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Hegel’s Theory of Quality

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Introduction

The system of logic is the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness. (59)¹

This Article is the first installment on my attempt to explain in pictographic terms precisely how Hegel's monumental *Science of Logic* functions. As it now stands, only small numbers of people have ever mastered the Logic since it was written between 1812 and 1816 and reissued in a second edition shortly before Hegel's death in 1831. In the United States, that number is small indeed. Yet it is Hegel's major work against which all his other, more accessible work must be read. Unfortunately, the *Science of Logic* is the single densest book ever published. No one who has peeked under its covers would think to dispute this claim. Yet, thanks to the pictures I will draw, the secrets of this book will yield themselves forth.

In portraying the system pictorially, I try to intrude upon the logical progress as little as possible, as is only right, since, according to Hegel, the Logic travels a strictly necessary path, whereas anything I might add would be mere "contingent" material.² Peter Goodrich has written, "The systematizer is always a follower and in a sense a moderate who defers to the author of the system itself."³ This describes my task. I try to follow Hegel as closely as I can, untangling his dense prose so that ordinary readers can follow it.⁴

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¹ All numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers from GEORG W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans. 1969).

² As Professor Mure put it:

Hegel himself, indeed, was opposed on principle to any such preliminary exposition of principles. Learning to philosophize, he thought, is like learning to swim: you cannot do it on dry land. Truth is the whole as result, and for the student it lies ahead. He musty watch it develop itself . . .


⁴ Clark Butler has called this an "arid approach to Hegel." CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 6 (1996). Nevertheless, it is the one I embrace here.
Who was Hegel? I will say the minimum.\(^5\) Born in 1770, Hegel was an unsuccessful college teacher, a high school principal, and eventually a chaired professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, where he enjoyed great fame as the premier philosopher in his day. Yet, soon after he died, his work lapsed into obscurity—perhaps because it was so difficult.\(^6\) If he was remembered at all, it was because Karl Marx famously turned Hegel on his head.

In modern times, Hegel's reputation had fallen so precipitately low that it became a term of contempt to call a theory Hegelian.\(^7\) Yet by the turn of the millennium, it became clear that Hegel had foreseen virtually all philosophical developments to date—and had successfully critiqued them.\(^8\) Today, when it is fashionable to style oneself "post-modern," it is foolish indeed (though very common) to undertake a philosophical project without a thorough grounding in the Hegelian method.

A word of warning: the *Science of Logic* is not to be confused with a later, much shorter work usually called the "*Lesser Logic.*"\(^9\) The Lesser Logic is part of the so-called Encyclopedia, Hegel's attempt to describe all knowledge. In contrast, the *Science of Logic*


\(^7\) Erroll Harris was written:

Hegel's writings have so long been shunned and despised, and his theories so commonly ridiculed as mere fantasy and paradox, that few are likely to approach with tolerance any attempt to rehabilitate him. The term "Hegelian" applied to any philosophical essay has become one of opprobrium and almost of abuse in some philosophical circles, and many academic philosophers would shrink from research into, or serious criticism of, Hegel's philosophy, as endangering their professional reputations.


\(^8\) See id. at 61 ("astonishingly prophetic").

\(^9\) GEORG W.F. HEGEL, *HEGEL'S LOGIC* § 80 (William Wallace trans., 1975). It is occasionally maintained that the *Lesser Logic* is the more authoritative statement of Hegel's philosophy because it is published later in time. TOM ROCKMORE, *ON HEGEL'S EPistemology AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY* 30 (1996). But I think this later work has to be taken for what it is—a guide to students. Much of the intricacy in the *Science of Logic* is omitted, and often the results of the *lesser Logic* are merely announced.
is sometimes called the "Greater Logic." The two books are quite different. I will refer to the Lesser Logic from time to time, where useful. This Article, however, is strictly an explication of the Science of Logic.

Hegel himself warned that the Logic could not be described in mere introductory material. Hence, I will resist the temptation of any such attempt. I set forth only a few tips on how to read this Article.

First, the table of contents to the Science of Logic is key. In most books the table of contents is boring--designed to be skipped. In the Science of Logic, the table of content vigorously organizes the whole book. For that reason, I will reproduce Hegel's chapter headings and subheading in bold type, in the same language and, mostly, in the same order that Hegel (or his translator) did. What follows is an account and commentary on exactly what material Hegel covers under each subheading.

The major contribution, if any, of this Article (and the many sequels to follow) is that I think I have reduced every move in Hegel's logic to a discrete diagram. Thus, in Hegel's first three chapters, there are precisely thirty official logical progression, organized in groups of three. Each official move is diagrammed in a "Figure." Thus, Figure 1(c) (Becoming) is the third sub-step of the first step of the Logic. Figure 2(a) (Determinate Being as Such) would be the first sub-step of the second step. Other drawings will be offered, but, if they are not labeled a "Figure," they are not official steps of the Logic. Rather they represent some digression by Hegel or perhaps by myself.

As you read this Article, it would be very helpful if, at all times, you kept all the drawings in front of you, as I will often refer back and forth between drawings without constantly reproducing them. For your convenience, these drawings are set forth in an appendix at the end of the Article. If your temperament permits the defilement of this law review, I suggest you rip out the pages containing those drawings, staple them together, and have them directly in front of you as you read. This will enable you to follow the discussion much more closely.

Hegel tends to name each official move with a distinct name. To help remind you when I refer to the official steps, I shall capitalize the term. However, if I am quoting from Hegel's English translator, I will reproduce the language exactly as the translator sets it forth. Nothing very significant, however, is intended in my
capitalization policy. It is just a reminder that certain terms have won official status in the logical progression, while certain other (e.g., abstract and concrete, or "being-within-self") have not. Admittedly, certain very commonly used terms ("determinateness") win official status, but given the very commonness of the term, I capitalize such terms only when there is some specific reference to their place in the logical system.

Where quotations are followed by a number in parentheses, I am citing to Arnold Vincent Miller's excellent translation of the Science of Logic. Where quotation marks are not followed by any such citation, I am either using "scare quotes" for ironic purposes, or perhaps I am referring to some snippet from a longer passage from Hegel that I have just quoted in full. I trust the reader will be able to tell the difference.

Beyond this, I will say no more. Let's proceed to watch how Hegel's Science of Logic unfolds.

I. The Triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming

A. Pure Being

To be or not to be.
That is the question.\(^{12}\)

Hegel's Science of Logic begins its journey with the simplest of simples--Pure Being. For Hegel, Pure Being is immediacy "as such." The phrase "as such" (an sich) in German is oft used by Hegel. It means "taken straight up," or "taken on its own terms without reference to anything else," or "in principle."

What is "immediacy as such?" A brief reference to the Phenomenology\(^{14}\) might help. Indeed, Hegel, in the introductory materials to the Science of Logic,\(^{15}\) refers to the Phenomenology as a necessary presupposition to Logic. In his Introduction, Hegel states

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\(^{12}\) WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act 2, scene 2.

\(^{13}\) Hegel's translator advises that "it is particularly important to note that in Hegel's vocabulary being nearly always implies immediacy." Miller, supra note 11, at 103.


\(^{15}\) Hegel's Introduction is discussed as an appendix to the discussion of the chapter on Pure Being. See infra text accompanying notes 121-39.
that pure immediacy is the result of the Phenomenology:

Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (49)

In other words, as William Maker has argued extensively, consciousness, in the Phenomenology, abolished itself by producing "pure knowing" (in which consciousness cannot distinguish itself). Or, in other words, consciousness discovers that it is nothing else but impure knowing. Pure knowing, in contrast, "ceases itself to be knowledge," (69) because knowledge insists on a distinction between the knower and the known object. Thus, at the end of its "way of despair," consciousness has shown itself to be an inadequate basis upon which to found philosophy. The Science of Logic takes up where the Phenomenology left off--with a purer immediacy than mere consciousness could ever comprehend.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel starts with consciousness "immediately" perceiving an object. Immediacy means that consciousness is aware of nothing that comes between the object and knowledge of the object. The object and the subject's knowledge of the object are taken to be the same thing. There is, at the start of the Phenomenology, an "immediate" unity between the thing and consciousness of the thing. In the Science of Logic, Hegel begins with immediacy. But it is already more radical than the immediacy of the Phenomenology. In the Phenomenology, immediacy is the name of a unity between consciousness and object (and, "as such," it was already not immediate but rather, like all unities, mediated by its parts). Now we will take up immediacy before there are any parts to break it up.

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16 PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 14, at 49-50.


18 Lawyers encounter the claim to immediate knowledge in H.L.A. Hart's claim that rules have a "core" meaning most of the time, but occasionally hard cases come along that are in the penumbra of judicial discretion. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). "Core" cases are ones in which judges have immediate knowledge of the right answer. Penumbra cases are ones in which the judge experiences thought as mediating between the right answer and the judge's decision.

19 Thus Hegel's remark, "Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness." (49)
This explains Hegel's remark that "[b]eing is the indeterminate immediate" (80) and an "indeterminate immediacy." (82)²⁰

We can draw this elementary move in an elementary way. Figure 1(a) implies the positing of the beginning in Pure Being. In all the Figures that follow, the left side of the page represents "being." (The right side of the page will represent "nothing," but this won't appear until Figure 1(b).)

**Insert Figure 1(a) here (located at the end)**

**Pure Being**

The fact that Pure Being is represented by a simple circle is a sign that Pure Being is taken as an immediacy.

*Black cows at midnight.* In the pure light of Being, nothing can be distinguished. We need some shade--some lines--to make anything out. Pure Being, however, paints in blinding white, and no other color. If a single shade of white were the only color a painter was legally permitted to use, what could be shown in a painting? We would have only the famous French work, "Cow Eating Grass." As Hegel puts it in the Second Remark:

> Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness . . . and for this reason, that it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being. (93)

Thus, one cannot perceive white cows in the middle of Sol or black cows at midnight. So it is with Pure Being and Pure Nothing. At this stage everything is indeterminate. In fact Pure Being and Pure Nothing could be each called "indeterminacy" as such.²¹

In the purest form of being, we see nothing (in a very double sense).²² But this is what we would perceive in a world of pure

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²⁰ Professor Maker notes the criticism of Dieter Henrich that immediacy is not immediate because it is merely the negation of mediation. **Maker, supra** note 17, at 94, quoting **DIETER HENRICH, ANFANG UND METHODE DER LOGIKE 85** (1971). This is wrong, Maker claims, because it was the very function of the *Phenomenology* to refute the givenness of objects as simply presented to consciousness.


²² The Danish scholar Justus Hartnack provides an aphorism that sounds well yet does not ultimately work. Hartnack defends Pure Being as a word with no denotations--only connotations. Pure Being is not "out there" (denotation), but certain things follow from the concept (connotation). **JUSTUS HARTNACK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S LOGIC** 12-13, 17 (Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans., 1998). This suggestion must be rejected to the extent its "connotation" that there is no
nothing. Hence, we might as well say that Pure Being is Pure Nothing, because they are precisely identical. In neither can anything be perceived.\(^\text{23}\)

*Self-equality.* With regard to Pure Being, Hegel announces that Pure Being is "equal only to itself." (82) That is, it is not equal to another. This should make sense to the reader. Figure 1(a) demonstrates that there is as yet nothing but Pure Being. Nothing else is allowed to be distinguished. Otherwise, we have smuggled in foreign "determinateness," which is not yet permitted.\(^\text{24}\) There being nothing else, Pure Being could hardly be equal to any other thing. It is therefore, if anything, only equal to itself.\(^\text{25}\)

What a strange phrase—to be equal to oneself! Consider the expression \(A = A\). A is not equal to itself here. Rather, it is equal to another \(A\), with different time-space coordinates than the first \(A\). One cannot even express true self-equality using an equal sign, because an equal sign is a mediating term between two other terms. So far we have only one term—Pure Being. To introduce a phrase that Hegel much favors, we can say that Pure Being is "self-identical." Self-identity is usually an insult in Hegel's Logic, though, at the very end, it is Spirit's triumph that it becomes authentically self-identical.

"For us." Before moving on to Pure Nothing (into which Pure Being changes of its own accord), I would like to raise an objection that may have occurred to some readers, and which is occasionally made in the critical literature.

Hegel implies that Pure Being cannot be thought by concrete

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\(^{23}\) "There is nothing to be intuited in it... Being... is in fact nothing." (82) If you think otherwise, then you are Parmenides, and unable to start up a philosophy. Parmenides, according to Hegel, assumed that Pure Being and Pure Nothing stay forever apart. (94)

\(^{24}\) Thus, Hegel writes that Pure Being "has no diversity within itself... It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination..." (82) Determination is too advanced for us. Do not introduce it before its time!

\(^{25}\) *Accord, John W. Burbidge, On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary* 39 (1981). Paradoxically, Hegel says that Pure Being "is also not unequal relatively to another." (82) This double negative should be read to mean that *there is no other*, not that there *is* an other to which Pure Being is "not unequal."
human intellects.26 "Whatever is conceivable is complex."27 But you may object, "I am sitting here thinking about Pure Being. How can Hegel claim these things cannot be thought?"28

Hegel would respond here that you are thinking, but this is inconsistent with the rules of Pure Being.

Pure Knowing . . . has sublated [i.e., erased] all reference to an other . . . ; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy . . . ; being and nothing else, without any further specification and filling. (69)

Thus, Pure Being as such precludes an Other who thinks. This means you, of course.29

If Pure Being were really here before us (and not just in our thoughts) we would be obliterated--sucked in. Indeed, the very fact that we are thinking at all is proof that Pure Being is not before us. Rather, it is apparent that Pure Being has already passed into Pure Nothing, and Pure Nothing has already passed right back into Pure Being. This follows because, as we have said, being and nothing are the same. All we have is this modulation back and forth. Neither Pure Being nor Pure Nothing is ever before us. Because we think, Pure Being and Pure Nothing have long since passed on. This is a good thing, given their propensity for obliteration. Relevant here is Hegel's remark: "the need to occupy

26 See LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 80 (Pure Being "is not to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in the imagination."). Relative to this implication is the objection of John Burbidge: "Even to refer to it as an immediacy is to introduce a reflective contrast with mediation." BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 38. Hegel himself will make this very point in the Philosophy of Right. He will use it to derive the existence of property, which the person expropriates. That is, if the person starts off as "autonomous," he is indeterminate. But such an indeterminacy implies that "determinacy" exists. This determinacy is "not the subject" and therefore eligible to be expropriated by the subject. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 34 Addition (Allen W. Wood trans. 1993); see generally David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things With Hegel, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1377 (2000).

27 HARRIS, supra note 7, at 78.

28 This is an especially poignant question because later, as we shall see, Hegel criticizes Kant's discovery that we can know nothing of the thing in itself--the object beyond phenomenal experience of it. Hegel's point is that Kant knows all about the thing in itself because he is naming it and describing its properties. Likewise, we are entitled to know why we can't think Pure Being.

29 As William Maker puts it, "given what consciousness instantiates, we can see that its suspension is specifically, indeed, preeminently relevant to the beginning of presuppositionless science." William Maker, Beginning, in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 36 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990).
This is the fundamental objection of Dieter Henrich: by negating mediation, Hegel implicitly appeals to the logic of consciousness (i.e., Reflection). See HENRICH, supra note 20, at 80. Professor William Maker responds that such a criticism overlooks the role that the Phenomenology played in negating mediation. Pure Being is before us because it was the result of the Phenomenology, in which consciousness negated itself and disappeared into the concept of Pure Knowing. MAKER, supra note 17, at 95-96. Maker distinguishes between (1) a reconstruction of the opening transitions, which "involve a reference to the exclusion of reflection," and (2) the actual logical steps. Id. at 260-61 n.18. The reflective aspect of the reconstruction (that which is "for us") does not mean that, for itself, the Logic appeals, in its opening steps, to the logic of Reflection. "So, if a reconstruction finds 'reflection present as negated,' this is perfectly in accord with Hegel's claims about the beginning of the logic as arising out of the sublation of mediation." Id. at 261 n.18.

Such criticisms--Hegel appeals to concepts not yet established--apparently date back to 1812, when the Science of Logic first appeared. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 28. Of such critiques, Butler writes:

[H]ermeneutic self-alienation into a transcended definition of the absolute does not require that we abstract from all we know. It requires only that we project ourselves out of our own definition (or nondefinition) of the absolute . . . and that we allow that definition to analyze and critique itself . . . [I]t is fair to comment before the deduction of determinate being that quality is not quantity, and before the deduction of essence that being in general is not essence. Yet, precisely for this reason, the fact that pure indeterminate being becomes determinate, that quality becomes quantity, or that being in general becomes essence comes as a dialectical surprise.

Id.

An example of what is "for us:" "being has . . . shown itself in becoming to be only a moment--a sublated, negatively determined being; but it is such for us in our reflection, it is not yet posited as such in its own self." (110) Here Hegel breaks character and speak to his audience much like a sports announcer who is not part of the game and who "announces" the game to the observing audience.
Several of the "remarks" following "The Unity of Being and Nothing" are designed precisely to warn readers of the rules of Pure Being. In the presence of Pure Being, there can be no determinate being that thinks. Any attempt to smuggle in thought (or any other "determinate being") is, so far, illegitimate.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{B. Pure Nothing}

The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps taken for a joke . . . No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that Being and Nothing are the same . . . If Being and Nothing are identical . . . it follows that it makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe, this city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not . . .\textsuperscript{33}

Pure Being has changed of its own accord to Pure Nothing. When it did so, it brought all its (sparse) properties with it. Thus, Pure Being was self-identical--equal to itself. So, then, is Pure Nothing. "[I]t is simply equality with itself . . .; absence of all determination and content." (82)

To illustrate Pure Nothing, we place a second circle to the right side of the page. The right side of the page represents nothingness, just as the left side represents being.

\textit{Insert Figure 1(b) here (located at the end)}

\textbf{Pure Nothing}

Of Pure Nothing, Hegel remarks:

\begin{quote}
In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or \textit{nothing} is intuited . . . (82)
\end{quote}

Of course, pure thinking \textit{cannot} be mentioned here. Pure Being and Pure Nothing do not permit distinctions of any mere objects. Thinking stands opposed both to Pure Being and Pure Nothing. Hegel thus implies that you literally cannot think it at all! If you have a thought, you have already trafficked in distinction and have not

\textsuperscript{32} Thus, Clark Butler warns that Pure Being is not to be confused with "[u]niversal being as a proposition of everything." BUTLER, supra note 4, at 28. Universal being presupposes that things have properties \textit{other} than being. Pure Being must be more radically conceived as blotting out the possibility of any other properties--or of things in general.

\textsuperscript{33} LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 88.
followed the premises of Pure Being.\textsuperscript{34}

Nevertheless, Hegel wishes to break character and speak "for us," to remind us that we probably believe that "something" is different from nothing. Indeed, what could be more radically different from Pure Being than Pure Nothing? Yet, paradoxically, they are the same!

Still speaking out of character, Hegel sounds the note of an important slogan: nothing is, after all, something. Nothing \textit{is}--a paradox! According to Hegel, "To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both [being and nothing] are distinguished and thus nothing \textit{is} (exists) in our intuiting or thinking." (82) That Nothing \textit{is}--this paradox reflects the claim that there is no difference between Pure Being and Pure Nothing.\textsuperscript{35}

C. Becoming

1. The Unity of Being and Nothing

We started with Pure Being but it \textit{changed} to Pure Nothing. The two moments would seem to be the most opposite of opposites, yet we could not hold them apart.

In this formulation, the concept of change "as such" can be "distinguished" from its predecessors, Pure Being and Pure Nothing. This change is a "complex" entity. It mediates Pure Being and Pure Nothing, and simultaneously is different from them. Hence, focusing on the modulation of Pure Being into Pure Nothing (and back again), we have introduced the very idea of distinction.

\textsuperscript{34} The reader may now think that we can never proceed beyond Pure Being because, in it, we are obliterated. This is true. Our relation to Pure Being is ambiguous. We are thinking the unthinkable. Furthermore, we can only borrow on advanced concepts--such as human beings who think and who stand over against Pure Being in violation of Pure Being's rules--to move the process along. I think Hegel admits this, from time to time, as we shall see. On Hegel's borrowing of advanced ideas to explicate the absolutely simple, see Erroll E. Harris, \textit{A Reply to Philip Grier}, in \textsc{Essays on Hegel's Logic} 80 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990).

\textsuperscript{35} William Maker has an interesting take on the identity and difference of Pure Being and Pure Nothing. To think indeterminateness, he writes, requires the thinking of a contrast. Indeterminateness is thus made determinate by a contrast. But no determinacy is invested in indeterminateness simply because indeterminateness is being \textit{thought}. Therefore, the determinacy of indeterminateness introduced by thought is nothing at all. Hence, by thinking of Pure Being, we are thinking Pure Nothing. \textit{Maker, supra} note 17, at 111.
Of Being and Nothing, Hegel remarks:

they are not undistinguished from each other . . . they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite.

This means that we--the audience for whom the Logic performs--contemplate the first two steps and we notice that, being two steps, they are distinct from each other. Yet the two steps could not be held apart. The one changed into the other and back again. We witness a kind of modulation between the difference of the two poles and we simultaneously witness their perfect identity. The fact that we notice movement allows us to produce Figure 1(c).36

In short, Hegel's logic, from the beginning, is a play between (a) pure stasis, (b) pure movement, and, in addition, (c) the unity of stasis and movement.37 Becoming is the first name of that unity.38

36 Relevant here is Erroll Harris's point that Pure Being does not mediate Pure Nothing. Nor is the reverse true. What is happening in Figure 1(b) is mere transition. "[E]ach is implicitly . . . what it becomes, but this implication is not yet explicit . . . " HARRIS, supra note 7, at 98.

37 See BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 41 ("In other words the double process by which being vanishes into nothing and nothing vanishes into being itself vanishes and leaves a tranquil but comprehensive result") (footnote omitted); see also HARRIS, supra note 7, at 95 ("Their unity is thus a perpetual oscillation, a perpetual timeless activity or discursus, which requires the self-identity of each, their mutual opposition and their mutual identity, all at once").

38 Clark Butler derives Determinate Being by different means—one that does not emphasize stasis and movement. According to Professor Butler, Pure Being is indeterminate. It is therefore nothing in particular. If being is "to be," it must therefore must be something in particular. Pure Being, operating at a different level from particular properties, implies that particular properties do exist. Furthermore, now that "determinacy" exists, we can, ex posteriori, confirm that its opposite--indeterminacy--exists. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 32-33.

This line of argument exploits the position of "for us" in a slightly different way. "We" can't think the indeterminate. Therefore, since we can think, there must be a determinate being to account for it, which in turn implies the validity of indeterminate being. In this line of reasoning, the thinker projects herself beyond herself "back into the most abstract (least self-differentiated) definition" and retravels the "path by which our contemporary definition of the absolute reconstitutes itself." Id. at 34. By this means of projection, the definition of Pure Being defeats itself.

Notice that this line of reasoning dispenses with the distinction between stasis and movement, to which Hegel directly refers.
"Always already" is a phrase that Hegel does not use but is much favored by postmodernism. It denotes what Kant might call a "condition of possibility." That is, when something always already is true, the truth is a kind of ever-present, transcendental principle. E.g., Drucilla Cornell, Rethinking the Beyond of the Real, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 729, 728 (1995) ("This becoming space of time and the becoming time of space is always already under say, as soon as anything 'is').

Burbidge points out that time never qualifies as a logical moment; rather, Hegel's theorizing about time occurs in his Philosophy of Nature, the second part to his Encyclopedia. John Burbidge, Concept and Time in Hegel, 12 Dialogue 403, 409 (1973). In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel remarks: "Time... has no power over the Concept, nor is the Concept in time or temporal; on the contrary, it is the power over time, which is this negativity only qua externality." Hegel's Philosophy of Nature § 258 (A.V. Miller trans., 1970). Later, we shall see that Hegel equates time, space and even the ego as the same thing--Pure Quantity. See ch. 4.

According to William Desmond:

Hegel also claims that the logical categories, while not simple historical products, manifest themselves in time... The categories are not temporal products simply and hence philosophy cannot be reduced to historicism. But while the categories are not temporal products simply, they render possible the temporal production of historical intelligibility.


Burbidge, explicating Hegel's psychological theory from the Philosophy of Mind, suggests that, when we pay attention to a thing, we add time and space to that thing. Time is later annulled by thought, however. See Burbidge, supra note

Time. Of this failure to hold the poles of Being and Nothing apart, Hegel says: "being does not pass over but has passed over--into nothing." (82-83) This remark has a temporal flavor to it. Since Pure Being moves of its own accord, it already moved into Pure Nothing (and Pure Nothing has already moved into Pure Being). We can never observe it now because it "always already" happened. 39

Here is a good "time" to warn readers about the concept of "time." Logic does not occur in time. The logical relations are quite atemporal in nature. 40 We, the human beings in the audience, however, do live in a world of time. "For us," the Logic does indeed take time to unfold--perhaps years or even a lifetime, or never if we never get around to it. If we decide to spend our time studying the Science of Logic, we catch a glimpse of what is not similarly finite but is atemporal. 41 In other words, every step in the Logic occurs simultaneously with every other step. Everything is "present." The "time" it takes to accomplish the steps is brought to the table by finite thinking beings. 42
Nevertheless, As Michael Kosock has emphasized, the very idea of negation, in which Dialectical Reason trafficks, refers to a past. If I say that Being is not, I am also saying Being once was, because a negation always works on some positive entity that preceded us. Dialectical Reason remembers, and so there is a kind of fantasy time—not to be confused with chronological time—at work in the Logic.

Movement. We now have before us a middle term: Becoming. Becoming represents movement. Movement can be perceived only because it has as background the static, passive non-movement of Pure Being and Pure Nothing. The movement we see is the illusion of a movie. A movie is simply a series of still photographs run at very fast speed. The pictures themselves do not actually move. Similarly, Becoming is a film consisting of two still photos—Pure Being and Pure Nothing.

Yet as we contemplate this pure movement, we "freeze" it in a thought. Becoming therefore has a dual nature. It arises as the relation between Pure Being and Pure Nothing. As a relation, it is composed of simpler parts. It is a complex entity. In this capacity, Becoming moves. But when we think of Becoming as such, we freeze it,
so that it does not move.

This paradox of rendering movement static is a necessity of which modern physics is much aware. Physics now teaches that a phenomenon cannot "be" and be perceived or measured at the same time. Such a principle is present in Becoming. It moves and yet it does not move.\textsuperscript{45} We cannot focus on these moments simultaneously. Yet each side of Becoming is inadequate to the whole. The concept of Becoming is in a deep state of contradiction.

\textit{Conventions}. At this point, I would like to return to my expository conventions, some of which I have already introduced. These will be the conventions for all future discussion. They will serve to provide some much needed visual aids for the explication to follow.

All middle terms (such as Becoming) are made up of three circles. The first of these will emphasize the positive, qualitative side. It leans to the left side of the page. The second term emphasizes the negative side. It leans to the right side of the page. Since the negative of something always presupposes a something to negate,\textsuperscript{46} the negative moment is always a double, "dia-lectical" one. Finally, the two dialectically opposed entities are reconciled by a middle term, which always contains a surplus (i.e., the whole is always greater than the parts).\textsuperscript{47} To illustrate the logical progress, we shall place the positive side to the \textit{left} of the page and the negative side to the \textit{right}. In the above description of Becoming, we thus place Pure Being to the left, Pure Nothing to the right, and Becoming as the middle term. The middle term always contains material

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textsc{Stephen W. Hawking}, \textit{A Brief History of Time} 53-61 (1988); Kosok, \textit{supra} note 43, at 256-57.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textsc{Burbidge, supra} note 25, at 54. This will become a vital point for the notion of Reflection. See chapter 10.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Non-Hegelians will recognize in Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Of this more familiar triad, Allen Wood writes:

The regrettable tradition of expounding this theme in the Hegelian dialectic through the grotesque jargon of "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis" began in 1837 with Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, a bowdlerizer of German idealist philosophy, whose ridiculous expository devices should have been forgotten along with his name . . . [T]o my knowledge, it is never used by Hegel, not even once, for this purpose or for any other. The use of Chalybäus's terminology to expound the Hegelian dialectic is nearly always an unwitting confession that the expositor has little or no firsthand knowledge of Hegel.

\textsc{Allen W. Wood}, \textit{Hegel's Ethical Thought} 3-4 (1990).
\end{itemize}
that exceeds what is provided by the two extremes. This excess guarantees that the dialectic progress grows in complexity and sophistication with each step.\footnote{See BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 44 ("As a synthesis something new is added; the new conception does not follow analytically from the preceding terms."); Winfield, supra note 21, at 50 ("Self-thinking thought is synthetic in that each new category is not contained in those that precede it.").}

The three terms, taken together, form the shape of a Borromean Knot.

\section*{The Borromean Knot}

These three overlapping circles produce seven distinct areas. The areas marked \([1, 2, 7]\) are static.\footnote{From now on, numbers in brackets, \textit{e.g.}, \([7]\)--refer to the spaces set forth in the Borromean Knot.} These portions do not suffer from overlap. The areas marked \([2, 4, 5, 6]\) are dynamic. These areas have two natures, being subjected to more than one jurisdiction. (The one marked \([4]\) is subject to all three jurisdictions. Only \([4]\) is present in every single step of the \textit{Science of Logic}. Later, we will see that \([4]\) is what Hegel calls "being-within-self."\footnote{See \textsc{Lucio Colletti}, \textsc{Marxism and Hegel} 9 (Lawrence Garner trans., 1973) ("Philosophy has adopted, Hegel states, the point of view of the 'intellec't [\textit{i.e.}, the Understanding], the principle of non-contradiction or of the mutual exclusion of opposites").}

In the realm of being, Logic progresses by contemplating the middle term (Becoming, in the Borromean Knot). This is a dynamic unity between two things--being and nothing--but it is likewise an "immediacy"--something taken as not dependent on another thing--a self-identical concept. This self-identity is marked as \([7]\) in the Borromean Knot.

In the first step, we dethrone the middle term from its central position by "abstracting" the "immediate" part of it \([7]\), suppressing its mediated part, shifting this mutilated entity over to the left of the page. This first contemplation is called the Understanding--the intuition which "immediately" perceives a concept as an uncomplicated entity.\footnote{See ch. 2.}
The Understanding

This shift to the left ("Understanding") is oblivious to the mediated structure of concepts.\(^{52}\) "The understanding determines and holds the determinations fixed." \(^{53}\) Understanding is what passes as "common sense." \(^{(45)}\) Here you have "the sensible and true avouch" of your own eyes.\(^{54}\) Thus, the unmediated portion of the Borromean Knot [7] becomes a self-identical entity [1] like that in Figure One, because the immediacy of the concept is taken as the whole truth of it. The Understanding, in its stupidity, presents the dynamic concept as static.\(^{55}\)

Dialectical Reason, however, remembers the history of the concept. The immediate concept (Determinate Being) was mediated after all, and the understanding has merely isolated the affirmative existent part of the concept—the side of being. The Understanding has simply ignored the negative component that dialectic reasoning is able to comprehend. Hence, as a second step, over on the right we place the negative moment of the concept.

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\(^{52}\) Accordingly, Burbidge emphasizes that the Understanding does not explicitly "abstract" a part from the whole. It thinks it has grasped the whole as a self-identity. BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 42.

\(^{53}\) See also LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 80 ("The logic of mere understanding is involved in speculative logic, and can at will be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting the dialectical and 'reasonable' element"). Both Burbidge and Harris think that the Understanding distinguishes as well as abstracts. John Burbidge suggests: BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 39 ("Understanding is to define [a new category] more clearly and distinguish it from other concepts."); see also id. at 44; HARRIS, supra note 7, at 37 ("it has two main characteristics, which are intimately connected with each other, abstraction and sharp, rigid distinction"). I do not see Understanding's function as connected with distinction. Understanding is the move that accepts self-identity. Difference is the hallmark of Dialectical Reason. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. The Understanding, after all, is a proposed theory of the Absolute, taken as a self-identity. If it is this, then nothing remains for the Understanding to distinguish. To be sure, when the Understanding turns from cosmological philosophy to lesser concerns, it distinguishes all the time. But its function in the Science of Logic, it seems to me, is to interpret all of being, in which case nothing is ever distinguished.

\(^{54}\) William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act 1 scene 1.

\(^{55}\) Understanding therefore "abstracts" a part and calls it the whole. Thus, abstraction is primarily defined as the 'drawing out' from the concrete whole of some partial element, which is then considered, or assumed to be, self-sufficient, and held in isolation from the rest.” HARRIS, supra note 7, at 80.
Dialectical Reason

This is the step of Dialectical Reason. "[R]eason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing." (28) It "negates what is simple." (28) As its name suggests, dialectical reasoning always reads double. A positive concept always leaves out (and thereby always implies) its opposite, which Dialectical Reason insists on making explicit. Dialectic reasoning introduces dynamism—a modulation between the two sides. That is, one side is always becoming the other. What is true of one side is always true of its opposite side.

Thus, in the last part of chapter 1, we will contemplate Becoming, formerly a middle term. The Understanding wrenches immediacy from Becoming and pulls it to the left.

Coming-to-be

On the left, the accent is on being. Becoming "becomes" Coming-to-Be—one of the two terms that make up Becoming. So conceived, Becoming is taken according to common sense. It has started from nothing and has "come into being."

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56 Earlier, we said, "nothing is, after all, something." Because nothing is on the right side of the page, it always stands over against some simple being on the left side of the page.

57 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 81 Addition ("Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work.").

58 I do not interpret Hegel's distinction of coming-to-be as an official step in the Logic. Rather, Hegel is simply discussing aspects of Becoming without moving the process along. See BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 41 (coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be "define the process of becoming more precisely"). For this reason, Hegel later can announce that Something (the second "official" middle term) is the first negation of the negation. If I were to make "ceasing-to-be" an official step, then Determinate Being would have been the first negation of the negation. Cf. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 99-100 (assuming that Determinate Being is separate from Becoming); CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 233 (1975).

59 The idea of "accent" on being comes from Hegel himself: "Both [being and nothing] are determinate being, but in reality as quality with the accent on being, the fact is concealed that it contains determinateness and therefore also negation. Consequently, reality is given the value only of something positive from which negation, limitation and deficiency are excluded." (111)

60 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel psychoanalyzes the Understanding and its initial leftwing anxiety in favor of Being:

If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as
But Becoming has the second aspect of starting from being and ending at nothing—"ceasing to be" or death. Dialectical Reason remembers history. It concedes Understanding's point that Nothing turns into Being. But it embarrasses the Understanding by pointing out that the opposite was just as true. Being turned into nothing. It "ceased to be." Dialectical Reason thus intercedes to point out that the Understanding has left out the negative side of the account. Hence, we can place "ceasing to be" over on the right and we could consider it together with "coming to be."

**Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be**

Dialectical reasoning, however, is too clever by half. It creates a duality and a modulation between the extremes. But in doing so, it actually replicates the error of the Understanding. That is, Dialectical Reason sees double, but to see double it poses a second abstract entity as opposite to the first [3]. This second extreme is in fact quite the same thing as the "understood" entity [1] that Dialectical Reason thinks it is criticizing.}

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Being and Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing. With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering some fixed predicate for Being, to mark it off from Nothing. Thus we find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with *matter*, susceptible of innumerable determinations—or even, unreflectingly, with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the mind. But every additional and more characterization causes Being to lose that integrity and simplicity it has in the beginning. Only in, and by virtue of this mere generality is it Nothing, something inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention or meaning.

LESSER LOGIC, *supra* note 9, § 87. In short, the Understanding fears its own death and wishes to fix its preservation in a unified proposition about the past truths it has been compelled to accept.

61 Once again, this is not an official step of the Logic, for reasons stated *supra* in n.57. Burbidge usefully renames these stages as perishing and genesis. BURBIDGE, *supra* note 25, at 41.

62 Slavoj Žižek calls this oppositional determination—when the universal, common ground of the two opposites 'encounters itself' in its oppositional determination. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, *TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY* 132 (1993). Žižek gives as an example the political party that criticizes the other party for acting out of partisanship. In this critique, the critic meets itself in its criticism and is doing the very thing it criticizes. Likewise, dialectical reasoning accuses the understanding of resting on abstraction when it too rests on abstraction.
This deserves emphasis, because we have before us the quintessential move from Essence, the midpoint of the Logic. Dialectic Reason has in effect "posited" itself. Speaking from [2] it has said, "We're not. We concede that [1] is. But we [2, 3] are not." Notice that, in a sense, [2] is the voice of Understanding itself--its negative, suppressed voice. Yet when it speaks up against [1], [2] claims autonomy from [1]. This autonomy is represented by [3]. Therefore, in its negativity, [3] has created itself by distinguishing itself from [1]. The motor of the distinction was [2]. (If you followed the argument in this paragraph, then you will have no trouble following the very difficult argument in Essence--nine chapters hence.)

Dialectical Reason therefore only produces a modulation between two identical extremes. We have a kind of autism that gets us nowhere, because drawing attention to the lack in understanding merely replicates the understanding's own error. That is, Understanding's error was the claim to self-identity [1]. But now Dialectical Reason has made the same error [3].

Oppositional determination also means that Hegel's entire system could be viewed as a triad (Understanding, Dialectical Reason, speculative unity) or as a quadrad. In the triadic case, Dialectical Reason is taken according to its self-perception--singular and self-identical. In the quadratic case, Dialectical Reason is counted twice from the perspective of Speculative Reason, which sees Dialectical Reason as self-alienated. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 79-80 (1999).

As John Burbidge characterizes the process, we start with the Understanding in its contemplation of Pure Being. It changes to Pure Nothing. Pure Nothing is likewise the product of the Understanding. The modulation between them is thus the "sequential" work of the Understanding. BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 42. Perhaps a better way of putting it: in the double aspect of Dialectical Reason, a second act of Understanding is always present. Dialectical Reason must "understand" the nothingness it has produced.

64 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel complains that Dialectical Reason is seen as "an adventitious [i.e., added from the outside] art which for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of contradiction." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 81(2). In Hegel's view, Dialectical Reason is quite immanent to the concept under analysis. Also in the Lesser Logic, Hegel indicates that the realm of the predicate "is," which conjoins two concepts,

and the shape which dialectic takes in them . . . is a passing over into another. This further determination, or specialization, is at once a forth-putting and . . . a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the same time the withdrawing of being inwards, its sinking deeper into itself.

Id. §84. This last passage supports the idea that, when [2] speaks the language of dialectic, it immediately passes over into an other--[3].
Speculative Reason wisely intervenes to stop the modulating nonsense. Speculative Reason is like a parent mediating between squabbling siblings. Speculative Reason notices that Understanding fell into error by suppressing or expelling the negative aspect of itself. Its younger brother, Dialectical Reason, exploited this fault, but it only replicated a negative version of Understanding's own fault. This other extreme [3], shares thus an identity with the understood extreme [1]. [3] likewise suppresses its own negative [2], an act which understanding is now likewise permitted to exploit. Each side cannot account for its lack by itself. But Speculative Reason has noticed it and is able to bring forth this lack into the light of day, showing that each side has a surplus--its own lack [2] which was beyond itself and hence a surplus. In short, the surplus [7] is the negative expelled material in [1] and [3].

Speculative Reason is the only moment that brings forth the truth that, between the two extremes--[1], [3]--there is difference. This difference, which is now expressed as [7], is the surplus and constitutes extra content--a static addition to the dynamic opposition. Speculative Reason therefore, working only with the materials implied by the extremes, produces a new middle term. Its name is Determinate Being--the subject matter of Chapter 2.

