wholes, and not necessarily by means of independent casual links between their separate parts, then of such a universe we could say, perhaps, that its course through time was determined, but we could not say that it was regular, nor would it be possible for a mind, however gifted, to infer, by any known process of reasoning, its future from its past.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

V.—PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the field was occupied in France and England by the schools of Descartes and Locke, followed by the scepticism of Hume and by the Encyclopédie, and while Leibnitz and Wolff flourished in Germany, Italy had no speculative movement of its own, penetrating to the depths of the national thought, and constituting a true tradition of philosophical study. On the decline of the splendid era of the Renaissance, when the arms of the foreigner were pressing heavily on the Peninsula, civil and political liberty died out, and with it all intellectual life, save only what still managed to survive in the departments of history and natural science. We were then as if cut off from the current of Modern Philosophy. The germs deposited by our thinkers of the second half of the fifteenth century ripened and bore fruit elsewhere. With us there remained only the galvanised Scholasticism of the Jesuits. Giovan Battista Vico, a solitary genius and pioneer of modern thought, died poor and uncomprehended. When the revolutionary storm of 1789 burst upon us, we were so flooded by French ideas, that at the beginning of this century those Italians who did not profess the theology of the Church of Rome were, with few and rare exceptions, followers of the Encyclopédie, Condillac and Cabanis. Genovesi at Naples, and Gioja and Romagnosi in the north of Italy (though the last-named refuted the theory of Transformed Sensation), applied the principles of Sensationalism to psychology, and to political economy with the other social sciences. Judicious writers, of no great speculative originality but of extensive and solid learning, and aiming at essentially practical ends, they betrayed in every portion of their works, even to theirrenchified style, the influence of foreign contemporary authors. A doctrine which, though not unaffected by Kant's philosophy, might yet be said to be in part original and Italian, first appeared in the writings of the Calabrian, Pasquale Galluppi. Then, in 1830, the Abate Antonio Rosmini of Rovereto (long before
his death) published at Rome his *Nuovo Saggio sull' origine delle idee*, and this, followed by the works of Vincenzo Gioberti, started the only philosophical movement that has exercised any wide influence on our national thought and life.

I. This movement, which occupied the whole of the second quarter of the present century, succeeded in giving a kind of unity to speculative studies in Italy by trying to reconcile the traditions of the past with the new needs of the present, Catholicism with Philosophy, and native with foreign thought.

To give effect to this attempted reconciliation, and to render it an active element in the national restoration, it was enough that it should be thought possible; which it was—under the influence of that sentiment and those political ideas which are the historical factor that must be kept constantly in view for the right understanding of the various manifestations of intellectual life in Italy. But of our three principal philosophers, Rosmini and Gioberti alone exercised a wide civil and political influence. The doctrines of Galluppi had a character and purpose essentially speculative. Born in 1771, and reaching the age of 49 before the publication of his *Saggio filosofico sulla Critica della conoscenza*, Galluppi did not come to be known throughout Italy till 1827, while his influence, especially in the north, was soon superseded by that of Rosmini and Gioberti. Rosmini, with a mind of greater power and breadth, conceived in his youth the system which occupied his mind all through life, and as a man, as a philosopher, as the founder of a monastic order, and as the intimate friend of the most illustrious men in Italy, he wrought far more deeply on his fellow-countrymen. The course of events and the tendencies of European culture from 1815 to 1830 favoured the direction which he gave to Italian thought, and its counterpart is to be found in the line taken about the same time in literature by Manzoni (afterwards a friend and disciple), following in the wake of the German Romanticists. It was a reversion to the Christian Idealism of the Middle Ages, of which the tradition still lingered in a portion of the Italian clergy, and at the same time it was an attempt to bring into greater prominence the Platonic element in this doctrine, harmonising it as far as possible with the spirit of modern philosophy and polity.

This purpose is especially discernible in Gioberti, joined with a much more pronounced tendency to identify religion and philosophy and make them the spring of a new national life. In his works written during exile in France and Belgium (1833-48), he plants himself, as it were, on the height of the Christian idea of creation *ex nihilo*, and surveys, in one wide sweep, all the consequences that seem to him to flow from this
principle in every department, whether of philosophy, or science, or polity. It is well-known what an impulse was given to the revolution of 1847-48 by his *Primato morale e politico degli Italiani*. The proposition maintained in this eloquent book—that Italy, as being the custodian of the most ancient religious and moral ideas and the see of the Pontificate their interpreter and depositary, is the first nation in the world—was only a splendid dream; but the immense force with which this dream worked on the minds of Italians, creating in them for the moment a wonderful unity of aspiration, was due to its being the truest expression of the want which then began to make itself felt in every part of Italian life—the want, namely, to convert all the memories of our past into a living present power. Now the past, whose memory lingered most vividly in Italy, especially amongst the common people and the clergy, was that of our mediæval commonwealths united, in their best and earliest days, under the protecting power of the Pope. Turning, then, to this Guelph tradition, at once religious and liberal, and pointing to it as the only signal of concord between divided parties, as the only way out of the darkness of plot and conspiracy into the open light of a great and united national enterprise, the school of Manzoni and Pellico (with which also Cesare Balbo partly sympathised) was able, by help of Gioberti, to put itself at the head of the political movement of 1847, and to give it the first and strongest impulse. Till then the Platonic-Christian Idealism of Rosmini had continued mainly speculative, or had only been able to lift a part of the clergy out of the Scholasticism of the Jesuits into a purer and freer thought. Through Gioberti it passed at once to the heart of Italian life, and diffused itself through a great part of society. The works of Gioberti, even the most abstract like the *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia*, being read and criticised from one end of Italy to the other, re-awakened the interest in speculative studies that had been slumbering so long. They also prompted a wider study of the works of Rosmini, which, owing to their somewhat severe and systematic character, were for long confined to a small circle of readers. Rosmini, who combated the doctrine of the temporal power of the Popes in his work *Delle cinque pieghe della Chiesa*, himself took part in the political events of 1848, when he was sent to Rome by Gioberti, then the minister of Charles Albert, to induce the Pope to take part in the war against Austria and to establish the bases of an Italian league. At that time Terenzio Mamiani was constitutional minister of Pius IX. These three leaders of our philosophical movement, forgetting the controversies that
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had hitherto divided them, now worked towards a common end in the interests of Italy. For the first time in history there was presented the example of a revolution promoted by speculative ideas, in harmony for a time at least with facts, and going very far to realise the perilous Platonic ideal of a nation headed by a philosophical mind. Nor was this a merely accidental feature of our national revival; it was rather the ultimate expression of the most general fact embodied in it, at once supplying the key to its whole meaning and revealing the constant tendency of all the moral and intellectual forces in the country to subserve one great political aim—the attainment of unity and independence. Literature, operating through the classical and romantic schools of Parini and Alfieri onwards to Manzoni, Niccolini and Giusti, had paved the way for the revolution among the cultured and citizen classes; and in the same direction the people, the clergy, and even the Pope himself, were led under the combined influence of philosophy, literature and religious feeling.

II. The issue of that revolution is known to all. 1848 and 1849 mark an epoch in the history of our modern thought and literature, the effects of which are still felt by us. The deep sense of disappointment under the hard test imposed on the ideals of our poets and philosophers by the contact of events, and the new direction given to the National Union party after 1852 by the hand of Cavour, had a powerful influence on our literature in separating it entirely from politics, by which till then it had been dominated, and also on our philosophy in estranging from the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti all (especially cleri) who had given a welcome to them solely because they were a compromise between theocracy and liberalism, between religion and science. No sooner did this compromise appear to be, as it really was, an impossibility, and come under the condemnation of Rome, than timorous minds quitted the camp of philosophy for that of faith, the ranks of Christian Platonism for those of Aristotelianism and the Scholastic Thomism professed by the Jesuits, who had been combated to the death by Gioberti and in their turn had never ceased to combat him.

