n-2)y^{n-3}z^3/3! . . .$ What matters here, Hegel asserts, is, not the sum as such, but the power relation revealed in the above series. The power relation as such can be isolated or abstracted from the "plus" signs of the above series.

But every power likewise has an express "plus sign" in it as the preceding power series reveals. This "plus sign" stands for indeterminacy, or quantitative difference. Or, in other words, the power relation may be an advance over simpler Quantum, but not *that* much of an advance such that it is entirely immune from outside manipulation. Even the power relation has (some of its) quality outside itself, as the chapters on Measure will emphasize. For this reason, Hegel remarks:

To treat an equation of the powers of its variables as a relation of the functions developed by potentiation can, in the first place, be said to be just a *matter of choice* or a *possibility*; the utility of such a transformation has to be indicated by some further *purpose* or use . . . (281)

In other words, quanta do not transform *themselves* to power series. Some outside force must make it happen. The Hegelian motive to do so, of course, would be to further progress in the Logic from beyond Quantity to Measure. Objective progress in the Logic still depends so

the exponent n is left off the y variable, which is incorrect. The Johnston-Struthers translation does not make this error. HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 298 (W.H. Johnston & L.G. Struthers trans., 1929).

far on subjective intervention.¹⁵⁵

In the function of potentiation given by Hegel, $x^n = (y + z)^n = y + ny^{n-1}z + n(n-1)y^{n-2}z^2/2 + n(n-1)(n-2)y^{n-3}z^3/3! \dots$, every term beyond y is the derivative of $(y + z)^n$ multiplied by z and divided by $n!$ Because the derivative is involved in this expansion, the increment ($z = *x$) is added to the original variable y . According to the mathematicians, $*x$ "is supposed to be not a quantum but only a *form*, the whole value of which is that it *assists* the development." (282)¹⁵⁶ Euler and Lagrange admit that the expansion is intended to produce the coefficients of the variables.¹⁵⁷ But setting z at 1 instead of an increment would likewise preserve coefficients, if that is all that is required.¹⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the use of $*x = z$ is to be criticized because $*x$ "is burdened with the false idea of a quantitative difference" which must later be "removed and left out." (282) In any case, "the essential point of interest" is the revelation of the power relation inherent in any Quantum. This "*power determination is immediate.*" (282) That is, it resists officious intermeddling by the mathematician and shows a moment of integrity within any Quantum.

Nor should this "power determination" be defined as the coefficient of the first term.¹⁵⁹ Apparently, this "quantifies" $*x$

¹⁵⁵ This is the so-called "silent fourth" of the Quality chapters. CARLSON, *supra* note 2, at 485-88.

¹⁵⁶ In general, Hegel accuses mathematics of quantifying $*x$ instead of leaving it an unnameable quality. Here he perhaps suggests that the practice of mathematics is inconsistent: it justifies the addition of the increment because the increment is pure form (qualitative, not quantitative).

¹⁵⁷ Hegel's exact sentence: "it is admitted--most categorically by Euler and Lagrange and in the previously mentioned concept of limit--that what is wanted is only the resulting power determinations of the variables, the so-called *coefficients*, namely, of the increment and its powers, according to which the series is ordered and to which the different coefficients belong." (282)

¹⁵⁸ Hegel seems to suggest that Euler and Lagrange hold that $y = x - *x$, and that $z = *x$, but in fact the formula works for any value of z . Hegel also states in this regard:

In order to retain the form of a series expanded on the basis of powers, the designations of the exponents as indices could equally well be attached to the one. (282)

I take this remark to mean the following: In the power series $x^n = (y + z)^2 = y + ny^{n-1}z + n(n-1)y^{n-2}z^2/2 + n(n-1)(n-2)y^{n-3}z^3/3! \dots$ the exponent to z indexes the terms of the expansion--the amount added to y . If $z = 1$, Hegel is saying, the exponent to z would still effectively index the terms of the expansion.

¹⁵⁹ This can be discerned *supra* in note 145.

illegitimately. Instead the series should be described as a "derived function of a power." (283) Presumably, this would signal the qualitative nature of x^n .

What is to be made of the power relation revealed in the function of potentiation?, Hegel asks. He observes that the series involves a decrease in the magnitude of the exponent: thus, $n-1$ yields to $n-2$, which in turn yields to $n-3$, as we travel from the first, second and third derivative. This series reflects the nature of space. Thus, x^3 describes a cube, with height, space and width. The first derivative ($3x^2$) reduces the cube to a plane. The second derivative ($6x$) reduces the plane to a line. The calculus amounts to a relation between these various dimensions. "The straight line [$y = 6x$] has an empirical quantum," Hegel writes (283). But the plane [$3x^2$] is qualitative; it contains a power relation.

Similarly, with regard to motion, the function of space traversed to time elapsed is a quantitative relation--that is, a straight line with no power relation. But accelerating or decelerating speed involves a power relation and hence is qualitative.

The differential calculus as applied to these relations appears arbitrary, but this would not be the case if one is aware of "the nature of the spheres in which its application is permissible." (284) Hegel implies that some consideration of a higher order equation to its derivative will reveal something on this score.

Hegel invokes "the simplest example from curves determined by an equation of the second degree." (284) For instance, $f(x) = x^2 + c$. The first derivative of such a formula produces the slope of the line tangent to this curve ($2x$). Other relevant lines to this curve are the "normal," which is perpendicular to the tangent¹⁶⁰ and the subtangent.¹⁶¹ "The problem," Hegel writes, "consists in finding the connection between the *relation* of these lines and the *equation* of the curve." (285)

Tangents. Hegel then launches into a history of the relationship between the parabolic curve and the straight line. At first, this relation was discovered empirically. Newton's teacher Isaac Barrow set forth a method for finding the slope of lines tangent to curves that was distinct from Newton's calculus. Barrow would consider a point on a curve--say a parabolic curve described as $y^2 = x$, to use Hegel's favorite example. He then would take a second point on the curve very close to this point. This second point, if below $y^2 = x$, could be described as $(y - \Delta y)^2 = (x - \Delta x)$, where Δ is an increment on the

¹⁶⁰ The normal has a slope that is the negative reciprocal of the slope of the tangent line. Thus, if the slope of the tangent is $f'(x)$, the slope of the normal is $-1/f'(x)$.

¹⁶¹ The subtangent is distance on the abscissa, as measured from the line that proceeds directly downward from the intersection of the normal and the tangent, to the point where the tangent line meets the abscissa. In short, it is the horizontal base of a right triangle. It will become important in the pre-calculus method of Isaac Barrow. See *infra* text accompanying notes 162-64.

ordinate and e is an increment on the abscissa.¹⁶² If $y^2 = x$ is subtracted from $(y - *y)^2 = (x - *x)$, the result is $2(*y)(y) - *y^2 = *x$. Since $*y$ is an infinitesimal, $*y^2$ is infinitely smaller. Therefore, Barrow "gives the instruction, in the form of a mere *rule*, to reject as *superfluous* the terms which, as a result of the expansion of the equations, appears as powers of the said increments or as products." (285) $*y^2$ is the increment to the second power, and is also the product of increments. If we choose to ignore $*y^2$, then $2(*y)(y) = *x$. Dividing both sides of this last equation by $*y$, we obtain $*x/*y = 2y$.

Consider the following diagram:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Barrow's Method

Hegel writes "for the increments of the ordinate and abscissa, the ordinate itself and the subtangent respectively are to be substituted." (285) In other words, PR is the increment of the ordinate and QR is the increment of the abscissa. The ratio PR/QR is equal to the ratio of the "ordinate itself" (285) (PM, or y^2 in the above formulation) and the subtangent (TM). Or, $PR/QR = y^2/TM$.

Of this method, Hegel writes:

The procedure, if one may say so, can hardly be set forth in a more schoolmasterlike manner; the latter substitution [$PR/QR = y^2/TM$] is the assumption of the proportionality of the increments of the ordinate and the abscissa with the ordinate and the subtangent, an assumption on which is based the determination of the [slope of] the tangent in the ordinary differential method; in Barrow's rule this assumption appears in all its naïve nakedness. (285-86)

In the pre-calculus days of Barrow and Fermat, "[i]t was a mathematical craze of those times to find so-called *methods*, i.e. rules of that kind and to make a secret of them." (286) Indeed, Barrow's technique was not even a *method*. Nothing was derived from established principles. "[T]he inventors had found only a empirical external rules, not a method." (286) Leibniz and Newton generalized the form of such empirical rules and thereby "opened up new paths for the sciences." (286)

The more genuine way of proceeding (compared to Barrow's method) is as follows. First, "the power forms (of the variables of course) contained in the equation are reduced to their first functions." (286) The value of the terms of the equation, however, are altered. The two functions do not equal each other. Rather, they are simply in a relation.¹⁶³ The "primitive" function is a curve; the derivative is a

¹⁶² These are "the tiny little lines afterwards known as increments in the characteristic triangle of a curve." (285)

¹⁶³ Hegel writes: "Instead of $px = y^2$ we have $p:2y$." (286) This is so on the rules of implicit differentiation (a version of the "chain rule"). According to this method, we take the derivative of

line. "But with all this nothing is as yet known," Hegel insists. (286) Even the ancients understood Barrow's seventeenth-century method of finding the slope of the tangent line by taking the ratio of the ordinate (y) to the subtangent. What the moderns added is the direct mode of producing the derivative from the primitive function. Nevertheless:

the imaginary increments of the co-ordinates and an imaginary characteristic triangle formed by them and by an equally imaginary increment of the tangent, have been invented in order that the proportionality of the ratio found by lowering the degree of the equation to the ratio formed by the ordinate and subtangent, may be represented, not as something only empirically accepted as an already familiar fact, but as something demonstrated. (287)

In other words, y/x is designed to look familiar and comfortable to those familiar with Barrow's method.

Lagrange rejected "this pretence and took the genuinely scientific course." (287) He dispensed with "infinitely small arcs, ordinates and abscissae" and hence with y/x .¹⁶⁴ With regard to y/x , however, the line derived "is determined only in so far as it forms the side of a triangle." (287) The unique point that conjoins the line and the curve also forms a part of the triangle. The tangent line thus has the form $p = aq$. This "determination does not require the additional term, $+ b$ which is added only on account of the fondness for generality." (288)¹⁶⁵ Hegel also draws attention to the fact that $a = p/q$, and the coefficient of a (here, 1) is the derivative of dp/dq . Thus, a is "the essential determination of the straight line which is applied as tangent to the curve." (288)

Descartes. In order to show that the straight line produced by derivation is the same straight line as the tangent, Descartes (who lived more than a century before Lagrange) had recourse to increments of the ordinate and the abscissa. "Thus here, too, the objectionable

both sides of the equation in terms of x . Hence, $dp/dx = (y^2/x)(y/x)$, or $p = 2y^2/x$. Hence, $y/x = p/2y$. Hegel also poses $2ax - x^2 = y^2$ and suggests that the derivative is $a - x/y$. This must be read as $(a - x)/y$. That is:

$$\begin{aligned} d(2ax - x^2)/dx &= (y^2/x)(y/x) \\ 2a - 2x &= 2y(y/x) \\ y/x &= (a - x)/y \end{aligned}$$

¹⁶⁴ Cf. BOYER, *CALCULUS*, *supra* note 115, at 13 ("The calculus has therefore been gradually emancipated from geometry and has been made dependent through the definitions of the derivative and the integral, on the notion of the natural numbers . . .").