**Determinate Being as Speculative Reason**

In terms of our Borromean Knot, the middle term is both dynamic [2, 4, 6] and static [7]. When we consider the parts [2, 4, 6], it is dynamic--a ceaseless modulation of birth and death. When we consider the dynamic modulation as "as such"--a middle term--we "name" the activity and thereby add a static dimension to the dynamic parts. This static equilibrium [7] in turn will be "understood" when it is shifted to the left and made into a new self-identical concept, which will occur in chapter 2.

Speculative Reason therefore adds the surplus of [7]. This is why we can call it speculative. [7] is reason's "return on investment"--the beyond of what was invested in the earlier steps. Speculative Reason's act is the act of "synthesis"--the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending

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65 Burbidge sees Speculative Reason as containing three separate steps. It develops the relation that unifies the extremes (synthesis). Then it names (or positivizes) the relation (mediation). Then it integrates the whole in a simple unity. BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 44.

66 See ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 62, at 122-23.

67 I am not here drawing an official step of the Logic. Determinate Being is simply another name for Becoming. See supra n. 57.
their diversity in one convenient cognition. Synthesis does not affirm the identity of the extremes. It affirms their difference as such (which, paradoxically, is the same identical lack in each of the subordinate terms).

Or, in yet other terms, synthesis shows that the two identities--[1] and [3]--are merely subspecies in a higher system. Hence, what gets added is the higher system. Thus, Speculative Reason forever raises the earlier points to a higher level. This increase is shown in [7]. It is the progressive step that proves that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Speculative Reason is the step of universality, which can be seen as the negative unity (or synthesis) of the parts. The unity is negative precisely because the unity is not to be found in the parts. It must be added (i.e., positivized).

The convention we have developed of moving the middle term to the left, generating its opposite and then deriving a new middle term, is designed to represent the movement of Spirit in expelling its dependence on otherness--something that Spirit will not successfully achieve until chapter 3 of Quality. By moving the middle term to the left, the bias, for the moment, is in favor of "being" over negation or death. This is the bias of intuition, which takes things in their immediacy and wishes not to think about the finitude of its puny ideas. This bias, however, will change when we reach Essence in the tenth chapter of the Science of Logic.

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68 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 60 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans. 1990).

69 Žižek calls this affirmation "symbolization" of imaginary opposition. ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 62, at 124.

70 See BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 44.

71 This movement of the method has been called "the lumpy, bumpy triangular wheel." John Burbidge, WHERE IS THE PLACE OF UNDERSTANDING? in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 180 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990). Meanwhile, Stephen Houlgate usefully reminds us that, unlike Kant, Hegel makes no sharp distinction between the understanding and reason. "Rather, he points to one activity of thinking and shows that this activity can be more or less self-conscious." Stephen Houlgate, A Reply to John Burbidge, in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 184 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990).

72 Thus, in the penultimate paragraph in the Doctrine of Being, Hegel remarks, "The being of the determinations is no longer simply affirmative as in the entire sphere of being." (384) At this point Hegel signals a fundamental shift in the attitude of the Understanding. See chapter 9.
With What Must Science Begin?

Here is a good place to retrogress and discuss a short essay that precedes the triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming. Although my convention is generally to use bold-faced subheads in strict conformance with the order of Hegel's table of contents, I have inserted this discussion out of order. The essay "With What Must Science Begin?" appears before chapter 1. Nevertheless, in order for us to begin, I have chosen to first discuss the triad of being-nothing-becoming in order to make the theme of this prefatory essay more meaningful.

Hegel's philosophical goal was to develop a presupposition-free account of the world—a philosophy that has no "givens" and that literally would provide its own foundations. (59) To start with an unproved "given" is precisely to surrender to superstition:

In every other science [except logic] the subject matter and the scientific method are distinguished from each other . . . These other sciences are . . . permitted to speak of their ground . . . only as premises taken for granted . . . Logic . . . cannot presuppose any . . . forms . . . , for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established within the science. (43)

Stipulation is the enemy of philosophy, in Hegelian thought. Stipulation is "stupid." Yet Hegel "began"—with immediacy-as-such (Pure Being). Hegel remarks, sensibly enough: "What philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate." (67) But which beginning shall we "stipulate?" He chooses immediacy, of course, but on what basis was he licensed to make this choice? Was it not a stipulation that we begin at all? This is the embarrassment that Hegel takes up in the essay under discussion.

Hegel admits that beginning is a presupposition, but he justifies the choice of Pure Being—or Pure Immediacy—because what is here presupposed is (much later) proven. (69) By this he means that the very last step of the Logic (Pure Knowledge) will coincide with the first step. His philosophy will take us in a circle. If the beginning is also the end, then we were justified in beginning.

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73 Hegel names presupposition "stupid—I can find no other word for it." (41-42)

74 Or, as Clark Butler puts it, "the project of defining the absolute . . . is certainly presupposed." BUTLER, supra note 4, at 1.

75 Professor William Maker suggests that presupposition exists in the beginning, but it is eliminated. The beginning therefore presupposes the elimination of the presupposition at the end of the Science of Logic. MAKER, supra note 17, at 85-86. The outcome, however, will negate this presupposition and
Pure Knowledge is the unity of Pure Mediation (or all the mediations there are) and Pure Immediacy, on the following plan:

**The Beginning**

If Pure Knowing partakes of Pure Being, then it is clear that the very function of Pure Knowing is to break itself apart. (Hegel calls this "diremption" of spirit into the world.) Thus the Logic is a never-ending flux. Nothing is ever at rest in the system (and yet the entire system of flux is paradoxically at rest). Spirit goes forth into the world (flux) and finds itself (rest). It thinks (flux) and therefore it is (rest).

"Pure knowledge" will be the Absolute Idea--the end of the Logic. At that point, the Absolutely Immediate will also be the Absolutely Mediated. Pure Being, then, in chapter 1 of the *Science of Logic*, is merely a one-sided view of Pure Knowledge--the side of immediacy. Hence, the first move of the Logic is the Understanding, as shown above. Hegel warns that it is essential to start in this one-sided way, because otherwise we have the result, not the beginning. (72)

Immanence. If I may interrupt our discussion of "With What Must Science Begin," it is now convenient to discuss two key ideas that, for Hegel, are absolutely vital.

The first of these vital concepts is "immanence." Immanence thereby cure the system of its bad beginning.


77 It is no surprise to read from Hegel enormous praise of Heraclitus:

The advance requisite and made by Heraclitus is the progression from being as the first immediate thought, to the category of becoming as the second. This is the first concrete, the absolute, as in it the unity of opposites [exists]. Thus with Heraclitus the philosophic Idea is to be met with in its speculative form; the Numbering of Parmenides and Zeno is abstract understanding. Heraclitus was thus universally esteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such...there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.

78 Justus Hartnack suggests that "[t]he beginning point, that is, the necessary presupposition, is our commonsense view: the world of identifiable and reidentifiable objects." Hartnack, *supra* note 22, at 20. I disagree. The Understanding abstracts from Pure Knowledge at the beginning, which seems quite divorced from anything recognizable as common sense.
means "derived from within." The only steps permitted in the Logic are the ones that are immanent in (and thus necessitated by) the earlier step. In the circular journey of the Science of Logic, no step is authorized unless it is completely derived from the ones before. "[A]t no stage . . . should any thought-determination occur which does not immediately emerge . . . that has not entered this stage from the one preceding it . . . ." (40) In terms of our conventions, [2] was the voice of Dialectical Reason. It was very much the suppressed voice of [1] and hence immanent or implicit within [1]. Dialectical Reason merely made express what was previously hidden. Likewise, Speculative Reason was the voice of [4]. [4] was immanent to both [1] and [3].

From the requirement of immanence, we can deduce that the earlier steps always imply the later ones and the later steps always imply the earlier ones. This directly follows from what was said earlier about "time." Time does not, like pleated cunning, unfold in the Logic. Everything is omnipresent. Hence, the Logic can go forward or it can go backward--instantaneously. Granted, we expend much time in doing so, but time is our curse--the curse of our finitude. Logic proceeds instantaneously. In any case, since the Logic is a circle, going forward is the same as going backward. In either direction, we reach Pure Knowing, which is the same as Pure Being.

Thus, Hegel tends to write sentences like: "[N]either being nor nothing truly is. [T]heir truth is only becoming." (94) What he means by this sentence is that Pure Being and Pure Nothing as such are inadequate and one-sided. The later step of Becoming [2] is already implied--is immanent--in Pure Being and Pure Nothing. The task of philosophy is to make express what otherwise lies latent and unobserved. When we reach Becoming, we will have seen the truth of the prior two steps.

Recall that, in Becoming, "being does not pass over but has passed over--into nothing." (82-83) This directly illustrates immanence. The truth of Pure Being (and also of Pure Nothing) was


80 Richard Winfield has remarked that, in light of this circularity, that which Understanding calls an advance "is equally a regress toward [i.e., from] the ground on which the development rests." Winfield, supra note 21, at 45. See also DESMOND, supra note 41, at 181 ("Difference of directionality will not count dialectically, since the two directions are different articulations of the one process of total self-mediation"). Professor Desmond, incidentally, does not approve of the reversibility of Hegel's dialectical system. He thinks the "other" should be held ultimately irreducible--a position that will be criticized from time to time, when appropriate parts of the Logic can be brought to bear to show this view to be wrong.
Becoming. Pure Being is always already Becoming. This is the same as saying that Becoming is immanent in Pure Being. It is this immanence that allows us to step forward (or backward).

Sublation. The second important concept I would like to introduce is "sublation"—not a word likely to be used by non-Hegelians.

Every step in the circular path of Logic is already "immanent" in every other step. From this it should be clear that, as we advance, we never destroy a prior step. Rather, we preserve it. Thus, every step contains [4], which implies that the prior steps have never been entirely destroyed. Yet the very idea of taking a second step means that we have also negated (destroyed) the first step. Thus, [1], [3], and [2] are expelled from the middle term. Yet, because we can go backwards as well as forwards, the middle term always implies [1], [2], and [3] in the guise of [4], [5], and [6], even though, "as such," the middle term expels them.

German has a strange word: Aufgehoben. It means simultaneously to preserve and to destroy (rather like the English word "sanction" means simultaneously to permit or to punish). Aufgehoben is a word that delights Hegel, and it is a key idea in everything that follows. As we proceed, every step constitutes a "moment" that reveals itself to us. Every new step constitutes the creation of a new moment and destruction of the old. Yet, because of immanence, the new step implies (or contains) the old step. The old step's truth (its not-yet-expressed, or implied truth) is the new step. Every step is both destroyed and preserved. It is, and it is not—stuff by which we shall make many a paradox.

In English, Aufgehoben is awkwardly translated into "sublation." The English term is actually from chemistry. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, sublation is "[a] precipitate suspended in a liquid, especially urine." Thanks to the English translators of Hegel, it also refers to the destruction and preservation of Logical moments by the more progressive moment which it generates.

Notice how sublation fits with Pure Being. Pure Being turned to

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81 "It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German language has a number of such." (107)

82 It is quite the opposite in the Phenomenology. There, as consciousness wends its path from sense certainty to Absolute Knowing, it stupidly forgets everything that went before. JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 227-28 (Samuel Cherniak & John Heckman trans., 1974).

83 Erroll Harris traces this translative choice to G.R.G. Mure, an Oxford commentator from the middle of the century. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 30; see MURE, supra note 2, at 35 ("Sublated' will serve as a translation").
Pure Nothing. The modulation itself was Becoming. Thanks to sublation, these three movements are contained in every moment that follows. As Hegel explicitly recognizes:

the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence . . . the starting point . . . remains at the base of all that follows . . . Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations. (71)

Each moment simultaneously is and is not, and is in the process of becoming something else. Realization of this contradiction is precisely Dialectical Reasoning, as illustrated in the diagram of "coming-to-be" and "ceasing-to-be."

Thinking v. Being. We now return to Hegel's reflection on the task of beginning a Logic which is supposed to be groundless. Obviously a beginning is grounded in our very decision to begin. The groundedness of the beginning is an embarrassment that Hegel must overcome, if he is to produce a philosophy without ground.

In his introductory essay, Hegel refers to the Absolute Idea as "Pure Knowing." Pure Knowing is said to be (simultaneously) "absolute immediacy" and "something absolutely mediated." That is, Pure Knowing is the end of all the mediations there are—the end of the Science of Logic itself. In this sense, Pure Knowing is "absolutely" mediated. But Pure Knowing is also the end of the circle that culminates in the beginning. Qua beginning, Pure Knowing is absolute immediacy. No mediations have occurred at all, and hence it is "immediate."

Pure Knowing is therefore a unity of all mediations and the pure self-identity or immediacy of the thought of Pure Knowing. Thus, as to beginning, we have seen Hegel note: "What philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate." (67) Which, however, shall it be?

It would not suit Hegel's pedagogical intent to begin with absolute mediation. This is the end of the journey. We are, after all, beginning. Thus, "it is equally essential that [Pure Knowing] be taken only in the one-sided character in which it is pure immediacy, precisely because here it is the beginning." (72) In other words, "beginning" implies abstracting an element from the "end."

In discussing this act of abstracting the beginning from the end, Hegel makes a subtle point. If, by beginning, we wrench pure immediacy from Pure Knowing, then we are saying that Pure Being is the content of Pure Knowing. We are also saying that the leftovers of Pure Knowing (after content is wrenched from it through our
beginning) is purely negative. In other words, to know some thing is a highly negative enterprise. The subject who "knows" is therefore very negative toward the content of his thought. This dichotomy between knowing (consciousness) and being is precisely what drives the Phenomenology along its path. The dichotomy also makes mincemeat of Descartes, who famously wrote, "I think, therefore I am." If you have followed the above point, the "I think" is not. It is "negative." Furthermore, the content ("I am") is not thinking (because it is that which is thought). What Descartes should have said is, "I think, therefore I am not." Or "I do not think, therefore I am." 

Beginning at the Beginning. Hegel has proposed to begin by wrenching Pure Being (or immediacy as such) from Pure Knowing. He now addresses various other candidates for beginning, and finds them wanting. First, instead of pulling Pure Knowing apart and starting with the piece called Pure Immediacy, why not let it stay together as a whole? Hegel calls this possibility the collapse of Pure Knowing (a complex) into Pure Being (a simplex). (73) In this move, Pure Knowing disappears. It is obliterated by Pure Being. Indeed, obliteration is what Pure Being specializes in.

Such a view is rejected by Hegel because it is now impossible to begin. Pure Being obliterates all distinctions—including the very idea of beginning at all:

[I]f pure being is . . . the unity into which knowing has collapsed . . . then knowing itself has vanished in that unity, leaving behind no difference from the unity and hence nothing by which the latter could be determined. Nor is there anything else present, any content which could be used to make the beginning more determinate.

But the determination of being . . . for the beginning could also be omitted, so that the only demand would be that a pure

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84 One could also observe about the leftovers is that they are mediation as such. We could also say that the leftovers are "immediate," because it can only mediate if it has content. Yet "content" has just been taken away.

85 See MURE, supra note 2, at 8 ("Thought and being are opposites, absolute and contradictory opposites . . . ").

86 René Descartes, Meditations II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES 214, 227 (John Veith trans., 1901).

87 Another way of looking at the "cogito" is to emphasize the "therefore." I think. From this a new moment arises. "I am." This interpretation of Descartes replicates Hegel's theory of becoming--at least the version in which Pure Nothing ("I think") because Pure Being ("I am"). Of course, Pure Being also becomes Pure Nothing--this is "ceasing-to-be," or dying.
In other words, suppose we collapse Pure Knowing (the Master Unity) into Pure Being. "Collapse" is used in a non-sublationary sense. The collapse is total, so that distinction as such goes out of existence. (Of course, sublation teaches that Pure Knowing is destroyed and preserved.) In the case of non-sublationary collapse, we do not wrench being out of its place in Pure Knowing. This step can be omitted. All we are left with is "demand" for a beginning. Whose demand? Ours, the fully formed beings in the audience, who want the show to begin!89

Taking up the audience's impatient demand for a beginning ("our" presupposition that there must be a start), Hegel suggests that the audience is "without a particular object." (73) The beginning is no object. The beginning must bring nothing to the table (if the system is truly to be "groundless"). The beginning "is supposed to be . . . wholly form without any content; thus we should have nothing at all beyond the general idea of a mere beginning as such." (73)

Granted that "beginning" is pure form and no content, can we at last begin? No. To say beginning is pure form is to say that it is nothing. And yet it will progress. It will become something. This means the nothingness of beginning--its purely formal nature--is a cheat. Since we have begun, the pure beginning had "being" in it all along. The rabbit of Being was already in the hat of beginning. That is the only reason it could "become" something: "therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning . . . is the unity of being and nothing . . . " (73) To say the same thing in slightly different words, if we do not wrench Pure Being from Pure Knowing and if we rely on the bare thought of a beginning, we imply that we begin from nothing, because we cannot introduce content. But if we actually go anywhere, then we didn't really isolate Pure Nothing after all.90 We smuggled in some content (some "being"), and

88 This act of wrenching (or abstracting) being from Pure Knowing Hegel calls "determination of being." (73)

89 William Maker takes the above passage to be a legitimate move of the Logic--in effect, simply a restatement of the principle that one should start with Pure Immediacy. MAKER, supra note 17, at 73-74. But I think Hegel is presenting a straw man here. The passage rejects the non-sublationary collapse and sets the stage for admitting that the Understanding elects to begin the Logic, by abstracting Pure Being from Pure Knowing.

90 Hegel here seems to suggest that beginning at Pure Nothing is impossible, because nothing comes of nothing. Later, in Remark 1, following "The Unity of Being and Nothing," Hegel will state that, if there is such a thing as Becoming--or if we are now something--then obviously we did not begin at Pure Nothing.
Cynthia Willett strongly argues that Hegel could have begun with Pure Nothing instead of Pure Being. Cynthia Willett, *The Shadow of Hegel's Science of Logic*, in *ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC* 88 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990). But the two moments I have just referred to suggest, at a minimum, that Hegel himself disagreed with the proposition. Willett is able to quote this passage:

[T]hat the beginning should be made with nothing (as in Chinese philosophy) need not cause us to lift a finger, for before we could do so this nothing would no less have converted itself into being . . . (99-100)

Here, however, Hegel is arguing against starting at Pure Nothing. The claim against which he is arguing is that one should begin by abstracting everything away. The result would then be Pure Nothing. Hegel disagrees. He thinks the result would be Pure Being--exactly the beginning that he proposes.

Willett's suggestion is based on the fact that Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same thing. Hence, starting with the one is starting with the other. But perhaps this overlooks the fact that Hegel begins with the end point--Pure Being. If we start at Pure Nothing, we are not at the end point, unless we agree that Pure Nothing is just another name for Pure Being. But it is not just another name. Pure Nothing is distinguishable from Pure Nothing, as Speculative Reason shows in Figure 1(c).

Meanwhile, Erroll Harris agrees that we cannot start with Pure Nothing, but for reasons that seem more like word-play than Logic. According to Harris, If Pure Nothing is thought, then it is. It is Pure Being. Hence, self-honesty requires the admission that we can only start with Pure Being. HARRIS, *supra* note 7, at 94. The trouble with this point is that Pure Being can no more be thought than Pure Nothing. Hence, it is conceivable to start with Pure Nothing--or with any other step in the Logic. But why do so, when such advanced starting places requires retrogression to the real starting place--Pure Being?

Later, Hegel comments that the beginning cannot have "determinateness" in it. "Determinateness" means a unity of being and nothing. (Thus, Becoming is a determinateness). Thus:

If being had a determinateness, then it would not be the absolute beginning at all; it would then depend on an other and would not be immediate . . . But if it is indeterminate and hence a genuine beginning, then, too, it has nothing with which it could bridge the gap between itself and an other; it is at the same time the end. (94)

Erroll Harris seems likewise baffled as to whom Hegel refers here. HARRIS, *supra* note 7, at 88.
that commencement with Pure Being reaches the same result as commencement with the pure idea of a beginning:

But let those who are dissatisfied with being as a beginning because it passes over into nothing and so gives rise to the unity of being and nothing, let them see whether they find this beginning which begins with the general idea of a beginning and with its analysis (which, though of course correct, likewise leads to the unity of being and nothing), more satisfactory than the beginning with being. (74)

Thus, both Hegel and the unidentified "beginner" produce the same unity of being and nothing.

The ego. In further exploring possible beginnings, Hegel considers the following "Cartesian" possibility: begin with the ego that is certain of itself. (75-76) The ego, however, is the most concrete of concrete things, according to Hegel.

What does "concrete" mean? By "concrete," Hegel means "not simple," or that which is constructed of many complex parts. The opposite of "concrete" is "abstract." (60) Abstraction is dead, but concrete things are alive with spirit:

"Fixed determinations," of course, are mere abstractions. Abstractions are empty, but concrete things have content and are in the process of "filling" themselves with yet more content. (123) The Ego, then, is concrete, "the most concrete of all things." (76) To serve as beginning, however, of a groundless logic, the Ego would have to purge itself of all content. It must not be concrete, but abstract. But if it did undergo such a purge, it would not be the "familiar ego" of which we are "certain," in the Cartesian sense of cogito ergo sum. The abstract ego would end up being Pure Knowing. But the process of abstraction would not be a logical progression. Rather, it would be driven by the arbitrary will to create a beginning of a groundless philosophy. The point is to produce Pure

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93 Thus, in the Lesser Logic, Hegel writes that Becoming is the first concrete thought. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, at § 88 Addition.

94 As William Desmond remarks, "thought not concrete is not thought at all." DESMOND, supra note 41, at 122. This, of course, relates to Hegel's point that pure knowing is not knowledge at all. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. For an interesting essay on the various uses of the terms "abstract" and "concrete," see Philip T. Grier, Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic, in ESSAYS ON HEGEL'S LOGIC 59 (George di Giovanni ed., 1990).
Knowing by means of logical progression. Meanwhile, the whole reason for beginning with the ego was that it is "familiar." But only the concrete ego (our empirical experience of our selves) is familiar. Abstract ego is utterly strange. Hence, it is not a suitable beginning.

The ego is unsuitable for this other reason. The ego develops in opposition to an object. This is the trajectory of the Phenomenology, which starts with consciousness of a certain object. Eventually, consciousness discovers that the object is its own self, and so the consciousness becomes a self-consciousness. In this story, the ego

shows that in [its] development the object has and retains the perennial character of an other for the ego, and that the ego which formed the starting-point is, therefore, still entangled in the world of appearance and is not the pure knowing which has . . . overcome the opposition of consciousness. (77)

In other words, the position of the ego is that it always faces an "other." Because consciousness is always correlative to some object, it becomes a bad candidate for beginning. It is simply not simple enough.

Beginning: An Assessment. The essay "With What Must Science Begin?" is difficult, and what appear to be "straw man" arguments take up most of its text. There are nevertheless three lessons worth remembering from this essay. (1) The Science of Logic is to be a groundless logic, utterly free of presupposition. (2) Deciding to begin at all is a contingent fact. "We" (the philosophical audience) don't have to begin at all. We could choose instead to read mere analytic philosophy, watch TV, or engage in some other unscientific activity. Hence, deciding to begin is a contingent factor. (3) Given that we have chosen to begin, Pure Being is the best starting place, because it is also the ending place. If the end produces the beginning, then the philosophy is self-grounded. As Hegel puts it, "result . . . returns as into its ground." (71)

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95 One hears an echo of this in the etymology of "consciousness," which means "with" knowledge of an object.
Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking

We have now finished with Hegel's essay on beginning.\textsuperscript{96} It is time to advance to the various remarks Hegel added to the end of the section labelled "Unity of Being and Nothing."

King Lear comments, "nothing comes of nothing."\textsuperscript{97} Hegel finds this observation important in the metaphysics of the Eleatics\textsuperscript{98} and Spinoza, but he finds the claim drastically wrong. If there is such a thing as Becoming, then of necessity the thing that becomes started with nothing and then obtains to something.

As to those philosophers who assert that being is being and nothing is nothing and that the two are unconnected, Hegel claims that they follow a philosophy of self-identity, where Becoming itself is impossible. This philosophy Hegel scorns as pantheism. (84) By this he seems to mean that every object is taken as self-identical and hence its own God.\textsuperscript{99}

Hegel says it is easy to show that advanced "things" (things way too complex for the chapter on Pure Being) all contain being and nothing.\textsuperscript{100} This, however, has to await the further progress of the Science of Logic. Instead, for the moment, Hegel challenges "self-styled sound common sense" (85) to find an example in which being is entirely separate from nothing.

One Hundred Thaler. Also in the First Remark about being v. nothing in "ordinary" thinking is the first major detailed assault on Kant to appear in the Science of Logic.\textsuperscript{101} The attack concerns Kant's

\textsuperscript{96}I also have included a summary of the two prefaces and the introduction to the book as an appendix to the discussion of Pure Being. See infra text accompanying notes 121-39.

\textsuperscript{97}William Shakespeare, King Lear Act 4 Scene 3.

\textsuperscript{98}That is, Parmenides, who believed in the One and hence not in Pure Nothing.

\textsuperscript{99}See also LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 88(5) ("The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage into Being, is controverted by the maxim of Pantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that nothing comes nothing, and that something can only come out of something").

\textsuperscript{100}Hegel provides no examples, but Erroll Harris, borrowing from Plato suggests one: A is tall compared to B. A is short compared to C. A both is and is not tall. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 96.

\textsuperscript{101}Hegel draws attention to his special focus on Kantian philosophy in the Introduction, which will be described here later. See infra text accompanying notes 121-39. Of this, Hegel writes:

[W]hatever may be said . . . about the precise character of this
own attack on St. Anselm and the so-called "ontological proof of God." Hegel will accuse Kant of using illegitimate moves against St. Anselm (with whom Hegel, in any event, disagreed).  

Here is Hegel's rendition of St. Anselm's ontological proof of God:

Certainly that than which nothing greater can be thought, cannot be in the intellect alone. For even if it is in the intellect alone, it can also be thought to exist in fact; and that is greater. If then that than which nothing greater can be thought, is in the intellect alone, then the very thing, which is greater, is in the intellect alone; then the very thing, which is greater than anything which can be thought, can be exceeded in thought. But certainly this is impossible.

Or, to paraphrase this, God ("that than which nothing greater can be thought") cannot be merely a figment of our imagination. If it were, then I can think of something greater than the merely imagined God: God that exists both in and out of the imagination. This greater God we will call God+. If God+ can be thought, then God+, which already exceeds thought, can be captured in thought. This is impossible—thought cannot exceed itself. Hence, we are left with God+, which is

philosophy... it constitutes the base and the starting-point of recent German philosophy and this its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it. (61 n.1)

Hegel credits Kant with paying attention to "more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude—not unavenged—contempt for them." (61 n.1) Hegel finds that "the philosophizing which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content... and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith." (62 n.1) This may have been Kant's result, but, Hegel complains, it is the starting point for most other philosophies.

Professor Harris reminds us that Hegel viewed Kant as a huge advance over the empiricist whom Kant sought to refute. Yet Hegel thought Kant's critical philosophy only went half-way. Therefore, because of this, and because of Kant's extreme prominence, "Hegel felt acutely the need to point out and to overcome Kant's shortcomings." Id. at 63.

Hegel complains against St. Anselm that to speak of God "existing" was "inadequate to the fulness of his reality," Id. at 70. The justice of this complaint should be apparent from Figure 1(c). If God merely "exists" in the sense of mere "being," then fully half of His content (nothing) is denied. God must be a unity of existence and non-existence. See LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 88 Remark ("So far then the question regarding the being of God... is of slight importance"); see also id. § 193 at 259.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 193, at 258.
both thinkable and existent in a realm beyond mere thought.

Hegel thought that such a proof merely presupposed "the concept of a being possessing all realities, including . . . existence." (86, see also 481) Hegel's real purpose in invoking this proof in chapter 1 is to attack Kant's different refutation of it. Hegel takes Kant's refutation to be a threat to what Hegel has written about the triad of being-nothing-becoming.

According to Kant's critique, all that the ontological proof accomplishes is to add existence (+) to the thought of God. Yet, according to Kant, existence is not an independent predicate to any object. In other words, + = 0, and nothing is achieved in the proof. Thus, says Kant, if I have 100 real dollars before me and I add the predicate "existence" to them, my fortune has not increased. I still have only $100. Or, if I have 100 imaginary dollars in mind, my fortune is likewise not increased if I think "existence" in connection with the concept.104

Hegel protests that, in the chapter on Pure Being, consciousness is supposed to think in a very, very abstract manner. But consciousness will be tempted to focus on something "concrete," which is not allowed at this stage of the Logic.105 If this happens, consciousness will ridicule Hegel's proposition that Being turns into Nothing. Hegel fears that people will interpret him as saying that it is a matter of indifference whether $100 are imaginary or real. Obviously, even the most ardent idealist sees that $100 in the mind is empirically different from $100 in the wallet. But $100, either in the imaginary form or wallet form, are concrete entities. Pure Being and Nothing, as they exist in chapter 1, are the ultimate abstract concepts. Stated otherwise, "having" and "not having" are matters of great consequence. But "having" is complex. "Being" and "not being" operate at a quite lower level. They are perfectly simple.106 If Pure

104 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 68, at 335-36.

105 "Nothing is usually opposed to something; but the being of something is already determinate and is distinguished from another something; and so transcendental the nothing which is opposed to the something is also the nothing of a particular something, a determinate nothing." (83)

106 On the distinction between "being" and "having." Hegel writes in the Lesser Logic:

As a term of relation, 'to have' takes the place of 'to be'. true, some[thing] has qualities on its part too: but this transference of 'having' into the sphere of Being is inexact . . . the character as quality is directly one with the some[thing], and the some[thing] ceases to be when it loses its quality. But the thing is reflection-into-self: for it is an identity which is also distinct from the difference, i.e. from its attributes. In many languages 'have' is employed to denote past time. And with reason: for the past is
Being is Pure Nothing, this does not mean that, in real life, you can dream up $100 and use it to buy a nice dinner.

Hegel also takes Kant to task for suggesting that an actual $100 is indifferent to my thought of them. This presupposes that the $100 has "self-identity"—a position that Hegel strongly opposes. Hegel will argue that all concepts contain "being-for-other." Hence, the $100 is not indifferent to what I think, because part of its constitution is being-for-other. (88) The $100's being-for-other is what I think of them. But perhaps these issues are presented by Hegel way too early for a full appreciation of their import.

Finally, Hegel criticizes Kant for comparing God to dollars. Dollars are finite things. With regard to finite things, our thought of them is different from the reality of them. In contrast, God is infinite. With God, the exact claim by Anselm is that the thought of God is precisely tied up with His existence. Hence, Kant is guilty of borrowing the attributes of finite things and applying them to infinite things—a category mistake.

Remark 2: Defectiveness of the Expression: Unity, Identity of Being and Nothing

Consider the phrase, "the relation of A and B." On the one hand, the remark refers to parts—A and B. On the other hand, the relation is a thing unto itself. The "relation" is just as self-identical a thing as A and B are. Is the aforementioned relation a complex or a simplex? Obviously, it is both. Becoming in Figure 1(c) is just such a "relation" between Pure Being and Nothing. [7] is simple, and [4, 5, 6] is complex.

In Remark 2, Hegel draws attention to this paradox of relationships in his analysis of the proposition "being and nothing are the same"—the proposition depicted in [2, 4] of Figure 1(c). On the one hand, the proposition asserts a relation—the identity or the "sameness" of being and nothing. On the other hand, the proposition refers to being and nothing as if they are different. The proposition

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107 In effect, Hegel thought Kant was a mere empiricist, relying on sense-certainty of perceived objects as the ultimate criterion of truth. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 63. Ironically, Kant himself thought he was refuting the empiricists. Id. at 48.

108 “Infinite” here means self-determining. See id. at 51. Infinity becomes important at the end of chapter 2 and is the basis of chapter 3.
is therefore contradictory. One could not refer to being and nothing as the same unless they were sufficiently different so as to be named "being," on the one hand, and "nothing" on the other.

What is the significance of contradiction, such as the one we have just identified? Contradiction—the "motor of things"—destroys the proposition. The proposition vanishes of its own accord. (Here we are to assume that only true propositions endure; the contradictory ones do not.) The vanishing is immanent in the proposition. Vanishing is the proposition's "result." (90) This vanishing—a movement—is Becoming. More precisely, it is "ceasing-to-be" what it is and "coming-to-be" something else.

The result, however, is not expressed in the proposition. The proposition we are examining ("being and nothing are the same") does not say "being and nothing are the same and the truth of this has already vanished." Thus, we have this very important dictum from Hegel: "the proposition in the form of a judgement is not suited to express speculative truths . . . " (90) Any given proposition expresses a moment of truth, but it is also a lie because it fails to add "and the truth of this proposition is about to and already has vanished." 

Where is the truth, then? It is in the movement of the entire system of Understanding, Dialectical and Speculative Reason. Truth is

109 Taylor, supra note 58, at 243.

110 See also PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 14, at 13 ("knowledge is only real and can be expounded only as science or system; further, a so-called fundamental proposition or principle of philosophy, even if it is true, is also false, for the very reason and just so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition or principle");* LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9. § 88 ("The fact is, no speculative principle can be correctly expressed by any such propositional form, for the unity has to be conceived in the diversity, which is all the while present and explicit").

111 This point is nicely expressed by Michael Kosok as follows:

That which is initially given can be referred to positively as that which is present . . . and negatively as that which is lacking (called "negative presence," since the given makes itself evident as a lack). The concept of negation viewed dialectically as a type of "negative presence" is therefore qualitatively different from the standard notion of logical negation. Given a term A, its negation not-A is usually interpreted to be a positive presence of something other than A, "-A," called, e.g., "B," such that A and B are not only distinct but separable "truth values." However the form "other than" is actually a referral to A since no content different from A has been posited: to simply deny A is not to assert anything else in its place.

Hegel calls propositions judgments. "Judgment is an identical relation between subject and predicate." (90) For example, "the rose is red," or "being/nothing are identical." Hegel says some very sensible things as to why judgments fail to capture the whole truth:

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\text{[T]he subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgement this is not expressed.} \tag{90-91}
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In other words, the rose is many things other than red, yet this "speculative content" is not expressed. In addition, many things are red besides roses. This too is not expressed. The tendered judgment is therefore not the whole truth.

To fill out the inadequacy of the judgment, the opposite judgment should be added: "being and nothing are not the same." (91) Between the stated and speculative content, there is ceaseless movement. The moment of identity (sameness) is legitimate but incomplete. The moment of difference (unsameness) is likewise legitimate but not complete.

**Unities in General.** Also in the second remark are some poignant observations about the nature of "that unfortunate word 'unity'" (91)--as in the unity of being and nothing. Ordinarily, unities are discovered by "mere comparison," a mediocre technique, in Hegel's view. (52) Comparison is accomplished by "external reflection"--a reflection quite divorced from the things compared.\(^{112}\)

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\text{When this reflection finds the same thing in two different objects, the resultant unity is such that there is presupposed the complete indifference to it of the objects themselves which are compared, so that this comparing and unity does not concern the objects themselves and is a procedure and a determining external to them. Unity, therefore, express wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more . . . paradoxical the more the terms of which . . . show themselves to be sheer opposites.} \tag{91}
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This abstract sameness of A and B, toward which A and B are indifferent, is not the unity which Pure Being and Pure Nothing enjoy. Pure Being and Pure Nothing are simultaneously the same and different. Sameness is constantly disappearing into difference. And vice versa, difference is vanishing into sameness. Identity and difference are constantly coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. The

\(^{112}\) External reflection will be a very important category from the first chapter of Essence. For now, think of external reflection as ordinary consciousness perceiving supposedly self-identical objects (in other words, naive metaphysics).
Suppose these moments of being and nothing had endurance. Then they would be determine being and determine nothing. These concepts, however, are too advanced. So far we have merely indeterminate Pure Being and Nothing. These moments are not yet in the least ways self-subsistent.

Remark 3: The Isolating of These Abstractions

Becoming is the unity of Pure Being and Nothing. The truth of being and nothing is that they are Becoming. In Remark 3: The Isolating of These Abstractions, Hegel criticizes some philosophical rivals who insist on isolating Pure Being or Pure Nothing, refusing to let them advance into Becoming.

One such person is Parmenides, who insisted that Pure Being is forever diverse from Pure Nothing. Hence, Parmenides could not make a beginning, because in Pure Being held fast, nothing moves and nothing can be perceived.

Plato is likewise criticized. Plato imagined a primal unity of all things, which he called "the One." The One, however, was to be distinguished from Being. The One therefore has non-being. If we say, "the One is," we are adding to the One. Therefore, the proposition "One is" exceeds the word "One." "One" is therefore purely negative. All this Hegel dismisses as mere presupposition (in comparison with his own commencement with Pure Being).

Another target is Friedrich Jacobi. Hegel ridicules Jacobi for asking how Pure Nothing "becomes" something. The question "how" demands the statement of a category. This demand belongs to the bad habits of reflection, which demands comprehensibility, but at the same time presupposes it is armed against . . . its own question. (96)

The fault of Jacobi seems to be that he imagines his mind intuitions the empty "space" of Pure Nothing. But, of course, in Pure Nothing, Jacobi's mind does not exist. By insisting on his right to an intuition, Jacobi is violating the very rules of Pure Nothing—that nothing (not even consciousness) is to stand determinate before it. Furthermore, Jacobi is faulted for confounding Pure Nothing with unlimited, empty space. Space is a concept. As such it is determinate. Pure Nothing is more indeterminate than the pure idea of

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113 Jacobi lived from 1743 to 1819 and became first president of the Academy of Sciences in Munich. In the Lesser Logic, Hegel categorizes Jacobi as an intuitionist with great faith in "faith." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, §§ 76-77.
empty space. Space is a determinate nothing. In such a not-yet-legitimate determinate nothing, its very indeterminateness constitutes its determinateness,

for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; hence as so opposed it is itself determinate . . . Or it can be expressed thus: because being is devoid of all determination whatsoever, it is not the . . . determinateness which it is; it is not being but nothing." (99)

Thus, if we think of nothing, we think of something. "Nothing, taken in its immediacy, shows itself as affirmative, as being . . . Nothing is thought of . . . and therefore it is; in . . . thinking . . . nothing has its being." (101) In truth, this discussion is too advanced for chapter 1, where determination does not even appear until Becoming appears.

We have said that a major Hegelian slogan is: nothing is something. Another way of putting this is that if we negate nothing, we get something. Or, something is the negation of negation. "[T]he insight that the negation of the negation is something positive . . . appears as a triviality to . . . haughty understanding," Hegel complains (103), but it will be a key idea in everything that follows.

**Remark 4: Incomprehensibility of the Beginning**

In Remark 4, Hegel addresses Kant's famous "first antinomy." According to this antinomy: (a) The world has a beginning in time and a limit in space. Or (b) the world has no beginning in time and is spatially unlimited. In proving (b), Kant argued that, if time began, there must have been a void before time. Yet a void cannot be a beginning. As per King Lear, nothing can come of nothing.

Hegel responds that this claim of "nothing comes from nothing" cannot be aimed at Hegel's theory of Becoming as the unity of being and nothing. Kant's claim of nothing-nothing works only if being and nothing can be kept apart and isolated. If they cannot be, then nothing becomes being, and becoming is a "third" standing over against the static, isolated moments of being and nothing.

Hegel uncollegially accuses Kant of sophistry:

This style of reasoning which . . . clings to the false presupposition of the absolute separateness of being and non-being is to be named not dialectic but sophistry. For sophistry is an

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114 Later, space will be equated with the more advanced thought of Pure Quantity. See chapter 4.

115 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 67, at 241.
Dialectical Reason, however, is opposed to argument from baseless presupposition.