It was opposition of another kind that was offered to the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti by those who either had adopted them because they were an advance upon scholastic dogmatism in the direction of modern philosophical principles, or who had kept aloof from them in the very name of those principles. This opposition was all the more serious because it derived its force from the contradiction inherent in the doctrines in question—the contradiction, namely, between mediæval dogmatism and the critical spirit of modern philosophy,
between the principles of Catholic theocracy and those of liberal thought. These two irreconcilable elements had been, so to speak, laid the one above the other in the philosophy of Rosmini and Gioberti, but the dogmatic and theological element had greatly the preponderance. How this came to pass is easy to see. We were the last to join the movement of modern intellectual life, and, like a man awaking from a long sleep who takes a backward glance over the road already travelled before resuming his journey, our thought, which had hardly been awakened by Galluppi, turned with Rosmini and Gioberti to the philosophy of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church; for in them was presented a tradition of well-defined doctrine and the only tradition which since medieval times had not entirely died out in our schools. Towards the close of 1834 Terenzio Mamiani, then an exile at Paris, set himself to take up again the thread of our traditional speculation at the point where it had been broken off in those philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who were the forerunners of the modern era. At that time Mamiani professed the philosophy of Experience (a doctrine nearly related to that of Galluppi), and in the name of this philosophy, which he thought more consonant both with tradition and with the genius of our people, he desired to wrest the direction of the Italian philosophical movement from the hands of Rosmini and Gioberti. But this design of his was not, and could not be, accomplished in the conditions of philosophical study then existing in Italy. The daring speculations of Leonardo da Vinci, of Bernardino Telesio, of Bruno, of Campanella, the predecessor of Bacon and Descartes, had not left among us any point of support, any philosophical tradition whatsoever to which this new intellectual movement might attach itself. The only philosophical tradition besides the Thomism professed by the Jesuits, which had never altogether died out in Italy especially among the clergy, was the Christian Platonism of the Fathers and Doctors, particularly St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventura, and to some extent also St. Thomas. It is well known how highly Vico esteemed Plato, and how much he meditated upon the Fathers and Doctors. Among the principal representatives of Idealism in union with Catholic doctrines, in the second half of last century, were Cardinal Sigismondo Gerdil (whose influence on philosophical teaching was felt chiefly at Bologna, Rome, and Turin), and Vincenzo Miceli, parish priest of Monreale in Sicily, where he had many disciples. If then it be remembered that in Italy even till well into the present century, philosophy had scarcely got out of the hands of the clergy and the seminarists; that to the clergy belonged Rosmini
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and Gioberti, and the majority of their followers; and that one of the chief aims of the teaching of these philosophers was to bring about that reconciliation of reason with religious authority that had already been tried by the Scholastics,—it is not at all surprising that the theological element should be found to predominate greatly over the rationalistic. Excepting Galluppi, a layman, and one who keenly felt the influence of the Rationalism of the preceding century and of Kant's *Kritik*, we cannot say that either Gioberti (at least in his early works) or Rosmini himself, however much he owned to having received powerful impulses from Kant, was deeply impressed by the spirit of modern philosophy. Now and again they touch its threshold and cast glances over it, but they lack the courage to pass within. In more than one place in the *Nuovo Saggio* Rosmini is moved by an impartial love of scientific inquiry—that same speculative need which prompted Kant to ask: "How is the fact of knowledge possible?" But it is only in the external form and expression given to the critical problem, and in some of the conclusions arrived at, that he comes near to Kant. The substance and foundation of the *Nuovo Saggio* are drawn from the theological and dogmatic ontology of the Christian Fathers and Doctors. With them the author is substantially at one as regards the ruling motives of his inquiry, and he never allows the freedom of his thought to go the length of admitting that anything can be true to a philosopher which is incompatible with religious faith. That is to say, Rosmini regards the agreement of the latter with the results of philosophical investigation as a postulate. Gioberti, in his earlier works, goes even farther than this. Not only does he identify philosophy and religion, but he recognises in the spirit a faculty *sui generis*, superior to reason and having the supernatural for its object. Viewing the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti mainly from this point of view, Cousin, therefore, had ground for asserting that Italian thought was still "in the bonds of theology".

III. Of all our thinkers, Galluppi, is in many respects the one most penetrated by the secular and modern spirit. For him the examination of the validity and limits of knowledge is not merely the principal, but the only, question of philosophy—which he defined as "the science of human thought". A born psychologist, a clear, calm and rigorous reasoner, he directed all his investigations towards one object, namely, that of showing how from the feeling of the Ego and its modifications (identified by him with consciousness) come all the materials of our ideas, and how these, stored up by the imagination, and separated and combined by voluntary analysis and synthesis, build up the
whole system of our cognitions. This doctrine touches Kant's *Kritik* at some points, and resembles it in its more general features, but differs in its foundation, and still more in its conclusions. Galluppi does not allow that there are any true and proper *à priori notions* other than these two—desert and duty. The theoretic activity, according to him, is receptive and not spontaneously productive. The form of knowledge is derived and extracted from the matter of experience, which contains it, as it were, in germ; and though for the elaboration and transformation of this matter there is need of subjective elements, the *synthetic unity* of thought, presupposed by this elaboration, is based upon the *metaphysical unity* of the Ego, conceived as a thing-in-itself. Thus Galluppi's Subjectivism trenches on a psychological Realism, and he is brought near to Reid and the Scottish School, to whom he gave much study. Among his propositions, these two recur most frequently: "Sensation is objective"; "Thought is reality in itself". Galluppi had an extensive and precise acquaintance with the history of modern philosophy, and it is one of his chief merits that he was the first to introduce and diffuse its study in Italy.

In Rosmini and Gioberti, Critic is expanded and exalted into a true and proper Metaphysic; the doctrine of knowledge, or Ideology, while holding always the first place, is brought into close union with the doctrine of being, or Ontology. Of the two, Rosmini is more nearly related to Kant, alike in native intellect and power of introspective analysis, and in his way of setting forth and handling the critical problem. In this respect superior to Galluppi, who confounds consciousness with feeling, Rosmini sees with Kant that the whole problem of knowledge reduces itself to the inquiry how by the concurrence of sense and intellect things, which are apprehended simply as *representations* and *intuitions*, come to be understood, to be thought and conceived as *objects*, according to certain necessary and universal laws; that this *knowability* can come to things of sense only through the intellect and consciousness; that the union of the one with the other, of the matter of knowledge with its form, is possible only through the medium of a primitive judgment, of which the subject, particular and singular, is given by sense-intuition, and the predicate is furnished by the mind; wherefore, *to know is to judge*. Kant and Rosmini thus agree in keeping the critical problem within the limits of psychology; they both recognise the ideal form of knowledge as its true constitutive part; both regard synthetic *à priori* judgments as essential to its production. Rosmini, however, restricts these to one, while he gives to the form of knowledge an origin and a value very different from what the *Kritik* assigns. According to him Kant's capital
defect consists in not having reduced to a minimum the formal part of knowledge and in not having deduced it from a single principle. This is what the Italian philosopher attempts to do, and on this he grounds the claim he makes to superior originality in the *Nuovo Saggio*. He aims at showing that all Kant's forms and categories presuppose one single and simplest form, that, namely, of mere possibility and ideality, the idea of *indeterminate being*, which is inborn, and which becomes determinate in its union with the real, given by sensation. The essential constitutive act of all knowledge, therefore, consists of a primitive and direct synthetic judgment, in which the idea of existence is added as a predicate to sensation; an act, which is completed in intellectual perception, and is expressible by the formula—"That of which I am sensible exists".

So far the difference between Rosmini and Kant will not seem very great. But it becomes a substantial one, when we consider the value he assigns to the form of knowledge and the source from which he derives it. From this point of view the Italian philosopher is seen to be essentially dogmatic as regards both the ground and the spirit of his doctrine. In Kant, the doctrine of knowledge is the base and condition of the doctrine of existence; Metaphysic presupposes Critic. With Rosmini, the reverse order is the proper one. The end constantly aimed at by him is to establish the *reality* of knowledge, by giving to it an object that is necessary, infinite, and superior to thought. This object of thought, *the ideal indeterminate existence*, is divine in its origin; it is "the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world". It acts as the mediator between our mind, which intuitively perceives it as a universal idea, and the reality of particular things, which comes to us solely by feeling. This doctrine, while it does not seem to me to succeed in establishing the objective truth of knowledge and inclines to a mystic Idealism, is yet far enough removed from the deeper meaning of the *Kritik*, to which, however, some of its Italian interpreters would fain accommodate it. The essence of the Kantian doctrine, as shown by Fichte, consisted in regarding knowledge and its laws as a product of the mind's proper activity. The Rosminian theory, on the other hand, really would make the divine light of intellect to descend from above upon the human mind, and by it be received and reflected on sensible things.

Gioberti, in the first form of his philosophy, started from an innate ideal intuition. However, in opposition to Rosmini, he maintained that as the divine ideal could not be manifested to us without a manifestation at the same time of the divine reality, the infinite *Ens* became the natural object of our mind.
both as an idea and as a reality, distinct from finite existences yet so far related therewith as to produce them by free creation ex nihilo. This native intuition of creation, which reaches back to the first beginnings of thought, but which, though it is implied in every conception, is first clearly revealed to the matured and scientific consciousness that explains and demonstrates it, takes the form of a primitive synthesis, or first judgment, to which Gioberti gives the name of ideal formula: The Ens creates the existent. It is the fiat of Genesis placed at the head of all science. And it is to be noted, that while for Rosmini the synthesis of the ideal with the real is effected by the mind in intellectual perception, and sense-experience furnishes the second element; for Gioberti, on the other hand, this synthesis is already given as a primitive intuition, which containing it contains also the confused ideal apprehension of every finite reality, and becomes, if I might so call it, an à priori anticipation of experience. Feeling does nothing but add the fact of perception to these its prior and essential conditions. Thus the whole activity of scientific thought is reduced to the function of translating into reflective form the internal speech of an immediate and divine revelation, with which corresponds external speech—language that serves as an indispensable medium to the operation of reflection, and is itself of divine origin; for according to Gioberti man was created with the faculty of speech. It is easy to see, then, that for him science is essentially an à priori process, starting as it does from the Absolute, from the idea, which stands first in the logical and psychological order of cognitions. Further, the introspective inquiry into the facts of mind must reduce itself to a very small matter in a system whose principle is so far removed from experience, analysis, and accurate and patient induction.