¹⁶⁵ Thus, if $x = y^2$, or if $x = y^2 + b$, the derivative is $2y$ regardless. The " $+ b$," Hegel charges, is added for sentimental reasons.

increment also makes its appearance." (288) But Descartes must be acquitted of the sins of calculus. Descartes was justified because he was acting as a geometer, when he asserted that a point on a curve has a unique tangent line. "For, as thus determined, the quality of tangent or not-tangent is reduced to a *quantitative difference*." (289) The tangent line is simply the smallest line (perhaps in terms of its difference between itself and the parabolic curve, which the derived line is supposed to represent). Such a relative smallness "contains no empirical element whatever" and nothing dependent on a quantum as such." (289) Yet, although reduced to quantitative difference, the line is qualitative, if the line is derived from a "difference in powers." (289) Apparently referring to the type of expansion associated with Isaac Barrow,¹⁶⁶ Hegel observes that the tangent line (when expanded to discover the slope of the line) reveals a difference of i and i^2 (in Cartesian terms)¹⁶⁷ or $*y$ and $*y^2$ (in Leibnizian terms). That i^2 is comparatively smaller than i is logically true--a qualitative relation. Hence, any attribution of a quantum to i is "superfluous and in fact out of place." (289) Hegel thus acquits Descartes of relying on infinitesimals in his analysis of the "greater smallness" of the tangent line (compared to the parabolic curve).

Hegel regrets that the Cartesian tangential method is "nowadays mostly forgotten." (289) Hegel quotes Descartes as stating that this method is "the most useful and most general problem that I know but even that I ever desired to know in geometry."¹⁶⁸ Hegel rather cryptically describes Descartes' method of finding the slope of the tangent. Here is an example of how it worked, with regard to the tangent of a given parabolic formula, say $y^2 = px$, to use a formula Hegel favors. Descartes first imagined an unknown point on that curve--some value of x and y . For ease of illustration, suppose $\{x, y\} = p$. Descartes then imagined a circle whose center was on the abscissa with a distance of h from the origin. If the circle has "equal roots,"¹⁶⁹ the

¹⁶⁶ It will be recalled that Barrow started with $y^2 = x$ and expanded both x and y by an increment: $(y - *y)^2 = x - *x$. The original formula, $y^2 = x$, was subtracted from $(y - *y)^2 = x - *x$, and the result was $2(*y)(y) - *y^2 = *x$. Since $*y$ is an infinitesimal, $*y^2$ is infinitely smaller. This authorized Barrow to simply ignore $*y^2$. See *supra* text accompanying notes 155-56.

¹⁶⁷ Here i stands for an increment.

¹⁶⁸ Miller leaves this quoted in untranslated French. The translation provided follows BOYER, *MATHEMATICS*, *supra* note 115, at 166.

¹⁶⁹ The roots of a quadratic equation are equal when the "discriminant" is equal to zero. The discriminant is $b^2 - 4ac$ in the standard solution to quadratic equations:

$$x = \text{-----}$$

radius of this circle is the "normal," which is perpendicular to the tangent. If we know the slope of the normal, we know the slope of the tangent, which is merely its inverse reciprocal.

The slope of the normal is defined as the ratio of the ordinate ($y = p$) and the "subnormal" ($h - p$).¹⁷⁰ Hence, h is the unknown that must be calculated to solve the problem.

The general formula for a circle whose center is not at the origin is $x^2 + y^2 - 2hx - 2ky + k^2 + h^2 - r^2 = 0$.¹⁷¹ Because the center of this circle on the abscissa, $k = 0$, thereby simplifying the formula. Meanwhile, $r^2 = (x - h)^2 + (y - k)^2$, by the Pythagorean theorem. Since $\{x, y\} = p$, then $r^2 = (h - p)^2 + p^2$. Substituting this expression of r^2 , we obtain $x^2 + y^2 - 2hx + h^2 - [(h - p)^2 + p^2] = 0$, or, more simply, $x^2 + y^2 - 2hx + 2ph - 2p^2 = 0$. From the given parabola, we know that $y^2 = px$. Substituting, we have $x^2 + px - 2hx + 2ph - 2p^2 = 0$. Rearranged in the form of a quadratic, we have $x^2 + (p - 2h)x + (2ph - 2p^2) = 0$. Where $h = 3p/2$,¹⁷² the quadratic equation just given has equal roots (p, p). Therefore the slope of the normal is $-p/(h-p) = -p/(1.5p)-p = -2$.¹⁷³

For instance, given $(x - 3)^2 = 0$, the two roots are obviously 3. The discriminant is zero, because $b = 6$, $a = 1$, and $c = 9$.

¹⁷⁰ Just as the subtangent is space on the abscissa underneath the tangent line, so the subnormal is like space under the normal.

¹⁷¹ The formula for a circle whose center is the origin is the Pythagorean theorem: $r^2 = x^2 + y^2$, where x and y are points on the circle. If the center is not the origin, the formula becomes $(x - h)^2 + (y - k)^2 = r^2$, where h is the distance from the center to the ordinate and k is the distance from the center to the abscissa. Multiplied out, the formula becomes $x^2 + y^2 - 2hx - 2ky + k^2 + h^2 = r^2$. Subtracting both sides of the formula by r^2 , we obtain the "standard form" of the circle's formula: $x^2 + y^2 - 2hx - 2ky + k^2 + h^2 - r^2 = 0$.

¹⁷² This conclusion is reached by use of the discriminant, $b^2 = 4ac$, which holds when the quadratic equation has equal roots. See *supra* note 162. In the expression $x^2 + (p - 2h)x + (2ph - 2p^2) = 0$, $a = 1$, $b = (p - 2h)$, $c = (2ph - 2p^2)$. Substituting this into $b^2 = 4ac$:

$$\begin{aligned}(p - 2h)^2 &= 4(2ph - 2p^2) \\ p^2 - 4ph + 4h^2 &= 8ph - 8p^2 \\ 9p^2 - 12hp + 4h^2 &= 0\end{aligned}$$

Once again we exploit the fact that, where roots are equal, $b^2 - 4ac = 0$. Because this is so, the standard solution to the quadratic equation reduces to $x = -b/2a$. In the last quadratic expression, $x = p$, $a = 9$, $b = -12h$. Hence, $p = 12h/18$ and $h = 3p/2$.

¹⁷³ The slope is negative because x and y are in reciprocal relations with regard to the normal. Below is a diagram of the Cartesian progress in question.

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of

Since the slope of the tangent is the negative reciprocal, the tangent's slope is $1/2$.

Is this the result that calculus obtains? Using the technique of implicit differentiation on $y^2 = px$, we obtain $*y/*x = p/2y$. But since it is given that $y = p$, we obtain $*y/*x = 1/2$.¹⁷⁴

This ability to obtain the tangent algebraically and without any use of the increment is, according to Hegel:

the brilliant device of a genuinely analytical mind, in comparison with which the dogmatically assumed proportionality of the subtangent and the ordinate with postulated infinitely small, so-called increments, of the abscissa and ordinate drops into the backgrounds. (290)¹⁷⁵

Hegel complains that "it is by no means self-evident that such a derivative equation is also correct." (290) The derivative "yields only a *proportion*" between $*y$ and $*x$. (290) Yet y and x are quanta. These can be made into infinite series--"functions of potentiation." When this is done, the values of x and y are altered. Now it is no longer certain that the proportion that previously governed in $*y/*x$ still holds. "All that the equation $*y/*x = P$ expresses is that P is a *ratio* and no other real meaning can be ascribed to $*y/*x$. But even so, we still do not know of this ratio = P , to what other ratio it is equal." (291)

Furthermore, Hegel charges, calculus claims, for instance, that $*(x - 3)^2/*x = 2x - 6$, but it fails to validate this conclusion. It is validated "from another source"--from the Cartesian algebraic method of equal roots. (291) Instead what calculus does with $(x - 3)^2 = 0$, is to equate zero with y and proceed accordingly.

this manuscript.]

The Cartesian Tangential Method

¹⁷⁴ Hegel points out that, in a quadratic equation with equal roots, the coefficient of the term containing the unknown in the first power is twice the single root (in terms of its absolute value). This can be seen easily in $(x - 3)^2 = x^2 - 6x + 9 = 0$. Obviously, the unique answer is $x = 3$, and this is half the coefficient of the second term ($|6|$). Consider also the derivative of the above formula-- $2x - 6 = 0$. Calculus obviously agrees that the derivative is related to a quadratic equation in which a unique root is half the coefficient of the second term. (To be precise, Hegel uses the examples of $d(x^2 - ax - b)/*x = 2x - a$, and $d(x^3 - px - q)/*x = 3x^2 - p$. I have changed the example to something more easily digested.)

¹⁷⁵ Brilliant Descartes' method may have been, but the above example involves $x = y = p$. For any other value of x and y , Descartes' method becomes, at best, monstrously complex. It is no wonder that Descartes' method is "nowadays mostly forgotten," (289) as calculus finds the slope of the tangent with delightful ease, for any point on the curve.

Calculus has this further fault. Given that quanta are equally functions of potentiation, it ought to explain that any magnitude is the function of other magnitudes. It does not do so. It simply leaves the magnitudes as given.¹⁷⁶

The Omitted Constant. With regard to $x^2 - 6x + 9 = (x - 3)^2 = 0$, the derivative function is $2x - 6$. The constant (9) is omitted without discussion. Hegel thinks that this omission means that, according to calculus, the constant plays no part in the determination of the roots if these roots are equal. The determination of the roots was exhausted by the coefficient of the second term of the quadratic equation. But this is not so. In Descartes's example (and in the example just given), the constant was the square of the roots, which therefore can be determined from the constant as well as from the coefficients. The constant is thus a function of the roots.

Terminology. Hegel offers an observation about the names "differentiation" and "integration." The character of these operations belie their names. To differentiate is to posit differences. But the result of differentiating is to reduce the dimensions of an equation, and to omit the constant is to remove an element of difference. The roots of the variables are made equal. Their difference is canceled.

Meanwhile, in integration, the constant must be added again. The previously canceled difference is restored. The names assigned to these operations help to obscure the essential nature of the matter--the qualitative nature of the increment.

*Mechanics.*¹⁷⁷ Physicists have their own interpretation of the differential calculus. Velocity (or motion) has already been

¹⁷⁶ This is my interpretation of the following passage:

The functional calculus, it is true, is supposed to deal with functions of potentiation and the differential calculus with differentials; but it by no means follows from this alone that the magnitudes from which the differentials or functions of potentiation are taken, are themselves supposed to be *only* functions of *other* magnitudes. Besides, in the theoretical part, in the instruction to derive the differentials, i.e. the functions of potentiation, there is no indication that the magnitudes which are to be subjected to such treatment are themselves supposed to be functions of other magnitudes.
(291)

¹⁷⁷ "'Mechanics' refers to the study of the rest and motion of bodies . . . under the action of normal mechanical forces . . . Its principal concerns are space and time, motion and flow, force and energy, mass and inertia, equilibrium and disequilibrium, impact and elasticity." Ivor Grattan-Guinness, *Hegel's Heritage in Applied Mathematics*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 201, 202 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993).

mentioned.¹⁷⁸ The formula $s = ct$,¹⁷⁹ "offers no meaning for differentiation." (292) But the equation for the motion of a falling body ($s = at^2$)¹⁸⁰ does so, and $s/t = 2at$. $2at$ "is translated into language, and also into existence" (293) as a factor in a sum. The sum is the attractive force of gravity and $2at$ is supposed to be "the force of inertia, i.e. of a simply uniform motion." (293) $2at$ implies "that in *infinitely small* parts of time the motion is uniform, but *infinite* parts of time, i.e. in actually existent parts of time, it is non-uniform." (293) $2at$ implies "that *if* gravity ceased to act, the body, with the velocity reached at the *end* of its fall, would cover twice the distance it had traversed, in the same period of time as its fall." (293) This, Hegel proclaims, is unsatisfactory metaphysics. "[T]he end of the period of time in which the body has fallen, is itself still a period of time; if it were *not*, there would be assumed a state of *rest* and hence no velocity." (293)

When physics uses the differential in arenas in which there is no motion, "even more illegitimate formalism of inventing an existence" occurs. (293) Hegel thinks this occurs in the analysis of the behavior of light ("apart from what is called its propagation in space") and in the application of quantitative determinations to colors. (293)

The motion described by $s = at^2$ is found empirically in falling bodies. The next simplest motion is $s = ct^3$, but no such motion is found in nature. Yet $s^3 = at^2$ is Kepler's third law of the motion of planets in the solar system, Hegel says.¹⁸¹ Now $s/t = 2at/3s^2$.¹⁸² Hegel suggests that a theory that explains the motions of the planets from the starting point of $2at/3s^2$ "must indeed present an interesting problem in which analysis would display a brilliance most worthy of itself." (294) Perhaps Hegel is being sarcastic here.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ See *supra* text accompanying notes 128039.