We call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which such seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously . . . a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself. (105)

Notice, in this formulation, that sublation is spontaneous. Spontaneity is a great Kantian word. It stands for freedom. The free thing is that which is uncaused. Similarly, in Dialectical Reason, an isolated moment freely and spontaneously sublates itself. It destroys itself and becomes its opposite. Hegel is the philosopher of positive freedom. That is, Spirit has a program. In most merely "liberal" philosophies, only negative freedom is produced--freedom from outside compulsion. Nothing positive is generated.

There also appears in this remark a reference to differential calculus, a concept which endlessly pleases Hegel. In differential calculus, we imagine the effect of a small change on a mathematical expression. For example, take $y = 5x$. Differential calculus asks, "if we change $x$ by a small amount ($\Delta x$), what is the effect on $y$?" Obviously, the answer is: no matter how small you think the change is, it will be visited five-fold on $y$. Or $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x} = 5$. Notice that, in this expression, as $\Delta x$ approaches zero, we approach dividing by zero--an impossibility. The differential is in the act of vanishing, and thus an example of Hegel's "determinate nothing," and a mathematical illustration of his dictum "nothing is, after all, something."

Of deeply spiritual entities like $\Delta x$, Hegel writes:

These magnitudes . . . are in their vanishing, not before their vanishing, for then they are nothing. Against this pure notion it is objected and reiterated that such magnitudes are either

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116 Critique of Pure Reason, supra note 67, at 33 (liberty is absolute spontaneity, an unconditioned as first member of a causal series), 300 (the causality of freedom is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time; freedom is not given in experience and is independent of impulse).

117 Almost 80 pages will be dedicated to calculus in the second chapter of Quantity. See chapter 5.

118 To test this out, suppose $x = 3$. Then $y = 15$. Let's increase $x$ by 1 ($\Delta x = 1$), so that $x + \Delta x = 4$. $y$ changes to 20--a five-fold increase compared to the change in $x$ ($\Delta y = 5$). Of course, in calculus, $x$ increases, not by 1, but by a number infinitely smaller than 1.
something or nothing; that there is no intermediate state between being and non-being . . . Here too, the absolute separation of being and nothing is assumed. (104)

Thus, $^* x / y^*$ is in between something and nothing.\textsuperscript{119} Those who argue with Kant that nothing is nothing (and not something) therefore place themselves in opposition to the considerable prestige of differential calculus.

2. Moments of Becoming: Coming-To-Be and Ceasing-To-Be

In Figure 1(c), Becoming is the middle term between Pure Being and Pure Nothing. Becoming is thus a complex. That is, it contains distinction. It contains its parts [2, 4, 5] and it has an immediateness [7] as well. Of this Hegel writes: "Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing . . . " (105) The "unseparatedness" is precisely this modulation we have spoken much about. Being and nothing cannot keep apart. Their unity is not an alien abstraction but is something that being and nothing participate in. Analogously, the love that two lovers have for each is not an alien unity. Love is a middle term in which the individuals participate.

Consider the unity as such. The unity as such appears only if the unified parts disappear. We cannot think of the whole and the parts simultaneously:

\begin{quote}
But in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other, is, each is not. They are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from . . . self-subistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated. (105)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{119} Later, Hegel will say that $^* x / y^*$ is a determinateness. It is "not nothing" but is "an intermediate state . . . between being and nothing." (254) According to one commentator:

The objection was raised against the differential calculus, that an intermediate position between being and nothing is an impossibility. The calculus . . . is based on this assumption, however, for it derives from the notion that the determinations of quantum are vanishing quantities, that is, that they are neither a quantum nor a nothing, but a mutual determination in respect of other quantities. The objection raised was therefore rejected by Hegel, who maintained that the unity of being and nothing is not a state but a disappearing as well as a becoming, only the middle or the unity itself constituting the truth of the matter.

The moments are there and they are not there. Thus, Becoming is a unity between the affirmation and the negation of its parts. When we affirm the parts, we focus on [4,5,6]. When we focus on the unity, we contemplate [7].

The parts [4,5,6] are active. In their modulation, being becomes nothing, and nothing becomes being. One is ceasing-to-be and the other is becoming proper—nothing into something. Coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are the same but they stand for different directions in the sublation of being into nothing.

In [4, 5, 6], Pure Being cancels itself and becomes Pure Nothing, and Pure Nothing cancels itself and becomes Pure Being.120 There is no advance until we contemplate movement itself as a third [7]. But sticking with [4, 5, 6] for the moment, the extremes sublate themselves. This means they cancel themselves and preserve themselves. What is true about the left side of the page is true about the right side of the page. Being is really nothing. And nothing is really being.

Each extreme changes into the other, and, in this transition, brings along its properties as it becomes the other. The extremes are in a state of perfect communication. This idea of the extremes investing the other with its properties is usefully called the "chiasmic exchange of properties."121 That each extreme transfers its property to the other is an idea to which we will return often.

3. Sublation of Becoming

Coming-to-be and ceasing to be are forces. Yet forces can only be observed in equilibrium. Hence, in Figure 1(c), [7] constitutes the equilibrium—the part of the unity that is at rest. Thus, Hegel writes:

The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is in the first place becoming itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are in this unity only as vanishing moments . . . Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result. (106)

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120 Here Hegel warns that "[t]hey are not reciprocally sublated—the one does not sublate the other externally." (106) What the extremes of being and nothing do they do to themselves.

One can say, in a double sense, that, if being and nothing are a contradiction, then Becoming "contains" the contradiction. That is, Becoming has contradiction inside it (and hence "contains" it). Becoming, so long as it stays a fixed moment, prevents contradiction from blowing apart.

But we have said that Becoming has its active parts and its static whole. This contradictory state of affairs means that Becoming, as a unity of the two must fall apart, because we cannot simultaneous contemplate movement and stasis:

This result is the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not nothing; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations . . . It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole. (106)

Becoming must go. We can only focus on one of the two features of Becoming. We have to choose. Shall we view Becoming as active or Becoming as passive? The above-quoted passage says: choose the passive. The passive is the position of understanding. It is the side of being. Hence, in our fourth official move of the Science of Logic, we will take the static part of Becoming [7], and move it to the left of the page (where understanding resides).

Insert Figure 2(a) here (located at the end)
The Move to Determinate Being

If we had made the opposite choice—if we moved the active part over to the right side of dialectical reasoning—we would be retrogressing: "a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations." (106) In effect we would drop back to Figure 1(b) or 1(a). Of course, we could do this. The Logic is a circle. It works forwards and backwards. But we (the audience) will learn more if we insist on pressing forward to chapter 2. This is the "progressive" move ("for us").

In Figure 2(a), we have taken the misshapen [7] and have rounded it out to [1]. This is the fundamental error of the understanding, which sees simplicity where it should see complexity. We contemplate Becoming as if it were a whole. In describing [1], Hegel writes:

But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the one-sided immediate unity of these moments, is determinate being. (106)
Professor Butler distinguishes between basic and nonbasic moves of the Logic. In the basic moves, the absolute is named directly. Thus, Pure Being and Determinate Being—as shown in Figure 2(a)—qualify as “basic” moves. Such a move presupposes that the moves of Dialectical Reason and Reason have been dropped. The “nonbasic” moves—Figures 1(b) and 1(c), for instance—do not purport to name the absolute, but merely to comment on any such definition. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 35.

Butler specifically announces that "Becoming is not necessary to the dialectical development." Id. at 36. Indeed, it is a positive impediment because, conceived as the autistic movement between the extremes in Figure 1(c), it prevents an advancement to [7] in Figure 1(c)—the step of Speculative Reason.

I disagree. Becoming is, first of all, named in Figure 1(c) for the first time. Hence, by the time we are conscious of the modulation, we have already overcome it. Hence, the modulation was no dead end. In the very naming of the activity we have progressed. Hence, Becoming—and Speculative Reason generally—is essential to the process and is a proposed version of the absolute, which, in Figure 2(a), the Understanding will proceed to misunderstand.

Figure 2(a) is a figurate version of the above passage. It draws the transition of Becoming to Determinate Being. In the transition from middle term to more advanced one-sided term, Hegel grants the one-sided version a new name. Becoming (a middle term) is now called Determinate Being (a one-sided term).

**Remark: The Expression 'To Sublate'**

In the Remark that follows "Moments of Becoming," Hegel describes some of the paradoxes of sublation, which we have already covered in conjunction with the notion of immanence. In this Remark, Hegel says: "[W]hat is sublated . . . is the result of mediation; it is a non-being . . . which had its origin in a being." (107) This should be a very comfortable proposition by now. It refers to Dialectical Reason, which is always double. Hence, it is a mediation. As a mediation (a complex), it is on the move. Sublation is therefore force—the force of Becoming.

**Appendix to Pure Being: The Two Prefaces and Introduction**

What follows are brief descriptions of what Hegel says in the prefaces to the first and second editions of the *Science of Logic*, and in the section labelled "Introduction." All the points made in this introductory material have been amply explained already. The reader is invited to skip this appendix and proceed directly to chapter 2, if curiosity does not suffice for a description of the exact content of Hegel's introductory materials.

First Preface. In the First Preface, Hegel regrets the fact

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122 Professor Butler distinguishes between basic and nonbasic moves of the Logic. In the basic moves, the absolute is named directly. Thus, Pure Being and Determinate Being—as shown in Figure 2(a)—qualify as “basic” moves. Such a move presupposes that the moves of Dialectical Reason and Reason have been dropped. The "nonbasic" moves—Figures 1(b) and 1(c), for instance—do not purport to name the absolute, but merely to comment on any such definition. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 35.

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123 As revealed in the drawing in the text accompanying notes 54-56.
modern times have lost an interest in metaphysics. Kant's "exoteric" teaching takes the blame. It holds "that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates nothing but fantasies of the brain." (25) Alas, everything has to be practical nowadays. For this reason, logic has fared better than metaphysics, because it promises to teach the practitioner "how to think."

But things are changing. Even the old guard, opposed to new ideas, has grudgingly become familiar with speculative philosophy. New ideas always have the following history: first, the new idea fanatically opposes the old idea, and, in its partisanship, it neglects "the labour required for a scientific elaboration of the new principle." (27) But the higher demand is that the new idea "should become systematized knowledge." (27)

Properly, logic is metaphysics--"purely speculative philosophy." (27) If it would be a science, it cannot borrow methods from "subordinate" fields such as mathematics. It certainly cannot be satisfied with "categorical assurances of inner intuition." (27) The proper method is the progression of fixed understanding, negative dialectics, and the "universal" move of negating the negation, thereby reaching the highest third step of Speculative Reason.

Second Preface. In the Preface to the Second Edition, Hegel apologizes for the imperfections in the First Edition. Poverty of existing philosophical work is to blame. True, prior work was helpful and gratefully acknowledged, but in the end it offered "only here and there a meagre shred or a disordered heap of dead bones." (31)

Hegel emphasizes the importance of language. German in particular is praised for being rife with phrases with opposite meanings, "so that one cannot fail to recognize a speculative spirit of the language in them." (32) But just because ordinary speakers use these ambiguous terms does not mean that they fully understand their speculative content. These terms are used, but it is the privilege of philosophy to consider such terms for themselves—not mere tools.

When categories are reduced to mere tools, then "feelings" predominate. We never say that our feelings are our servants. Rather, they are independent forces. We serve them. Feelings are "particular" (i.e., not universal), but we experience in ourselves a universality that stands over against the mere particularism of feeling.

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124 I.e., the opposite of "esoteric." Exoteric teaching is completely open and public. Esoteric learning belongs to elite societies of scholars.

125 We have seen that Aufgehoben (sublation) means both to destroy and to preserve—a perfect Hegelian word!
When we give ourselves up to a sensation . . . and in it feel ourselves confined and unfree, the place into which we can withdraw ourselves back into freedom is this region of self-certainty . . . of thought" [i.e., the region of our experienced universality]. (35)

We are aware that we can only think in the universal terms of language. Hence, speculative philosophy conceives a relation between three terms: the subject (abstracted from feelings) and the object are the two extremes. "Thought" mediates as a middle term. Hence, we have:

**Thought**

So conceived, thought actually cuts us off from the object.

But this view can be countered by the simple observation that these very things which are supposed to stand beyond us and, at the other extreme, beyond the thoughts referring to them, are themselves figments of subjective thought. (36)

Thoughts are taken to be *forms*, referring to a content (i.e., the object) that is beyond thought. But the truth of the object is its notion—what we think of it. This notion therefore is the content of the object.

If we can draw the notion from the object, then thinking becomes free. "Free" thought is that which "is performed with an awareness of what is being done." (37) Free thought is spirit itself (and spirit is nothing but consciousness as such). When thinking is merely instinctive (unaware of itself), "spirit is enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied material." (37) That is, instinctive thinking cannot fathom the unity in diverse things. This is the state of mere "common sense," (38) of which Hegel is a huge opponent.

Spirit is free if it is "actual." Actuality is self-knowing, and spirit's job is to find what is merely implicit in itself and make it "actual." Hence, "the loftier business of logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth." (37) (Notice in this discussion, there are not "many minds."

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126 This is a criticism of Kant, who thought we could know nothing of the thing-in-itself. Hegel is pointing out that the thing-in-itself is a thought, like any other, and therefore is not in any way privileged over other thoughts of phenomena.

127 Common sense is also properly the Understanding, a necessary but inadequate analytical moment.

128 Actuality is the third part (or the last three chapters) in the Doctrine of Essence.
There is mind as such. It is the universal element in us all that we experience when we abstract ourselves from mere feelings.)

As for common sense (unfree thought), it leaves truth and content to one side and considers only form. But content, divorced from form, cannot be formless. "[I]f it were, then it would be only vacuity, the abstraction of the thing-in-itself." (39) Content has its own form, and it is only through this form that content has soul and meaning. This content-laden form is Notion. All other forms are merely finite and untrue.

Thought has a necessary development. In this development, the steps must necessarily follow one another. Mathematics claims this necessity, but it is inadequate. It stays simple. Its practitioners do nothing but ward off heterogeneous elements—an effort that is itself "tainted" with heterogeneity. (40)

Logic makes demands on the listener. She must calmly suppress her own opinions and let the logic do its work. Hegel complains that he has been "too often and too vehemently attacked by opponents who were incapable" of seeing that their opinions "contain categories which are presuppositions and which themselves need to be criticized before they are employed." (40-41)

Attacks have most vociferously been aimed at Hegel's beginning with Pure Being, Pure Nothing, and Becoming. Hence, some study of the nature of beginnings is warranted.\textsuperscript{129} The beginning is very treacherous, because the reader will be tempted to smuggle in complex ideas, when the playing field is ultra-simple. Examples of such illegitimate presupposition: infinity is different from finitude, or content is different from form. These points are

narrated and asserted rather than proved. But there is something stupid--I can find no other word for it--about this didactic behavior; technically, it is unjustifiable simply to presuppose and straightway assume such propositions. (41-42)

\textbf{Introduction: The General Notion of Logic.} In the Introduction, Hegel defines Logic as the science of thinking. Hence, the Science of Logic is self-referential. That is, it has its own self as its subject matter. It is both (a) method and (b) the study of method. The subject matter of the Logic is thought itself. It is thought about thought.

In every other science, subject matter and method are distinguished from each other. In such sciences, method is taken for granted. There, method (thought procedures) is "grounded." (43)

Logic, however, must be groundless. That is, the ground of Logic must be established by Logic. The Notion of the Logic must be its own final result. Hence, "what logic is cannot be stated

\textsuperscript{129} This, of course, is done in the essay "With What Must Science Begin?"
This is the hated idea of self-identity, which Hegel will much criticize. (43) Logic's knowledge of what it is must emerge as the final outcome. For this reason, no "introduction" can establish Logic's Notion. It can only make Logic "more accessible to ordinary thinking." (43)

Ordinary thinking takes "thinking" to be the mere form of cognition. The content of the cognition supposedly remains beyond thought. This extraneous content is therefore immune from the laws of thought. Thought therefore contains no real truth. What is essential lies outside thought. Thus, "the object is taken as something complete and finished on its own account, something which can entirely dispense with thought for its actuality." (44) Thought, on the other hand, is taken as defective; it has to complete itself with extraneous materials. Thinking thus must accommodate itself to the object. The object is indifferent to thought, and so thought modifies only itself--never the object--when it contemplates the object. (45)

At least in the sphere of reason, the foregoing is quite erroneous. Such ideas "bar the entrance to philosophy" and "must be discarded at its portals." (45)

Ancient metaphysics had a higher conception of thinking than this. It rightly believed that knowledge of things is obtained through thinking what is really true of them. Things were taken, not in their immediacy, but as things raised to the form of thought.

But then "reflective understanding" seized possession of philosophy. "Understanding" means "abstraction." It separates and holds fixed its separations. (46) Thus, it separates "thought" from "the object thought"--it separates form and content. In doing so, truth is lost. "Knowing has lapsed into opinion." (46) Left to its own devices, the Understanding flees to sensuality as the only guarantor of the truth. Yet, "since this knowledge is self-confessedly knowledge only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of [sensuality] is admitted, but at the same time presupposed." (46) Taking a swipe at Kant, Hegel says of the view that we can only know phenomena (not things-in-themselves):

> This is like attributing to someone a correct perception, with the rider that nevertheless he is incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false. (47)

The trouble with Kantian metaphysics is that this is accepted as a presupposition, "so that there was no question of an immanent

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130 This is the hated idea of self-identity, which Hegel will much criticize.

131 This describes the "natural assumption . . . in philosophy." MAKER, supra note 17, at 89 citing PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 14, 46.

132 This can be seen in Figure 2(a), where the understanding stupidly takes the part for the whole.

But equally it must transcend . . . its separating determinations and straightway connect them." (46) This connecting activity (Speculative Reason) is the great "negative step" that leads to the true Notion of reason. (47)

From what point of view must the logic be considered? Hegel's answer is, fundamentally, from Spirit's own view. In effect, Spirit learns what it is. In the *Phenomenology*, a thinking subject faced an object. The end result was a complete unity of subject and object--absolute knowing:

Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (49)

This end point of the *Phenomenology* is the beginning point of the *Science of Logic*.

Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. (49)

In other words, Spirit thinks itself in the *Science of Logic*. This is connected with the beginning thesis that the Logic has itself as its subject matter. Logic's point of view is strictly its own--not ours. The *Science of Logic* is no phenomenology.

Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth . . . Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. (49-50)

The *Science of Logic* is nothing short of "the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite

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133 "Understanding has a bad press amongst Hegelians," writes one astute reader of the Logic. Burbidge, *Place of the Understanding*, supra note 71, at 171. But it is a very necessary and noble (though one-sided) part of the process. One mustn't think that the step can be dispensed with.

134 Why a "negative" step? Referring to Figure 1(c), the concept of Becoming negates the earlier step of Dialectical Reason. Thus, [7] is the negation of [4, 5, 6].
mind." (50) A strong claim indeed!135

Thus, logic does not think about some other thing. It does not provide forms that are mere signs of the truth. "[O]n the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." (50)

To understand this, "one must discard the prejudice that truth must be something tangible"—something beyond thought. (50) Even Plato was guilty of this prejudice. Platonic Ideas are existing things, but in another world. Properly speaking, actuality adheres to the Notion of objects—the thought of them. To the extent it is distinct from its Notion, an object ceases to be actual. It is a non-entity. Tangibility belongs only to this null aspect of the object—beyond—thought.136

Kant’s critical philosophy was "overawed by the object, and so [all] logical determinations were given an essentially subjective significance." (51) As a result, Kantian philosophy remained burdened with the object he wished to avoid. The unknowable thing-in-itself was a limit—a pure "beyond." The Phenomenology, however, liberated the opposition of consciousness and lifted the determinations of thought "above this timid, incomplete standpoint." (51)

Ordinary logic had not been improved since Aristotle, and so, Hegel observed, it had fallen into contempt.137 It is dealt with out

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135 Terry Pinkard remind us that such remarks were "strong stuff from a relatively unknown writer who was at the time still only a Gymnasium professor with unfulfilled aspirations for university employment." PINKARD, supra note 5, at 342.

Is Hegel a blasphemer, claiming divine powers for himself and for those who comprehend his Logic? Professor William Maker argues not. The thrust of his defense is that absolute knowing obliterates consciousness. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17. Therefore, no merely conscious individual can attain the position of absolute knowing. MAKER, supra note 17, at 130. Indeed, Maker interprets Hegel as emphasizing man’s finitude, but without the problems inherent to antifoundational postmodernism, which stupidly insists on the contradictory dogma, "there are no universal truths." "Thus," Maker writes, "rather than being the ultimate philosophical blasphemy, Hegel's presentation of absolute knowing is the consummate critique of it." Id. at 131. Hegel is guilty of blasphemy "only so long as we see consciousness' mode of knowing as the only possible one." Id. at 134.

136 Here Hegel makes clear his position on the vulgar inquiry as to whether, if a tree falls in the forest out of earshot, there is sound. Hegel would say that the sound is not "actual" because it is not truth.

137 The Miller translation includes at this point a notorious footnote that Hegel wrote for the first edition of the Science of Logic but deleted in subsequent editions:

The latest treatment of this science which has recently appeared, System of Logic by Fries, returns to the anthropological foundations. The idea or opinion on which it is based is so
of habit rather than conviction. When the determinations of run-of-the-mill logic

are taken as fixed determinations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them. (48)

Such a logic accepts its determinations "in their unmoved fixity." (52) It brings together such concepts only by external (not immanent) relation. It is "mere comparison" based on external difference. It is mere analytical philosophy. Ordinary logic "is not much better than a manipulation of rods of unequal lengths in order to sort and group them according to size," or "a childish game of fitting together the pieces of a coloured picture puzzle." (52-53) It is mere reckoning, mere mathematics, mere empirical science. It has not even a trace of scientific method.

"Before these dead bones of logic can be quickened by spirit," Hegel writes that the following "quite simple insight" must be grasped:

the negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity . . . but essentially only into the negation of its particular content . . . such a negation is not all . . . negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results . . . Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation it has a content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it is richer by the negation . . . of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system of Notions as such has to be formed--and has to complete itself in a purely continuous course in which

shallow, both in itself and in its execution, that I am spared the trouble of taking any notice of this insignificant publication. (52 n.1)

Apparently, this footnote created a scandal at the time it was printed. J.F. Fries was Hegel's lifelong enemy. He was a popularizer of philosophy and considered a liberal (though also a virulent anti-semit). Fries obtained jobs at the universities at Jena and Heidelberg before Hegel did, which was irritating, and Fries's book on logic appeared in 1811, one year before Hegel's publication. Hegel apparently looked forward to royalties on Science of Logic and felt that Fries's publication would eat into his income.

Publication of the above-quoted footnote caused much comment in the philosophical community and contributed to Hegel's failure to receive a professorship at Heidelberg until Fries himself vacated his position for a chair in Geneva. D'HOND'T, supra note 5, at 83-98.
In other words, the key is the slogan that nothing is, after all, something. "Nothing" contains and therefore preserves what it cancels. It adds content (itself) to what it cancels. This is the heart and core of Hegel's system.

Hegel says that he cannot pretend that the Science of Logic is incapable of greater completeness. (54) But he knows that the method is the only true one. "This is self-evident simply from the fact that [the method] is not something distinct from its object and content." (54)

The negativity possessed within the positive entity is what enables the Logic to advance. This is the dialectic. Hence, in Hegel's philosophy, Dialectical Reason has a different connotation than in the old philosophies. Plato took dialectics to be "mere conceit" or "a subjective itch for unsettling and destroying what is fixed and substantial." (56) Kant rated dialectics higher. In the Critique of Pure Reason, it became a necessary function of reason. But nevertheless Kant held it to be "merely the art of practicing deceptions and producing illusions." (56) It was "only a spurious game, the whole of its power resting on concealment of the deceit." (56)

True, Kant's expositions in the antinomies of pure reason do not indeed deserve any great praise; but the general idea on which he based his expositions is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction. Primarily, it is true, with the significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things-in-themselves but their nature is precisely intrinsic or in itself. This result, grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul. (56)

Here is a hint at Hegel's basic view that, whereas Kant found four antinomies in pure reason, he should have seen that every concept has antinomy within it. There are infinite, not four, antinomies. Hegel ends the Introduction by suggesting that the Logic is better appreciated by those who have immersed themselves in the particulars. Such a person is more likely to see the universal arise from the aggregate of particulars. Thus, a law student who studies lots of laws is more likely to appreciate jurisprudential theory than

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138 For some very interesting commentary on this confession, see Burbidge, Place of the Understanding, supra note 71, at 179-81.

139 Supra note 67.

140 See chapter 4.
Thus, Hegel would undoubtedly oppose the law course frequently called "legal method," if taught to beginning law students. Such a course would be strictly post-graduate, in Hegel’s curriculum. Similarly, he who approaches [the Science of Logic] at first finds in logic an isolated system of abstractions which, confined within itself, does not embrace within its scope the other knowledges and sciences. On the contrary, when contrasted with the wealth of the world as pictorially conceived, then this science in its abstract shape looks as if it could achieve anything sooner than the fulfillment of its promise. (57-58)

The value of logic is thus only appreciated when preceded by experience in subordinate sciences. "[I]t then displays itself to mind as the universal truth, not as a particular knowledge alongside other matters." (58)

II. From Determinate Being to Infinity

Hegel begins Chapter 2 of Quality with some preliminary remarks about the progress to follow. Some of these remarks, however, must remain mysterious until the chapter is finished.

Recall that, at the end of chapter 1, Determinate Being appeared. According to Figure 1(c), Becoming was the first Determinate Being. In Figure 2(a), we wrenched the immediate part of Figure 1(a) and shifted it to the left. Figure 2(a) was thus the characteristic move of mere Understanding. Later, in Figure 2(b), Dialectical Reason will remind us of a suppressed "other." In Figure 2(c), Speculative Reason will reconcile the two opposites with a new middle term.

Determinateness. A key concept is introduced in the brief preamble to chapter 2: "determinateness." A "determinateness" denotes a unity of being and nothing. Thus, Becoming is an express determinateness (whereas Pure Being and Nothing were only implicit determinatenesses). A determinateness is therefore a double-sided

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141 Thus, Hegel would undoubtedly oppose the law course frequently called "legal method," if taught to beginning law students. Such a course would be strictly post-graduate, in Hegel’s curriculum.

142 Hegel, incidentally, frequently called the Understanding "picture thinking"—a derogatory reference.

143 Charles Taylor remarks that "Hegel takes up the Spinozan principle that all determination is negation." TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 232.
entity in a state of contradiction.
A determinateness does not, by itself, indicate that we can now see things. Taking to heart a point by G.R.G. Mure, we must realize that, throughout the first three chapters at least, we have before us quale only--qualities lacking all quantitative determination. "[W]e are in a world prior to the thought of a thing," he writes, "and the dialectic will be a sort of fluent instability, an impotent shifting rather than an active self-determining of spirit."  

Quality. In Figure 2(a), the determinateness of Becoming is made into a one-sided being by the Understanding. In effect, the Understanding places the accent on being. Special care should be taken in interpreting Figure 2(a). There, Determinate Being is shown as an immediate entity [1], the same as Pure Being was. But, thanks to the law of sublation, we know that Determinate Being contains all past steps. It has a history. It is therefore a determinateness--not an immediate entity. This will be true for the rest of the Logic, until immediacy establishes at the very end. Hence, it is possible to say that Determinate Being is Quality--a determinateness with the accent on being. Thus, Hegel writes:

Determinate being corresponds to being in the previous sphere, but being is indeterminate and therefore no determinations issue from it. Determinate being, however, is concrete; consequently a number of determinations, distinct relations of its moments, make their appearance in it. (110)  

In the preamble to chapter 2, Hegel states that, if we determine something's Quality, we are saying that it is opposed to an other--its negation, its nothingness. We are also implying that Quality is alterable and finite. Why alterable? This will become comprehensible only later, but it has to do with the fact that Determinate Being is in a state of Becoming--a movement that is present on the logic of sublation. It should, however, be clear why Quality is finite. Quality is a one-sided view of a determinateness. Therefore, it is clearly limited by its other, as Figure 2(b) will show.

The three major subheadings of this chapter are therefore (A)
Determinate Being as Such [1]; (B) Something and its Other (or Finitude) [1, 2, 3]; and (C) Qualitative Infinity [1–7]. Roughly, (A) is the move of the Understanding, as Figure 2(a) shows. (B) is the modulating double move of Dialectical Reason, and (C) is the conciliatory move of Speculative Reason. The first two subheadings are further subdivided, so that the triad of Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason replicate themselves within each subheading.

A. Determinate Being as Such

The first subdivision of the chapter is itself subdivided. First we take (a) Determinate Being as such. This is the move of Understanding and is portrayed in Figure 2(a). Then (b) we take Determinate Being as a determinateness. Here we see both sides of the determinateness—its being and its nothingness. This is the dialectical moment. We keep the accent on "being," however. Here we have "Quality" before us. The subdivision ends with the achievement of Something—a unity of Quality and Negation.

Reflection-into-self. Of this last step, Hegel mysteriously writes that quality

is to be taken as well in the one determination of determinate being as in the other—as reality and negation. But in these determinatenesses determinate being is equally reflected into itself; and posited as such it is (c) something, a determinate being. (109)

In other words, first we take Quality, a determinateness with the accent on being (which Hegel unofficially also calls "reality"). Then, in step two, we take the same determinateness with the accent on negation. Each of these two determinatenesses is "reflected into self." Here for the first time we have an important Hegelian trope. What does it mean for a determinateness to be reflected into itself?

"Reflection Within Itself" is the name Hegel gives to the first three of nine chapters on Essence—the middle portion of the Logic. The phrase denotes a strong sense of immanence. Thus, such a reflection is said to be an "immanent determining." (407) Reflection also denotes thought digging deeper. When we "reflect" about ourselves, we delve beyond the appearances in order to get at a deeper truth. We do this by shedding the inessentials. What we shed are the appearances—our mere being—and we discover some deeper non-being behind the veil. Reflection-into-self is therefore a very negative enterprise of shedding one-sided being to find negative essence. Hence, whatever Quality (and its Negation) become, they become it through their own negative force. They negate their superficial appearance and reveal their true character as something deeper. In terms of the Borromean Knot, [1] and [3] shed [2], which
turns out to be the essence of both [1, 2] and [2, 3]. [2] is then raised above its station to [4-7]--the middle term.

Reflection, however, is, in general, too advanced for the Doctrine of Being, which is "the sphere of the immediate, the unreflective . . . the simply presented."148 Nevertheless, as everything in Logic's future is implied from the start, it is not surprising that we should find activity which, "for us"149 and not "for itself," resembles Reflection-into-self.

"Posited." We also have in the above-quoted sentence an early use of the all-important word "posit." When you "posit" a proposition, you put it forth and bring it into existence.Positing is the work you do. Hence, "positive law" is the law put forth by human beings (as opposed to natural law, which is produced by God or nature).150 In effect, "positing" is the activity that is shown in Figure 2(a). There, Becoming [7] "is posited" as a purer form of being. It sheds [4,5,6] and becomes [1]. In this activity, [1] "reflects into itself."

The opposite of positing is that which is merely "for us." We the audience may know some truths about the unfolding Logic, but Logic's job is to make express what is merely implicit. "Positing" means to make express one's true nature. In "positing" the "in itself" (implicit) becomes "for itself" (free of oppression by external others). Thus, Hegel writes

only that which is posited in a Notion belongs in the dialectical development of that Notion to its content; whereas the determinateness that is not yet posited in the Notion itself belongs to our reflection. (110)

In other words, what belongs only to our reflection is not yet posited. Such information is "for us"--a kind of preview for our edification and not strictly part of the Logic.

Throughout the Doctrine of Being (which consists of Quality, Quantity and Measure), "positing" will occur by constantly placing the emphasis on "being." Each move by the Understanding occurs by shifting [7] (or some other part of the middle term) over into [1]. But in the middle part of the Logic--the Doctrine of Essence--"positing" radically changes character. In Essence, the paradigmatic move of the Understanding constitutes a shift to the right--from [7] to [3]. Essence always posits what it is by announcing what it is

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148 HARRIS, supra note 7, at 111.

149 On "for us," see supra text accompanying notes 26-32.

150 Hegel will define natural law as follows: "we take natural law to consist just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori, which cause therefore must contain an absolute spontaneity within itself . . . " (738)
not. This is the quintessential move of human freedom in the negative sense, and thus at the end of essence we will have arrived at human self-consciousness. In other words, the human subject is simply not an object, and nothing more than this—a very negative notion that is much emphasized in Lacanian thought. Finally, in the "Subjective Logic"—the last part of the Logic that follows Essence—"positing" occurs simultaneously on the left and the right. Both subject (on the right) and object (on the left) posit what they are. What they eventually posit is their perfect unity in the middle term of Spirit. In the first part of the present chapter, we shall witness reality and unreality each positing themselves as "something."

(a) Determinate Being in General

Hegel begins this subsection by describing the move from [7] to [1] in Figure 2(a):

From becoming [7] there issues determinate being [1], which is the simple oneness of being and nothing. Because of this oneness it has the form of immediacy. Its mediation, becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself . . . (109)

If Becoming is a oneness, it is so by virtue of [7]. If we posit the whole of Becoming [4, 5, 6, 7], it is certainly not a oneness, but is an aggregate of "ones." Thus from [7] springs forth Determinate Being [1] in general. In this form it is immediacy. But its history is steeped in mediation.

Dasein. At this point, Hegel discusses the portentous German word "Dasein." The German word for Being is "Sein, and the German word for Determinate Being is "Dasein," which, literally translated, means being there. Thus, Determinate Being is being in a certain place. Yet, Hegel warns, "space" is too advanced for chapter 2. Dasein does, however, capture a hint of negation. If a thing is there, it is not here. Thus: "Determinate being as the result of

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152 Burbidge prefers "a being." He reasons: "The indefinite article suggests that it is not absolutely indeterminate but is in some way limited by a nothing out of which it comes and to which it may return." BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 42.

153 Professor Butler suggests that the significance of Something is that a determination is this as opposed to that. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 47. Something, however, is reserved for Figure 2(c)—not Figure 2(a). The very idea of Determinate Being already incorporates this notion of "this, not that." As Butler puts it somewhat earlier, the significance of Determinate Being is that things become "determinable. Id. at 41. It is not yet, however, not a "thing" that endures over
its becoming is, in general, being with a non-being such that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being." (110) The simple unity of Determinate Being is, of course, [1], in Figure 2(a)--also [7] in Figure 1(c). Hegel expressly warns that the "simple unity" of [1] is nevertheless, because of its history, a determinateness: "Non-being thus taken up into being in such a way that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such." (110)

Hegel next warns that Determinate Being--heir to the "being" portion of Becoming [7]--is "a sublated, negatively determined being." (110) That is to say, [7] is the negation of the earlier history of Becoming, as shown in Figure 1(c). Or, [7] is simply what [4, 5, 6] were not--the static moment of the dynamic unity. But, if being is negatively determined, it is only so "for us." For itself, the negative nature of this activity is "not yet posited." The negative determination of being is the move of Essence. It is too advanced for chapter 2. Determinate Being has, however, posited itself as a determinateness. This much it knows of itself.

The Silent Fourth. In this subsection, Hegel also hints at something interesting about Understanding:

That the whole, the unity of being and nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being [1] is an external reflection; but in the negation, in something and other and so on, it will come to be posited. (110)

Hegel seems to be saying here that the move of Understanding--abstracting [7] and making it [1]--is not strictly the move of Logic. It comes from the outside. It is our move. We are "external reflection."

This point should be understood as follows. The Logic is a circle. We can go forward or backward. If we choose to go forward, through the move of Understanding, this is our choice. We do this because we have an interest in watching the Logic unfold in that particular direction. 154 What follows automatically, however, is Dialectical Reason and Speculative Reason. These, at least, are "immanent" to the Logic itself. In short, Logic requires the Understanding to move forward. Without the audience, the Logic at this point lies fallow. It does not move. Hence, the Understanding represents a necessary contingent moment in the Logic. 155

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155 Perhaps the presence of a consciousness as a necessary element of the Logic is why Hegel emphasizes that the Science of Logic presupposes the
Slavoj Žižek has suggested that there is always a "fourth" in the Hegelian triad of Understanding, Dialectic, and Speculative Reason. He compares it to the dummy in a game of bridge—the silent spectator that actually controls the game—a "Master Signifier" that makes sense of all the other signifiers. Hegel's remark about the Understanding being "external reflection" vindicates Žižek's observation.

John Burbidge likewise suggests that the beginning of the Logic is infected with contingency. He writes:

Transitions are essential, and comprehensive wholes are essential. But this can be acknowledged only because understanding can isolate and fix each of them, and hold them together in a disjunction. In other words, dialectical transitions will introduce contingencies; reflection will integrate this new subject matter into a comprehensive perspective; understanding will fix its terms and relations.

Thus, the intervention of the Understanding is a contingent event. It is necessary if the Logic is to progress, but it is not necessary that the Logic progress for us unless we—not yet part of the logical system—prod it into action. We are, after all, still only in the primitive stage of mere being. We have not yet reached subjectivity, where things move of their own accord.

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Phenomenology. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20; see also Harris, supra note 7, at 26.

156 Žižek, KNOW NOT, supra note 109, at 179.

157 Burbidge, Place of the Understanding, supra note 71, at 130.

158 We must not be stubborn in holding on to an outmoded idea, Burbidge warns. Id. at 41 ("[T]he resolution of self-contradiction will not come by holding stubbornly to the earlier category, but by moving to a new perspective in which the two moments are no longer simply opposites but are subcontraries of a more inclusive category.").

159 The passage I have quoted from Burbidge's essay draws a dissent from Stephen Houlgate, who sees Burbidge as claiming the Understanding is ultimately what holds the Logic together:

Surely, therefore, we should not be thinking of the stages of understanding, dialectic and speculative reason as held together in a vertäntig disjunction, that is held together as separate, but moments of one speculative development. And if that is the case, then thought does not culminate in understanding and thus go on setting up and dissolving conceptual determinations indefinitely, as Professor Burbidge seems to claim, but culminates rather in a definitive grasp by speculative reason of...
Finally, Charles Taylor, whose book did much to reverse the eclipse of Hegel's work in the twentieth century, finds this element of contingency a fatal flaw in the Logic. He writes:

The derivation of Becoming here is not as solid as that of Dasein. This is the first but not the last place in the Logic where Hegel will go beyond what is directly established by his argument, because he sees in the relation of concepts a suggestion of his ontology . . . But of course as probative arguments these passages are unconvincing. They fail, as strict conceptual proof, however persuasive they are as interpretations for those who hold Hegel's view of things on other grounds. Thus, in this case, the notion of becoming imposes itself supposedly because of the passage from Being to Nothing and back; but this is a passage which our thought is forced to when we contemplate either . . . we cannot trade on this principle at this stage.\(^{160}\)

This reproach, however, may be answered. First, we have seen that Dasein (Determinate Being) is Becoming, so that the criticism (Becoming's derivation is weaker than that of Dasein) is not exactly coherent.\(^ {161}\) Second, Hegel is, of course, required to go beyond the predicates of logical development to show what the Logic is "for us." "We" (i.e. self-consciousnesses) don't appear until quite late in the Logic. It is "for us" that the Logic is unfolding. Hence, of course Hegel must concede a role to the contingency of an observing subject in order to explain the relation of Pure Being and Nothing to Becoming. We must therefore dismiss Taylor's point as not well taken.

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the unified movement of thought through its three stages . . . .

Houlgate, supra note 71, at 185. Houlgate's view is that Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and Speculative Reason

are all modes of conceptual self-determination and can only be treated properly when the Logic reaches the point at which thought becomes explicitly self-determining, not before. That point is reached in the subjective logic.