In this respect, indeed, Gioberti's teaching marks a distinct retrogression in the history of our more recent thought. With Galluppi and Rosmini the faculty of observation and critical analysis is supreme, and some parts of Rosmini's Nuovo Saggio, and of his Psychology, Anthropology and Logic may rank with the best productions of modern philosophical thinking. Vincenzo Gioberti joined to some of the most brilliant qualities of the philosopher all those of the orator; great elevation of feeling; a wide and happy perception of the relations binding ideas and facts; a power of soaring to the highest pinnacles of thought, and thence taking in at a glance a vast range of practical applications and consequences; also, a great fervour and sincerity of convictions, which he had the art of communicating in their full intensity to the reader's mind. But with all these qualities, he had not the patient persevering force of thought.
that advances with slow but sure step, and regards truth, not as a haphazard and fortuitous conquest, but as a legitimate possession, reserved for him alone who can vindicate his claim to it by the best reasons. No modern philosopher, not even Schelling himself to whom he bears some resemblance, delights more than Gioberti in imaginary syntheses, lacking the due preparation of careful analysis. Hence the cordial and, as Schopenhauer would say, the truly theological hatred with which he pursues psychology and psychologists, particularly Descartes, their father. The influence of the Giobertian school (which from 1842 to 1850 was considerably larger than the following either of Rosmini or Galluppi) was very hurtful in two ways. It diverted attention from serious and patient thought, and from the psychological inquiries started by Galluppi and Rosmini; while its return to the theological dogmatism of the Middle Ages could not but provoke a reaction as extreme as had been the enthusiasm with which it was originally embraced in the political excitement of the time.

IV. I have already pointed out that the occasion of this reaction was the events of 1848 and 1849, and that its true efficient cause was the contradiction that underlay the principles and elements composing the new Italian philosophy. What has been said is sufficient to show that the first impulse to this philosophy and the form of some of its principal problems were certainly derived from Kant's *Kritik*; but that the matter and spirit of its doctrines, with their tendency towards certain final conclusions, came to it from Catholic theology. The modern element overspread the old, but did not succeed in interpenetrating it. It has been said of Galluppi and Rosmini that they were Kantians without knowing it, and the observation, apart from the conclusions that are sought to be drawn from it, has a basis of truth; but the fact that, "without knowing it," they were in contact with modern philosophy, while they were moved by principles diametrically opposed to it, is the very reason why they are so far separated from it both in substance and in spirit. Nevertheless, theirs is the merit of having opened out for Italian minds a way by which to enter the current of modern ideas. They showed their countrymen what maturity of thought was necessary before they could assimilate the products of modern philosophy and civilisation.

The maturity of mind and culture developed in Italy especially during the second quarter of the century was not, however, wholly or even in greater part the work of philosophy and science, as was the case in Germany. With us it was mainly the result of political revolution and of the closer
sympathy which this set up between our national spirit and that of the other European peoples. The revolutionary movements extending from 1821 to 1847, the price we had to pay for the work of renovation that gradually penetrated to every part of Italian society, were the means of introducing modern principles; and this more by way of sentiment, literature and art, than of speculative and abstract thought.

After Genovesi, Romagnosi and Galluppi, who belonged rather to the age of 1789, philosophy long remained too much occupied with a priestly "vision of the Absolute and eternal ideas," to be able to appropriate whatever of a more modern, youthful, and promising spirit was stirring in the breasts of the new Italian generation, and stamping them with a mark of its own. This it was that caused the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti, notwithstanding the favour shown them at the beginning of the revolution of 1847-48, to have the power only of starting it, not of directing it, and still less of conducting it to a definite issue. Giuseppe Mazzini and, in a different way, the author of Arnaldo da Brescia, took from the outset a much clearer view of the course and probable outcome of Italian affairs. They felt that the principles with which philosophy, in Gioberti, had placed itself at the head of the national movement, no longer represented the deeper convictions of that portion of society which alone was fitted to conduct the revolution to an end and establish a new order of things. The ideas of the more youthful and energetic minds in Italy had kept pace with those of French society from 1830, while in those provinces of the north and south where the German philosophers were most studied the atmosphere of thought was very different from that in which the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti sprang up. Whether monarchists or republicans, classicists or romanticists, the "Unionist Liberals" were all agreed on one point—to break, with the past and with Rome in politics, and in philosophy to liberate human reason from every kind of religious authority and theological bondage. The Encyclical of the 29th April, 1848, revealing the impossibility of any kind of agreement between the Pope and the national party, only confirmed from without what had already been felt and foreseen by many. And, however the various parties might differ in their view of the means, the end that sooner or later became clear to the minds of all was the necessity of giving the lead of the national movement, in the order of ideas as well as of facts, to the secular principle: Rome must be left aside. This, which was really the overthrow of the political and philosophical creed proclaimed in Gioberti's Primato, was the program of the great Unionist party that from 1850 onwards had its centre in Piedmont, its arm in the Royal
House of Savoy, and its head in Cammillo Cavour. The fact that this party should, at so short an interval from the illusions of 1848 and 1849, have been able so clearly to see the goal towards which the nation was tending, shows how ripe was its consciousness of the new times, with their new needs and interests. But to my mind still more notable is the fact that the first inspirer and apostle of this new national enterprise, the unification of Italy through the instrumentality of the house of Savoy, was none other than Gioberti himself, who foretold it in his *Rinnovamento*, written at Paris, where he had gone on a diplomatic mission after the battle of Novara, and where he remained a voluntary exile till his death in October 1852.

V. Gioberti’s posthumous works, the *Protologia*, published by his disciple, Giuseppe Massari, in 1857, made up though they be for the most part of fragments, and certainly containing no well-defined body of doctrine, yet suffice to show us how the same change that had come over his political ideas since 1849 had affected (but perhaps a little earlier) the foundations of his speculative thought. This change was not, and could not be, an evolution from the previous doctrines professed by the philosopher of Turin; it was rather their antithesis. In the *Rinnovamento* the headship of Papal Rome and the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal power, proclaimed by the *Primato*, gave place to the headship of Piedmont and the liberation of the State from the Church. In the *Protologia* not only was religion no longer, as it had before been, identified with philosophy, but it was entirely separated from it, and so far from the authority of faith being allowed to bear down the free examination of reason, it was put under subjection, reason being endowed with full power to interpret and explain from its proper data the existence and truth of religion. This new conception of Gioberti’s in regard to the value and power of reason substantially modified his teaching, at the same time that it brought him very near to Hegel. To the Italian philosopher the Absolute Idea became what it was to the German—the essence and basis of things and of spirit. It is no longer opposed to finite thought, by which it is intuitively, though vaguely, perceived as an object superior and external to itself, but it is transformed into an absolute thought, which is inherent and immanent in human thinking, and creates it, or, as Gioberti says, posits it. The dialectic law of this absolute thought is the law of things and of being; human reflection, aided by language, only serving to translate the infinite idea into conceptions and their signs, without however being able at any time to reach its deeper meaning. In his doctrine of the creation likewise, Gioberti takes up different philosophical ground in the posthu-
mous works from that first occupied by him. While remaining faithful to his "ideal formula," and attempting every mode of escape from Pantheism, he admits the existence of a substantial relation between the world and God, who is for him the infinite in action, in whom the finite exists potentially as an indefinite possibility, previous to its determination outwards and its limitation in action. In its potential aspect, therefore, the Universe is God himself; and Gioberti does not hesitate to name it with Cardinal di Cusa "a potential God," a "Deus contractus".

This doctrine is a bold attempt to reconcile Plato with Hegel and with the principles of Christianity, from which Gioberti did not even now dare to break away altogether. The imperfect form in which it was left at his death, makes it impossible to say with certainty what place it might have come to occupy in the history of modern philosophy, had he been able to attain to a full understanding of the new direction and tendencies of his thought. But amid all the passionate disputing that goes on in Italy between those who deny any substantial novelty to the posthumous works, and those who would make out their coincidence with Hegelianism, one thing at least is clear, that in them the rationalistic element prevails greatly over the dogmatic and theological, however much the philosopher may still strive to reconcile the two. His mind, large as his heart, seemed destined to be the living embodiment of the mind of his country; and, just as between 1833 and 1846 his thought was crowned by the Utopian idea of an agreement with the past and with Rome that paved the way for the revolution by mediating between the clergy and the people, so now after the sad experience of facts he found himself irresistibly impelled to make common cause with those who had their gaze turned towards the future only. Proof of this appears in the friendship that bound him during the last years of his life to various republicans—among them Giorgio Pallavicino. The Correspondence of the philosopher with the democrat of Genoa, lately published at Milan by B. E. Mainier, is one of the most interesting books that can be read by those who desire to know thoroughly the latest period of our revolution. Between the author of the Rinnovamento and the young national party there was, however, one great difference, which Pallavicino has expressed by saying that he never could understand how the philosopher who could jest with him about the Eternal Father and hell-fire, should have had lying open on the bed, whereon he was found dead, the Promessi Sposi and the Imitatio Christi. It is clear that, however far Gioberti did advance in the direction of rationalism, he was never able unreservedly to accept or tranquilly to adopt all its principles and their consequences; and on the whole his posthumous works proved more a hindrance than a
help to Italian thought. Falling under the Romish censure, interpreted in quite opposite ways by Gioberti's old disciples and by the Hegelians, they indicated but did not throw open that new way which, without breaking the continuity of Italian thought, might bring it into relation with modern philosophy. They only served to bring out more absolutely the contrast between those who wished to keep our philosophy entirely separated from that of the rest of Europe, and those who were too eager to introduce a foreign element into it, without due preparation and without regard to the national genius.