¹⁷⁹ Where s is distance, t is time, and c is velocity.

¹⁸⁰ In this formula, a stands for the acceleration effect of gravity.

¹⁸¹ Here, s stands for the semimajor axis of an ellipse--i.e., the farthest distance possible between the planet and the center of the sun. The variable t stands for the period of the orbit (for earth, one year).

¹⁸² This is so on the implied differential method, wherein we differentiate both sides of Kepler's formula by t . Hence $s^3/t = (s^3/s)(s/t) = 3s^2(s/t)$, and $at^2/t = 2at$. Combining these results:

$$3s^2(s/t) = 2at$$

$$s/t = 2at/3s^2$$

¹⁸³ Hegel believed Newton's fame was unjustified--that he merely reformulated Kepler's third law, and that Kepler deserved the crown. *Science of Logic* at 343-44; see also *id.* at 365 (complaining that

The application of calculus to physics is not interesting, Hegel announces.¹⁸⁴ But the analysis of trajectory (in ballistics) is significant, if trajectory is a curve defined by the higher powers. To construct such a curve, transitions are required from "rectilinear functions"--i.e., straight lines. (294) In other words, a cannon ball exits the muzzle of the cannon in a straight line but, thanks to gravity, converts its trajectory into a parabolic curve. These rectilinear functions, "as functions of potentiation," are derivatives that must be "obtained from the original equation of motion containing the factor of time." (294) The factor of time, however, is eliminated when the rectilinear functions are derived, and the powers in the original equation are "reduced to lower functions of development." (294) Such considerations lead to "the interesting feature of the other part of the differential calculus" (294)--presumably the part that deals with infinite series.

The Integral Calculus. Hegel has now concluded his comments on the differential calculus.¹⁸⁵ His next subject is the integral calculus.

Newton's great reputation protects his theories from criticism); PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, *supra* note 33, § 270 ("It has subsequently become customary to speak as if Newton were the first to have discovered the proof of these laws. The credit for a discovery has seldom been denied a man with more unjustness."). This, commentators complain, is unfair to Newton, who unified Kepler's and Galileo's laws in a single theory of gravitation. Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 78; Wahsner, *supra* note 133, at 87-88. One commentator suggests that Hegel was guilty of "grotesquely exaggerated patriotism." Ihmig, *supra* note 139, at 400; *but see* Robert Weinstock, *A Worm in Newton's Apple*, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 430 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993) (strongly agreeing that Newton is overrated).

¹⁸⁴ Borzeszkowski disagrees and states that Hegel "ignores the fact that [x/y] creates a new quantity, and that on account of the duality in space-time and velocity, it also created the possibility of representing physically the fact that "to move means . . . to be in this place and not to be in, at one and the same time." Borzeszkowski, *supra* note 33, at 78 (footnote omitted), *citing* 1 GEORG. W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 273 (E.S. Haldane trans., 1963). Borzeszkowski also chastises Hegel, who spends much time on Lagrange, for having neglected Lagrange's *Analytical Mechanics*, which, Borzeszkowski feels, would have been instructive. Finally, Hegel wrongly accused physics of asserting the self-identity of rest and motion and an inability to describe how one changes into another. Borzeszkowski asserts that physics views "rectilinear uniform motion as being equivalent to rest." *Id.* at 80.

¹⁸⁵ He terminates with this grand summary:

Its nature has been found to consist in this, that from an equation of power functions the coefficient of the term of the expansion, the so-called first function, is obtained, and the *relation* which this first function represents is demonstrated in moments of the concrete subject matter,

Hegel thinks it to be an advance that the integral calculus no longer views itself as a method of summation.¹⁸⁶

The integral calculus, "as everyone knows," is the converse of the differential calculus. (295) The starting point is the derived function, and one travels back to the "primitive"¹⁸⁷ function from which the first function is derived.

What is the meaning of the primitive formula that the integral calculus discovers? The ratio of the abscissa and the ordinate. The differential calculus, on the other hand, deals only with the ratio of y/x .

The usual method of the integral calculus is use of the infinitesimal difference. Thus, the area under a curve is infinitely divided up into "trapezia" (296)--that is, trapezoids whose parallel sides are the ordinate (y_0) and another ordinate (y_1) infinitely close (separated by x). The unparallel sides of the trapezoid are the abscissa and the curve itself. The area under the curve is thus the rectangle entirely under the curve, plus the right triangle sitting atop the rectangle, formed by the abscissa, the ordinate and the arc. "[T]he square of the arc element is supposed to be equal to the sum of the squares of the two other infinitely small elements." (296)¹⁸⁸

The primitive formula derived from a function taken as a derivative is the area under the curve that the formula expresses.¹⁸⁹

these moments being themselves determined by the equation so obtained between the two relations. (294)

To translate, calculus reveals a relation-- y/x . The differentials (x and y) are the qualitative moments in Quantum.

¹⁸⁶ Integral calculus stands basically for the area under a curve. One view of it is that integral calculus adds together the infinitely narrow rectangles that run from the curve to the abscissa. This vision of summation, however, is what Hegel is rejecting. According to Boyer, "[t]he definite integral is defined in mathematics as the limit of an infinite sequence and not as the sum of an infinite number of points, lines, or surfaces." BOYER, CALCULUS, *supra* note 115, at 50.

¹⁸⁷ Hegel calls this the "original formula." (297)

¹⁸⁸ This is an extremely loose interpretation of Hegel's rather mystifying interpretation. In order to compensate for the curve's failure to be parallel to the abscissa, the integral calculus takes the average of the two ordinates and forms a rectangle, which is roughly bisected by the curve. This corresponds to taking the area of the rectangle entirely below the curve, plus the "right triangle" that sits atop this rectangle.

¹⁸⁹ This can be seen as follows. Take a primitive function, such as $y = x^2$. $y/x = 2x$. Integral calculus now describes the primitive as $y = \int 2x dx$. This last expression ($\int 2x dx$) represents the ordinate ($y = x^2 + c$) times the abscissa (x). In short, the area under the curve is divided into infinite quasi-rectangles, as defined by the

The derivative constitutes the "quadrated curve" at the top of infinitely narrow trapezoid under the curve. But, Hegel complains, the integral calculus mechanically notes the relation between the derivative and the primitive--that these constitute a proportion. It "spares itself the trouble of demonstrating the truth of what it simply presupposes as a fact." (297) The integral calculus has "found out from results already known elsewhere, that certain specific aspects of a mathematical object stands in the relation to each other of the original to the derived function." (297)

In the integral calculus, the primitive function is derived. The derivation is given. But it is

not directly given, nor is it at once evident which part or element of the mathematical object is to be correlated with the derived function in order that by reducing this to the original function there may be found that other part or element, whose magnitude is required to be determined. (297)

In other words, a ratio is formed between the derivation and the primitive, but the sides of the ratio are not really described by the integral calculus. "The usual method" is to assign to the derivative the status of the infinitely small. (297) This derivative (taken as the top of the trapezoid whose sides are the ordinate and whose bottom is $*x$) produces a right triangle of three infinitely small sides--the derivative as hypotenuse, the ordinate and abscissa as the other two sides. This triangle, together with the rectangle below it, make up the area under the curve, once the totality of such trapezoids are summed.

The transition from such so-called elements of the area, the arc., etc., to the magnitude of the total area or the whole arc itself, passes merely for the ascent from the infinite expression to the finite expression, or to the *sum* of the infinitely many elements of which the required magnitude is supposed to consist. (298)

That is, $*x$ or $*y$ represent infinite, qualitative moments. Yet the integral calculus makes finite what is truly infinite--a Notional fault. For this reason, "[it] is therefore merely superficial to say that the integral calculus is simply the converse . . . of the differential calculus." (298)

Lagrange. Lagrange did not smooth out these problems. "The declared object of his method" was to "provide an independent *proof* of the fact that between particular elements of a mathematical whole, for example, of a curve, there exists a relation of the original to the derived function." (298) In other words, Lagrange undertook to prove the truth of integral calculus, but could not proceed directly, because the derivative contains "terms which are *qualitatively* distinct"--that is, $*x$ or $*y$, which are not quantities. All that can be shown is "the mean between a *greater* and a *less*." (298) That is, the integral

ordinate times the abscissa. Such is the meaning of the expression $f2x*x$. The integral sign (f) indicates summation of all these quasi-rectangles, thereby encompassing all the area under the curve.

calculus always takes a rectangle defined by *x at the base and two infinitely close ordinates as the vertical sides. These sides are averaged, so that, in the resulting rectangle, the average ordinate is always too great or too small for the area under the curve. From this it is "deduced" that "the function of the ordinate is the derived, first function of the function of the area. (298)¹⁹⁰

Archimedes. Hegel sees Lagrange translating Archimedean principles into modern terms. Archimedes taught that

the arc of a curve is greater than its chord and smaller than the sum of the two tangents drawn through the end points of the arc and contained between these points and the point of intersection of the tangents. (299)¹⁹¹

Archimedes' method was, through repetition, to render the difference between arc and the chords or tangents smaller and smaller through subdivision.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Hegel puts it this way:

From the development of the condition that the required magnitude is greater than the one easily determinable limit and smaller than the other, it is then deduced that, e.g. the function of the ordinate is the derived, first function of the function of the area. (299)

It is generally true that the differential calculus views the curve as the first derivative of the area under the curve. That is, the plane is rendered into a line by differential calculus.

¹⁹¹ Visually, this is obvious. Hegel describes the following figure:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Arc Between Chords and Tangents

¹⁹² Archimedes was important in the history of the calculus. BOYER, *CALCULUS*, *supra* note 115, at 50-53. Archimedes calculated the area under the above arc by finding the area of the triangle, which we will call A. He then took the lines XZ and YZ as the bases of two new triangles with their vertex on the curve. The areas of these triangles was found to be $\frac{1}{4}$ of A. Again, each side of these new triangles became the bases of newer triangles, whose area was calculated to be $\frac{1}{4}$ of the prior triangles. This was continued so long as patience held out. The sum of all the triangles constituted the area under the arc. Archimedes calculated this to be

$$A(\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4}^2 + \frac{1}{4}^3 \dots \frac{1}{4}^{n-1}) = (4/3)A$$

"[T]he formalism of the infinitesimal directly presents us with the equation $*z^2 = *x^2 + *y^2$," Hegel writes (299). This must be taken as an example of the Pythagorean theorem, and it reflects the fact that the integral calculus measures infinitesimal changes at the top of each infinitely narrow trapezoid beneath a curve. Lagrange, starting from this premise, showed that "the length of the arc is the original function to a derived function whose characteristic term is itself a function coming from the relation of a derived function to the original function of the ordinate." (299) In other words, there is a circular relation to differential and integral calculus. Differential calculus produces the derivative from the primitive, and integral calculus produces the primitive from the derivative.¹⁹³

The higher the value of n , the more the answer approached $(4/3)A$.