Id. at 186. In other words, a subject reaches back and mixes in with the earlier logic moves. This "external reflection" can be viewed as the very contingency that Burbidge asserts is needed to make the Logic unfold.

\(^ {160}\) TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 233.

\(^ {161}\) In chapter 1, I identified Becoming with Determinate Being and deliberately concluded that no work had been done when Becoming was broken down into coming-to-be, ceasing-to-be, and Determinate Being. Otherwise, Determine Being would be the first negation of the negation. But Hegel says clearly that Something (Figure 2(c)) is the first negation. See infra. Meanwhile, Figure 2(a) is the "immediate" version of Determinate Being as a middle term.
Is Hegel's remark about Understanding—that it is an external reflection—consistent with positing? Hegel has strongly said that "positing" alone counts as a logical move, under the principle of immanence. The answer is, as might be expected, yes and no. Yes, the Understanding contingently comes forth to send the Logic on the path toward further development. But external reflection works by seizing on [7]—which is immanent in Becoming. In effect, the Understanding is a unity of contingency and necessity. We make the Understanding come forth, but we use it to seize upon materials that are already logically "present."

This point is important in refuting the false idea that Hegel is some sort of pre-post-modern "totalitarian." Here we see the implication that contingency is a necessity within the system. This unity of contingency and necessity is key to the very last part of the Doctrine of Essence.

(b) Quality

In Figure 2(a), we have isolated Determinate Being on the left [1], as the "immediacy of the oneness of being and nothing." (111) Being and Nothing "do not extend beyond each other" at this stage. (111) Yet we know from its history that Determinate Being is a determinateness: "so far as determinate being is in the form of being, so far is it non-being, so far is it determinate." (111) Nevertheless, in Figure 2(a), Determinate Being is a unity in which "as yet no differentiation . . . is posited." (111) This seems to be saying that "Determinate Being in General" is only the static part of [1]. It suppresses [2]. We have Quality only when [2], the negative voice of [1], is suppressed. The opposite of Quality is Negation. Hence, we have:

Insert Figure 2(b) here (located at the end)

Quality and Negation

What is the difference between Determinate Being in Figure 2(a) and Quality in Figure 2(b)? Each occupies the space of [1], yet the name changes. Why? The answer seems to be that Quality more clearly implies its opposite, while Determinate Being declines to make any reference to its opposite. Thus, Hegel writes:

Determinate being, however, in which [only] being is contained [1], is itself the criterion for the one-sidedness of quality—which is only immediate or only in the form of being. (111)

Later, Hegel will remark that, in Quality, Determinate Being shows its determinateness: "in quality as determinately present, there is distinction--of reality and negation." (114) This too indicates that the unique contribution of Quality (as compared to Determinate Being) is to emphasize a dialectical relation between Quality and Negation.\(^{163}\)

In any case, it pleases Hegel to change the names of [1] in Figure 2(b). Perhaps Determinate Being and Quality are the same concept--the leftward leaning isolation of being at the expense of nothing.

Determinateness, however, is a broader term than Quality or Determinate Being. It encompasses the opposition of negativity.\(^{164}\) Hence, in Figure 2(b), Negation as such appears. Notice that [3] is isolated from [1, 2]. Hegel says that [3] is just as much Determinate Being as [1]--or, in other words, nothing is just as much something as something is. Hence, Determinate Being

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\text{is equally to be posited in the determination of nothing [3], when it will be posited as a differentiated, reflected determinateness, no longer as immediate or in the form of being. (111)}
\]

In this proposition, Determinate Being is a reflected determinateness. How can this be, if Determinate Being is (one-sidedly) taken as a simple by the Understanding? The answer is that, in Figure 2(b), Dialectical Reason is at work. It must see double. We can observe [3], a Determinate Being as such, but it is in connection with the express determinateness of Figure 2(b) as a whole. In other words, in Figure 2(b) the determinateness of Determinate Being makes itself expressly manifest. It is "posited" as complex (though simultaneously a simple, as shown in [3]). As complex, it is "no longer immediate." Hence, Hegel remarks that Nothing is a determinate element of a determinateness." (111) It is reflected, in the sense that it has shed the inessential "being" [1] of which it is the deeper truth. Reflection involves the statement, "I am not that." Hence, [2] is the negative voice that distinguishes [1] and thereby becomes [2, 3], which is just as much Determinate Being as [1, 2].

Hegel finishes this subsection by equating Quality with reality. Hence, reality is "quality with the accent on being." (111) This same reality is negation when "burdened with a negative." (111) Or, in other words, Negation is just as "real" as reality. Negation

\(^{163}\) John Burbidge analyzes this step quite differently. He appears not to agree that Determinate Being is the same as Quality. Rather, he thinks that Figure 2(b) should be written as [1] = Determinate Being (which he calls "a being") and [3] = Quality. BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 48. This leaves out Negation altogether and therefore cannot be sustained from Hegel's text.

\(^{164}\) See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
is a "quality but one which counts as a deficiency."\(^\text{165}\) The "quality" of Negation is shown in [3].\(^\text{166}\)

**Remark: Quality and Negation**

In this Remark, Hegel speaks of the common usage of the word "reality." Philosophers speak of merely empirical reality as worthless existence. Ordinary speakers may claim that mere thoughts have no "reality." Yet, on Hegel's analysis, reality (i.e., Quality) is one-sided.

Reality plays a role in the ontological proof of God, which Hegel visited in chapter 1 (as an excuse to attack Kant). In the metaphysical concept of God, "which, in particular, formed the basis of the so-called ontological proof," (112) God was defined as the sum-total of all realities. In this sum-total no contradiction existed. No exemplar of "reality" canceled any other. In this account, realities were taken as perfections, containing no negation. Without negation, realities do not oppose one another, but exist in perfect indifference to each other.\(^\text{167}\)

Such realities abolish determinateness. Yet without negation, being is indeterminate. Hence, reality, in this view, regresses to Pure Being. It is "expanded into indeterminateness and loses its meaning." (112) Such a view of God—as abstract reality—effectively changes God into Pure Nothing.

But suppose we take reality as "determinateness." Then the sum total of all realities is also the sum total of all negations and hence of all contradictions. Since contradiction is power and force, such a view makes of God "absolute power in which everything determinate is absorbed." (113) In other words, this absolute power destroys reality, once again leaving God as a nothing:

\[ \text{Reality itself is, only in so far as it is still confronted by a being which it has not sublated; consequently, when it is thought as expanded into realized, limitless power, it becomes the abstract nothing.} \ (113) \]

\(^{165}\) Hegel predicts that Negation will later be "determined as limit, limitation." (111) See Figure 5(b).

\(^{166}\) Charles Taylor calls Determinate Being as Such (Dasein) a "marriage . . . of reality and negation." TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 233. This is slightly inaccurate. "Reality" is *already* the unity of being and negation (with the accent on being). Reality is married to a negation which is just as much a reality as the reality it negates.

\(^{167}\) Such a view was attacked in chapter 1 as "pantheism." See supra text accompanying notes 97.
Hegel also warns against making negation (the mirror view of reality) into an abstract nothing, as Spinoza did. Of course, as Hegel, emphasized in chapter 1, nothing can stand before Pure Nothing, which obliterates everything. Rather, we must always view Nothing as a determinate nothing.

For Spinoza, there was only one substance, and it was abstract nothingness. Substance so defined was supposed to be the unity of thought and being (i.e., extension). This reduces thought and being to mere "moments"--"[o]r rather, since substance in its own self lacks any determination whatever, they are for him not even moments." (113) Individuals cannot persist in the face of Spinoza's substance. Everything is obliterated.

The Positive. Toward the end of the remark, Hegel compares Negation in chapter 2 with the Negative when it stands in correlation with the Positive, much later in the Doctrine of Essence. The Positive, Hegel states, is "reality" reflecting the negation. In the Positive, reality has only "illusory being." (113) But in "reality as such," the Negative is still hidden.

These remarks cannot be fully appreciated at this stage. Much later, we will see that Illusory being refers to the first attempt to isolate the Essential. The attempt is a failure—the Essential is only Illusory Being. But this kind of self-denunciation of Being is what Essence is. The act of self-denunciation is what Hegel will call Reflection.

Another way of viewing Illusory Being is that it is what reflection "sheds" as it retreats into itself. In effect, Illusory Being is "inessential." Hence, the Positive is a very advanced version of "reality." The Positive has renounced its being and overtly embraces the Negative, whereas, in reality, occult Negation is merely implied in the concept of Quality.

Property. Finally, Hegel compares Quality to the property of a thing. Quality is property when it manifests itself immanently to another in an "external relation." (114) By this, Hegel signals (rather mysteriously, at this stage) that we speak of properties when "things" have great resilience. That is, the thing potentially remains the same thing, even if it loses one or more of its properties. This resiliency Hegel will call Existence. Such resilience is far too advanced for chapter 2, however. Quality has no such resilience.

By way of an example of "property," Hegel offers this:

By properties of herbs, for instance, we understand determinations

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168 These are discussed in Determinations of Reflection, where they will be identified the moments of Opposition.

169 See Hegel's discussion of illusory being in the first chapter on reflection.
which are not only are *proper* to something, but are the means whereby this something in its relations with other somethings *maintains* itself in its own peculiar way, counteracting the alien influences posited in it and making its own determinations *effective* in the other—although it does not keep this at a distance. (114)

Using a term Hegel has not yet introduced, a thing's properties partake of "Being-for-self." The observer is capable of imposing its own view on the herb, introducing "alien influences." Property counteracts such influences that the observer *posits* into the herb. They are, in short, the authentic statements of the thing to the outside world. Thus, Hegel agrees with Friar Lawrence: "Oh mickle is the powerful grace that lies in herbs, plants, stones and their true qualities." 

These "proleptic" remarks about properties may have misled Charles Taylor into misinterpreting the entire status of Determinate Being. Taylor thinks Hegel is making the common sense point that the property of some thing can be discerned only in contrast to some other property, We cannot have the shape "square" without the shape "round." Thus, Taylor concludes:

> Although the quality by which we can characterize a given *Dasein* may be defined in contrast to imaginary properties, that is, properties which are not instantiated, some of the contrasts on which we base our descriptions must be instantiated. In these cases, the contrast between *Daseine* as qualities is a contrast between distinct things: Hegel uses the word 'something' here (*Etwas*) . . .

This interpretation of Determinate Being seriously misses the point. Hegel would undoubtedly dispute the philosophical worth of the common sense observation that one property is not some other property, and he would surely point out that such comparisons presuppose the self-identity of the property perceived. Indeed, self-identity of realities is precisely the position Hegel attacks in the Remark entitled "Quality and Negation." In short, Taylor criticizes Hegel for making properties into things, when this is the very position

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170 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 3 Scene 2.

171 TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 234.

172 Id. "Something" is just about to appear in Figure 2(c) as the unity of Quality and Negation. (William Wallace, translator of the Lesser Logic, will translate *Etwas* as "somewhat," better capturing the world prior to the thought of a thing. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 90.

173 In chapter 1, we saw Hegel's low opinion of "comparison."
that Hegel is criticizing. To be sure, Hegel discusses the properties of herbs, but this discussion is strictly "for us." Such properties are too advanced for the realm of Determinate Being, which concerns itself with what Mure called *quale*. ¹⁷⁴

Under the the false impression that Hegel is concern with self-identical properties, Taylor complains of a disjunction between "contrast" of properties and negation as the substance of Determinate Being. ¹⁷⁵ Of course, there *is* a disjunction between the two concepts, ¹⁷⁶ but in fact Hegel does not, at this stage, concern himself with contrast of identifiable properties.

Taylor goes on to complain that, the properties of a "thing" *causally* maintain the thing in its integrity (as Hegel recognized in his analysis of herbs). He judges Hegel's argument to be "a bit loose" and "embarrassing," given the fact that "cause and effect" are relations developed only the Doctrine of Essence. ¹⁷⁷ These objections disappear if Mure's observation concerning *quale* is honored. Contrary to Taylor's point, we are far too early for the doctrine of the "thing," which appears only in the Doctrine of Essence. ¹⁷⁸

How, Taylor asks, does this common sense notion of comparison lead to "the notion of Determinate Beings in a kind of struggle to maintain themselves in the face of others, and hence as 'negating' each other in an active sense"? ¹⁷⁹ The question is falsely put.

¹⁷⁴ *See supra* text accompanying note 143.

¹⁷⁵ TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 234 ("What may worry us is that Hegel seems to move from this unexceptionable point that all reality must be characterized contrastively . . . to the notion of determinate beings in a kind of struggle to maintain themselves in face of others, and hence, as 'negating' each other in an active sense.").

¹⁷⁶ Erroll Harris, however, sees a conjunction. Alteration, Harris points out, always involves contrast. Suppose A becomes B. Before this change, A is "contrasted" with B. Change occurs. A is altered. A is now B. B is to be contrasted from what it was--A. Hence, alteration and contrast go hand in hand. HARRIS, supra note 7, at 107; see also id. at 109 ("change or alteration is properly change only if both terms, that from which and that into which change occurs, are held together as the phases of a single process"). But more to the point, the contrast of A and B is not yet admissible. At this earlier point, we can speak only of A and "not A."

¹⁷⁷ TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 234.

¹⁷⁸ HARRIS, supra note 7, at 106. To quote Hegel's own reproach of Taylor's position: "And always when a concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, empty headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having in mind an image of, something else than what is in question . . ." LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 88.

¹⁷⁹ TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 234.
Determinate Being is not derived from the comparison of "things." Nevertheless, the balance of the question is a good one. How does it follow that being struggles to "be" in the face of negativity? The answer is that external reflection intervenes into the realm of Determinate Being in order to press forward its logic. With this assistance, being is in motion. It is in the process of Becoming. The act of Becoming (as opposed to ceasing-to-be) is the act of the Understanding, that constantly accents being at the expense of nothing. Of course, it falls to Dialectical Reason to do the opposite—to emphasize the negative.

(c) Something

The last subsection within "Determinate Being as Such" is "Something." Recall that, in Figure 2(b), Quality [1] had a dialectical relation with Negation [3]. Now the determinateness in Figure 2(b) must sublate itself and show itself as "void"—though, as always, preserved.

In the move from Dialectical to Speculative Reason, we notice that Dialectical Reason chided Determinate Being for ignoring its own negative voice [2]. But Dialectical Reason was likewise guilty of ignoring its own positive voice [3]—the same mischievous foul sin of which the Understanding was guilty. Hence, Speculative Reason sees that

negation is determinate being, not the supposedly abstract nothing
but posited here as it is in itself, as affirmatively present . .
., belonging to the sphere of determinate being. (115)

Or, in mathematical terms, [1] = [3]. In this formulation, the distinction between Quality and Negation has been sublated. They are equal. But "this sublating of the distinction is more than a mere taking back [of Figure 2(b)] and external omission of it again." (115) We cannot merely retreat to Figure 2(a)—Determinate Being as such. "The distinction [between [1] and [3]] cannot be omitted, for it is." (115) Hence, we have Determinate Being [1], the distinction within Determinate Being [2], and sublation of the distinction. As Hegel puts it, we have "determinate being, not as devoid of distinction as at first, but as again equal to itself through sublation of the distinction." (115) But this "return into self" of the Determinate Beings—the return of [1] and [3] into [2, 4]—also represents an enhancement [7]. We now have, not Determinate Being in General, but "a determinate being, a something." (115) Hence:
Insert Figure 2(c) here (located at the end)

**Something**

We are still, however, in "the world prior to the thought of a thing."\[^{180}\] "The universe and all in it is here just an undifferentiated--somewhat."\[^{181}\]

*Being-within-self*. It is said (wrongly) that eskimos have a hundred words for "snow," because snow is so important to their way of life.\[^{182}\] This is apparently a canard.\[^{183}\] What they have is a series of simple expressions which can be translated into "wet snow," or "powdered snow." English has precisely the same phrases.

"Being" is to Hegel what "snow" is to the eskimos. Hegel has many different compound expressions for it. Accordingly, we have in the discussion of "Something" the first appearance of the expression "being-within-self."

Hegel says of Something:

> This sublatedness of the distinction is determinate being’s own determinateness; it is thus being-within-self: determinate being is a determinate being, a something. (115)\[^{184}\]

In this passage, being-within-self is "sublatedness." Hence, being-within-self is an active notion. It designates immanent activity. It is in the nature of being to turn into nothing and then into something. This development represents being within the self. Nothing external is required.\[^{185}\]

*Negation of the negation*. Hegel has already discussed the "negation of the negation." It is the step that Speculative Reason takes in creating the middle term. This [7] is the negation of the negation. It is the creation of "something" out of a double negative.

\[^{180}\] MURE, supra note 2, at 116.

\[^{181}\] Id. at 117. Here, Mure invokes William Wallace’s translation of *Etwas*—the somewhat. Miller translates this as Something.


\[^{184}\] The first part of this statement is deeply paradoxical. Distinction is sublated; the "sublatedness" is Determinate Being’s own determinateness. Yet determinateness requires distinction by its nature. The paradox disappears, however, if we emphasize the preservation side of sublation. In other words, distinction is preserved in Determinate Being’s determinateness.

\[^{185}\] Though, earlier in the chapter, Hegel warned that the Understanding entails an external reflection, which does indicate something from the outside is required. Being is therefore never entirely "within self."
Hegel, however, now tells us that "Something is the first negation of negation." (115)

Figure 2(c) shows a middle term, which is negation of the negation. But did we not see the same configuration of circles in Figure 1(c)? Why wasn't Becoming in Figure 1(c) the first negation of the negation?

The answer is that negation is a determinate nothing. In Figure 2(c), Negation canceled Quality, and Something in turn canceled Negation. Figure 1(c) is not a negation of the negation. Pure Nothing was an indeterminate nothing. Properly speaking, Pure Nothing did not emanate from Pure Being in the same way that Negation emanated from Quality. For that reason, Figure 1(b) shows Pure Nothing as non-dialectic. In Figure 2(b), however, Quality's own voice [2] demanded that Negation posit itself. [2] was inherently within Determinate Being (or Quality) under the laws of sublation. This internal voice is the birth of Dialectical Reason. For this reason, Quality confesses its being-within-self for the first time, and Hegel can rightly say that Something is the first negation of the negation.¹⁸⁷

Hegel suggests that the first negation in Figure 2(b) must be distinguished from the negation of the negation in Figure 2(c). The first negation is abstract. Thus, in Figure 2(b), the "overlap"

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¹⁸⁶ As Gadamer put it, Pure Nothing "bursts forth" from Pure Being without dialectical negation. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC 89 (Christopher Smith trans., 1976).

¹⁸⁷ This interpretation is bolstered by the following passage from the Lesser Logic:

> The distinction between Being and Nothing is... only implicit and not yet actually made: they only ought to be distinguished. A distinction of course implies two things, and that one of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence the distinction between the two is only meant to be... In all other cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends both things [2]. Suppose e.g. we speak of two different species: the genus [2] forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence there can be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness. If it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts, so that thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that Being is not a particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite indeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 87 Remark. In effect, when species are compared, genus is [2], the being-within-self of the species. But, because Figure 1(b) lacks any common ground between Pure Being and Nothing, Becoming does not qualify as a negation of the negation.
between Quality and Negation is designated by [2] only. In contrast, the negation of the negation is concrete. In Figure 2(c), the overlap between Something and its constituent parts is described by [4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, [2] in Figure 2(b)—an abstraction—itself becomes a "concreteness" [2, 4] in Figure 2(c).

Self-determination. Hegel further describes negation of the negation as a "simple self-relation in the form of being." (115) Can this be justified? Once again, the answer is yes. In Figure 2(c), [4] is the space common to Determinate Being, Negation, and something. [4] is "being-within-self" simpliciter. By virtue of [4], the negation of the negation is "simple"—it cannot be further subdivided. It is self-related because it is common to all terms. It is in the form of being because the negation of the negation participates within the leftward-leaning notion of Quality [1, 3, 4].

Freedom. Hegel quickly identifies negation of the negation with ordinary self-determination—freedom. The progress is free in the sense that nothing from the outside compels the progress. By the negative process of self-destruction, the self establishes that it is. If we may return to Descartes,188 "I think therefore I am" is drastically wrong if it is taken to mean "I think = I am." Active thinking is a negative that is opposed to passive being. But if the emphasis is on therefore, Descartes is exactly right. I think. I negate myself so that I can unself-consciously think about myself as an object. Because I negate myself, it therefore follows that I am. In terms of Figure 2(c), thinking is Negation, and "I am" is Something. Thus, Descartes is properly describing a process, not an analytic result. In Kantian terms, the cogito is a synthesis, not an analysis.189

The negation of the negation is said to be "the restoring of the simple relation to self." (116) This can be witnessed in [7], which is "simple." But Hegel is quick to add that Something is "equally the mediation of itself with itself." (116) As a mediation it is not simple. It is not just [7], but is [4, 5, 6] as well. Thus, if we admit [7] is the "itself" of Something, and also that [4, 5, 6] is just as much the "itself," then it becomes clear how Something is "the mediation of itself with itself." Self-mediation is a feature of all middle terms, and was witnessed even in Figure 1(c) in a more abstract form. In the middle terms, "mediation with the self is

188 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.

189 According to Kant, the analytical is the necessary, logical unity of two concepts, according to a law of identity. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 136 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996). Synthesis is the conjunction of representations into a conception, which conjunction is not to be found in objects themselves. Synthesis therefore adds a negative unity to the objects as taken in by understanding. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 67, at 60, 78.
The introductory material uses the phrase from time to time, however. 

"posited." (116) But, for that matter, thanks to the rules of sublation, mediation is present in both the left extreme and the right extreme of any given Figure. Mediation "is to be found everywhere, in every Notion." (116)

Being's abstractness. In his discussion of Something, Hegel emphasizes how ephemeral "being" is. This was certainly evident from chapter 1, where Pure Being "always-already" was Pure Nothing. It is still true in chapter 2. The resilience of "things" does not appear until midway through the Doctrine of Essence, when things have (but are distinguishable from) their properties.

On the ephemerality of being, Hegel writes:

In our ordinary way of thinking, something is rightly credited with reality. However, something is still a very superficial determination; just as reality and negation, determinate being and its determinateness, although no longer blank being and nothing, are still quite abstract determinations. It is for this reason that they are the most current expressions and the intellect which is philosophically untrained uses them most, casts its distinctions in their mould and fancies that in them it has something really well and truly determined. (115)

In Cartesian terms, we commonly think "I am" and are comforted by the proposition. In truth, being is nothing. Only in the Subjective Logic (the Doctrine of the Notion) does the human subject have "staying power." But that resilient category will be a very negative unity indeed—not a mere "being."

In-itself. In his discussion of Something, Hegel for the first time overtly refers to the important concept of the "in-itself." The in-itself is, in effect, what is merely implicit. The job of the in-itself is to make itself express. The in-itself must be "for itself." When a thing is "for itself," it knows what it is. It cannot perceive what it is merely "in itself." Thus, Hegel writes:

This mediation with itself which something is in itself, taken only as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; it thus collapses into the simple oneness which is being. (116)

When Hegel describes self-mediation of the Something as "in itself," he is stating that self-mediation is "for us" only. It is not yet "for itself"—expressly manifested. Indeed, self-mediation is the hallmark of Essence—way too advanced for our primitive progress to date.

Yet Hegel also said a few sentences earlier: "In something, mediation with self is posited, in so far as something is determined

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190 The introductory material uses the phrase from time to time, however.
as a simple identity." (116) In other words, if, within the Something, we focus on [7], we have Something's simple identity. Given [7], mediation is supposedly "posited." But "posited" means made manifest. How can self-mediation be simultaneously posited and "in itself"?

The answer seems to lie in the ephemerality of being. At this stage, the move of the Understanding was to wrench [7] from the middle term and shift it to the left so that it became [1]--as Figure 2(a) showed. When this occurs, the Something "collapses into the simple oneness which is being." The Understanding gets away with this distortion because [7] "has no concrete determinations for its sides." (116) Concrete determinations will build themselves up later, in the Doctrine of the Notion--the last third of the Science of Logic. At that point, the Understanding cannot do such violence to the middle term. For now, however, the middle term "collapses" into mere being. The self-mediation, "posited" in the Something [4, 5, 6, 7] is merely "in itself" once the Understanding has its way ([7] 6 [1]). After this operation is accomplished, being does not manifestly recognize its self-mediation. For this reason, self-mediation is merely "in itself." It will not become "for itself" until being becomes self-consciousness at the end of Essence.

Alteration. In the preamble to chapter 2, Hegel warned that Quality was alterable. At the very end of his discussion of the Something, Hegel makes good on this prediction. Invoking the law of sublation, he states that Something contains Becoming, but in a more complex form:

Something as a becoming is a transition, the moments of which are themselves somethings, so that the transition is alteration--a becoming which has already become concrete. (116)

Thus, Hegel has shown that Quality as such is on the move. It is alterable--courtesy of its own being-within-self. Thus, "something alters only in its Notion." (116)

But can we affirm that the moments of the Something are themselves somethings? Hegel stretches his terminology here to make a point. Of course, Quality and Negation (the moments of the Something) are too crude to claim for themselves the honorable name of Something. But Hegel wishes to emphasize that Quality and Negation are both Qualities. Yet since the Understanding recognizes only [7] at this early stage, Something "alters only in its Notion; it is not yet posited as mediating and mediated, but at first only as simply maintaining itself in its self-relation." (116) Thus, because the Understanding insists on making [7] into [1], the Understanding does not grasp the double nature of the middle term. That double nature of mediating the earlier steps and being mediated by them is still "in itself."
B. Finitude

It is time to reveal a structural feature of chapter 2. The entire chapter is tripartite. Ultimately, it can be drawn as follows:

A Diagram of Chapter 2

In Determinate Being in General, we witnessed the development throughout Figure 2. What now must be revealed is that the entire development of Figure 2 was "left-leaning." That is, in the above drawing, Determinate Being stayed in its fixed leftward position, and movement occurred within it.

Now we will do the mirror opposite with Finitude. Everything that happens here will be "right-leaning," with Finitude staying in its negative, fixed position vis-a-vis Infinity. What is happening, in effect, is that work is going on in the extremes, while, for the moment, the middle term of Infinity is static.

As Hegel puts it in the short preamble to Finitude:

In the first section, in which determinate being in general was considered, this had . . . the determination of being. Consequently, the moments of its development, quality and something equally have an affirmative determination. In Finitude, the negative determination contained in determinate being is developed, and whereas in [Determinate Being in General], [Negation] was at first only negation in general, the first negation, it is now determined to the point of the being-within-self or the inwardness of the something, to the negation of the negation. (117)

Or, in other words, we left off the Something as unaware of its own mediated-mediating nature. Now its nature as negation of the negation will be made express.

Accordingly, the first sub-moment of Finitude is itself double: (a) Something and an Other. The second step is likewise double: (b) constitution and limit. The middle term will be (c) the Finite. The doubled nature of the steps prove that they are negative in nature, because negativity always requires a positivity to negate. How these twin steps follow will have to await the demonstration, which, by way of warning, the reader is sure to find exceptionally difficult.

(a) Something and an Other

Nothing is, after, all something. Ergo, the implied truth of Determinate Being in General--[2] in Figure 2(b)--is multiple
nothings which are equally somethings. The Understanding now sees [4, 2, 6] as the unity of Something and Other. That is, Something/Other--[5] and [6]--are unified. The force that holds them together is [4].

In Figure 3(a), we take [4, 5, 6] and represent it in an affirmative guise. That is, [4, 5, 6] becomes [1] and behaves accordingly.

**Insert Figure 3(a) here (located at the end)**

**Something/Other**

Figure 3(a) illustrates *positing*, or manifestation of what the thing is. Hence, what we find is that the *mediated nature* of the something [4, 5, 6] is what shifts to the left—not the immediate nature of the Something [7]. Yet, paradoxically, the modulation between [5] and [6] is presented as a static unity [1].

When we left off with Something, Hegel had strongly emphasized that the constituent parts of Something in Figure 2(a) were each

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191 “Multiple” here means more than one [2-7]. Later, in the next chapter, we will generate the Many Ones. There, “multiple” will mean infinite, separate Ones. See infra text accompanying notes ---.

192 Professor Burbidge sees something similar happening here but describes it differently. Recall that he viewed Speculative Reason as having three different steps: synthesis, naming, and integration into a whole. See supra text accompanying note 64. At this very stage, he sees integration as failing:

When speculative reason synthetically combines two concepts it may find on examination that the relation is one of integration and that the two collapse into a simple unity. On the other hand, however, the relation may not be integration, but something else, which still leaves the moment of thought incomplete.

Burbidge, *supra* note 25, at 48. In other words, he sees Figure 3(a) as being Speculative Reason's move. I have described it as Understanding's move. We agree, however, that integration fails. Figure 3(a) isolates pure non-integration. This, however, tends to impeach Burbidge's claim that integration is a necessary step within Speculative Reason, since here integration fails.

193 Of this paradox, Burbidge writes:

Thought no longer has a simple concept, but wavers between [Something and Other]. The negative moment, implicit in a *being* [i.e., Determinate Being] has now become explicit.

*Id.* at 48. [1] is explicitness itself. Hence, Burbidge is close to the truth of the matter, but I would not say that *negativity* has become implicit. Rather, the *movement* between Something and Other has reified itself in [1]. (“Reify” means to “thingify” or to render a non-thing into a thing.)
Readers of the Phenomenology, supra note 14, will recall how, in chapter 1, the subjective moment of "this" (indexicality) disrupted the perfect unity of sense-certainty. It is likewise disruptive here, in the Science of Logic. Hegel was a stern critic of "voila."

Accordingly, the choice of Something and Other is a subjective designation which falls outside Something and Other. The designation of one as affirmative and the other as negative is not an immanent move. We decide which is which. Once again, a moment of contingency makes itself manifest.

Yet, nevertheless, the meaning of Figure 3(a) is that Determinate Being determines itself as itself, but also as an Other. "[T]here is no determinate being which is determined only as [a Determinate Being]" and not also as an Other. (118)

So far, within Figure 3(a), we have Something/Other, but no way of distinguishing whether it is Something or whether it is Other. It is one or the other, but (so far) not both. We can only tell the difference from mere comparison—which, as we saw in chapter 1, is mediocre technique. The only legitimate move is for Something or Other to posit what it is on its own. This will be done in Figure 3(b), but first Hegel digresses to contemplate nature.

Nature. From Figure 3(a), Hegel derives physical nature, in some passages which will undoubtedly be found too difficult for so early a stage of the Logic.

Because Figure 3(a) is the move of Understanding, Something/Other is Other in an abstract manner. It is not in concrete relation with Something. "[T]herefore, the other is to be taken as isolated." (118) And, we might add, Something/Other is likewise Something abstractly—not in concrete relation with the Other. For the moment, however, we concentrate on Something/Other as Other, as we, licensed by external reflection, are entitled to do.

Because Other is isolated, it is "the other in its own self, that is, the other of itself." (118) Note the hint of self-alienation here. If the Other is the Other of itself, it is not itself. A single entity has now doubled itself. There is Other, and there is the original self to which Other is Other.

Was this a legitimate move? The answer is yes. Hegel's point is that "Other" is a correlative term. But if Other is taken "as such," no Other to the Other is supplied. Otherness must therefore turn back

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194 Readers of the Phenomenology, supra note 14, will recall how, in chapter 1, the subjective moment of "this" (indexicality) disrupted the perfect unity of sense-certainty. It is likewise disruptive here, in the Science of Logic. Hegel was a stern critic of "voila."

195 See supra text accompanying note 111.
on itself and make "itself" its Other. In a sense, this is parallel to the move of Pure Nothing. Pure Nothing likewise expelled itself from itself and became Pure Being, in Figure 1(b). Hence, pure otherness at this later stage implodes upon itself and becomes "something."

This self-alienation, Hegel says, is physical nature--the "other of spirit."

**Otherness in Itself**  
**(Nature)**

Of nature, Hegel writes that Spirit's determination "is thus at first a mere relativity by which is expressed, not a quality of nature itself, but only a relation external to it." (118) Or, to translate, if Spirit is present in Figure 3(a)--which we know, through the laws of sublation and if we take [1] in Figure 3(a) as abstractly Other (and not as abstractly Something), then Spirit becomes Other to itself. In other words, Spirit expels itself from itself. This expelled Other is at first merely a relativity, not a quality of nature itself. That is, nature is determined as "not spiritual." Nothing more than this determination is established here.

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196 Professor Butler calls this move "nonintentional reference." Butler, *supra* note 4, at 29 ("The autobiographer refers to himself, smoke refers to fire, and entities refer to determinate properties"). Burbidge puts it this way:

> As other it refers to something which is not. Yet because it is isolated by understanding there is nothing else to which it can be related. It can only be other in itself by becoming other than itself.


197 I do not take the discussion of nature to be a move in the Logic as such. Therefore, I do not label it as Figure 3(b). Nevertheless, this drawing can be overlaid upon the official Figure 3(b), in order to represent its significance.

198 Recall that Pure Being was abstracted from Pure Knowing, which was the Absolute Idea and hence Spirit.

199 Renate Wahsner, *The Philosophical Background to Hegel's Criticism of Newton*, in *HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM* 81, 82-83 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). Hyppolite remarks that, for Hegel, nature is "the fall of the idea, a past of reason, rather than an absolute manifestation of reason." HYPPOLITE, *supra* note 82, at 244.

200 Much later, Hegel will describe nature as such "the ground of the world." (464) This means "the world is nothing but nature itself." (466) But nature is indeterminate. "Before nature can be the world a multiplicity of determinations must be externally added to it. But these do not have their ground in nature as such; on the contrary, nature is indifferent to them as contingencies." (464) In
Yet, per Figure 2(b), isn't Quality itself a relativity (to Negation)? How then could [3] be not a quality of nature? I think what Hegel is trying to say is that, at this stage, nature is negatively posited by Spirit. In other words, Spirit says, "Nature is what I am not." So far, nature has no qualities of its own. Whatever qualities nature has are, so far, "in itself" and not yet posited.

Hegel continues:

However, since spirit is the true something and nature, consequently, in its own self is only what it is as contrasted with spirit, the quality of nature taken as such is just this, to be the other in its own self (in the determinations of space, time and matter). (118)

In other words, nature is Other to Spirit. Yet, on the laws of sublation, nature is just as much Spirit. Hence, nature is self-alienated Spirit:

The other simply by itself [1] is the other in its own self, hence the other of itself [2] and so the other [2] of the other [3]--it is, therefore, that which is absolutely dissimilar within itself [1, 2], that [1] which negates itself [2], alters itself. But in so doing it remains identical with itself [1, 2], for that into which it alters [2] is the other [2, 3], and this is its sole determination; but what is altered [2] is not determined in any different way but in the same way, namely, to be an other; in this latter, therefore, it [1] only unites with its own self [1, 2]. (118)

Or, to translate, let's take Something/Other as Other-in-itself [1]. "Other" is always a correlate. Other is Other only if there is yet another Other. Hence, within the Other, there must be an Other. We thus recognize that the original Other is actually [1, 2]. As such, we can see the otherness [2] in the Other. The determinateness is thus self-generated within the Other. In this activity, the Other

other words, Nature as such must be considered as very, very abstract. It is nothing but "other" to Spirit.

201 Thus, in his Philosophy of Nature (part two of the Encyclopedia), Hegel writes, "This impotence of Nature sets limits to philosophy and it is quite improper to expect the Notion to comprehend--or as it is said, construe or deduce--these contingent products of nature." HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE § 250 (A.V. Miller trans., 1970).

202 Hegel's analysis of nature starts with Pure Quantity--space and time--as will be discussed in the next installment.
"remains identical with itself." Because Other is [1] and also [2], Other "only unites with its own self."

The significance of this is as follows: It is a main theme of Hegel that Spirit goes forth into the world and splits itself off from nature, only to join together and become unified once again. Yet Spirit is just as present in nature as it is alienated from nature, which makes reconciliation possible. In effect, Spirit must overcome self-alienation. It must heal its own self-inflicted wound. And nature is self-alienation as such—a wound upon Spirit. Hence, nature is

posited as reflected into itself with sublation of the otherness, as a self-identical something [3] from which, consequently, the otherness which is at the same time a moment of it [2], is distinct from it and does not appertain to the something itself. (118-19)

Most of these terms can only become clear after the appearance of the True Infinite. For now, we can say, with some hope of coherence,

203 See Burbidge, supra note 25, at 48 ("Therefore even in the process of change being other remains identical with itself").

204 Thus nature is "the sphere of the externality of space and time into which [Spirit] "freely releases itself." Grier, supra note 94, at 64. As Hegel puts it late in the Science of Logic: "the Idea is the process of sundering itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again of bringing this inorganic nature under the power of the subject and returning to the first simple universality." (759)

205 See Harris, supra note 7, at 26 ("Nature is rediscovered as the self-external embodiment of the Idea developing itself through the natural process"); William Maker, The Very Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel is Not an Idealist 1, 18, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998) ("Just as logically self-determining thought required thinking its other, conceiving nature will require thinking an other to its initial determinacy"). John Burbidge presents a lucid discussion of Hegel's attitude toward nature. According to Burbidge, Hegel saw nature as

the sphere of contingency and external relations. Things and events are separated in space and time even though space and time are themselves continuous. If a theory is to explain natural phenomena, it must therefore perform two interrelated tasks. It must show why isolated entities are separated in the way they are; that is, it has in some way to dissolve the contingency of appearances...

John W. Burbidge, Chemistry and Hegel's Logic, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 609 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993). The continuity of space and time is developed in chapter 4.

206 See infra text accompanying notes 247-51.
that when the abstract Other turns out to be the Other to itself, a negative (concrete) Otherness is produced. If we focus on [3], Nature has sublated [1] and withdrawn into itself--or, "reflected into itself," as Hegel puts it. In its guise as [3], nature is self-identical. Its Otherness [2] is a moment of nature, but, as [3], nature is distinct from it. In addition, as [3], nature does not appertain to the "something itself." This seems to mean [1]. Hegel has lately been calling [1] the abstract Other, but recall that the abstract Other is likewise abstract Something.

Desmond v. Maker. It is a key complaint of Professor William Desmond that Hegel's dialectic overwhelms the Other and does not allow it to exist in its irreducibility. One might, however, discern in Hegel's discussion of nature at least a moment of irreducibility, where Spirit distinguishes itself radically from nature. Here, nature endures separate and apart from thought--the realm of Spirit. Yet one must admit that, under the laws of sublation, nature (as Other to Spirit) is definitely "reducible" to simpler parts--Determinate Being and Determinate Nothing, and Pure Being and Pure Nothing.

That Hegel preserves an irreducible otherness in the idea of nature can be gleaned from William Maker's discussion of the topic:

So what does it mean to say that nature here is "the Idea in its otherness" or is the self-externality of thought? We have already seen that, for Hegel, this does not mean that the real or nature as such are nothing but idea or thought. What then is being asserted is, I believe, this: If we are to consider, to purely and simply think the real or nature, this can be done in systematic philosophy in such a way that we do not transform our topic into a "thought thing" . . . if we conceive or define the subject matter to be considered as being "other than thought." But, since this is still presuppositionless and systematic philosophy, and because therefore we cannot assume . . . the legitimate capacity to "know" nature as an object such that we could derive its determinacy as "other than thought" from nature "itself," then what is other than thought here can only be conceived in and through thought's contrasting itself with itself.