VI. From what has been said up to this point it will be apparent, however, that such a contrast as this was inevitable, and that it was bound to manifest itself in full force after 1849, when the consciousness of modern principles and ideas, which had been at once a cause and an effect of our political movements, was revealed in all its fulness to a new generation, born and brought up in their midst. This result was greatly promoted by the study of foreign philosophies, especially that of Germany, which for more than twenty years had been prosecuted with an interest growing ever stronger with the development of our thought. Even before the year 1840, the Abate Alfonso Testa, of Piacenza, had combated the doctrines of our philosophers with the weapons of Transcendental Idealism, of which he published a critical examination in 1843. At Naples, where Galluppi, the first to diffuse the study of the English philosophers and of Kant, had taught, and where a contemporary of his, Ottavio Colecchi, of Abruzzo, had professed the Kritik, there began to be formed, shortly before 1848, a Hegelian school, which included the two brothers Silvio and Bertrando Spavento, Francesco De Sanctis, Cammillo De Meis, Antonio Tari, Niccola Marselli, and others of less note. These introduced Hegelianism not only into our abstract philosophical studies, but also, and in my opinion with greater fruit, into our literary and historical criticism. The school was scattered by the events of 1848. Some of its adherents languished for long in wretched prisons, where they sought comfort in philosophy; others betook themselves to Piedmont, and amongst these was Bertrando Spaventa, who remained there till 1860, and there published the first of his writings on the history of Italian philosophy. The judgment he then uttered—a judgment, however, which he afterwards substantially modified—was to this effect: "The Italian philosophy rejects the principle of the modern world, and denies science, for it denies the idea of the spirit as a thing identical with liberty, or rather liberty itself; it denies the absolute nature of thought, the dialectic essence of which is the very essence and dialectic of being; it denies the identity of the divine and
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human nature," &c., &c. Thus wrote Spaventa in 1850, condemning the Italian school in the name of Absolute Idealism. In 1851 and 1852 appeared La Filosofia della Rivoluzione, by Giuseppe Ferrari (London), and La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane, by Ausonio Franchi—two books in which the doctrines of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani were absolutely combated and refuted in the name of a critical Scepticism, which started at once from the principles of the Encyclopédie and from those of Kant. Differing in intellectual disposition no less than in the results of their doctrines, Ferrari and Franchi were at one in rejecting the speculations of our native philosophers as opposed to the spirit of modern philosophy. Ferrari, however, who in previous writings had confuted Rosmini, now adopted some of his psychological doctrines. Franchi's first work was a lively polemic directed against G. M. Bertini, then a follower of Gioberti, in which he condemned the doctrines not only of his adversary but of all the Italian schools, and summed up his opinion thus:—"Modern philosophy has not yet become possible in Italy".

Thus, of a sudden, after 1849, arose two diametrically opposite philosophical movements. On the one hand stood the schools of Rosmini and Gioberti, professing to be in harmony with faith—Italianissimi; on the other there was the Rationalism of the new followers of the German doctrines—Hegelians, Kantians, Sceptics. I designate the two opposed parties in this way, because it was the principle of national tradition, rejected by the one and exaggerated by the other, that mainly divided and still divides them. And indeed their relative position is such that it can be rightly understood only by those who look back to the intellectual and political conditions of Italy at that time. For, viewed solely in its speculative aspect, the difference between the two schools might have left some path open, if not for reconciliation, at least for peaceable co-operation in the same intellectual work—the development of our thought. They had more than one principle in common, and more than one point of contact with modern philosophy; whilst the grafts which modern thought had inserted into the old trunk of the scholastic mediæval tradition, whence sprang the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti, might perhaps have grown and spread till the whole had been renewed. But this could have come to pass only if the absorption of the modern elements by our national thought had been effected in a continuous manner, and if those who introduced the doctrines of foreign schools had first spent upon them the analysis and criticism necessary to render them fit for assimilation by the Italian mind. Now it so happened that neither of these conditions was satisfied. Rosmini and Gioberti
had distinguished disciples, but no true and proper successors; and the political and intellectual changes that went on after 1849 extinguished all the life and original activity in their schools. The disciples clung to the words of their masters, and rejected all innovation and all impartial study of foreign doctrines. The sentiment and the idea of "Italianism" in philosophy, which were certainly exaggerated by Gioberti but yet when he wrote had some justification, became in some of his followers a prejudice and a pretext for narrowness of mind and ignorance of all modern culture. And, on the other hand, most of those who at that time tried to introduce the German philosophy among us had no sufficiently broad and clear idea of the end they aimed at and of the means by which it might be reached; or, if they had such an idea, they certainly did not succeed in realising it. At the close of 1855, Ruggero Bonghi, the distinguished translator of Plato and Aristotle, in his youth the disciple and friend of Rosmini, and now one of the most illustrious of the writers and politicians of the moderate party, spoke in this strain:—"Those who now try to propagate and insinuate German doctrines in Italy do not seem to have sufficiently considered the natural difference between the Italian and German minds, and between the languages by which they are expressed". And elsewhere he speaks of them as "more inclined to appear profound than to make themselves intelligible". The upholders of Italian doctrines erred in despising the German philosophy, while they did not know it; the Hegelians and Kantians erred in wishing to make Italians think wholly in the manner of Germans. To many Giobertians and Rosminians the German philosophy appeared not only as the opposite of that professed by their masters, but also as the absolute negation of every religious and moral principle and of all science. In the eyes of Ausonio Franchi, on the other hand, Rosmini's system and Gioberti's first speculations were confounded with the Traditionalism of Father Giovacchino Ventura and the Scholastic Thomism of the Civiltà Cattolica, which had been started in 1850 by the Jesuits at Naples to support the reaction then in full course and the temporal power of the Pope.

The absolute impossibility of uniting to one end and in one common work the two opposite schools that thus struggled for supremacy in Italian thought, was made clear when Terenzio Mamiani founded at Genoa in 1850 an Academy of Italian Philosophy. During the five years of its existence this Academy grappled with various important questions, and helped by its valuable publications to promote among us the love of philosophy. It cannot be said, however, either to have given a vigorous mental impulse, or to have realised the hope of its
founder, that the best Italian minds might in this way be brought into a fruitful union of speculative and moral studies, and to an agreement on certain supreme truths, common to natural reason and philosophic thought, and forming, as it were, a perennial tradition of science raised above the contention of systems and schools. Even if such a general and indefinite aspiration could have been realised at all, it was little fitted, especially at that time, to give unity of direction to the efforts of an Academy which embraced men of absolutely contradictory opinions in philosophy. The struggle which they kept up for the leadership of Italian thought was one of life and death, admitting neither truce, nor compromise, nor reconciliation. The Academicians, as one of them, Bertrando Spaventa, said, had nothing more in common than their assembly-hall. There they met, and called each other friends, colleagues, associates; but with the best intentions in the world they yet could never manage to understand one another. They formed an Academy of Italian Philosophy for the simple reason that they were born and settled in Italy. So far the Academy only too faithfully reflected the state of minds throughout the country.

VII. The founder and president of the Academy, in his desire to imbue it with a broad and conciliatory spirit, began from that time to put forward the doctrines to which he had himself been led by a slow evolution of thought through the various phases of the philosophical movement started by Galluppi. A follower of the experimental school during the first years of his exile in France, Count Terenzio Mariiani had gradually made his way towards an idealism, which, without losing sight of the national tradition and of Christianity, aimed at becoming entirely independent of revelation and theology. This rationalistic tendency became more and more manifest in Mariiani's writings; and succeeding, as he did on the death of Rosmini and Gioberti, to their position of influence, he has given a very powerful impulse to the national thought. To the authority exercised by his genius, his teaching, and the purity of his political life, Mariiani, as a writer and philosopher, adds the attractions of an artist. An elegant poet and polished prose writer, he has ever been the most illustrious representative of that classical school which was headed by Alfieri and which, by going back to the forms of antique art and the study of the men of the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, re-invigorated the national sentiment by means of literature. Of this school Mariiani has in all his writings been, so to say, the philosopher; his ideal always being that close union of Christian and modern thought and feeling with the forms of antique art aimed at by those writers of the Renaissance, with whom, as I have before
said, he seeks to restore the continuity of philosophical tradition. Among his works composed at the time of full vigour, two in particular reveal this intention, and have procured him the greatest amount of fame—*I Dialoghi di scienza prima*, where he happily imitates Plato; and the *Inni sacri*, in the manner of Homer and Callimachus, but with their subject borrowed from the Christian legends so intimately bound up with the traditions of our country and people.