¹⁹³ Antonio Moretto reads Hegel as pointing to Lagrange's apagogic reasoning (reasoning by process of elimination). Lagrange assumed a curve, $y = f(x) > 0$. The area under this curve, bounded by the ordinate, abscissa and some value of y , is $F(x)$. Assume y is increasing between x and $(x + i)$. Now let us isolate the area under $(x + i) - x$ as $F(x + i) - F(x)$. It is true that

$$(1) \quad if(x) < F(x + i) - F(x) < if(x + i)$$

This expresses the fact that the height of the ordinate-- $f(x)$ --times the increment in x (i) is less than the height of the ordinate further on time the increment--or $if(x + i)$. In other words, $f(x)$ is rising over this interval. Meanwhile, the area of the interval-- $F(x + i) - F(x)$ --is an average of the rectangles described solely by $if(x)$ or $if(x + i)$.

Lagrange next uses the Newtonian binomial expansion, *supra* note 144, but truncates the series. He stipulates:

$$(2) \quad f(x + i) = f(x) + if'(x + j)$$

Strictly speaking, the binomial expansion method implies that the very last term of (2) is $if'(x)$, but j is defined as $0 < j < i$. In other words, j is an increment smaller than the smallest increment. Basically, (2) as rearranged states:

$$(3) \quad [f(x + i) - f(x)]/i = f'(x + j)$$

The expression in (3) simply says that the slope ($f'(x + j)$) is the ratio of the difference between the ordinates $f(x + i) - f(x)$ divided by the abscissa (i).

Next, Lagrange expands $F(x + i)$ but truncates the series at the end of the third term of the expansion.

$$(4) \quad F(x + i) = F(x) + iF'(x) + i^2F''(x + j)/2$$

(2) and (4) are now substituted into (1) to obtain

$$(5) \quad i[F'(x) - f(x)] + i^2F''(x + j)/2 < i^2f'(x + j)$$

Both Archimedes's method and Kepler's "treatment of stereometric objects"¹⁹⁴ entail use of the infinitesimal, and this prestigious heritage, Hegel complains, "has often been cited as an authority for the employment of this idea in the differential calculus." (299)¹⁹⁵ "The infinitesimal signifies, strictly, the negation of quantum as quantum" (299)--the proposition that, Hegel repeatedly charges, mathematicians do not confront. The methods of Valerio¹⁹⁶ and Cavalieri¹⁹⁷ get better marks. Their work centered on the relations between geometrical objects. "[T]he fundamental principle is that the *quantum* as such of

Lagrange now draws attention to $[F'(x) - f(x)]$. He reasons (apagogically) that either $[F'(x) - f(x)] = 0$, or it does not. If not, (4) does not hold universally. Hence, by apagogic reasoning, $F'(x) - f(x) = 0$, or $F'(x) = f(x)$, and thus integral calculus is vindicated. Moretto, *supra* note 65, at 158-59.

The expression in (5) can be usefully interpreted if we divide both sides of the inequality by i and then solve for i . We get:

$$(6) \quad i > [F'(x) - f(x)]/[f'(x + j) - (F''(x + j)/2)]$$

If I can think of an i larger than the left side of the inequality, then (1)--true by definition--is true only if $F'(x) - f(x) = 0$.

That Lagrange was guilty of alternation between a segment too large and a segment too small can be seen in (1), where $if(x) < if(x + i)$. Nevertheless, Hegel praises Lagrange's method

because it proves an insight into the *translation* of the Archimedean method into the principle of modern analysis, thus enabling us to see into the inner, true meaning of the procedure which in the other method is carried out mechanically. (299)

In other words, Archimedes' method was literally exhaustive and mechanical, but Lagrange was able, albeit through apagogic reasoning, to calculate the area under a curve without exhaustion.

¹⁹⁴ Stereometry is the art of measuring solids.

¹⁹⁵ Hegel may be thinking of Simon L'Huilier, who, in a "prize-winning essay" of 1787, proposed that "the method of the ancients, known under the name of Method of Exhaustion, conveniently extended, suffices to establish with certainty the principles of the new calculus." BOYER, *CALCULUS*, *supra* note 115, at 255 (citing L'Huilier's *Exposition élémentaire des principes des calculs supérieurs*).

¹⁹⁶ Luca Valerio is the author of *De Centro Gravitatis Solidorum*. In this work he anticipated the notion of limit later adopted in calculus. BOYER, *CALCULUS*, *supra* note 115, at 104-07.

¹⁹⁷ Buonaventura Cavalieri was a student of Galileo who favored use of the indivisible. *Id.* at 117. Boyer describes Cavalieri as not sharing "the Aristotelian view of infinity as indicating a potentiality only . . ." *Id.*

the objects concerned, which are primarily considered only in their constituent relations, is for this purpose to be left out of account, the objects thus being taken as *non-quantitative*." (299-300) They fall short, however, of bringing to the fore the "affirmative aspect" or "*qualitative* determinateness" of $*x$ (300).¹⁹⁸ This aspect will be made explicit, Hegel promises, in his discussion of the Ratio of Powers, with which Quantity finally concludes. Lagrange, however, is credited with bringing this affirmative aspect to notice, "with the result that the procedure which is burdened with an unlimited progression is given its proper limit." (300)

Hegel concludes this second longest of all remarks by reaffirming that his goal is to describe the Notion, not to reform calculus as such. In any case, any review of calculus for its appreciation of Quantum's Notion would have been inductive only (and hence of poor truth content).

The subject matter of the calculus, Hegel says, is "the relation between a power function and the function of its expansion or potentiation, because this is what is most readily suggested by an insight into the nature of the subject matter." (298) The calculus readily exploits addition, logarithms, and "circular functions," but these are merely convenient to the enterprise--not essential. The calculus has "a more particular interest in common with the form of series namely, to determine those functions of expansion which in the series are called coefficients of the terms." (301)¹⁹⁹ The calculus, however, concerns itself with the relation of the original function to the coefficient of the first term. The series aims at exhibiting a number in the form of a sum. The infinite on display in the series has nothing in common with the affirmative qualitative determination on display in the calculus.

In the calculus, Hegel complains, an expansion occurs by means of the "the infinitesimal in the shape of the *increment*." (301)²⁰⁰ But this is achieved "externally," by the will of the mathematician. Mathematicians do not develop the notional implication of $*x$. The series, "which in fact is not what is wanted" by consumers of the calculus, has the fault of producing "an excess"--a remainder "the elimination of which causes the unnecessary trouble." (301) Lagrange favored the series and so had this difficulty. But Lagrange's method at least brought to notice "what is truly characteristic of the calculus." (301) The forms of $*x$ and $*y$ are not forced into objects by Lagrange. Lagrange "directly demonstrated to which part of the object the determinateness of the derived function (function of expansion) belongs." (301)

¹⁹⁸ The affirmative nature of Quantum's quality becomes a major theme in the next chapter. See *infra* text accompanying notes 220-32.

¹⁹⁹ It will be recalled that the derivative is, in effect, the coefficient of the first term, as in $*y/*x = 5$, where $f(x) = 5x + c$. The Maclaurin series was likewise an infinite series of the coefficient of the first term. See *supra* n. ---.

²⁰⁰ This can be observed in the difference quotient, described *supra* in the text accompanying notes 110-11.

Remark 3: Further Forms Connected With the Qualitative Determinateness of Magnitude

In the previous Remark, Hegel emphasized the qualitative nature of the infinitesimal. This qualitative dimension was present in the power function--a function involving x^2 or a higher power. There is a weaker form as well, which is the subject of this remark. This form appears in the context of geometry.

From the analytical side, power relations are formal and homogeneous. "[T]hey signify *numerical* magnitudes which as such do not possess that qualitative difference from each other." (302) But when these concepts are used by geometers, "the qualitative determinateness of the analytic relation is fully manifested as the transition from linear to planar determinations, from determinations of straight lines to those of curves, and so on." (302)

Spatial objects, as Hegel had earlier emphasized,²⁰¹ are by nature "given in the form of *continuous* magnitudes." (302) But they likewise are to be taken as discrete. Thus, a plane is an aggregate of lines, the line an aggregate of points.

The procedure in question derives the point from the line, or the line from the plane. From such a determination, progress can be made arithmetically. (For example, given a point designated as 5, the line $5x + c$ can be derived through the integral calculus.) The starting point is simple, compared to the concrete, continuous magnitude that is derived. It is important, however, that the starting point be self-determined. That is, the point is without dimensions. It is not "determined," but rather determines itself. The point, then, like $*x$, is qualitative.²⁰²

Hegel calls the summation of points into a line or lines into a plane the "direct method." (303) This may be compared to the indirect method that begins with limits; between these limits lie the self-determined element as the goal toward which the method advances. In other words, if we may speak of the area of the circle, **B** is an infinite series. Hence the area of a circle ($\mathbf{B}r^2$) only approaches the limit (because **B** is never complete). Between the limit and $\mathbf{B}r^2$ there is always a remainder. The result in both methods comes to the same thing--the law for progressively determining the required magnitude without the possibility of reaching the perfect, finite determination demanded.

Kepler has the honor of first having thought to reverse this process and of having started with the discrete as the starting point.

²⁰¹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 26.

²⁰² It will be recalled that the point as automatically generative of the line first appeared in Hegel's discussion of Limit in chapter 2. The point that immediately goes outside of itself may fairly be called quantitative, but to the extent it logically produces the line proves that the point is immune from external reflection and therefore also qualitative. On the point as leading from the derivation of time from space in Hegel's philosophy of nature, see Lawrence S. Stepelevich, *Hegel's Geometric Theory*, in *HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE* (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998).

He expresses this quite simply in analyzing Archimedes' first proposition of cyclometry.²⁰³ According to this first proposition, "a circle is equal to a right-angled triangle with one side being the length of the [radius] and the other the circumference of the circle (where these two sides are joined in the right angle)."²⁰⁴ Kepler interpreted this to mean that the circumference has infinite points in it, each of which could be regarded as the base of an isosceles triangle.²⁰⁵ The apex of each triangle is the center of the circle. Thus, the circle becomes an infinite set of extremely thin "pie slices," and the area could thus be calculated.²⁰⁶ "[H]e thus gives expression to the resolution of the continuous into the from of the discrete." (303) This description of the infinite, however, "is still far removed from the definition it is supposed to have in the differential calculus." (303) Discrete elements

can only be *externally* summed up . . . [T]he analytic transition from these ones is made only to their *sum* and is not simultaneously the geometrical transition from the point to the line or from the line to the plane. (304)

Thus, Hegel implies that only speculative philosophy can draw from discrete points or line the continuous quality that they have with lines or planes.²⁰⁷

A moment of qualitative transition occurs, which entails recourse to the infinitely small. This recourse, Hegel says, is the difficulty. To dispense with this expedient, "it would have to be possible to show that the analytic procedure itself which appears as a mere *summation*, in fact already contains a *multiplication*." (304)

But such an admission involves a fresh assumption about the application of arithmetical relations to geometrical figures. According to this assumption, arithmetical multiplication constitute a transition to a higher dimension. Thus, the multiplication of lines produces a plane. (For example, the area of a square with side x is x^2 .) Here multiplication is not merely an alteration of magnitude, but the production of a qualitative spatial character. Repeating themes from earlier chapters,²⁰⁸ Hegel insists that "the transition of the line into

²⁰³ Cyclometry is the measurement of circles.