In short, irreducible otherness plays a role in the Science of Logic. Its name is nature. For this reason, Maker acquits Hegel of the charge of reducing the irreducible other: "To comprehend the other systematically is not to deny or to reduce the other to system," Maker writes. Rather, a philosophy of nature is "an attempt to

207 DESMOND, supra note 41.
208 MAKER, supra note 17, at 117-18.
209 Id. at 137.
conceive in thought what is radically other than thought without transforming that other into a derivative of thought."\textsuperscript{210}

\textit{Being-for-other}. Immediately following the derivation of nature, Hegel introduces the important concept of Being-for-other:

\begin{quote}
Something [1, 2] \textit{preserves} itself in the negative of its determinate being [\textit{Nichtdasein}] [2]; it is essentially one with it and essentially \textit{not} one with it. [Something] stands, therefore, in a relation to its otherness and is not simply its otherness; it is a \textit{being-for-other}. (119)
\end{quote}

What Hegel is describing here is [2]. With reference to the above depiction of Spirit and Nature, the abstract Something [1] is \textit{with} [2]--they share the same circular space [1, 2]. But [1] is also different from [2]. As different, [2] is in a relation with [3], which is its \textit{being-for-other}. [2] is \textit{being}--that is why it is included in the leftward circle. But [2] is also \textit{for the other}--the entity described as [2, 3].

Hegel tries to describe being-for-other this way as well:

\begin{quote}
Determinate being as such is immediate [1], without relation to an other [3]; or, it is in the determination of \textit{being} but as including within itself non-being [2], it is \textit{determinate} being, being negated within itself . . . but since at the same time it also preserves itself in its negation, it is only a \textit{being-for-other} [2]. (119)
\end{quote}

Thus, [2] is negative, but it is also positive. [2] genuinely belongs to the realm of being even as it is likewise a participant in negation.

Later, Hegel summarizes being-for-other as follows:

\begin{quote}
But being-for-other [2] is, first, a negation of the simple relation of being to itself [1] which, in the first instance, is supposed to be determinate being and something; in so far as something is in an other [2] or is for an other, it lacks being of its own. But secondly it [2] is not negative determination as pure
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id}. In a later essay, Maker emphasizes that, if self-determination is to reach completeness, it must complete itself by limiting itself. Nature must be radically other to thought if thought is to be absolutely determinate. "If the content of nature is conceptualized as being thought-like, or as a derivative product of thought--as though it had not genuine limit--there would be no genuinely distinctive and complete domain of logical self-determination." William Maker, \textit{The Very Idea of Nature}, supra note 203, at 9. Maker also emphasizes that nature is not what is other to consciousness. Such a misconception would reduce nature to being "for consciousness." Rather, nature "is what it is independently of any conscious mind and thus this conception of nature is thoroughly nonidealistic." \textit{Id}. at 12.
Thus, being-for-other is not Pure Nothing. Rather, it is a determine nothing—for negative Determinate Being. It is also the same thing as being-in-itself. Being-in-itself. To being-for-other, Hegel contrasts the important concept of being-in-itself.

We saw earlier that "in itself" means implicit, not posited, not yet expressed. It is the job of the in-itself to render itself manifest. Being-in-itself obviously is "being"—hence properly on the left side of the page—but merely implicit being. Of being-in-itself, Hegel writes that being-for-other preserves itself in the negative of its determinate being and is being, but not being in general, but as self-related in opposition to its relation to other, as self-equal in opposition to its inequality. Such a being is being-in-itself. (119)

Hence, being-in-itself is [2], and so is being-for-other. What then is the difference, if they are both represented by [2]? Being-for-other is [2] with a reference to [3]—its "Other." But being-in-itself is [2] taken as an immediacy, without any reference to [3]. We are now ready for an official advance:

Insert Figure 3(b) here (located at the end)

Being-for-other and Being-in-itself

Figure 3(b) is described by Hegel in the following passage:

Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of the something. There are here present two pairs of determinations: 1. Something and other, 2. Being-for-other and being-in-itself. The former contain the unrelatedness of their determinateness [1]; being-for-other and being-in-itself are . . . moments of the one and the same something [2], as determinations [3] which are relations and which remain in their unity, in the unity of the determinate being [1, 2]. Each [1], [3], therefore, at the same time, also contains within itself its other moment [2] which is distinguished from it. (119)

This passage straightforwardly describes Figure 3(b).

Hegel continues:

The being [2] in something [1,2] is being-in-itself. Being, which is self-relation, equality with self [1], is now no longer immediate, but is only as the non-being [2] of otherness [3] (as determinate being reflected into itself). (119)
Notice that, when Determinate Being reflects into itself—when it sheds extraneous material—something negative results—[2], or the "non-being of otherness." Of [2], Hegel further declares:

Similarly, non-being [2] as a moment of something [1, 2] is, in this unity of being and non-being, not negative determinate being in general, but an other, more specifically—seeing that being is differentiated from it—at the same time a relation to its negative determinate being, a being-for-other. (119-20)

Thus, [2] is both being-in-itself—taken as part of [1, 2]—and being-for-other—taken as part of [2, 3]. [2] has a double function. It is part of two systems. Which system does it belong to? This depends on external reflection—on our choice.

We can also contemplate [2] by itself, standing alone. It stands for both Being-in-itself and Being-for-other. Hegel predicts that this unity in [2] will reappear in the Doctrine of Essence as the relation of Inner and Outer, and also as the unity of Notion and Actuality (120)—ideas far too advanced to explicate here.

The thing in itself. Hegel also relates [2], taken alone, to the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself, of which Hegel is a sharp critic. "[T]he proposition that we do not know what things are in themselves," Hegel complains, "ranked as a profound piece of wisdom." (121) (Indeed, one can scarcely turn a page of the Critique of Pure Reason without encountering this particular dogma.) Things are "in themselves," Hegel states, when abstraction is made from all Being-for-other. That is, we perceive in a given thing only its outward appearance—its Being-for-other, "the indeterminate, affirmative community of something with its other." (126) Once we expel all being-for-other, we have being-in-itself. Kant insists that we supposedly have no idea what the thing-in-itself is, but Hegel strongly disagrees.

Things are called "in themselves" in so far as abstraction is made from all being-for-other, which means simply, in so far as they are thought devoid of all determination, as nothings. In this sense, it is of course impossible to know what the thing in itself is. For the question: what? demands that determinations be assigned; but since the things of which they are to be assigned are at the same time supposed to be things in themselves, which means, in effect, to be without any determination, the question is made thoughtlessly impossible to answer, or else only an absurd answer is given. (121)

The thing-in-itself is the absolute, and, furthermore, it is one. That is, once appearance is abolished, there is but one thing in itself in its indeterminacy: "What is in these things in themselves, therefore we know quite well; they are as such nothing but truthless, empty abstractions." (121) In contrast, Hegel's analysis has shown

Thus, if you follow Hegel, what a thing is in itself is in unity with what it is "for other." In other words, appearance has a strong unity with essence, and we can, through Logic, glimpse the thing-in-itself. This is the strong implication of considering [2]--the unity of Being-in-itself and Being-for-other.

Positedness. Hegel contrasts Being-in-itself with Being-for-other--both equally contained (indeterminately) within [2]. He also pauses to contrast Being-in-itself with positedness.

"Positedness" must not be confused with the act of positing, which we have already discussed. Positedness is a state of being, whereas positing is an activity. Properly speaking, the term "positedness" belongs to the Doctrine of Essence, not the Doctrine of Being. We can say, roughly, that determinateness is to the Doctrine of Being what positedness is to Essence:

Determinateness       Positedness
---------------------- = ------------------
Doctrine of Being     Doctrine of Essence

Determinateness v. Positedness

Both determinateness and positedness signal a unity between opposites. Positedness is what results when reflection-into-self retreats into itself and drags into its lair the very Illusory Being it seeks to shed. Thus, in chapter 2, Hegel says of positedness that it is opposed to being-in-itself. It includes being-for-other (as its etymology would suggest). But "it specifically contains the already accomplished bending back of that which is not in itself into that which is being-in-itself." (121) In other words, a positedness is an entity that shows what it is by announcing what it is not. What such an entity renounces "bends back" upon the announcing entity. By way of a political analogy, when Richard Nixon announced, "I am not a crook," he in effect revealed himself to be a positedness. The American public understood Nixon's remark in just this way.

A confusing passage appears in Hegel's too-early (proleptic) discussion of positedness:

Being-in-itself is generally to be taken as an abstract way of expressing the Notion; positing, properly speaking, first occurs

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211 See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.

212 Thus, Hegel will say later, "In the sphere of essence, positedness corresponds to determine being." (406)
in the sphere of essence, of objective reflection . . . In the sphere of being, determinate being only proceeds from becoming, or, with the something an other is posited, with the finite, the infinite [is posited]; but the finite does not bring forth the infinite, does not posit it. In the sphere of being, the self-determining even of the Notion is at first only in itself or implicit—as such it is called a transition. (121)

Thus, Hegel strongly distinguishes "positing" (advanced) from "being posited" (primitive).

Does this rather obscure passage mean that positing is inappropriate to the realm of Being? The answer is yes, even though Hegel uses the word throughout the Doctrine of Being. We have already identified the quintessential move of Figure 2(a)—a shift of [7] to the left—as the act of positing. At such moments Hegel uses the verb "to posit" but always in its passive tense. Recall that Figure 2(a) also required an external reflection. We had to intervene to extract [7] from the middle term and make it into [1]. Because this was so, positing is, so far, only passive. Active positing is merely "in itself." Thus, Determinate Being springs out from Becoming. Determinate Being "is posited." But Becoming does not posit. Self-determination only appears later. 213

Properly speaking, "positing" implies a necessary correlate. 214 For this reason, everything in Essence comes in pairs. Here, in the Doctrine of Being, things are "qualitative;" that is, they are:

[T]he other is, the finite ranks equally with the infinite as an immediate, affirmative being, standing fast on its own account; the meaning of each appears to be complete even without its other.

(122)

In the realm of Being, self-identity seems possible (for a moment). But it will be otherwise with Essence. There, the Positive correlates with the Negative, and has no meaning separate from that correlate. Similarly, "cause" presupposes "effect":

[H]owever much they may be taken as isolated from each other, [cause and effect] are at the same time meaningless one without the other. There is present in them their showing or reflection in each other. (122)

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213 Thus, Harris correctly identifies the positing of Being-in-itself/Being-for-other as "for us as reflecting philosophers." Harris, supra note 7, at 108.

214 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 112 ("The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realized, but only postulated by reflection").
In any case, the nature of positedness is too advanced. Once again, Hegel previews a concept that will become important only later.

Hegel concludes Something/Other with an admonition: always keep separate what is merely in itself from what is posited. The "posited" is being-for-other, precisely the opposite of being-in-itself.

(b) Determination, Constitution and Limit

At the very end of Something/Other, Hegel writes: "Being-for-other is, in the unity of something with itself, identical with its in-itself." That is, [2] stood for both being-for-other and being-in-itself. This implies that "being-for-other" is in the Something [1, 2]. In Figure 3(b), determinateness was thus reflected back into the Something/Other. [1] was therefore a double--Something/Other. But this does not mean we regress from Figure 3(b) back to 3(a). Since determinateness has made itself manifest in Figure 3(b), and since Figure 3(a) specifically denied determinateness, that path is blocked. We must go forward--to Determination of the in-itself.

Insert Figure 3(c) here (located at the end)

Determination of the In-Itself

Of this new development, Hegel writes:

The in-itself into which something is reflected into itself out of its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself, but as negation of its being-for-other is mediated by the latter, which is thus its moment. It is not only the immediate identity of the something with itself, but the identity through which there is present in the something that which is in itself; being-for-other is present in it because the in-itself is the sublation of the being-for-other, has returned out of the being-for-other into itself; but equally, too, simply because it is abstract and therefore essentially burdened with negation, with being-for-other. (122)

To translate this difficult passage, Something [1] is reflected into itself. This means [1] is reflected into [2, 4]--which is just as much the Something as [1] was. Thus, [1] is sublated. Furthermore, [1] is reflected "out of" its Being-for-other [3]. If we take "reflection" to be the announcement, "I am not that," then [1] becomes [2, 4] by announcing it is not [3]. Hence [1] becomes [2, 4], but [2, 4] is not an abstract "in-itself." Under the laws of sublation, [2, 4] contains--"is mediated by"--Being-for-other. All of this is said in the first sentence of the above-quoted passage. The second sentence states that Being-for-other is in [2] not merely by sublation of [3], but because [2] was already Being-for-other, in its
"abstraction." Thus, in Figure 3(b), [2] can be viewed as an abstraction. As such, it was already Being-for-other. Hence, [2] from Figure 3(b) was both "determinateness in the form of simple being"--abstract--and "determinateness in the form of the \textit{in-itself} of the Something/Other--concrete. (123)

The "in-itself," then, finds itself "determined" in Figure 3(c). Determination is "affirmative" determinateness. That is, if we place the accent on "being," [7] represents Determination's affirmativeness. "Determination implies that what something [as portrayed in Figure 3(c)] is \textit{in itself}, is also present in it." (123)

Or, in other words, Being-in-itself is made manifest when it is determined as such.

Hegel gives us this mysterious description of Determination:

\begin{quote}
Determination is affirmative determinateness as the in-itself with which something in its determinate being remains congruous in face of its entanglement with the other by which it might be determined, maintaining itself in its self-equality, and making its determination hold good in its being-for-other. (123)
\end{quote}

In other words, in Figure 3(c), Something is Something/Other. Only external reflection could tell whether it was Something or Other. Whatever external reflection chooses, that determination by external reflection is Something/Other's Being-for-other. Now external reflection chooses. With the accent on being, the Something is "determined" as Something. This is the function of Determination. It stands for a dependence on external reflection.

Hegel immediately follows with another baffling sentence:

\begin{quote}
Something [1] \textit{fulfils} its determination [7] in so far as the further determinateness which at once develops in various directions through something's relation to other, is congruous with the in-itself of the something [2, 4], becomes its filling. (123)
\end{quote}

To make sense of this, recall that, in Figure 3(c), [1], [3], and [2, 4] are all determinatenesses. [1] = Something/Other, [3] = Being-for-other/Being-in-itself, [2, 4] = all of the preceding. These are the "further determinatenesses which develop in various directions." Something [1] stays "congruous" with its being-in-itself [2, 4] by virtue of its participation in Determination [4].

The general point seems to be that Something is Something (and not Other) because it is \textit{determined} as such by an outside force. Yet it could not be so determined unless it were already "in itself" determinate.\textsuperscript{215} In other words, an object needs outside force to be

\textsuperscript{215} Thus, Burbidge suggests that the distinction between "determinate" and "determined" cannot be maintained. "For when something is determinate, it has
what it is. But the object is not purely the product of outside force. Determination is a compromise between Being-in-itself and Being-for-other. Between the object and the determining subject is a "play of forces."216

Reason. As an example of Determination, Hegel writes: "The determination of man is thinking reason." (123) Reason distinguishes man from brute. Yet brutality exists within man. This is his being-for-other. Thus, brutality is to man what nature is to Spirit.

There is a hint of Kantian moral theory here. For Kant, inclination is natural and reason is spiritual. Morality consists of suspending nature so that reason could speak.217 Similarly, when parents have a baby, they have produced a brute. But brutality is what the baby is for the parents—not to mention the neighbors. The baby also has Being-in-itself. This is reason. The job of the parents is to bring forth the Being-in-itself of the child. If they succeed, the child is "determined" to be a person. The Determination, however, is at first an external reflection. The child cannot raise herself. But education works only because reason is the "in-itself" of the child. Thus, the determination of man is thinking reason.

Constitution. Staying within Figure 3(c), Hegel points out that the in-itself [2] of the now-determined Something [1, 2] is to be distinguished from the determinateness which is only being-for-other [2, 3], which is outside Determination. In other words, [3] retains "the form of immediate, qualitative being." (123) Hegel assigns to [3] the name of "Constitution":

That which something has in it, thus divides itself and is from this side [3] an external determinate being, but does not belong to the something's in-itself. The determinateness is thus a constitution.

Constituted in this or that way, something is involved in external influences and relationships. This external connection on which the constitution depends, and the circumstances of being determined by an other, appears as something contingent. But it is the quality of something to be open to external influences and to have a constitution. (124)

Thus, a constitution is something alien, imposed on Something. So conceived, Constitution seems a lot like the tyranny of the

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216 This phrase comes from the Phenomenology, where knowledge of the object is shown to be a "play of forces" between the knowing subject and the object. PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 14, ¶¶ 138-43.

Understanding. We therefore treat it as the Understanding's move, in Figure 4(a).

Insert Figure 4(a) here (located at the end)

Constitution

This is a move structurally identical to what we saw in Figure 3(a). In it, the mediated nature of the middle term is posited. This will be the quintessential move of the Understanding throughout the three sections of Finitude.

Hegel goes on to claim that, if Something alters, the alteration occurs within its constitution. Something as such preserves itself. Thus, alteration is only a surface change in the Something. Constitutional change does not affect the Determination of the Something. Thus, "something in accordance with its determination, is indifferent to its constitution." (124) Here Hegel agrees with Kant that only the permanent is changed.218

Taylor's Challenge. By isolating the negative part of the Something and considering it "as such" in Figure 4(a), a serious note of negativity has migrated from the right side of the diagram over to the left. These are the very seeds from which will sprout the self-destruction of the Doctrine of Being.

This transition is brusquely challenged by Charles Taylor, who insists that the brief mortality of things may cohere with our experience but it is not logically required.219 In effect, Taylor accuses Hegel of the inductive fallacy--drawing universals from experience. Any ground in experience, of course, would defeat Hegel's claim that he has discovered a Logic. To paraphrase Kant, experience has insufficient vouchers to produce a universal truth.220

It is Taylor, however, not Hegel, who is guilty of appeal to experience. Taylor has experienced that some things endure. On this basis, he is unwilling to accept the premise that "being" logically cannot endure, when pressed by the Understanding to its logical conclusion. Later, Hegel will remark: "It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it." (237)221 Taylor is guilty of just such a tenderness toward the world of things in his attack on Figure 4(a).

In fact, Taylor's taste for subsistence will soon be amply

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219 Taylor, supra note 58, at 236.

220 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment 74 (J.H. Bernhard trans., 1951).

221 Also, "contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of truth generally." (439)
indulged by the *Science of Logic*. Self-subsistence is the hallmark of True Infinity. True Infinites "cease to be" but remain what they are. They endure. Later, in the Doctrine of Essence, enduring "things" will appear. At this later stage of the Logic, "things" will turn out to be contradictory, negative unities of multiple "qualities." The very negativity that Taylor opposes thus turns out to be the savior of his precious "things." Self-subsistence is too advanced an idea for the extremely abstract Doctrine of Quality. It must await the arrival of essential Existence.

Nor is there anything wrong with Hegel's methodology in Figure 4(a). Hegel's technique is to focus the vulture eye of the Understanding on the middle term. Even Taylor admits that [4, 5, 6] of Figure 3(c)--that which is negative, compared to [7]--is a constituent part of any Determination. Why cannot the Understanding consider [4, 5, 6] as such? If it does, and if we develop the logic of the negativity within the Determination, then the Logic proceeds along its solemn way. I see nothing illegitimate in Hegel's methodology here, nor should we concede that Hegel covertly relies on the experience of things not enduring. Rather, it is Taylor who insists that the Understanding must not make the move of Figure 4(a), lest it disturb his experience that some things persist.

Indeed, the very next move in Figure 4(b) will make Taylor's own point. Being does not go out of existence as a result of introducing the camel nose of Constitution into the tent of "being." Determinations do survive the isolation of negative activity. We have already seen that the determined something is indifferent to the positivization of Limitation into Constitution. In any case, Determination never does go out of existence altogether. Rather, under the laws of sublation, it is destroyed and preserved.

Taylor makes this additional criticism of Figure 4(a).

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223 Taylor has not attended to a passage from the *Science of Logic* that I have already quoted:

> In our ordinary way of thinking, *something* is rightly credited with reality. However, something is still a very superficial determination; just as reality and negation, determinate being and its determinateness, although no longer blank being and nothing, are still quite abstract determinations. It is for this reason that they are the most current expressions and the intellect which is philosophically untrained uses them most, casts its distinctions in their mould and fancies that in them it has something really well and truly determined. (115)

224 HARRIS, *supra* note 7, at 106.
Constitution—a positivization of [3] in Figure 3(b)—has two senses. (a) Constitution is negation as contrastive frontier. It is also (b) negation as "interactive" influence or causal pressure (which might destroy the Something). Of Figure 4(a), Taylor writes:

This argument arouses our suspicion, and rightly so. For it trades on a number of confusions. First the two senses of negation, the contrastive and interactive are elided in the term frontier (Grenze). Something only has determinate being through its contrastive frontier with others. Its frontier is in this sense constitutive of it. "Something [Etwas] is only what it is in its frontier and through its frontier."[225]

But this frontier is common with the other contrasted properties. It also defines and is constitutive of them. Hence in containing it each contains what negates it as well as what essentially constitutes it.

If we now shift to the [interactive] sense of frontier . . . we can give this "negation" a concrete as well as just a contrastive logical sense, and it looks as though each entity essentially contains the seeds of its own destruction. But of course however much we may be tempted to speak of something containing its negation in the contrastive sense, when we move to the frontier at which things "negate" each other by interaction, it is just false to say that each contains its own negation. Quite the contrary, to the extent that they maintain themselves, they hold their "negations" off. If they fail to do so, of course, they go under, but they are not essentially determined to do so by the very way in which they are defined.[226]

In other words, things may change because of outside pressure, but they do not necessarily change because of internal pressure. Hegel is therefore supposedly guilty of conflating these two senses of Limitation. Taylor implies that Hegel was wrong to locate Constitution into the very heart of Determination. It should have been left on the outside. Taylor goes so far as to announce the Science of Logic is a failure, because of the very point just described.[227]

Taylor concludes this line of inquiry by judging that Hegel's doctrine of the immanent self-erasure of being is "not established by

[225] This is a quote from the Lesser Logic, supra note 9, § 92 Addition, where Hegel states that Something is constituted by its frontier. In general, I have translated Taylor's argument to terms more appropriate for the Science of Logic, as opposed to the Lesser Logic.

[226] TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 236.

[227] Id. at 346.
a strict proof." But Hegel might say in his defense that, in using Something/Other and Constitution to introduce negativity into the heart of being, Hegel proceeds logically in this sense: In Figure 2(a), the Understanding has exhausted the possibilities of seizing upon the immediacy to be found in Figure 1(c). Now the Understanding is engaged in the study of mediation, which brings negativity into being. The negative is therefore the "in-itself" of being, which, when it becomes "for itself," spells the end of the Finite being. To my eye, this is "a strict proof"—whatever that is—and it seems clear that Taylor, at least, has not destroyed Hegel's enterprise.

Determinism. Because Constitution [1] represents only the mediated parts of Determination [4, 5, 6], the immediate version of Determination [7] is immune to Constitution. It is Constitution's negation. Hence, Hegel opposes unconstituted Determination (in its negative version) to Constitution, and thus we have

Insert Figure 4(b) here (located at the end)
Constitution v. Determination

Of Figure 4(b), Hegel writes: "But that which something [in Figure 3(c)] has in it, is the middle term" of Figure 4(b). (124) To translate, Something/Other had determinateness reflected into it, as we saw earlier. This now becomes the new middle term which we will show in Figure 4(c):

Insert Figure 4(c) here (located at the end)
Limit (Determinateness as Such)

In due course, Hegel will rename Determinateness as Such and call it Limit.

In Figure 4(c), the extremes of the syllogism act in their accustomed raffish manner: "[D]etermination spontaneously passes over into constitution, and the latter into the former." (124) This is the same modulation of Pure Being and Nothing—the chiasmic exchange of properties—that we saw in Figure 1(c).

Hegel describes this "connection" between Constitution and (the negative version of) Determination in the following terms: "[I]n so far as that which something is in itself is also present in it, it is burdened with being-for-other." (124) This we saw to be true in Figure 3(b), where [2] was the pair of Being-for-other and Being-in-itself. Being-for-other was therefore a constituent part of Determination, in its positive sense, as shown in Figure 3(c). "[H]ence the determination is, as such, open to relationship to other." (124)

This openness of Determination is what justifies us in making

\[\text{Id. at 239.}\]
the negative version of Determination the right-leaning term in Figure 4(c). In this position, Determination is "being-for-other" to Constitution. By this move, Determination is "reduced to constitution." (124) This appears to mean that Constitution derives from [3] in Figure 3(c), where Determination was the middle term. Now Determination is "reduced" to [3], from its former honor of being a middle term. Conversely, "being-for-other isolated as constitution and posited by itself, is in its own self the same as the other . . . in its own self." (124) This passage justifies our move of Being-for-other in Figure 3(b) to the left in Figure 4(a) and renaming it Constitution. In such a position we can say that Constitution was isolated--became [1]--and was posited in its own self. Constitution is thus said to be a "self-related determinate being" [1], but it also has Being-in-itself [2] "with a determinateness, and therefore a determination." (124) In other words, by the law of sublation, Constitution, taken immediately as [1], is also a determinateness [1, 2] (by structure) and a Determination (by pedigree). Constitution and Determination are mutually independent--as Figure 4(b) shows. The punchline of the discussion seems to be that Constitution imposes determination from the outside, but it is simultaneously on the inside. It has its effect only because it is the "in itself" of Determination [2]. Thus, Constitution--originally on the outside--is now on the side of being in Figure 4(c). Constitution, which alters, is now "posited in the something." (125) With Constitution, "being-within-self includes the negation within it [2], by means of which alone it has its affirmative determinate being." (125) This means that Quality has become "negation of the other," and "being-within-self is the non-being of . . . otherness." (125) As part of being-within-self, Constitution is now immanent within the Determinateness and is part of its process.

Here is a major development that will culminate in the Finite. Being is now a negative activity--"the ceasing of an other in it." (126) Coming-to-be has transformed itself into Ceasing-to-be, which, from now on, becomes the very theme of being's tongue.

Limit. At this point, Hegel introduces the important concept of Limit. From Figure 4(c), it should be apparent that Constitution [1] and Determination (taken as [3]) share a common determinateness [2, 4], which is Determinateness in General [4-7]. This Hegel now wishes to rename as Limit.

In Limit, "the non-being-for-other becomes prominent." (126)

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229 Recall that, in Figure 3(a), [4, 5, 6] were in unity with [3] in Figure 2(c). Hence, Constitution in Figure 3(a) derives from [3] in Figure 2(c).

230 As Burbidge emphasizes, Constitution stands for change, which is now seen as an inherent dynamic of the Something. Hence, the Something changes itself.

BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 50.
The Other [4, 6] is negated there (by [4, 5]). It is kept apart from the Something. "[I]n the limit, something limits its other." (126) But Other [4, 6] is likewise a Something. Hence, it claims Limit as much as the affirmative Something (i.e., Constitution [4, 5]) does. Hence, Limit is a little like the border between France and Germany. This border is a line, but does the line belong to Germany or to France? Since a line is not spatial, it is a non-entity, so far as the spatial concepts of France and Germany are concerned. Limit is in fact the negative unity between the two nations, as [7] in Figure 4(c) clearly shows.232

Because Limit is the non-being of the other, Something

231 Hegel emphasizes that Limit is internal to the determinateness. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 92 ("We cannot therefore regard the limit as only external to being which is then and there. It rather goes through and through the whole of such existence.") Limit therefore works to imply the negativity of Being—a negativity that underwrites the independence of the thing from outside oppression. But this can be turned around. Limit also prevents the thing from truly being what it thinks it is. Slavoj Žižek exploits this aspect of Limit and uses it to explain the Lacanian idea of ex-timacy. In Žižek's account, Limit implies there is a nothingness in the soul of the subject which can never overcome in order to be truly object. This nothingness is the subject's "internal limit—that is, the bar which itself prevents the subject's full realization." SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE—OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH FIGHTING FOR? 29 (2000).

232 In emphasizing that the Something is through its limit, Hegel writes some sentences that interfere with the way I have drawn Figure 4(c). In particular, Hegel insists that

limit is simple negation or the first negation, whereas the other is,
at the same time, negation of the negation, the being-within-self
of the something." (126-27)

This suggests that I should have drawn Figure 4(c) as follows:

**Limit as Simple Negation**

Still, I was able to locate sentences that just as much vindicated Figure 4(c) as the above reconceived drawing. Some of these sentences follow hard upon what I have just quoted:

Now in so far as something in it limit both is and is not, and these moments [1, 3] are an immediate qualitative difference, the negative determinate being and the determinate being of the something fall outside each other . . . Limit is the middle between the two of them in which they cease. (127)

Hence, I suggest that above-quoted troublesome sentences be read to mean that Determination is implicitly Limit (the first negation), and Other is the negation of Limit (so taken) and hence is expressly Limit (Determination as Such). These are not, however, "official moves" of the Logic.
Limit is nothing else but a "beyond." In Figure (4)(c), this "beyond" would be described as \([7]\). Thus, the Somethings--\([4, 5]\) and \([5, 6]\)--have their Determinate Being (in part) "beyond their limit." (127)

And furthermore, Limit has "non-being" \([7]\) beyond the Somethings. Something is therefore different from its Limit, an idea illustrated by some simple geometric terms:

- the line appears as line only outside its limit, the point; the plane as plane outside the line; the solid as solid only outside its limiting surface. (127)

By way of example, take Line AZ (comprised of infinitely numerous points). A and Z are the limits of the this line. The line only appears "outside" A and "outside" Z. So it is with the plane. Imagine a square, enclosed by four lines. This plane exists only "outside" the line (though within the four lines taken together). A thing therefore exists only outside its limit, and this "outside" constitutes the "stuff" or "being" of Limit. In short, Limit implies an "unlimited something." (127).

Yet this beyond of the limit--the unlimited something--is only a Determinate Being. As such, it is indistinguishable from its Other--another Determinate Being. Or \([4, 5] = [4, 6]\). And Limit, being a middle term, is both the "unity and distinguishedness" of the two Somethings. Without Limit, the two Somethings are the same. Thus Something owes its Determinate Being to Limit. Limit is where that being is located. Furthermore, Limit and Determinate Being are each the negative of the other. Yet Determinate Being is only in Limit.\(^{233}\) This means that the Something \([4, 5]\) expels itself \([4]\) from itself (and banishes this material to Limit).

Contradiction. Immediately after introducing Limit, Hegel speaks of the vital concept of "Contradiction"--a term officially introduced only much later, in the Doctrine of Essence. In chapter 2, Hegel says of Limit that it is in a state of unrest--just as Becoming was. This unrest--Contradiction--is what impels the Something to go beyond its Limit. Thus, a geometric point--which is Limit to the line--goes outside itself and becomes the line, which is nothing but an infinite progression of points. The Limit of the plane is the line--a plane being nothing but an infinite array of lines. Hegel thus defines the line as "the movement of the point," and the plane

\(^{233}\) This justifies John Burbidge's observation that Limit "prevents the introduction of changes that would destroy its specific qualities and would make it into something else." BURBIDGE, supra note 25, at 51.
is "the movement of the line." (128) Thus, points are both the limit to and elements of the line. Indeed, according to Kant's Second Antinomy: everything is (a) infinitely divisible, or (b) contains an "element" that is purely simple.\textsuperscript{234} In this formulation, "element" is clear Limit to the process of subdivision.

As Limit to the line, the point is the beginning of the line which spontaneously repels itself from itself to create the line. Yet, in spatial or linear terms, "there is no such thing as a point, line or plane"--taken as limit to line, plane, or solid. (129) As Limit, they exist outside line or the plane or the solid. Limit is a Determinate Being but also a nothing. As such, it very much resembles Becoming, which starts from Nothing and "becomes" a Determinate Being.

But is this true? Does the point spontaneously produce the line? Why can't I just hold the point fixed? The answer is that, if I concede that the point is Limit, it must be Limit to something (just as earlier Other had to be Other to something). That implicit something must be "beyond" Limit. The very idea of Limit compels a transcending. Hence, the geometric point, when conceived as Limit, necessarily produces the line spontaneously. Or, in other words, Limit is a correlative term. Limit must necessarily have an "other." With regard to the geometric point, if we stipulate that this point is a Limit, the line sprouts forth quite automatically.

\textbf{(c) Finitude}

We are still not done with Finitude, the middle term in chapter 2. In Determinate Being as Such--the first third of the chapter--we made a circle, but the work was all done to the left of the page. The quintessential move of the Understanding was \[7\] \[6\] \[1\]. But in Finitude--the middle--we have been occupying the right side of the page. Yet the movement was to the "left" of the "right." Here the move has been \[4, 5, 6\] \[6\] \[1\]. That is, we isolated "mediation as such." In this second part of the chapter, we have made two revolutions. The first culminated in Determination. The second in Limit (or Determination as Such). Now we shall draw two more.

Limit must be the Limit to something beyond itself. Hence Limit transcends itself necessarily. "Something with its immanent limit . . . through which it is directed and forced out of an beyond itself, is the \textit{finite}." (129)

Of Finitude (the \textit{state} of being finite), Hegel writes that Something has a quality that is determined but limited. "[I]ts quality is its limit, and, burdened with this, it remains in the first place an affirmative, stable being." (129) But Limit, as negative to the Something, must develop its negativity--a negativity

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, \textit{supra} note 67, at 248-52.
which is now the being-within-self [4] of the Something. This
development of the negative is its "becoming." The developing
negativity is the Something's Finitude:

When we say of things that they are finite, we understand
thereby that . . . finite things are not merely limited--as such
they still have determinate being outside their limit--but that .
. . non-being constitutes their . . . being. Finite things . . .
send themselves away beyond themselves, beyond their being. They
are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite not only
alters, like something in general, but ceases to be; and its
ceasing to be is not merely a possibility . . . but the being as
such of finite things is to have the germ of decease as their
being-within-self: the hour of their birth is the hour of their
death. (129)

The meaning of above, oft-quoted passage should be fairly
evident. We think of ourselves as finite beings. We know that we
shall die. That must mean that our death is already embedded within
us.235 Death is our being-in-itself. We only await this being-in-
itselitself to posit itself as actual. At that point our life ends.

From God's eye view, there is no time. Hence, our birth is
simultaneously our death. God sees our lives as the constant
modulation of Pure Being turning instantaneously into Pure Nothing.
To God, we are born and we die in the very same "hour." Like
Shakespeare, Hegel too generously accords us an hour to strut and
fret upon the stage, but to God this hour is nothing at all.

(") The Immediacy of Finitude

The thought of Finitude brings sadness. "[T]here is no longer
left to things an affirmative being distinct from their destiny to
perish." (129) The other negatives--Negation, Constitution, Limit--
reconcile themselves with their Other. But Finitude is "negation as
fixed in itself, and therefore stands in abrupt contrast to its
affirmative." (130) Yet Finitude is likewise an affirmative thing.
Hence, we have:

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As Hegel remarks in the *Lesser Logic*:

We say, for instance, that man is mortal, and seem to think that
the ground of his death is in external circumstances only; so that
if this way of looking were correct, man would have two special
properties, vitality and--also--mortality. But the true view of the
matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death, and that the
finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-
suppression.

*Lesser Logic, supra* note 9, § 82 Addition.
Insert Figure 5(a) here (located at the end)

Finitude

Of Figure 5(a) Hegel writes poignantly:

The understanding persists in this sadness of Finitude by making non-being the determination of things and at the same time making it imperishable and absolute. (130)

In Figure 5(b), [4, 5, 6] represents the "beyond" of Limit--its non-being. The Understanding makes this beyond into [1]. Thus, Finitude, or death, is eternal and fixed. For this reason, Finitude "is the most stubborn category of the understanding." (129)

But Dialectical Reason comes to the rescue and provides an optimistic note, compared to saturnine Understanding:

Certainly no philosophy or opinion, or understanding, will let itself be tied to the standpoint that the finite is absolute; the very opposite is expressly present in the assertion of the finite; the finite is limited, transitory. (130)

In short, Finitude gets a taste of its own medicine. Under the laws of sublation, Finitude is also Limit. Limit transcends itself. So does Finitude.

Hegel now considers the claim (by unnamed persons) that the Ceasing-to-be of Finitude does not happen. It is said that "the finite is irreconcilable with the infinite." (130) Finitude's being is held to be absolute. Suppose (the straw man argument continues) that the finite ceased to be. Then we have arrived at Pure Nothing. We have retrogressed to chapter 1.

Hegel's answer is that the Finite ceases to be, but this ceasing to be itself ceases to be as well. The impasse is solved by the negation of the negation.

(ß) Limitation and the Ought

Finitude is the move of the Understanding. As such, Finitude suppresses the negative. Dialectical Reason brings forth the negative voice [2]. Hegel calls this negative stage Limitation, which, he warns, must not be confused with the earlier stage of Limit: "Something's own limit thus posited by it as a negative which is at the same time essential, is not merely limit as such, but limitation." (132)

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236 This would become Charles Taylor's position. See supra text accompanying notes 215-24.
In his defense of Hegel against charges of totalitarianism, William Maker emphasizes that Logic limits itself and so posits its own beyond. "[T]hus, the system limits itself." MAKER, supra note 17, at 139. Limitation proves "the necessity for thought of thinking something as having the character of not being determined by thought." Id. In Maker’s view, the self-determinations of the Logic leave nature intact and irreducible and also explain the necessity of nature from within the perspective of the Logic.

**Figure 5(b)**

**Limitation**

Hegel writes of the move to Limitation:

> In order that the limit which is in [the Finite] should be a limitation, something must at the same time in its own self transcend the limit, it must in its own self be related to the limit as to something which it is not. (132)

This accounts for Limitation. It is that which transcends Limit--the "not" of Limit. Or, it is [3], the beyond of [1]'s Limit. Hegel continues:

> The determinate being of something [1] lies inertly indifferent, as it were, alongside its limit [2]. But something only transcends its limit in so far as it is the accomplished sublation of the limit, is the in-itself as negatively related to it [2]. And since the limit is in the [Finite] itself as a limitation [2], something transcends its own self [3]. (132)

Thus, the Finite's own voice [2] compels the production of Limitation [3]. Limitation is also [2], but of course, taken immediately, it is also [3]. As always, when [2] speaks, [3] is implied.237 Hegel immediately follows up Limitation with the middle term--the Ought.

**Insert Figure 5(c) here (located at the end)**

**The Ought**

Of the Ought, Hegel states that it contains the determination in double form: once as the implicit determination counter to the negation [4] and again as a non-being which, as a limitation [6], is distinguished from the determination, but is at the same time itself an implicit determination.

This, I think, simply says that the Ought is a middle term. The first term is the "implicit determination counter to the negation." This would appear to be a reference to [4], as part of the in-itself to

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the Finite [1, 3, 4]. The Ought also contains Limitation [4, 6], which, though negative, is equally a Determinate Being.

The Ought is therefore a moment of the Finite—its most advanced moment. But, Hegel insists, whereas Limitation is posited as a Finite, the Ought is only implicitly a Finite. Limit is immanent in the Ought, under the laws of sublation. But Limit's restriction is enveloped in the in-itself, for, in accordance with its determinate being, that is, its determinateness relatively to the limitation, [the Ought] is posited as the in-itself. (132)

The truth of this might be described as follows. Recall that, throughout the middle of chapter 2, we have been "reifying" the mediated parts of the middle term, as in Figure 4(a) or 5(a). Thus, [4, 5, 6] 6 [1]. If we concentrate on the Ought [4-7] v. Limitation [2, 3, 4, 6], [4, 6] are the being-in-itself of the Ought. Since it is precisely the being-in-itself that the Understanding seizes upon in order to advance the progress, the Ought is the ultimate being-in-itself. It is Being-in-itself as such. Now, if this is true, the Finitude in the Ought is by definition merely implicit, solely because the Ought's own message is "implicitness." The Ought expresses nothing expressly!