Mamiani professes himself a Platonist, in as far as he maintains, contrary to all critical and empirical schools, the absolute objectivity of ideas. And the fact that he has by new arguments demonstrated this objectivity and placed it beyond the pale of doubt, constitutes, as he believes, the chief claim of his doctrine to stand as true and original. It does not, in his opinion, contradict the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti, but completes these while tempering their excesses, and thus it closes the period in our speculation which opened with Gal-luppi.

His doctrine of consciousness is directed towards the same end that Rosmini and Gioberti had in view when they combated the *Kritik*—namely, to prove with full certitude that we apprehend directly the infinite reality and the finite reality. It thus reduces itself to two main points, *perception* and *intelligence*, or *ideal vision*, and is wholly dependent on two principles, whereby Mamiani seeks to reconcile Plato and Aristotle: Every universal is *ante rem*; Every cognition is *post rem*. In other words, every idea considered in itself is universal, necessary, immutable, and, as such, *objective*, independent of thought, and underived from sense; and on the other hand, no idea is innate—all are preceded by sense-perception, which is the occasion of their appearing before the mind and being determined as the truth of the things presented by experience. Thus, by means of ideas as well as by sense-perceptions, human consciousness receives into itself the real, the *noûmenon*. Like Reid, Mamiani excludes from perception all intervention of conceptions and representative ideas. It is according to him an immediate relation of the spirit with reality; it is an act *sui generis* and in the highest degree simple; a mental intuition, by which in our sense-affectives we are made aware of the *action* of the exciting forces and substances. Such an action is *involved* in the passivity of sensation, and is perceived by us in conjunction therewith, but we cannot by means of this inward intuition penetrate to the substances which operate upon us. They and our spirit, which sometimes modifies them and sometimes is modified by them, are joined in a relationship, in which the acts only
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are united and reciprocally penetrative, while the substances and subjects remain incommunicable.

To this relation, which unites our spirit to sensible reality through experience, there corresponds another which unites it to absolute reality through ideas. The idea, according to Mamiani, is the Absolute in as far as it appears and announces itself to the mind; it is the mental form of the Absolute, which is determined in particular ideas, each of the latter expressing ad intra the eternal possibility of a finite thing, and ad extra its concrete reality, which however is given only in the fact of experience. Thus in the truth of ideas the mind intuitively perceives the real existence of the Absolute, but it apprehends only its presence, and, as it were, touches its surface without being able to pierce with the eye to its mysterious depth, or to comprehend its perfections and attributes, which are represented by the ideas only in a symbolical and analogical fashion. In this, as in other parts of his doctrine, Mamiani takes a path midway between Rosmini, who denies to man the intuition of absolute reality, and Gioberti, who goes so far as to concede to him the perception of the divine substance. He has tried with all his might to fix the extreme limit of the mind’s intuition of the Absolute; but (as might be expected) has been able to give a merely imaginative representation of it.

The fundamental doctrine of Mamiani, and the point towards which he has rallied all the powers of his mind, is the demonstration of the real presence of the Absolute in the ideal representation—a demonstration which at bottom is the celebrated argument of St. Anselm, modified and reproduced in a new form. Mamiani wishes to prove that every idea (and not merely the idea of God) includes a necessary truth, which, as such, is inseparable from an eternal, absolute, and self-existent object. The unity of ideas constitutes the totality of truth, which is therefore inseparable from and convertible with the reality of the Absolute. Assuming the Principle of Contradiction, he maintains that, if every necessary and absolute truth did not subsist in a real eternal object, it would become contradictory, for it would both exist and not exist at the same time. However, he does not pretend to deduce the existence of the Absolute from a higher principle; he only wishes to prove that it is the postulate and condition of every ideal truth (not excluding the Principle of Contradiction itself), and that thus the Absolute is immediately and intuitively perceived by us.

Mamiani has written a Cosmology, which he thinks the most novel part of his philosophy and by which he intended to supply a substantial defect in the systems of Rosmini and Gioberti. The following are some of its chief features. Starting from the
idea of the good and its relation to the creative act, which he regards as necessary, he thence advances to the conception of the world as an indefinite multitude of monads, or simple activities, which act upon each other, and are united under the active influence of the infinite, whose perfections they come to share by an indefinite progression thitherward. This cosmic progression Mamiani tries to demonstrate à priori, by basing it on the idea of the infinite as well as on that of nature; then he traces it up to the highest grade of things, to wit, the region of moral existences, which are immediately subject to it. Having thus raised himself to a philosophy of history, whose fundamental conception is the organic unity of mankind, he sets himself to enumerate the laws of its development, and the forms it has assumed in different nations and in their mutual historical relations. The Italian philosopher's speculations on the subject of the vicissitudes and destinies of mankind, though preceded by those of Vico and Romagnosi, are in part original. They find their completion in the doctrine set forth in his work *Di un nuovo diritto europeo* (1859), which was translated into French, and is well known outside Italy.

His general philosophy may be studied in his *Confessioni di un Metofisico* (1865), in his *Meditazioni Cartesiane* (1869), and in his last work, *Compendio e Sintesi della propria filosofia, ossia nuovi Prolegomeni ad ogni presente e futura Metafisica* (1876). Except on the one head of the relation of philosophy to faith, his doctrine has a common origin with the systems of Rosmini and Gioberti, and it leans towards mysticism by reducing the mind's activity in cognition to very small limits. Its psychological basis is rather weak, and in this respect it is inferior to the doctrine of Rosmini.

Mamiani is a man of a lively and versatile mind, and of an indefatigable activity. Professor of Philosophy of History in the University of Turin from 1837 to 1850; in 1860, Minister of Public Instruction in the first Italian Cabinet, presided over by Cavour; next, Italian Ambassador in Greece and afterwards in Switzerland; then Councillor of State at Florence and now at Rome, he has until last year taught in the Athenæum of the latter city, and is at the present moment one of the most active workers connected with the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*. This Review, which is known to the readers of *MIND*, is the most important of the Italian periodical publications devoted to philosophy. Mamiani's fellow-workers have full liberty of thought and discussion, but though some of them profess very different doctrines from his, they rally round him as the most influential representative of that speculative movement which helped forward our national resurrection, and awoke us from an
intellectual torpor of more than two centuries. Mamiani's labours within this movement would, I believe, have had much more effect, if he had professed all along in his writings a well defined doctrine, and if in the excess of his attachment to our traditions he had not too rigidly condemned all foreign philosophy, especially that of Kant. Notwithstanding this, however, he certainly cannot, as many others of our philosophers can, be charged with having refuted modern doctrines without knowing them. The spirit of free yet conscientious criticism which characterised his first onslaughts on Rosmini and Gioberti, has remained with him throughout the long controversy which as an old man he has maintained with the Hegelians and Positivists, while the activity of his mind has only increased with years as he has seen the adherents of a purely Italian philosophy range themselves about him in two sections; on the one hand being the avowed opponents of Hegel and Comte, on the other those who without swearing to their words are yet eager to assimilate the results of modern thought.

VIII. Of the latter section of thinkers several have been invited by Mamiani to co-operate in the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, and they have taken part in it to a considerable extent. Among the most notable of these have been G. Battista Bertini and Francesco Bonatelli. Bertini, who died a couple of years ago, was a man of acute mind, and a most earnest searcher after truth. After his first work, *Idea d'una filosofia della Vita* (1850), which Franchi took as the subject of his criticism, he wrote no more purely philosophical books; but it is certain that with ripening knowledge he drifted away from the doctrines of Gioberti more and more in the direction of a rationalistic theism, which to some extent agreed with the theism of Mamiani, though it was more largely influenced by modern philosophy, especially that of Germany. A learned Hellenist and vigorous critic, Bertini turned his attention chiefly to the History of Philosophy. His work on the Greek philosophers anterior to Socrates, based on the text of the fragments collected by Mullach, is our best work relative to that period of ancient speculation. He was particularly interested in morals, and in the religious problem, on which he wrote at length and had much discussion with Mamiani, who has often treated the subject in the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*. His posthumous work, *Il Vaticano e lo Stato* (1877), recommends to enlightened and liberal Catholics a reform that should purify their religion and aim at bringing it into harmony with reason and the moral sense. Bertini was professor of History of Philosophy in the University of Turin.

Bonatelli, professor of Philosophy in the University of Padua,
belongs to the Herbartian School, from which he has borrowed in particular his psychological doctrines, while endeavouring to bring them into harmony with the autonomy of moral acts and with religious faith, which he professes with the deepest conviction. His two principal works are *Pensiero e Conoscenza* and *La coscienza e il meccanismo interiore*, to which he has lately added a long essay on Hartmann, show him to be possessed of a refined if not original mind, with much acuteness of observation and a sound knowledge of the History of Philosophy.