²⁰⁴ Miller erroneously writes "diameter" instead of radius. Since the circumference is $2Br$ and the radius is r , and since the area of the right triangle is $\frac{1}{2}(2Br)(r)$, the result is Br^2 , the area of a circle.

²⁰⁵ An isosceles triangle is one that has two equal sides. [?]

²⁰⁶ See Moore, *supra* note 112, at 139-41.

²⁰⁷ It can be noted here that Archimedes' simple method does not rely on the infinitesimal, but Kepler's method does so rely--a Hegelian fault. Moretto, *supra* note 65, at 160.

²⁰⁸ See Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 520-23.

a plane must be understood as the *self-externalization* of the line." (304) Likewise the point externalizes itself into the line and the plane into a volume.²⁰⁹

With regard to the transition from plane to volume, Hegel remarks that the self-externality of a plane (two dimension) should involve the multiplication of a plane by a plane, thereby creating a four-dimensional object. "[G]eometrical determination," however, reduces the dimensions to three." (305) This is because space, "represented as an expansion outward from the point," is "a *concrete* determinateness beyond the line in the third dimension." (305) Hegel suggests that Kepler's law ($s^3 = at^2$)²¹⁰ has a spatial side, which is geometrical, and a temporal side which is merely arithmetical.

"It will now be evident," Hegel observes, "without further comment, how the qualitative element here considered differs from the subject of the previous Remark." (305) In the power relation at the heart of notional calculus, "the qualitative element lay in the determinateness of power." (305) This point relates to what Hegel will say of the Ratio of Powers in the next chapter: when $x^x = 16$, x determines itself, so long as 16 stays fixed. This self-determination is qualitative in nature and stands for Quantum's recapture of its being, which was entirely external at the beginning of Quantity.

The Quality present in geometry is different. "[H]ere, like the infinitely small, it is only the factor as arithmetically related to the product, or as the point to the line or the line to the plane, and so on." (305) The qualitative transition from the discrete to the continuous "is effected as a process of summation." (305)

This summation, however, does imply multiplication. This comes into view when the area of a trapezoid (or "trapezium," as Hegel's translator calls it) is said to be the sum of two opposite horizontal, parallel lines, divided by two, times the height.²¹¹ The height is represented to be the set of infinite lines which must be summed up. These lines "must at the same time be posited with negation." (306) That is, they are so infinitely narrow that "they have their determination solely in the linear quality of the parallel limits of the trapezium." (306) These trapezoids "can be represented as the terms

²⁰⁹ "This," Hegel states, "is the same as the representation of the line as the *motion* of the point, and so forth." (304-05) Motion, however, includes a determination of time and thus appears in this representation rather as merely a contingent, external alteration of state." (305) This is not so "from the standpoint of the Notion which was expressed as a self- externalization." (305)

²¹⁰ It will be recalled that s stands for the semimajor axis of an ellipse, and t stands for the time of the orbit. See *supra* n.181.

²¹¹ Hegel's formula is "the product of the sum of two opposite parallel lines and half the height." Where the parallel lines are $\{a, b\}$ and distance between a and b is h , the formula is

$$\frac{(a + b)h}{2}$$

of an arithmetical progression, having a simply uniform difference which does not, however, require to be determined, and whose first and last terms are these two parallel lines."²¹² (306) The sum of such a series, Hegel, explains is "the *product* of the parallels and half the *amount* or *number* of terms." (306) This product is "the specific magnitude of something which is *continuous*"--the height of trapezoids without width. (306) This sum can be viewed as the "*multiplication* of lines by lines." (306) That is, the sum is a geometric area--"something having the quality of a plane." (306) Implicated is "the qualitative element of the transition from the dimension of line to that of plane." (306)

The method of representing planes as sums of lines is also used when multiplication is not entailed. Hegel considers this formula

$$\frac{\text{circle}}{\text{ellipse}} = \frac{\text{major axis}}{\text{minor axis}}$$

where the diameter of the circle is the same length as the major axis.²¹³ Each ordinate of the circle thus corresponds to an ordinate of the ellipse. The relation of the corresponding ordinates is the same as the

$$\frac{\text{major axis}}{\text{minor axis}}$$

Therefore, the sum of all the ordinates must be in like proportion. Hence, proportionality likewise makes the leap from discreteness to continuity. "[T]o be swayed by the representation of a plane," Hegel remarks, "or to help it out by adding the idea of *sum* to this *one* moment, is really to fail to recognize the essential mathematical element here involved." (306)

Cavalieri. Hegel returns to Cavalieri, who received relatively good marks for resisting the quantification of *x.²¹⁴ Cavalieri used indivisibles (*i.e.*, qualities), rather than infinitesimals. The indivisibles were lines when he considered a plane, and squares or circles when he considered a three dimensional object. These indivisibles he called the *regula*.

Hegel quotes Cavalieri as follows:

²¹² Hegel does not have in mind the trapezoid that forms an element of a definite integral here. He has in mind a trapezoid with real area and, further, more, tipped on its side so that the parallel lines are horizontal.

²¹³ Such a figure looks like this:

Circle and Ellipse with Common Diameter and Major Axis

²¹⁴ See *supra* text accompanying notes ---.

all figures, both plane and solid, are *proportionate* to all their indivisibles, these being compared with each other collectively and, if there is a common proportion in the figures, distributively. (307)

By this means, Cavalieri proved the proposition that parallelograms of equal height are proportional to their bases.²¹⁵ Two lines from these figures that are equidistant from and parallel to the base have the same proportion as the two bases have. The line, however, Hegel states, is not presented by Cavalieri as "the whole content of the figure." (308) Rather, the line is the content only "in so far as it is to be arithmetically *determined*." (308) Properly, "it is the line which is the element of the content and through it alone must be grasped the specific nature of the figure." (308)

Hegel now reflects on "the difference which exists with respect to that feature into which the determinateness of a figure falls." (308) This is the figure's external limit. Where the determinateness of a figure is an external limit, the continuity of the figure "*follows upon* the quality or the proportion of the limit." (308) When the boundary of two figures coincide, the figures are equal. In parallelograms of equal height and base (and hence of equal area), however, only the base is an external limit. The height, upon which proportion depends, "introduces a second principle of determination additional to the external limits." (308) To prove that parallelograms are equal when they have the same base and height, Euclid reduced them to triangles--*continuous figures limited externally*." (308) In Cavalieri's proof of the proportionality of parallelograms, Cavalieri was careful to state that we never know the amount of lines in a parallelogram--an amount Hegel names "an empty idea assumed in support of the theory." (308) Cavalieri only spoke of the magnitude of proportional lines. Because the space of the parallelogram was enclosed within limits, the magnitude of the lines was likewise enclosed within the same limits. Hegel paraphrases Cavalieri as saying, "*the continuous figure is nothing other than the indivisibles themselves . . . if it were something apart from them it would not be comparable*." (309)

According to Hegel, Cavalieri meant to distinguish "what belongs to the *outer existence* of the continuous figure from what constitutes its *determinateness*." (309) In constructing theorems about the figure, we must attend to the determinateness alone. In stating that "the continuous is *composed* or *consists* of indivisibles," Cavalieri implicitly located continuity of the figure as external to the figure.

[I]nstead of saying that 'the continuous is nothing other than the indivisibles themselves,' it would be more correct and also directly self-explanatory to say that the quantitative determinateness of the continuous is none other than that of the indivisibles themselves.

²¹⁵ Actually, any line within the parallelogram, of course, will be of the same length as the base. Therefore, it follows that lines equidistant from the base of their parallelogram would, of course, bear the same proportion.

In other words, continuity is immanent to the indivisible itself, a fact to which Figure 11(a) speaks directly. Nevertheless "Cavalieri does not support the erroneous conclusion that there are greater and lesser infinites which is drawn *by the schools* from the idea that the indivisibles constitute the continuous." (309) Cavalieri says that he took the aggregate of indivisibles not as an infinite number of lines, "but in so far as they possess a specific kind of limitedness." (309) Any proofs by Cavalieri are free from "any admixture of infinity." (309) His method reduces to "the conception of determinateness as an external spatial limit." (309)

With regard to the coincidence of geometric figures, it is, Hegel says, a "childish aid for sense perception." (309) In fact, if triangles are congruent, we have only one triangle before us. This singularity of the triangle is its true qualitative determinateness, "in its distinction from what is given in intuition." (310)²¹⁶

With parallelograms, Hegel observes that the height and equality of the angles are distinct from the sides ("the external limits") of the figure. (310) This gives rise to an uncertainty. Besides the base, are we to take the vertical side of the parallelogram as an external limit, or the height? If we compare a square with an extremely acute parallelogram with the same base and height, the parallelogram²¹⁷ may look bigger than the square. The side of such a parallelogram is indeed longer than the side of the square. Such a longer line may seem to launch "more" infinite lines than the shorter side of the square. "Such a conception, however, is no argument against Cavalieri's method." (310) The aggregate of parallel lines imagined in the two parallelograms presupposes the equidistance of the compared lines from their base. From this it follows that the height, not the side of the parallelogram, is, with the base, the determining moment.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ The point here is that Euclidean geometry "has not entirely freed itself from being embroiled in what is sensory: the congruence of plane figures is reduced to the possibility of superposition, and simply by means of the figures' being moved with a rigid motion." Moretto, *supra* note 65, at 153, According to Moretto:

Nowadays we can appreciate the datedness as well as the validity of his observation. By means of the modern procedures of abstract algebra, we can now say that when two sides of a triangle and the angle between them are given, the class of all the infinitely many triangles congruent to that given, is unambiguously defined."

Id.

²¹⁷ The Miller translation errs by calling the acute parallelogram a "triangle." (310)

²¹⁸ Hegel bids us to compare two parallelograms having the same height and base but not lying in the same plane. Rather, the plane of one figure is at an angle from the plane of the second figure. If a third plane cuts through the parallelograms, the lines from the one parallelogram are not equidistant from the lines of the other.

Hegel finally concludes. The intention of foregoing remarks on the calculus, he says, "has been to bring to notice the *affirmative* meanings which, in the various applications of the infinitely small in mathematics, remain so to speak in the background." (312) In the infinite series, as well as in Archimedean cyclometry, the infinite means this: "the reduction of the arc to the straight line cannot be effected." (312) Presumably this means that calculus cannot be achieved by purely arithmetic means.

A distinction, Hegel says, is introduced between the continuous and the discrete which makes the continuous appear as if it does not possess any quantum.²¹⁹ (For example, the number of points in a line

This image leads to Hegel's mediation of a dispute over indivisibles between Cavalieri and Andreas Tacquet (who lived in early seventeenth century Holland). According to Carl Boyer, Tacquet denied that objects of a higher dimension could be viewed as made up of elements of a lower dimension. BOYER, *CALCULUS*, *supra* note 115, at 139-40 (calling this criticism justified). With regard to a cone formed by a right triangle encompassing the axis, the two apparently disagreed as to which line should be taken as the discrete element that determines the surface of the cone. According to Tacquet's objection, Cavalieri's atomistic method represents the triangle of the cone to be composed of lines parallel to the base and perpendicular to the axis. These lines are radii of the circles of which the surface of the cone is made. If this surface is taken to be the sum of all the circles, "such a result clashes with the truth formerly taught and demonstrated by Archimedes"--that a cone is formed by revolving the hypotenuse in a circle around the axis. Isaac Barrow (whose work was "tainted with the assumption . . . that a curvilinear triangle . . . may be equated with a rectilinear triangle if both are infinitely, that is, very small," (311)) answers this objection by Tacquet. To determine the surface of the right angled cone, it is not the axis but the hypotenuse of the triangle of the cone which must be taken as the line that, when it spins around in a circle, generates the surface. Presumably, the point here is that, since the axis is shorter than the hypotenuse, it generates fewer lines than the hypotenuse, and this is what contradicts Archimedes' privileging of the hypotenuse.