Common usage. Let's pause for a moment and ask what is meant by "ought." Suppose I say to you: "You ought to take piano lessons." This can be broken down to a statement of what is and what is not. Thus, I have really said: "You have the potential to be a better piano player. For this reason, lessons would be good end-means reasoning." Your potential is. Also, I have said: "Frankly, right now, you're not yet a good piano player. That's why lessons are in order." Your talent is merely potential and is not now actual. In terms of actuality, your talent is not. In both cases, something is present and also absent—potentiality (present) and actuality (absent). These statements are full of Becoming. The potential should cease-to-be what it is and should become something else. Actuality should come-to-be and should cease being only potential.

Anglo-American empirical philosophers are fond of saying that you cannot prove an "ought" from an "is." Such philosophers suppress the in-itself and never advance beyond Understanding. In fact, Hegel argues that this is quite wrongheaded. Anything that ought to be "is." The Ought "is" in the present. If it is not, then it will never come-to-be. The proof of the Ought is precisely whether it does come-to-be. If it never does, it was never possible. In the eye of God, the Ought always comes-to-be and is indistinguishable from the "is." Thus, probability experts are likely to agree that, given infinite time, what is possible will become actual. Hegel's point is no
This point of view does much to illuminate Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. There, Kant defends, inter alia, belief in the immortality of the soul, because only this makes possible the attainment of absolute moral perfection. Critical of Practical Reason, supra note 188, at 148. This moral perfection is an Ought to mortals, but to God, moral perfection is.

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Kant tended to argue that duty could never be absolutely fulfilled by finite mortals.\textsuperscript{240} For this reason, the Ought was always before us. In Hegel's philosophy, the Ought is an early idea that is much transcended in the logical progress.

Hegel also emphasizes that "in the world of actuality itself, Reason and Law are not in such a bad way that they only ought to be--it is only the abstraction of the in-itself that stops at this." (136) The Ought is only the "standpoint which clings to finitude and thus to contradiction." (136)

Towards the middle of this Remark, Hegel addresses a claim that Limitation cannot be transcended. "To make such an assertion," he complains, "is to be unaware that the very fact that something is determined as a limitation implies that the limitation is already transcended." (134) Limitation is the negative of the Finite. As such, the Finite is already "beyond" Limitation, even before Limitation comes to be. It is in the nature of reason to transcend the Limitation of the Particular and manifest what is Universal.

\textit{Birds and Rocks and Trees and Things}. In light of the above, why don't rocks rise up from the earth and cast off their unconscious slough in order to be self-conscious beings, if Limitation is already overcome in them?\textsuperscript{241} Here is a question very likely to bother the beginner. If Hegel really raises the object to subjectivity in the \textit{Science of Logic}, why don't the rocks speak to us?

Hegel reassures us, "Stone and metal do not transcend their limitation because this is not a limitation \textit{for them}." (134)\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{240} For a description of Kant's moral theory in light of our finitude, see Schroeder & Carlson, \textit{supra} note 215.

\textsuperscript{241} Of course, psychotics do indeed think that such things speak. \textit{See} WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II Act 3, scene 1:

Mock not my senseless conjuration, lords.
This earth shall have a feeling, and these stones
Prove armed soldiers ere her native king
Shall falter under foul rebellion's arms.

\textsuperscript{242} By way of adding credentials to Hegel's metallurgy, it may be pointed out that, in the original 1807 edition of the \textit{Phenomenology}, the title page identifies Hegel as Dr. and Professor of Philosophy at Jena, assessor in the Ducal Mineralogical Society and member of other learned societies." Donald Phillip
Limitation is a feature of sentient beings. Rocks have already been expelled from Spirit when physical nature was shown, earlier in the chapter, to be self-alienated Spirit.

Yet Hegel goes on to say that perhaps stones and metals do transcend their Limitation. They have Being-in-itself. They "ought" to become something different. If oxidizable, they potentially can be burned. In the view of God, they will be burned, because God's timeless nature dissolves all difference between the potential and the actual. "[O]nly by force" can unoxidized metal be kept from its rusty fate. (134)

243 Hegel gives further examples of nature overcoming Limitation. Thus, the plant transcends the Limitation of being a seed. The sentient creature feels pain, which is "negation in its self," a "limitation in its feeling." (135) The sentient creature's feeling of self is the totality that transcends this Limitation. "If it were not above and beyond the determinateness [of pain], it would not feel it as its negation and would feel no pain." (135)

244 Hyppolite remarks:

The essence of the inorganic thing is in fact a particular determination, which is why it becomes concept only in its connection to other things. But the thing does not preserve itself in that connection; it if only for-some-other; it does not reflect on itself in the process of relating to other things... These elements are particular determinations, and they lack reflection on themselves, that is, they present themselves as being for-others.


243

HYPPOLITE, supra note 82, at 240-41.
Is the Ought--Being-in-itself as such--null? Yes, for several reasons. First, throughout Finitude, we are making rightward-leaning circles. Hence, we are generally in the realm of nothingness. Furthermore, the Ought is not as well as is. And finally, as Being-in-itself it expressly refuses to manifest itself. That is the positing that the Ought achieves.

**Transition of the Finite into the Infinite**

In the transition to the Infinite, Hegel introduces no new terms, yet, in a very short space a new advance is described. What we get are enriched observations pertaining to Figure 5(c).

First, Hegel isolates the mediated portions of the Ought [4, 5, 6]. Here is where the Ought contains limitation, and limitation contains the ought. Their relation to each other is the finite itself which contains them both in its being-within-self. (136)

The being-within-self of the Finite is, of course, [4]. Thanks to [4], we can say that the Finite contains both the Ought and Limitation. By virtue of these observations, the Finite of the transition is more powerful than the Finite of Figure 5(c). The more powerful Finite expressly includes the Ought and Limitation, under the laws of sublation.

The enriched Finite appears in Figure 6(a). It is made up of the Ought and Limitation, where these two overlap in Figure 5(c):

**Insert Figure 6(a) here (located at the end)**

**Enriched Finite**

Dialectical Reason now intervenes to remind the reader that what appears to be a self-identity [1] has a negative voice [2]. Therefore, this voice emerges from [1] and produces a like Finite [3]. That is, [1] "ceases-to-be" and the new Finite "comes-to-be" as the negative of the first Finite: "Thus, in ceasing to be, the finite has not ceased to be; it has becomes . . . only another finite." (136)

**Insert Figure 6(b) here (located at the end)**

**Another Finite**

This other Finite [3] likewise ceases to be and it becomes the former Finite [1]. What we have is the ceaseless seething turmoil of the sort we saw in Figure 1(b), where Pure Being became Pure Nothing. A Finite comes and goes, to be replaced by another Finite.

Of this process of birth and death, Hegel writes:
closer consideration of this result shows that the finite in its ceasing-to-be, in this negation of itself has attained its being-in-itself, is united with itself. (136)

In short, the in-itself has manifested itself in this ceaseless activity. The in-itself of the Finite is the act of dying. Here we have a "harbinger preceding still the fates"—"being" is about to die.

Hegel describes this business of dying as follows:

Each of it moments contains precisely this result; the ought transcends the limitation, that is, transcend itself; but beyond itself or its other, is only the limitation itself. The limitation, however, points directly beyond itself to its other, which is the ought . . . " (136)

Notice that each extreme ceases to be and points to the other as that which really is. In other words, each extreme says, "I am not it." This is tantamount to saying, "My other is it." This negative "positing" is precisely the move of Essence, much later in the Logic. It is presaged early in the Doctrine of Being as the move that rightward leaning Finitude makes, pending our arrival at Infinity—the last part of the chapter.

In its activity, the Enriched Finite (which Hegel here calls the Ought) becomes what it is by ceasing to be—by going beyond itself. Hence, "in going beyond itself . . . it equally only unites with itself." This going beyond while remaining united is the negation of the negation itself. Thus we have the middle term between the two finites:

**Insert Figure 6(c) here (located at the end)**

**Infinity**

Absolute. Of Figure 6(c), Hegel writes that "[t]he infinite in its simple Notion can, in the first place, be regarded as a fresh definition of the absolute." (137) Here, for the first time in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel associates the middle term with the "Absolute." As the Logic progresses the Absolute becomes increasingly richer, until the ultimate Absolute Idea, which encompasses all mediations. At that point, the Absolute is what Hegel called in the prefatory material "pure Knowing."  

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246 Erroll Harris suggests that every step in the *Science of Logic*—whether produced by the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, or Speculative Reason—is "a provisional definition of the Absolute." Harris, supra note 34, at 80. This, of course, is likewise true. The Understanding tries to grasp the whole truth, just as
Of the Absolute, Hegel specifies that

the forms of determinate being find no place in the series of those determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, for the individual forms of that sphere are immediately posited only as determinatenesses, as finite in general. (137)

Thus, "forms of Determinate Being" are "determinatenesses," which Dialectical Reason describes in such forms as is shown in Figure 6(b). Only two circles are invoked here. The form of the Absolute is more advanced, as shown in Figure 6(c). It invokes all three circles.

In the Lesser Logic, however, Hegel more broadly claims that every step of the way has been a proposed definition of the Absolute: "at least the first and third category in every triad may--the first, where the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple self-reference." The second step of Dialectical Reason, however, is merely a negative critique of the Understanding's proposition. On its own, it does not pretend to put forth a definition of the Absolute.

C. Infinity

This section of the Science of Logic is certainly the most overwritten, overlong section we have so far encountered. One gets the impression that Hegel received much criticism of his view of the Infinite, and therefore he has responded with the weight of pure repetition in the hope of convincing his unnamed opponents of his views. In truth, by grace of what has preceded, the concept seems straightforward.

The Infinite in Figure 6(c) still suffers from limitation and Finitude. It is, so far, "Spurious Infinity." It is spurious because it names only the endless modulation that emerged in Figure 6(b). Hence, we have:

Speculative Reason does. Each is likewise unsuccessful, until the end of the book. Nevertheless, here Hegel refers to the middle term as a provisional definition of the absolute.

247 LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 85. Clark Butler overlooks this passage when he announces, "Hegel is nowhere so indiscriminate as to say that qualitative being is a definition of the absolute." BUTLER, supra note 4, at 110.
Hegel writes that the Spurious Infinity of Figure 7(a) is "the true being, the elevation above limitation." (137) In this first stage "the finite has vanished in the infinite and what is, is only the infinite." (138) In other words, in Figure 7(a), the Understanding is in charge. It sees only the self-identity of the Infinite--not its complexity as a determinateness. It cannot see that, within the Infinite, one finds the Finite.

(b) Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite

Dialectical Reason now intervenes to point out the history of Spurious Infinity. The Infinite has negated the Finite, as can be seen in Figure 7(a). In short, the Infinite is a Determinate Being, with negation inside it. This internal negation is its Limit. Hence, [2] speaks up and generates:

Insert Figure 7(b) here (located at the end)

Spurious Infinity and its Other

In Figure 7(b), "the finite stands opposed to the infinite as a real determinate being; they stand thus in a qualitative relation, each remaining external to the other." (138)

It should be apparent that something is wrong with Spurious Infinity. It was supposed to be Infinite--in the sense of having no finite borders. But Figure 7(b) reveals it to be just as finite as the earlier Finites.248

Hegel next draws attention to [1] and [3] in Figure 7(b):

But the infinite and the finite are not in these categories of relation only; the two sides are determined beyond the stage of being merely others to each other . . . and thus [Spurious Infinity] is reduced to the category of a being which has the finite confronting it as an other . . . The infinite is in this way burdened with the opposition to the finite which, as an other, remains at the same time a determinate reality although in its in-

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248 As Hegel puts it in the Lesser Logic,

To suppose that by stepping out and away into that infinity we release ourselves from the finite, is in truth but to seek the release which comes by flight. But the man who flees is not yet free: in fleeing he is still conditioned by that from which he flees.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 94 Remark.
itself [2], in the infinite, it is at the same time posited as
sublated; this infinite is the non-finite—a being in the
determinateness of negation. (139)

In other words, Spurious Infinity is just another Finite. It "has
only the first, immediate negation for its determinateness relatively
to the finite." (140) The Spurious Infinity is merely the beyond of
the finite—and itself a Finite!

Each [1], [3] is assigned a distinct place—the finite as
determinate being here, on this side, and the infinite, although
the in-itself of the finite [2], nevertheless as a beyond in the
dim, inaccessible distance, outside of which the finite is and
remains. (140)

Here we have a note of disapproval aimed in the direction of Kant,
who believed we could know nothing of the thing-in-itself.249 Hegel's
eventual criticism of Kant will be that the thing-in-itself is a
concept, like any other, and therefore at the same level of
phenomena. Likewise, in Figure 7(b), Spurious Infinity is the
disconnected "beyond" [1] of the finite—an unacceptable /conclusion.

A little later, Hegel will compare Spurious Infinity to a line
that continues indefinitely in both directions:

The image of the progress to infinity is the straight line, at the
two limits of which alone the infinite is, and always only where
the line—which is determinate being—is not, and which goes out
beyond to this negation of its determinate being, that is, to the
indeterminate." (149)

This is a very good description of the faults of Spurious Infinity.
The "Infinite" is portrayed as never present in the line. It is
always where the line is not. If we extend the line to reach
Infinity, we only find that Infinity has relocated and is still
always just beyond. Travelers know Spurious Infinity in the form of
the horizon. The traveler heads for it, but never quite reaches it.
The horizon stubbornly relocates itself as we approach it.

True Infinity will end up as a circle—not a line. (149) It
will bend back on itself and will have no beginning or end. But how
this is achieved must await further examination of Spurious Infinity.

If we isolate [1] and [3] and ignore [2], then we have
"unrelated" entities. Hegel warns that it would be a huge mistake to
view the Infinite as the unconnected "beyond" of the Finite. There is
a connection—[2]. Of [2], Hegel writes:

This negation which connects them—the somethings reflected into

249 See infra text accompanying notes ---.
themselves—is the limit of the one relatively to the other, and that, too, in such a manner that each of them does not have the limit in it merely relatively to the other, but the negation is their being-in-itself... (140)

Notice that the "somethings"--[1] and [3]--reflect themselves (or "collapse") into [2]. Once again we see reflection as a kind of shrinkage, a renunciation of its inessential parts. [2] is Limit to [1] and [3], and [2] is being-in-itself to both entities as well. Because [2] is Limit, Spurious Infinity is definitely not infinite—in the sense of "without borders." Yet each Finite is a "beyond" of [2]. Hence [1], on one side, and [3], on the other, is the negation of [2] "[E]ach thus immediately repels the limit, as its non-being, from itself." (140) In other words, just as [1] and [3] reflect themselves into [2], they likewise reflect themselves back into themselves, from [2] into [1] or [3]. When this occurs, each extreme posits "another being outside it, the finite positing its non-being as this infinite and the infinite, similarly, the finite." (140) Once again, reflection reveals itself to be negative, but productive. Thus, when [1] withdraws into itself, it presupposes the existence of [2] and hence of [3]. These will be the quintessential moves in the Doctrine of Essence.

In this section, Hegel lays the groundwork for an advance to the True Infinite:

It is readily conceded that there is a necessary transition from the finite to the infinite—necessary through the determination of the finite—and that the finite is raised to the form of being-in-itself, since the finite, although persisting as a determinate being, is at the same time also determined as in itself nothing and therefore as destined to bring about its own dissolution. (140)

In other words, if I designate a concept as finite, I imply that there is such a thing as an Infinite, such that the finitude of the concept makes sense. Finitude is thus a "correlative" term. It always has an Other. Furthermore, the Finite has within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Implicit in the Finite is its ceasing-to-be. Since implicitness is the Ought—Being-in-itself as such—the being-in-itself of the Finite is precisely its implied nothingness.

The above passage leads to the negation of the negation. The unity of each Spurious Infinity is that it goes beyond itself. In other words, the pure motion of the modulation from and back into [2] is the common element.

[T]his alternating determination... appears as the progress to infinity... The progress is, consequently, a contradiction which is not resolved but is always only enunciated as present... This spurious infinity is in itself the same thing as the
Motion is the unity of the Finite and the Spurious Infinite. That is to say, there can be no motion between [1] and [3] unless indeed both exist as correlates. The motion unifies them. "[T]his unity alone which evokes the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite." (142) This motion is the True Infinite. It is, as Hegel will say much later, "the eruption of the infinite in the finite as an immediate transition and vanishing of the latter in its beyond." (371-72)

(c) Affirmative Infinity


external realization of the Notion. In this realization is posited the content of the Notion, but it is posited as external as falling asunder. (143)

What does Hegel mean by "external"? If we contemplate [1] 6 [3] and [3] 6 [1], we have left out [2]. [2] has been "externalized" from the process. Yet [2] is also essential. Without [2], neither "is what it is--each contains its own other in its own determination." (144) Hence, [1] and [3] are "external" to the essential component--[2].

Hegel drops back to consider the immediate determination of the Infinite [1]. This is merely the "beyond" of the Finite [3]. Yet both [1] and [3] lay claim to [2].


This progress is the external aspect of this unity at which ordinary thinking halts, at this perpetual; repetition of one and the same alteration, of the vain unrest of advancing beyond the limit to infinity, only to find in this infinite a new limit in which, however, it is as little able to rest as in the infinite . . . This progress is the external aspect of this unity at which ordinary thinking halts, at this perpetual; repetition of one and the same alteration, of the vain unrest of advancing beyond the limit to infinity, only to find in this infinite a new limit in which, however, it is as little able to rest as in the infinite. (142)
In each, therefore, there lies the determinateness of the other, although according to the standpoint of the infinite progress these two are supposed to be shut out from each other and only to follow each other alternatively . . . (143)


Hegel describes the signification of this as follows:

In saying what the infinite is, namely the negation of the finite, the latter is itself included in what is said; it cannot be dispensed with for the definition or determination of the infinite. One only needs to be aware of what one is saying in order to find the determination of the finite in the infinite. (143)

In short, the Infinite is a polar concept--like positive and negative on a bar magnet. With magnets, "positive" makes no sense alone. It only exists in correlation with "negative." (To test this, try cutting the magnet in half to isolate the "positive" side of the magnet. What you now have is two smaller bar magnets, each with positive and negative extremes. The positive can never be isolated.)

As with the "positive" of a magnet, the Infinite cannot be isolated from the Finite. This implies that the entire perspective of the infinite progress is false. It is like isolating the "positive" from the bar magnet.


252 Kosok, supra note 43, at 254 (1972) ("Unity is therefore the transcendence of that which is unified, m, and transcendence as a movement from an initial state (e) to its negation (-e) is a unity of both . . .").

both modes yield one and the same result: the infinite and the finite viewed as connected with each other—the connection being only external to them but also essential to them, without which neither is what it is—each contains its own other in its own determination, just as much as each, taken on its own account considered in its own self, has its other present within it as its own moment. (144)

In other words, [1]'s view of [2] is that [2] expressly connects it to [3]. [3] thinks [2] separates it from [1]. Yet, recalling that "nothing is, after all, something," we can likewise say that "no relation is, after all, a relation." Hence, both [1] and [3] agree that [2] is a relation. Thus, the same result is yielded. The connection is external.

The externalization of [2]

yields the decried unity of the finite and the infinite—the unity which is itself the infinite which embraces both itself and finitude—and is therefore the infinite in a different sense” [from the Spurious Infinite]. (144)

This brings us to Figure 7(c):

Insert Figure 7(c) here (located at the end)

True Infinity

Of Figure 7(c), Hegel writes that Spurious Infinity and its other (also a Spurious Infinity) have a common term [2, 4]. Taken alone [2, 4] posits [1] and [3] as canceled—sublated. "[I]n their unity, therefore, they lose their qualitative nature." (144) But [2, 4] is, so far, only the "finitized infinite." (145) Now Finitude is the negation of the in-itself. We saw this in the preamble to "Finitude", where the in-itself of the Finite was to manifest its own death. There, Hegel said of the Finite that the hour of its birth is the hour of its death.

Because the Finite is in [2, 4], and the Finite must terminate itself (and become [7]), "it is exalted, and, so to say, infinitely

\[254\] Why "decried"? This may refer to uncited criticism of Hegel's derivation of the True Infinite.

Soon after the phrase quoted in the text, Hegel writes of rebutting

the idea of the unity which insists on holding fast to the infinite and finite in the quality they are supposed to have when taken in their separation from each other, a view which therefore sees in that unity only contradiction, but not also resolution of the contradiction through the negation of the qualitative determinateness of both . . . (144-45)
exalted above its worth; the finite is posited as the infinitized finite." (145) Sublation of the two Finites comes from within--from [2]:

That in which the finite sublates itself is the infinite as the negating of finitude; but finitude itself has long since been determined as only the non-being of determinate being. It is therefore only negation which sublates itself in the negation. (146)

In other words, the True Infinite is the negation of the negation. Each of the Finites manifests its inherent non-being in [2, 4], and this very activity is what the True Infinite is.

Thus, both finite and infinite are this movement in which each returns to itself through its negation; they are only as mediation within themselves. (147)

This activity can be seen as [4] in Figure 7(c). The contribution of the True Infinite is that it encompasses both the Spurious Infinite and the Finite. In True Infinity, Limit (between the Finites) and Limitation (Other to the Spurious Infinite) are sublated. Thus we have in Figure 7(c)

the complete self-closing movement which has arrived at that which constituted the beginning; what arises is the same as that from which the movement began, that is, the finite is restored; it has therefore united with itself, has in its beyond only found itself again. (147)

Hegel's critics, whom he insultingly names "the understanding," fail to follow along:

The reason why understanding is so antagonistic to the unity of the finite and infinite is simply that it presupposes the limitation and the finite, as well as the in-itself, as perpetuated; in doing so it overlooks the negation of both which is actually present in the infinite progress . . . (147)

It is ever the fault of Understanding to overlook the negative inherent in a concept. Becoming compared. The Spurious Infinite and its Finite "beyond" modulate back and forth. The name of the movement back and forth is the True Infinite. This process, of course, much resembles Becoming, with which chapter 1 ended. Thus, both chapters 1 and 2 end in similar ways--in modulation.

Nevertheless, True Infinity is more advanced than Becoming. It is "now further determined in its moments." (148)
Becoming, in the first instance, has abstract being and nothing for its determinations; as alteration, its moment possess determinate being, something and other; now, as the infinite, they are the finite and the finite, which are themselves in process of becoming. (148)

This summary of the progress to date more or less matches what has been described. Becoming, in the above account, is straightforward. As Figure 1(c) shows, its moments are merely abstract. The reference to alteration is more mysterious. It is, however, clear that Hegel is referring to Figure 2(c)--the Something. Its moments were Determinate Being--simple determinatenesses comprised of Quality and Negation. (It will be recalled that Hegel emphasized that the Something "is alteration--a becoming which has already become concrete." (116))

Finally, something new is introduced in True Infinity: the extremes themselves are in the process of Becoming. It was their own manifestation of their non-being--each independently from its own side--that gave rise to the self-negating activity Hegel has named True Infinity.

The thing-in-itself. True Infinity, "the consummated return into self" (148), is being. It is not abstract being, but rather Determinate Being, "for it contains negation in general and hence determinateness." (148-49) It is here, "present before us. It is only the spurious infinite that is beyond." (149) This can be taken as a reproach to Kant, who thought that the beyond was the thing-in-itself which we could never know: "to be thus unattainable," Hegel remarks, "is not its grandeur but its defect, which is at bottom the result of holding fast to the finite as such as a merely affirmative being. It is what is untrue that is unattainable." (149) Better to let the Finite do what it does best--cease-to-be. In the very act of ceasing to be we reach True Infinity.255

Because True Infinity is here before us, it is a higher reality than the former reality, which was simply determinate. The True Infinity has acquired a more concrete content and therefore deserves the name "reality." (149) It is what endures. The Finite is precisely what does not endure. It is "not real."

Ideality. Hegel has second thoughts about invoking reality in connection with True Infinity. He invoked it only because the term is familiar to "untrained thinking." (149) In truth, reality was opposed to the first negation. But now we have a negation of the negation, which is opposed to both reality and the first negation. A better word for True Infinity is ideality. Thus, "ideal being [das Ideelle] is the finite as it is in the true infinite"--a moment which is not self-subsistent. (150)

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255 Much later, Hegel will describe the True Infinite as "contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being." (440)
Hegel suggests that ideality can be called the "quality of infinity." (150) "Quality" here cannot be taken as official Quality—what stands over against Negation in Figure 2(b). Rather, we must take quality according to ordinary usage. Hence, ideality is the nature of True Infinity. Ideality suggests the idea of movement—of becoming, that primitive version of True Infinity.

Of course, Hegel is known as the philosopher of idealism. Now we can grasp what that means. Not "reality" as the Understanding perceives it but a deeper, anti-empirical truth is at stake in Hegel's work.

**Transition**

At the end of chapter 2 (but prior to a pair of Remarks), we find a brief transition to chapter 3. Here Hegel says simply that, because True Infinity is a more advanced version of Becoming, it is a "transition."

Finitude itself has sublated itself. Its self-erasure was True Infinity as such. But, in erasing itself, it returned to itself. It has abolished Otherness altogether. It has achieved Being-for-self—the subject of the next chapter. While Being-for-self may seem grand, and is indeed necessary to true freedom, it will turn out very badly indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter. To become "all" is to lose all, as Pure Being learned to its detriment. Something similar will happen to True Infinity, in its guise as Being-for-self.

**Remark I: The Infinite Progress**

Although Hegel has written a very repetitive, overlong analysis of True Infinity, he nevertheless feels it necessary to returns to his relentless attack upon Spurious Infinity. Perhaps we can assuage our impatience by recalling that the target is Kant, who announced that we can never know the thing-in-itself. Kant was Hegel's great opponent and was, then as now, the most important and prestigious of philosophers.

Hegel complains that the Spurious Infinite is a contradiction, yet it is put forward by bad philosophy as the final solution to metaphysics. But the beyond of the Finite is simply nothing—"a flight beyond limited being which does not inwardly collect itself and does not know how to bring the negative back to the positive." (150) Spurious Infinity is incomplete reflection. It has before it both determinations of True Infinity, but it cannot bring the ideas together in a unity. It only knows how to alternate them, back and forth.

To put this in more Kantian terms, the thing-in-itself is that

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which is beyond perception, which knows only phenomena. Suppose we "perceive" the thing-in-itself by naming it as such. We have only before us a phenomenon. The real thing-in-itself is beyond. Hence, when Kant tries to think the thing-in-itself, he only substitutes the Finite for what was supposed to by Infinite. The Infinite therefore always alternates with the Finite, whenever Kant tries to confront the thing-in-itself.

An example of Spurious Infinity is "cause and effect."

[A] cause which had no effect would not be a cause, just as an effect which had no cause would no longer be an effect. This relation yields, therefore, the infinite progress of causes and effects . . . (151)

Thus, every cause is an effect, and every effect is the cause of a new effect. We have a never-ending chain--alternating Spurious Infinities. Indeed, we find that "cause and effect" is Kant's third antinomy, which states that cause-and-effect are a bad infinity that never gets resolved, or it is a finite chain that is resolved by a "first cause" (which ends up being the Kantian autonomous subject).

Kant solves the antinomy by recognizing "the equal correctness and equal incorrectness of the two assertions." (151) But Hegel proposes that these two moments "are only moments." (151) What are really present before us at all times are not the moments as such but the movement between the alternating moments. In this movement "the finite is united only with itself, and the same is true of the infinite." (152) The negation of the negation which is the True Infinite is thus the affirmation--the being--of both moments. In this unity of both moments--the ideality of the moments--the contradiction of the Spurious Infinite is resolved. Abstract thoughts are brought together in a unity. We thus have before us Speculative Reason itself:

In this detailed example, there is revealed the specific nature of speculative thought, which consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity. Each moment actually shows that it contains its opposite within itself and that in this opposite it is united with itself; thus the affirmative truth is this immanently active unity, the taking together of both thoughts, their infinity--the relation to self which is not immediate but infinite. (152)

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257 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 67, at 251-53.

Figure 7(c) is a perfect illustration of Speculative Reason. Each Finite had its Being-in-itself in its own erasure. This self-erasure was common to both of the extremes. It was their "active unity."

Hegel states of unnamed philosophers:

Thinkers have often placed the essence of philosophy in the answering of the question: how does the infinite go forth from itself and become finite? (152)

This, the thinkers respond, cannot be made comprehensible. Hegel devastatingly responds that these philosophers never had the True Infinite before them. They had the Spurious Infinite before them. Hence, the Infinite was already a finite. There can be no question of going forth from the True Infinite! Thus, what is really incomprehensible is that the Infinite should be so completely separated from the Finite--now and at the beginning. "Neither such a finite nor such an infinite has truth; and what is untrue is incomprehensible." (153)

Nevertheless, Hegel is able to answer the question of the thinkers. The infinite goes forth precisely because it is the Spurious Infinite. As such, it has no enduring truth and must of necessity become another Finite--as the alteration in Figure 7(b) showed. And, for that matter, the Finite goes forth as well--right back to the Infinite.

Or rather it should be said that the [Spurious Infinite] has eternally gone forth into finitude, that, solely by itself and without having its other present within it, the infinite no more is than pure being is. (154)

Or, the Spurious Infinite, being just a Finite, is not--that is its Being-in-itself. It "ought" to manifest its destiny.

Remark 2: Idealism

The chapter ends with some interesting remarks about the nature of idealism. "The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being," Hegel writes.

Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is actually carried out . . . A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite Infinite as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy. (155)

That this last assessment is true can be proved by this following test. Suppose a philosopher were to say to you, "Everything is finite and will come to an end. That is the absolute truth." By
now, you have figured out how to respond: "But your own statement about finitude is put forth as infinite. Hence, not everything is finite. Your own statement belies your philosophy." With this simple observation, you will have destroyed the soi-disant philosopher, who purported to explain the nature of finitude. Absolutization of the Finite is a poor excuse for philosophy.

In common usage, "the ideal" means "figurate conception," and "what is simply in my conception." (155) In short, it means mere subjective fancies. Hegel certainly does not mean this when in invokes ideality. Rather, it is (objective) Spirit that is ideal. "In spirit . . . the content is not present as a so-called real existence." (155) This so-called "real existence is, in any case, already "ideally in me." It is the Being-for-other of the object, which I have abstracted from the object and made into a thought.

The reduction of idealities into subjective fancies Hegel names "subjective idealism." (155)

This subjective idealism [whether unconscious] or consciously enunciated and set up as a principle, concerns only the form of a conception according to which a content is mine; in the systematic idealism of subjectivity this form is declared to be the only true exclusive form in opposition to the form of objectivity or reality. (155-56)

The fault of such idealism is that it maintains a separation between the thought of a thing (the form) and the thing-in-itself (the content). The content is allowed to remain wholly in its Finitude. Such philosophizing never gets beyond the Spurious Infinite.

III. From Being-For-Self to Repulsion and Attraction

Qualitative being finds its consummation in Being-for-self. If chapter 1, as a whole, adheres to "being" and if chapter 2 leans toward "nothing," chapter 3 constitutes a middle term between the two. It is the negation of the negation--"the primary definition of the Concept [i.e., Spirit] as such." Chapter 3 will itself exhibit its left, right and center bias.

We have reached a good point to note that the Logic is like a pendulum that initially swings wildly between extremes. But then, as it becomes more "grounded" (in the sense of gravity), swings less and less. Within chapter 3, we are witnessing a less violent swing that we saw earlier. Of course, the wildest swing of the pendulum was from Pure Being to Pure Nothing. Nothing could be more opposite than these two concepts. Yet they were the same! Now we see the swings between being and nothing to be less extreme. The swing to being is weighed

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259 HARRIS, supra note 7, at 110. This, of course, is only "provisionally true." Id.
down by its encumbrance in nothing, and vice versa.

In the short preamble to the chapter, Hegel makes this comment about Determinate Being.

It thus contains . . . only the first negation [3], which is itself immediate; it is true that being [1], too, is preserved in it and both are united in determinate being in a simple unity [2], but for that very reason they [1] [3] are in themselves still unequal to each other and their unity is not yet posited.

Determinate being is therefore the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of finitude. (157)

How is it that [1] and [3] are "still unequal" when Hegel has been emphasizing in chapter 2 that [1] = [3]? What Hegel means is that [1] is [1] only relatively--to [3]. It is "for other" and not "for itself." There is a split between Being [1] and determinateness [1, 2, 3]. In other words, there is a distinction between Understanding and Dialectical Reason. In chapter 3, however:

the difference between being and determinateness or negation is posited and equalized. (159)

What "being" in this chapter must do is to embody negation, which is only imperfectly done in the earlier stages. In those stages, the difference between being and nothing lay at the base. But we did end in True Infinity, which was the "posited negation of the negation." (157) This was a grand "middle term," which Hegel now names as "absolutely determined being." (159) This middle term becomes the ground of chapter 3.

The chapter, as always, is divided into three parts. First, there is (A) the One. Then the One repulses itself from itself ([1] 6 [3]), yet stays connected with itself (in [2]). It becomes (B) the One and the Many, and then (C) Repulsion and Attraction. As the stage of Speculative Reason, Repulsion and Attraction are a duality of movement and stasis. When viewed as static, Repulsion and Attraction collapse "into equilibrium"--that is, a middle term. (157) The name of this middle term is Quantity--and entity with no Quality at all. Thus, by becoming all, Quality ironically loses all.

This will be a point of interest to "liberal" political philosophers interested in the work of John Rawls. Rawls wishes to make the individual the irreducible atom of political theory, but, when the individual is placed behind the "veil of ignorance," the all-significant individual becomes nothing at all--an empty vessel. If the individual behind the veil of ignorance--i.e., bereft of all quality--does anything, it is because Rawls comes to the rescue and attributes some quality to this big zero that is supposed to be the

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center of all ethical philosophy. In trafficking in such empty concepts as individualism, Rawls precisely replicates the transition of Being-for-self into Quantity.\(^{261}\)

**A. Being-For-Self As Such**

Hegel writes that something "is for itself in so far as it transcends otherness." (158) In Being-for-self, otherness is only a "moment"--historically significant, but now posited as thoroughly sublated.

Being-for-self is said by Hegel to be "the infinite return into itself." (158) How is this so? At the end of chapter 2, we saw that the True Infinite was comprised of two Finites--the Spurious Infinite and its other--a Finite. Each of these was an Ought. The being-in-itself of each was that each must cease-to-be. The very act of ceasing-to-be was the unity of the two otherwise incommensurable entities. This movement was self-generated. The two Finites blew themselves up. In effect, the movement was toward the middle term--True Infinity--in Figure 7(c). Hence a movement to True Infinity was a return to itself; the self-erasure was Being-in-itself of the Finites becoming "for-itself." Furthermore, it was an "infinite" return in that this movement transcended all Limitation. Hence, the return was infinite in the True Infinite sense of being without borders--without Limitation.

*Consciousness.* Before moving on to the first subsection of "Being-for-self as Such," Hegel compares Being-for-self with consciousness and self-consciousness. Mere consciousness re-presents to itself the object it senses. In other words, it renders the object ideal.

\[\text{In its entanglement with the negative of itself, with its other (i.e., the idealized object), consciousness is still only in the presence of its own self. (158)}\]

That is, if consciousness is \([1]\), the idealized object (i.e., knowledge) is \([2]\). The "self" of consciousness is \([1, 2]\). Therefore, in knowledge of the object \([2]\). \([1]\) merely confronts its own self.\(^{262}\)

In light of this structure, consciousness is

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\(^{262}\) Later, it will be shown that the ego is highly negative and is defined solely as not the object or knowledge of the object. See chapter 4. This suggests that the ego is better seen as \([3]\) and the object as \([1]\). But as \([1] = [3]\) in any case, this amendment adds nothing to the analysis in the text.
the dualism, on the one hand of knowing [2] an alien object external to it [3], and on the other hand of being for its own self [1, 2], having the object ideally . . . present in it [2]; of being [1] not only in the presence of the other [2, 3], but therein being in the presence of its own self [1, 2]. (158)

In comparison, self-consciousness is "being-for-self as consummated and posited." (158) Self-consciousness contemplates only itself.

The side of connexion with an other, with an external object, is removed. Self-consciousness is thus the nearest example of the presence of infinity. (158)

Self-consciousness, however, is far too advanced to be properly introduced yet. Self-consciousness exists at a very different level of the Logic from that of mere Being-for-self. Being-for-self is still qualitative, but self-consciousness is not. It will developed only at the end of the Doctrine of Essence. Nevertheless, consciousness is implicitly at stake in chapter 3 of the Science of Logic, because it partakes of True Infinity.

\[263\] TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 245. Taylor, however, offers an unjustified criticism of Hegel's transition from Being-for-self to Quantity. According to Taylor, when Being-for-self expels its content, the Logic should return back to the beginning—Pure Being and hence Pure Nothing. But instead Hegel presses on illegitimately to Quantity. "In this of course," Taylor writes,

Hegel seems to be having his cake and eating it, retaining those prerogatives of the subject he needs for his argument while remaining in the sphere of Being; but let us waive this objection in order to follow his argument.

Id. Taylor thus takes Being-for-self as a prerogative of the subject and therefore out of place in the transition to Quantity. This is clearly erroneous. Being-for-self is a necessary predicate of consciousness, not a prerogative that is derived from consciousness. The logic of Being-for-self is to expel all its content. But in doing so, Being-for-self does not retrogress. It becomes a Pure Quantity. Here Taylor fails to comprehend the difference between Pure Quantity and Pure Being. The difference is that Pure Quantity stands over against all its content. Hence Pure Quantity is a determinate indeterminacy, far more advanced than Pure Being, against which nothing stands. Taylor, in the above passage, accuses Hegel of retaining an aspect of consciousness—Being-for-self—and using it to foment the transition. But in fact Being-for-self is an aspect of consciousness, not the other way around.

\[264\] Hegel's remarks on consciousness may have misled Erroll Harris in his discussion of Being-for-self. He writes:

Being-for-self is not just the reflection of an object but the awareness of the relation between subject and object, and yet further the awareness that they are identical as one self-
(a) Determinate Being and Being-for-self

Being-for-self is "infinity which has collapsed into simple being." (158) Hence, we can portray it as follows:

Insert Figure 8(a) here (located at the end)

Here we see a change of the Understanding's focus. In chapter 1, [7] 6 [1], which occurs in both Figure 1(a) and Figure 2(a). This pattern represented Understanding's focus on the immediacy present in the middle term [7]. In chapter 2, [4, 5, 6] 6 [1]. This move started in Figure 3(a) and continued through Figure 7(a). This second pattern represented Understanding's focus on the mediation present in the middle term. Now, in Figure 8(a), Understanding focuses on the unity of immediacy and mediation. In other words, Understanding has progressed from Understanding as such in chapter 1, to Dialectical Reason in chapter 2, and now on Speculative Reason in chapter 3. It sees every move now as a True Infinite--a thing that stays what it is while it becomes something else.

Of Being-for-self, Hegel writes:

[I]t is determinate being in so far as the negative nature of infinity . . . is from now on in the explicit form of the immediacy of being, as only negation in general, as simple qualitative determinateness. (158)

This formulation is most paradoxical. At least, however, we can see that True Infinity was negative in nature. It was nothing else but Finitude erasing itself from within. What it erased was immediacy of being. We can also accept that this negative process has been presented in the form of an immediacy of being. This is what [1] in Figure 8(a) shows. But how is [1] in Figure 8(a) a Determinate Being consciousness . . . The idealizing of the object, however, is precisely the awareness by the subject of the relation between the idea and the object, as well, at the same time and by the same token, as the awareness of the object.

Id. at 111-12. These sentences and others, emphasizing "awareness" of a "subject," suggest that Harris takes being-for-self to be consciousness itself. But consciousness is far too advanced for it to be equated with being-for-self, even though, under the laws of sublation, being-for-self will be one of its constituent parts.