Much nearer to Mamiani stands Luigi Ferri, professor of Philosophy in the University of Rome. Having prosecuted his early studies at the École Normale of Paris, he was confirmed in his natural bent for psychological observation and for that accurate historical analysis of systems of which the French have furnished us with many examples. Ferri adheres substantially to the Idealism professed by Mamiani, though with a certain reservation as to the psychological portions of that doctrine, to which he would give a more solid basis by the study of the phenomena of consciousness. What conclusions he may ultimately arrive at by this study, which seems to me to indicate a change in his thought brought about by the German and English psychology, do not yet appear. Ferri's principal work is the *Essai sur l'histoire de la Philosophie en Italie au dix-neuvième siècle* (1869), and it is certainly the most complete and solid history that has yet appeared in regard to our contemporary philosophy. Here it is faithfully delineated both in its inner development and in its relations to Italian political movements and to the part played in them by our philosophers. And yet the author, I think, is open to the charge of having represented these as more in unison than they really were with the spirit of Modern Philosophy, and of having exaggerated its influence on the dogmatic and theological element in their doctrines. Ferri has also given much study to the philosophers of the Renaissance. His latest work is the publication of the MS. of a treatise by Pomponazzi, *In libros de Anima*, discovered by him in the Angelica Library at Rome, and elucidated in an important memoir, wherein he maintains that Pomponazzi's doctrine and his interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the intellectual soul never varied. On this subject he has recently engaged in a lively polemic with Prof. Fiorentino.

Domenico Berti, a man of much influence from his genius and learning as well as the position he holds among our politicians of the moderate party, is specially known by his historical labours. At first a teacher of the doctrines of Rosmini in the University of Turin, he has gradually arrived at the conception of a close harmony between philosophy and the results of the
natural sciences. But he has rather indicated than formally expounded his philosophical opinions, and he is best known by his *Vita di Giordano Bruno*, a solid piece of work that throws much new light upon the mind and labours of the unfortunate philosopher of Nola. It was the author's intention to follow up his biography of Bruno by the exposition and criticism of his doctrines, but as yet the promise remains unfulfilled. Berti was professor of History of Philosophy in the University of Rome till a year ago, and is the author of two other important works on the philosophers of the Renaissance. One of these is entitled *Copernico e le vicende del sistema copernicano in Italia, nella seconda metà del secolo XVI. e nella prima del XVII.*, &c. (1876); the other, *Processo di Galileo Galilei pubblicato per la prima volta* (1876). The latter has been subjected to very severe criticism by German scholars, calling forth Gebler's recent publication, *Die Acten des Galilei'schen Processes, nach der vatikanischen Handschrift herausgegeben* (Stuttgart, 1877). Berti was for some years Minister of Public Instruction.

By the side of these men, who without cutting themselves off from the Italian speculative tradition are more or less in contact with the method and principles of Modern Philosophy, are some others, who either continue to follow the doctrines of Rosmini and Gioberti, or who, rejecting its systematic form, adhere to its dogmatic and theological substance and to the postulate of a necessary agreement between reason and faith. At Turin Rosmini's doctrine had from the first one of its main centres; and there it was long taught by G. B. Peyretti, lately dead. He and Profs. Pestalozza and Corte have expounded it in an elementary form, and their manuals have been adopted as textbooks in most of the Lyceums of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany since 1860. In the University of Pisa the Rosminian doctrine is at present professed by Paganini, author of a work that treats of its relation to theology. In the southern provinces the philosophy of Gioberti's first works is still professed by some, chief among whom are, in Sicily, the Abate Vincenzo Di Giovanni, professor in the Lyceum of Palermo, author of numerous careful works on the History of Philosophy, and at Naples by the Abate Vito Fornari, an imaginative and elegant writer, more of a theologian than a philosopher, and known by his *Dialoghi dell'Armonia universale* (1862), by a treatise on *L'Arte del dire*, and by a *Vita di Cristo*, of which only two volumes have as yet appeared. Formerly a pupil of Fornari, and now a professor in the University of Bologna, Francesco Acri has given proof of a rare knowledge of German doctrines and of the history of philosophical systems, in regard to which he has in various writings emitted certain novel and rather noteworthy ideas.
In Tuscany, where there is some repugnance to speculations of too abstract a nature, and where the school of Galileo by means of the Accademia del Cimento created a strong tradition of experimental study, a ready welcome was given to Galluppi. Later arose some followers of Rosmini, chiefly attracted by his psychological doctrines. The philosophy of Gioberti, especially that of his first writings, has been taught from youth upwards by Augusto Conti, now professor of Philosophy in the Higher Institute of Florence, and well-known outside of Tuscany. A Catholic by conviction and sentiment, and, like Rosmini and Gioberti, nurtured in the study of the Fathers and Doctors, he professes doctrines that accord with the main truths of Christianity, while they are declared by him to be contained in the natural consciousness of every man, so as to need only recognition from science. Philosophy, according to him, presupposes and has for its material the natural certitude of truth given to us by the three relations of thought—to mind, to human society, and to God. These relations provide the philosopher with five criteria, namely, evidence and the love of truth, the authority of common sense and of the learned, and the authority of Revelation. Evidence is the primary criterion; the others are secondary and subsidiary. This doctrine, expounded in the work entitled Evidenza, amore e fede o i Criterii della Filosofia (1872, 3rd ed.), is substantially at one with that of Rosmini and Gioberti as to the necessity of making its ultimate agreement with revealed truth the postulate of every scientific demonstration. Conti, however, goes farther than this, and not only does he not recognise any natural intuition of God, or of divine ideas, but he would make Philosophy entirely independent of any kind of systematic form, by distinguishing the truths which he calls substantial and theorematic, as being naturally known and demonstrated and beyond the pale of doubt, from the problems, which are given over to the examination and judgment of philosophers. In what way and how far he would thus restrict the liberty of scientific reflection and lower its value, does not sufficiently appear; there is, however, according to Conti, a “perennial and progressive Philosophy,” which is not to be confounded with sects and erroneous systems. The latter confound and derange the order of the truths of consciousness, which they fail to comprehend in all its relations; the former faithfully traces out this order without confounding or denying it in any part. Philosophy is “the science of God, of the world and of man in their universal order, present to human consciousness”; its true method consists in the recognition of the nature and sequence of the universal relations existing between ideas and things, setting
out from the examination of inner facts, and rising thence to the highest notions of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, and lastly applying these to the scientific knowledge of God, the world, and man, and to the reasoning of the three arts, Logic, Æsthetics, and Morals. This large design has been realised by Conti in a series of works (9 vols.) comprehending Elementary Philosophy and Higher Philosophy, divided into Dialectics, Æsthetics, and Morals. He is besides the author of a History of Philosophy (the only one yet written in Italy), in which he follows out the "perennial tradition" of speculative thought, and, distinguishing it from the "sects" which deny and modify natural and revealed truth, finds its completest and highest realisation in the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church, especially St. Thomas. Conti exercises a great personal influence by the precision of his thought, his remarkable power of expression, and the strength of his convictions. His Elementary Philosophy is taught by many disciples in our Lyceums.

IX. At the head of the opposition, by which the doctrines of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani have found themselves confronted since 1850, stand, as I have already said, the Sceptics and Hegelians. Sceptical criticism is represented by Ferrari and Franchi. At bottom the doctrine expounded by Ferrari in his Filosofia della Rivoluzione is the phenomenalism of Protagoras, reanimated by the Criticism of Kant and the Empirism of the eighteenth century. The conception round which it moves is that of the perennial incessant change pervading everything, facts as well as ideas, Logic as well as Nature. For, on the one hand, says Ferrari, the very logical laws, which would seem to reveal to us a close relation of identity between the essential elements of our ideas, are vain and fallacious, and, when subjected to analysis, disclose irreconcilable antitheses and antinomies; and, on the other hand, everything in Nature is subject to change, alteration, contrast, and thus is averse from that unity which thought looks for in facts by representing them to itself and explaining them scientifically by their laws. Contradiction is therefore the law of being, and should be accepted without any attempt at its removal. Antinomies do not, as Kant sought to prove, occur only in the principal ideas of reason, but also in all ideas, and in all facts, and furthermore between ideas and facts; so that Logic and Nature are contradictory in themselves and between themselves, and thought, which would dominate facts by applying itself to their real elements, is of necessity involved in error. Ferrari consequently entirely denies the possibility of science, and concludes that all we have to deal with is facts, or rather their appearances (existence and appearance being the same), and that
thought, so far from wishing to dominate phenomena, should be subordinate to them, and confine itself to the examination of their infinite varieties and contrasts, accepting, without pretending to penetrate, the hidden revelations of Nature. Thus by an opposite route Scepticism arrives at the same point as theological Dogmatism—sentiment and faith, the *credo quia absurdum* of Tertullian, a maxim often repeated by Ferrari. He is best known by his works on the Philosophy of History, and by his doctrine of “political periods,” with which he tries to measure arithmetically the different phases of the life of nations. A pupil of Romagnosi’s, long resident in France, where he was much appreciated, he returned to Italy in 1859, was professor of Philosophy of History at Milan, Florence, and Rome, and a deputy of the Extreme Left till his death last year. Ferrari was a man of a powerful and original mind, but undisciplined and impatient of the rigorous examination of facts, so that also in his political forecasts he often went astray.