One may fairly ask why Hegel, in a work that unfolds the very spirit of the universe, felt compelled to mediate disputes such as this.

²¹⁹ At this point, Hegel sets forth this apparently mystifying sentence:

This difference appears arithmetically as a purely quantitative one, that of the root and power, or whatever degree of powers it may be; however, if the expression is to be taken only quantitatively, for example, $a:a^2$ or $d.a^2 = 2a:a^2 = 2:a$, or for the law of descent of a falling body, $t:a^2$, then it yields the meaningless ratios of $1:a$, $2:a$, $1:at$; in supersession of their merely quantitative aspect, the sides would have to be held apart by their

segment cannot possibly be assigned, because there are infinite points there.) By breaking down continuous objects into discrete infinitesimals, the difference appears to be quantitative. In truth, the difference is qualitative. If the magnitude of one line is multiplied by the magnitude of another, we have "the qualitative alteration of the transition from line into plane; and to that extent a negative determination comes into play." (313) That is, qualitative alteration obliterates, whereas quantitative alteration does not. For this reason, the introduction of the infinite, thereby quantifying what should be qualitative, "only serves to aggravate [the difficulty] and prevent its solution." (313)

If I have any readers left at this point, they may finally move on to consider a mercifully short chapter 6 on quantitative ratio, which, of course, stands for a qualitative relation.

III. Quantitative Relation

Quantum is an infinite being. It changes *quantitatively* but, as it changes, it remains what it is *qualitatively*. As Hegel describes Quantum (as it stood at the end of chapter 5):

The infinity of quantum has been determined to the stage where it is the negative beyond of quantum, which beyond, however, is contained within the quantum itself. This beyond is the qualitative moment as such. (314)

At this stage, Quantum is a unity of the qualitative and the quantitative. Thus, chapter 6 (that is, the third chapter of Quantity) is a chapter of Speculative Reason, just as chapter 4 represented the Understanding and chapter 5 represented Dialectical Reason.

Quantum at this advanced stage is *ratio*. Quantitative ratio is "the contradiction of externality and self-relation, of the affirmative being of quanta and their negation." (315) Its distinct feature is that it is "qualitatively determined as simply related to its beyond." (314) Quantum is continuous with this beyond, and the beyond is another Quantum. The relation between Quanta, however, is no longer externally imposed. These quanta have recaptured an integrity that more primitive Quantum did not have. In becoming other, these quanta return to themselves, because they are as much Other as they are themselves. Once again we have a preview of the typical move of reflection, which returns to itself every time it expels its other (bringing, under the

different qualitative significance, as $s = at^2$, the magnitude in this way being expressed as a quality, s a function of the magnitude of another quality.

In the above sentence " $d \cdot a^2$ " is peculiar. I have interpreted " d ." to mean $a^2/a = 2a$, and " $d \cdot a^2$ " means $2a:a^2$. Furthermore, I take " $t:a^2$ " to be a misprint, stemming from the German addition. Properly this should be " $t:at^2$," or time as compared with acceleration. The entire sentence states that a and a^2 , for instance, or t and at^2 are qualitatively different, but if these are made into quantitative ratios, they are the meaningless expressions of $1/a$, or $1/at$.

laws of sublation, the expelled material with it). This move implies that the essential selfhood of the Quantum is as much in the other as it is in itself. Thus, Hegel writes, "what each is, it is in the other." (314) Furthermore:

the other constitutes the determinateness of each. The flight of quantum away from and beyond itself has now therefore this meaning, that it changed not merely into an other, or into its abstract other, into its negative beyond, but that in this other it reached its determinateness, finding *itself* in its beyond, which is another quantum. (314)

Here Hegel implies that Quantum cannot distinguish itself without the aid of the Other. Therefore, the Other is as much the stuff of self as it is Other. Hence, in distinguishing Other, Quantum finds itself.²²⁰

The quality of Quantum, then, is "its externality as such." In ratio, "the quantum is now *posited* as having its determinateness in its externality, in another quantum, and as being in its beyond what it is." (314)

At stake here is not just one Quantum and its beyond (another Quantum), but the *relation* between these two quanta. Thus Quantum "is not only *in* a ratio, but it is *itself posited as a ratio*." (314) Each extreme, then, has to be taken as a singularity and *also* as a mediation. It is as if [1] or [3] is implicitly [4-7]. The extremes have grown concrete.

In its singularity, ratio is "a self-enclosed totality and indifferent to limit." (314) Quantum expresses its totalitarianism "by containing within itself the externality of its determining and by being in this externality related only to itself." (314) In short, Ratio is an infinite being that encompasses its own other (as infinite beings always do).

Hegel concludes his short introduction to ratio by describing the three sections into which chapter 6 is divided. First, we have Direct Ratio. Here the qualitative moment is not yet explicit. Rather, it still shows the retrogressive mode of having its externality outside itself. Direct Ratio shows all the defects of the Understanding. Second

²²⁰ In this passage, Hegel echoes perhaps the most famous passages he ever wrote--the Lord-Bondsman dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT* (A.V. Miller trans. 1977). In this dialectic, two warriors try to subjugate each other. One succeeds and becomes the master, the other the slave. But the master discovers that the other is truly himself. The master is thus reduced to dependency. Likewise, in ratio, Quantum attempts to distinguish itself by expelling the Other, only to find that the Other is as much itself as itself is.

Errol Harris calls "The Quantitative Relation or Qualitative Ratio" a chapter that is "more technical than philosophical. ERROL E. HARRIS, *AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL* 140 (1983). But perhaps he underestimates its importance. In any case, the Ratio of Powers, with which the chapter ends, is a very lucid and powerful demonstration of the qualitative moment in the heart of Quantity.

is Indirect Ratio, or Inverse Ratio. Here Dialectical Reason holds forth. A modulation occurs here between the quanta as they negate each other. Third, we have the Ratio of Powers (e.g. $x^2 = y$). Here quantum (x) reproduces itself. When this middle term is posited as a simple determination, we have reached Measure--the unity of Quantity and Quality. At this moment, the rightward leaning chapters of Quantity give way to the centrist chapters of Measure.

The culmination of this chapter, then, is the Ratio of Powers-- $x^2 = y$. The middle term, however, is a definition of the absolute. Shall we say, then, that the universe (y) is x^2 ? Yes, in a sense, if x stands for some "thing" (or Unit). This chapter--Quantitative Relation--in effect argues that all "things" define all other things, even while remaining a thing-in-itself. Hegel is therefore describing a universe of deeply contextual unitary "things."

A. The Direct Ratio

Direct Ratio can be drawn as follows:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 17(a) Direct Ratio

In Figure 16(a), Direct Ratio is, as Hegel affirms, immediate. Yet the ratio is nevertheless expressly a relation of quanta. The ratio is determined by these quanta, and so the determinateness of the ratio lies in an other. Yet Direct Ratio also has its beyond and its otherness inside itself as well, as it is, by now, an infinite being.

Direct Ratio is itself a Quantum. Hegel insists on calling this the exponent--a confusing choice of words. For mathematicians, where $y^2 = x$, 2 is the exponent. What Hegel means by it, however, is simply the relation between the two quanta making up the ratio. Mathematicians would commonly call this relation the "product."²²¹ Thus, if $x^4 = 16$, Hegel calls 16 the exponent.

As a Quantum, the Direct Ratio is the unity of Unit and Amount, per the laws of sublation. Unit stands for being-for-self, and Amount stands for "the indifferent fluctuation of the determinateness, the external indifference of quantum." (315) Earlier, Amount and Unit were moments of Quantum. Now, each of them are quanta on their own. Hence, an infinite regress is before us. Every quantum is in turn an Amount and Unit, which are in turn quanta. In short, we have passed into the realm of the quantitative infinite.

The exponent of the Direct Ratio is, as Figure 17(a) indicates, a "simple determinateness"--a paradox because determinatenesses are complex. Nevertheless, this coheres with the complex-but-simple nature of the extremes at this stage of the Logic. Thus, the exponent is a Quantum. As such it is complex--an Amount. The exponent is also simple and hence qualitative--a Unit. Hegel explains the qualitative nature of

²²¹ See 320-21 ("the exponent, simply as product, is *implicitly* the unity of unit and amount . . . ").

the exponent as follows. Take $a/b = 2$. If an outside force determines that $b = 5$, then the exponent determines that $a = 10$. This power of the exponent over its parts is the exponent's qualitative nature at work. Thus, Hegel can write that the determinateness of the sides of the ratio lies beyond itself. There is but one determinateness common to both sides of the ratio, and it lies beyond the sides and is located in the exponent.

The two sides of the ratio thus work to constitute a single Quantum--the exponent. It follows, then, that each side is less than Quantum, compared to the exponent. These sides are reduced to Unit and Amount.

But didn't Hegel just tell us that each side was a Quantum? Why now say that each side is *less* than Quantum? In order to emphasize that, at this late stage, outside force cannot simply have its way with the sides of the ratio. The exponent disciplines the sides of the ratio. The integrity of the Direct Ratio therefore implies the servile dependence of the sides.

Hegel refers to this incompleteness of the sides as a negation. What this means is that the sides of the ratio are no longer independent. Thus, the exponent of the ratio lays claim to the quality and the sides of the ratio are the negative to that quality. They embody quantitative difference.

But does this not mean that the exponent²²² is complete? Hegel denies this. The exponent (quotient) is still either Unit or Amount. Hegel gives this example: if $A/B = C$, and if we measure this expression in terms of B (i.e., B is the Direct Ratio), and if A is deemed Unit, the quotient C is the Amount. If A is the Amount, C is "the unit which to the amount A is required for the quantum B." (316-17) Or, to further illustrate the examples, if $A/B = C$, then $A/C = B$. Hence, the quotient C can take B's place with ease. C, therefore, is "not posited as what it ought to be. . . the ratio's qualitative unity." (317)

B. Inverse Ratio

If Figure 17(a) emphasizes the immediacy of the ratio, it is the job of Figure 17(b) to emphasize the incompleteness of the ratio, which Hegel has named a sign of negativity.

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]²²³

²²² Here he calls it "exponent as quotient." (316)

²²³ In this sense, I disagree with Mure's analysis of Direct and Indirect Ratio, the sum total of which is as follows:

In Direct Ratio . . . the two quanta unified in the constant exponent increase or diminish together. In Indirect Ratio they vary inversely and so in closer relation.

Figure 17(b)
Inverse Ratio

The fault of Figure 17(a) was that it was supposed to be immediate and immune from outside manipulation, but was not. An external reflection had to determine whether the quotient was the exponent or whether it was one of the subordinate sides. Thus, in $C = A/B$, C is exponent. But it is likewise Unit/Amount, because $A/C = B$.