In the Phenomenology, consciousness that exhibits Being-for-self is the unhappy consciousness. HYPPOLITE, supra note 82, at 190-215. The unhappy consciousness sees itself as an entity, but it feels that its content is all outside itself--in an alien God. PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 14, ¶ 231 ("For the Unhappy Consciousness the in-itself is the beyond of itself").
(which implies that it is a determinate Negation)? Furthermore, how can [1] be a determinateness, which is a doubled figure, not an immediacy? The answer is that this is so on the laws of sublation. [1] is ever presented as a simple immediacy. This is the only way the Understanding can perceive things. Yet [1] has a history in determinateness.

But more can be said. True Infinity represents the self-erasure of all Finitude--transcendence above Limit (Determinateness as Such in Figure 4(c)). Limit, in turn, cleaves all determinatenesses in two. But Limit was transcended. What was erased--determinateness--is now present in Being-for-self--immediacy of being.

(b) Being-for-one

It is the role of Dialectical Reason to bring forth the negative voice that Understanding suppresses--a negative voice that it discovers by recollecting history. Hence, Dialectical Reason remembers that "determinate being is present in being-for-self." (159) Hegel names this negative recollection "Being-for-one."

Insert Figure 8(b) here (located at the end)

"This moment expresses the manner in which the finite is present in its unity with the infinite." (159) As such, it is "an ideal being." (159) It will be recalled that "ideal being [das Ideelle] is the Finite as it is in the true infinite"--a moment which is not self-substinent. (150) By calling Being-for-one a moment, we can say that it was present, but isn't any more. Only our memory of it is present--inside Being-for-self.

Hegel states that, because Being-for-one is an ideal being--a negative memory or "moment" inside Being-for-self, or [2]--it "is not present as a determinateness or limit." (159) Nor is it present as a mere other. Being-for-one is not yet a one. Hence, it is like being-in-itself--not yet explicit. "Consequently, what we have before us is still an undistinguishedness of the two sides." (159)

Hegel goes further to deny that we can even acknowledge that Figure 8(b) is a determinateness. Thus, he says things like:

there is only one being-for-other, and because there is only one,
this too is only a Being-for-one; there is only the one ideality
of that, for which or in which here is supposed to be a
determination as moment. (159)

Why this somewhat hysterical insistence that [1, 2] is really "one"? (Incidentally, this implies that [3] is not even before us. [3] is the otherness that has been sublated.) This instinct to insist that we suppress the multiplicity which is clearly visible in Figure 8(b)
perhaps comes from the fact that, at the beginning of chapter 3, the syllogism unfolds on the left side of the page--the side of "being." Later, in the middle of the chapter, the movement will occur toward the right of the page--the side of "nothing." At the end, we will be dead in the middle. All this is true, but with the understanding that chapter 3 is itself generally the middle term between chapters 1 and 2.

The issue is: why won't Hegel admit that Being-for-one is a determinateness? Here, in the left-leaning emphasis of "Being-for-self as Such," we cannot admit this. Determinateness as such (which Hegel named Limit in chapter 2) has been sublated. Therefore, we cannot refer to it without regressing. For this reason, "Being-for-one and being-for-self are, therefore, not genuinely opposed determinatenesses." (159)

On the other hand, by the law of sublation, we can equally affirm that Limit is present in Figure 8(b), because everything we have done in chapters 1 and 2 is canceled and preserved. Nevertheless, to dwell upon Limit is not progressive. We must escape our history and move forward.

Hegel permits us hypothetically to assume a difference between Being-for-self and Being-for-one, as we are sorely tempted to do as we gaze upon the concreteness of Figure 8(b). In such a case, "we speak of a being-for-self." (159) That is, [1] exists separate from [3]. In such a case, [1] is "the sublatedness of otherness." (159) As such, [1] "relates itself [1] to itself as the sublated other [3], and is therefore 'for one.'" (159) It is not "for an other." Thus, we simply cannot admit that [2] is Being-for-other"--i.e., [2, 3]. It is only Being-for-one--the Being-in-itself of Being-for-self.

To further explicate Being-for-one, Hegel states that the ego and God are ideal because they are infinite. They overcome all Limit. But as beings-for-themselves, "they are not 'ideally' different from that which is 'for one.'" (159) If they were, they wouldn't be advanced Infinites. They would be mere retrograde Determinate Beings. In other words, they would be constituted by others and not by themselves.

Remark: The German Expression, 'What For a Thing' (Meaning 'What Kind of a Thing')

Hegel has already expressed his delight with the speculative ambiguity of the German language. In the Remark following Being-for-one, he now lauds the German phrase, was für ein Ding, which means "What kind of a thing is that?" Literally translated, however, it means "What for a thing?"

Hegel thinks that this phrase illustrates Being-for-one. The

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265 See supra text accompanying note 124.
question does not ask, "What is A for B?" (Or, similarly, "what is A for me?") It asks, "What is A for A?" In this question, which seeks the quality of the thing, the quality (Being-for-one) returns to the thing. "[I]n other words that which is, and that for which it is, are one and the same." (160)

Ideal entities enjoy an "infinite self-relation." (159) Thus, "[e]go is for ego, both are the same, the ego is twice named, but[,] so that each of the two is only a 'for-one,' [the ego] is ideal." (160) The infinite "thing" referred to in was für ein Ding, whether this Ding be ego or any other Infinite, is both an identity and an ideality. That is, [1, 2] in Figure 8(b) is to be taken as an immediacy/identity, but only as an ideal immediacy. "Ideal," in general, designates "being" as it exists after it graduates from the college of True Infinity--"being" reduced to a mere moment or memory. In True Infinity, "reality" erases itself and becomes the deeper negative substance that lies beneath. Thus, Hegel remarks, "Ideality attaches . . . to the sublated determinations as distinguished from that in which [i.e., from which] they are sublated"--reality (160). In other words, reality is in the past\textsuperscript{266} and is now only remembered by Dialectical Reason as a moment.

Of [1, 2] in Figure 8(b), Hegel states that the ideal is one of its moments. Reality is its other moment. Both reality and ideality "are equally only for one and count only for one." (160) The ideality is also one reality--a reality without distinction (and for that very reason an ideality). Thus, perhaps, the ideality is a reality on the laws of sublation (but not otherwise). Nevertheless, reality is a definite "moment" in the ideality. Or to say the same thing in slightly different words, we saw in chapter 2 that "reality" precisely implied a linkage of being with nothing. Hence, a reality without distinction suggests that reality is sublated and hence is now only a memory--an ideality.

To return to the too-advanced example of consciousness, what Hegel seems to be getting at is that consciousness encounters reality, but it idealizes what it encounters. Hegel warns that consciousness is implicated in a difference between itself and other. This is equally true for self-consciousness, which has itself as object, from which it nevertheless stands as observer. Hegel suggests that observing consciousness produces conceptions, which are idealities taken as realities. Indeed, the history of the ideality is steeped in reality.

Nevertheless, Hegel warns against thinking of thought as only an ideal being. This would presuppose "the standpoint from which finite being counts as the real, and the ideal being or being-for-other has only a one-sided meaning." (160) In other words, an

\textsuperscript{266} This is a logical, "fantasy" past. Time does not exist in the Logic, so I am not talking about a historical past. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
empiricist, who counts only finite being as real, would view ideality as merely subjective. Hegel apparently wants to say that the real requires the ideal, and what is ideal is part of the definition of objectivity itself. Indeed, recall that ideality has been produced in the course of analyzing the being of objects. What we are saying about ideality is so far very much in the object. This is, after all, only chapter 3 of the Objective Logic. As of yet, there is no subjectivity at all! Hence, there can be no question of isolating reality from ideality, or of identifying the ideal as merely subjective.

Hegel now returns to the discussion of idealism he first commenced in chapter 2. There, he remarked that, in any philosophy, the precise question is always, "How far has the principle of idealism been carried through?" Further observations now become possible, courtesy of the appearance of Being-for-one.

Philosophies, Hegel muses, can be judged "on whether finite reality still retains an independent self-subsistence alongside being-for-self," which by now has sublated and hence surpassed mere reality. (161) Furthermore, a philosophy will be judged on "whether in the infinite itself the moment of being-for-one, a relationship of the ideal to itself as ideal, is posited." (161) That is, philosophy must recognize the moment of recollecting that which has been sublated. We may ask, however: What does it mean for the ideal to have a relation to itself? A relation (a middle term) requires simpler things (the extremes of the middle term). Otherwise, it does not perform the act of "relating." Hence, there must be simpler parts within the ideal thing. This is Being-for-one in Figure 8(b). Hence, in Figure 8(b), Being-for-self is a relation, and furthermore a relation to itself, since the parts are all internal to Being-for-self. Of course, we continue to snub [3], which is simply left out of our consideration for the moment.

On the above criteria of "good" philosophy, Spinoza is found wanting. He held that infinity is only the absolute affirmation of a thing. In his philosophy, substance does not reach Being-for-self, which is a negative idealization of the thing.

"[T]he noble Malebranche" receives a better mark for making idealism more explicit. (161). According to Malebranche, God includes within Himself all eternal truths. We see these truths only in God. God awakens our sensations of objects by an action of which

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267 Malebranche was an eighteenth century theologian who pushed Catholic thinking to the point of excommunication. Malebranche explored "occasionalism," the problem that God's grace seemed arbitrarily conveyed. Malebranche went so far as to imply that occasionalism evidenced God's narcissism. Man had to fall so that God could save him--occasionally. On Malebranche (and, incidentally, some connections with Hegel), see ŽIŽEK, TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 61, at 116-17; SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 78-80 (1997).
Leibniz frankly confessed as much. Bertrand Russell quotes him as saying, "I do not believe ... that any system is possible in which the monads interact, for there seems no possible way of explaining such action. Moreover, such action would be superfluous, for why should one monad give another what the other has already?" Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz 134 (1992)

The third sublates otherness in the sense that, if otherness is external, the monad is nothing (sublated) in terms of otherness.
not generate plurality from within the monad, and so plurality is external to itself (that is, a mere presupposition). Nor does any transition from plurality back to a whole ever occur. Ideality is merely formal in this system. As form, it stands over against the content (plurality). Ideality is not immanent within the monads.

Other idealisms (such as Kant's) are given bad marks. They "do not go beyond the ought or the infinite progress." (163) They see a dualism of Determinate Being and Being-for-self. In other words, the perceived phenomenon never makes itself into the Kantian thing-in-itself; hence, we can never know the thing-in-itself. Hegel does concede that, in Kant's philosophy, the thing-in-itself "enters into the ego and becomes something for it." (163) This thing-in-itself is thus "perpetuated as a negative being-in-itself." (163) That is, it is [2], which is the Being-in-itself for [1], but it is also negative [3]. This means that the thing-in-itself has erased itself and posited its material in the ego. The ego [1, 2] then becomes ideal. But the moment of Being-for-one is not completed to the point where [3] simply vanishes. [3], in Figure 8(b), can be taken as Kant's thing-in-itself, which Being-for-self [1, 2] refuses to acknowledge. For this reason, it was "faintly" drawn in Figure 8(b). Of course, recall that we continue to refuse recognition to [3].

(c) The One

In Figure 8(b), "Being-for-self is the simple unity of itself and its moment, being-for-one." (163) In effect, Being-for-self refuses to acknowledge [3]. Rather, Dialectical Reason is convinced that the relation between self and other is "ideal"—occurring totally on the "being" side of the page. This coheres with the basic "leftist" bias of which the first part of all of Hegel's "Quality" chapters are guilty. Thanks to this bias, "[t]here is before us only a single determination, the self-relation of the sublating." (163) Hegel explains that the

moments of being-for-self have collapsed into the
undifferentiatedness which is immediacy or being, but an immediacy based on the negating which is posited as its determination. (163)

In other words, what comes to the fore in the One is the negativity inherent in Being-for-self and Being-for-one. In this negativity, [3] was not even acknowledged. The pure negativity of refusing to acknowledge the Other is now the middle term. Refusal to acknowledge as such is now front and center (or "posited.")
Now some questions may arise as to why I have drawn the One in this fashion. Were we not recently in the habit of ignoring [3] altogether? Why now do we say that Being-for-one is [3], when [3] has been abolished? For that matter, why did Figure 8(b) show [3] as Being-for-one, if the point was to abolish [3]?

The answer is that refusing to recognize something is the surest way of recognizing it, and therefore [3] was never abolished. Throughout most of the last century, the United states refused to "recognize" the government in Cuba. Yet Cuba was a peculiar obsession of Americans. They did scarcely anything else but focus on Cuba during the days when they did not recognize it.

Similarly, if the One stands for the ongoing act of refusing to recognize otherness [3], then [3] is very much recognized. Hence, the One becomes the pure notion of refusal to recognize. Or, as Hegel put it, the One is "an immediacy based on the negating which is posited as its determination." (163)

Hegel immediately follows with this initially baffling observation:

Being-for-self is thus a being-for-self, and since in this immediacy its inner meaning vanishes, it is the wholly abstract limit of itself--the one. (163)

This remark, I think, more accurately describes Figure 9(a), which looks like this:

What the above-quoted passage presages, somewhat ahead of its time, is that Being-for-self has reduced itself to pure refusal to recognize otherness. In its refusal, it unintentionally recognizes otherness as such. If we take this snubbed otherness to be of equal dignity to the Being-for-self, then the One is merely a Being-for-self. Furthermore, as mere refusal to recognize the other, the One's inner meaning has vanished. If it is only refusal to recognize, the content of the One must be entirely in the Other that the One refuses to recognize. Or, in other words, in refusing to recognize the Other, the One refuses to recognize its own self.

At the level of Figure 8(c), however, we can affirm that the One does indeed recognize [3], in the guise of refusing to recognize it. For this reason, [3] is one of the constituent parts of the One.

Hegel concludes "the One" with the following methodological observation, which, I think, justifies the design of Figure 8(c):
Attention may be drawn in advance to the difficulty involved in the following exposition of the development of the one and to [this difficulty's] cause. The moments which constitute the Notion of the one as a being-for-self fall asunder in the development. They are: (1) negation in general [3], (2) two negations [2, 3, 4, 6], [4-7], (3) two that are therefore the same [1] = [3], (4) sheer opposites [1], [3], (5) self-relation, identity as such [1, 2, 4, 5], [2, 3, 4, 6], [4-7] (6) relation which is negative and yet to its own self [7]. (163)

Hegel states that the reason for separating these moments here is to draw attention to the fact that the One is not just Being-for-self as such but a Being-for-self that, in effect, recognizes other Beings-for-themselves--a plurality that will be expressly recognized in the next section. Thus, "each moment is posited as a distinct, affirmative determination, and yet they are no less inseparable." (164) In other words, the pretence of the One is that it has no relation with the other Ones to which it is unconnected. But, of course, nothing is, after all something, and no relation is, after all, a kind of relation. In short, by not recognizing [3], the One recognizes [3], and so it becomes a One, rather than One as such. Because it is merely a One, there is perforce another One. There are in fact Many, as we are about to discover.270

B. The One and the Many

According to Figure 9(a), the mere empty space of the middle

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270 In the above account, the One in Figure 8(c) is the name given to the pure refusal of being to recognize the other as its constituent part. Charles Taylor has a far different interpretation, which he admits departs from Hegel's "fanciful" derivation of the One. According to Taylor:

[A] being of this kind can only be picked out, that is, distinguished from others, by some numeration-like procedure. In other words, we can only identify a particular being of this kind by attributing to it some number in a series, or some ordinal position. For all beings of this kind are identical in being without determinate quality, they can only be distinguished numerically.

Of course, in this argument I am taking for granted that identifying "the one" is the same as distinguishing it from others, that a being of this kind is only conceivable as one among many. How else can a being without internal differentiation by identified, except in contrast with others?

TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 245. Taylor, I think, mixes in thoughts about Number and Degree as he worries about identifying One from some other One. Taylor entirely misses the derivation of the Many from the One, which is a necessary precondition to ordinal numbers. This derivation depends on the One's status as a True Infinite, as we shall see in the next section.
term was moved over to the left. Thus, if in Figure 8(a) we moved the middle term as such, now we move the place where the middle term ought to have been. What gets moved is a sort of ghost of Being-for-self. Hegel describes that move as follows:

The one is the simple self-relation of being-for-self in which its moment have collapsed in themselves and in which, consequently, being-for-self has the form of immediacy, and its moments therefore now have a determinate being. (164)

Figure 9(a), then, represents a seizure of the "collapsed moments" by the Understanding. The end result is the immediacy which Hegel names the One. One does have Determinate Being--but only as its moment. That is, we have only the recollection of that moment--not Determinate Being as such, which by now has been sublated.

Thus, the One of Figure 9(a) is "self-relation of the negative." (164) Furthermore it is a process--a process of determining. What does it determine? The very Other [3] it has been refusing to recognize. Thus, non-recognition is, after all, a recognition. It is also a process of self-determining. It is self-determining because it is in the process of recognizing only itself (and not the excluded Other). This duality can be portrayed as follows:

Insert Figure 9(b) here (located at the end)

The One and the Void

In this duality of process, we have before us ideality [1, 2]. Here, otherness is present as a mere moment/recollection of the past. Hence, [2] is within the One. But [1] also determines, and hence [3] comes into existence. This "unrecognized" entity is named the Void. Because the Void is posited, "reality"--overt Determinateness as such, or the presence of Limit--reasserts itself. Of this reappearance of reality at the expense of ideality, Hegel writes:

The ideality of being-for-self as a totality thus reverts . . . to reality and that too in its most fixed, abstract form, as the one.

(164)

Thus, the One is a relation of relations. It is the unity of ideality (self-relation) and reality (relation to Other).

Hegel concludes the preamble to "The One and the Void" by reminding the reader of a process that should now be familiar. Dialectical Reason brings forth [2] as the voice of [1]. [2] is the "in-itself" of the One.

[What the one is in itself [2] is now only ideally present in it, and the negative consequently is an other distinct from it [3].
What shows itself to be present as distinct from the one [3] is its [1] own self-determining . . . (164)

Hegel puts the same point in slightly different words:

[T]he unity of the one with itself [1, 2] as thus distinguished from itself [1] is reduced to a relation [2], and as a negative unity it [1] is a negation of its own self as other [2], exclusion of the one as other from itself [2, 3]. (164)

In other words, Dialectical Reason focuses on [2], which implies [3]. But since [2] is the genuine voice of the One, the One itself has produced the void.

(a) The One in its own self

This subsection of the chapter is in fact about Figure 9(a), even though both Figures 9(a) and 9(b) have already been described in earlier passages.

Of Figure 9(a), Hegel writes that the One is unalterable:

In its own self the one simply is; this its being is neither a determinate being, nor a determinateness as a relation to an other, nor is it a constitution; what it is, in fact, is the accomplished negation of this circle of categories. Consequently, the one is not capable of becoming an other: it is unalterable. (164)

That the One is not Determinate Being, determinateness, or Constitution is true on the laws of sublation. By now, these have been reduced to idealities--mere moments. The One of Figure 9(a) is thus simply the bare refusal to recognize the Other--and nothing else.\(^\text{271}\)

The One is indeterminate--but it is not the same indeterminacy that Pure Being was in Figure 1(a). The One's indeterminateness is a determinateness, as Figure 9(b) shows. The One is related to its "self" [2]. The One is "a self-related negation." (165) That is, [2] is negation of [1] yet it is [1]'s own voice, as Dialectical Reason

\(^{271}\) Erroll Harris gets it wrong. I believe, when he suggests:

> being-for-self is simply one--not one among many, but one differentiating itself into and as many internal moments . . .

> Being-for-self is a differentiated whole.

HARRIS, supra note 7, at 115. It is rather more true that the One expels its many moments into the Void and remains an empty shell \textit{without} internal moments. That, at least, is what Being-for-self is "for itself." For us," we can see, in the main, that this act of Repulsion will be unsuccessful.
recollects. Difference is therefore in the One.

The One negates itself. That is, it is a "self-related negation." (165) Hence, the One [1] turns away from itself to an Other--[2],

but this movement is immediately turned back on itself, because it follows from this moment of self-determining that there is no other to which the one can go . . . (165)

Here, Hegel reminds us that the premise of the One is that it absolutely refuses to recognize the Other. Hence, [1] flees [2], but it cannot, consistent with its principle, move to [3]. It must retreat back to [1]. In light of this retreat,

the mediation of determinate being and of ideality itself, and with it all difference and manifoldness, has vanished. There is nothing in it. (165)

In effect, the One has holed itself up in [1] and refuses even to recognize its own content--[2]. As [1], the One has distinguished itself from being-within-self as such [2]. The One is therefore truly content-less.

This state of being without content makes the One unalterable, because things alter only as a result of a dynamic which depends on Dialectical Reason recalling that [2] exists. But the One has now expelled [2], and, with it, any hope of alteration. This, I think, is what Hegel means in the following enigmatic passage:

[The One] is indeterminate but not, however, like being; its indeterminateness is the determinateness which is a relation to its own self, an absolute determinateness--posited being-within-self. (165)

Notice that the indeterminateness of the One is an absolute determinateness. This phrase "absolute determinateness" connotes "relation" as such separate and apart from the parts it relates. "Relation" isolated from its parts is an entity that is all form and no content.

If the One as [1] is this absolute determinateness--a relation without parts--then why is it also posited being-within-self, which we have always associated with [2]? The answer is that being-within-self was always the negative voice of the Understanding which it suppressed. Dialectical Reason, through recollection, brings [2] to the fore. Yet, what was [2]? It was always that which unified [1] and [3]. But if we now say that we wish to consider [2] as a relation but without any reference to its parts, then [2] would be relation as such. But that is what we are saying [1] is. [1] = [2], and both are "posited" as being-within-self as such--relation without any content
to unify.

The One [1] has isolated itself from its being-within-self [2]. The One, a nothing, is "the abstraction of self-relation" (165)--relation isolated from its parts. Nevertheless, it is to be distinguished! The One posits itself as nothing, and therefore it also posits being-within-self as its absolute other. "[T]his being-within-self no longer has the simple character of something but, as a mediation, has a concrete determination." (165) That is, being-within-self is [2, 3] in Figure 9(b)--concrete and mediating.272

The One has expelled its own being-within-self, and this, of course, implies that the One's being is entirely outside of itself. But, of course, the expelled material [2, 3] is actually the One's own self. The One has thus expelled itself from itself. Thus, [2] continues to be the One, but, as expelled, and as mediation, it must latch onto [3], which is revealed therefore to be just as much in [1] as not in [1]. In short, [1] = [3].

Hegel has already named [3] as the Void. But by virtue of the equality just expressed, the Void is "posited as in the one . . . The void is thus the quality of the one in its immediacy."

(b) The One and the Void

In this section Hegel explicitly discusses Figure 9(b), where the One confronts the Void. But in fact [1] = [3]. Hence, "[t]he One is the void as the abstract relation of the negation to itself." (165) In other words, the One and also the Void are relation as such, without reference to any parts. They are thoroughgoing negatives.

Even though [1] = [3], [1] and [3] are also different. The One has affirmative being, but the Void does not. Their difference is "posited" by Dialectical Reason. What is the difference? Nothing more than this: "as distinct from the affirmative being of the one, the nothing as the void is outside it." (165) Thus, the One has a content--it is simply not the Void. And, of course, the Void has a

272 One might say at this point of [2]--which implies [2, 3]--that it has Being-for-self. This would be to say that [2] is indifferent to [1]. If we do say this, we come close to Erroll Harris's remark:

This being for itself of its other [2], this grasp of the relation between self and other, as for one and for itself, is the essence of ideality.

HARRIS, supra note 7, at 111. Harris, who admits to nervousness about his grasp of Being-for-self, is perhaps correct that [1]'s "other" is [2] and that [2] has Being-for-self. But, besides having Being-for-self, [2] is the essence of ideality because [2] stands for a recollected "moment" of [1, 2]'s history in reality. Hence, contrary to its Being-for-self, [2] has sublated Being-for-other. On the basis of this paradox, Harris formulation can be affirmed.
content—it is not the One.

In light of this difference, Figure 9(b) is once again infected with Determinate Being.

The one [1] and the void [3] have negative relation to self [2] for their common, simple base. The moments of being-for-self emerge from this unity, become external to themselves . . . (165)

Thus, taken by themselves, the One and the Void are isolated and have renounced their connection with being-within-self. But Dialectical Reason sees the truth. The renunciation is a fraud. The One (and the Void) are retrogressive Determinate Beings.273

Remark: Atomism

By now it should be apparent that Hegel was a huge opponent of any philosophy that presupposes self-identity of objects. At the deepest core of the object is a modulating unity of being and nothing. It follows, then, that Hegel will not be enamored of "atomism." He calls it an example of "figurate conception."274 (166)

273 Erroll Harris confesses that he does not fathom the transition from the One to the Void.

But Hegel makes a very complex and obscure transition from the One to the Void, by drawing a distinction within the One between abstract self-relation as empty . . . and its concrete affirmative being.

HARRIS, supra note 7, at 116. This would appear to be a misreading. The One [1] expels the Void [2, 3]. Hence, at least at the level of Figure 9(b) the distinction is not within the One. Nor is the affirmative being of [1] "concrete" following the expulsion of the Void. It is, ironically, the void that is concrete. Affirmative self-relation is empty, precisely the opposite of what Harris says.

Harris goes on to suggest that, according to Hegel, [1] "reverts" to determinateness. Id. More accurately, when [1] expels [3], [3] automatically implies [2, 3]--a determinateness. But [3] is likewise the One. As such, it expels [2] which implies automatically implies [1, 2]. Hence, [1] does, in a sense, become a determinateness--indirectly, because of [3]'s action, but it definitely does not revert to a determinateness. [1, 2]--the product of [3]'s act of repulsion--is in fact a different entity than the [1] the expelled [2] and created [2, 3]. The One is about to become the Many, which happens in the very next section. Our discussion there will make clear why "reversion" is inappropriately invoked.

Harris finishes his analysis by suggesting that, after Figure 9(b), the One and the Void each "emerge from this whole as determinate beings." Id. This is indeed how Speculative Reason analyzes the modulation of Figure 9(b), but the middle term (Repulsion) will soon rescue them from this seemingly retrogressive move.

274 On Hegel's opposition to atomism, see HARRIS, supra note 7, at 7-8.
"Picture thinking" is ever the bête noir for Hegel. Hegel states that the atomism of the ancient Greeks was the exultation of the One and the Void. Admittedly, atomism was an advance over Parmenides's "being" or Heracleitus's "becoming." But, in the end it is equally easy for figurate conception to picture here atoms and alongside them the void. It is, therefore, no wonder that the atomistic principle has at all times been upheld; the equally trivial and external relation of composition which must be added to achieve a semblance of concreteness and variety is no less popular than the atoms themselves and the void. The one and the void is being-for-self, the highest qualitative being-within-self, sunk back into complete externality; the immediacy . . . of the one . . . is posited as being no longer . . . alterable; such therefore is its absolute, unyielding rigidity that all determination, variety, conjunction remains for it an utterly external relation. (166)

In other words, atomism can account for the repulsion of one atom from another, but it has no theory (other than subjective composition) that suggests why atoms adhere together.  

Atomic thinkers, Hegel continues, did not remain wedded to the brute externality of the One and the Void. The Void was recognized as the source of movement, which, of course, means that the One and the Void did not have a purely external relation. Thus, the One can move only into unoccupied space--not into space already occupied by a One. But this "not trivial" (166) piece of information means only that the Void is the presupposition or condition of movement--not is ground. In addition, the very idea of movement is also presupposed in this view. That is, no logical connection between the One and the Void is yet recognized. The profounder view is that the void constitutes the ground of movement . . . [I]n the negative as such there lies the ground of becoming, of the unrest of self-movement . . . (166)

Hegel concludes the Remark by complaining:

Physics with its molecules and particles suffers from the atom, this principle of extreme externality, which is thus utterly devoid of the Notion, just as much as does that theory of the State which starts from the particular will of individuals. (167)

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275 Burbidge, Chemistry, supra note 205, at 609.

276 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel complain that the atomists presume to think they are not being metaphysical:
Physics, of course, has wised up since 1815. Today, quantum mechanics, is eerily Hegelian in structure, as if Hegel had peered somehow into the very structure of matter. Liberal philosophy, however, definitely has never escaped its reliance on the self-identity of the free (i.e., adult, white, male) individual, for whom the state is merely "useful." Any kind of utilitarian or contractarian philosophy (such as that of John Rawls) is fundamentally atomistic in its outlook. Such philosophies do not get past the One and the Void.

(c) Many Ones: Repulsion

"The one and the void constitute the first stage of the determinate being of being-for-self," Hegel writes. "Each of these moments has negation for its determination." (167) Indeed, the One and the Void are nothing but negation as such. But each stands over against the other: "the one is negation in the determination of being, and the void is negation in the determination of non-being."

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At present, students of nature who are anxious to avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear to Atomism. But it is not possible to escape metaphysics and cease to trace nature back to terms of thought, by throwing ourselves into the arms of Atomism. The atom, in fact, is itself a thought; and hence the theory which holds matter to consist of atoms is a metaphysical theory. Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is true; but, to his honour be it said, he did not by any means obey his own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do not think: while man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician.

The real question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether our metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are not, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of thought, rigidly fixed by understanding, and making these the basis of our theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on this ground that one objects to the Atomic philosophy.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 98 Remark.

277 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel writes:

In modern times the importance of the atomic theory is even more evident in political than in physical science. According to it, the will of individuals as such is the creative principle of the State: the attracting force is the special wants and inclinations of individuals; and the Universal, or the State itself, is the external nexus of a compact.

LESSER LOGIC, supra note 9, § 98.
This pure positionality vis-a-vis each other is their "thin" claim to the honor of "being."

Figure 9(b) has the by-now-familiar attribute of being pure motion, a movement that travels through [2]. Hence, Hegel writes:

The being-for-self of the one [1, 2] is, however, essentially the ideality of determinate being [2] and of other [3]: it [1, 2] relates itself not to an other [3] but only to itself [2]. But since being-for-self is fixed as a one, as affirmatively for itself, as immediately present, its negative relation to itself is at the same time a relation to an affirmative being . . . (167)

In this difficult passage, Hegel in effect emphasizes that [2] is [1]'s own voice. Yet [2] always implies [3]. That is, Dialectical Reason brings [2] to the fore, but [2] is always yet another "being"—a [3]. Hence, [3] = [1], but also [1]'s relation to [3] is, at the same time, "a relation to an affirmative being"—that is, [3] is radically different from Being-for-self, which can be defined as [1, 2]. Thus, [3] is "a determinate being [2, 3] and an other"—[3], as excluded from [1, 2].

Many Ones. The upshot of the above discussion is [1, 2] expels [2]. But [2] implies [3]. And [3] is just as much the One as [1] or [1, 2] is. Hence, "[t]he one is consequently a becoming of many ones."

Is this justified that there are many ones? Have we not simply produce a single other One—to wit, [3]? In other words, in Figure 9(b), do we witness [1] 6 [3] infinite times, and [3] 6 [1] infinite times? If so, we have mere alternation, not infinite multiple production. Such an alternation is merely the Spurious Infinite. In this monotonous process, we don't have "many Ones" but only [1] 6 [3] 6 [1].

Such a move would be regressive. We have already sublated the Spurious Infinite. Hence, [3] 6 [1] violates the Logic of [1] and constitutes an "external reflection" on our part. (168) In other words, "for us," we are tempted to say that [1] infinitely produces the same [3] and vice versa. But the standpoint of the One is absolute indifference to the other Ones. It is we who proclaim the many Ones as a single One. Logic as such does indeed produce many Ones, which imperialist thought insists on unifying.278 We are not at this point licensed to unify in this way. (This will be licensed in Figure 10(a), when the Many Ones are united in Attraction.)

Hegel confirms that the above account is why we must admit that the Void and the One are each Many Ones. Only "external reflection"

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278 Clark Butler points out that, for atomists, the universe as aggregate of innumerable beings-for-self is a definition of the absolute. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 94-95.
denies the many-ness of the Ones. (168) To prove this, Hegel compares Figure 9(b) to becoming, as this is presented in Figure 2(b). In Figure 2(b), [1] expels its otherness and continued to be. It did not "cease-to-be." In Figure 9(b), when [1] expelled its otherness and continued to be. It did not "cease-to-be." [1] in Figure 9(b) therefore has resilience, whereas [1] in Figure 2(b) had none whatever. What occurs in Figure 9(b), then, is that the One [1, 2] repels itself [2] from itself. Yet, in doing so, [1] is, and it remains what it is. [1] does not cease-to-be.\(^{279}\)

If, when [3] likewise repels itself from itself, we must not say that [3]'s product is [1] as such. If we did, then, reverting back to [1] 6 [3], [1] must have ceased-to-be, such that [3] can create [1] anew. Instead, it must not be the case that [3] 6 [1]. Rather, [3] becomes yet some other [1]. If we insist upon [3] 6 [1], we are implying that [1] ceased-to-be. We have reduced what Hegel will call Repulsion of the Ones into mere Ceasing-to-be—a highly reactionary move.


what is immediately suggested to external reflection: repulsion not as the generation of ones, but only as the mutual repelling of ones presupposed as already present. (168)

That is, in the false move, [3] presupposes what it produces is [1], when it is not licensed to say anything about what its Other is—except that it is not [3].

Of what [1] produces, Hegel writes:

[T]he products of the process are ones, and these are not for an other, but relate themselves infinitely to themselves. The one

\(^{279}\) One commentator sees the resilience of the extremes even as they expel themselves from themselves as the hallmark of Measure, discussed infra in chapter 7. Cinzia Ferrini, Framing Hypotheses: Numbers in Nature and the Logic of Measure in the Development of Hegel's System, 295-96 in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998). It should be clear, however, that such an attribute of the extremes is already present at a much earlier stage—in the Many Ones. Indeed, the extreme that goes outside of itself and stays what it is—this is precisely the unique contribution of the True Infinite. TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 253.
repels only itself from itself, therefore does not become but already is . . . (168)

If, on the other hand, we said [3] reproduces the original [1], then we would be admitting that [3] contains Being-for-other. Thus:

If plurality were a relation of the ones themselves to one another then they would limit one another and there would be affirmatively present in them a being-for-other. (168)

The above proposition cannot be true. [3] is the One and is strictly "for itself," just as [1] was. Thus, [3] cannot be said to reproduce [1]. Rather it produces some other One. And, for that matter, [1] reproduces "many" [3]'s. As both [1] and [3] are infinite processes, they instantaneously\(^{280}\) fill the universe with Many Ones. "The plurality of ones . . . unconstrainedly produces itself."

(169) Of these mutually indifferent Ones, Hegel writes: "The void is their limit but a limit which is external to them, in which they are not to be for one another." (168) It should be apparent why Limit [2] is external to [1], which continues to "be" as pure negativity towards the other Ones.\(^{281}\)

This negative shedding of content is called, at this stage, Repulsion. Repulsion is the name of the middle term between the One and the Void. It names the very movement by which [1]—and also [3]—shed [2], so that each can be truly One.

\(^{280}\) "Instantaneously" means in no time at all. Since the Logic does not occur in time, the universe is "instantaneously" full of Many Ones.

\(^{281}\) This account of the birth of multiplicity is entirely absent from Terry Pinkard's interpretation of Attraction and Repulsion. Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics*, 41 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 453, 456-58 (1980-81). He thinks Hegel simply asserts "the notion of quantitatively distinct units" as following from the identity of the One and the Many. *Id.* at 457. But I think Hegel does show that distinct units are a direct consequence of True Infinity which stays what it is as it becomes something else, thereby producing multiple ones through its repulsing activity.
Repulsion is said to be "a simple relating of the one to the one, and no less also the absolute absence of relation in the one." (169) Repulsion is the fixed name of an active process (as all middle terms are). In repulsion, the One sublates all its otherness once and for all. It becomes a "purified" being. But as such, it has no content at all! Whatever content the One has is somewhere outside it. This is what Hegel meant when he indicated (168) that the One's Limit [2] was entirely external to the One.  

**Remark: The Monad of Leibniz**

In the remark following "Being-for-one," Hegel discussed Leibniz's "ideating monad," which was conditionally praised for its ideality, but criticized for its utter indifference to otherness. In Hegel's view, Leibnizian idealism "does not grasp [the ideating monad] as a repulsion of the monads." (169) Atomism (denounced in the Remark just prior to this one) counts for even less. It does not even possess the notion of ideality.

(I)t does not grasp the one as an ideal being, that is, as containing within itself the two moments of being-for-self and being-for-it, but only as a simple, dry, real being-for-self. (169)

It does, however, surpass Leibnizian idealism in that it goes "beyond mere indifferent plurality." (169) Thus, atoms repel and attract each other, unlike the monad.

**C. Repulsion and Attraction**

**(a) Exclusion of the One**

We now face some very heavy weather. Virtually every turn of phrase within every sentence shall require special attention. There is no other way to follow Hegel through the underbrush of this difficult subsection.  

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282 Charles Taylor entirely misses the derivation of the Many from the One, and so it is not surprising that he names Repulsion as "another example of a detour [from] essential notions." TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 246. Taylor apparently is stuck on what Hegel called the "second repulsion" of external reflection, which is not productive of the Many. See supra text accompanying note 278.

283 John Burbidge's "fragmentary" comment on the Logic takes a vacation just before this spot is hit. JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL'S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A
The One was earlier said to be a non-relation--or a relation without parts. This suggests absolute indifference of the One toward any other One. The One is a free-floating entity in the Void. Hence, as a non-relation, Hegel now says that the Determinate Being of the Many Ones "is external to them." (170) The Ones are therefore "this negative relation to themselves as [well as] to affirmatively present others--the demonstrated contradiction, infinity posited in the immediacy of being." (170)

What does it mean for a One to be a "negative relation to itself"? Fundamentally, it is the posture of the entity that says, "I am not that." Thus, the One says, "I am not the Void." In fact, the One is nothing but this announcement of what it is not. And what it is not is its very being-in-itself [2], which it has repulsed. Hence, the One, in its self-hatred, has expelled its own determinateness from itself, and has therefore propagated the many Ones. As a relation without parts, it is no doubt an absurdity--a "demonstrated contradiction." (170) It should also be clear by now why the One is an "infinity posited in the immediacy of being." The One is certainly immediate, and, in addition, the One is an Infinite. Recall that the True Infinite was a pure movement of the Finites exceeding their Limitations. This is, of course, what the One has accomplished. In effect, it has gone beyond its Limitations and is nothing at all.

Repulsion now finds itself facing what it repelled. What was excluded was the Many Ones, which, though plural, are taken as a unified whole (even as each of the Ones is completely indifferent to each other One). Hence, we have

Insert Figure 10(a) here (located at the end)

Attraction

In Figure 10(a), [4, 5, 6] represent the Many Ones, as produced in Figure 9(b). This is the "exclusion" that Repulsion faces.

In Figure 8(a), the entire middle term was taken as an immediacy, and it became Being-for-self. In Figure 9(a), the mere negation of the middle term was taken--the negative, ghostly version of [4, 5, 6]. It became the One. Now Figure 10(a) seemingly shows a retrogression--an expulsion of mediation of the middle term. This seizure of "mediation" by the Understanding was characteristic of the moves in chapter 2, such as Figure 3(a). Have we retrogressed?

I think the answer is "no." In chapter 3(a), we saw that Hegel designated the Understanding as an external reflection. That is, we, as a hidden fourth, made the Understanding progress. Yet we

COMMENTARY (1981). Erroll Harris finds it "difficult to understand and interpret." HARRIS, supra note 7, at 116. Terry Pinkard calls this part of the Logic "boisterously obscure." Pinkard, supra note 280, at 457. If these astute philosophers had trouble, we had all better prepare for the worst.
progressed only by the use of the middle term's immanent materials. But in Figure 10(a), Repulsion does all the work of alienating the Many Ones. In other words, external reflection in the Understanding has been displaced by the operations of True Infinity. Now, in Figure 10(a), Repulsion itself generates the forces needed to expel the Many Ones.