Owing to the very abstract form of his doctrines, Ferrari has exercised but little influence among us. It has not been so with Franchi, a lively and exact writer, ever aiming at one object—the utter demolition of what he was the first to call the Philosophy of the Italian Schools, and which he identifies throughout with the Scholasticism and Theology of the Church of Rome. I have already allowed that there is a foundation of truth in this harsh judgment of Franchi’s; but yet he goes too far, and, looking only to the substantial agreement between Italian doctrines and Catholic dogma, he fails to take sufficient account of the elements derived from Modern Philosophy, of the impulses given by Galluppi, Gioberti, and Rosmini, and, above all, of their historical value as paving the way for the national revolution and arousing us from our secular slumber to a new life of thought and action. To condemn them, however, without appeal, it is enough for Franchi that they should substantially agree with the Catholic creed, no matter what amount of liberty of thought and inquiry and what rigour of method our philosophers may have employed. In this intemperance of criticism we recognise the truest expression of the negative reaction that followed the attempt made by Rosmini and Gioberti to reconcile Catholicism with Philosophy. The reaction was all the greater in Franchi’s case from the depth and passionateness of his early faith; for he was educated in an ecclesiastical seminary, and wore the priest’s habit before laying it aside when severe inward struggles landed him in Rationalism; he dropped also his very name of Cristoforo Bonavino, calling himself henceforth Ausonio Franchi. His other works, besides the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, are *La Religione del secolo*.
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XIX., the Razionalismo del popolo, the Sentimento, two volumes of Lezioni sulla Storia della Filosofia moderna, and the Teorica del Giudizio. In this last he criticises the synthetic judgments \textit{apriori} of Kant, and expounds the doctrines of the philosophers who have treated of the subject. Born for controversy, which he manages with rare skill and vigour, Franchi, as a philosopher and psychologist, has no doctrines of his own, and fluctuates between the Criticism of Kant and a mild Sensationalism, in which feeling is substituted for sensation as the basis of the phenomena of consciousness. His thought borrows force and life from the ardour of his convictions, which however is prone to excess and gives to his style a declamatory tone. He is a professor in the Scientific and Literary Academy of Milan.

Franchi has followers in various parts of Italy; but he has not, nor ever could have, a school. In fact the only speculative doctrine, opposed to that of our philosophers, which has formed a school among us is Hegelianism. Started in Naples previous to 1848, it has flourished there since the political overturn of 1860, and now has its centre in the University, where it is taught by Augusto Vera and Bertrando Spaventa. Of the two, Vera is the true and leading representative of the school, both because he professes its doctrines more faithfully, and because to his influence as a teacher and writer he adds the authority of a name well-known beyond Italy. There is no need to mention to the readers of MIND the many writings by means of which the translator of Hegel has so powerfully aided in the diffusion of his doctrines both in Europe and in America; for he has not limited himself to illustrating and defending these, but has also to some extent developed them by thought of his own. Among contemporary philosophers Vera is one of those who have cut themselves most adrift from the idea of nationality, though he did publish some years ago an important work on one question of special interest to Italy—the freedom of the Church in relation to the State. He has always refrained from any direct examination of the doctrines of our philosophers, to whom he allows no speculative value whatsoever. This severe judgment on Galluppi, Rosmini and Gioberti finds expression in a work, entitled \textit{La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie; Essai de Philosophie Hégélienne} (Paris, 1868), written by Raffaele Mariano, a pupil of Vera's, and the author of other works, in which the principles of Hegelianism are applied to the religious and political problems of our time. Among the followers of Hegel we should mention also the late Marchesa Marianna Florenzi Waddington, a lady of the highest culture and the author of various works, in one of which an attempt is made to
reconcile the doctrine of the immortality of the soul with the principles of absolute idealism.

The theoretical and doctrinal part of Hegelianism, however, has been of less account among us than the applications made of it in the field of historical and critical studies, which have been to some extent revived by its influence. Did space permit, I might speak of Francesco De Sanctis as one who under inspiration from Hegel led the way to a broader and more philosophical literary criticism than reigned in our schools in the first half of the century. Moreover, Hegelianism has, though in a less degree, influenced the relations of philosophy to the physical sciences, as shown in the writings of Cammillo De Meis, professor of History of Medicine in the University of Bologna. His aim has ever been to harmonise the speculations of philosophy with the results of experimental research. Thus in his work, I Tipi animali (of which as yet only one volume has appeared), he proposes a solution of the problem of the variation of species which, without repudiating the empirical data of Darwin's discoveries, would subject them to the superior requirements of a strictly scientific demonstration. The work to which De Meis chiefly owes his fame is his Dopo la Laurea, a kind of autobiography descriptive of his youthful studies and the state of his mind on quitting the University. It gives a vivid picture of the Italian mind between 1848 and 1860.

I have already appealed to the judgment of one of our most illustrious living writers, Ruggero Bonghi, as to the reason why the labours of the Hegelian school have borne less fruit among us than might have been expected. The merit that certainly belongs to it of having brought Italian into immediate contact with German thought, of having infused into the inert mass of our philosophical studies a new vein of stirring and refreshing ideas, of having for the first time opened out to our view the broad prospect of that historical method which is the glory of modern science—this undeniable merit of the Hegelian school would have seemed to the impartial historian all the greater, had more account been taken by it of the natural and traditional disposition of the Italian mind, and had the attempt not been made to introduce foreign ideas among us as if they were so much merchandise. Moreover it dogmatised at least as much as its opponents, and that too at a time when it ought rather to have trained our minds to that critical analysis and those psychological inquiries from which alone we could derive solid preparation for the modern scientific method. But indeed in Italy our minds were so little inclined to criticism that it was very natural, or I might say necessary, for many to pass per
saltum from the theological dogmatism of the ontologists to another dogmatism of an opposite but no less absolute kind; and even now, though the most faithful followers of the Hegelian school have dropped many of their southern fancies, the identity of being and not-being and the evolution of the Absolute are regarded as the last word of science—as so many articles of faith. This, it will be said, is a necessary consequence of the systematic spirit. The evil, however, was that, whereas for the Germans Absolute Idealism was the last stage of one of the broadest and most liberal speculative movements on record, for us, on the other hand, it was only an importation, accepted for the most part by its followers without examination, and for no other reason than that it represented a faith opposed to that which had hitherto been preached to them; accepted too as the latest outcome of modern speculation, though the doctrine was already superannuated in Germany, and no longer responded to the needs of European thought.

Bertrando Spaventa saw this more clearly than any of the other Hegelians. Stepping in between the partisans of an exclusively national philosophy and the strict Hegelians, who took no account of our intellectual traditions, he recognised the need of linking our thought once more to that of the other nations of Europe, whilst, at the same time, he clearly saw that we could enter into the spirit of Modern Philosophy only by preserving the consciousness of our speculative thought in its entirety and in all its historical continuity, and by taking up again the thread of our philosophical tradition at that point where it had been in relation with the thought of other nations. The same position had been already maintained by Mamiani as against Rosmini; but it was taken up anew by Spaventa, after 1850, and defended with much power. In his view our philosophers of the Renaissance mark the point in history to which Italian thought must turn to find again the consciousness of itself and of its traditions, and above all Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella are important as initiators of modern thought. He regards Bruno as the precursor of Spinoza, and Campanella as the precursor of Descartes. In Vico, who followed these at a long interval and rose to a general conception of man and history, Spaventa sees the final outcome of their doctrines, and an indication from afar of the Idealism of Kant.

This view has been traced by Spaventa in one series of his Saggi, which throw much light upon the history of modern philosophy, and are certainly the best of his writings. These are only one part of his work, however; the other being given up to an attempt to discover in the doctrines of our latest philosophers, especially Gioberti, an intimate connexion between
Italian speculative thought and modern philosophy. I have already remarked that in his earliest writings Spaventa agreed with Vera and the other Hegelians in excluding Galluppi, Rosmini and Gioberti from the history of modern speculation. But he confesses that riper study has convinced him that our philosophers not only felt Kant's influence, but were, unknown to themselves, urged by an irresistible logical necessity to the same critical results; that Galluppi was a Kantian without being aware of it; that Rosmini gave to the problem of knowledge the same solution as Kant; and finally that Gioberti is in his early works a Spinozist, in his posthumous a Hegelian. Such are the main conclusions reached by Spaventa in that part of his historico-critical essays, where he searches out and not seldom finds the subtlest analogies between the speculations of Italian and German philosophers; but here his criticism is undoubtedly at its weakest. That our philosophical thought indeed was influenced by the same speculative needs as had determined the *Kritik* of Kant, and that especially Galluppi and Rosmini, in applying themselves to the problem of knowledge, were so far linking themselves to modern Philosophy, are facts which no impartial critic would deny. But that Rosmini and the author of the *Primato* can be called Kantians or Hegelians, that the matter and, what is of more consequence, the spirit of their speculations substantially agree with the modern German philosophy, are what no criticism, however ingenious, will ever succeed in proving.