In the Inverse Ratio, the exponent is some fixed Quantum. Apparently, we are not to multiply $C = A/B$ by B/C , which would reveal the exponent to be no different from the Unit/Amount. Rather, we are to consider the exponent as fixed--as Unit only. Thus, where A is deemed the Unit and B or C the Amount, we solve for A and obtain $A = BC$. In such a relation, B and C are in an inverse relationship. If B increases, C must fall in value.²²⁴

If Inverse Ratio fixes A and refuses to let it descend from its exponency to become a mere side of the ratio (i.e., by multiplying $A = BC$ by $1/B$ or $1/C$), why is it appropriate to show Inverse Ratio in the position of [3] in Figure 17(b)? Hegel explains that, in the Inverse Ratio:

the exponent . . . is posited as negative towards itself as quantum of the ratio, and hence as qualitative, as a limit--with the result that the qualitative moment is manifested independently and in distinct contrast to the quantitative moment. (318)

The negativity of the exponent justifies labeling the Inverse Ratio as [2, 3] in Figure 17(b). In addition, in expressing the qualitative moment, Dialectical Reason is drawing from [1]--a Quantum--its history in Quality. Thus, the fixity of the exponent in the Inverse Ratio is an ideal Quality--a rooted sorrow plucked from the memory of [1].

The nature of alteration has changed in the Inverse Ratio, compared to the Direct Ratio. Where $C = A/B$, either A or B is Unit. When Unit is increased, Amount is increased.²²⁵ Nevertheless, C could likewise be made Unit, since $A = C/B$. In the Inverse Ratio, however, the exponent stays in its place, and alteration "is *confined within the ratio*, and this arbitrary quantitative fluctuation, too, is limited by the negative determinateness of the exponent as by a limit." (318) In short, the fixity that is characteristic of Inverse Ratio resembles

relation," when the function of the Indirect Ratio is to emphasize the qualitative difference between either side and the exponent.

²²⁴ This is equally true of $C = A/B$. Here, if A increases, $1/B$ must decrease.

²²⁵ Here, in discussing alteration in the Direct Ratio, Hegel divorces A and B from the ratio and imagines that one of them is increased, and hence the other is increased. If, on the other hand, he viewed A and $1/B$ as the sides of the ratio, the relation between these sides of the ratio are inverse.

Limitation in Figure 5(b). In Limitation we learned that the "determinate being of something [1] lies inertly indifferent, as it were, *alongside* its limit [2]." (132) But, since [2] is internal to [1, 2], the finite being limits itself. The implication of Limitation was that the finite being "ought" to sublimate itself. Here, the implication is the mirror opposite. Now, promiscuous Quantum "ought" to sustain its integrity. Yet it still needs an external reflection to hold fixed the exponent.

Hegel now makes three points about Inverse Ratio, in order "to consider more closely [its] qualitative nature." (318) (1) The Inverse Ratio represents an affirmative moment. Because it has been fixed, it is now "better" than its parts. But (2) negativity is still contained within it. The Inverse Ratio displays itself "as self-determining, as a limit of itself within itself." (318) In other words, the limit of Inverse Ratio, taken as [3], is [2], which is nevertheless within Inverse Ratio and hence a self-limitation. Thus, the Inverse Ratio is "an immediate magnitude as a *simple* determinateness" [3]. (318) It is likewise a determinateness, in which [3] experiences [2] as a limit. In other words, if $A = BC$, then A is the immediacy, but B or C is also the internal limit to the other side of the ratio. Meanwhile the sides (B and C) both have within themselves their unity with A. Furthermore, B and C are implicitly identical to their other. Whatever is true of one--its power to limit the other--is true of the other as well. Yet (3) it is likewise true that the exponent is negative to the sides "and is the limit of their reciprocal limiting." (319)

Each side, then, "has its *limit* within the exponent." (319) Each side is also the negative of the other. One becomes smaller as the other becomes greater. Because of this, each side "continues itself *negatively* into the other," (319) thereby proving itself to be an infinite being that is both in itself and out of itself. Each side therefore contains, and is contained by, its other. That is to say, each side "is measured by [the other], for each is supposed to be only that quantum which the other is not." (319) Thus, Hegel introduces the idea of Measure for the first time. Measure will stand for the inability of either side of the syllogism to define itself.

The continuity of one side into the other constitutes the unity of the two sides. This continuity must be viewed as a motion, and so we are on the verge of our next step--the step of Speculative Reason. At this point, the unity is merely in-itself. This in-itself is to be distinguished from the magnitude that the sides happen to have. Each side only *is* "to the extent it takes from the other a part of their common in-itself, the whole. But it can take from the other only as much as will make its own self equal to this in-itself." (319) In other words, each side gives to the other side, not its quantitative nature, but its qualitative nature of self-equality.

But there is a limit as to how much each side can take from the other. "[I]t can take from the other only as much as will make its own self equal to this in-itself." (319) That is, since the sides of the ratio are interested in recapturing Being-for-self, each side takes from the other only enough to be equal to the other. Thus, in the expression $x^y = y$. The first x determines the value of the second. The second therefore takes its being from the first. But where it takes only so much as is necessary to be equal, then each x gains an immunity from manipulation by the mathematician, so long as the exponent y stays

fixed.

Each side of the Inverse Ratio, then, "limits the other and is simultaneously limited by it." (319) Yet once the side of the ratio achieves its in-itself--its potential--it establishes its independence from the other side. "[T]he *other* magnitude become zero." (319) It vanishes.

Obviously this point cannot be taken mathematically. Indeed, if one side of the ratio (x) is zero, the other side (also x) must likewise be zero, and $x@x$ no longer is equal to $y > 0$. Rather, the point is that the first x enjoys Being-for-self. If so, then it is indifferent to the second x , which then can be viewed as a nothing--a void.

Hegel writes:

Thus each side is the contradiction between its determination as the in-itself, i.e. as unity of the whole, which is the exponent, and its determination as moment of the ratio; this contradiction is *infinity* again in a fresh, peculiar form. (319)

Here Hegel seems to be saying that the side of the ratio has recaptured its being and therefore *is* the whole.²²⁶ Now x determines the exponent. Yet it is still the side of a ratio and quantitative. x both stays within itself and goes outside itself and is therefore a True Infinite.

But these thoughts look ahead to the ratio of powers ($x@x=16$). Hegel still has some more points to make about the Inverse Ratio ($x@y=16$). Hegel now emphasizes that, in the Inverse Ratio, there is a limit upon x and y . Neither can become zero. If, for example, x were to be set at zero, the exponent would be destroyed. x could, however, become infinitely close to zero without destroying the exponent. The exponent, then, is the limit to the sides of the ratio.²²⁷

The infinity in x as it approaches but never reaches zero is strictly spurious. x is "itself finite, is bounded by its opposite, by the finitude of each side and of the exponent itself and is consequently only *approximation*." (320) But the bad infinity is "here *posited* as what it is *in truth*, namely, as only the *negative moment* in general." (320) This negativity belongs to the sides of the ratio and constitutes an immunity from mathematical manipulation. This immunity is the Being-in-itself of the sides of the ratio, or, as Hegel puts it,

²²⁶ This would be so as a speculative matter because the sides of the ratio are [2], which in turn becomes the whole in the next step of Speculative Reason.

²²⁷ Geometrically, x and y are in a hyperbolic relation and could portrayed as follows:

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Hyperbola

"their finitude, as their simple alterableness, is related to this in-itself which, however, remains absolutely distinct from them as their negation." (320) Since this spurious infinity is the beyond of quanta, and since it is now posited as *in* the quantum that make up a side of the ratio, Quantum has now official recaptured its being.

The Inverse Ratio has now transformed itself to the next stage, but before that stage is described, Hegel summarizes the nature of the Inverse Ratio. It was a relation of "an immediate quantum" (x) to another such quantum (y) "in such a way that its increase is proportional to the decrease of the other." (320) This was a negative relation between the quanta. A third magnitude--the exponent--was the "common limit of this their fluctuating increase." (320) In the Inverse Ratio, the fluctuation "is their distinctive character--in contrast to the qualitative moment as a *fixed* limit; they have the character of *variable* magnitudes, for which the said fixed limit is an infinite beyond." (320)

The beyond of the inversely proportional quanta is a *fixed* finite quantum. This fixity is "beyond" the quantitative nature of the quanta and so is the qualitative element. Nevertheless, this fixity has simultaneously "developed as a mediation of itself [3] with itself in its other [2]." (320) In other words, fixity creates a limit to the x and y--a Spurious Infinity. This is located in the sides of the ratio [2] but nevertheless inside the ratio [2, 3].²²⁸

Hegel summarizes the Inverse Ratio as follows:

The general result can be indicated by saying that the whole, as exponent, is the limit of the reciprocal limiting of both terms and is therefore posited as *negation of the negation*, hence as infinity, as an *affirmative* relation to itself. (320)

Thus, the exponent is limit to the sides and the sides are likewise limit to the exponent. The negation of the negation is, precisely, the refusal of either side to disappear and becomes zero. A limit is now located in the sides of the ratio. These sides negate the fixity of the ratio. Now the sides speak for themselves as to what they are (within the confines of the externally fixed exponent).

²²⁸ At this point, there seems to be a serious misprint in the Miller translation. From Struthers and Johnson, I am interpreting the following sentence:

We have found and must coordinate the determinations that this infinite Beyond exists as a present and finite (but optional) Quantum; and, further, that its fixity (by virtue of which it is thus related to the quantitative as infinite Beyond) which is the qualitative element of Being only as abstract self-relation, has developed itself within itself as mediateon of itself in its Other, namely the finite moments of the Ratio.

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 339 (W.H. Johnston & L.G. Struthers trans., 1929).

The exponent is the product of x and y , and as such is " *implicitly* the unity of unit and amount." (321) As such, the sides of the ratio [2] is within the being of the ratio [2, 3]. Hence, the ratio is " *implicitly* related to itself." (321)

Nevertheless, x and y fluctuate at the will of the mathematician, which evidences "the *externality* of quantitative being." (321) But the ratio has its qualitative moments. These include the fixity of the ratio (which the mathematician insists upon), the inclusion of the sides of the ratio [2] in the ratio itself [2, 3], and "the identification of the exponent with itself in its *self-external otherness*." (321) Presumably this means that the exponent is immune from being determined by the sides of the ratio. *They* change, but the exponent stays fixed.

Of the sides, Hegel makes two final points: (") The ratio has an "affirmative aspect," (321) which is presumably the "being" of the Inverse Ratio--its fixity. Yet, because each side of the ratio cannot be raised to equality with the exponent, each side is, in a sense, "fixed." This fixity--the inability of x or y to equal 16--means that each side "is *implicitly* the whole of the exponent," (321) since the Inverse Ratio is all about fixity.²²⁹ Yet (β) the quanta have a negative moment--the inability to be equal to the exponent. The exponent limits them. This limit expresses itself as a Spurious infinite, as the mathematician strives to make x or y equal to zero. This resistance to manipulation is "the *negation* of the self-externality of the exponent." (321) This resistance is likewise communicated to the ratio, which is therefore "posited as preserving itself and uniting with itself in the negation of the indifferent existence of the quanta, thus being the determinant of its self-external otherness." (321)

C. The Ratio of Powers

The Ratio of Powers is shown in Figure 17(c):

[All illustrations are set forth at the end of this manuscript.]

Figure 17(c) Ratio of Powers

²²⁹ This "equality" of a given side of the ratio with the exponent justifies Professor Mure's remark:

In Ratio of Powers, where one [*i.e.*, the exponent] is a higher power of the other [*i.e.*, a side of the ratio], they relate, If I follow Hegel, so closely that they are fully equivalent to the exponent, and the total expression is true infinity.

MURE, *supra* note 12, at 120. A True Infinite becomes other and remains the same. Hence, the sides become the exponent, in the sense that each is *fixed*. Fixity stands for quality here.