In Figure 10(a), the One—which we will take as [7]—"repels from itself only the many ones which are neither generated nor posited by it." (170) Does this contradict what was said with regard to Figure 9(b), where the One generated (and posited) the Void? There we learned that the Void, in turn, was not only another One but was Many Ones. Hence the Void was posited. In Figure 10(a), that which Repulsion excretes was not posited. The contradiction is resolved because Repulsion is at a higher level than the positing activity of Figure 9(b). Repulsion is the unity between the many Ones—not the producer of the Ones. Hence, Repulsion did not generate or "posit" the Many Ones. The Many ones were posited earlier, by the Ones themselves. Indeed, Repulsion itself was posited by the Many Ones. What "posited" Repulsion does in Figure 10(a) is to isolate the unposited Ones—and thereby to unify them. The mere grouping of all the diverse Ones together is what Hegel calls Attraction.

Hegel next states: "This mutual or all-round repelling is relative, is limited by the being of the ones." (170) Why is Limit—a sublated term—invoked here? What this denotes is that Repulsion, being an act, must be a correlative. There is the repelling One and, necessarily, the repelled One. Being correlative, Repulsion is limited—by the being of the Ones. Or, in other words, repelling takes the form we saw in Figure 9(b).

By invoking Limit here, Hegel explains that, in Figure 10(a), [7] is left behind. Thus, [7] is limited—left behind—by "the being of the ones;" the ones now become [1]. Furthermore, if this is Repulsion's own work—and not the work of external reflection—Repulsion limits itself. It [7] refuses to recognize itself beyond this Limit [4, 5, 6]. Of course, this refusal to recognize is the perfect recognition. Hence, [7] exceeds its Limit, like the good Infinity it is, and is covertly [1].

This means that, in Figure 10(a), [7] does not really remains behind but is swept along with the Many Ones, against its will. Its attempt to isolate itself fails. We can view this failure as a representation of Repulsion's inability to sustain itself as an isolated entity, separate and apart from Attraction—a dependence

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284 Limit, it will be recalled, was correlative. For this reason, the point (as limit to the line) spontaneously generated the line. See supra text accompanying notes 230.

285 We will see this phenomenon of being left behind but covertly going along in the guise of Determination of Reflection in the Doctrine of Essence.
that will soon be made explicit.

Of [1], Hegel writes that "[t]he plurality is, in the first place, non-posited otherness." (170) That [4, 5, 6] is not posited we have already seen. Repulsion found the Many Ones as "given" to it. Repulsion therefore proceeded to expel non-posited materials. This plurality is Limit to [7]. And, in addition, we know through the laws of sublation that the plurality [4, 5, 6] is also the Void, as shown in Figure 9(b).

This implies that [4, 5, 6] are the Many Ones, but also an immediacy--the void. We thus have further justified the design in Figure 10(a), where the Many Ones became an immediacy, standing over against [7]--another immediacy.

The Many Ones paradoxically "are . . . in the void" (170). Yet each One is in the process of "repulsing" the Void. Hence, Repulsion [7] is a relation [4, 5] to another One [1, 2, 4, 5] and "is the posited determinate being of the many ones." (170)

Repulsion, however, is not the being-for-self of the Ones, we are told, "for according to this they would be differentiated as many only in a third." (170) What does this mean?

Being-for-self refuses to recognize otherness. Hence, the relation of One to the Void (and hence to another One) could not be a "relation." Relations, after all, expressly depend on otherness. Every "whole" must have its "parts." If the Ones [4, 5, 6] had Being-for-self and also a relation to another One [7] (as Repulsion shows), then external reflection would have to assert the relation, as Repulsion's very task is to deny all relation. To hear Repulsion tell the tale, the relation would not be immanent to the Ones themselves. But Repulsion is a liar. Instead, "it is their own differentiating which preserves" the Ones. (170) That is, the Ones are in the process of expelling the Void from themselves--in Figure 9(b). This process as such is the middle term in Figure 9(c). And in this middle term, the Ones [4, 5, 6] are preserved--though now expelled in Figure 10(a).

The Ones also "posit one another as being only for-one." (170) Being-for-one, it will be recalled, was idealized Being-in-itself--mere memory of a determinateness, brought forth in Figure 8(b) by Dialectical Reason. Now, however, the One [1, 2] expels [2]; [2] becomes the Void and hence one of the Many Ones. In this expulsion, "the being-for-one as determined in exclusion is, consequently, a being-for-other." (170) This remark is best understood as referring to Figure 9(b)--not the current Figure 10(a).

In Figure 9(b), Being-for-one [2] is expelled and hence is, in effect, Being-for-other. But if [2] is Being-for-other, then [1] is "other" to Being-for-other. This allows Hegel to suggest that [2, 3] likewise expels [1]. [1] is in fact expelled by its other. In effect, [1] is now "not for itself but for-one, and that another one." (170) In other words, [1] is "for" [2, 3].
Also, if it is true that [2, 3] has now expelled [1] as its other, then, likewise, in Figure 10(c), the Many Ones [4, 5, 6] have expelled [7], which is the advanced version of the One. The Many Ones now are seen to take the initiative. They have said to [7]: "You can't fire us. We quit!"

This initiative of the Many Ones is the "being-for-self of the many ones." (170) It is "their self-preservation," which is achieved by the mutual repulsion of the One and the Many Ones. That is, [7] fires the Many Ones, and the Many Ones fire [7]. In fact, Hegel implies that not only does the union of the Many Ones repel [7], but within [4, 5, 6], the Many Ones repel each other. In so doing, "each posits the others as a mere being-for-other." (170) This is a higher version of the reciprocal "flip" I have just referred to. It implies that the One [1] is Other to its very self [1, 2]. In other words, the Ones simultaneously preserve themselves and negate themselves--the hallmark of True Infinity and of sublation itself.

The ones "maintain themselves through their reciprocal exclusion." (171) This is their Being-for-self, and it is shown by [1] in Figure 10(a). This Being-for-self is the active process of repulsing Being-in-itself. Yet the expelled Being-in-itself [2] ended up being the One [2, 3] just as much as the expelling One [1, 2] was. All the Ones are [2]: "they are in their being-in-itself the same." (171) Furthermore, [1] negates its own Determinate Being [2, 3]. But, once again, all the ones do this! In this regard, they are all the same. "Consequently, as regards both their being and their positing, they are only one affirmative unity." (171) This again is seen as [1] in Figure 10(a). This "sameness" is the Attraction of the supposedly diverse Ones to each other.

The Ones are attracted to each other in [1] of Figure 10(a). But Hegel next states that this dissolution of all difference in Figure 10(a) and the assertion of [1] as an immediacy is "a comparison made by us." (171) In short, external force was brought to bear to weld the Ones together. Now earlier I suggested that Repulsion's expulsion of the Many Ones was not externally caused. Yet the dissolution of all difference in [1] is external. This appears at first to be contradictory, but the two statements indeed can be reconciled. The Understanding's external force can be described as this: the Understanding no longer wrenches a piece from the middle term. The middle term expels those pieces on its own. But the Understanding still needs external force to weld the pieces together. They could still fly apart as in Figure 9(b). But such a move is retrogressive. Instead, we the audience, decide to move on, which requires the formation of [1]. Hence, the Understanding works on unifying [1] but not on the expulsion of [4, 5, 6, 7].

This moment replicates Hegel's critique of Leibizian monads. Recall that these monads ideated themselves, but their relation-to-other had to be externally
The sameness of the Ones may be our act of comparison, but "we have also to see what is posited in them in their inter-relatedness." (171) This is the role of Dialectical Reason. Dialectical Reason discovers that the Ones of Attraction nevertheless maintain themselves as Ones by mutual Repulsion. And in remaining aloof in this way, they negate their own negatedness--their own act of repulsing [2] from [1, 2]. But the Ones are only in [1, 2]--"only in so far as they negate." (171) Hence, by negating their negation, they negate their own being. Since negation is their mode of return into themselves, the negation of their negation prohibits this return. Hence, the Ones are not, or:

Insert Figure 10(b) here (located at the end)
Attraction and Repulsion

Remark: The Unity of the One and the Many

In this Remark, Hegel lays bare the great irony of what has happened:

Self-subsistence pushed to the point of the one as a being-for-self is abstract, formal, and destroys itself. It is the supreme, most stubborn error, which takes itself for the highest truth, manifesting in more concrete forms as abstract freedom, pure ego and, further, as Evil. (172)

We have seen that the One has utterly expelled all its being from itself. Hence, what was supposed to be perfectly self-subsistent and liberated from the other ended up surrendering all its being to the Other.

Evil. Hegel relates Being-for-self (self-subsistence) to pure egotism and Evil. This relation to evil is worth dwelling on.

In one of his late works, Kant in effect admitted that the famous categorical imperative--"Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a particular of universal legislation"\textsuperscript{107}--was a mere procedure. This procedure called for a person to suppress her pathology (i.e., emotion, inclination, or being-for-other), so that only the voice of universal reason (being-for-self) could speak. But what if the voice of reason spoke absolute evil for its own sake, not for the sake of inclination? Then Kant had to admit that the resulting evil could not be distinguished from morality. This possibility Kant called "diabolical evil."\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{264-65} See supra text accompanying notes 264-65.

\textsuperscript{107} CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 188, at 46.

\textsuperscript{108} See generally Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 216.
What Kant confesses is that the highest morality flips around and becomes the worst evil.\textsuperscript{289} This admission was nothing but an confession to the dynamic of Being-for-self that Hegel has described.

Of diabolical evil, Hegel writes:

It is that freedom which so misapprehends itself as to place its essence in this abstraction [of Being-for-self], and flatters itself that is thus being with itself it possesses itself in its purity. More specifically, this self-subsistence is the error of regarding as negative that which is its own essence, and of adopting a negative attitude towards it. Thus it is the negative attitude towards itself which, in seeking to possess its own being destroys it, and this its act is only the manifestation of the futility of this act. (172)

Clark Butler quotes Hegel as saying, "evil is to be apprehended as the existence of contradiction."\textsuperscript{290} This means, according to Butler that "the fallen individual soul persistently acts on the contradictory belief that it exists like an atom whose existence or good is detached both from that of other individuals and from the community of individuals in which it has been reared."\textsuperscript{291}

Hegel's own advice to the egotistical self is to let go of Being-for-self and submit to the jurisdiction of the big Other. For example, the final lesson that reason has to give (before ostensibly announcing itself as spirit) is that "law is law," and it just has to be accepted, because who are we, after all, to proclaim, through the law of the heart, that we are above the law?\textsuperscript{292} Similarly, in the Philosophy of Right, morality ends in the nightmare of Being-for-self.\textsuperscript{293} What the free individual must do is to submit to Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life). There, traditions of the family, the market, and the state will anchor the individual to prevent Being-for-self from turning monstrous.

Returning to the theme of the One and the Many, Hegel ponders the "ancient proposition" that "the one is many and especially that the many are one." (172) The truth of this, Hegel claimed, cannot be expressed in "fixed" propositions. The truth is "to be grasped as a becoming, a process, a repulsion and attraction--not as being." (172)

\textsuperscript{289} IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 54 (Allen Wood & George Di Giovanni trans., 1998)


\textsuperscript{291} BUTLER, supra note 4, at 56.

\textsuperscript{292} Phenomenology, supra note 14, ¶ 394-437.

\textsuperscript{293} PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 26, § 139.
We mortals know only the traces of this movement and try, by our Understanding, to fix the movement in a "proposition."

It is too easy, Hegel warns, to assume that there are "many" which are welded by the Understanding into the One (just as modern utilitarians assume that the "good" is an aggregate of human preferences). It directly follows from this comparison that any given one is a self-sufficient atom. This is asserted as a "fact, and all that has to be done is to grasp this simple fact." (173) Of course, these are dogmas that Hegel strongly opposes as the assertion of mere "atomism."

(b) The One One of Attraction

At this point, the Many Ones have no relation—or rather a relation that is negative—inter se. This relationship, however, "is without effect" because the Ones "presuppose one another as affirmatively present." (173) When this relation is posited as Repulsion—in Figure 9(c)—the relation is "only the ought-to-be of ideality." (173) By this Hegel means that the relationship of Repulsion is not self-subsistent—but it ought to be so. Hence, "[i]n attraction, ideality is realized. Repulsion passes over into attraction, the many ones into one one." (173) That is, Repulsion [7] is present in Attraction [1], but only as a memory, not as an express immediacy. This was shown in Figure 10(a), where Repulsion sought to stay aloof but covertly traveled along and became part of [1].

Attraction now has a resilience—a reality—that Repulsion did not have. The Many Ones are now One One.

But now repulsion and attraction must be considered in a relation, as shown in Figure 10(b). Repulsion is said to be "the reality of the ones." (173) Attraction is "their posited ideality." (173) How is this so (especially since Hegel has just announced that Repulsion is "an ought-to-be of ideality" and Attraction the realization of Repulsion)? The answer is that Repulsion is the reality of the Ones. In Repulsion, the Ones are negatively related. Hence, the Ones demonstrate their Determinate Being—a being in relation with a nothing. In Attraction as such in Figure 10(a), this negative relation is sublated. It is only a memory. Hence, for the Ones, relation is a "posited ideality." Thus, Hegel can say:

The relation of attraction to repulsion is such that [Attraction] has [Repulsion] for presupposition. Repulsion provides the material for attraction. If there were no ones there would be nothing to attract; the conception of a perpetual attraction, of an absorption of the ones, presupposes an equally perpetual production of them. (173)

Repulsion is therefore the truth of Attraction, as Dialectical Reason discovers in Figure 10(b). If it were not for the constraint of
repulsing force, Attraction long ago would have gathered all the ones into a single inert One. When this is hypothetically accomplished—when we achieve the "One One of Attraction"—Attraction abolishes itself and goes out of existence. Attraction therefore has negativity within itself: "attraction is inseparable from repulsion." (173)

Notice that in Figure 10(a), attraction was simply our license to say that the Many Ones were one. But in order to say this, we likewise had to presuppose that the Many Ones were diverse. In short, Attraction is a force—an activity. But it cannot be permitted to succeed. Otherwise, our license abolishes itself. This important point is called the "play of forces" in the Phenomenology. The idea of it is that force is never perceptible unless another force opposes it. Otherwise, the first force would have obliterated everything long ago. Forces must always be in an equilibrium, if they are to be perceived at all. The same point can be made about human society. If we view personality as a becoming—a force—it must have another force—another person—to oppose it. Otherwise it could not recognize itself. Thus, human beings need another human being to recognize it as such. Persons, in Hegel's psychological theory, are not self-identical but social for this very reason.

Hegel next warns us against an illegitimate view of Attraction. Recall that, in Figure 10(a), Attraction is the name Hegel gives to the unity of all the Ones. The One One of Attraction is thus the result if Repulsion is not present in Attraction as a negative moment. Hence, Figure 10(a) could be taken as a diagram of this One One, whose impossibility is posited only in Figure 10(b). What Hegel warns against is to picture the One One as king of the Ones—a primus inter pares with "precedence" over the peasant Ones. (173) Such a picture, where the One One is a mere One, is wrong on several accounts. First, "attraction belongs equally to each of the many ones as immediately present." (173) Furthermore, the illegitimate picture would grant self-identity to all the Ones, including the primus inter

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294 Hegel later warns that the word "force" is not to be used in connection with Attraction, if force is taken to mean a self-subsisting, self-identical meaning. (178-80) I use the word "force" here, but not in the disapproved manner Hegel describes.

295 Phenomenology, supra note 14, ¶ 138-43.

pares, which Hegel describes as "an equilibrium of attraction and repulsion." (173) Self-identity, of course, is always an error (until we reach the last page of the *Science of Logic*). The illegitimate picture also suggests "a specific difference" between the One One and the Many Ones, when Attraction is supposed to be "the positing of the immediately present undifferentiatedness of the ones." (174) Nevertheless, on the laws of sublation, the Many Ones are idealized and are indeed within the One One. Thus, in Figure 10(b), the Many Ones are [2] in the unity of [1, 2]. In an earlier life, they were [4, 5, 6] in Figure 9(c); for this reason, Hegel can say of the Many Ones that "through their posited negation arises the one of attraction, which is consequently determined as mediated, the one posited as one." (174) In other words, [1] in Figure 10(a) depends on the suppression of what will be [2] in Figure 10(b).

The One One of Figure 10(a) is "determined as mediated" and "posited as one." (174) How can this One One be determined as mediated, when it is shown in Figure 10(a) as an immediacy? I think the answer is that Hegel is referring to Repulsion's act of positing. In Figure 10(a), we saw Repulsion seated upon the toilet, repelling itself from itself. This act is mediated—it implies the actor (Repulsion) and the excrement (the Many Ones). Of course, Repulsion itself denies that it is positing at all. Rather, Repulsion claims that it is merely refusing to recognize the Many Ones. But Repulsion has already been revealed to be a liar. "For us," we know that Repulsion has de-posited the Many Ones. The Understanding now intervenes. It peers into the toilet and interprets the excremental materials as the One One. Hence, the act of positing is mediated and concrete. But the result is an immediacy.

We saw earlier that the Many Ones were sublated in Figure 10(a), but they return as [2] in Figure 10(b). In other words, Repulsion is the Many Ones. Furthermore, the Many Ones are the negative internal voice of Attraction [1, 2] itself. Thus, "attraction does not absorb the attracted ones into itself as into a centre." (174) Rather, Repulsion, from the inside of Attraction, "preserves the ones as many in [Attraction]." (174)

(c) The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction

In the final subsection of chapter 3, Hegel points out that the difference between the One and the Many is now a difference of their relation to one another. This relation has now split into two—Repulsion and Attraction. In Figure 10(b), each is different yet essentially connected.

Repulsion appeared first. It was initially immediate—as shown by [7] in Figure 9(c). Its Many Ones were repulsed and, in this action, de-posited as immediate—as the unitary Void, or as Attraction. Thus, the Many Ones became a relation—Attraction. The
two immediates--Repulsion and Attraction--were, at that point, indifferent to each other. Attraction--the unity of the Many Ones--was "externally added to it as thus presupposed." (174)

We must pause to consider: what does it mean that Attraction was presupposed? Here Hegel echoes his comments on atomism, in his Remark following "the One and the Void." Atomists were there said to presuppose the Void, in which the atoms move about. Hegel, however, dialectically established the Void as the Many Ones--in Figure 9(b). The Many Ones are now, in Attraction, made into the One One. Hence, just as atomism presupposes the Void (Attraction), so Repulsion assumes the Void (Attraction) as it expels the Many Ones.

In Essence, we will see that the very act of positing is always coupled with presupposition. If an entity announces, "I am not that"--the act of positing--it presupposes there is a "that" from which it differentiates itself.297 Thus, Repulsion, if it posits that it is not the Many Ones, must presuppose that there is such a thing as the Many Ones. The Many Ones are, by external will, forged into the One. As we saw earlier, the unity of the Many Ones is "externally added."

Repulsion, then, disperses the Many Ones into the Void--"into somewhere undetermined, outside the sphere of repulsion itself." (175) Repulsion is simply indifferent to what it repulses, and this amounts to a negation of "the inter-relatedness of the many." (175) Yet, if we were to say that the Ones are Many, this would be just as externally added as to say that the Ones are One in Attraction. "[T]he ones, as unrelated, do not repel or exclude one another. [T]his constitutes their determination." (175) Repulsion is nevertheless still a relation. That is, it is an activity, and activity requires an actor and a thing acted upon. "[R]epulsion and flight is not a liberation from what is repelled and fled from. [T]he one as excluding still remains related to what it excludes." (175)298

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297 This role of presupposition is developed in Reflection. See chapter 10. The point becomes vital in the commencement of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel's dialectic of liberal freedom. There, he starts with the most negative of negative freedom--the self freed of all inclination, desires, and even embodiment. The self is indeterminate. But, Hegel emphasizes, if such a self is indeterminate, there must be "determinacy." In short, the self announces, "I am not that--the determined." Determinacy is thus presupposed by the liberal subject. PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 26, § 34; Carlson, supra note 26, at 1382.

298 This is a Freudian truth--the repressed is a bloody instruction that always returns to haunt the inventor. For instance, Father Enjoyment returns as Name-of-the-Father. ŽIŽEK, supra note 154, at 134-35. In Lacanian terms, what is foreclosed in the symbolic returns in the real. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 191 (1996).
Or, in other words, no relation is, after all, a kind of relation. This moment of relation is Attraction itself, and thus implicitly is inside Repulsion. In Figure 9(c), Attraction can be viewed as [4, 5, 6]. In this capacity, Attraction negates "abstract repulsion" [7]. (175) According to Repulsion, "the ones would be only self-related affirmative beings." (175)

By emphasizing Attraction as internal to Repulsion in Figure 9(c), Hegel likewise emphasizes that Attraction is internal to Repulsion in Figure 10(b). There, Attraction can be viewed as [2]. But if Attraction is Repulsion's negative voice--the voice of Dialectical Reason--then Hegel likewise implies that, in Figure 10(c), Repulsion is just as much Attraction, and Attraction is just as much Repulsion. Instead of placing Attraction on the left, we could have placed it on the right. Instead of naming the rightward extreme "Repulsion," we could have named it "Attraction.

The extremes, then, cannot distinguish themselves. It took an outside determination to name them in the way we did. Thus, we see something similar to Figure 3(b), where the leftward extreme was Something/Other and the rightward extreme was Being-for-self/Being-for-other. There also, an outside force had to determine whether "being" was truly on the left or truly on the right. This helpless state of the extremes portends no self-subsistence. They are absolutely dependent on an outsider to inform them who they are.

This is the great irony of Being-for-self in general. It purports to expel otherness so that it can be only "for itself." Yet, in the end, it has no idea who or what it is. Only an outsider can explain to Being-for-self what it is. Hence, in the Phenomenology, Hegel refers to the unhappy consciousness as having Being-for-self and not Being-in-itself. The unhappy consciousness therefore perceives that he is nothing and God is everything.299

Repulsion and Attraction are inseparable. "[A]t the same time each is determined as an ought and a limitation relatively to the other." (175) As mere Oughts, they ought to exceed their Limitations.

The Ought of these opposing forces is "their abstract determinateness in the form of the in-itself." (175) This phrase is a reference to [2] in Figure 10(b). Taken "as such, or "abstractly," [2]--the very determinateness of both Attraction and Repulsion--is the in-itself to both forces. From [2] will spring the new middle term. For the moment, however, Hegel draws attention to the fact that, in [2], "each [i.e., Attraction or Repulsion] is simply directed away from itself and relates itself to the other. [E]ach is through the mediation of the other as other." (175) In other words, [1] repulses [2]--its very being. Hence, [1] is because its essence--[2]--is utterly other. The obverse could be said about [3], which likewise repulses [2]. At this point, these forces are self-

299 Phenomenology, supra note 14, ¶ 231.
subsistent only in the sense that each is "posited for the other as a different determining." (175) But, simultaneous to their being "for other" in [2], each is "for self" in [1] and [3] respectively. Thus:

1. In this interdependence the mediation of each through the other is rather negated, each of these determinations being a self-mediation. (175)

In what sense a self-mediation? First, each is an immediacy. Yet each has a history in mediation. [1] was the product of the Understanding, which, though external, works with materials ready to hand. [1] is therefore a mediation of "self," in the sense that its selfhood as such was, by the Understanding, brought to the fore. Furthermore, Dialectical Reason brings [2] to the fore, but repeats Understanding's error because it isolates [3] as abstracted from [1]. As [2] is [3]'s own voice--and as [3] is mediated by [2]--[3] is likewise self-mediated, even though, taken alone, [3] is an immediacy.

Of [1] and [3], Hegel writes that "each presupposes itself, is related only to itself in its presupposition." (176) This is fully implied in Figure 10(b), which emphasizes the relatedness of Attraction and Repulsion. Thus Attraction (now revealed to be just as much Repulsion) expels [2]--its own self. It says, "I'm not [2]." In saying this, [1] presupposes there is such a thing as [2] to expel. And furthermore, [2] is just as much Attraction as [1] was. Hence Attraction presupposes itself and is related only to itself. The same could have been said about Repulsion (which is just as much Attraction as Repulsion).

In Figure 10(a), we saw Repulsion repelling the Many Ones, which were taken as immediately given--presupposed. Attraction became the Many Ones in unity--unified by the external force of the Understanding. Now Hegel says that the Many Ones have not disappeared. They are Repulsion itself--taken as the negative of Attraction. Figure 10(b) then could have been drawn as the opposition of the One and the Many. Thus, the Many Ones were presupposed by Repulsion in Figure 10(a), but now Repulsion is its own presupposition. This will become the archetypical move of Reflection much later, in the Doctrine of Essence. Reflection typically expels itself from itself only to become precisely what it repelled. This has now happened to Repulsion. It expelled the Many Ones. Now it is the Many Ones--the opposite of the One One of Attraction and the failure of Attraction to succeed in its task of uniting the Ones. Likewise, the Many Ones are Repulsion as such. Repulsion is their Being-for-self--isolated from the oppression of any Other in [3].

When Attraction isolates itself as [1], it posits itself as "the real one." (176) The Many are only ideal. That is, they vanish like the memory they are. But these many others are supposed to be "for themselves." They are supposed to be busy repelling others.
Attraction presupposes ideality in the Many Ones. That is, ideality is present in the Many considered as [3]—not just as considered in [2]. Attraction, at this moment, wishes to be radically by itself, and so the reference is to [3], not to [2].

Both sides at this point are quite identical in their activity. Each side self-presupposes. It posits itself as the negative of itself. It sheds its Being-in-itself [2] and attributes it to the other. This shedding activity is Repulsion—a self-preservation. Within the entity it is the same self-identity—Attraction. Each thus has both moments of Repulsion and Attraction—self-preservation and self-alienation. Each expels itself into the other. In this activity, each "is the transition of each out of itself into the other." (176)

Each posits itself as its own other:

The one as such, then, is a coming-out-of-itself, is only the positing of itself as its own other, as many; and the many, similarly, is only this, to collapse within itself and to posit itself as its other, as one, and in this very act to be related only to its own self, each continuing itself in its other. (176)

Thus, we have the "undividedness of the coming-out-of-itself (repulsion) and the self-posing as one (attraction)." (177) Each is in its own self the negation of its self—and total continuity of itself in the other.

The repulsion of the determinately existing ones is the self-preservation of the one through the mutual repulsion of the others, so that (1) the other ones are negated in it—this is the side of its determinate being or of its being-for-other; but this is thus attraction as the ideality of the ones; and (2) the one is in itself, without relation to the others . . . (177)

In other words, [1] and [3] each preserve themselves in their purity by expelling [2]—referred to above as "the others," or the Many Ones. In [1] and [3], [2] is negated. That is, [1] and [3] each renounce their being-for-other. Each renounces Attraction as such. Hence:

Attraction as a negating and a generation of the one sublates itself, and as a positing of the one is in its own self negative of itself, repulsion. (177)

Or, [1] and [3] are Repulsion; each sublates Attraction. Hence, Attraction negates Repulsion ("the one"), which is the same as saying that it negates itself. Attraction also generates and posits the one. Being-for-self has now reached its conclusion. We now reach the middle term, which is the naming of a pure activity of repelling all content. This middle term is, at last, Quantity.
Of Quantity, Hegel writes that it is "[t]he one as infinitely self-related." (177) What does this mean? Recall that the Infinite is what goes beyond all Limitation. So, in Figure 10(c), Repulsion/Attraction has gone beyond its Limitation. It is "the mediation in which [the One] repels from itself its own self as its absolute (that is, abstract) otherness." (177)

Quantity is the thinnest of entities. All its "being" is expelled; it is a mere ghost of Being. For Quantity, its expelled Quality is the very non-being of Quantity.

Yet Quantity was impoverished through its own initiative. It is, in Republican terms, the "undeserving poor." Quantity "is only self-relation" and a "becoming in which it is no longer determined as having a beginning." (177) By this, Hegel means that Quantity has sublated immediacy itself.

Among the things outside itself are the Many Ones. This is ironic. We are inclined to think of Quantity as numbers, but, so far, distinguishable integers are too advanced for us. We must think of Quantity as such, with no Determinate Being of its own. Thus, Quantity is a sublating that is "at first determined as only a relative sublating of the relation to another determinately existent one." (177) This non-relation is even less than an "indifferent repulsion and attraction." (177) Repulsion and Attraction are, after all, posited as relations. Quantity has moved beyond relation (or so

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300 Interestingly, the middle term of Repulsion and Attraction is, in the Philosophy of Nature, said to be "matter."

Hegel argues as follows: matter is the unity of the two moments, of repulsion and attraction; it presents itself as weightedness, which is understood as the tendency toward the centre of a distributed materiality, within which the centre is something purely geometrical and not physical. Matter itself is weighted: the property of weightedness cannot be separated from it, and displays itself as the tendency toward the centre lying outside matter. The centre must not be assumed to be material, "for the precise nature of material being is that it posits its centre as external to itself." In accordance with his general Notion of nature, Hegel saw in this determination of weightedness evidence of matter's lack of independence.

it thinks). But in its radically negative attitude toward its own being, Quantity

equally displays itself as passing over into the infinite relation of mediation through negation of the external relations of the immediate, determinately existent ones, and as having for result that very process of becoming which . . . is the collapse into simple immediacy. (177)

Thus, by negating immediacy, Quantity is—what else could it be?—nothing but mediation. Indeed, if you think of Quantity in the more advanced notion of ordinary numbers, Quantity does nothing but relate various qualities. Thus, the number "three" can refer to three houses, three roses, three bears, etc. The number three is a great mediator of these "things."

Quality has now become Quantity, and Hegel now reviews the moments of the transition. The fundamental determination of Quality—the first three chapters of the Science of Logic—was "being and immediacy." (178) In these chapters, "limit and determinateness are so identical with the being of something, that with its alteration the something itself vanishes." (178) Here, Hegel summarizes the trajectory of Something, which alters itself and becomes an Infinite Being. That Infinite Being has now repelled from itself its own being, and hence it (formerly the Something) has now vanished. This was foretold when the Something became the Finite. The very Ought of the Finite was that it must cease-to-be. In Quantity, its destiny is fulfilled.301

Hegel refers to Quantity as an immediate unity, "in which the difference has vanished but is implicitly present in the unity of being and nothing." (178) In other words, Quantity is pure relation without parts—a contradiction. Yet, by virtue of being a relation without parts—an immediate unity—Quantity implies its parts. Hence, Quantity cannot remain an immediacy but must make express what is, for the moment, only implicit within it. Thus, Hegel can write, "This relation to other contradicts the immediacy in which qualitative

301 Failure to grasp that the Ought predicts the abolition of being, I think, leads Charles Taylor to announce that this transition from being-for-self to Quantity is "a little strained." TAYLOR, supra note 58, at 244. Of this transition, Taylor writes: "It offers another example of a twist we have often noticed in the Hegelian dialectic: where Hegel "goes back" from the advanced point he has reached in order to take up and "feed into" his dialectic some other important range of concepts or transitions." Id. Taylor takes the True Infinite to be both ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, and he implies that Hegel privileges one over the other solely in order to produce Quantity—the realm in which the content of being is strictly beyond the Being-for-self. Yet, if we concentrate on the feature of the Ought—that it names ceasing-to-be as the soul of the Finite—then the pursuit of ceasing to be at the expense of coming-to-be—is (like the quality of mercy) not strained.
determinateness [i.e., Quantity] is self-relation." (178) In other words, having expelled its being, Quantity must now recapture it by bringing Quality back within itself.

Hegel concludes this subsection by summarizing the first three chapters: (")) Pure Being is immediacy, which pervades determinateness, limit, etc., "which are posited in [Pure Being] as sublated." (178) (But, as determinateness and limit are more advanced than Pure Being, they are sublated in Pure Being only at the end of the Science of Logic, or only if we elect to retrogress back to the beginning.) (§) Determinate Being is no longer immediate, but is "reflected into itself, as related not to an other but to itself." (178) This reference to reflection-into-self suggests that mediation is immanent to Determinate Being. Otherness is not truly "other" but is intimate302 to the self of Determinate Being. (∫) Being-for-self has sublated determinateness. This work was accomplished in the True Infinite. Hence:

"Limit," it will be recalled, was Determinateness as Such--a relation between externally imposed Constitution and negatively considered Determination. Hence, what Hegel seems to be saying is that Quantity is the determinateness which is not a determinateness, or relation which is not relation. The "parts" needed to make the relation whole have been repulsed. This thinnest of thin substance--relation without things to relate--is therefore indifferent to its own Being. We have before us Quantity as such--more abstract than such advanced concepts as quanta or number.

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302 The internality of otherness is what Jacques Lacan calls "ex-timacy." It represents that which is foreign but within us. Žižek, Ticklish Subject, supra note ---, at 45. The "ex-timate" is what we are "more than ourselves." Id. at 375. It reflects the proposition that what we feel is most ourselves--our subjectivity, our sexuality, our desire, our moral conscience, etc., are all created through intersubjective relationships, language and law (i.e., the symbolic order) and is, therefore, in some way outside of ourselves as well. See generally, Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimite (Elisabeth Doisneau eds. & Francoise Massardier-Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74 (March Bracher, et al., trans., 1994).
Remark: The Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction and Repulsion

Attraction and Repulsion, Hegel complains, are usually regarded as forces, taken as self-subsistent and not logically connected to each other. He points out that he prefers to think of them as moments, which pass into each other. They are not fixed in their opposition but literally are each other. Taken wrongly as fixed opponents, these forces are thought to meet in a third—matter. This third is likewise thought to be self-identical and external to the forces working upon it. Even if forces is said to be within matter (as in gravity), nevertheless force and matter are taken as radically separate from each other.

Hegel then turns to Kant's construction of matter from the forces of Attraction and Repulsion. We have already seen that Hegel thought Kant suffered from a bad case of self-identity. Here we find more criticism along the same line.

Hegel complains that Kant's "construction" of matter is unworthy of the name, "unless any exercise of reflection, even

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303 Readers are entitled to skip this Remark, as it is unnecessary to the progress of the Logic.

304 Michael John Petry, The Significance of Kepler's Laws, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 439, 485-86 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993) ("Hegel [points] out that the main fault in Kant's construction of matter from the forces of attraction and repulsion, is that forces are conceived of not as that by means of which the unity of matter first comes into being, but as that through which matter, as an already finished product, is set in motion").

305 See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 67, at 171.

306 Although this Remark is thoroughly negative in tone, one author sees Hegel giving great credit to Kant here:

Hegel's point is that the great advance made by the Kantian procedure over that of its predecessors was that instead of beginning by positing matter and then implanting the various forces in it as something alien and contingent, as something introduced into it from without, it conceived of matter as essentially involving the power to repel and attract. Attraction and repulsion therefore become a conceptual aspect of matter from the very outset. Hegel maintains that whatever deficiencies Kant's construction may have had, it did have the inestimable merit of having attempted to derive matter, "from these two opposite determinations as its fundamental forces."

analytical reflection, is to be called a construction." (179) Kant's method is, in Hegel's views, merely analytical, not constructive. It works on presupposition. Matter is presupposed, and then Kant asks what forces are needed to maintain the determination he presupposed.

Kant imagines that Attraction exists, because matter could not persist through Repulsion alone. Repulsion, in turn, is induced from the phenomenon that matter is (sometimes) impenetrable. Consequently, Repulsion is immediately given, but "attraction is added to the concept syllogistically." (180) Thus, experience teaches Kant about Repulsion. Reflection on this experience produces Attraction. Hence, Attraction and Repulsion do not exist at the same level.

The source of the difficulty is Kant's one-sided reduction of matter to its impenetrability. Granted, matter resists the sense of touch. This is matter's Being-for-self and the sublation of its Being-for-other. But matter also is relation of its subparts, which include spatial extension, cohesion, and solidity.

In the end, Kant presupposes that matter fills space and has continuity. These presupposed attributes are assumed to be the force of Attraction. Thus, Attraction is to matter what the dormitive principle is to opium. It is the presupposition that accounts for the effect observed.

Hegel gives Kant some provisional credit for thinking that Attraction is internal to matter. Still, Kant leaves Attraction as a self-identity, even while he locates it within matter. But, Hegel thinks, Kant is on weaker ground in claiming that Repulsion adheres only to the surface of matter. This presupposes such concepts as "nearer" or "more distant" within matter.

The same presupposition, however, infects Attraction. One atom attracts a second atom. That atom attracts a third. The Attraction of the first atom on the third is in competition with the Attraction of the second atom on the third. Hence, just as Repulsion is mediated by "near" and "far," so is Attraction.

In any case, Repulsion is not just on the surface, as Kant says. It must interpenetrate. The surface which resists touch is, inter se, devoid of Hegelian Repulsion. On the contrary, the surface unites in repelling touch. Because of this uniting, Kant must admit that Attraction is needed in order for Repulsion to appear. Hence, Repulsion interpenetrates all matter, just as Attraction does.

Kant states that, through Attraction, matter occupies but does not fill space. That is, atoms are interpenetrated with space. This proves that Attraction works over space. But what keeps the space empty? Hegel credits Repulsion, which replicates Hegel's point that Attraction and Repulsion presuppose each other:

We see that Kant here unconsciously realizes what is implicit in the nature of the subject matter, when he attributes to the force of attraction precisely what, in accordance with the first determination, he attributed to the opposite force. While he was
busy with establishing the difference between the two forces, it happened that one had passed over into the other. (183)

In summarizing, Hegel complains that Kant's exposition of the opposed forces is analytic. Matter is "supposed to be derived from its elements," (183) but matter is in fact presupposed as already formed. Forces merely act on presupposed matter and do not constitute it--the opposite of what Kant set out to prove.

Conclusion

In its journey, being started by placing an accent on its affirmative side. But this accent was no more than the announcement of what being was not. That is, being is not nothing. The substance by which being manifested itself was therefore beyond it. Being sustained itself only by refusing to recognize the other. It became nothing else but this refusal,\(^{307}\) and hence it enslaved itself to its other. It became the very act of expelling its own content. As this expelling force, it is Quantity.

This expulsion of content from what is immediately is of the utmost spiritual significance. It is the heart of idealism, as opposed to materialism. Hegel's idealism "ascribes being to the infinite, the Spirit, God."\(^{308}\) Hegel's idealism "denies that things and the finite world have true reality."\(^{309}\) Thus, if Quality has chased its being elsewhere, it does so only to retrieve it at a deeper spiritual level.

In any case, Quality did not lose all. It retained Being-for-self--empty though this was. This retained Being-for-self ended up producing the very idea of multiplicity. Because the True Infinite never entirely gave up its place, its expelled content, itself a Being-for-self that expels its content, counted as a new One, which in turn produced yet another new One, etc.

Later, in Quantity, Being will discover that its other is really itself. Quantity continues to go outside itself but recognizes that its destination is still its own self.\(^{310}\) This realization, culminating in Measure, is the threshold to essence, where this return to self is named Reflection. Here, being gives rise to a

\(^{307}\) "Dasein is a determinately qualitative finite being determined by what it excludes..." HARRIS, supra note 7, at 136.

\(^{308}\) COLLETTI, supra note 51, at 7.

\(^{309}\) Id.

\(^{310}\) Id. at 137 ("Moreover, its other is not a qualitative other, but is an extension of itself beyond its own limit, and is still indifferently the same all over again, the limit notwithstanding.").
deeper soul that has "staying power." The essential thing endures, but the thing that merely is is finite and therefore must become (and already is) what is not. What is and what is not thus serve as the stuff for Hegel to make paradoxes.