As a philosopher, Spaventa has no doctrines peculiar to himself. Substantially he is a follower of Hegel, but this does not prevent him from adopting any good thing that other schools may offer, as, for example, the Herbartian, whose psychology he highly appreciates. But it is in the field of critical History of Philosophy that he has exercised most influence as a teacher and a writer. His ideas in regard to the philosophers of the Renaissance have found their most faithful interpreter in Francesco Fiorentino, professor in the University of Pisa, and best known by his two valuable works on Pomponazzi and Telesio, which are both marked by care and originality of research in regard to the schools of Padua and Cosenza. Fiorentino has also recently published a book of *Elementi di Filosofia*, for use in the higher instruction, in which, while substantially following Kant, he partly adopts in psychology the doctrines of Herbart, and in logic the theories of Mill. He is conductor of the *Giornale Napoletano*, which in its philosophy represents the views of Spaventa’s followers.

X. In Italy as elsewhere the advance in historical and critical studies is bound up with the rise and spread of the Positive
Philosophy in Italy. I purposely make use of the term Positive (which in England is rejected by Experientialists) for two reasons: first, because the positivist doctrines came to us directly from France, being from the first nothing but an echo of Comte's ideas; and secondly, because, in regard to the meaning of the word Positivism, there has been, and still is, in the minds of many in Italy some confusion of schools and doctrines that are at one in rejecting metaphysics but in other points are widely different. This confusion is to be attributed rather to the meagre philosophical culture of the Italian people, than to any fault in those who first introduced the new doctrines among us. Before 1870, attention had been drawn to these by Pasquale Villari, the well-known historian of Savonarola and Machiavelli, in an essay published in the Politecnico of Milan, and by Aristide Gabelli in his work entitled L'Uomo e le Scienze morali. Both these writers, but especially Villari in his historical studies, adhere substantially to the doctrines of Comte, while endeavouring to harmonise them as much as possible with the tradition of our experimental schools. Till a few years ago, however, the literature of the young Italian Positive School was not of much account; not that there was any lack of writers, but they did not form a true and distinctive school. Without any clear or definite notion of their philosophical tendencies, they lost themselves in useless generalities about method, categories of cause, substance, being, &c., and declaimed against the doctrines of their opponent without inquiring whether in the field of Experiential Philosophy and with the aid alone of scientific method, it were possible, or had elsewhere been tried, to give a doctrinal form and development to Psychology and the other moral sciences. The new and fruitful direction which these had taken in England, without abandoning the tradition of the school of Locke, Hume, and Hartley, was almost unknown in Italy till shortly before 1870; the number of readers of Spencer, Bain, or Lewes being very limited, while Stuart Mill was known chiefly by his Liberty and his economic writings.

The extension of the national culture and the new impulse given to philosophical studies by advance in the historical and physical sciences have contributed much to change this state of things. The influence of the doctrines of Comte, an almost absolute one at first, has been superseded in our Positive School by that of the English philosophy. And now it may be said that the latter is more known and studied among us, especially by the general body of the intelligent public, than is the German philosophy. The followers of the latter are to be found chiefly in the universities, while Mill, Spencer and Bain are the names of highest repute amongst our most cultured classes and the
students of the historical and social sciences. I will not say, however, that these, or at least the greater part of them, fully understand the position of the English Experiential School, or its relation to the history of contemporary philosophy—to Empirism and Materialism on the one hand and to metaphysical and theological Dogmatism on the other. For it is not unusual to find Büchner, Comte, and Spencer quoted in some volume or journal as members of the same school, and to hear it asserted by writers of repute that the English school identifies physiology with psychology. So true is it that few in Italy, even among the learned, have been able to free themselves from all dogmatic prejudice and to see that the experimental study of subjective phenomena may have a rigorous scientific form independently of any definite solution of the problem of being.

Nevertheless a few recent publications of the Positive School in Italy deserve to be noticed. One of these is Niccola Marselli's *Scienza della Storia*, intended by the author to be the introduction to a work on the Philosophy of History not yet published, and containing an exposition and acute examination of the doctrines held on that subject: Marselli is a follower both of Hegel and Comte. Another is Ardigò's *La Psicologia come scienza positiva* (1871), the first attempt in Italy to give a definite shape to the principles and consequences of Positivism. Starting from the doctrines of the English School of psychology, taken in conjunction with the recent researches of Helmholtz and Fechner, Ardigò aims to rise above both Materialism and Spiritualism to the conception of a "psychophysical reality". His work reveals a mind of speculative power and aptitude for subjective analysis.

In our prosecution of psychological inquiry two facts have to be noted as promising well for the future of our philosophical studies. The one is the appearance of writings, mostly by young men, in which psychological observation is subjected to a division of labour and limited to the rigorous analysis of single phenomena or single groups of phenomena. Of such writings one of the most noteworthy is that by Dr. Paolo Riccardi, entitled *Saggio di studii e di osservazioni intorno all' attenzione nell' uomo e negli animali* (Modena, 1877). The other and still more significant fact is the exhibition by philosophers and men of science of a disposition to find in Psychology and Anthropology a common field of inquiry and study, which cannot fail to bear fruit. For on the one hand we have the recognition of the necessity of never separating the study of psychical from that of physiological, ethnical, and historical facts; and on the other, we have the avowal of the value of subjective observation together with the application of the strict
rules of the inductive method. It is some years since the celebrated Accademia dei Lincei of Rome, at the suggestion of its president Quintino Sella, instituted a new section for the moral, historical and philological sciences; and philosophy is now represented in it by Mamiani, Ferri, and Berti. Then again, the Italian Society of Anthropology and Ethnology, which meets at Florence, at one of its latest sittings changed its title to that of the Society of Anthropology and Comparative Psychology, intending thereby to mark its desire henceforward to add the culture of Philosophy to its previously restricted field of external and physiological inquiry. This change, it may be noted, was effected at the instance of Prof. Mantegazza, President of the Society, a distinguished physiologist and writer of works on hygiene, and of Prof. A. Herzen, well known by his Analisi fisiologica del libero arbitrio.

XI. In conclusion I would remark that, while there is thus a certain amount of activity in philosophical studies, there is as yet in Italy no true and proper speculative movement. The facts here brought forward will, I venture to think, have made it apparent that for twenty years and more the conditions surrounding our thought have been little in its favour, and have tended to check rather than promote its vigour. Looked at from any point whatsoever, the doctrines of Galluppi, Rosmini, and Gioberti have been the only product of speculation which Italy of itself has yielded during this century; and it was only so long as they were the expression of a great moral and political crisis, and responded to a living national want, that they were able to hold sway over the realm of thought. After 1850, overtaken by the spirit of the new times, they found themselves confronted by the Critical Scepticism and the Hegelianism which then began to make head in our midst. The division which thus sprang up was an irreconcilable one, and proved fatal to our thought by wasting its energies in barren contentions. German speculation had passed by a slow and gradual evolution from Leibnitz and Wolff through the criticism of Kant and the systems of Fichte and Schelling to Hegel; but not till the close of its splendid course did this great idealistic movement in its final outcome cross the Alps. Introduced among us it found our minds, by long habituation to theological dogmatism, little, if at all, trained to severe criticism and rigorous analysis, and disposed to make philosophy a question rather of nationality than of science. Between the “ideal intuition” of Rosmini and Gioberti and the “idea” of Hegel there was no middle term possible; hence there was no possibility of a serious and fruitful discussion between the followers of the two schools, nor any common ground.
of agreement or of study. The one maintained an exclusively Italian tradition; the other repeated foreign doctrines. The attempts which both made to restore life and movement to Italian thought, without abandoning tradition, and to naturalise the philosophy of Hegel among us, have been attended, as yet at least, with no general or lasting results. And this, either because our minds were already exhausted, surfeited or distracted, or because we altogether lacked that spirit of application and discipline, which has contributed so much to the progress of science in Germany.

What we really stand in need of is the thorough scientific preparation that comes of patient observation, psychological analysis, and a loyal and willing acceptance of whatever conclusions the strict application of scientific method may yield; and, fortunately, the signs are not wanting that such a process of preparation is at last making way in our midst. This is attested by the increasing interest displayed in psychological research, and by the attention bestowed on the History of Philosophy, ancient and modern, as shown by the recent publication of various valuable translations of ancient philosophers, and by the production of numerous special historical works and monographs. Of the German philosophers Kant alone can be said to supply a key to the history of modern philosophy, and as in Germany so with us he is now the chief object of study. Side by side too with the increasing knowledge of foreign languages grows our capacity for assimilating the ideas which they embody; while the habit of free thought is becoming confirmed, in proportion as the impulse to the study of the great philosophical, religious and social problems, that formerly came entirely from without, is now more and more begotten of the activity and growing energy of our own national life.

G. Barzelotti.