Hegel says of the Ratio of Powers ($x^x=16$, for example) that it is a "quantum which, in its otherness, is identical with itself and which determines the beyond of itself." (321) That is, given the requirement of x^2 , the one x determines itself and its other. At this point, Quantum "has reached the stage of being-for-self." (321) Here "quantum is posited as returned to itself." (322)

In earlier stages, we could never tell whether x or y was Unit or Amount. Now $x = x$, so that Unit *is* Amount. For this reason the Ratio of Powers is "posited as determined only by the unit." (322) The quantum (x) may undergo alteration, when it is raised to a higher power, "but in so far as this alteration is a raising to a power, this its otherness is limited purely by itself." (322)

Hegel refers to the Ratio of Powers as qualitative yet external--an apparent contradiction. Where the exponent is fixed, the variable x is determined by the other x . Hence, its determinateness is external. But x is equally *internal*: "this externality is now posited in conformity with the Notion of quantum, as the latter's own self-determining, as its relation to its own self, as its *quality*." (323) "[I]n so far as the externality or indifference of its determining counts," (323) the Ratio of Powers is still Quantum. At this moment it "is posited *simply* or *immediately*." But also at this moment "it has become the other of itself, namely, quality." (323) In going outside itself, Quantum stays within itself, "so that *in this very externality quantum is self-related*" and hence "is being as quality." (323)

In the Ratio of Powers, the exponent, like the sides of the ratio, has changed. It "is no longer an immediate quantum." (322) Rather, "it is of a wholly *qualitative* nature." (322) But the quantitative aspect is preserved as well. According to this quantitative nature, the negativity toward (*i.e.*, independence from) outside manipulation (*i.e.*, the quality of the Quantum) is not merely immediate. Rather, this Determinate Being of the Quantum "is posited as continued into its otherness; for the truth of quality is just this, to be quantity, immediate determinateness as sublated." (322)

We have presented $x^x=16$ as an example of the Ratio of Powers. In it, x is unalterable, and thus x has recaptured its Quality. But is it not the case that outside forces can erase 16 and choose, say, 25 instead, thereby changing x ? Of course, Hegel admits, but nevertheless the Ratio of Powers "has a closer connection with the *Notion* of quantum." (322) In it, Quantum has reached the full extent of its Notion "and has completely realized it." (322) It expresses the distinctive feature of Quantum, which Hegel describes as follows:

Quantum is the *indifferent* determinateness, *i.e.*, *posited as sublated*, determinateness as a limit which is equally no limit, which continues itself into its otherness and so remains identical with itself therein. (322)

Why is Quantum a determinateness? It will be recalled that Determinateness was another name for Limit.²³⁰ It stands for a unity of being and nothing. So Quantum, as Number, is the unity of Amount (being) and Unit (nothing). Number--an early version of Quantum--was

²³⁰ Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 519.

indifferent to its Quality. It depended on external reflection to determine which of its parts was Amount and which was Unit. But now that indifference is sublated. Number is now the Ratio of Powers, which resists outside manipulation. Nevertheless, Amount and Unit are indistinguishable precisely because they are equal ($x = x$). Each side of the ratio stays what it is and yet it determines itself in its other. It both "remains identical with itself" and goes outside itself.

The Quality of Quantum is also said to be "the difference of itself from itself." (322) How is this so? If we contemplate, $x \times x = 16$, clearly the first x is distinguishable from the second x , if only by the very difference of location each has on this printed page. Nevertheless, $x = x$, and so, if the first x is different from the second x , it is different *from itself*. It is no self-identical entity, which, to Hegel, is a great philosophical error (until the Absolute Idea achieved self-identity on the last page of the Logic).

To have a selfhood that is different from itself is what it means for Quantum to be a ratio. At first, in Direct Ratio, ratio showed itself in an immediate form. There, "its self-relation which it has as exponent, in contrast to its differences, counts only as the fixity of an amount of the unit." (322) Presumably, this means that, in Direct Ratio, where the Unit is fixed, Amount is fixed. In the Inverse Ratio, the exponent is only *in principle* the determinant of the sides of the ratio. In fact, x and y can fluctuate greatly, but they never quite become zero. For this reason the exponent is affirmative in that it has an independence from its sides. That is, the Quantum which is exponent relates itself to itself.

A summary. Hegel now summarizes the entire journey that Quantity has made--a journey that is now at an end. Quantity was at first opposed to Quality. But Quantity was itself a Quality--"a purely self-related determinateness distinct from the determinateness of its other, from quality as such." (323) Ironically, Quantity learned to resist Quality, and in its resistance, it showed itself to be a Quality. By hating its other, it *became* its other. "Quantity . . . is in its truth the externality which is no longer indifferent but has returned into itself." (323)

But Quantity is not only a Quality. "[I]t is the truth of quality itself." (323) Without Quantity, there could be no Quality.

On the brink of Measure, Hegel notes that a double transition was necessary. Not only does one determinateness continue into the other but the other determinateness continues into the original one.²³¹ Thus, Quality is contained in Quantity, "but this is still a one-sided determinateness." The converse is true as well--Quantity is contained in Quality. "This observation on the necessity of the *double* transition," Hegel remarks, "is of great importance throughout the whole compass of scientific method." (323)²³²

The entity in which Quality and Quantity coexist as equal entities is named by Hegel as Measure.

²³¹ That is, in $x^2 = y$, x stays an x and determines the other side of the ratio as x .

²³² This double exchange is what was earlier called the "chiasmic exchange of properties." Carlson, *supra* note 2, at 468.

Remark

Hegel's study of Quantity ends with a short remark. Here Hegel criticizes an unnamed philosopher's description of the Notion. In this philosophy, immediate Notion was named the first power. Rendered determinate, Notion was called the second power. In its return to itself, wherein it is a totality, it was the third power. Power used here, Hegel states, belongs to Quantum. They do not correspond to Aristotle's dynamic notions.

The power relation "expresses determinateness in the form or difference which has reached its truth." (324) But this Notional truth is appropriate only for the primitive stage of Quantum. It is not appropriate for the Notion as such. "Differences which are proper to quantum are superficial determinations for the Notion itself and are still far from being determined as they are in the notion." (324) In the infancy of philosophy, Pythagoras used numbers to designate universal distinctions, but the first through third powers referred to above are little better than numbers.

[T]o retrogress from [thought] determinations to those of number is the action of a thinking which feels its own incapacity, a thinking which . . . makes itself ridiculous by pretending that this impotence is something new, superior, and an advance. (324-25)

It is unhelpful, Hegel suggests, to borrow mathematical terms to describe the Notion. If these are merely symbols for the true Notion, then the Notion would first have to be derived logically and then symbolized. But, upon deriving the Notion, the symbols become superfluous, as we would have before us the direct Notion. Use of mere forms simply evades "the task of grasping the determinations of the Notion." (325)

Conclusion

"A main result of the science of logic is to repudiate quantitative definition of the absolute, and to retrieve qualitative definition."²³³ Accross the "quantity" chapters, we have seen how an exclusive quantitative perspective falls apart.

Being at first expelled otherness so that it could be all by itself--independent from the negative. But it discovered that, in this mode, being expelled all its content and became Quantity. Quantity stands for the very act of expelling all content.

Quantity discovers, however, that it has an integrity that it cannot expel--a limit that preserves its content within itself. "This inability to reach its bourne Hegel describes as *eine Ohbmacht des Negativen*--a weakness of the negative--in that what it abolishes by its own cancelling immediately reasserts itself."²³⁴

²³³ CLARK BUTLER, *HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY* 143 (1996).

²³⁴ HARRIS, *supra* note 11, at 136.

This reassertion of what is canceled is nevertheless "other." Hence, in Quantitative Infinity (Figure 16(a)), Quantum goes outside itself to a beyond. The infinitely big or small number can never be named. Yet, in going beyond its limit, Quantum discovers that its *own content* is beyond the limit. In this sense, Quantum returns to itself when it exports its content to the other. This return will later be called reflection-into-self--the hallmark of Essence. For now, it can be noted that the nature of being has changed. Whereas in the first three chapters being constituted expelling the negative, now being constitutes expelling its own self and therefore, in this act of expulsion, accomplishes a return to itself. This return to self is still implicit and will remain so in the last installment of the Doctrine of Being--Measure.



Figure 1(a)
Pure Being



Figure 1(b)
Pure Nothing




Figure 1(c)
Becoming




Figure 2(a)
The Move to Determinate Being




Figure 2(b)
Quality and Negation




Figure 2(c)
Something




Figure 3(a)
Something/Other




Figure 3(b)
Being-for-Other and Being-in-Itself



Figure 3(c)
Determination of the In-Itself




Figure 4(a)
Constitution




Figure 4(b)
Constitution vs Determination




Figure 4(c)
Limit (Determinateness as Such)




Figure 5 (a)
Finitude




Figure 5 (b)
Limitation




Figure 5 (c)
The Ought




Figure 6 (a)
Enriched Finite




Figure 6 (b)
Another Finite




Figure 6 (c)
Infinity




Figure 7 (a)
Spurious Infinity




Figure 7 (b)
Spurious Infinity and its Other




Figure 7 (c)
True Infinity




Figure 8 (a)
Being-For-Self




Figure 8 (b)
Being-For-One




Figure 8 (c)
The One




Figure 9 (a)
The One in its Own Self




Figure 9 (b)
The One and the Void




Figure 9 (c)
Repulsion




Figure 10 (a)
Attraction




Figure 10 (b)
Attraction and Repulsion




Figure 10 (c)
Quantity




Figure 11 (a)
Continuity




Figure 11 (b)
Discreteness




Figure 11 (c)
Enriched Quantity




Figure 12 (a)
Continuous Magnitude




Figure 12 (b)
Discrete Magnitude




Figure 12 (c)
Quantum




Figure 13 (a)
Amount




Figure 13 (b)




Figure 13 (c)
Number




Figure 14 (a)
Extensive Magnitude




Figure 14 (b)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)




Figure 14 (c)
The Quality of Quantum




Figure 15 (a)
Intensive Magnitude (Degree)




Figure 15 (b)
Extensive Magnitude




Figure 15 (c)
Qualitative Something




Figure 16 (a)
Quantitative Something




Figure 16 (b)
Quantitative Infinite Progress



Figure 16 (c)
Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small




Figure 17 (a)




Figure 17 (b)
Inverse Ratio




Figure 17 (c)
Ratio of Powers




Figure 18 (a)
Immediate Measure




Figure 18 (b)
Mediated Immediate Measure




Figure 18 (c)
Specifying Measure




Figure 19 (a)
Rule




Figure 19 (b)
Rule Measuring its Other




Figure 19 (c)
Ratio of Measures (Realized or Specified Measure)




Figure 20 (a)
Combination of Measures




Figure 20 (b)
Measure as a Series of Measure Relations




Figure 20 (c)
Elective Affinity




Figure 21 (a)
Continuity of Affinity




Figure 21 (b)
Indifference of Affinity (Substrate)




Figure 21 (c)
Nodal Line




Figure 22 (a)
Abstract Measureless




Figure 22 (b)
Quality of the Abstract Measureless




Figure 22 (c)
Infinite For Itself




Figure 23 (a)
Absolute Indifference




Figure 23 (b)
Inverse Ratio of the Factors







Figure 23 (c)
Essence




Beginning




Borromean Knot



Coming-to-Be and Ceasing-to-Be



Coming to Be



Determinate Being as Speculative Reason






Diagram of Chapter 2




Dialectical Reason




Limit as Simple Negation




Otherness in Itself




Thought




Understanding




The Doctrine of Being
Section Two: Magnitude (Quantity)



Cartesian Plane



Constant as Maximum/
Minimum of Parabola




$$x = \frac{-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}}{2a}$$


Quadratic Equation

$$X = \frac{-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}}{2a}$$


Quadratic Equation




Cartesian Tangential Method



Hyperbola



Circle and Ellipse with Common
Diameter and Major Axis



Arc Between Chords and Tangents